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During a pandemic-era marked by shutdowns, labor shortages, supply chain disruptions and inflation, there has also been a surge in applications to start new businesses. Entrepreneurship has taken off at unprecedented levels.

Since August 2020, applications filed to start new businesses have averaged around 400,000 per month. Prior to the pandemic, they hovered around 300,000 per month, according to U.S. Census Bureau data. There are signs that this is not just a pandemic-era trend. At the end of 2022, entrepreneurship was still booming.

As the anti-monopoly movement has picked up steam in important policy circles, some have begun thinking that small business promotion is a good idea. This seems to be partially driven by the technical view that small businesses are a way to counteract corporate concentration and partially driven by the more ideological and aesthetic view that there’s something inherently just and beautiful about small-time entrepreneurs and mom and pop shops.

In reality, small business promotion is mostly a bad idea. Small businesses pay lower wages, provide worse benefits, are often exempt from important worker protections, and are incompatible with the way unionization works in this country.

That bigness and market power are major problems does not mean that companies can never be too small. Like all things, this is a question of balance. The defenders of bigness are on the firmest ground, not when they argue for size itself, but when they argue that American politics often fetishizes smallness to a destructive degree.

Even as U.S. lawmakers fret about giant corporations and lament the death of the small proprietor, they remain wedded to the free market doctrines that dismantled the tools we used to fight concentration and market power directly. The only remaining route to defending small businesses is to essentially exempt them from regulations: from environmental laws, from workplace safety requirements, from anti-discrimination rules, and more. This creates a race to the bottom, in which smaller companies are permitted to exploit workers, defile the environment, and violate all sorts of other minimum standards, all in the name of allowing them to preserve some meager amount of remaining market share. Paradoxically, our indulgence of bigness has led policymakers to defend smallness in the worst possible way.

Over at The Incidental Economist, Austin Frakt is publishing an interesting series on “job lock”. This is the idea that, because most of us get our health benefits from our employers, we are “locked” into jobs we don’t like because they offer benefits which we do like (or need).

We get our health benefits from our employer because they are non-taxable. If employees bought health insurance on our own, we would pay premiums with after-tax dollars. Given this government discrimination, the idea of job lock makes sense: If we got our homes from our employers, we would surely hesitate to switch jobs, which would result in forced eviction from the current home to a new one.

Anecdotal evidence confirms that job lock is a serious problem for some people. Nevertheless, we find no statistically significant increases in employment durations or decreases in wages for those with employer-provided health insurance and with health problems in the family as would be expected if job lock were pervasive. We test for job lock using a hazard model framework exploiting variation in employment durations by employer-provided health insurance status and the actual health conditions of family members. Thus, we obtain a very direct test of the job lock phenomenon, instead of relying on proxies for family health such as other health insurance coverage or family size.

Other researchers have found that worker mobility is affected by family size or the presence of other insurance, and they have interpreted these results as evidence of job lock. When we estimate duration models that depend on the presence of other insurance or family size, we do get similar results to those obtained earlier. We find that employment durations increase for those in large families with employer-provided health insurance, and that employment durations decrease for those having both employer-provided health insurance and health insurance from another source. On the other hand, using the measures based on the interaction of employer-provided health insurance and the actual health conditions of family members, we find no evidence of job lock in employment durations. Some would argue that this constitutes mixed evidence in favor of job lock on employment durations.

When the Congressional Budget Office weighed in earlier this month on the work incentives of ObamaCare, much of the attention was focused on whether millions of Americans could cut back their work hours or even quit their jobs.

The law’s supporters called this “ending job lock,” and Nancy Pelosi pointed out that people could now leave unsatisfying jobs to, say, “write poetry.”

Inflation was not the result of a policy mistake–it was the inevitable result of mammoth global shocks and their long-lived–but dampening-ripples

In early 2021, debate raged about the potential economic effects of the American Rescue Plan (ARP). The ARP, passed in early 2021, was explicitly designed as fiscal stimulus, with large and front-loaded transfers to households as its centerpiece, along with substantial aid to state and local governments.3

But, as leaders prepare for the UN climate change summit in Paris (COP21) next week, we must grasp the fact that cities do not have to exacerbate social and environmental difficulties. Well‑designed, well-governed cities will in fact improve the lives of billions of people who will be newly urban by 2050.

London in the 19th century provides interesting insights. As it exploded with migrants attracted to urban jobs, it became the world’s first megacity. And, like some megacities of today, it became over-congested, dirty, polluted and dangerous. Life expectancy for a man was less than 30 years. It was, as the late planner Peter Hall described it, the “City of Dreadful Night”.

Any larger city centre will naturally discourage the use of cars, as congested streets are already a byproduct of higher population density. This is immediately a boon in terms of sustainability, as fewer cars on the road means less pollution. That being said, the city needs to have the alternative transport options and infrastructure in place to make up for these ‘lost’ roadways. This includes bike pathways, pedestrian access, and perhaps most importantly, a variety of interconnected public transport options.

Tokyo is the largest city in the world yet is also ranked as one of the most livable. In fact, Japan’s capital is the only megacity to consistently land on many livability ranking lists. Japan’s public transport networks are world class, famous for having regular services and for being consistently on time. With bullet trains that reach 320km/h, you’d be hard pressed to find somewhere they can’t take you. As a bonus, they’ve recently become more accessible for wheelchair and mobility scooter users, as well as blind and deaf commuters too.

The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), signed into law by President Biden on August 2022, also contains provisions regarding drug pricing. Two policies in particular are designed to influence drug prices, and these might in turn affect drug development strategies.

First, the IRA provides that starting in 2026, the federal government will have the authority to negotiate a maximum fair price (MFP) for some drugs among the highest-spending, Medicare-covered drugs. Second, drug manufacturers will be required to pay rebates to Medicare if drug prices rise faster than inflation.

Meeting participants highlighted the importance of training in responsible research conduct and ethics. Given students' future role as science ambassadors and influencers, their training should not only convey skills and knowledge but also awareness and critical thinking about the prospects and potential for dual use of synthetic biology. All researchers must remain vigilant regardless of the many pressures and distractions of running a successful research lab; they may not have specialist training in identifying the risks of misuse but they are the people best placed to maintain informed oversight of risks.

One example of current synthetic biology research with potential dual use is gene drive technology, which can be used to propagate a particular suite of genes throughout a population. The benefits of using gene drive technology include the eradication of disease-carrying insect populations and the elimination of invading pest species but it has raised concerns about the unintended ecological impacts of reducing or eliminating a population (; ).

To understand how synthetic biology could challenge or undermine existing approaches to biosecurity oversight and regulation, it is necessary to frst consider the international legal instruments relevant to biosecurity, and how these instruments are implemented at the national level (Trump et al. 2020). Based on this analysis, it is apparent that there is no single international legal instrument and no ‘one-size-fts-all’ approach to national implementation. Rather, the regulatory space Opportunities, Challenges, and Future Considerations for Top-Down Governance… governing biosecurity and synthetic biology can most accurately be described as a ‘patchwork’ of regulatory measures that tend to address biosecurity and synthetic biology indirectly. As scholars have previously observed, the regulatory space governing biosecurity comprises a “collection of cooperative and coercive national and international control measures – including international agreements, multinational organisations, national and international laws, regulations, policies, norms and rules – intended to prevent the spread of dangerous weapons and technologies” (McLeish and Nightingale 2007, p. 1638).

International legal instruments establish global norms and obligations that are implemented by countries according to their unique risk and regulatory cultures. In relation to biosecurity, no single instrument is more important or directly relevant than the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, commonly known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The BWC, which opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975, is the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the development, production and stockpiling of an entire category of WMD.3 Under Article I of the Convention, member states agree that they must not “develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”

In relation to existing top-down governance measures for biosecurity, synthetic biology represents a promising yet potentially destabilizing advancement in the life sciences, one that could introduce new risks and regulatory challenges. In particular, a number of high-profile synthetic biology experiments, ranging from the de novo synthesis of poliovirus (Cello et al. 2002) to the recent synthesis of horsepox virus (Noyce et al. 2018), have raised concerns that the same techniques could be exploited to bypass regulatory controls (e.g. the United States, US, Select Agent Regulations) on lists of high-risk pathogens. Moreover, the possibility of synthesizing novel ‘taxonomically unclassified’ pathogens (NSABB 2006; Garfinkel et al. 2007) has led some to question the logic and utility of current ‘list-based’ approaches to regulation. Looking to the future, if synthetic biology does, in fact, ‘deskill’ the ‘art’ of biological engineering, new regulatory approaches could very well be essential because the tools of modern biology will be widely accessible to both responsible and malicious actors.

Claims about synthetic biology’s potential, like other emerging technologies, nonetheless tend to overstate its ‘enabling’ capacity. Likewise, the ease of producing biological weapons tends to be overstated. As a number of commentators note, biology is not yet easy to engineer (Jefferson et al. 2014) and, for the foreseeable future, the skills necessary to produce biological weapons are likely to remain only within the grasp of states (Piers Millet in Regalado 2016). However, the field’s emphasis on eliminating technical barriers and reducing the importance of tacit knowledge (Oye 2012) represents a powerful source of expectation for advocates and critics alike. For advocates, it represents the possible realization of modern biology’s full potential, one that could yield revolutionary advances in health, medicine, and industry in the twenty-first century. For critics, it represents a seemingly open-ended risk that requires exceptional precaution. For national governments, and international conventions responsible for establishing global biosecurity norms and obligations that are operationalized at the national level through legislation and other regulatory tools (McLeish and Nightingale 2007), a central question is how (if at all) does top-down biosecurity governance need to change in response to synthetic biology?

As someone who has worked at the highest levels of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, I think this opposition is a huge mistake.

Without a greater government role in health insurance, many of the discoveries emerging from the labs of these industries will never reach patients. Why? Gene-based treatments that save someone from dying 20 years in the future have no chance of being embraced by private insurers whose business model depends on annual renewals.

Single-payer status has nothing to do with drug development. And drug innovation is not as important as you think.

The US spent $325B on prescription drugs in 2015. Medicare spent $147B of this (45%) and Medicaid spent another $57B (18%). That’s 63% of total prescription drug spending in the US. We already have single-payer.

During public health emergencies, DOD can be called upon to provide support functions to civil authorities, such as providing military personal for casualty clearing or staging. For example, National Guard units were recently deployed in New York to enforce the containment zone around New Rochelle and in the State of Washington to build field hospitals. Military personnel also can support the evacuation of patients to locations where hospital care is more readily available, such as in transporting infected cruise ship passengers to and from military bases around the country to be quarantined.

In 2015, during the height of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, DOD personnel provided logistical and airlift assistance, helped build treatment units in the region, and established mobile testing laboratories. DOD has worked closely with other federal agencies—such as HHS and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—to coordinate such response efforts in the past. For example, at the height of the Zika outbreak in 2016, DOD assisted these agencies in establishing preparedness, detection, and response measures, such as vector (e.g. mosquito) control in Hawaii.

In the spring of last year, the massive coronavirus outbreak aboard a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier, USS Theodore Roosevelt, was a jarring wake-up call for many senior military leaders about the impact that the pandemic could have on military readiness.

The carrier reported hundreds of COVID-19 infections and was forced to make an unscheduled stop in Guam for almost two months. That was among the early “alarm bells” that forced the Pentagon to ask hard questions that had wide-ranging implications.

The budget proposes $4.7 trillion in tax increases on businesses and individuals, raising U.S. tax rates to some of the highest in the developed world. The budget’s projected revenues rise to 20.1 percent of GDP by 2033, 2.7 percentage points above the 50‐​year average. All that tax revenue is still not enough to stabilize government debt as a share of the economy.

The administration plans to release additional details on each of the proposed tax increases next week. Based on summary documents, current reporting, and past proposals, we have a good sense of how the White House would like to increase taxes.

Through the Inflation Reduction Act, President Biden is delivering on his promise to lower prescription drug costs, make health insurance more affordable, and make the economy work for working families. This law means millions of Americans across all 50 states, the United States territories, and the District of Columbia will save money from meaningful benefits like:

lower prescription drug prices in Medicare through price negotiation with manufacturers,

In addition to these industry-specific trends, pharma has also been affected by broader global trends, such as supply chain pressures. While the pharma industry is considered somewhat protected by its high inventory levels and long-standing dual sourcing, over a given ten-year period, the likelihood of supply chain disruptions still represents a potential loss of 25 percent of EBITA. Inflation has risen in recent months to levels not seen for decades, leading to increasing costs for labor, raw materials, and transportation. This is over and above the persistent price pressures pharma is already facing, particularly in generics. Since pharma customers are not expected to fully absorb these cost increases, profit margins are under pressure.

Meanwhile, increased state interventions and protectionist trade policies are creating new pressures on manufacturing networks and could drive increased regionalization. This would be a capital-intensive exercise: to regionalize just 10 percent of current vaccine trade in one particular geographical region, governments would need to invest an estimated $100 million.