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Social security is today an immensely popular term. Everybody in public life is for social security and nearly all discussion of the subject concerns improvement and extension. It remains, however, a term of uncertain meaning, which conveys very different ideas to different people. To many Americans it means nothing more than old age pensions; to others, it is a socialized form of insurance protection against hazards whose normal consequences are poverty and dependency; to still others, a governmentally guaranteed minimum income in all contingencies of life; to others, again, an economic system which operates to afford plenty for everybody. These are only some of the concepts of social security widely prevalent in this country. This lack of precise meaning to some extent accounts for the popularity of social security. Social security is in fact more of an ideal than an institution or group of institutions. Yet if we are to intelligently discuss the place which social security should have in postwar America or how social security can be improved, we need to give an institutional content to the term.

What is called "social security" differs from country to country. Social security is a part of the total institutional pattern of the nations in which it exists and is most soundly conceived in conformity with such total patterns. It is something different in totalitarian countries like Germany and Japan from what it is in democratic countries like the United States and the nations of the British Commonwealth, and some- thing else still in Soviet Russia. The existing governmental structure, the economic system which prevails, the stage of economic development attained, the history and traditions of the nation will all have their in- fluence upon the social security institutions of the country and even upon what is considered to be social security. So will such social and economic factors as the state of family life, the economic position of women, the mobility of labor, the extent of union organization, and, above all, the nation's economic productivity. This holds true also for psychological factors such as the public attitude toward government, the degree to which security is valued as contrasted with the opportuni- ties presented by risks, and the prevailing concepts of progress.

Second, the question is whether social security is strictly limited to public schemes. As discussed at the start of this chapter, acknowledgement of state responsibility for income protection was at the root of social security, thus stressing the importance of public responsibility. Of course, income protection can also be organised by other parties, including employers, family members, mutual funds and private funds. This raises the question whether such provisions are also to be counted as social security. This question has become more relevant now that in many countries the role of the state is being reduced and some public tasks are privatised, including parts of social security.

There is nothing against including such forms in the concept of social security, for instance, for calculating expenditure on social issues or income redistribution. However, in view of the normative dimension the issue is different, since again the question has to be answered whether the state has fulfilled its obligations. Because of the impact upon the legal position of the persons concerned, it still makes a very important difference as to who is responsible for income redistribution.

In this discussion it is important to point out that the provisions recognised so far as social security (the ‘old’ risks) fulfil the requirement that their materialisation is not due to the initiative of the claimant. More precisely, it is possible to define precisely when a person is eligible or not, for example, between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. This criterion is closely linked with the insurance character of a large part of the schemes, but is also more generally still relevant, since the sustainability (financing) and legitimacy of the system depend very much on the possibility to control access and use. If one can claim ‘at will’ the system cannot survive. Therefore this principle that the materialisation of the contingency must not depend on personal choices is essential for distinguishing schemes as social security schemes.

Study grants and housing benefits also provide for income compensation and could therefore be considered a form of social security. However, also for these risks the problem is that there is a choice for claimants to influence their materialisation; moreover, there can be different views on whether these risks should be collectively borne than in the case of the traditional risks.

This does not mean, of course, that states cannot make arrangements for such contingencies, but they fall outside the concept of social security generally used.

Study grants and housing benefits also provide for income compensation and could therefore be considered a form of social security. However, also for these risks the problem is that there is a choice for claimants to influence their materialisation; moreover, there can be different views on whether these risks should be collectively borne than in the case of the traditional risks.

This does not mean, of course, that states cannot make arrangements for such contingencies, but they fall outside the concept of social security generally used.

The distinction between old and new risks on grounds of the possibility to influence one’s own risk is not an absolute one. For instance, unemployed people can to a certain extent influence the duration of their unemployment depending on their willingness and attempts to accept and find work. Also in case of illness there can be large variations in the work which persons are still willing to do. Family benefits are only paid after a couple has taken the initiative to produce a child. If we compare this with a new risk, namely the obligation to care for a seriously ill child, this does not leave much choice, in some situations, to quit or reduce work.

The problem is, however, that for the old risks the legal conditions for benefit eligibility can be much more sharply defined and supervised than in the case of the new risks. This makes it more difficult to control access to compensation for such new risks. For instance, in the example of the ill child, it can still be disputed whether the partner, or other family members, of a professional organisation is asked to provide the care. And in case of care for other family members, friends or relatives the question also arises if the person concerned has to undertake the task of caring or whether somebody else can be asked. Comparable discussions arise in case of divorce insurance. The new risks make supervision difficult and would require a thorough investigation of the private situation of the claimant.

The contingencies covered are traditionally the following: old age, survivors, disability, industrial accidents, unemployment, sickness, and maternity. In the definition it is attempted to characterise these schemes: they are linked with the physical situation of the person which means that he cannot work anymore (sickness, disability, old age) or a personal situation that has led to a loss of income (death of breadwinner). Unemployment is not related to the physical position, but is often the result of economic development.

This definition does not mean that there is also an obligation to give protection in all situations which fall within this definition. For instance, self-employed persons are hardly ever protected against loss of income due to economic developments. However, if a scheme meets the definition, it is considered part of social security.

Social security, a term long used by the ILO, is defined (ILO, 2000, p. 29) as ‘‘the protection which society provides for its members, through a series of public measures9 [FOOTNOTE 9 BEGINS] 9 A key difference between ‘‘social security’’ and ‘‘social protection’’ is that the former is provided through public measures. The term ‘‘social security’’ was first officially used in the title of U.S. legislation – the Social Security Act of 1935 – even though this Act initiated programs that focused only on the risks of old age, death and disability (ILO, 1989, p. 3). [FOOTNOTE 9 ENDS]: to offset the absence or substantial reduction of income from work resulting from various contingencies (notably sickness, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, invalidity, old age and death of the breadwinner); to provide people with health care; and to provide benefits for families with children.’’

“Analysis of the relationship between the two EU legal instruments on cross-border healthcare,” in The relationship between the Regulations on the coordination of social security systems and the Directive on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare, https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/197636/

First, it could be argued that Covid-19 vaccination programmes are not sickness benefits. However, this would run counter the broad definition of sickness benefits in kind. The CJEU held that ‘the concept of social security [is] to be regarded as including the aim of preventing the spread of disease, which cannot be regarded as a mere measure of social assistance.’91 The Heinze judgment discussed above qualifies preventative measures aimed at fighting a contagious disease as sickness benefits. The fact that the Directive expressly excludes vaccination programmes further suggests that, if it was not for the exclusion, they would qualify as healthcare. From the start of the roll-out of the vaccines, it seems that they form part of the benefit basket. It may be assumed that the Covid-19 vaccination programmes are based on ‘legislation’ within the meaning of the Regulations.

Nevertheless, his typology of statutory social security inspired subsequent typologies which included social insurance, means-tested social assistance schemes, demogrant allowances and a variety of mandatory benefits provided by employers, as well as tax allowances and concessions. Kaim Caudle’s inclusion of employer mandates and the use of tax advantages by governments was particularly helpful in that it publicized the need to transcend the emphasis placed on social insurance as the primary and most desirable form of social security at the time. It is certainly recognized today that fiscal measures should be included in any account of social security. As is shown in Chapter 6 of this book, the tax system is now being used quite extensively by the government of the United States to provide income support, and there are signs that other countries, such as the United Kingdom, are also placing more emphasis on the use of fiscal measures.

Following the ILO classifications, many comparative accounts of social security now classify social security into four or five different types of schemes. In his formative study of social security in the developing countries, Midgley (1984) argued that the classification of social security schemes as social assistance, social insurance, employer liability schemes, social allowances and provident funds is a convenient way of proceeding and offers a reasonably comprehensive framework for analysis. Similarly, in his prodigious account of international trends in social security, Dixon (1999) also classified social security programmes in this way. The typology presented in Table 1.1 not only adopts the standard five-fold classification of social security but also recognizes the importance of the fiscal system in providing income maintenance and support.

"SOCIAL Security" is a term of trans-Atlantic origin. The department of Government in the United States which administers what we in Britain should call unemployment insurance and contributory pensions in old age and for widows, orphans and other survivors, was established under the Social Security Act of 1935, and is called the Social Security Board.- Three years later, in 1938, the same term was adopted by New Zealand to describe its comprehensive measure of income security for all citizens. Three years later again, in the Atlantic Charter of 1941, the American and British leaders, followed in due course by the Governments of the other United Nations, declared -their desire to bring about the fullesit collaboration between all nations in the economic field, " with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security." Finally, in the report on Social Insurance and Allied Services made by me to the British Government in November 1942, I adopted the term, in proposing a Plan for Social Security to give freedom from want.

Having spent recently tWo months on the other side of the Atlantic in dis- cussing problems and methods of Social Security, I propose to devote my address to-day to recording some of the principal reflections aroused by this discussion. As a preliminary it will be convenient to explain more precisely the meaning attached here to the term " Social Security."

Social security, a term long used by the ILO, is defined (ILO, 2000, p. 29) as ‘‘the protection which society provides for its members, through a series of public measures9 [FOOTNOTE 9 BEGINS] 9 A key difference between ‘‘social security’’ and ‘‘social protection’’ is that the former is provided through public measures. The term ‘‘social security’’ was first officially used in the title of U.S. legislation – the Social Security Act of 1935 – even though this Act initiated programs that focused only on the risks of old age, death and disability (ILO, 1989, p. 3). [FOOTNOTE 9 ENDS]: to offset the absence or substantial reduction of income from work resulting from various contingencies (notably sickness, maternity, employment injury, unemployment, invalidity, old age and death of the breadwinner); to provide people with health care; and to provide benefits for families with children.’’

This definition of social security corresponds to the ILO Social Security Standard (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (no. 102). The contingencies identified (except unemployment) affect individuals rather than communities. Collective risks such as drought, bad harvests, natural disasters and war, also affect people’s income security, especially in developing countries. In most cases, existing social security systems do not specifically addresses these risks but cover them only through general ‘‘social assistance.’’ The ILO definition of social security includes social insurance (i.e., contributory schemes), social assistance (i.e., tax-financed benefits provided only to those with low income through means-test or income test); and universal benefits, i.e., tax-financed benefits provided without being income- or means-tested (ILO, 2000, p. 29).10 [FOOTNOTE 10 BEGINS] 10 See ILO (1989) for details on the distinction between social insurance and social assistance. [FOOTNOTE 10 ENDS] Social insurance provides insurance for wage earners. The principle elements of social insurance are as follows: (1) participation is compulsory, with few exceptions; (2) it is financed by contributions which are normally shared between employers and workers, with, perhaps, state participation in the form of a supplementary contribution or other subsidy from general revenues; (3) contributions are accumulated in special funds out of which benefits are paid; (4) surplus funds are invested to earn further income; (5) a person’s right to benefit is secured by his contribution record without any test of need or mean; (6) and contribution and benefit rates are usually related to what the person is or has been earning (ILO, 1989, p. 4).

Social security can be looked at from two points of view. In a narrow and popular sense, it may be perceived by workers as a means of obtaining some contingency payments, as a series of benefits which include medical care, sickness benefits, maternity benefits, employment injury benefits, old-age benefits, invalidity benefits, survivors’ benefits, unemployment benefits, and family benefits. In some cases, welfare benefits such as vocational rehabilitation for disabled persons, convalescents, or even vocational training or retraining for unemployed workers, and recreational facilities are also included among social security benefits. Thus, the contingencies normally dealt with by social security systems include:

(i) the need for medical care;

Second, Defendants urge the Court not to be the first "to judicially expand the scope of this statute decades after enactment." (Rec. Doc. 8 at 12). The question before the Court is the precise scope of the statute, namely if the notice requirements of 40:2203.1 apply to dentists and dental services. The use of the term "expand" is misleading, as no court has previously addressed this issue. In fact, Defendants have not presented, nor has the Court's independent research revealed, any case analyzing in depth the scope of 40:2203.1. Thus, there is no core precedent surrounding this issue from which the Court can "expand."

In this Essay I propose reinvigorating and expanding the public trust doctrine so that its protection is extended to wildlife, and by necessity, to the habitat it depends upon. 4 [FOOTNOTE 4 BEGINS] I use the term "expand" because the public trust doctrine, as currently used by most states, does not protect wildlife or wildlife habitat per se, but is instead restricted to water-based protections. I use the term "reinvigorate" because it is equally clear that the public trust doctrine in its original form contemplated the protection of wildlife within its scope. See infra text accompanying notes 18-20. As the first United States court to discuss the doctrine noted, in rejecting a riparian landowner's claim to exclusive rights in tidal oyster beds, the courts have been historically aware of a legal distinction between private, public, and common property. Common property (property encumbered with a public trust), said Chief Justice Kirkpatrick of the New Jersey Supreme Court, includes "the air, the running water, the sea, the fish, and the wild beasts. [These are] things in which a sort of transient usufructuary possession only, can be had. . . ." Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 71 (1821) (citations omitted). [FOOTNOTE 4 ENDS] In my assessment, [*725] the public trust doctrine offers a framework for resource management and decision making that is ecosystemic. By ecosystemic, I mean an approach that allows resource managers to consider both the short-term and long-term needs of wildlife, the health of the habitat upon which a specific species or variety of species depend for survival, and the needs and goals of those humans 5 who interact with wildlife in the ecosystem. And critically, I suggest that the public trust doctrine offers both a historically and jurisprudentially sound approach for achieving this objective.

Is plain meaning so plain? This is not meant to be a philosophical question, but one deserving serious legal analysis. The plain-meaning rule claims to provide certainty and narrow statutes' domains. As a relative claim, comparing plain meaning with purposivism, I agree. But I do not agree that plain-meaning analysis is as easy as its proponents suggest. In this piece, I tease out two very different ideas of plain meaning-ordinary/popular meaning and expansive/legalist meaning-suggesting that doctrinal analysis requires more than plain-meaning simpliciter. Perhaps more importantly, I argue that plain meaning, as legalist meaning, can quite easily expand a statute's scope, relative to a baseline of ordinary meaning or the status quo ex ante.

Instead of conceptual extension or expansion, let's first talk about physical extension or expansion, starting with the example in Ricky's answer.

Saying that a forest extends beyond the lakes is a description of how far you can go and still be in the existing forest - you can go beyond the lakes and still be in the forest even if the forest never increases in size. This is an idiomatic use of the word extend - it applies due to the context.

As John Lawler has pointed out in comments, the different verbs have different meanings. So, "deepened" might be appropriate if the new problems are very similar to the previous problems, but somehow more difficult or intricate. "Broadened" is probably more common, when the new problems are related to the previous ones, and perhaps of similar difficulty, but with new aspects. "Extended" is similar to "broadened", but gives more of an air of progress into new territory. "Expanded" is also similar, but gives an air of making the technique more general.

If I had to pick one, I would probably choose "extended". ("Expanded" would be a close contender if the original technique was highly specialised and the new work helped to make it more general.) This is mainly personal preference, and also dependent on the nature of these new studies, so I have no references to cite. I have not attempted to answer the question of which is more common. You could try Google Ngram for that.

[**10] Second, Eastport asserts that the presumption against retroactivity does not apply because the amendment was intended only as a clarification of existing law. HN7 Where an amendment to a statute is remedial in nature and merely serves to clarify existing law, no question of retroactivity is involved and the law will be applied to pending cases. City of Redlands v. Sorensen, 176 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211, 221 Cal. Rptr. 728, 732 (1985). The evidence in this case, however, does not support the conclusion that the amendment to section 66452.6(f) was simply a clarification of preexisting law. The Legislative Counsel's Digest specifically states that "the bill would expand the definition of development moratorium." Senate Bill 186, Stats. 1988, ch. 1330, at 3375 (emphasis added). Since the Legislative Counsel is a state official required by law to analyze pending legislation, it is reasonable to presume that the Legislature amended the statute with the intent and meaning expressed in the Counsel's digest. People v. Martinez, 194 Cal. App. 3d 15, 22, 239 Cal. Rptr. 272, 276 (1987). By its ordinary meaning, the term "expand" indicates a change in the law, rather than a restatement of existing [**11] law. In light of the Counsel's comment, Eastport's argument is unpersuasive.

The question is squarely presented as to whether the placing of the neon signs on the towers expanded the use to which the property had been previously devoted. The restrictive part of the ordinance which prohibits expansion refers to the nonconforming [**362] use of the property. Literally, it provides that the use may be continued but it cannot be [*146] expanded. Webster's International Unabridged Dictionary defines the word "expand," to extend, to enlarge. The application of such definition to the word "expanded" as contained in section 10 would mean that the use that was being conducted on the premises at the time of the adoption of the ordinance could not be extended or enlarged. The placing of the neon signs on the towers did not expand or enlarge the use to which the property was devoted. [***7] It may have been installed for advertising purposes, hoping that it would result in a gain of its business, but there is nothing in the record which indicates that such advertising would be followed by any expansion or enlargement of the laboratory experiments that were being conducted on the property. Zenith had the right to continue its nonconforming use and the right to advertise that use and the products it was handling, so long as it did not expand the use to which the property was devoted when the ordinance was adopted.