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We agree that more powerful countries are likely to have more influence on the long-term future than less powerful ones, and that a country’s economic development is a strong indicator of its technological and geopolitical power. However, this does not mean that developed countries matter morally more than developing ones. Rather, it underscores the importance of global development—the process of low- and middle-income countries becoming high-income ones. Similarly, although workers in high-income countries generally have higher labor productivity, a large component of this is the place premium. That is, a worker’s productivity increases—sometimes by a factor of 15 or more—when they move from a poor country to a rich country, simply because they are being paid more for the same work. Once again, this speaks to the importance of global development and helping people escape poverty. This essay describes why it’s important for the long term future for everyone to be in a relatively high-income country, and what it might look like for global development to be a longtermist issue. Global development benefits the long-term future by increasing diversity in global institutions and reducing civilization’s vulnerability to global catastrophic risks like armed conflict and pandemics. What is global development? Effective altruists regularly talk about “global health and development” as a category of ways to do good. However, it’s clear now that development drives health much more than health drives development. Global development is the process by which low- and middle-income countries turn into high-income countries. The best modern example of this are the Asian countries of South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and China. These have been compared with other Asian countries that were thought to be “tiger cubs” in the ‘90s such as the Philippines and Thailand in the book How Asia Works, by Joe Studwell. In this book, Joe lays out a recipe for development. Here’s the summary from Bill Gates: Create conditions for small farmers to thrive. Use the proceeds from agricultural surpluses to build a manufacturing base that is tooled from the start to produce exports. Nurture both these sectors (small farming and export-oriented manufacturing) with financial institutions closely controlled by the government. Importantly, in South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and China, these steps were taken by relatively uncorrupted leaders who made it their life’s work to develop their home country. Other countries unable to develop had leadership who were swayed by the neoliberal free-market thinking pervasive at the World Bank and IMF at the time, or who were otherwise too corrupt or incompetent to stay true in delivering their development strategy. Global development is important for the long-term future In an EA Forum post, Beckstead defines three types of benefits that an intervention can have: proximate benefits, benefits from speeding up development, and trajectory changes. Global development would have immediate benefits for people alive today: economic development in low-income countries means that fewer people would experience poverty, illness, hunger, and violence. Speeding up development is speeding up the process by which countries become high-income, so it would ensure that people realize these benefits sooner. But most of the benefits of global development are through trajectory changes that affect the long-term future. We argue that global development creates significant long-term benefits through this route. Global development can also lead to trajectory changes in the global political environment that would not happen if the development timeline were slowed down, since such changes can be locked in over time. Global development increases diversity in global governance One of the main ways global development benefits the far future is through its impact on diversity and inclusion in world institutions. As countries get richer, their people get better educated and thus better placed to participate in institutions with great decision-making power over the world, such as multinational corporations, governments, and international organizations. Increasing the diversity of decision makers in global institutions improves the quality of world governance, which enables humanity to better navigate existential risks and other global challenges. Diversity in global institutions improves their efficacy in two ways. First, socially diverse groups outperform homogeneous groups at decision-making because they deliberate more carefully and pay more attention to facts. They also innovate more because diverse group members bring unique perspectives. Second, it improves value alignment between these institutions and humanity as a whole. It has been proposed that humanity should engage in a “long reflection” to decide what is ultimately of value before making potentially irreversible decisions regarding its future. For such decisions to reflect the values and needs of all of humanity, as many people as possible should be able to participate meaningfully in the global institutions making these decisions. Currently, about 689 million of the 8 billion people worldwide live in extreme poverty, and they cannot participate meaningfully in world governance as long as their basic needs are not met. 2.9 billion people lack Internet access, which is an important communication channel through which people make their voices heard on global issues and influence global institutions. Internet adoption is uneven across social groups: for example, women, people in rural areas, and people over age 25 are less likely to have Internet access. These disparities are especially pronounced in the 46 UN-designated Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Another barrier to diversity in global governance is the structure of institutions such as the United Nations, which is not designed to represent the general will of humanity. UN institutions represent the will of states—especially the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. Although a diverse group of countries have voices in the UN, their citizens do not, especially in the case of authoritarian states. Global development reduces existential risks Another important way in which global development improves the long-term future is by reducing existential risks, particularly risks from pandemics and political instability. 80,000 Hours estimates that the risk of a biological existential catastrophe in the next 100 years is about 1 in 1000. Poverty makes communities more susceptible to spreading infectious diseases. For example, a study of Monrovia, Liberia, in 2014 found that people living in slums who caught the Ebola virus spread it to an average of 3.5 times more people than people living in rich neighborhoods. This is because these neighborhoods are overcrowded, contaminated, and lacking in sanitation and health care infrastructure. Also, malnutrition weakens the immune systems of poor people, thereby making them more vulnerable to disease. Raising national income improves population health and enables countries to invest more in public health infrastructure, which makes populations more resilient to potentially catastrophic pandemics. Global poverty also causes existential risk through its negative effects on international security. Many developing countries, particularly weak states, are caught in a vicious cycle of poverty, corruption, and political instability: “Inept, corrupt, or weak governance fosters poverty; widespread poverty makes effective, equitable governance more difficult to achieve; and when weak governments fail to improve their people’s lives, their legitimacy suffers.” Weak states often engender terrorism and crime because they are unable to maintain law and order in their territories. Global development in practice There are two general ways to increase the living standards of people around the world. The first is reducing barriers to immigration to high-income countries so that more people from low-income countries can move to them, take advantage of the place premium, and send money back to their countries of origin. The second is to pursue policies to increase the productivity of low-income countries so that their people are better off. Reducing barriers to migration Opening up borders in high-income countries does not decrease opportunities for those in high-income countries (although it may stress city infrastructure if not planned well). Matthew Yglesias writes about a six-month period in 1980 where 125,000 Cubans left the Cuban port of Mariel and arrived in Florida (a 7% increase in the labor workforce). These immigrants weren't particularly skilled, but no decreases in natives’ wages occurred. Yglesias explains that immigrants increase the quality and variety of goods and services available, instead of competing for native workers’ jobs. Furthermore, when the supply of hired help is increased, some college-educated women who might have otherwise been stay-at-home moms are more likely to work. Immigrants also send money back home: for example, according to the Central Bank of the Philippines, between 1975 and 1994 Filipino overseas contract workers sent remittances totaling $18.196 billion (for comparison, the Philippines is currently $46B in debt to the World Bank, IMF, etc.).10 Closing the digital divide is also one way to gain some of the benefits of open borders, by opening up opportunities for jobs in high-income countries that can be done remotely to people in lower income countries.11 Catch-up growth Economic growth improves quality of life better than public health interventions. However, it is difficult for a country to increase its income unless the country's leadership is both dedicated to this cause, and following the correct strategy towards development. As pointed out by a report from Rethink Priorities last year, land redistribution (the first step of developing a country according to How Asia Works) is unlikely to happen without some kind of major turmoil (such as a country gaining independence) as landowners have political power, even if landowners are vastly outnumbered. Here are some examples of organizations pursuing catch-up growth in low- and middle-income countries: The World Bank and IMF provide loans and advice to low and middle income countries for development. Depending on the income of the country, the loan may not have to be repaid. The Gates Foundation provides entrepreneurial support. Newer organizations working on the problem include Growth Teams and the Charter Cities Institute. Entrepreneurs such as Sierra Juice and Jaza Energy contribute by providing jobs and increasing production value of exports. Interestingly, investment in non-hydro renewable energy has actually tipped to be greater in low- and middle-income countries than in high-income countries, now that solar has become cheaper. The Center for Global Development advocates for rich-world policies that benefit low- and middle-income countries. Other organizations engage in activities such as microloans, which are shown to benefit the recipient as long as the microloan is not used to fund people joining multi-level marketing schemes. Organizations like Grameen America should stop allowing the loans to be used for this purpose. Overall there are many more initiatives meant to alleviate poverty than to encourage the economic development and democratic power necessary to end it. Given that government-led development is hard without a people in power dedicated to and capable of executing development strategy, the mechanism by which development happens is by successful businesses giving people stable jobs, especially jobs that upskill workers in their career. Conclusion While a naive application of longtermism might lead one to think that low-income countries are less important than high-income countries, this view is facile because it ignores the fact that countries can and do develop over time. Rather, longtermism speaks to the importance of developing low-income countries into high-income ones. Global development improves the long-term future of humanity by improving global governance and decreasing civilization’s vulnerability to catastrophic risks. This makes global development a pressing longtermist issue.

For these reasons, sui generis rights have been proposed for folklore. According to these proposals, protection should be perpetual and retroactive, and derivative works should be strictly controlled. But there may be consequences for the implementation of these rights. By overprotecting folklore, the public domain diminishes, which means that there are fewer works to use to build on. Therefore, indigenous artists who want to develop their artistic traditions by reinterpreting traditional motifs in non-traditional ways, and want to compete in the arts and crafts markets may be inhibited by these regimes. The consequence is that these laws may "freeze" the culture in a historic moment, allowing us to think of indigenous peoples as romantic relics from a lost time, and to deny them a contemporary voice.

‌The intellectual property legal regime is a powerful one, its component parts comprising a complex body of law, an existing mind share, and a cache-all of which have developed over the years, and from which all peoples should benefit. Thus, if the workings of the intellectual property machine involve culturally-specific components, that machine should not be discarded when it is found ineffectual for all cultures; rather, the machine should be reconstructed such that it works for all cultures. The inclusion of indigenous peoples' cultural knowledge, inventions, expressions, and works within an intellectual property regime requires some rewiring of the parts, but does not diminish the potential legal value of the machine itself. This Article discusses the means by which indigenous interests can, and should, be incorporated into intellectual property law. 9 Copyright laws, in their current formulation, are inadequate to protect the fruits of human creativity of indigenous peoples. Thus, I will argue that copyright laws can, and must, be expanded in three ways so as to protect and maintain the vitality of the artistic and literary works of indigenous cultures: incorporating collective and communal authorship; expanding originality requirements to reflect collective and communal authorship; and applying limits on the duration of protection in a broader community context. I also propose that a variety of intellectual property mechanisms be drawn upon to provide special protection for "sacred" cultural works.In Part One, I use the debates over terminology to illuminate briefly some of the cultural issues at play with respect to the protection of the literary, artistic, and scientific works of indigenous peoples. In Part Two, I discuss the parameters of "intellectual property" and introduce the concept and operation of copyrights. In Part Three, I argue that the legal construction of authorship within the copyright context must be expanded to accommodate indigenous interests. In this Section, I examine in detail notions of authorship as they are embedded in intellectual property law and show that they run contrary to fundamental principles of authorship held by indigenous peoples. I argue that authorship must be reconstructed to accommodate cultural difference. I discuss developments toward that end in Australian case law and suggest additional intellectual property concepts that can be drawn upon to further that objective. In Part Four, I address the need to recast originality requirements to reflect an expanded notion of authorship, and in Part Five, I explore the various alternatives to basing the duration of rights on the "life of the author" within this expanded framework, noting both practical and policy conflicts over the duration of rights. Finally, in Part Six, I advocate special protection for sacred cultural works, and explore some of the already established legal mechanisms, in addition to copyright, through which this protection can be sought.

While sui generis protections address specific legal shortcomings, they merely accommodate customary law. Modifying the Copyright Act to incorporate, rather than separately address, these legal concepts fully recognize the value of TCEs as copyrightable material. Fusing concepts such as cultural patrimony into the fundamental tenants of copyright law would allow for an expanded understanding of authorship, as TCEs often represent this same level of cultural significance such that the community the TCE represents effectively “authored” it. This new category of authorship must operate in a limited scope, only extending to a work with such cultural significance that it exists indivisible from its holder. Following the 10th Circuit’s lead in Corrow and taking note from Australian jurisprudence, judge-made law can begin the process of recognizing communal authorship in the United States.

The current inability to identify an author because of the differences in customary notions of authorship leaves incredibly sacred Indigenous designs and garments entirely unprotected. By expanding the definition of authorship, the Copyright Act can accommodate TCEs within the existing framework, and possessing a valid copyright allows for full enjoyment of the benefits granted by the Act, such as an economic monopoly and standing to bring suit for infringement. Indigenous communities will also have the autonomy to make decisions about licensing and exploiting their designs, options foreclosed to works existing in the public domain. However, merely recognizing Indigenous designs as copyrightable only partially protects them from exploitation by mainstream fashion. To offer a wellrounded bundle of protections, the United States must explicitly recognize and enforce moral rights.

The first section of this article has shown that the treatment of Indigenous oral traditions relies on multiple legal areas, but none of them are sufficient on their own. Cultural property law provides the basis for safeguarding and inventory making. Indigenous rights provide more control to Indigenous people, and this control then extends to their creations, such as oral traditions. Intellectual property rights, while useful for controlling the subject matter, does not have a single type of right that perfectly fits oral traditions. While not opposing other types of rights and a future sui generis system, the second part of this article has analyzed the copyright implications for different works in different stages, meaning that copyright will affect control at every stage. This does not have to automatically mean that copyright is always beneficial for the Indigenous community. In fact, especially in the earlier stages, copyright can benefit outsiders more. However, recognizing and avoiding copyright pitfalls in earlier stages and then having the option to rely on copyright at later stages is still relevant for Indigenous communities interested in this type of control. Therefore, this article has reached the conclusion that the impact of an existing, relatively harmonized, and strong system like copyright needs to be recognized and considered in parallel to other attempts for finding what is best for oral traditions.

(4) Domestic The term “domestic” when applied to a corporation or partnership means created or organized in the United States or under the law of the United States or of any State unless, in the case of a partnership, the Secretary provides otherwise by regulations.

“Domestic Laws” shall mean the laws, rules or regulations of the United States or any State thereof or the District of Columbia.

The term "United States" means the United States and all areas under the jurisdiction or authority thereof.

**We do not endorse any of the decisions made by the Supreme Court referenced in this article.

In the first of these cases, Johnson v. McIntosh (21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)), Chief Justice Marshall ruled for the Court that Indian tribes could not convey land to private parties without the consent of the federal government. The Court reasoned that, after conquest by the Europeans and the establishment of the United States, the rights of the tribes to complete sovereignty were diminished, and the tribes' power to dispose of their land was denied. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)), the Court addressed the question of whether the Cherokee Nation was a "foreign state" and, therefore, could sue the State of Georgia in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Chief Justice Marshall ruled that federal courts had no jurisdiction over such a case because Indian tribes were merely "domestic dependent nations" existing "in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." The statements by the Court in Cherokee Nation established the premise that Indian nations do not possess all of the attributes of sovereignty that the word "nation" normally implies. Indian nations are not "foreign," but rather exist within the geographical boundaries of the United States, which necessarily limits their sovereignty. It would be unacceptable for an Indian nation located within the United States to enter into treaties with other countries, or to cede Indian land to foreign countries (to have a French or German enclave in the middle of Montana, for example.)

Indeed, with respect to the word "includes," the definition of "foreign country" largely mirrors the rule's definition of "United States" in its usage of "includes." See 26 C.F.R. § 1.911-2(g). The rule defines the "United States" as:

United States. The term "United States" when used in a geographical sense includes any territory under the sovereignty of the United States. It includes the states, the District of Columbia, the possessions and territories of the United States, the territorial waters of the United States, the air space over the United States, and the seabed and subsoil of those submarine areas which are adjacent to the territorial waters of the United States and over which the United States has exclusive rights, in accordance with international law, with respect to the exploration and exploitation of natural resources.

The Administrator begins by arguing that the language of the CSA itself is evidence of congressional intent favoring his construction of the statute. His argument is based on the definitions of terms chosen by Congress in drafting the relevant provisions of the CSA. He first cites the definition of the term “United States” as used in “accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B). This term is the only portion of the Schedule I criteria that Congress has expressly defined in the CSA, providing that “[t]he term ‘United States,’ when used in a geographic sense, means all places ... subject *886 to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(28) (emphasis supplied). Coupling this statutory definition of “United States” with the dictionary definition of “accepted”—which means “generally approved” or “generally agreed upon”—the Administrator argues that the phrase “accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, ” 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B), must contemplate an administrative determination that the substance has been “generally approved” for use in treatment in “all places” subject to United States jurisdiction. In other words, FDA interstate marketing approval is necessary to satisfy this criterion because, otherwise, the substance could not be deemed to be “generally approved” everywhere in the United States.7 We find this argument to be strained and unpersuasive. The CSA's definition of “United States” plainly does not require the conclusion asserted by the Administrator simply because section 802(28) defines “United States” as “all places subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(28) (emphasis supplied). Congress surely intended the reference to “all places” in section 802(28) to delineate the broad jurisdictional scope of the CSA and to clarify that the CSA regulates conduct occurring any place, as opposed to every place, within the United States. As petitioner aptly notes, a defendant charged with violating the CSA by selling controlled substances in only two states would not have a defense based on section 802(28) if he contended that his activity had not occurred in “all places” subject to United States jurisdiction. We add, moreover, that the Administrator's clever argument conveniently omits any reference to the fact that the pertinent phrase in section 812(b)(1)(B) reads “in the United States,” (emphasis supplied). We find this language to be further evidence that the Congress did not intend “accepted medical use in treatment in the United States” to require a finding of recognized medical use in every state or, as the Administrator contends, approval for interstate marketing of the substance.

Although the claims recite only one positional relationship between the gas equilibration reservoir and the conduit, namely that the former is positioned in the latter, the '824 written description (including both text and drawings) teaches three, separate positional embodiments.56 Turning first to the text of the specification, taught is one embodiment in which the gas equilibrium reservoir is "within" the conduit (col. 9, line 42) or "in" the conduit (col. 3, lines 18, 42).57

[BEGIN FOOTNOTE 57] Webster's defines "in," at 557, as "Within the bounds or area of" and "within," at 1268, as "In or into the inner part: INSIDE." Note that the definition of "within" incorporates "in." The word "in" does not require that something be completely and continuously inside of something else. A component may be "in" another component if it is located, at least in relevant part, in the defined space. See Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 119 F.3d 16, 1997 WL 419391 at *8 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (non-precedential). See also Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 383 F.3d 1352, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("General use dictionaries define 'in' as 'used as a functional word to indicate location or position in space or in some materially bounded object.' Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1139 (1993). From these definitions, the ordinary meaning of 'storage means in a data processor' is a device capable of retaining data located within a data processing device or system."); TI Group Automotive Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("we affirm the district court's construction of the term 'within' as meaning 'inside'," stating "what is not outside is on the inside"). [END FOOTNOTE 57]

“Domestic Laws” shall mean the laws, rules or regulations of the United States or any State thereof or the District of Columbia.

Indeed, with respect to the word "includes," the definition of "foreign country" largely mirrors the rule's definition of "United States" in its usage of "includes." See 26 C.F.R. § 1.911-2(g). The rule defines the "United States" as:

United States. The term "United States" when used in a geographical sense includes any territory under the sovereignty of the United States. It includes the states, the District of Columbia, the possessions and territories of the United States, the territorial waters of the United States, the air space over the United States, and the seabed and subsoil of those submarine areas which are adjacent to the territorial waters of the United States and over which the United States has exclusive rights, in accordance with international law, with respect to the exploration and exploitation of natural resources.

The term "United States" means the United States and all areas under the jurisdiction or authority thereof.

**We do not endorse any of the decisions made by the Supreme Court referenced in this article.

In the first of these cases, Johnson v. McIntosh (21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)), Chief Justice Marshall ruled for the Court that Indian tribes could not convey land to private parties without the consent of the federal government. The Court reasoned that, after conquest by the Europeans and the establishment of the United States, the rights of the tribes to complete sovereignty were diminished, and the tribes' power to dispose of their land was denied. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)), the Court addressed the question of whether the Cherokee Nation was a "foreign state" and, therefore, could sue the State of Georgia in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Chief Justice Marshall ruled that federal courts had no jurisdiction over such a case because Indian tribes were merely "domestic dependent nations" existing "in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." The statements by the Court in Cherokee Nation established the premise that Indian nations do not possess all of the attributes of sovereignty that the word "nation" normally implies. Indian nations are not "foreign," but rather exist within the geographical boundaries of the United States, which necessarily limits their sovereignty. It would be unacceptable for an Indian nation located within the United States to enter into treaties with other countries, or to cede Indian land to foreign countries (to have a French or German enclave in the middle of Montana, for example.)

(4) Domestic The term “domestic” when applied to a corporation or partnership means created or organized in the United States or under the law of the United States or of any State unless, in the case of a partnership, the Secretary provides otherwise by regulations.

Indigenous Peoples around the world continue to resist and reinvent ways of maintaining their lifeways in the face of the onslaught of a civilization increasingly in decline, based on the ideas of ​​anthropocentrism, a free market, and destroying nature to quench their thirst of accumulation. Indigenous communities face attacks on multiple levels, including extractivism in their territories, and appropriation of their cultural creations and knowledge. In recent decades, the struggles of Indigenous Peoples to protect their ancestral knowledge and intellectual property has increased leaving lessons in organization, lobbying, and alerts from Peoples who have experienced cultural appropriation. Cultural appropriation includes forms of extractivism in Indigenous territories, where transnational mining, oil, gas, pharmaceutical, seed, and fashion industry companies, to name a few, exploit a natural resource, impacting the lives of the communities they have protected or rely on said resource for their livelihoods. Cultural appropriation is an asymmetric relationship between cultures and societies, where the dominant culture/society deals with and justifies its relations with minorities, in this case the Indigenous Peoples, to use their knowledge, ways of life, art, their relationships with plants and animals, spirituality, worldviews and other aspects of Indigenous identity for capitalist consumption. In the 21st century, Indigenous Peoples are not free from being constantly "discovered" by some businesspeople. The cultural appropriation that we address in this article is based on how Indigenous Peoples and communities are suffering extractivism or appropriation without their Free, Prior and Informed Consent and where they are not respected as the collective creators of said tangible and intangible culture, use, or traditional knowledge. Appropriation, in general, implies the separation of the creation from the original authors, the modification of the original meaning or the use of the creation to be marketed as a new product that can be massively consumed. This new product is shown as a new creation or reinvented by the appropriator. The benefit of social recognition or economic benefit remains with those who appropriated the tangible or intangible culture, while the community that has created and protected it for hundreds of years continues to suffer systematic racism for maintaining it. Indigenous Peoples demand the recognition and protection of their artistic and cultural creations, uses, and relationships with plants because they have been their protectors and many have given their lives to defend their lifeways, cultures, and relationships with the environment. Cultural extractivism leaves communities more vulnerable than they already are. In addition, with free market laws and the legal norms of private patents that privilege corporations, companies, and individual creations, the demands or complaints of collective intellectual property of Indigenous Peoples remain only anecdotes. These forms of economic subsistence of traditional knowledge or use are harmed because Indigenous communities cannot continue to produce something that is now produced massively. Such is the example of the dream catchers of the Ojibwe-Chippewa Peoples, which are now mass-produced in China and sold in dollar stores, totally alien to their creators and to their original meaning, and replaced with profits benefiting a company instead of its creators. The case of the “xaam nëxuy” blouse from Santa María Tlahuitoltepec, Mexico, by the designer Isabel Marant, is a flagrant case of plagiarism of Ayuujk designs and collective clothing that is used ancestrally and represents the cosmoexistence and wisdom of the community passed down from generation to generation. This blouse, as well as the Indigenous clothing of many communities in the world, is collective and not individual property. Individual adaptations and modifications to the blouse that are created as fashion are also considered collective creations. The blouse was sold by Marant as her own creation and the sale price was 300 percent more expensive than those made by the women and men of Santa María Tlahuitoltepec. As in this case, there are many communities that are not even aware that their designs are marketed by international companies, and if they do, they do not go beyond public denunciation, because international laws do not recognize collective rights. The struggle carried out by the Union of Yageceros Healers of the Colombian Amazon (UMIYAC), made up of the Cofán, Inga, Siona, Coreguaje, and Kämsa Biya Peoples in southern Colombia is another example of cultural and biodiversity extractivism. Traditional healers have denounced many outsiders coming to Indigenous communities to be in yagé ceremonies. These ceremonies are now also being done by young people from the community who do not have the experience or ancestral knowledge and do it because there is a high demand and a short-term economic benefit. The sacred plant of the Yagé or Ayahuasca is being offered commercially through spiritual retreats, Ayahuascaqueras ceremonies, and schools of shamanism. UMIYAC denounces this exploitation, “It is a mercantile phenomenon of use, consumption, manipulation, and appropriation of our medicinal traditions, our knowledge, and our image. These practices violate the sacredness of our worldviews, offend our authorities, and go against ratified international conventions and treaties to protect the intangible, medicinal, spiritual and cultural heritages of Indigenous Peoples (ie: Colombian Constitution of 1991, Convention 169 / ILO , 1989 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007, among others)." The Yagé plant and the ceremony are the collective, ancestral, and an intangible heritage of the Amazonian Peoples and its superior purpose is to heal, not to be commercialized. Commercialization causes the use of the plant to become decontextualized. Unfortunately, the calls and denunciations of Indigenous Peoples have had little impact on the looters of Indigenous cultures. We need more support from national governments and more corporate responsibility towards the Peoples.

As shown by the Shingle Springs Band case, federal trademark law leaves much to be desired when it comes to allowing tribes to protect their names from non-members. Moreover, many tribes "suffer significant economic loss from unauthorized copying of their traditional designs."86 The lack of action to protect intellectual property among tribes is jarring. Tribes and individual Native artists are, as previously mentioned, not well-off economically, and are unlikely to successfully defend an action for copyright or trademark infringement. Although the IACA is a fine start, it cannot be Congress's last action on the intellectual property rights of Native American tribes and their members.

Congress has taken steps to protect tangible aspects of tribal property.87 Passing legislation to protect historically important artifacts "established a fundamental principle of Native American ownership of their cultural property."88 Even so, there remains no recourse for the appropriation of cultural aspects of tribes that are intangible. This has led some tribes to protect its intangible [*12] cultural property of significance from outsiders.89 As both tangible and intangible elements of tribal culture are "essential to the survival of Indian Nations as distinctive cultural and political groups," Congress must act by altering the current intellectual property schemes within the United States.90

In a letter to online shop Patowl, the Ministry identified printed t-shirts that carried designs mimicking the labor-intensive hazme si puedes (“do me if you can”) embroidery of the Zapotec Indigenous people of the community of San Antonino Castillo Velasco, Oaxaca.

Further, Culture Minister Alejandra Frausto demanded a “public explanation on what basis it could privatize collective property.”13 However, Mexican Indigenous communities have few channels to seek legal remedy from Zara, Anthropologie, and Patowl or any legal deterrence from subsequent acts of appropriation. They must instead turn to public pressure as a source of accountability.