Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Bataille UBI Neg › UBI Productive › 1AR – UBI productive

UBI increases productivity – more money per person spurs increased aggregate demand, output, employment, labor, prices, and wages

Yash Rajwanshi 20 [2-25-2020. Yash Rajwanshi: Business & Data Science @ Berkeley Haas. "Unboxing Universal Basic Income". https://econreview.berkeley.edu/unboxing-universal-basic-income/. 7-18-2023, Dhilan-GDS]

Another key argument for UBI is the effect it will have on the growth of the economy. Proponents of UBI claim that putting money in the hands of every American will create an economic multiplier, and permanently grow the economy. Evidence from past case studies and economic predictions seems to support this assertion. A 2017 report by the Roosevelt Foundation used the Levy Institute macroeconometric model to demonstrate that an unconditional cash assistance program of $1,000 for all adults annually would expand the economy by 12.56 percent over the baseline after eight years. The study shows that, in addition to a rise in aggregate demand, a $1,000 UBI would likely cause an increase in output, employment, labor force participation, prices, and wages. Various studies of cash transfer programs in other countries demonstrate that economic growth ultimately also trickles up to other aspects of welfare programs. The “Mincome” Experiment in Manitoba, Canada, where an experimental basic income project was tested almost 40 years ago, showed that the population receiving a basic income had an 8.5 percent reduction in hospital visits, with fewer incidents of work-related injuries, and fewer emergency room visits from accidents and injuries. Additionally, the population experienced lower psychiatric hospitalization, which is an indicator of higher overall mental health. Another example, the GiveDirectly™ program, created cash transfer methods for poor households in Kenya, and showed positive effects in nutrition-based spending and overall assets for these households. This also correlated to overall healthier lifestyles and less hospital visitation. With this information, the benefits of UBI seems to be substantiated by strong empirical evidence and a number of logical macroeconomic predictions. That being said, the studies are smaller-scale than anything that would be implemented in the United States. They also are focused primarily in under-developed markets with lower wage floors. For that reason, many critics maintain that UBI in the US may not be a foolproof idea or work in a similar manner as the smaller scale sample in Kenya.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Bataille UBI Neg › UBI Productive › 2AC – UBI productive

UBI enables growth – the baseline capacity, competitive wages, job-seeking, investments, and school attendance open the floodgates to an Keynesian economy in constant growth

Sharon Chau 19 [6-16-2019. Sharon Chau: Westminster School, she will be reading Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the University of Oxford, . "Does Universal Basic Income Work?". https://kwokscholars.org/blog/does-universal-basic-income-work.html. 7-18-2023, Dhilan-GDS]

UBI brings a plethora of benefits for multiple stakeholders, especially the most vulnerable. Firstly, it reduces the coercive aspects of capitalism. Currently, workers have to take up employment because they lack alternative means of subsistence. UBI provides a baseline capacity for sustenance, allowing people to refuse exploitative labour. This makes work much less coercive and also increases wages for unpleasant work, which leads to higher compensation and an incentive for employers to eliminate such tasks. UBI further liberates people from working or seeking work due to the unconditional cash grant13, which creates a society no longer hostage to the rule, “No matter how it dulls the senses and breaks the spirit, one must work”14. The grant thus challenges an anchoring principle of capitalism that tethers social citizenship to waged labour15. Additionally, UBI increases workers’ collective power. Unions can use it as an unlimited strike fund to bargain against conditions, compared to limited funds from members that would run out rapidly in a prolonged strike. In addition, UBI grants citizens more autonomy16. The reduced labour time17 creates room for autonomous activities and production which is not subordinated to the goal of maximising profit18. Lastly, UBI provides enough security to enable retraining and job-seeking. Hence, UBI has radical emancipatory potential for the most vulnerable in the capitalist system.

Secondly, insecurity would decrease. UBI provides a dependable, unconditional stream of revenue which many can factor into their worst expectations. It massively reduces stress when one knows that money would appear in their bank account every week if they ever have a rainy day. This security also means additional incentives for individuals to invest in themselves through education, vocational courses or products to increase their productivity. Many people currently save up to prepare themselves in case of financial hardship, but this would be unnecessary if there existed UBI. Increased security additionally improves people’s mental health. Generous unemployment benefits have been shown to offset suicide from losing jobs19, and life satisfaction among the long-term unemployed increases significantly when they retire and the social expectation of employment is lifted20. Both effects are achieved through UBI, which offers an immediate safety net for anyone if they go through unexpected hardships, and removes the expectation of employment. Hence UBI ensures financial security, insulating us from financial shocks, increasing our investments and productivity and improving our mental health.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › DA – AUMF › 1NC – Shell

Extinction.

Lesser 20 [Max JD Candidate at Georgetown University Law Center, MA from Hunter College, BA in Political Science from George Washington University, Former Law Clerk for the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “Part 3 (of 3): A President or a King?”, Medium, 1/22/2020, https://medium.com/@maxles1206/part-3-of-3-a-president-or-a-king-651a81e4cadc]/ISJD

Second, the modern “imperial presidency” has become drastically more powerful than intended by our constitutional design. Through a combination of congressional abdication and delegation, the modern Presidency has become a leviathan of unmatched size and global power. The modern commander in chief today leads an administrative workforce of over 14 million,[5] “a military of 2 million armed with weapons that can eradicate human civilization,”[6] and possesses nearly unmatched authority in foreign affairs. Alexander Hamilton wrote that impeachable offenses “relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to society itself,” and given the vastly increased powers of the modern American presidency, the severity of the “injury” a modern president can inflict has correspondingly become far more serious. Furthermore, while the concerns of the founders may have concentrated on our vulnerable young republic being manipulated by more powerful foreign countries, we are now in a position where the immense powers of the “imperial presidency” place the commander in chief in a position to (1) coerce foreign governments to interfere in our elections for his personal gain or (2) severely weaken our national defenses against ongoing foreign interference efforts through negligence and abdication of duty.

The twin dynamics of increasing foreign interference in American politics and growing power in the Office of the President — have come to a head in the Trump administration. Two examples highlight the danger of the confluence of these trends: Russian election interference in 2016 and the Ukrainian extortion campaign that is the center of the current impeachment inquiry. First, the article will analyze the role of the Trump campaign in furthering the Russian interference campaign in 2016, as well as President Trump’s role in obstructing special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into Russian interference. These cases involved a more reactionary approach to foreign influence which nonetheless strongly signaled the President’s receptivity to foreign assistance, his willingness to encourage foreign influence campaigns, and his obstruction of subsequent government investigation. Second, the article will study President Trump’s extortion campaign against the government of Ukraine, in terms of releasing congressionally appropriated military aid in exchange for politically charged investigations of the President’s political opponents and the Democratic party. This case involves a proactive solicitation of foreign influence in our elections using the powers of the state, making it a more clear-cut case of treacherous abuse of power in foreign relations that violates the public trust. Furthermore, congressional investigation of this foreign influence campaign has been entirely obstructed by the President, which continues to the present day.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › DA – AUMF › 1NC – Shell

That causes the US to signal weak Congressional war powers, emboldening adversaries.

Stimson 4/4 [Cully Senior Legal Fellow and Deputy Director at the Meese Center, “Time for House to Join Senate, Reclaim Congress’ War Powers”, The Heritage Foundation, 4/4/2023, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/time-house-join-senate-reclaim-congress-war-powers]/ISJD

The Senate voted overwhelmingly, and on a bipartisan basis, last week to repeal the obsolete 1991 and 2002 Iraq Authorized Use of Military Force resolutions by a vote of 66-30.

That is sound policy, as I previously wrote here. It’s time for the House of Representatives to debate the Senate-passed repeal, and while doing so, keep in mind the many reasons why it should repeal these vestigial AUMFs, given the current threat environment.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › DA – AUMF › 1NC – Shell

BUT presidential support is key to getting it across.

Rachel Looker 3-29. Politics NOW Reporter. "AUMF repeal: Senate votes to repeal military authorizations for Iraq and Gulf wars". USA Today. 3-29-2023. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2023/03/29/aumf-repeal-senate-vote-passes/11513600002/

WASHINGTON — The Senate passed legislation Wednesday repealing decades-old military authorizations and formally end the Iraq and Gulf wars. 

The bill to repeal the authorization for the use of military force, or AUMF, passed in the Senate by a vote of 66-30. 

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › DA – AUMF › 1NC – Shell

Congress even repeals the 2001 AUMF now

Malley 7/12 [Blaise Malley is

Lawmakers have in recent years had a renewed appetite to reclaim Congress’s warmaking power. The Senate voted earlier  to repeal the Iraq War authorizations from 1991 and 2002. The House has passed  in previous legislative sessions and President Joe Biden had  to support a repeal of the 2002 legislation, though those attempts have not yet become law. 

There have also been efforts to end U.S. military participation in specific conflicts, including War Powers Resolutions  U.S. support for the Saudi-led war on Yemen in 2019 and efforts to withdraw forces from  and . 

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › CP – Subsidies › 1NC – Shell

The counterplan facilitates international reform better than the plan – our evidence is specific to subsidies.

Urpelanien 21 -- [Johannes Urpelanien is a Nonresident Senior Fellow. Elisha George is a former Graduate Research Assistant - Initiative for Sustainable Energy Policy, Johns Hopkins University – Center on Regulation and Markets, "Reforming global fossil fuel subsidies: How the United States can restart international cooperation," Brookings, 7-14-2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reforming-global-fossil-fuel-subsidies-how-the-united-states-can-restart-international-cooperation/, accessed 7-16-2023] // David

Globally, governments spend more than $500 billion on subsidies for fossil fuels that contribute to inefficiency, inequity, and negative externalities. Despite this obvious problem, efforts at reforming fossil fuel subsidies across the world have been piecemeal. If countries are to achieve the decarbonization goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change, they need to urgently address these subsidies as part of the transition away from fossil fuels. In doing so, countries need to accurately measure all types of support offered to fossil fuels and devise solutions accordingly. This means that they need to identify and tackle both production and consumption subsidies. Production subsidies increase the profitability of extracting and transporting fuels, usually by offering tax breaks, production credits, or accelerated depreciation for capital investment. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) found that production subsidies increased by 30% in 2019, reversing a five-year downward trend. On the other hand, consumption subsidies, which make energy products cheaper for end consumers, declined on average but rose in key economies like India. The United States now has a unique opportunity to lead this global effort. President Joe Biden’s executive order for government agencies to stop fossil fuel subsidies and the United States’ renewed commitment to the Paris Agreement serve as strong commitments to domestic reform. By leveraging these signals, making tangible progress, and showing that it has every intention of eliminating subsidies, the United States can then credibly push for international reform as well. To lead a global subsidy reform effort, the United States should first use the Group of Twenty (G20) to create a working group that develops a collective reform strategy, with the buy-in and participation of members. Second, the United States can recommend that countries, including itself, concretely link reform strategies with their Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement. Lastly, it should develop a program to provide Least Developed Countries (LDCs) with technical and financial assistance to remove subsidies while also promoting economic recovery and growth.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › CP – Subsidies › 1NC – Shell

The plan does not address the root cause of the problem – it’s fossil fuel subsidies, not carbon pricing.

Seba, 21 -- [Tony Seba, "The fastest route to net zero is not a carbon tax: it’s ending the $6 trillion/year fossil fuel bailout," Rethink Disruption, 11-8-2021, https://rethinkdisruption.com/carbon-tax-fossil-fuel-bailout/, accessed 7-16-2023] // David

Global business groups are calling on governments to pursue an international strategy on carbon pricing at the COP26 UN climate summit. While well-intentioned, the reality is we don’t need carbon pricing to create a level-playing field in global markets. We just need to end trillions of dollars of subsidies to the coal, oil and gas industries: because these industries are already stranded. Carbon polluters, like any polluters, should pay for the damages they impose on societies. But carbon pricing is not the most effective way to accelerate the clean energy disruption and get to net zero. Carbon pricing takes mainly two forms. A carbon tax is imposed on the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions generated by fossil fuel producers. Or a ‘cap and trade’ approach imposes limits on how much producers can emit which, if exceeded, incur payments that can be invested in carbon offset schemes. The idea is that by introducing such taxes, markets will shift and companies will be incentivized to transition away from fossil production due to the higher costs. The IMF claims that a carbon tax is “the single most powerful” way to combat climate change. But the IMF is wrong. A study in Environment Research Letters evaluating carbon pricing policies around the world since 1990 concludes that: “Overall, the evidence indicates that carbon pricing has a limited impact on emissions.” That’s because it doesn’t address the root causes of the problem: the fact that the fossil fuel industries and their value chains are already technically bankrupt. Our research at RethinkX shows that when using accurate data for the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), solar, wind and batteries are already cheaper than conventional energy in most regions of the world, which is getting more expensive with time. This means that fossil fuel generation assets are already vastly over-valued and will never meet hoped for returns. What keeps societies locked-in to burning coal, oil and gas are utility monopolies supported by $6 trillion dollars a year (or $11 million a minute) of government subsidies – without which these industries would collapse under their own economic dead-weight. Trying to impose carbon pricing on fossil fuels while giving them trillion dollar handouts is like trying to put out a fire in a burning building by throwing out bits of burning wood while repeatedly dousing the whole structure with petrol. It doesn’t make any sense. The first thing we need to do to put out the fire is to stop throwing petrol everywhere. Then we’ll be in a position to put out the flames for good.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › 2NC – AT – China Follow On BCA

BCA violates WTO – AND even if it doesn’t, it doesn’t spur follow on, but triggers trade wars by the most affected countries, like China – US BCA + CBAM magnifies risk

Koester 21 – (Stefan Koester was a senior policy analyst with ITIF’s Center for Clean Energy Innovation. He has a background in energy and environmental policy and has worked on carbon pricing, corporate sustainability, energy efficiency, electricity markets, and issues related to the electric power sector and renewable energy at the state, regional, and federal levels), "," 9/20/2021, https://itif.org/publications/2021/09/20/unworkable-solution-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanisms-and-global-climate/, accessed 7-17-2023] //sp

Compatibility with the WTO A well-designed trading system would clearly allow nations to impose discriminatory tariffs based on global negative externalities such as climate change. Unfortunately, the WTO is not so well designed. Many trade scholars believe that CBAMs are incompatible with key WTO rules—most notably, the principle of nondiscrimination among a country’s trading partners.23 While WTO member states are supposed to be allowed to adopt policies that are inconsistent with standard trade rules for environmental reasons, these policies may not be “a means of arbitrary/unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”24 Many trade scholars believe that CBAMs are incompatible with key WTO rules. This vague clause is already the subject of litigation within the WTO’s dispute settlement process, which may have a bearing on cases brought against CBAMs.25 To date, countries seeking to defend policies that have the effect of discriminating on environmental grounds have lost their cases, so those hoping to defend a CBAM may find themselves in an uphill battle.26 No matter what the final outcome, the legal ambiguity such cases create, and the slow pace with which they are adjudicated (exacerbated by vacancies that paralyze the WTO Appellate Body), would muddy CBAM implementation.27 Even if a CBAM is successfully negotiated and applied, further risks persist. The burden of administrative compliance may reduce overall trade. Solutions that seek to avoid weakening the economies of developing countries by exempting their products or gradually implementing a CBAM for them could prompt a WTO challenge based on this differential treatment.28 Impacted countries could retaliate unilaterally or multilaterally. Such trade wars could spiral far beyond the initial sectoral confines and into non-related products as nations ratchet up tariffs on a wide swath of products.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › 2NC – AT – No Trade War

The Aff mistakes China’s willingness to cooperate as weakness – Trump era proves a provoked China will respond, a doctrine that continues to be proven

Kurtenbach 19 – (Elaine Kurtenbach is the Asia business editor for The Associated Press. She has worked in Hong Kong, Tokyo, Shanghai and Beijing and is now based in Bangkok at the AP’s regional headquarters. She earned a BA in comparative politics at Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut and a MS in agriculture and resource economics at the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii); "Xi says Beijing wants trade deal, but willing to ‘fight back’," PBS NewsHour, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/xi-says-beijing-wants-trade-deal-but-willing-to-fight-back //sp

President Xi Jinping said Friday that Beijing wants to work for a trade deal with the United States but is not afraid to “fight back” to protect its own interests. Echoing the upbeat tone adopted by other Chinese officials in recent days, Xi told a visiting U.S. business delegation that China holds a “positive attitude” about the trade talks. “As we always said we don’t want to start the trade war, but we are not afraid,” Xi said. “When necessary, we will fight back but we have been working actively to try not to have a trade war.” Later Friday, President Donald Trump reiterated his oft-stated assertion that the world’s two biggest economies are “potentially very close’’ to forging a modest “Phase 1” agreement. Such an agreement would be expected to include increased U.S. farm sales to China but to leave bigger points of conflict largely unresolved. These include long-standing allegations that China steals trade secrets and pressures foreign companies to hand over technology. “We have a deal potentially very close,’’ Trump said in a phone interview with “Fox & Friends.” Yet the president also insisted that Xi “wants to make it much more than I want to make it. I’m not anxious to make it.’’ “As we always said we don’t want to start the trade war, but we are not afraid,” Xi said. The U.S. delegation from Bloomberg’s New Economy Forum, a conference held in Beijing this week, included former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, former U.S. Trade Representative Mike Froman and other dignitaries. The latest flareup in trade tensions came after Trump imposed punitive tariffs last year on billions of dollars’ worth of Chinese exports to the U.S., seeking to ramp up pressure for changes in Chinese trade and investment policies. China has retaliated with tariff hikes of its own. Sanctions have gradually escalated and trade talks have made only halting progress. But the two sides are working toward what they say will be a preliminary agreement to pave the way for tackling more complex issues. During the meeting at Beijing’s ornate Great Hall of the People, Xi reiterated to the group China’s stance that a deal requires “mutual respect and equality.” “We want to work for a Phase 1 agreement on the basis of mutual respect and equality,” Xi told the group. The Wall Street Journal reported Thursday that China’s lead negotiator in the talks, Vice Premier Liu He, has invited his U.S. counterparts to Beijing for more talks, suggesting there may be some progress. However, the prospects even for a more general deal look uncertain, given that China has said it wants a promise from the U.S. side to gradually reduce the tariffs already in place. It’s unclear if the U.S. side would be willing to do that. Pressure is building as financial markets grow increasingly jittery over prospects for a breakthrough. Trump agreed to hold off on raising tariffs further last month while the two sides talked. But the Washington is still due to hike tariffs on $160 billion worth of imports from China next month. That increase would boost prices on smartphones, laptops and many common household goods. Ultimately, the U.S. side wants China to scrap a blueprint for state-led development of industrial leadership in advanced technologies such as robotics and artificial intelligence. Foreign companies also object to policies and practices they say force them to hand over technology in return for access to the vast Chinese domestic market. In the meeting Friday, Xi emphasized that Beijing will not yield its own “financial sovereignty,” hinting at limits to China’s flexibility on issues the ruling party considers vital for the country’s future. He drew from historical references, perhaps mindful of the important role Kissinger played along with the late Premier Zhou Enlai in brokering the rapprochement between Washington and Beijing in the early 1970s after decades of Cold War alienation. China is finding its way “just like feeling the stones while crossing a river,” Xi said, in an expression famously used by Deng Xiaoping, the revolutionary leader who led the “reform and opening up” era beginning in the late 1970s. “We are working to realize the Chinese dream of renewal of our nation,” Xi said.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › General

Taiwan nuclear escalation is highly probable --- weapons capable of caring nukes have been deployed and Ukraine has motivated decisive victory maneuvers

Klare, 22 - Michael T. Klare, The Nation’s defense correspondent, is professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C. (Michael T. Klare, "Could the Fight Over Taiwan Trigger Nuclear war?”, 10/13/22, The Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/china-taiwan-nuclear-war/)//EG

Thanks to Vladimir Putin’s recent implicit threat to employ nuclear weapons if the United States and its NATO allies continue to arm Ukraine—“This is not a bluff,” he insisted on September 21—the perils in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict once again hit the headlines. And it’s entirely possible, as ever more powerful US weapons pour into Ukraine and Russian forces suffer yet more defeats, that the Russian president might indeed believe that the season for threats is ending and only the detonation of a nuclear weapon will convince the Western powers to back off. If so, the war in Ukraine could prove historic in the worst sense imaginable—the first conflict since World War II to lead to nuclear devastation. But hold on! As it happens, Ukraine isn’t the only place on the planet where a nuclear conflagration could erupt in the near future. Sad to say, around the island of Taiwan—where US and Chinese forces are engaging in ever more provocative military maneuvers—there is also an increasing risk that such moves by both sides could lead to nuclear escalation. While neither American nor Chinese officials have explicitly threatened to use such weaponry, both sides have highlighted possible extreme outcomes there. When Joe Biden last spoke with Xi Jinping by telephone on July 29, the Chinese president warned him against allowing House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to visit the island (which she nonetheless did, four days later) or offering any further encouragement to “Taiwan independence forces” there. “Those who play with fire will perish by it,” he assured the American president, an ambiguous warning to be sure, but one that nevertheless left open the possible use of nuclear weapons. As if to underscore that point, on September 4, the day after Pelosi met with senior Taiwanese officials in Taipei, China fired 11 Dongfeng-15 (DF-15) ballistic missiles into the waters around that island. Many Western observers believe that the barrage was meant as a demonstration of Beijing’s ability to attack any US naval vessels that might come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a Chinese blockade or invasion of the island. And the DF-15, with a range of 600 miles, is believed capable of delivering not only a conventional payload, but also a nuclear one. In the days that followed, China also sent nuclear-capable H-6 heavy bombers across the median line in the Taiwan Strait, a previously respected informal boundary between China and that island. Worse yet, state-owned media displayed images of Dongfeng-17 (DF-17) hypersonic ballistic missiles, also believed capable of carrying nuclear weapons, being moved into positions off Taiwan. Washington has not overtly deployed nuclear-capable weaponry in such a brazen fashion near Chinese territory, but it certainly has sent aircraft carriers and guided-missile warships into the area, signaling its ability to launch attacks on the mainland should a war break out. While Pelosi was in Taiwan, for example, the Navy deployed the carrier USS Ronald Reagan with its flotilla of escort vessels in nearby waters. Military officials in both countries are all too aware that should such ships ever attack Chinese territory, those DF-15s and DF-17s would be let loose against them—and, if armed with nuclear warheads, would likely provoke a US nuclear response. The implicit message on both sides: A nuclear war might be possible. And although—unlike with Putin’s comments—the American media hasn’t highlighted the way Taiwan might trigger such a conflagration, the potential is all too ominously there. Current Issue “One China” and “Strategic Ambiguity” In reality, there’s nothing new about the risk of nuclear war over Taiwan. In both the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–55 and 1958, the United States threatened to attack a then-nonnuclear China with such weaponry if it didn’t stop shelling the Taiwanese-controlled islands of Kinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu), located off that country’s coast. At the time, Washington had no formal relations with the communist regime on the mainland and recognized the Republic of China (ROC)—as Taiwan calls itself—as the government of all China. In the end, however, US leaders found it advantageous to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in place of the ROC and the risk of a nuclear conflict declined precipitously—until recently. Credit the new, increasingly perilous situation to Washington’s changing views of Taiwan’s strategic value to America’s dominant position in the Pacific as it faces the challenge of China’s emergence as a great power. When the US officially recognized the PRC in 1978, it severed its formal diplomatic and military relationship with the ROC, while “acknowledg[ing] the Chinese position that there is but one China and [that] Taiwan is part of China.” That stance—what came to be known as the “One China” policy—has, in fact, underwritten peaceful relations between the two countries (and Taiwan’s autonomy) ever since, by allowing Chinese leaders to believe that the island would, in time, join the mainland. Taiwan’s safety and autonomy has also been preserved over the years by another key feature of US policy, known as “strategic ambiguity.” It originated with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, a measure passed in the wake of the US decision to recognize the PRC as the legal government of all China. Under the act, still in effect, the United States is empowered to supply Taiwan with “defensive” arms, while maintaining only semi-official ties with its leadership. It also says that Washington would view any Chinese attempt to alter Taiwan’s status through violent means as a matter “of grave concern,” but without explicitly stating that the United States will come to Taiwan’s aid if that were to occur. Such official ambiguity helped keep the peace, in part by offering Taiwan’s leadership no guarantee that Washington would back them if they declared independence and China invaded, while giving the leaders of the People’s Republic no assurance that Washington would remain on the sidelines if they did. Since 1980, both Democratic and Republican administrations have relied on such strategic ambiguity and the One China policy to guide their peaceful relations with the PRC. Over the years, there have been periods of spiking tensions between Washington and Beijing, with Taiwan’s status a persistent irritant, but never a fundamental breach in relations. And that—consider the irony, if you will—has allowed Taiwan to develop into a modern, prosperous quasi-state, while escaping involvement in a major-power confrontation (in part because it just didn’t figure prominently enough in US strategic thinking). From 1980 to 2001, America’s top foreign-policy officials were largely focused on defeating the Soviet Union, dealing with the end of the Cold War, and expanding global trade opportunities. Then, from September 11, 2001, to 2018, their attention was diverted to the Global War on Terror. In the early years of the Trump administration, however, senior military officials began switching their focus from the War on Terror to what they termed “great-power competition,” arguing that facing off against “near-peer” adversaries, namely China and Russia, should be the dominant theme in military planning. And only then did Taiwan acquire a different significance. The Pentagon’s new strategic outlook was first spelled out in the National Defense Strategy of February 2018 in this way: “The central challenge to US prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition” with China and Russia. (And yes, the emphasis was in the original.) China, in particular, was identified as a vital threat to Washington’s continued global dominance. “As China continues its economic and military ascendance,” the document asserted, “it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.” An ominous “new Cold War” era had begun. Taiwan’s Strategic Significance Rises To prevent China from achieving that most feared of all results, “Indo-Pacific regional hegemony,” Pentagon leaders devised a multipronged strategy, combining an enhanced US military presence in the region with beefed-up, ever more militarized ties with America’s allies there. As that 2018 National Defense Strategy put it, “We will strengthen our alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains.” Initially, that “networked security architecture” was only to involve long-term allies like Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Soon enough, however, Taiwan came to be viewed as a crucial part of such an architecture. To grasp what this meant, imagine a map of the Western Pacific. In seeking to “contain” China, Washington was relying on a chain of island and peninsular allies stretching from South Korea and Japan to the Philippines and Australia. Japan’s southernmost islands, including Okinawa—the site of major American military bases (and a vigorous local anti-base movement)—do reach all the way into the Philippine Sea. Still, there remains a wide gap between them and Luzon, the northernmost Philippine island. Smack in the middle of that gap lies… yep, you guessed it, Taiwan. In the view of the top American military and foreign policy officials, for the United States to successfully prevent China from becoming a major regional power, it would have to bottle up that country’s naval forces within what they began calling “the first island chain”—the string of nations stretching from Japan to the Philippines and Indonesia. For China to thrive, as they saw it, that nation’s navy would have to be able to send its ships past that line of islands and reach deep into the Pacific. You won’t be surprised to learn, then, that solidifying US defenses along that very chain became a top Pentagon priority—and, in that context, Taiwan has, ominously enough, come to be viewed as a crucial piece in the strategic puzzle. Last December, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner summed up the Pentagon’s new way of thinking about the island’s geopolitical role when he appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last December. “Taiwan,” he said, “is located at a critical node within the first island chain, anchoring a network of US allies and partners that is critical to the region’s security and critical to the defense of vital US interests in the Indo-Pacific.” This new perception of Taiwan’s “critical” significance has led senior policy-makers in Washington to reconsider the basics, including their commitment to a One China policy and to strategic ambiguity. While still claiming that One China remains White House policy, President Biden has repeatedly insisted all too unambiguously that the United States has an obligation to defend Taiwan if attacked. When asked recently on Sixty Minutes whether “U.S. forces…would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion,” Biden said, without hesitation, “Yes.” The administration has also upgraded its diplomatic ties with the island and promised it billions of dollars’ worth of arms transfers and other forms of military assistance. In essence, such moves constitute a de facto abandonment of “One China” and its replacement with a “one China, one Taiwan” policy. Not surprisingly, the Chinese authorities have reacted to such comments and the moves accompanying them with increasing apprehension and anger. As seen from Beijing, they represent the full-scale repudiation of multiple statements acknowledging Taiwan’s indivisible ties to the mainland, as well as a potential military threat of the first order should that island become a formal US ally. For President Xi and his associates, this is simply intolerable. “The repeated attempts by the Taiwan authorities to look for US support for their independence agenda as well as the intention of some Americans to use Taiwan to contain China” are deeply troubling, President Xi told Biden during their telephone call in November 2021. “Such moves are extremely dangerous, just like playing with fire. Whoever plays with fire will get burned.” Since then, Chinese officials have steadily escalated their rhetoric, threatening war in ever more explicit terms. “If the Taiwanese authorities, emboldened by the United States, keep going down the road for independence,” Qin Gang, China’s US ambassador, typically told NPR in January 2022, “it most likely will involve China and the United States, the two big countries, in military conflict.” To demonstrate its seriousness, China has begun conducting regular air and naval exercises in the air- and sea-space surrounding Taiwan. Such maneuvers usually involve the deployment of five or six warships and a dozen or more warplanes, as well as ever greater displays of firepower, clearly with the intention of intimidating the Taiwanese leadership. On August 5, for example, the Chinese deployed 13 warships and 68 warplanes in areas around Taiwan and two days later, 14 ships and 66 planes. Each time, the Taiwanese scramble their own aircraft and deploy coastal defense vessels in response. Accordingly, as China’s maneuvers grow in size and frequency, the risk of an accidental or unintended clash becomes ever more likely. The increasingly frequent deployment of US warships to nearby waters only adds to this explosive mix. Every time an American naval vessel is sent through the Taiwan Strait—something that occurs almost once a month now—China scrambles its own air and sea defenses, producing a comparable risk of unintended violence. This was true, for example, when the guided-missile cruisers USS Antietam and USS Chancellorsville sailed through that strait on August 28th. According to Zhao Lijian, a spokesperson for the foreign ministry, China’s military “conducted security tracking and monitoring of the U.S. warships’ passage during their whole course and had all movements of the U.S. warships under control.” No Barriers to Escalation? If it weren’t for the seemingly never-ending war in Ukraine, the dangers of all of this might be far more apparent and deemed far more newsworthy. Unfortunately, at this point, there are no indications that either Beijing or Washington is prepared to scale back its provocative military maneuvers around Taiwan. That means an accidental or unintended clash could occur at any time, possibly triggering a full-scale conflict. Imagine, then, what a decision by Taiwan to declare full independence or by the Biden administration to abandon the One China policy could mean. China would undoubtedly respond aggressively, perhaps with a naval blockade of the island or even a full-scale invasion. Given the increasingly evident lack of interest among the key parties in compromise, a violent outcome appears ever more likely. However such a conflict erupts, it may prove difficult to contain the fighting at a “conventional” level. After all, both sides are wary of another war of attrition like the one unfolding in Ukraine and have instead shaped their military forces for rapid, firepower-intensive combat aimed at securing a decisive victory quickly. For Beijing, this could mean firing hundreds of ballistic missiles at US ships and air bases in the region with the aim of eliminating any American capacity to attack its territory. For Washington, it might mean launching missiles at China’s key ports, air bases, radar stations, and command centers. In either case, the results could prove catastrophic. For the United States, the loss of its carriers and other warships; for China, the loss of its very capacity to make war. Would leaders of the losing side accept such a situation without resorting to nuclear weapons? No one can say for sure, but the temptation to escalate would undoubtedly be great. Unfortunately, at the moment, there are no US-China negotiations under way to resolve the Taiwan question, to prevent unintended clashes in the Taiwan Strait, or to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation. In fact, China quite publicly cut off all discussion of bilateral issues, ranging from military affairs to climate change, in the wake of Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. So, it’s essential, despite the present focus on escalation risks in Ukraine, to recognize that avoiding a war over Taiwan is no less important—especially given the danger that such a conflict could prove of even greater destructiveness. That’s why it’s so critical that Washington and Beijing put aside their differences long enough to initiate talks focused on preventing such a catastrophe.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › General

Conflict not confined an escalation — US and every country in east asia gets involved

Newsham 20 - retired US Marine Officer and a Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fellow Grant Newsham, "War in the Taiwan Strait is not unthinkable," Asia Times, 1-15-2020, https://asiatimes.com/2020/01/war-in-the-taiwan-strait-is-not-unthinkable/-- 嘉玮

Conflict not confined A fight over Taiwan will most likely not be confined geographically to the Taiwan Strait area – nor restrained in the level and scope of violence. And the US will likely get involved. Once that happens, the possibility of eventual nuclear escalation cannot be ruled out. Indeed, the prospect of US involvement is near 100% once Americans in Taiwan are killed. Nothing unifies Americans more. Even worse for Xi, despite a 45-year track record of appeasement of China’s ambitions, the United States is finally waking up to the threat faced by the island democracy, as evidenced by recent National Defense Strategy documents, passage of the Taiwan Travel Act and other Congressional declarations calling for increased support for Taiwan. Notably, support for Taiwan appears to have overwhelming bipartisan support, including from politicians who loathe President Donald Trump and resist him on every other matter. Whether this stern approach to China will survive a change in US administration and the potential return of a PRC “engagement” faction in business, academia, and officialdom is an open question. Indeed, former US State Department East Asian Affairs acting director Susan Thornton advised Chinese Communist officials several months ago to just wait for another more accommodating administration. Moreover, after too many years of US leaders – military and civilian – dismissing the Chinese military threat, a fight won’t be easy for the US. Even getting in close to support Taiwan militarily will be difficult and costly. The PLA has had two decades to upgrade its military and is, unfortunately, a match for the US in certain areas – or even superior. That said, the American military is still powerful. Although it requires urgent improvements, the US military can still take on the People’s Liberation Army. Chinese submarines, ships and aircraft will go down, together with the “only-child” sons manning them. The sorrow of the thousands of mainland Chinese families who were allowed only one child may not bother senior CCP officials, though, as there is a large, “spare” unmarried male population. In pursuit of Xi’s “China Dream,” Beijing may be less concerned about casualties than one imagines. Rather, the bigger worry for Beijing might be the simple embarrassment of losing troops, ships and aircraft in such numbers that the CCP leadership appears clueless about what it has gotten into. As important, economic difficulties caused by the conflict might add to such perceptions on the part of the Chinese public. Nations often rally around leaders once the shooting starts, even as casualties, hardships, and expenses mount. With Beijing’s firm control over its propaganda and internal security apparatus, it is possible that the PRC will become a fiercer, even more implacable enemy after losing tens of thousands of military personnel, and (foreseeably) some number of civilians. Still, it is entirely foreseeable that the Chinese public and Xi’s rivals might blame “Xi Jinping Thought” for their problems. But for Beijing it still might be worth the costs given Taiwan’s value from a strategic geography perspective alone. Seize Formosa and the PRC has breached the so-called First Island Chain that effectively hems in Chinese forces and prevents unfettered access to the Pacific Ocean. PLA forces operating from Taiwan would undercut the entire US and allied defense posture in the Western Pacific. It would be a huge psychological blow to American prestige, and to Japan’s confidence in its ability to survive a similar assault. American nervous system Despite 18 years of the “Long War,” in reality, the US has gotten used to relatively painless wars in recent times. The immediate human costs alone of a war arising over Taiwan will be a shock. A few years ago four US Special Forces soldiers were killed in an ambush in Niger, and it was considered a national catastrophe. One wonders how the American public, and political class, will respond to losing 5,000 sailors and Marines in an afternoon. Even the US military will be jolted. Recall the surprise of British forces (and the public) when Argentine bombs and missiles started sinking Royal Navy ships during the Falklands War in 1982. A fight with China will be much worse. US leadership spent too many years ignoring or denying the possibility. As a result of the bloodshed, the US and PRC relationship will be hostile for decades to come. You don’t kill thousands of each other’s citizens and just forget about it. Not even long-time “Friend of China” Henry Kissinger and former Goldman Sachs CEO Hank Paulson, who played key roles in paralyzing the US strategic response to China’s increasingly antagonistic rise, will be welcome in Beijing – and one hopes they would not be inclined to visit in any event. For most “average” Americans, the allure of cheap Chinese goods at Wal-Mart will fade as the first casualties are announced, and even Wall Street bankers (some of them, at least) will realize they are, after all, flag-waving Americans. In the case of those with less patriotic and pro-democracy instincts, financial sanctions will likely prevent them from doing business with the enemy. There is an added risk for Beijing. What if Tokyo publicly admits what it has long thought: that Japan’s first line of defense is Taiwan? The Japan Self-Defense Forces are professional, well equipped and (in some cases) formidable – particularly the Japanese navy with its submarine and anti-submarine warfare units. It is hard to imagine a Taiwan Strait conflict not expanding to include Japan: it will either be compelled to support the US for fear of breaking the Japan-US alliance or it will be forced to respond to a Chinese attack on its territory, and seizure of certain of Japan’s southern Nansei Shoto islands as part of the PLA’s campaign against Taiwan. So while Japan has spent decades pretending it is exempt from war and the serious requirement of preparing for it, conflict just might come its way, unbidden. Tokyo either assents to PRC domination and ends its alliance with the United States – or rapidly improves its military capabilities – to perhaps include nuclear weapons. Most importantly, Japan and its military must be prepared to shoot – and that will be a huge psychological shift for the JSDF and Japanese society writ large. Japan’s defense capability is less than it appears on paper, owing to decades of pathological dependence on the United States. But a crisis is often necessary to spur Japan’s ruling class into action. A shoot-up over Taiwan just might be crisis enough for Tokyo. And while all this is happening around Taiwan, what does North Korea do? One plausible scenario is an attack on South Korea – both as a distraction to benefit Beijing’s efforts against Taiwan and the US, and as an outright effort to topple the ROK government and unify the peninsula on Pyongyang’s terms. Even launching a handful of missiles against the South or towards Japan would stir things up considerably, and stretch available US forces for the Taiwan front. A fight over Taiwan would also force other countries to decide whose side they are on. This choice may come quickly for Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia if the Straits of Malacca are closed. This would signify the end of the convenient (but impossible to continue) global fantasy in which nations have avoided choosing sides while pretending the PRC is a benign country, like a really big Canada. Nuclear weapons might start to look like a necessary option for more than a few countries besides Japan – Australia and South Korea, for instance. As a logical outcome, one expects the world will split into rival camps, and with a considerable degree of economic disengagement. The US perhaps has the advantage for now, but suppose the PRC prevails (even modestly) in the conflict, and ASEAN nations decide to align with China more than is presently the case. And beyond into Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, the PRC might be viewed as the safer long-term bet. As noted, there is a possibility of the conflict spreading well beyond Asia as the US and partners shut down PRC bases and other facilities overseas that are useful for military and commercial purposes, or seize or sink China-bound merchant vessels – and any PLA Navy ships that present themselves. The PRC will not sit idly, however. For starters, it is already capable of targeting US bases and forces in Japan and the Central Pacific and presumably will do so, further expanding the conflict and fueling tit-for-tat escalation.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › General

Taiwan invasion likely and has global consequences — civilian suffering and decks economy

Newsham 20 - retired US Marine Officer and a Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fellow Grant Newsham, "War in the Taiwan Strait is not unthinkable," Asia Times, 1-15-2020, https://asiatimes.com/2020/01/war-in-the-taiwan-strait-is-not-unthinkable/-- 嘉玮

Whether anyone actually wins a war is a philosophical debate. The Germans and Japanese in 1945 might have thought wars do indeed have winners. But perhaps it’s better said that in most conflicts some parties lose more than others. Such would be the case if Beijing attempted to militarily subjugate Taiwan. And Xi Jinping just might do so. He declared in a January 2019 speech that China did “not promise to renounce the use of force” but, rather, reserved “the option to use all necessary measures” to take Taiwan. Taiwan voters on Saturday were conscious of Xi’s warning as they voted in their presidential election, but they decided to keep Tsai Ing-wen in office for another four years – definitely not Xi’s desired outcome. Much of the debate over a Taiwan Strait conflict focuses on preparation for and conduct of the PRC’s attack: whether Beijing will or won’t attack, what an attack might look like and Taiwan’s ability to defend itself, whether the US would or should get involved and whether it ought to sell Taiwan this or that weapon. Such discussion is useful, but the actual consequences and longer-term ripple effects of a fight over Taiwan deserve much more attention. The Battle for Taiwan would have truly global consequences, akin to the invasion of Poland by the Soviets and Germans in 1939. Examined here are key aspects of what happens once the shooting starts, and the follow-on global economic and political effects. The envisioned scenario is a full-scale PLA assault against Taiwan, but it’s worth noting that even a “limited” assault – such as against one of Taiwan’s offshore islands – may not stay limited very long. Given Beijing’s oft-stated determination to take all of Taiwan, an off-shore island assault would only constitute a tactical objective in the march on Taipei, and would also have serious and wide-ranging political and economic consequences. Of course, Beijing hopes to defeat Taiwan without a military conflict: its immediate strategy is, through relentless political warfare, to scare and psychologically batter Taiwan into submission. But President Xi seems willing to use force. He increasingly sounds like a resentful drunk talking himself into a fight in a South Boston bar at 1 am. And People’s Liberation Army generals – flush with massive and increasingly sophisticated new weaponry – are eager to prove their allegiance to achieving Xi’s “China Dream” of “The Great Reunification.” If it comes to a cross-strait shoot up, China’s powerful military with its arsenal of missiles, long-range rockets, ships, aircraft – and apparent ability to use them – can certainly hammer Taiwan, and just might seize the island. But such a victory would come at an immense cost in lives, money, and reputation. It would be a Pyrrhic victory that would result in the PRC’s isolation and genuine decoupling from the civilized world. And an assault on Taiwan won’t be something started on Thursday and finished on Monday – won’t be a “short sharp war.” Nor will it be business as usual after a couple of weeks, with everything forgotten and US-bound shipments of iPhones and plastic Santa Clauses resuming, and American soybeans going the other way. For starters, Taiwan can resist an assault even though the military balance now heavily favors the People’s Republic. Taiwan’s military is competent and bolstered with so-called asymmetric weapons and operational concepts. Further, it is aided by formidable cyber-warfare capabilities. It can inflict heavy casualties on PLA forces, and there is the added morale heft Taipei can leverage: these are free people fighting for their lives. However, even if fighting tooth and nail, Taiwan will suffer immensely, regardless of whether the PLA actually manages to capture the island and eliminate organized opposition. It requires little imagination to get a sense of the destruction and loss of life from a Chinese assault on Taiwan, particularly once civilian targets are hit. China will likely want to terrorize the civilian population into submission early with its initial missile and airstrikes, but it just might only target selected military and government capabilities at this point. However, once fighting starts in urban areas casualties will be in the tens, if not hundreds, of thousands; infrastructure – transportation, power, computer networks – will be destroyed, and the society and economy will be brought to their knees. And should the Chinese assault succeed, there is the horror of Communist occupation awaiting the survivors. As repeatedly demonstrated by the Chinese Communist Party since its inception, it remorselessly inflicts cruel (often fatal) retribution on the many people who resisted the Chinese takeover – as well as on many of those who secretly supported the PRC’s efforts.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › Impact – Japan

Japan — security, semiconductors, democracy

Buchan 23 - (staff reporter for Taipei times Noah Buchan), "The world after a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan," Taipei Times, 7-14-2023, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2023/07/14/2003803158-- 嘉玮

JAPAN — SECURITY, SEMICONDUCTORS AND DEMOCRACY Matake Kamiya says that a successful attack on Taiwan by China would shatter the security system of the US, having an equally detrimental effect on the world’s liberal democracies and their ability to provide each other with security guarantees. “[A successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan] would change Japan’s security environment fundamentally. Any discussion for Japan of Taiwan’s fall should have this fact as its starting point,” writes Kamiya, a professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan. Kamiya writes that most Japanese security experts he interviewed believe that the US can prevail against China if it attacked Taiwan — if, that is, it sends serious reinforcements. If Taiwan is taken, these experts reason, the US did not provide meaningful support, so “the confidence of regional countries in the US willingness to commit to regional security will collapse.” Kamiya says that both imagined scenarios would for Japan amount to the same outcome, except in two areas. In scenario one, confidence in a US security alliance would plummet; scenario two could witness Japan and other allies of the US shifting towards China’s sphere of influence in an emerging bipolar Asia-Pacific. However, under scenario two, China could attack Japan and the 50,000 US troops stationed there, which would further undermine trust in a Japanese-US security alliance. It may be the case, he adds, that the US would take Japan’s security more seriously, believing that if it doesn’t, Tokyo will side with China in an emerging Asia-Pacific conflagration. Kamiya also discusses Taiwan’s existence as a democracy and close partner of Japan, which constrains China’s activities in the Pacific, and limits China’s access to US military bases in Guam and Hawaii — critical to maintaining peace and stability in the Western Pacific. Additionally, so long as China’s military is directed towards Taiwan, military power directed towards Japan remains limited. That would change after an invasion. Chinese military activities will become more active than they are today in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, the Western Pacific and the South China Sea, where 90 percent of Japan’s crude and 60 percent of its natural gas are transported through. Japan’s current defense posture doesn’t anticipate a Chinese attack from the Pacific side, demonstrated quite clearly by the fact there are no Self-Defense Force bases or camps on the Izu Islands or the Bonin Islands. With regards to semiconductor technology, the economic impact will not only be serious for Japan, but for the world as a whole. Thirty-three percent of the semiconductors used in Japan are imported from Taiwan. Tokyo also depends heavily on Taiwan for high-performance logic semiconductors that cannot be manufactured in Japan, while Taiwan currently accounts for 92 percent of the most advanced semiconductor manufacturing in the world. “The negative impact on Japan’s economy is expected to be substantial, if not critical,” he writes. Finally, Kamiya says that a failure of the US and Japan to defend democratic Taiwan will also impress on the international community that liberal democracy is in retreat in East Asia and autocracy is on the rise. “The cost of the fall of Taiwan is prohibitively high for Japan,” Kamiya writes.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › Impact – Australia

Australia—Taiwan invasion kills Australian perception of the US and ends US influence in the Indo-Pacific

Buchan 23 - (staff reporter for Taipei times Noah Buchan), "The world after a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan," Taipei Times, 7-14-2023, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2023/07/14/2003803158-- 嘉玮

AUSTRALIA — ‘CHINA DREAM MADE MANIFEST’ The failure of the US and its allies to come to Taiwan’s defense would generate a highly permissive environment for Beijing, writes Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Taiwan is a means for China to supplant the US as the dominant strategic power in the Indo-Pacific, and failing to come to Taiwan’s defense would seriously undermine the perception that the US would come to the defense of other allies in the region. Even worse, Taiwan’s loss after US military intervention would be a catastrophic blow to the interests of the US and probably represent the end of a free and open Indo-Pacific, as US influence in the region wanes in favor of China’s expansionism. “Beijing’s grand strategic objective would be to promote a community of common destiny, led by China, in which its neighbors accept a ‘Chinese Century’ and a hegemonic new Middle Kingdom. It would be the China Dream made manifest,” Davis writes. Davis says that a successful invasion and occupation of Taiwan would force Australia to reconsider whether the US could live up to its security commitments to Canberra — even if their current security commitments survive. “At the most fundamental level,” Davis writes, “Australian and American interests are intertwined and linked at the military-strategic level, with Australian reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence security guarantees as a foundation for Australia’s defense policy for decades.” A failure of the US to intervene in support of Taiwan would raise questions in Australia about the efficacy of US extended nuclear deterrence, not just for Australia, but for other key allies such as Japan and South Korea, particularly if an inability to intervene was in part seen to be driven by implicit or explicit Chinese threats of nuclear weapons use, in a manner similar to Russia’s use of nuclear threats against NATO during the Ukraine war. Under these circumstances, Davis raises the possibility of a “nuclear sharing” agreement, which could see Australia developing alternative deterrence arrangements with India, South Korea and Japan to slow Chinese expansionism. Ultimately, Davis writes, Australia shouldn’t wait until an invasion occurs, because hoping that Beijing accepts the current status quo across the Taiwan Strait indefinitely is an unlikely scenario. There needs to be a serious discussion among the US and its allies about the threat of a cross-strait invasion before 2030. “Hope is not a strategy,” Davis writes.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › Impact – Korea

Korea — end of US east Asian hegemony, nuclear prolif, emboldens North Korea

Buchan 23 - (staff reporter for Taipei times Noah Buchan), "The world after a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan," Taipei Times, 7-14-2023, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2023/07/14/2003803158-- 嘉玮

SOUTH KOREA — EMBOLDENED NORTH Kim Du-yeon, an adjunct senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, says that four key factors determine how South Korea would react to the loss of Taiwan: a moderate or conservative government in power, US-South Korea relations, China-South Korea relations and the actions of North Korea. Like previous contributors, Kim says both outcomes would be negative in terms of how Seoul perceives US security commitments and its interest in obtaining a nuclear deterrent. Kim writes that the majority of the South Korean public and policy establishment aren’t paying attention to events taking place across the Taiwan Strait. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made the South Korean public aware that conflicts in a different region are linked to their daily life, which has forced democratic countries to sharpen their support for liberal democratic values against emboldened authoritarian states. That being said, the South Korean public would probably oppose its military’s involvement in a Taiwan crisis. Kim says that China’s successful takeover of Taiwan could result in two outcomes. The first sees China become an aggressive and coercive hegemon in the region. Although some experts that Kim interviewed believe that South Korean goods could still pass through the Taiwan Strait, confrontation in the waters of Northeast Asia would likely occur, leading to significant concerns over freedom of navigation and intelligence-gathering efforts. Kim writes that the second outcome sees China engage in a charm offensive, or “smile diplomacy.” China would engage Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian countries to prevent international isolation and sanctions. Allies and partners of the US could accommodate China either out of fear of retribution or survival. Regardless of either two outcomes, many in South Korea would believe that Washington could no longer be trusted to live up to its security guarantees. A conservative government in Seoul could begin serious discussions on ways to develop nuclear weapons. An isolationist government in Washington could add weight to Seoul’s decision to go nuclear. A third consideration involves North Korea. Kim says Taiwan’s fall would likely embolden North Korea to be more aggressive, both politically and militarily — especially if the US committed its 25,000 troops based in South Korea to a Taiwan contingency — regardless of the aforementioned two actions. Kim says that South Korean officials need to have frank conversations with the US about what their role in a Taiwan conflict would be (“strategic clarity”), particularly in the context of a changing liberal democratic international order. Government officials must also engage in frank discussion with the South Korean public about what their country’s role would be if China successfully invaded Taiwan.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › Impact – India

India — Taiwan invasion destroys US credibility

Buchan 23 - (staff reporter for Taipei times Noah Buchan), "The world after a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan," Taipei Times, 7-14-2023, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2023/07/14/2003803158-- 嘉玮

INDIA — UNRELIABLE PARTNER Whereas the contributors from Japan, South Korea and Australia say that the US as a regional security guarantor would be called into question after Taiwan’s fall, the contributor from India, Jabin Jacob, already sees the US as an unreliable security partner, which would play a key role in how New Delhi would respond. “It remains somewhat of a default position in India that the US cannot be relied on and that in the case of any outbreak in hostilities with China, India would be on its own,” writes Jacob, associate professor at the Shiv Nadar University and an adjunct research fellow at the National Maritime Foundation. Jacob says that India “remains dismissive of feelers or requests from the Taiwanese side” to receive more international recognition, and the bilateral relationship does not have weight or depth to allow India to take risks to commit to Taiwan as an international actor. Consequently, a successful invasion of Taiwan by China would change little in the burgeoning bilateral relationship, though it would have implications on a range of other issues. Jacob finds it significant that the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has never reached a consensus on Chinese threats, even though Beijing has been New Delhi’s primary security challenge for many years. BJP voters, he adds, have always considered Pakistan and Indian Muslims as more immediate concerns. China doesn’t fire up the average Indian voter, which means military reforms to improve Indian military capabilities “have lagged dangerously.” “Simply put,” Jacob writes, “the ‘reclaiming’ of Taiwan by China will likely not generate the necessary pressures within the Indian political establishment to focus on the threat posed by China.” India would view Taiwan’s fall as directly linked to the diplomatic and military failures of the US, because Washington failed to meet its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. India would be concerned about the long-term reliability of other US partners like Japan, Australia and South Korea in political projects like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and other concerns such as its substantial trade in the South China Sea. Further, efforts to diplomatically and economically integrate South Asia with India will be undermined, especially its national security. India’s ability to manage Beijing will be shaken considerably and likely increase the likelihood of flareups along the Line of Actual Control between China and India. “India, far from being a ‘leading power,’ will likely become a ‘receding power’ — worried constantly about threats to its territory from an ascendant China,” Jacob writes.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › Impact – Semiconductors

Invasion spills over globally — loss of semiconductor industry is catastrophic

Vest 22 - (Master’s degree in Chinese Economic and Political Affairs from UC San Diego and a Bachelor’s degree in International Affairs from Colorado State University. Charlie Vest et al.), "The Global Economic Disruptions from a Taiwan Conflict," Rhodium Group, 12-14-2022, https://rhg.com/research/taiwan-economic-disruptions/ //sp

Immense global disruptions, even under conservative assumptions In a blockade scenario, the most significant disruption to global economic activity would come from a halt to Taiwan’s trade with the world, particularly in semiconductors. Associated disruptions to global supply chains—especially in major chip-consuming sectors such as electronics, automotive, and computing—would have grave repercussions for the world economy. Global trade with China would also decline due to a contraction in global trade financing, shocking the global economy and potentially triggering debt crises among China’s more fragile trade partners. Disruptions from lost trade with Taiwan Taiwan is the world’s 16th largest trading economy, having imported and exported $922 billion in goods and services in 2021. Almost all of this trade would be severely disrupted in the event of a blockade. Setting aside the value of imports that end up being re-exported and ICT-related trade that we cover below, approximately $565 billion in Taiwanese value-added trade would be at high risk of disruption from a blockade.[4] While absolute trade values at stake are high, the most serious economic impact would come from disruptions to semiconductor supply chains and related downstream industries. Taiwan produces 92% of the world’s most advanced logic chips (at node sizes less than 10 nanometers in size), as well as a third to half of the global output for less sophisticated but nonetheless critical chips.[5] By some estimates, Taiwan’s leading chip foundry TSMC produces 35% of the world’s automotive microcontrollers and 70% of the world’s smartphone chipsets. It also dominates in the production of chips for high-end graphics processing units in PCs and servers. A rough, conservative estimate of dependence on Taiwanese chips suggests that companies in these industries could be forced to forego as much as $1.6 trillion in revenue annually in the event of a blockade.[6] Beyond the immediate effect on corporate revenues from lost semiconductor production, the global economy would face significant second-order impacts that would likely add trillions more in economic impact. Many industries depend on the availability of goods and equipment containing Taiwanese chips. These include e-commerce, logistics, ride-hailing, entertainment, and other industries that collectively employ tens of millions of people. Spare parts and components for critical public infrastructure, such as telecommunications and medical devices, could become scarce. Ultimately, the full social and economic impacts of a chip shortage of that scale are incalculable, but they would likely be catastrophic.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › Impact – Economy

Invasion destroys at least 2 trillion in economic activity from just a blockade

Vest 22 - (Master’s degree in Chinese Economic and Political Affairs from UC San Diego and a Bachelor’s degree in International Affairs from Colorado State University. Charlie Vest et al.), "The Global Economic Disruptions from a Taiwan Conflict," Rhodium Group, 12-14-2022, https://rhg.com/research/taiwan-economic-disruptions/-- 嘉玮

When taken together, our estimates suggest that the global disruption from a Taiwan conflict would put well over two trillion dollars in economic activity at risk, even before factoring in the impact from international sanctions or a military response. This note offers a look at just some of the likely disruption channels in a blockade scenario, and this figure should be regarded as a floor; the full scope of imperiled activity would surely be greater. Importantly, most of these disruptions would materialize almost immediately (particularly the impacts in financial markets) and would be hard to reverse. These impacts would be felt across the global economy, including in countries that may appear to be only tangentially linked to Taiwan. Some of the impacts of a blockade could be mitigated, if only partially. A share of global trade could be redirected, and smart policy and business decisions in advance of a crisis—such as increasing stockpiles of critical chips—could mitigate the impacts from a short-lived conflict. Yet Taiwan’s centrality in the global semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem means there would be few alternatives in the short-run, and thus disruptions from a blockade would lead to very high, unavoidable costs to the global economy. Our work sets aside, for now, the economic costs of international policy responses such as financial sanctions against China, but the potential application of these tools needs to be better understood. Additionally, while we have focused on the direct economic activity at risk from a blockade, there are a wide range of economic risks associated with lower-level tensions in the Taiwan Strait that need to be better understood. These might include Chinese economic coercion against foreign companies and countries in response to Taiwan-related statements or actions, rising shipping costs from intensifying military activity in the Taiwan Strait, or the reaction of financial markets to a further escalation between China and Taiwan, possibly involving the US. Preparing for these risks, including through rigorous contingency planning, will be important, whether or not one believes a full-blown conflict is coming.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI LS Carbon Dividend Neg 23 › China DA › 2NC – I/L – Broader Asia

Increased trade tensions with China hurts Asian nations

Saito 23 – (Yuta Saito is a second-year Ph.D. student in Computer Science at Cornell University. Saito completed hus bachelor’s degree in Industrial Engineering and Economics at the Tokyo Institute of Technology); "Asia stands to lose big from U.S.-China trade war: IMF Asia chief," Nikkei Asia, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Asia-stands-to-lose-big-from-U.S.-China-trade-war-IMF-Asia-chief //sp

China and the U.S. account for 42% of the global economy. Tensions between the two countries have increased since 2017, and we estimate that the tariffs alone reduced global GDP by 0.4 percentage points in 2022. That's a pretty big impact. There is a lot of noise about imposing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and tensions have risen following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Increased trade tensions will result in economic losses not just for China and the U.S., but for Asia as a whole, given the region is highly integrated into global supply chains and has significant trade exposure to both countries. The economic consequences of increased fragmentation could be significant. In a severe fragmentation scenario, where the world became divided into two blocs based on countries' positions toward Russia's war in Ukraine, GDP in Asia could decline 3 to 4 percentage points due to reduced trade. Japan and South Korea, which export substantial volumes to China, would be affected. [Association of Southeast Asian Nations members] such as Vietnam and Cambodia could also feel a strong impact.