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2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Answers to Neg › AT: Too Small (Gender)

Even a moderate UBI recognizes the value of reproductive work because it is paid unconditionally.

Lawhon and McCreary, 2020 - profs of Geography at Universities of Oklahoma and Florida State [Mary and Tyler, March, Antipode – A Radical Journal of Geography “Beyond Jobs vs Environment: On the Potential of Universal Basic Income to Reconfigure Environmental Politics” TA]

Equally importantly, a UBI provides support for those undertaking work that is poorly remunerated in existing economies. Indeed, as feminists such as Federici (2012) and James (2012) have long argued, the reproduction of capitalist workforces relies upon the exploitation of women’s unpaid work in the home. Those working as migrants and in the service industry are equally central to ongoing production and reproduction, but undervalued in existing political economies. A UBI is normatively different than arguments in favour of payment for specific services; as an unconditional grant, it is received whether one works or labours. In practice, however, it enables participation in and greater valuation of reproductive activities. While it is difficult to conceive of a UBI that would replace the standard of living of traditionally unionised, white, male industrial labour force, a moderate UBI could effectively increase incomes and reduce the dependency of more highly exploited populations doing socially reproductive work.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Answers to Neg › AT: Too Small (Gender)

Framework controls the size of the UBI - a gendered lens pushes a UBI to adequate levels rather than minimally sufficient ones because it recognizes that unpaid labor is necessary to make the minimal income sufficient.

Goldblatt, 2021 - Professor of Law, University of the Witwatersrand [Beth “Basic Income, Gender and Human Rights” Acc 1/28/23 TA]

Adequacy is an essential element of the right to social security. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights explained that: Benefits, whether in cash or in kind, must be adequate in amount and duration in order that everyone may realize his or her rights to family protection and assistance, an adequate standard of living and adequate access to health care … States parties must also pay full respect to the principle of human dignity contained in the preamble of the Covenant, and the principle of non-discrimination, so as to avoid any adverse effect on the levels of benefits and the form in which they are provided. 31 Adequate social protection that is attentive to gender must ensure that income support takes account of the position of women within households, women’s unpaid work and care obligations, women’s lower earnings and savings, and women’s position in the workforce which is often informal and precarious. What constitutes adequacy and whether there are minimum core levels of provision required by rights has been debated within the field of social and economic rights .32 In addition, valid concerns have been raised with a human rights emphasis on sufficiency leading to efforts to tackle poverty without also ensuring distributive equality.33 A substantive equality approach to social protection rights requires structural responses to systemic inequality via social, economic and political reconfigurations that lead to fundamental changes to gender, class and other relations.34 It thus requires policies aimed at overcoming inequality rather than just providing minimum levels of poverty relief. This idea of adequacy should be central to the human rights lens used to consider questions of the theory, design and politics of a basic income. In addition, adequacy must be understood as a global issue since affordability and economic choices facing states require international cooperation and assistance, as required by the ICESCR.35

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Answers to Neg › AT” Reinforces Gender Roles

A basic income will not reinforce women’s domestic roles – that argument relies on classist and racist assumptions

Zelleke, 2019 - Prof of Practice in Political Science at NYU Shanghai [Almaz, May 16, Phenomenal World, “Feminist Theory, Gender Inequity, and Basic Income” Interview by Hana Beach, Acc 2/23/23 TA]

In the feminist literature there is a divide between those who think that a basic income is a good thing for women and those who think it will reinforce women’s disproportionate responsibility for care. They are worried that people will say that women should stay in the domestic sphere because now they are being compensated for doing so. What’s interesting to me about the welfare rights movements that originated in the 1960s and ’70s in the US and in Europe is how they inform this feminist debate. In those movements, the women who would have been the immediate beneficiaries of an unconditional guaranteed income were absolutely in favor of it. It was middle class and professional women in the 1970s who were against the idea of a basic income and who thought it would be something that would relegate women to the domestic sphere. This argument clearly doesn’t offer an intersectional understanding of feminism. When we think about what’s good for women, we have to think about what’s good for women of different classes and what’s good for women of different races and ethnicities. The outsourcing of childcare is one of the things that makes it possible for middle class and professional women to have careers. When women join the labor market, it’s not the case that care work is redistributed evenly among men and women. It’s being redistributed among women—specifically to poor women of color, to legal and undocumented immigrants, who now have to leave their own families in the care of someone else, who is typically unpaid, and earn a wage by caring for other people’s families. Redistributing care work in this way does not solve gender division of labor. We have to redistribute it to men as well. HB: In her famous essay “Welfare is a Women’s Issue,” former chairperson of the National Welfare Rights Organization [NWRO] Johnnie Tillmon made that connection about domestic service work and the division of labor—her analysis, gained from lived experience, was spot on, which I think says a lot about the importance of participatory policy design. AZ: It’s absolutely important to hear from the people who are going to be the biggest beneficiaries of a basic income or any other kind of policy of welfare reform. I’m drawn to the welfare rights movement because women were arguing for increased and unconditional welfare benefits. Those demands are clearly important to the discourse around basic income today.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Answers to Neg › AT” Reinforces Gender Roles

The potential for reinforcement is not a reason to reject the Aff – it is a reason why our framework is essential to keep the state focused on gender to Prevent the turns.

Koslowski and Duvander, 2018 - prof of Social and Political Science, Univ of Edinburgh and prof of Sociology, Stockholm University [Alison and Ann-Zofie, Working Paper 2018:05 “Basic Income: The Potential for Gendered Empowerment?” Acc 1/28/23 TA]

5. Conclusions: Basic Income, a Radical or Conservative Policy with Regard to Gendered Empowerment? A basic income promises ‘real freedom’, or a freedom from dictate; what role then for state intervention? The interplay between social policies and norms is of key interest to social scientists and policy makers. This is particularly clear in the arena of public health, in which the interventionist state often plays a strong role in changing our behaviours, for e.g., with regard to smoking, alcohol consumption, vaccinations, sugar consumption. There are other examples around environmental behaviours too, e.g. recycling and reduced use of plastic bags and other plastics. Should the state not take action too with regard to gender equalities? Norms will develop: there is no such thing as total ‘real’ freedom. Legal frameworks however, such as parental leave policies can see changes to norms, even those as deeply embedded as parenting practices. In Sweden, such statements are hardly controversial, but choice and gender equality are sometimes contrasted, and the limits to state intervention are constantly renegotiated. Basic income would potentially change the boundaries for state intervention, which for many sounds intuitively positive, and may well bring many benefits. However, if the state does not intervene regarding gender-equality, gender norms will be determined by other less visible forces, such as the power dynamics within households. It is likely that a universal basic income has the potential for empowerment for all, but for this to be achieved, attention will need to be paid to its potential for gendered outcomes. The concerns raised here regarding the limitations of empowerment for women from a basic income—particularly with regard to whom remains holding the baby, doing the majority of domestic work and the majority of both formal and informal care work—are not in themselves arguments against the implementation of a basic income. However, there are certainly strong reasons to not let basic income replace other structures that have been shown to be relevant for gender equality, in particular the ones directed at supporting families, such as parental leave and childcare services.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Framing Extensions › Risk Analysis Bad

Our impact outweighs on probability and magnitude – risk assessment is epistemologically biased towards white masculine elites who discount the severity of everyday localized violence in destroying marginalized populations.

Verchick 96 [Robert, Assistant Professor, University of Missouri -- Kansas City School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1989, “IN A GREENER VOICE: FEMINIST THEORY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE” 19 Harv. Women's L.J. 23]

Because risk assessment is based on statistical measures of risk, policymakers view it as an accurate and objective tool in establishing environmental standards. n275 The scientific process used to assess risk purports to focus single-mindedly on only one feature of a potential injury: the objective probability of its occurrence. n276 Risk assessors, who consider most value judgments irrelevant in determining statistical risk, seek to banish them at every stage. n277 As a result, the language of risk assessment -- and of related environmental safety standards -- often carry an air of irrebuttable precision and certainty. The EPA, for example, defines the standard acceptable level of risk under Superfund as "10<-6>" -- that is, the probability that one person in a million would develop cancer due to exposure to site contamination. n278 [*76] Feminism challenges this model of scientific risk assessment on at least three levels. First, feminism questions the assumption that scientific inquiry is value-neutral, that is, free of societal bias or prejudice. n279 Indeed, as many have pointed out, one's perspective unavoidably influences the practice of science. n280 Western science may be infused with its own ideology, perpetuating, in the view of the ecofeminists, cycles of discrimination, domination, and exploitation. n281 Second, even if scientific inquiry by itself were value-neutral, environmental regulation based on such inquiry would still contain subjective elements. Environmental regulation, like any other product of democracy, inevitably reflects elements of subjectivity, compromise, and self-interest. The technocratic language of regulation serves only to "mask, not eliminate, political and social considerations." n282 We have already seen how the subjective decision to prefer white men as subjects for epidemiological study can skew risk assessments against the interests of women and people of color. The focus of many assessments on the risk of cancer deaths, but not, say, the risks of birth defects or miscarriages, is yet another example of how a policymaker's subjective decision of what to look for can influence what is ultimately seen. n283 Once risk data are collected and placed in a statistical form, the ultimate translation of that information into rules and standards of conduct once again reflects value judgments. A safety threshold of one in a million or a preference for "best conventional technology" does not spring from the periodic table, but rather evolves from the application [*77] of human experience and judgment to scientific information. Whose experience? Whose judgment? Which information? These are the questions that feminism prompts, and they will be discussed shortly. Finally, feminists would argue that questions involving the risk of death and disease should not even aspire to value neutrality. Such decisions -- which affect not only today's generations, but those of the future -- should be made with all related political and moral considerations plainly on the table. n284 In addition, policymakers should look to all perspectives, especially those of society's most vulnerable members, to develop as complete a picture of the moral issues as possible. Debates about scientific risk assessment and public values often appear as a tug of war between the "technicians," who would apply only value-neutral criteria to set regulatory standards, and the "public," who demand that psychological perceptions and contextual factors also be considered. n285 Environmental justice advocates, strongly concerned with the practical experiences of threatened communities, argue convincingly for the latter position. n286 A feminist critique of the issue, however, suggests that the debate is much richer and more complicated than a bipolar view allows. For feminists, the notion of value neutrality simply does not exist. The debate between technicians and the public, according to feminists, is not merely a contest between science and feelings, but a broader discussion about the sets of methods, values, and attitudes to which each group subscribes. Furthermore, feminists might argue, the parties to this discussion divide into more than two categories. Because one's world view is premised on many things, including personal experience, one might expect that subgroups within either category might differ in significant ways from other subgroups. Therefore, feminists would anticipate a broad spectrum of views concerning scientific risk assessment and public values. Intuitively, this makes sense. Certainly scientists disagree among themselves about the hazards of nuclear waste, ozone depletion, and global warming. n287 Many critics have argued that scientists, despite their allegiance [*78] to rational method, are nonetheless influenced by personal and political views. n288 Similarly, members of the public are a widely divergent group. One would not be surprised to see politicians, land developers, and blue-collar workers disagreeing about environmental standards for essentially non-scientific reasons. Politicians and bureaucrats are two sets of the non-scientific community that affect environmental standards in fundamental ways. Their adherence to vocal, though not always broadly representative, constituencies may lead them to disfavor less advantaged socioeconomic groups when addressing environmental concerns. n289 In order to understand a diversity of risk perception and to see how attitudes and social status affect the risk assessment process, we must return to the feminist inquiry that explores the relationship between attitudes and identity. 1. The Diversity of Risk Perception A recent national survey, conducted by James Flynn, Paul Slovic, and C.K. Mertz, measured the risk perceptions of a group of 1512 people that included numbers of men, women, whites, and non-whites proportional to their ratios in society. n290 Respondents answered questions about the health risks of twenty-five environmental, technological, and "life-style" hazards, including such hazards as ozone depletion, chemical waste, and cigarette smoking. n291 The researchers asked them to rate each hazard as posing "almost no health risk," a "slight health risk," a "moderate health risk," or a "high health risk." The researchers then analyzed [*79] the responses to determine whether the randomly selected groups of white men, white women, non-white men, and non-white women differed in any way. The researchers found that perceptions of risk generally differed on the lines of gender and race. Women, for instance, perceived greater risk from most hazards than did men. n292 Furthermore, non-whites as a group perceived greater risk from most hazards than did whites. n293 Yet the most striking results appeared when the researchers considered differences in gender and race together. They found that "white males tended to differ from everyone else in their attitudes and perceptions -- on average, they perceived risks as much smaller and much more acceptable than did other people." n294 Indeed, without exception, the pool of white men perceived each of the twenty-five hazards as less risky than did non-white men, white women, or non-white women. n295 Wary that other factors associated with gender or race could be influencing their findings, the researchers later conducted several multiple regression analyses to correct for differences in income, education, political orientation, the presence of children in the home, and age, among others. Yet even after all corrections, "gender, race, and 'white male' [status] remained highly significant predictors" of perceptions of risk. n296 2. Explaining the Diversity From a feminist perspective, these findings are important because they suggest that risk assessors, politicians, and bureaucrats -- the large majority of whom are white men n297 -- may be acting on attitudes about security and risk that women and people of color do not widely share. If this is so, white men, as the "measurers of all things," have crafted a system of environmental protection that is biased toward their subjective understandings of the world. n298 [*80] Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz speculate that white men's perceptions of risk may differ from those of others because in many ways women and people of color are "more vulnerable, because they benefit less from many of [society's] technologies and institutions, and because they have less power and control." n299 Although Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz are careful to acknowledge that they have not yet tested this hypothesis empirically, their explanation appears consistent with the life experiences of less empowered groups and comports with previous understandings about the roles of control and risk perception. n300 Women and people of color, for instance, are more vulnerable to environmental threat in several ways. Such groups are sometimes more biologically vulnerable than are white men. n301 People of color are more likely to live near hazardous waste sites, to breathe dirty air in urban communities, and to be otherwise exposed to environmental harm. n302 Women, because of their traditional role as primary caretakers, are more likely to be aware of the vulnerabilities of their children. n303 It makes sense that such vulnerabilities would give rise to increased fear about risk. It is also very likely that women and people of color believe they benefit less from the technical institutions that create toxic byproducts. n304 Further, people may be more likely to discount risk if they feel somehow compensated for the activity. n305 For this reason, Americans worry relatively little about driving automobiles, an activity with enormous advantages in our large country but one that claims tens of thousands of lives per year. The researchers' final hypothesis -- that differences in perception can be explained by the lack of "power and control" exercised by women and people of color -- suggests the importance that such factors as voluntariness and control over risk play in shaping perceptions. [*81] Risk perception research frequently emphasizes the significance of voluntariness in evaluating risk. Thus, a person may view water-skiing as less risky than breathing polluted air because the former is accepted voluntarily. n306 Voluntary risks are viewed as more acceptable in part because they are products of autonomous choice. n307 A risk accepted voluntarily is also one from which a person is more likely to derive an individual benefit and one over which a person is more likely to retain some kind of control. n308 Some studies have found that people prefer voluntary risks to involuntary risks by a factor of 1000 to 1. n309 Although environmental risks are generally viewed as involuntary risks to a certain degree, choice plays a role in assuming risks. White men are still more likely to exercise some degree of choice in assuming environmental risks than other groups. Communities of color face greater difficulty in avoiding the placement of hazardous facilities in their neighborhoods and are more likely to live in areas with polluted air and lead contamination. n310 Families of color wishing to buy their way out of such polluted neighborhoods often find their mobility limited by housing discrimination, redlining by banks, and residential segregation. n311 The workplace similarly presents workers exposed to toxic hazards (a disproportionate number of whom are minorities) n312 with impossible choices between health and work, or between sterilization and demotion. n313 Just as marginalized groups have less choice in determining the degree of risk they will assume, they may feel less control over the risks they face. "Whether or not the risk is assumed voluntarily, people have greater [*82] fear of activities with risks that appear to be outside their individual control." n314 For this reason, people often fear flying in an airplane more than driving a car, even though flying is statistically safer. n315 If white men are more complacent about public risks, it is perhaps because they are more likely to have their hands on the steering wheel when such risks are imposed. White men still control the major political and business institutions in this country. n316 They also dominate the sciences n317 and make up the vast majority of management staff at environmental agencies. n318 Women and people of color see this disparity and often lament their back-seat role in shaping environmental policy. n319 Thus, many people of color in the environmental justice movement believe that environmental laws work to their disadvantage by design. n320 [*83] The toxic rivers of Mississippi's "Cancer Alley," n321 the extensive poisoning of rural Indian land, n322 and the mismanaged cleanup of the weapons manufacturing site in Hanford, Washington n323 only promote the feeling that environmental policy in the United States sacrifices the weak for the benefit of the strong. In addition, the catastrophic potential that groups other than white men associate with a risk may explain the perception gap between those groups and white males. Studies of risk perception show that, in general, individuals harbor particularly great fears of catastrophe. n324 For this reason, earthquakes, terrorist bombings, and other disasters in which high concentrations of people are killed or injured prove particularly disturbing to the lay public. Local environmental threats involving toxic dumps, aging smelters, or poisoned wells also produce high concentrations of localized harm that can appear catastrophic to those involved. n325 Some commentators contend that the catastrophic potential of a risk should influence risk assessment in only minimal ways. n326 Considering public fear of catastrophes, they argue, will irrationally lead policymakers to battle more dramatic but statistically less threatening hazards, while accepting more harmful but more mundane hazards. n327 [*84] At least two reasons explain why the catastrophic potential of environmental hazards must be given weight in risk assessment. First, concentrated and localized environmental hazards do not simply harm individuals, they erode family ties and community relationships. An onslaught of miscarriages or birth defects in a neighborhood, for instance, will create community-wide stress that will debilitate the neighborhood in emotional, sociological, and economic ways. n328 To ignore this communal harm is to underestimate severely the true risk involved. n329 Second, because concentrated and localized environmental hazards tend to be unevenly distributed on the basis of race and income level, any resulting mass injury to a threatened population takes on profound moral character. For this reason, Native Americans often characterize the military's poisoning of Indian land as genocide. n330 [*85] 3. Understanding Through Diversity Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz challenge the traditional, static view of statistical risk with a richer, more vibrant image involving relationships of power, status, and trust. n331 "In short, 'riskiness' means more to people than 'expected number of fatalities.'" n332 These findings affirm the feminist claim that public policy must consider both logic and local experience in addressing a problem. n333 Current attempts to "re-educate" fearful communities with only risk assessments and scientific seminars are, therefore, destined to fail. n334 By the same token, even dual approaches that combine science and experience will fall short if the appeal to experience does not track local priorities and values. Cynthia Hamilton illustrates these points in her inspiring account of how a South Central Los Angeles community group, consisting mainly of working-class women, battled a proposed solid waste incinerator. n335 At one point, the state sent out consultants and environmental experts to put the community's fears into perspective. The consultants first appealed to the community's practical, experience-based side, by explaining how the new incinerator would bring needed employment to the area and by offering $ 2 million in community development. n336 But the community group found the promise of "real development" unrealistic and the cash gift insulting. n337 When experts then turned to quantifying the risks "scientifically" their attempts backfired again. Hamilton reports that "expert assurance that health risks associated with dioxin exposure were less than those associated with 'eating peanut butter' unleashed a flurry of dissent. All of the women, young and old, working-class and professional, had made peanut butter sandwiches for years." n338 The sandwich analogy, even assuming its statistical validity, could not convince the women because it did not consider other valid risk factors (voluntariness, dread, and so on) and because it did not appear plausible in the group members' experience. In the end, Hamilton explains that the superficial explanations and sarcastic responses of the male "experts" left the women even more united and convinced that "working-class women's [*86] concerns cannot be dismissed." n339 Thus even the "science" of risk assessment, if it is to serve effectively, must include the voices of those typically excluded from its practice.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Framing Extensions › Extinction Focus Bad

The drive to prevent extinction is a form of masculine survivalism where gendered bodies become the unwilling tools to sustain humanity. You should refuse the obsession with patriarchal reproduction.

Mitchell ‘15

(Audra Mitchell, Audra Mitchell is a settler scholar who lives and works on the Ancestral and treaty lands of the Neutral (Attawandaron), Haudenosaunee and Mississaugas of the New Credit (please see Honouring the Land). She currently holds the the Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology at Wilfrid Laurier University. From 2015-18 she held the CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs Audra is an Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, 8-3-2015, "Gendering extinction," Worldly, , JKS)

The reproduction of survival/ the survival of reproduction

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Framing Extensions › Structural Violence First

You should refuse debate’s constant urge to prevent incalculable future threats and recognize the urgency of gendered violence.

Olson ‘15

(Elizabeth, professor of geography and global studies at UNC Chapel Hill, ‘Geography and Ethics I: Waiting and Urgency,’ Progress in Human Geography, vol. 39 no. 4, pp. 517-526)

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that the body is increasingly set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially large-scale future events of forecasted suffering. Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can distort moral reasoning. Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious and real ticking clocks and warning systems, the urgent body must be bypassed because there are bigger scales to worry about: What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so high, that they necessitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006) In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the urgency to secure the state, the citizenry, the economy, or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as impulsive and thus requiring management. McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). Bodies that are currently suffering cannot be urgent, because they are excluded from the potential collectivity that could be suffering everywhere in some future time. Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014). As large-scale urgent concerns are institutionalized, the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning and coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-scale emergency is a ‘built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies. The urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage (e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151) of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city. In short, the urgencies of the body provide justifications for social exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of preparedness and risk avoidance. Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state. But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the assumed priority of the large-scale future emergency, the urgent body becomes literally nonsense, a non sequitur within societies, states and worlds that will always be more urgent. If the important ethical work of urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes, ‘waiting … produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010: 186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and open than urgency. In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its effects upon the subjects of study. Waiting can demobilize radical reform, depoliticizing ‘the insurrectionary possibilities of the present by delaying the revolutionary imperative to a future moment that is forever drifting towards infinity’ (Springer, 2014: 407). Yonucu’s (2011) analysis of the self-destructive activities of disrespected working-class youth in Istanbul suggests that this sense of infinite waiting can lead not only to depoliticization, but also to a disbelief in the possibility of a future self of any value. Waiting, like urgency, can undermine the possibility of self-care two-fold, first by making people wait for essential needs, and again by reinforcing that waiting is ‘[s]omething to be ashamed of because it may be noted or taken as evidence of indolence or low status, seen as a symptom of rejection or a signal to exclude’ (Bauman, 2004: 109). This is why Auyero (2012) suggests that waiting creates an ideal state subject, providing ‘temporal processes in and through which political subordination is produced’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 90; see also Secor, 2007). Furthermore, Auyero notes, it is not only political subordination, but the subjective effect of waiting that secures domination, as citizens and non-citizens find themselves ‘waiting hopefully and then frustratedly for others to make decisions, and in effect surrendering to the authority of others’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 123). Waiting can therefore function as a potentially important spatial technology of the elite and powerful, mobilized not only for the purpose of governing individuals, but also to retain claims over moral urgency. But there is growing resistance to the capture of claims of urgency by the elite, and it is important to note that even in cases where the material conditions of containment are currently impenetrable, arguments based on human value are at the forefront of reclaiming urgency for the body. In detention centers, clandestine prisons, state borders and refugee camps, geographers point to ongoing struggles against the ethical impossibility of bodily urgency and a rejection of states of waiting (see Conlon, 2011; Darling, 2009, 2011; Garmany, 2012; Mountz et al., 2013; Schuster, 2011). Ramakrishnan’s (2014) analysis of a Delhi resettlement colony and Shewly’s (2013) discussion of the enclave between India and Bangladesh describe people who refuse to give up their own status as legitimately urgent, even in the context of larger scale politics. Similarly, Tyler’s (2013) account of desperate female detainees stripping off their clothes to expose their humanness and suffering in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in the UK suggests that demands for recognition are not just about politics, but also about the acknowledgement of humanness and the irrevocable possibility of being that which cannot wait. The continued existence of places like Yarl’s Wood and similar institutions in the USA nonetheless points to the challenge of exposing the urgent body as a moral priority when it is so easily hidden from view, and also reminds us that our research can help to explain the relationships between normative dimensions and the political and social conditions of struggle. In closing, geographic depictions of waiting do seem to evocatively describe otherwise obscured suffering (e.g. Bennett, 2011), but it is striking how rarely these descriptions also use the language of urgency. Given the discussion above, what might be accomplished – and risked – by incorporating urgency more overtly and deliberately into our discussions of waiting, surplus and abandoned bodies? Urgency can clarify the implicit but understated ethical consequences and normativity associated with waiting, and encourage explicit discussion about harmful suffering. Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response. Geographers could be instrumental in reclaiming the ethical work of urgency in ways that leave it open for critique, clarifying common spatial misunderstandings and representations. There is good reason to be thoughtful in this process, since moral outrage towards inhumanity can itself obscure differentiated experiences of being human, dividing up ‘those for whom we feel urgent unreasoned concern and those whose lives and deaths simply do not touch us, or do not appear as lives at all’ (Butler, 2009: 50). But when the urgent body is rendered as only waiting, both materially and discursively, it is just as easily cast as impulsive, disgusting, animalistic (see also McKittrick, 2006). Feminist theory insists that the urgent body, whose encounters of violence are ‘usually framed as private, apolitical and mundane’ (Pain, 2014: 8), are as deeply political, public, and exceptional as other forms of violence (Phillips, 2008; Pratt, 2005). Insisting that a suffering body, now, is that which cannot wait, has the ethical effect of drawing it into consideration alongside the political, public and exceptional scope of large-scale futures. It may help us insist on the body, both as a single unit and a plurality, as a legitimate scale of normative priority and social care. In this report, I have explored old and new reflections on the ethical work of urgency and waiting. Geographic research suggests a contemporary popular bias towards the urgency of large-scale futures, institutionalized in ways that further obscure and discredit the urgencies of the body. This bias also justifies the production of new waiting places in our material landscape, places like the detention center and the waiting room. In some cases, waiting is normatively neutral, even providing opportunities for alternative politics. In others, the technologies of waiting serve to manage potentially problematic bodies, leading to suspended suffering and even to extermination (e.g. Wright, 2013). One of my aims has been to suggest that moral reasoning is important both because it exposes normative biases against subjugated people, and because it potentially provides routes toward struggle where claims to urgency seem to foreclose the possibilities of alleviation of suffering. Saving the world still should require a debate about whose world is being saved, when, and at what cost – and this requires a debate about what really cannot wait. My next report will extend some of these concerns by reviewing how feelings of urgency, as well as hope, fear, and other emotions, have played a role in geography and ethical reasoning. I conclude, however, by pulling together past and present. In 1972, Gilbert White asked why geographers were not engaging ‘the truly urgent questions’ (1972: 101) such as racial repression, decaying cities, economic inequality, and global environmental destruction. His question highlights just how much the discipline has changed, but it is also unnerving in its echoes of our contemporary problems. Since White’s writing, our moral reasoning has been stretched to consider the future body and the more-than-human, alongside the presently urgent body – topics and concerns that I have not taken up in this review but which will provide their own new possibilities for urgent concerns. My own hope presently is drawn from an acknowledgement that the temporal characteristics of contemporary capitalism can be interrupted in creative ways (Sharma, 2014), with the possibility of squaring the urgent body with our large-scale future concerns. Temporal alternatives already exist in ongoing and emerging revolutions and the disruption of claims of cycles and circular political processes (e.g. Lombard, 2013; Reyes, 2012). Though calls for urgency will certainly be used to obscure evasion of responsibility (e.g. Gilmore, 2008: 56, fn 6), they may also serve as fertile ground for radical critique, a truly fierce urgency for now.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Framing Extensions › Ethic of Care

A feminist framework requires a universal basic income – it problematizes the breadwinner model and prevents the punishment of women who go against the model.

Zelleke 2011 - prof of political science at The New School [Almaz, January Policy and Politics, “Feminist political theory and the argument for an unconditional basic income” TA]

Conclusion Feminist political theory has in many ways moved on from critiques of theories of justice, by moving beyond the focus on questions of economic inequality to questioning the value or legitimacy of such comprehensive theories altogether. While much recent work has indeed extended feminism’s critical project into important new areas, it is crucial that our attention not shift entirely before the insights gained in the realm of economic inequality are institutionalised in policy. The Scandinavian version of the universal breadwinner model of citizenship – a generous welfare state with policies designed to induce men to take caregiving leaves from paid employment – offers one model of a gender-egalitarian society, but one that continues the prioritisation of the male-dominated public sphere of paid employment over the sphere of care. The feminist version of the liberal egalitarian tradition that has as its foundation a universal, unconditional basic income at a level to meet basic needs, on the other hand prioritises the emerging norm of combined care work and paid employment throughout adulthood. The latter attempts not so much to mould individual behaviour to a socially dominant norm, but to allow for the emergence of alternative norms of behaviour beyond the dominant universal breadwinner norm. By socialising the cost of supporting care – not only among fathers, but also among all those whose high earnings suggest protection from the burdens of care – a basic income promotes reciprocity not only within families but also between those with care responsibilities and those without. Finally, by providing an unconditional floor of income to low-skilled workers, basic income provides bargaining power for those who might prefer to stay home and take care of their own children or parents over working as low-paid caregivers for higher-paid women and men, or for women and men of all classes to demand workplaces more accommodating of universal care responsibilities. A universal, unconditional basic income does not promise a gender-symmetrical society – an unreachable goal anyway, until men can bear and breastfeed babies. But it may lead to a society in which remaining, and perhaps essential gender differences do not penalise women (or men) who choose not to pursue androcentric ideals of citizenship by relegating them to poverty, dependence on their spouses or employers, and second-class citizenship.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Framing Extensions › Ethic of Care

Adopting a feminist lens is crucial to avoid solvency problems – the justifications for a Basic Income are key to the Type of UBI we adopt – framework will shape the details

Zelleke, 2011 - The New School for General Studies, New York [Almaz, Policy & Politics vol 39 no 1, “Feminist political theory and the argument for an unconditional basic income” TA]

The liberal egalitarian tradition suggests a different foundation for a gender egalitarian society: an unconditional basic income, which, I argue, supports care work in accordance with the principles of a feminist theory of distributive justice and the universal caregiver model of citizenship. First, a basic income derived from a feminist theory of justice would provide every child and adult a guaranteed minimum income sufficient for basic needs, fulfilling the feminist reciprocity principle; this is in contrast to basic income proposals justified on other grounds, which often limit the basic income to adults, or tie the amount of the benefit to reductions in inequality rather than provision of basic needs. Second, basic income provides caregivers with resources to use as they prefer: as a personal caregiving stipend, to pay for care provided by others, or indeed, for any other purpose, thereby supporting care and supporting the autonomy of caregivers. Third, by redistributing income to those with the least, basic income redistributes power to society’s most vulnerable members. For those in need of care, it reduces the power imbalance between care recipients and caregivers by guaranteeing recipients of care at least minimal resources, thereby fostering equality of respect. It reduces power imbalances within the family, where it provides a caregiver financial resources and a citizenship status independent of paid employment, and it provides a wage supplement and some bargaining power to low-paid workers. Finally, an unconditional and universal basic income triggered by no condition other than low income, and recouped through the tax system from recipients with higher incomes, has the potential to eliminate poverty more effectively than any other scheme of redistribution.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Solvency Extensions › S - Feminist Economics

The aff is an example of feminist economic governance – this alternative model of economics promotes environmental sustainability, reduces inequality, and solves gendered violence.

Gill ‘15 [Stephen, Research Professor of Political Science, York University, “Critical Perspectives on the Crisis of Global Governance”, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 144-149, Accessed: 7/10/23] HZaidi

What would a different system of global economic governance look like that might better fulfil commitments to gender equality and human rights? A gendered analysis of global economic governance would begin from the premise that the social forces engaged in global capitalism and its economic governance are not only structured along the lines of class, race and ethnicity but also are gendered in terms of their prevailing ideas, institutions and power potentials. Some guiding questions might include those listed in Box 7.2. Each of these components of social forces that could reshape global economic governance will now be considered in turn. These consist principally of two broad types: ideologies that justify or legitimate a given political order, and the commonly held predispositions or assumptions that lead people to treat the economic and social world and its interactions as if they are self-evident or part of the ‘common [figure 7.2 OMITTED] sense,’ which structures what is conceived of as possible in the realm of policy/politics. From a gender perspective it is crucial to underline how both the ideology of disciplinary neoliberalism as well as the ‘common sense’ that governs the prevailing concepts of global economic governance does not take into account the economy of daily life: how people exist on a daily and intergenerational basis through the interaction of paid and unpaid work. The dominant perspective ignores the way in which economies are not only a set of financial transactions but also a collection of work and labour processes, some of which are paid and others unpaid, and how each of these processes involves distinct sets of social relations as well as economic inputs and outputs. To understand why this is the case we need to think through the way that production for the market place is related to how families and communities provide the very conditions for production to occur. Thus, productive activities in a capitalist system normally refer to the processes of creating goods and services that can directly create profit. By contrast, the reproductive economy consists of people, and it involves activities and processes that are not merely associated with biological reproduction but also the feeding, caring, replenishing, and daily maintenance and socialization of family, household and community members. Reproductive work and voluntary community work could in principle, be done by men or women – but provisioning has been socially constituted as mainly the responsibility of women rather than men in most societies (Elson 1998). However, it is impossible to conceive of production in the absence of the reproductive economy since it encompasses work carried out by human beings for direct support of the productive sector through for example the produced input of labour. Indeed, US researchers have estimated that accounting for all unpaid domestic work would add 80 per cent to GDP (Zuckerman 2014). However, at best, in the perspectives that prevail in the governing discourses of global economic governance, provisioning remains largely invisible and thus outside of the scope of public policy. At worst it is a lacunae or ‘strategic silence’ in the generic frameworks of knowledge that constitute orthodox economics. By contrast a key focus and purpose of feminist economics is to make this unpaid work visible and thus to reconstitute our understanding of the ‘economic’ in order to restructure the provision of resources (including time) and care in a more equal fashion between women and men, in both private and public institutions. A feminist perspective therefore suggests a wider vision of the economy that sees national output as a product of the interaction of the domestic sector alongside the public, private and financial sectors, producing services that include the reproduction of the labour force on a daily and generational basis. Whilst outside the formal production boundary, this work affects the quantity and quality of labour supplied to production; it also affects ‘the stability of the social framework in which market and state are embedded’ (Elson 2002). Such a vision of the economy, if integrated into the institutions of global economic governance, would transform economic analysis and policy prescriptions. For example, policy makers would include social reproduction (including the ‘care economy’) in considerations of labour market, social, monetary and fiscal decisions since social reproduction normally depends on some form of income support. This can happen through wages, transfers by governments or access to arable land and informal sector activities. Conversely, many of the insecurities that are inherent in the labour market and other forms of access to money are absorbed and mediated at the household level. The degree to which households can respond to market downturns and crises – the extent to which women’s unpaid labour can act as a shock absorber – in turn affects the way economic growth occurs. Whilst many economists recognize gender relations as a factor of analysis at the microeconomic level, macroeconomics remains focused on aggregates and policy objectives such as price stability. The traditional policy instruments of macroeconomics such as fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies are constructed as if they are gender-neutral (Cagatay and Erturk 2004). If by contrast, there is a recognition that macroeconomic policies rest upon a set of distributive relations across different sectors of the economy and involve distributive choices across various social groups (Elson and Cagatay 2000), then gender relations (along with class, race and ethnicity) should be incorporated into the analysis of those distributive social relations. This would mean integrating an analysis of the gendered divisions of labour and decision making in the different spheres of economic activity. This ‘bottom up’ approach whereby economic policy would be steered by the daily realities of women and men as they experience the intersections of social reproduction, production and finance would go a long way towards ‘re-embedding’ economics in society. Such an approach would ask how people meet their daily needs, what the requirements are for human well-being, how they are being met, what constraints exist to meet such needs, and what economic policies support or undermine daily needs and well-being. Such a focus on the unpaid economy requires a commitment of public investment in basic infrastructure such as access to fuel and fresh drinking water as well as social infrastructure such as health and care services. It will also require some redistribution in the remaining unpaid work between women and men, boys and girls. This would require reconsidering what is meant by progress, efficiency, growth and development. Women’s movements and other civil society groups have argued that we cannot go back to the model of economic development that existed before the crisis as this signalled growing inequalities, environmental destruction and, a growing global domestic crisis witnessed in the huge shifts in social and family arrangements. Restoring growth – a return to normalcy – is insufficient if the goal is a more just, equitable (in terms of class, race/ethnicity, caste and region) and sustainable (conserving natural resources) development (Jain and Elson 2010: 19). This does not mean ‘anti-growth’.8 Economic growth – if it is defined as the increase in the real use-value of economic activity – can mean many different things with different environmental and social implications. If it is simply measured according to conventional national income accounts premised upon exchange-value it can mean more private automobiles or better public transport; more strip mining or child care centres. Thus thinking about organizing the economy in a different way to avoid environmental degradation and to focus on needed social investments and ‘decent’ work which provides sufficient income and recognizes workers’ rights would be part of a new common sense and growth strategy premised upon human needs. For example an element that would be central to a new growth strategy would be food sovereignty, that is, local and democratic control over the provisioning of food, something that has not been delivered by the liberalization of international trade in food. Recognizing that women make over half of the agricultural work force in developing countries, better land rights for women and more equitable public investment and regulation of markets to support women farmers would undergird this new approach (Jain and Elson 2010). In economics, students are demanding a more real world-based curriculum of study that moves away from the neoclassical free market theories and abstractions that dominate teaching and modelling.9 Reform of the educational curriculum more generally and particularly in the field of economics, is a key aspect of creating a new ‘common sense’ of economic literacy that can underpin new frameworks of global economic governance. This will require a revolution in the way in which economics is both taught in schools and universities and discussed in political discourse and particularly in the media, in ways that encourage a variety of different viewpoints and policy prescriptions. It will also require greater representation of heterodox (including feminist) economics in the policy community to realize a more encompassing, democratic model of global economic governance. This means that what is considered a crisis and how winners and losers are identified will also depend on the type of knowledge at the heart of governance: educational efforts of transnational feminist advocacy networks have been important for challenging orthodox economic understandings of global economic governance. They have played a particularly important role in issue creation and agenda setting and influencing policy discourses towards the acceptance of a more heterodox, socially embedded economics (for example, the International Gender and Trade Network, the Working Group on Gender, Macroeconomics and International Economics, the Development Alternatives Network for Women (DAWN) and Women in Development Europe (WIDE).10

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Engagement

A basic income is key to ending the patriarchy because reducing women’s poverty promotes democratic engagement.

Pateman, 2018 – Prof of Political Science at UCLA [Carole, Aug 15, Feminist Current “Why feminists need to take up a basic income in their fight for women’s liberation: An interview with Carole Pateman” Interviewed by Jacqueline Gullion, https://www.feministcurrent.com/2018/08/15/feminists-need-take-basic-income-fight-womens-liberation-interview-carole-pateman/ Acc 3/23/23 TA]

JG: Can you describe how you came to understand basic income as in the interests of the advancement of women and a more democratic society? CP: One of the first things that attracted me to basic income is that, if the income was set at a sufficient level, it would not just relieve poverty, but it would be the end of poverty. For women it is actually very important because women’s income tends to be less than men’s. I mean if you think about a few decades ago [in the global North], it was not seen as altogether seemly for married women to be employed. They were reliant on their husband’s income, and his generosity (or not) for their own standard of living. Now, women’s wages still tend to be less than men’s, so we still don’t have a situation where women and men have equally high standards of living. With something like a basic income, women could be assured of a reasonable standard of living in the same way men are. Finally, we’d really start talking about equal citizenship. JG: That certainly supports the argument of why it would be better for individuals to be entitled to the basic income rather than a household to have a set amount. CP: You know what happens historically when money goes to the household? Men tend to spend it on things other than the necessities of life for their wives and children. One good thing about family allowances in Britain is that they were always paid to the mother, so there was a really good chance that the children benefited. JG: Could you say a bit more about the ways in which a basic income enables women (or anyone) to participate fully as a citizen in a democracy? CP: A certain level of subsistence is required if you’re going to have the time and energy and possibility of getting the knowledge required to participate fully in your society. If all your time and energy goes toward trying to make enough money to keep body and soul together, or to providing for a family, then you are going to have to make pretty heroic efforts to actually participate. If you are actually interested in having a democratic citizenry — that is where citizens have the opportunity, in some way or another, to govern themselves and not just be governed by others — then there has to be a material basis for it.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Engagement

A UBI recontextualizes feminine labor and enables democratization

Pateman ’4 (Carole Pateman, important feminist and political theorist, “Democratizing Citizenship: Some Advantages of a Basic Income”, POLITICS & SOCIETY, Vol. 32, March 2004, ) - CSC

Now is the time to ask the second question. The conditions under which the institution of employment and the Anglo-American social insurance system were constructed have now crumbled. “Old economy” male breadwinner jobs are being swept away in global economic restructuring and “downsizing.” New jobs have been created but many are low paid, lacking benefits, and temporary, and economic insecurity is widespread. Views about femininity, masculinity, and marriage are changing too, but since we are still in the midst of all these changes it is hard to know what the eventual outcome will be. Still, times of rapid change provide opportunities to investigate new ideas and look critically at old arrangements—including the moral hazard of institutions that give incentives to men to avoid their fair share of the unpaid work of caring for others. It has now become possible to rethink the connections between income and paid employment; between marriage, employment, and citizenship; between the private and public division of labor; and between caring work and other work—and to reconsider the meaning of “work.” But such rethinking requires a different approach from that taken by many participants in the debate about stakeholding and basic income. This is crucial if proper account is to be taken of women’s freedom, which has received rather short shrift in discussions of a basic income. As early as 1792, Mary Wollstonecraft argued in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman that rights, citizenship, and full standing for women required economic independence, whether a woman was married or single.33 As Ackerman and Alstott emphasize, a capital grant would be a step in this direction, but a basic income would for the first time provide all women with lifelong economic independence. Thus feminists might be expected strongly to support the introduction of a basic income.34 Yet this is not the case. Some feminists are critical of the idea because they fear a basic income would reinforce the existing sexual division of labor and women’s lesser citizenship. They argue that the provision of an income without having to engage in paid employment would, in light of women’s position in the labor market combined with lingering beliefs about the proper place and tasks of women and men, give women an even greater incentive to undertake more unpaid caring work in the household, and, conversely, men would have another incentive to free ride. A basic income, that is, would reinforce existing limitations on women’s freedom.3 This objection illustrates the importance of the reasons advanced for supporting a basic income. The probability of feminist fears being borne out is higher, for example, when the argument is made that to avoid weakening the “incentive to work” a basic income should be below subsistence level. This “incentive” is promoted with men and paid employment in mind. A basic income at this level provides no incentive for wives to “work” (i.e., enter paid employment); rather, it would encourage them to do more unpaid caring work. Again, to support basic income on the grounds that it would improve the living standards of the poorest sectors of the population does not promote consideration of the structural connections between marriage, employment, and citizenship, and the private and public sexual division of labor. Without the debates about basic income being informed by feminist arguments, and a concern for democratization (and genuine democratization necessarily includes women’s freedom and standing as citizens), the discussion will revolve around ways of tinkering with the existing system rather than encouraging thinking about how it might be made more democratic. Putting democratization at the center requires attention to institutional structures, especially the institutions of marriage and employment. For instance, Ackerman and Alstott remark in The Stakeholder Society that the “case for stakeholding does not ultimately rest on its effects on employment, marriage, or crime. It rests on each American’s claim to respect as a free and equal citizen.” However (leaving crime aside), the respect accorded to women and men as free and equal citizens has a great deal to do with the institutions of marriage and employment. It is not possible to understand women’s lesser citizenship, as Ackerman and Alstott show in their discussion of social security, without understanding the relationship between their position as wives and men’s position as workers. Similarly, Van Parijs argues that while “a defensible long-term vision” of an unconditional basic income at the highest sustainable level is vital, nevertheless more limited and politically feasible proposals are also essential. He states that a household-based guaranteed minimum income “would definitely be a major change in the right direction”—but the right direction according to which reasons? Household-based schemes disregard not only all the problems about the sexual division of labor, and the fact that women earn less than men, but also income distribution within households. Can it be confidently assumed that income would be distributed equally between husband and wife? A basic income is important for feminism and democratization precisely because it is paid not to households but individuals as citizens. A focus on individuals does not imply resort to the atomistic individualism of neo-classical economics. The problem of women’s self-government and full standing as citizens is visible only when individuals are conceptualized within the context of social relations and institutions. A household-based basic income allows the problem of marriage, employment, and citizenship to be avoided since wives (women) disappear into the category of “the family” or “household.” To treat a basic income as a payment to households rather than individuals ignores the question of who performs the work of caring for household members. That is, it is tacitly assumed that reciprocity exists and that free-riding is only a problem about men avoiding employment. This assumption is nicely illustrated by the picture of a male surfer on the cover of Real Freedom for All. In academic discussions the surfer is used to represent non-contributors. But in the popular political imagination and the media other symbols of free-riding are present, such as the African American “welfare queen”or, more recently, the “illegal immigrant” or the “asylum seeker.”38 The figure of the surfer not only obscures the problem for democratization of popular attitudes embodied in these other symbols but also obliterates the systematic avoidance of one form of contribution, the vital caring work, by men who are in employment. Nor do the numerous suggestions for conditions to be placed on payment of a basic income as a solution to free-riding—Atkinson’s “participation income” is a well-known example—get to grips with free-riding by men in the household. While the notion of a “contribution” may be broadened to include, for example, the work of caring for others, as in Atkinson’s proposal, this is insufficient to focus attention on the structural problem of the connections between marriage, employment, and free-riding by husbands. While payment of a basic income to a husband for his “contribution” through employment and to his wife for her “contribution” in the home is to recognize that she does indeed make a socially valuable contribution, this does little to calm the fears of some feminists that a basic income will merely reinforce women’s lesser standing and the idleness of husbands in the household. An adequate discussion of free-riding and reciprocity in debates about basic income is hampered by, on the one hand, the prevalence of an economistic or contractual sense of “reciprocity.” In this interpretation of the term the recipient must make a contribution directly in return for every benefit received, a view that magnifies the problem of free-riding. On the other hand, by ignoring the household, participants in the debate tacitly presuppose that “reciprocity” in another sense, that is, mutual aid, characterizes domestic interactions.40 To refocus the debate about basic income around its significance for democratization would mean replacing the preoccupation with one kind of free-riding with an examination of how to reinforce reciprocity in the sense of mutual aid across the social order. And that, in turn, would require widening the terms of debate, engaging with the large body of feminist analysis, moving away from the assumptions of neo-classical economics, and developing a political argument. In conclusion I want to make two further points. First, schemes for a conditional basic income raise another problem. In effect, these proposals declare irrelevant the comparison of basic income with universal suffrage as a democratic right. The criteria for eligibility for a conditional income may be very generously interpreted, but there are always likely to be individuals who fail, or refuse, to meet the conditions. What, then, is their status? Are they, like individuals who lack the franchise, to become second-class citizens? All the time that a basic income is conditional, a privilege not a right, the problem of second-class and lesser citizenship cannot be avoided. The use that citizens make of their freedom is open to no guarantees. Democratic self-government entails that they decide for themselves how and when they will contribute, or whether they will contribute at all. If the cost of improving democratic freedom for all citizens is the existence of some drones, then, I submit, it is a cost worth paying. Second, let me emphasize that a basic income is not a panacea. In itself, a basic income would not, for instance, provide an adequate stock of affordable housing, sufficient good quality education, adequate health care, an end to racism, or violence-free neighborhoods. Yet if a genuinely democratic society in which the freedom of women is as important as that of men remains an aspiration, it is hard to see that there is a substitute for an unconditional basic income.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Work

Women’s work is traditionally unappreciated and underpaid – a UBI would solve for these structural issues.

Patricia Schulz 2017 – Masters in Law, University of Geneva

“Universal Basic Income in a feminist perspective and gender analysis”, Global Social Policy, 01/31/2017, - A.K.

The UBI, if unconditional and at a level covering basic needs, would help tackle the structural inequalities inherited from the past, due to the sexual divide between the public and private sphere. Although the normative framework has improved in many countries of the North and South, and women’s education is now higher than men’s in a number of countries, in average, women still face de facto unequal chances of political, economic and social participation. Their educational efforts are not rewarded the same: the higher their education, the greater the gender pay gap – one of the most depressing statistics one can consider. A recent study on the discrimination experienced by women due to pregnancy and maternity in the United Kingdom shows how deeply discrimination is embedded in society and how it prevents an equal access to the world of work and equal chances in this world, even after decades of efforts, legal and practical, in one of the most advanced economies, to implement gender equality in this field. Feminist economists have for decades criticized mainstream economic theory for considering only remunerated work in the so-called production sector, and gross domestic product (GDP) still considers only this sector. Change occurs, there are now numerous publications and data in economic and social sciences addressing unpaid, care work and its relation to the various disadvantages women face. But even with this new approach and the almost general recognition that gender equality is key to economic development, care work remains mainly female. Even though satellite accounts give information on the value of reproductive work, it is still either not really considered as work if provided for free in the private sphere or, if it is provided against pay, in a work relationship, it is often poorly paid and considered. Reproductive work, mainly accomplished by women the world over, for free or very little money, thus remains steadfastly insufficiently addressed in practice in the labour market and legislation, as well as the homes of people. Women pay a high price for providing the largest part of care work in the home, as this limits the access or choices of girls to education and the access of women to paid work, deprives them of the autonomy that goes with an income and the protection of social security systems when one is in place, and thus exposes them to the risk of poverty and dependence.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Norms

A UBI would increase respect for traditionally feminine labor and empower women in the home

Robeyns ’01 (Ingrid Robeyns, PhD, Chair in Ethics of Institutions at the Ethics Institute of Utrecht University, “Will a Basic Income Do Justice to Women?”, Analyse & Kritik, 22, 5/1/2001, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/auk-2001-0108/html?lang=en)

Which second order effects can we expect? First, we might expect that a basic income will lead to a revaluation of unpaid work. In Western societies there is a societal tendency to undervalue unpaid work, especially household work and care labour. European societies value the job one has often as the most important source of status and integration into society. A basic income will in an indirect way contribute to a financial revaluation of unpaid work, which might also help to increase the respect people show for this kind of work. One can expect that a basic income, even when it is small, will be positively valued by housewives (or househusbands). It gives those women a feeling of contributing to the incomes of the family, and to get more recognition for the care and household work they do. Pahl (1989) notices that for British housewives the child allowances they receive are psychologically very important, even when they are very small. In principle, all family members gain by the formation of a household, but the share of those gains that different individuals get can differ considerably from one arrangement to another. Therefore, households can best be seen as "co-operative conflicts" (Sen 1990). How the gains from the co-operation are divided depends, among other things, on the bargaining position of the individuals. There is evidence on the existence of links between money and power in the household. Power is then conceptualised by the ability to take (part in) decisions. It appears that the partner with the highest income is more dominant in decision making, and women with paid employment have on average more power than women working unpaid at home (Pahl1989). Ott (1995) shows that specialisation in unpaid labour weakens the bargaining position of housewives. Her empirical tests confirmed that education and non labour income increase the power of housewives in the household. The higher the income of the husband, the less power the wife has. Although these studies are limited in number and most of them are small scale and thus difficult to generalise from, there is growing evidence that personal income increases power. This implies that the introduction of a basic income will increase the bargaining power of housewives, but that for women working on the labour market, everything depends on the effects of the labour supply and total net income change.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Norms

UBI can uproot systemic patriarchal views on women

UN Women ‘21

“Universal Basic Income: Potential and Limitaitons from a Gender Perspective,” United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), 21 April 2021, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/2021/Policy-brief-Universal-basic-income-en.pdf - EC

Feminists supporters argue that an individual income such as UBI could help guarantee women’s economic autonomy in the face of ongoing discrimination in employment and increase their bargaining power in (and beyond) families and communities. UBI would remove the exclusionary pitfalls and stigma attached to means-tested schemes, as well as avoid the paternalistic and sometimes coercive implementation practices documented for some conditional cash transfers.14 It may also avoid the ‘unemployment traps’ sometimes experienced by welfare recipients who risk losing their benefits should they increase their labour force participation— with particular detriment to single parents and people with disabilities.15 A secure and reliable income on an individual rather than household level could be especially important for those seeking to leave violent partners or unhappy relationships, by cushioning the financial shocks of partnership dissolution that tend to leave women and transgender and gender-diverse people worse-off than men.16 Research on cash transfers also suggests that a regular inflow of cash can in some cases mitigate intimate partner violence, including by improving emotional and mental wellbeing through reduced economic stress.17 In the context of employment, UBI may provide the necessary safety net to exit exploitative working conditions or buffer income instability for those unable to access waged work. Employment discrimination can make it especially difficult for transgender and gender-diverse people to access safe and secure employment. For example, in the European Union alone at least nine member States do not protect against discrimination in employment on grounds of gender identity.18 Some feminist proponents of UBI also celebrate its potential to reshape patriarchal gender norms around paid work and unpaid care, since no person is relegated to being a masculinized ‘breadwinner’ or feminized ‘caretaker’ in order to have income security. If combined with the provision of affordable quality care services, UBI could potentially encourage a more equitable distribution of care among genders.19 Indeed, some argue that UBI could lead to higher valuation of a range of non-commodified activities, including voluntary, emotional/affective and creative pursuits.20 Given that UBI is paid to individuals regardless of kinship relations, it could also support a range of diverse family forms, including cohabiting and extended families and ‘families of choice’ formed by many LGBTIQ people.21 Whether and to what extent these positive effects materialize will depend to a large degree on specific design features, including whether the UBI’s benefit level allows for maintaining an adequate standard of living.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Self-Sufficiency

It's hard for women suffering from domestic violence to become economically self sufficient

Adrienne E. Adams,, 2011, ","Michigan State University Department of Psychology Center for financial security , https://centerforfinancialsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/adams2011.pdf

Economic self-sufficiency can be defined as having the income necessary to meet basic needs (e.g., food, housing, child care, health care, transportation, taxes) without relying on public or private/informal assistance.1 Achieving self-sufficiency requires earning a steady living wage, which can be a significant challenge for DV survivors. Batterers may forbid their partners from having a job or engage in disruptive behaviors in an attempt to sabotage their employment (Adams, et. al. 2008). The result is often lost hours, lost work days, and lost jobs (Swanberg, Macke, & Logan, 2006; Wettersten, et al., 2004). Further, batterers’ interference can contribute to an inconsistent employment record or weakened job skills, which can compromise a woman’s future employability and earning potential (Tolman, Danziger, & Rosen, 2001). A great deal of research has examined the effects of DV on women’s employment. Early on, researchers focused on employment status (employed vs. not employed) as the central employment outcome; however, it quickly became evident that at any point in time a woman with an abusive partner is as likely to have a job as any other woman (Browne, Salomon, & Bassuk, 1999; Lloyd & Taluc, 1999; Tolman & Rosen, 2001). Instead, what distinguished women with abusive partners from their non-abused counterparts were their higher levels of job instability (Browne, Salomon, & Bassuk, 1999; Tolman & Wang, 2005). To date, job stability has been measured in several ways. One method is to examine how DV affects the amount of time a woman spends employed. For example, research has shown that DV is linked to working fewer weeks and months in a given period, as well as with working fewer hours annually (Staggs & Riger, 2005; Tolman & Wang, 2005). A second approach to measuring job stability requires not only taking into account the amount of time a woman spends working, but also examining job loss (Adams, et al., in press). It is important to consider job loss as a dimension of job stability because cycling between many jobs likely affects women’s economic well-being differently than having one sustained job. For example, working nine months out of the year at one job likely relates to different economic outcomes than working for a total of nine months at four or five different jobs. Thus, considering job loss as a dimension of job stability more fully captures the complex ways that DV may affect women’s employment. Related to job instability, DV can also compromise women’s ability to gain selfsufficiency through employment by negatively affecting their employability and earning potential. Factors related to employability that are important in the context of DV are human capital and work-supporting resources. Three commonly used measures of human capital are education, job skills, and work history (Staggs & Riger, 2005; Tolman & Wang, 2005). Education can be assessed by asking about the number of years of formal schooling or the highest level of education completed; job skills are often measured using Holtzer’s (1996) 9-item index of entry-level job skills; and work history has been captured through the number of months or years a woman has worked for pay in a given timeframe.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Self-Sufficiency

Ubi solves – eliminates need for financial dependence and allows women to afford basic necessities

Hallett 21 – [Hamish Hallett, “UBI and Domestic Violence,” UBI Lab Network, 02-06-2021, ] /jsam

For far too long we have seen universal basic income through a single lens, which is that this policy can only reduce economic inequality. Yet it is an idea that goes beyond any single issue. There is a lot of research that points towards the lack of economic independence as a core reason people do not leave abusive relationships. However, what is not being discussed by governments and NGOs is the relationship between universal basic income and domestic violence. What universal basic income can do is provide a way out for those suffering from abuse. Victims of violence will no longer rely on abusive partners for their basic needs as they can provide for themselves with their UBI.

Not only that, a universal basic income destroys financial barriers that domestic abuse victims have experienced for a very long time. Introducing this policy creates a gateway for the likes of Grace and many others who have suffered in traumatic relationships. Survivors can create a new life for themselves using the money. They can spend their UBI on services such as counseling, a new house or take time to recover from their experiences rather than going straight into work. It can also have a potential broader effect in reducing women's homelessness.

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Solvency Extensions › S – Leave Abuse

UBI helps women enduring DV

Womack ‘20

“How universal basic income could help women in abusive relationships” , SLATE, August 4, 2020.

- Myra

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Advantage Extensions › Patriarchy Impacts

Patriarchy justifies gender-based injustices

Evans ’23 , Writer, Associate Editor for Simply Psychology, management positions within healthcare

“Patriarchal Society According To Feminism, ”Simply Sociology, April 20, 2023 https://simplysociology.com/patriarchal-society-feminism-definition.html

Patriarchal ideology is the idea that men have more power, dominance, and privilege than women. Patriarchy is a social system in which men hold primary power and predominate in roles of political authority. It occurs in both one”s personal life and within the workplace. Sexism, meanwhile, is prejudice or discrimination based on sex; typically directed against women and girls. It manifests in subtle ways, such as through jokes or comments, as well as more overt forms of discrimination, such as denying women equal opportunities in education or employment. Combined, patriarchy and sexism create a system in which women are oppressed both socially and economically. Patriarchy reinforces sexist attitudes and beliefs, and provides men with the power to act on them. This can result in women being denied equal rights and opportunities, or experiencing violence and abuse. Sexism, on its own, can also lead to discrimination and oppression. For example, women may be paid less than men for doing the same job, or be passed over for promotions because of their gender (Lerner, 1986).

2023 CNDI Evidence
Feminist UBI Aff › Advantage Extensions › Patriarchy Impacts

Patriarchal norms threaten society

Vince ’19 , author, journalist and broadcaster for The Guardian

“Smashing the patriarchy: why there's nothing natural about male supremacy,” The Guardian, Nov 2, 2019, - EC

That’s not to say that just because a cultural trait has emerged it is necessarily “good”. Patriarchal norms, for instance, are damaging to our health and our societies, increasing death and suffering, and limiting humanity’s creative potential. We are, though, neither slaves to our biology nor our social norms – even if it can feel that way.