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2023 SDI Evidence
Taxes Good/Bad › Wealth Tax › Wealth Tax Bad

Wealth tax in Europe failed.

Greg Rosalsky, 2-26-2019 ( If a Wealth Tax is Such a Good Idea, Why Did Europe Kill Theirs? NPR 7-3-2023 https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2019/02/26/698057356/if-a-wealth-tax-is-such-a-good-idea-why-did-europe-kill-theirs) // cb-khs

Normally progressives like to point to Europe for policy success. Not this time. The experiment with the wealth tax in Europe was a failure in many countries. France's wealth tax contributed to the exodus of an estimated 42,000 millionaires between 2000 and 2012, among other problems. Only last year, French president Emmanuel Macron killed it. In 1990, twelve countries in Europe had a wealth tax. Today, there are only three: Norway, Spain, and Switzerland. According to reports by the OECD and others, there were some clear themes with the policy: it was expensive to administer, it was hard on people with lots of assets but little cash, it distorted saving and investment decisions, it pushed the rich and their money out of the taxing countries—and, perhaps worst of all, it didn't raise much revenue.

2023 SDI Evidence
Taxes Good/Bad › Wealth Tax › Wealth Tax Bad

Laundry list of reasons why a wealth tax won’t work.

Karl Smith, 3-17-2020 ( A Wealth Tax Will Hurt the Economy, Not Help. Boston Review. 7-3-2023. https://www.bostonreview.net/forum_response/karl-smith-wealth-tax-will-hurt-economy-not-help/.) // cb-khs

In fact, by their own estimates, the radical wealth tax they endorse would bring in less and less revenue over time, since it would erode very large fortunes and prevent new ones from being created. For the same reason, it would also reduce revenues raised by the capital gains tax, the income tax, and the estate tax. A radical wealth tax could thus leave the less well off worse than they are today. For their argument to work, the decline in wealth over time must produce meaningful gains for the average American. But there are a number of problems with this presumption. First, a wealth tax would encourage existing wealth to be transferred overseas. The most straightforward way this can happen is for wealthy people to renounce their U.S. citizenship and move abroad. To discourage such defection, both the Warren and Sanders plans call for an exit tax on 40 percent of all wealth. That may seem like a hefty disincentive. But if the alternative is exposure to a wealth tax designed to erode fortunes to a very large extent over time, it may not be much of a disincentive after all. Moreover, there would be an enormous incentive for the wealthy to attempt to avoid the exit tax by lowering the assessed value of their assets for the single year in which they leave. The economists Larry Summers and Natasha Sarin estimate the avoidance rate for the estate tax, a similar one-time levy, to be around 60 percent. An exit tax, which could be planned for far more effectively than one’s death, should see avoidance rates at least as high. That means the exit tax would amount to an effective rate of only 24 percent. For many of the very wealthy, that option would likely be far preferable to having their wealth eroded to a much greater degree over time. So much for existing fortunes. But a wealth tax would also encourage entrepreneurs to leave the United States even before their fortunes are made. According to the Forbes 400, over half of the fifteen richest people in the United States made their fortunes within their lifetime. A wealth tax would incentivize them to have done so from Toronto or Vancouver rather than New York City or Silicon Valley. It is not clear how any of the issues that Zucman and Saez want to address would be improved by having by shifting the distribution of North American billionaires to Canada. It is more likely that, over time, the U.S. advantage in economic innovation would be eroded as a growing concentration of successful entrepreneurs abroad—in Canada, Singapore, or other potential wealth tax havens—lures venture capitalists and startups out of the United States. Second, reducing wealth does not necessarily reduce power. Jeff Bezos is the wealthiest person in the United States, but a great deal of his power comes from his position as CEO of Amazon, of which he owns roughly 12 percent. If a wealth tax jeopardizes executives’ ability to hold on to their positions at the top of the companies they run, there would be even stronger incentive for them to leave the country. When I challenged Saez and Zucman on this point last fall, they responded that effective CEOs would not have to worry because they could still maintain the support of their board; the wealth tax would only make it easier for ineffective executives to be removed. Yet, to the extent that effectiveness is measured in increasing Amazon’s profits, Bezos retains every incentive, if not more incentive, to use Amazon’s size to influence government policy and stifle competition. Third, a wealth tax will face enormous opposition from those who feel threatened by it. The super-wealthy are ideologically diverse. Some, including Bill Gates, are supporters of progressive causes, including some types of wealth tax. Others, such as the Koch brothers, are strong supporters of free market policy. By far, however, most donations by the super-wealthy are to non-political causes. By politicizing wealth itself, a wealth tax would encourage billionaires to enter the political process against it. Michael Bloomberg reportedly committed upwards of $2 billion toward a political campaign that was at least in part designed to prevent Bernie Sanders from getting the Democratic nomination. There may be other ways to decrease economy inequality, encourage competition, and reduce the impact of money on politics, but a wealth tax isn’t it.

2023 SDI Evidence
Taxes Good/Bad › Carbon Tax › Carbon Tax Bad

A carbon tax would hurt poor people the most.

 Rumeen Islam. 1/19/22. Roumeen Islam is Economic Advisor for the Infrastructure Global Practice, which covers digital development, energy and extractives, transport and logistics, and disruptive technologies. She has worked in countries in multiple regions, the most recent being the Europe and Central Asia Region. She also served as lead economist in the Development Research Group, in the office of the Chief Economist. She has written and published in many areas of economics,  and was Head of the World Development Report, “Building Institutions for Markets.” Her previous work has mostly focused on macroeconomics and growth, international trade and finance, financial systems and growth as well as private sector development, among other topics. She is a graduate of Harvard University, where she studied economics. She has a Masters in Public Policy from Princeton University and a PhD in Economics from Columbia University. “What a carbon tax can do and why it cannot do it all”  . Accessed July 3rd 2023.

A carbon tax reflecting the social cost of carbon is viewed as an essential policy tool to limit carbon emissions: high prices for carbon-emitting goods reduce demand for them. The carbon tax is generally levied on fossil fuels.  Some countries have already adopted such a tax and discussions are ongoing in others. There are proponents of a global carbon tax too. Yet, governments are often keener to adopt measures other than a tax to contain carbon emissions. And amongst countries that have adopted a carbon tax, the levels vary substantially, and other measures exist alongside it.  It is natural to ask why a carbon tax is not used universally in preference to other policies to limit emissions and why, even if there is such a tax, other policies are needed too. There are good reasons why governments may not want to use carbon taxes, and one of them relates to their welfare impacts. For example, a carbon tax on fossil fuels is often regressive in its impact- hurting poorer people relatively more than richer ones. Even when it might be progressive, poorer people still suffer a welfare loss when prices rise, making their consumption basket more expensive. Devising transfers to compensate them for this loss is not a simple matter. Compensation systems may not be well developed, and it may be difficult to identify those hurt or to get funds to them. Thus, even if governments impose a tax, they may still balk at levying a carbon tax high enough to reduce emissions to the extent they desire. Another reason that governments may hesitate is that adopting new taxes can be politically difficult  because there are entrenched business interests that would lose. Letting market prices of fossil fuels rise immediately to reflect social costs may not be desirable for other reasons too. The carbon tax on fuel aims to restructure economies by raising the cost of a critical resource- the juice that makes them run. But restructuring takes time  as people, capital and other resources do not flow seamlessly into new sectors. During the transition, resources can be unemployed for long periods, and the larger the immediate price increase, the larger the potential disruption in the short term.  “The carbon tax on fuel aims to restructure economies by raising the cost of a critical resource- the juice that makes them run. But restructuring takes time as people, capital and other resources do not flow seamlessly into new sectors.” Another issue with carbon taxes is that they target carbon dioxide emitted from fossil fuels. They do not directly target other carbon compounds, such as methane, which has a short atmospheric lifetime but a large warming potential. Carbon emissions from agriculture/livestock, deforestation, waste management, or poor land use, are hard to assess and monitor and these are generally not taxed directly. Alternative, non-tax- based policies are needed and used to limit carbon and other GHG emissions from these sources. These include altering manure and waste management, feeding or land- use practices, among others. Thus, governments use a variety of targeted policies, and regulations, spreading the adjustment across different segments of markets, societies, and time – in effect, setting a range of implicit taxes and other fiscal incentives. For example, banning all imports of non-EV luxury vehicles, or taxing emissions from all luxury yachts- are clearly policies that aim to penalize wealthier consumers. Requiring office buildings to install energy-saving devices is another targeted regulation; raising parking fees in cities, investing in green public transport, or providing government subsidies for investments in renewable energy are others. For every target on the quantity of emissions, there is a policy package that is needed, even when there is a carbon tax, because markets are not perfect or complete, consumers may not be perfectly informed, adjustment is not costless , political sustainability is key, and distribution matters. Where the additional cost of various policies eventually falls depends on the policy package used and the characteristics of the market. But there clearly is a case for a rich policy toolbox. Some of the resources used in other sectors will flow into the renewable energy and supporting sectors where both investment and jobs will increase. Yet, this too, will not automatically and immediately make up for disinvestment in fossil fuels, as is already evident. Supply- demand mismatches will happen in the short run. Add to this substantial uncertainty regarding several economic variables, such as the size of fuel reserves, the size of stranded assets, the harshness of winter, the future direction of climate policy, the pace of innovation in the renewables sector, or demand risk, and it is clear how economic disruption may be magnified.

2023 SDI Evidence
Taxes Good/Bad › Carbon Tax › Carbon Tax Good

Carbon taxes have been proven effective throughout the world. It is time for the US to step up.

Brown 2/22/22. Sara writes about management issues affecting global business leaders, with an emphasis on management science. Areas of interest include artificial intelligence, the digital economy, marketing, operations management, platforms, system dynamics, and supply chain. “6 arguments for carbon taxes” . Accessed July 3rd 2023.

The first  was proposed in the United States in 1973. Almost 50 years later,  have instituted carbon taxes, but the U.S. has yet to take action. The idea remains in favor with economists: In 2019, more than 3,600 economists  in support of a carbon tax as the “most cost-effective lever to reduce carbon emissions at the scale and speed that is necessary.” Proponents include MIT Sloan finance professor “It seems clear that it’s going to cost a lot to get the world to where it needs to be,” she said during a recent appearance on . “That money has to come from somewhere.” Efficiency, fairness, and transparency dictate that policymakers address the question of who will pay what head on, she said. A carbon tax is a fee for tons of carbon dioxide emitted. Lucas and Jeff Meli, head of research at Barclays, discussed why a carbon tax is what Meli called an “elegant” solution to reducing carbon emissions. A well-structured cap-and-trade program, which also puts a cost on carbon use, is another good solution, Lucas said, and she would be happy to see either become law.

2023 SDI Evidence
Taxes Good/Bad › Carbon Tax › Carbon Tax Good

Carbon Tax would generate a trillion dollars over a year.

Congressional Budget Office 2020. The Congressional Budget Office is a federal agency within the legislative branch of the United States government that provides budget and economic information to Congress. “Impose a Tax on Emissions of Greenhouse Gases” . Accessed July 3rd 2023.

The accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere—particularly of carbon dioxide (CO2) released when fossil fuels (such as coal, oil, and natural gas) are burned—contributes to climate change, which imposes costs and increases the risk of severe economic harm to countries around the globe, including the United States. The federal government regulates some emissions in an effort to reduce them; however, emissions are not directly taxed. This option would impose a tax of $25 per metric ton on most emissions of greenhouse gases in the United States—specifically, on most energy-related emissions of CO2 (for example, from electricity generation, manufacturing, and transportation) and on some other greenhouse gas emissions from large manufacturing facilities. The tax would increase at a constant real (inflation-adjusted) rate of 5 percent per year.

2023 SDI Evidence
Taxes Good/Bad › General

Raising taxes in the current system makes it too complex and unfair.

Gary Burtless, 5-15-2008 ( The Tax System: Too Complex, Unfair and Outdated Brookings 7-3-2023 https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-tax-system-too-complex-unfair-and-outdated/) // cb-khs

Stimulus checks in taxpayers’ mailboxes this year are a bright note in an otherwise unpleasant season. In most Americans’ minds, the annual tax-filing ritual raises two questions: Why is it so complicated? And, what’s the point of all these incomprehensible rules and exceptions? The system is way too complex. Over the years, Congress has created many rules and exceptions as incentives for taxpayers to use their money in certain ways. But these incentives — such as encouraging certain forms of energy — are concealed under mounds of instructions, so many people don’t realize they exist and don’t get to take advantage of them. Not only is our tax system too complicated; it’s also outdated. For example, payroll taxes — which cover fast-rising Social Security and Medicare expenditures — simply cannot meet future needs. In short, a better system would keep taxes as low as possible, make them more equitable, and still raise the revenue needed for government to run. Yet, most proposals popular on Capitol Hill — such as making recent tax cuts permanent or raising limits on tax-deferred savings — are unrealistic and unfair to middle and lower-income families. With special interests more powerful than average taxpayers, tax policy largely reflects the schemes of entrenched Washington lobbies. Presidential candidates and other national leaders should be advocating changes like making it possible for many taxpayers to pay without filing returns — as is commonly done in dozens of other countries. The next Congress should streamline tax incentives for education, and combine the personal exemption, child credit and earned income credit into a higher standard deduction. Corporate income should be taxed only once, rather than taxing both corporations’ new income and individual investors’ capital gains — but clamp down on corporate tax shelters. Tax enforcement must be toughened, so slackers don’t make the rest of us pay more than we should. A truly comprehensive tax reform package would eliminate the alternative minimum tax, or AMT. This monster was created to ensure that all wealthy people pay taxes. But the AMT increasingly threatens to gobble up more of the hard-earned income of middle-class Americans and doesn’t stop the wealthy from using generous tax shelters. Congress can afford to do away with it by raising income tax rates slightly or with other changes.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Inflation DA › AT: › AT: Impact: Econ – 2AC

Downturns don’t cause wars

Liao 19’ – Jianan, Shenzhen Nanshan Foreign Language School, China. “Business Cycle and War: A Literature Review and Evaluation”, Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, Vol. 68, , 02-xx-2019

First, war can occur at any stage of expansion, crisis, recession, recovery, so it is unrealistic to assume that wars occur at any particular stage of the business cycle. On the one hand, although the domestic economic problems in the crisis/recession/depression period break out and become prominent in a short time, in fact, such challenge exists at all stages of the business cycle. When countries cannot manage to solve these problems through conventional approaches, including fiscal and monetary policies, they may resort to military expansion to achieve their goals, a theory known as Lateral Pressure. [13] Under such circumstances, even countries in the period of economic expansion are facing downward pressure on the economy and may try to solve the problem through expansion. On the other hand, although the resources required for foreign wars are huge for countries in economic depression, the decision to wage wars depends largely on the consideration of the gain and loss of wars. Even during depression, governments can raise funding for war by issuing bonds. Argentina, for example, was mired in economic stagflation before the war on the Malvinas islands (also known as the Falkland islands in the UK). In fact, many governments would dramatically increase their expenditure to stimulate the economy during the recession, and economically war is the same as these policies, so the claim that a depressed economy cannot support a war is unfounded. In addition, during the crisis period of the business cycle, which is the early stage of the economic downturn, despite the economic crisis and potential depression, the country still retains the ability to start wars based on its economic and military power. Based on the above understanding, war has the conditions and reasons for its outbreak in all stages of the business cycle.

Second, the economic origin for the outbreak of war is downward pressure on the economy rather than optimism or competition for monopoly capital, which may exist during economic recession or economic prosperity. This is due to a fact that during economic prosperity, people are also worried about a potential economic recession. Blainey pointed out that wars often occur in the economic upturn, which is caused by the optimism in people's mind [14], that is, the confidence to prevail. This interpretation linking optimism and war ignores the strength contrast between the warring parties. Not all wars are equally comprehensive, and there have always been wars of unequal strength. In such a war, one of the parties tends to have an absolute advantage, so the expectation of the outcome of the war is not directly related to the economic situation of the country. Optimism is not a major factor leading to war, but may somewhat serve as stimulation. In addition, Lenin attributed the war to competition between monopoly capital. This theory may seem plausible, but its scope of application is obviously too narrow. Lenin's theory of imperialism is only applicable to developed capitalist countries in the late stage of the development capitalism, but in reality, many wars take place among developing countries whose economies are still at their beginning stages. Therefore, the theory centered on competition among monopoly capital cannot explain most foreign wars. Moreover, even wars that occur during periods of economic expansion are likely to result from the potential expectation of economic recession, the "limits of growth" [15] faced during prosperity — a potential deficiency of market demand. So the downward pressure on the economy is the cause of war.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Inflation DA › AT: › AT: Impact: Econ – 2AC

No Econ Impact

Walt 20 – Stephen M, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, Foreign Policy, , 05-13-2020

One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose. This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too. Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure. I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is hard to imagine any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do. Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely. Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible. If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished. On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).” Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself. The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success. Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then. The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term. To be sure, I can’t rule out another powerful cause of war—stupidity—especially when it is so much in evidence in some quarters these days. So there is no guarantee that we won’t see misguided leaders stumbling into another foolish bloodletting. But given that it’s hard to find any rays of sunshine at this particular moment in history, I’m going to hope I’m right about this one.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Inflation DA › AT: › A2: Link: Social Security

Social Security stabilizes the economy from shocks

Quinby Et Al. 21’ – Laura D, a senior research economist. Robert Siliciano, a research economist. Gal Wettstein, a senior research economist. “DOES SOCIAL SECURITY SERVE AS AN ECONOMIC STABILIZER?”, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, , 07-01-2021

Conceptually, the stable nature of Social Security benefits insulates recipients from macroeconomic conditions on a personal level. Workers whose income and employment depends on the local job market may reduce their spending in response to negative shocks, lowering demand for goods and services in a given county. However, retirees have no such fluctuations in their OASI benefits and may maintain local spending regardless of economic conditions. At a macro-finance level, the Social Security OASI program smooths national income by providing stable spending with cyclical borrowing. The payroll tax financing implicitly borrows from expansions to spend more in recessions at a national level, and borrows from counties in a relative boom to spend in counties in a relative bust.

This study shows evidence that a county’s share of Social Security income is associated with a relatively smaller relationship between the macroeconomic fluctuations in a given county and the remainder of its state. Furthermore, in industries where demand is local – such as retail, healthcare, and entertainment – employment and earnings were similarly stabilized by a higher share of Social Security benefits in total county income. This stabilization was statistically indistinguishable between the Great Recession, when the employment margin was fewer firings, and the surrounding expansions, when the employment margin was hiring.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Inflation DA › AT: › A2 Link – UBI

Inflation should be considered less of a problem than the fact that people can’t meet basic economic needs.

MARCA, April 19 2022 - 07:34 CDT UBI 2022: Would Universal Basic Income cause inflation?https://www.marca.com/en/lifestyle/us-news/2022/04/19/625eac3f22601dca4b8b4593.html

Those who are concerned about the implementation of such scheme, point to the potential rise of prices due to the law of supply and demand in the event UBI offers people more money to spend. However, former presidential candidate Andrew Yang explained why he believes that inflation will not be a major issue. "Money in people's hands for a couple of months last year - in my mind - was a very, very minor factor, in that most of that money has long since been spent and yet you see inflation continue to rise," he told CNBC. "Everyone is concerned about inflation. I'm concerned about the fact that it's making a lot of Americans' lives miserable, because it's a very difficult circumstance when your expenses are climbing, and maybe your income isn't keeping pace."

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Inflation DA › AT: › AT: UQ

Inflation is still rough, and wages still haven’t recovered.

Smialek 23 – Jeanna, a reporter covering the Federal Reserve and the U.S. economy for The New York Times. “Is the Inflation Battle Won? Not Yet.”, New York Times, , 06-21-2023

But Mr. Powell emphasized that it was too early to declare victory in the battle against rapid price increases.

The reason: While less expensive gas and slower grocery price adjustments have helped overall inflation to fall from its four-decade peak last summer, food and fuel costs tend to jump around a lot. That obscures underlying trends. And a measure of “core” inflation that strips out food and fuel is showing surprising staying power, as a range of purchases from dental care and hairstyling to education and car insurance continue to climb quickly in price.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Inflation DA › AT: › AT: UQ

Rate Hikes are continuing – inflation not stabilized

Rugaber 23’ – Christopher. “Fed’s Powell: More rate hikes are likely this year to fight still-high inflation”, AP, , 06-21-2023

WASHINGTON (AP) — With inflation in the United States still excessive, most Federal Reserve officials expect to raise interest rates further this year, Chair Jerome Powell told a House committee Wednesday.

“Inflation pressures continue to run high, and the process of getting inflation back down to 2% has a long way to go,” Powell said on the first of two days of semi-annual testimony on Capitol Hill.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Inflation DA › AT: › AT: UQ

Economic recovery is growing weaker.

Pan 23’ – Jing, an avid advocate of investing for passive income. Despite the ups and downs he’s been through with the markets, Jing believes that you can generate a steadily increasing income stream by investing in high quality companies.He wrote a monthly dividend stock newsletter for the better half of the past decade. Jing holds a Master’s Degree in Economics and an Honours Bachelor of Science Degree, both from the University of Toronto. “World Bank Just Halved Its US Growth Forecast For 2024, Saying The Economy 'Is Likely To Remain Weak' — 3 Investment Strategies Tailored For A Sluggish Economy”, Yahoo Finance, , 06-14-2023

The World Bank just slashed its forecast for U.S. economic growth for 2024.

Real gross domestic product (GDP) in the country is now projected to grow by 0.8% in 2024, according to the international lending institution’s latest Global Economic Prospects report. Previously, its forecast was 1.6%.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Inflation DA › AT: › AT: UQ

Inflation is here to stay, despite no hikes

Olijnyk 23’ – Zena, worked in all areas of media, from print newspapers and magazines to radio and television. At Canadian Lawyer, she focuses on reporting on legal stories out of Western Canada and the Atlantic provinces, as well as stories related to mergers and acquisitions and dealmaking. “‘Sticky’ inflation means higher interest rates could last longer than expected: Bennett Jones report”, Canadian Lawyer, , 06-20-2023

The result is that high interest rates in the U.S. and Canada (with the U.S. federal reserve rate now at 5.25 percent and the Bank of Canada rate at 4.75 percent) will cool down the economies of both countries.

Dodge, one of the authors of Bennett Jones’ , said at a recent webinar for firm clients noted that from the second quarter of 2023 to the second quarter of 2024, real GDP will grow at annualized rates of 0.8 percent in the United States and one percent in Canada.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Inflation DA › Impact › Impact: Econ – 2NC

Best models go NEG.

Gallea and Rohner 21’ – Quentin, PhD, postdoctoral researcher in political economy at the University of Zürich. Dominic, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne. “Globalization mitigates the risk of conflict caused by strategic territory”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 118, No. 39, , 09-28-2021

This contrasts with an intellectual tradition of arguing that globalization, business, and trade may—by fostering interdependence—curb the incentives for engaging in domestic and international conflicts. This argument has its roots ranging as far back as the thinking of De Montesquieu [1758 (2)] or Angell [1909 (3)], has been refined verbally by an array of “liberalist” scholars in international relations (see the survey in ref. 4), and has recently been scrutinized in formal game-theoretical models (see, e.g., refs. 5 and 6).

While a small body of empirical research has linked trade to interstate wars (4, 5, 7, 8), the arguably even more pressing question of how globalization and trade affect domestic conflicts has received even less attention.† This is a major gap in the literature, given that since World War II, roughly 80 to 90% of wars have been within rather than between states (11). Hence, the goal of the current article is to study the question of how places close to strategically important trade routes may be more or less subject to civil conflict and how their fate is affected by surges in globalization.‡

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Inflation DA › Impact › Impact: Econ – 2NC

Defense doesn’t assume the post-COVID landscape – the globe’s a tinderbox, primed for conflict

Labott 21’ – Elise, Adjunct Professor at American University’s School of International Service, Columnist at Foreign Policy, MA in Media Studies, New School for Social Research, BA in International Relations from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. “Get Ready for a Spike in Global Unrest”, Foreign Policy, , 07-22-2021

To call 2021 the summer of discontent would be a severe understatement. From Cuba to South Africa to Colombia to Haiti, often violent protests are sweeping every corner of the globe as angry citizens are taking to the streets.

Each country has different histories and realities on the ground, particularly in Haiti, where years of violence and government corruption culminated two weeks ago in the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. But they all faced a perfect storm of preexisting social, economic, and political hardships, which fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic only inflamed further. And they are merely a foreshadowing of the post-coronavirus global tinderbox that’s looming as existing tensions in countries across the world morph into broader civil unrest and uprisings against economic hardships and inequality deepened by the pandemic.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Inflation DA › Impact › Impact: Econ – 2NC

Decline causes terrorism, civil wars, and diversion that go global – nothing checks

Liu 18’ – Dr. Qian, PhD in Economics from Uppsala University, Former Visiting Researcher at the University of California, Berkeley, Managing Director for Greater China at The Economist Group, Guest Lecturer at New York University, Tsinghua University, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Fudan University. “The Next Economic Crisis Could Cause A Global Conflict. Here's Why”, World Economic Forum, , 11-13-2018

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising income inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict.

The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Inflation DA › Links › Links—Federal Jobs Guarantee

Jobs Guarantee reduces the strength of the labor market, AND causes inflation by flooding the economy

King 21’ – Adam D, Department of Politics, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. “Critical reflections on the job guarantee proposal”, A Socialist Review, , 02-09-2021 *JG = Job Guarantee

There are several problems with this narrative. Recall that Minsky’s aim was not only to aid the unemployed but also to achieve full employment without causing the wage-price inflation that partially ended postwar full employment policy in the 1970s.26 Such a situation holds only if the wage floor set by the JG is low enough not to allow workers in the private sector to demand higher wages, or, as Seccareccia has critically characterized it, by maintaining a “loose” full employment policy in which JG wages are purposefully set low enough to not drive private sector wage growth over time.27 Wray in fact has previously argued that the existence of a JG program could be used to discipline the wage demands of private sector workers. He writes: However, just as workers have the alternative of [JG jobs], so do employers have the opportunity of hiring from the [JG] pool. This is the primary ‘price stabilization’ feature of the [JG] program. If the wage demands of workers in the private sector exceed by too great a margin the employer’s calculations of their productivity, the alternative is to obtain [JG] workers at a mark-up over the [minimum wage]. This will help to offset the wage pressures caused by elimination of the fear of unemployment.28 Here, Wray characterizes the JG program not as a bargaining tool in the arsenal of the working class, but as a “price stabilization” mechanism that effectively pools the reserve army of labour and pays them a wage sufficiently low to allow employers to obtain (or threaten to obtain) these workers when private sector wage demands are too high.

The change from describing the job guarantee as a wage- and inflation-containing institution to one geared towards improving the bargaining power of workers is quite remarkable. One need only to take stock of the various features and benefits that Wray et al. now include in their jobs program proposals. For example, in keeping with the movement demand for “$15 and Fairness,” the Levy Institute proposes to set the wage in their jobs program at $15 per hour, which would effectively function as the new US federal minimum wage.29 As Dean Baker points out, however, there are approximately 40 million US workers currently earning less than $15 per hour—the federal minimum wage remains $7.25 per hour. This could mean one of two things: either low-wage private sector employers would have to raise wages quickly in order to retain employees, or the JG program would have to absorb a lot of displaced private sector workers.30 It is hard to imagine employers tolerating this without a substantive fight. Additionally, this does not account for whatever “spillover effects” a substantial JG-induced wage increase might generate up the income ladder (or at least proximate to the JG wage). This is not to suggest simply that significant increases at the bottom of the wage distribution are not necessary and justifiable, but rather to point out that this outcome is incompatible with JG theorists’ previous insistence that the program would serve a “price stabilization” function—at least short of some other institutional mechanism, such as coordinated wage bargaining or a broad incomes policy.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Inflation DA › Links › Links—Federal Jobs Guarantee

Federal Guarantee’s ensure trade-offs that create cyclical economic downfall and reinsure inequality – turns case

Patel 20’ – Prateek, Master of Public Administration. “The Federal Job Guarantee: A Hopeful Plan That’s Too Expensive to Deliver”, Public Purpose Journal, Vol. XVII, , 11-xx-2020

Labor Dynamics Impact On Private Sector Market from Job Guarantee Plan

According to Vincenzo Caponi’s “The Effects of Public Sector Employment on the Economy,” he examines the impact on public sector employment on the economy as a whole. Whenever the public sector creates jobs by hiring citizens to provide goods and services, it has both positive and negative effects on the labor market (Caponi, 2017). His research showed that the unemployment rate decreased in the short-term, creating more stabilizing effect in economy. Along with this, certain demands in inequity were met in places that had higher levels of poverty in comparison to others. Plus, with the higher levels of public sector jobs, many employers were encouraged to employ disadvantaged and marginalized Americans (Caponi, 2017). At the same time, the reduction of short-term unemployment by expanding public sector jobs were not efficient, because wages in the public sector are flexible and not fixed. This expansion of public sector jobs created a crowding-out effect of private sector, where many people left their low-paying private sector jobs to work for the public sector that provided higher levels of stability. To add to this, wages are unresponsive to productivity differences, so if workers are less or more productive in the public sector, they do not see salary increases or decreases (Caponi, 2017). With the crowding-out effect leading to labor shortage and lack of overall productivity in public-sector jobs, Caponi’s research suggests that there is a reduction in the overall productivity of the economy, coupled with the negative effects of the resource reallocation from the private to the public sector.

2023 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Inflation DA › Links › Links --- Medicare for All

Plan triggers inflation and interest rate hikes—increases in government spending when the economy is at full employment freaks out the Fed.

Olson and Sheiner 17

(Louise M. Sheiner Policy Director - The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Senior Fellow - Economic Studies at Brookings Peter Olson Research Analyst, , “The Hutchins Center Explains: Fiscal stimulus and the Fed,” pg online @

WHAT IS FISCAL STIMULUS? Fiscal stimulus is a term for tax cuts or new government spending that increase aggregate demand. Almost any deficit-increasing policy—reduced corporate taxes, more generous food stamps, added infrastructure spending—can stimulate demand, but the precise impacts depend on the structure of the package and the timing. For example, tax cuts aimed at the poor can boost the economy more in the near-term than tax cuts for the rich because the poor tend to spend a higher percentage of what they receive than the wealthy. In contrast, a decision today to build a new nuclear submarine five years in the future won’t have much effect on demand in the short-term at all. WHEN IS FISCAL STIMULUS WARRANTED? Fiscal stimulus can be helpful when unemployment is high and economic output is less than its potential. When the economy is at full employment, or close to it, fiscal stimulus is more likely to lead to higher prices than to higher output. In that case, the Federal Reserve is likely to raise interest rates to keep higher government spending or lower taxes from producing an unwelcome increase in inflation. DOES IT MAKE SENSE RIGHT NOW? The current unemployment rate in the U.S. (4.7%) is near what economists think of as “full employment”, and GDP growth in 2016 likely was close to what many economists think of as its potential rate (1.8 to 2.0%), roughly defined as the rate at which the labor force grows plus the rate at which productivity (output per hour of work) grows. As a result, the U.S. does not appear to require additional stimulus right now. At least, that was Chair Yellen’s take at the Federal Reserve’s December 2016 press conference. When asked about fiscal stimulus, she said that it was “not obviously needed,” given the “solid labor market.” Other Fed officials have made similar comments since Donald Trump’s election brought more talk of stimulus. For instance, Loretta Mester, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, said earlier this month that “I think we’re basically at full employment… and I think that inflation is going to be moving back up to 2 percent over the next couple of years. So I don’t see a need of the kind of fiscal policy just to stimulate aggregate demand….” HOW ABOUT SPENDING ON PUBLIC INVESTMENT? The Fed clearly would prefer that any fiscal expansion be aimed at increasing the long-run potential growth rate. John Williams, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, recently stated: “Today I don’t think we need short-term fiscal stimulus. What we need is really better policies and investments in the long-term health of the economy.” Increased government spending on investment—bridge projects, scientific research, education—raises the level of future GDP, whereas spending on consumption does not. So as Williams suggests, even when fiscal stimulus doesn’t make sense for near-term support for the economy, increased spending on public investment might. (For a Hutchins Center explainer on public investment, see here.) As Governor Lael Brainard said at the Hutchins Center recently: Changes in fiscal policy that raise the level or growth rate of productivity or that induce greater labor force participation and higher levels of skill and education in the workforce raise the nation’s productive capacity and result in more sustainable increases in output and living standards. The higher productivity and workforce levels engendered by these policies would likely increase investment opportunities and raise expectations of future income growth, sustainably boosting the levels of investment and consumption and, as a result, the longer-run neutral rate. Such policies are more likely to be sustainable because the boost to GDP that they provide continues to accumulate over time, limiting increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio and preserving fiscal space. [Fiscal space is how much more debt a government can take on before it runs into trouble.] Some economists, such as Douglas Elmendorf, dean of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and Louise Sheiner—one of the authors of this post—have argued that now is a particularly good time for the government to undertake more investment because interest rates are so low, which makes borrowing to finance that investment much cheaper. IS FEDERAL RESERVE INTEREST RATE POLICY LIKELY TO RESPOND DIFFERENTLY TO TAX CUTS AND SPENDING INCREASES IF THEY ARE LARGELY AIMED AT INCREASING INVESTMENT AS OPPOSED TO CONSUMPTION? It is entirely possible that the Fed could respond the same way to two packages that look quite different—one aimed at stimulating aggregate demand in the short term, and one aimed at improving the economy’s growth potential in the long run—because government spending intended to boost the economy’s productive capacity in the long run will generally also increase short-run aggregate demand. Government spending acts as fiscal stimulus whether the government is buying food or a supercomputer that may lead to scientific breakthroughs and greater growth potential. More generally, whether the Federal Reserve will increase interest rates in response to a fiscal stimulus package depends on both the timing of the effects and the magnitude of those effects. Inflationary pressures come from increases in aggregate demand not met by increases in aggregate supply. So if President Trump and Congress fashion a tax-and-spending package that increases both demand and supply by the same amount at the same time, that wouldn’t be inflationary. The Fed would not respond by raising interest rates. But such a policy would be unusual. Most investments take time to build and time to bear fruit. Consider the time it takes to develop a new air traffic control system and the time it takes for airlines to adapt to it, or the lag between improved education funding and a more skilled workforce. IF FISCAL STIMULUS MEANS TIGHTER MONETARY POLICY IN THE SHORT TERM, IS THERE ANY REASON TO DO IT? Spending increases and tax cuts would lead to greater deficits, and thus to an increase in the national debt. A larger debt, among other impacts, could make it harder for the federal government to borrow still more to provide fiscal stimulus during the next downturn. But a deficit-widening package of spending increases and tax cuts probably would lead the Federal Reserve to raise rates more than it otherwise would, and that would give it more room to cut rates in a downturn. In effect, fiscal space would be traded for monetary policy space.