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2023 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Innovation › Tech Leadership key

US military tech leadership solves every existential risk.

Ash Jain 19, senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he oversees the Atlantic Council’s Democratic Order Initiative and D10 Strategy Forum; and Matthew Kroenig, deputy director for strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and associate professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University, 10/30/19, “Present at the Re-Creation: A Global Strategy for Revitalizing, Adapting, and Defending a Rules-Based International System,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Present-at-the-Recreation.pdf

The system must also be adapted to deal with new issues that were not envisioned when the existing order was designed. Foremost among these issues is emerging and disruptive technology, including AI, additive manufacturing (or 3D printing), quantum computing, genetic engineering, robotics, directed energy, the Internet of things (IOT), 5G, space, cyber, and many others. Like other disruptive technologies before them, these innovations promise great benefits, but also carry serious downside risks. For example, AI is already resulting in massive efficiencies and cost savings in the private sector. Routine tasks and other more complicated jobs, such as radiology, are already being automated. In the future, autonomous weapons systems may go to war against each other as human soldiers remain out of harm’s way.

Yet, AI is also transforming economies and societies, and generating new security challenges. Automation will lead to widespread unemployment. The final realization of driverless cars, for example, will put out of work millions of taxi, Uber, and long-haul truck drivers. Populist movements in the West have been driven by those disaffected by globalization and technology, and mass unemployment caused by automation will further grow those ranks and provide new fuel to grievance politics. Moreover, some fear that autonomous weapons systems will become “killer robots” that select and engage targets without human input, and could eventually turn on their creators, resulting in human extinction. The other technologies on this lisgt similarly balance great potential upside with great downside risk. 3D printing, for example, can be used to “make anything anywhere,” reducing costs for a wide range of manufactured goods and encouraging a return of local manufacturing industries.61 At the same time, advanced 3D printers can also be used by revisionist and rogue states to print component parts for advanced weapons systems or even WMD programs, spurring arms races and weapons proliferation.62 Genetic engineering can wipe out entire classes of disease through improved medicine, or wipe out entire classes of people through genetically engineered superbugs. Directed-energy missile defenses may defend against incoming missile attacks, while also undermining global strategic stability.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Innovation › US- China War !- Nuclear

U.S.-China war goes nuclear.

Talmadge 18, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (Caitlin, 10/15/18, "Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control", Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option)

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese war is Taiwan. Beijing’s long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington’s longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Were Washington to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, the world’s sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities—whether doing so was Washington’s stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China’s conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China’s attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China’s ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China’s sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear-armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China’s growing land-based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China’s ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China’s coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country’s interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military’s failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, high-intensity conventional war. China’s vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China’s real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored U.S. strategy to ensure a conventional victory would likely endanger much of China’s nuclear arsenal in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China’s nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the “no first use” pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea-based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in wartime developments that could shift China’s assumptions about U.S. intentions. If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose—on an unpopulated area or at sea—as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline.

The risk of great power war is high – it could cause nuclear escalation

2023 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Innovation › Innovation !

Revitalizing innovation is key to restore deterrence and prevent post-pandemic US-China nuclear war- miscalc likely now

Flournoy, 20 -- former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (2009-2012)

[Michèle, "How to Prevent a War in Asia: The Erosion of American Deterrence Raises the Risk of Chinese Miscalculation," Foreign Affairs, 6-18-2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-18/how-prevent-war-asia, accessed 6-29-2021]

How to Prevent a War in Asia

2023 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Innovation › Innovation !

Innovation key to out-compete China

Wheeler, visiting fellow in Governance Studies at The Brookings Institution, Chairman of the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) from 2013 to 2017, ‘20

(Tom, “Digital Competition With China Starts With Competition At Home,” )

The United States and China are engaged in a technology-based conflict to determine 21st-century international economic leadership. China’s approach is to identify and support the research and development efforts of a handful of “national champion” companies. The dominant tech companies of the U.S. are de facto embracing this Chinese policy in their effort to maintain domestic marketplace control. Rather than embracing a China-like consecration of a select few companies, America’s digital competition with China should begin with meaningful competition at home and the allAmerican reality that competition drives innovation.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Innovation › Ubi solves Competitiveness

UBI solves competitiveness with China – it fosters tech, inspires national interest, and increases innovation

Singer & Silvian 21 --- Scott Singer is a Ph.D. candidate in international relations at the University of Oxford. Ben Silvian is pursuing his Masters degree in technology management at Georgetown University. 11/09/2021 (“How Universal Basic Income Can Advance the United States’ China Strategy.” The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/how-universal-basic-income-can-advance-the-united-states-china-strategy/. Date Accessed: 6-23-2023.)

How can the United States overcome the democratic constraint problem that is inhibiting progress in developing an optimal foreign policy response toward China? The answer lies partly in modifying domestic incentives such that the American public supports strategically optimal foreign policies. If U.S. domestic policy can harness technological advancement to improve the lives of average Americans, it can unlock advantageous foreign policy approaches from their domestic constraints. The only way to turn Luddites into technophiles is to recalibrate the system so that the economic gains of advanced technology start flowing to them. Relevant human infrastructure investment could manifest in a range of forms, but here we consider one of the most prominent ideas from the 2020 U.S. presidential elections: Universal Basic Income (UBI).

At its core, UBI is a direct investment in American human capital, distributing the immense economic gains of technology advancements throughout the populace. The policy, popularized by Andrew Yang as a “Freedom Dividend,” would guarantee direct cash payments every month. Cash is highly flexible and fungible, meaning it can be used to overcome the recipient’s most pressing financial pain points.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Innovation › Innovation Declining

China is quickly catching up as the U.S. loses its innovative edge, threatening our economic superiority and security.

Brotherton-Bunch 23 (Elizabeth, Senior Vice President for Communications at Alliance for American Manufacturing, “The United States is Losing Its Innovation Edge Over China, a New Report Warns,” Alliance for American Manufacturing, 1/24/2023, https://www.americanmanufacturing.org/blog/the-united-states-is-losing-its-innovation-edge-over-china-a-new-report-warns/#:~:text=for%20American%20Manufacturing-,The%20United%20States%20is%20Losing%20Its%20Innovation,China%2C%20a%20New%20Report%20Warns&text=The%20Information%20Technology%20and%20Innovation,comes%20to%20total%20innovation%20output.)

A new report from the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, not-so-subtly titled “Wake Up America: China Is Overtaking the United States in Innovation Output,” warns that “China is positioned to evolve from an imitator to an innovator” which “threatens the market share of the United States and allied nations in high-value-added, advanced industries, which are important to U.S. prosperity and security.” Authors Ian Clay and Robert Atkinson found that in 2010, “China’s innovation and advanced-industry capabilities were approximately 58 percent of U.S. capabilities on a proportional basis (accounting for size of its economy, population, etc.) and 78 percent of U.S. output in absolute terms.” But by 2020, that had increased to 75 percent of U.S. capabilities on a proportional basis and 139 percent (!!!) in absolute terms. Time to wake up, indeed. The consequences of losing our innovative edge would be enormous in all sorts of ways, including for America’s national security. The “superiority of the U.S. military rests largely on its technological superiority,” the report notes, and the United States already is far too reliant on imports to supply our military. Clay and Atkinson write: “…even if the United States could reliably count on other countries to provide it with military technologies and supplies, its superiority would be diminished by definition. If the United States must rely on others for the development and production of defense technologies, then its military can only be as technologically advanced as its suppliers’.” Losing innovation also would be harmful to economic security, leading to lost jobs and lost market share. But as we’ve seen over the past several years thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic and supply chain crisis, it also could create a ripple effect across the entire economy.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
2AC › Innovation › Innovation Declining

Innovation in the U.S. is declining while cost of research and innovation increases exponentially.

Gold 21 (E. Richard, McGill University, Faculty of Law and Faculty of Medicine, Canada, “The fall of the innovation empire and its possible rise through open science,” National Library of Medicine, June 2021, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8024784/#:~:text=Examining%20a%20variety%20of%20measures,has%20been%20declining%20since%201916)

Amidst the hype over innovation's contributions to wellbeing and the economy lies growing concern over the declining effectiveness of the innovation system to create wealth and to attain greater social benefit. Despite mounting evidence of this decline, alarm over it nevertheless remains in the shadows of the innovation literature, finding instead a modest voice in environmental sustainability journals (Tainter et al., 2017), among complexity theorists (Youn et al., 2015), some economists (Bhattacharya and Packalen, 2020; Bloom et al., 2020; Gordon 2016; Strumsky et al., 2010) and jurists (Feldman and Wang, 2017). In this article, I document this decline in innovation and the failure of the institutions of innovation to provide incentives and structures that increase the efficiency of the innovation system. Among the reasons for this decline, I examine the growing disequilibrium between proprietary and open science models of innovation that has upset the historical synergy between the two (David, 2008). In the last part of this article, I investigate the potential of open science partnerships to help restore this balance and, through it, to increase the effectiveness of the innovation system.

In Part 2, I describe the empirical literature highlighting three aspects of innovative activity over the past century, using the US as the focus of this study. First, I canvass the evidence supporting the proposition that the cost of research and innovation is not only increasing but has been increasing exponentially over the last century. Second, researcher productivity – researcher output, whether measured in papers, lifespan added, or increased agricultural productivity – has suffered a steady decline for over a century. Third, for most of the 20th century, increased investments in science and technology – particularly investments in hiring new researchers – have offset the productivity decline, leading to steady rates in the production of new innovation artifacts such as papers, patents, and products (C. I. Jones, 2002). These investments are occuring, however, at a rate that is unsustainable in the long term.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
1AC › Inequality Adv

Prioritize poverty- it’s the fourth leading cause of death in the US

DAVID DANELSKI April 17, 2023 (David Danelski is a seasoned communications professional who is adept at preparing and promoting content about science, business, education and policy that is lucid and compelling for lay audiences; UC Riverside; “Poverty is the 4th greatest cause of U.S. deaths Only heart disease, cancer, and smoking were associated with a greater number of deaths, UCR study finds”; https://news.ucr.edu/articles/2023/04/17/poverty-4th-greatest-cause-us-deaths#:~:text=A%20University%20of%20California%2C%20Riverside,people%2015%20years%20and%20older.)//ISir

Poverty has long been linked to shorter lives. But just how many deaths in the United States are associated with poverty? The number has been elusive – until now. A University of California, Riverside, (UCR) paper published Monday, April 17, in the Journal of the American Medical Association associated poverty with an estimated 183,000 deaths in the United States in 2019 among people 15 years and older. This estimate is considered conservative because the data is from the year just prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused spikes in deaths worldwide and continues to take its toll. The analysis found that only heart disease, cancer, and smoking were associated with a greater number of deaths than poverty. Obesity, diabetes, drug overdoses, suicides, firearms, and homicides, among other common causes of death, were less lethal than poverty. “Poverty kills as much as dementia, accidents, stroke, Alzheimer's, and diabetes,” said David Brady, the study’s lead author and a UCR professor of public policy. “Poverty silently killed 10 times as many people as all the homicides in 2019. And yet, homicide firearms and suicide get vastly more attention.” Another finding is that people living in poverty – those with incomes less than 50% of the U.S. median income -- have roughly the same survival rates until they hit their 40s, after which they die at significantly higher rates than people with more adequate incomes and resources. The analysis estimated the number of poverty deaths by analyzing income data kept by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and death data from household surveys from the Cross-National Equivalent File. Deaths reported in surveys were validated in the National Death Index, a database kept by the National Center for Health Statistics, which tracks deaths and their causes in the U.S.. Their findings have major policy implications, the researchers say. “Because certain ethnic and racial minority groups are far more likely to be in poverty, our estimates can improve understanding of ethnic and racial inequalities in life expectancy,” the paper reads. Additionally, the study shows that poverty should get more attention from policymakers, said Brady, the director of UCR’s Blum Initiative on Global and Regional Poverty. Beyond the emotional suffering of surviving family members and friends, deaths are associated with a great economic cost. Experts agree that a death is expensive for a family, community and government, Brady said. “If we had less poverty, there'd be a lot better health and well-being, people could work more, and they could be more productive,” Brady said. “All of those are benefits of investing in people through social policies.” The title of the paper is “Novel Estimates of Mortality Associated With Poverty in the U.S.” In addition to Brady, study authors include Professor Ulrich Kohler at the University of Potsdam, Germany, and Professor Hui Zheng at Ohio State University in Columbus.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
1AC › Inequality Adv

Economic Inequality creates a never ending cycle of poverty and stagnation

Polacko 21, Matthew Polacko, Writer at the Department of Science Politics at the University of Quebec Monreal, “Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality- An Overview, De Gruyter, October 20, 2021, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/spp-2021-0017/html?lang=en//Isim

Escalating income inequality has been linked with numerous negative outcomes. On the economic front, negative results transpire beyond the obvious poverty and material deprivation that is often associated with low incomes. Income inequality has also been shown to reduce growth, innovation, and investment. On the social front, Wilkinson and Pickett’s ground-breaking The Spirit Level (), found that societies that are more unequal have worse social outcomes on average than more egalitarian societies. They summarised an extensive body of research from the previous 30 years to create an Index of Health and Social Problems, which revealed a host of different health and social problems (measuring life expectancy, infant mortality, obesity, trust, imprisonment, homicide, drug abuse, mental health, social mobility, childhood education, and teenage pregnancy) as being positively correlated with the level of income inequality across rich nations and across states within the US. displays the cross-national findings via a sample of 21 OECD countries. 3.1 Economic Income inequality is predominantly an economic subject. Therefore, it is understandable that it can engender pervasive economic outcomes. Foremost economically speaking, it has been linked with reduced growth, investment and innovation. Leading international organisations such as the IMF, World Bank and OECD, pushed for neoliberal reforms beginning in the 1980s, although they have recently started to substantially temper their views due to their own research into inequality. A 2016 study by IMF economists, noted that neoliberal policies have delivered benefits through the expansion of global trade and transfers of technology, but the resulting increases in inequality “itself undercut growth, the very thing that the neo-liberal agenda is intent on boosting” (Ostry, Loungani, and Furceri 2016: 41). Cingano’s (2014) OECD cross-national study, found that once a country’s income inequality reaches a certain level it reduces growth. The growth rate in these countries would have been one-fifth higher had income inequality not increased, while the greater equality of the other countries included in the study helped to increase their growth rates. Consumer spending is good for economic growth but rising income inequality shifts more money to the top of the income distribution, where higher income individuals have a much smaller propensity to consume than lower-income individuals. The wealthy save roughly 15–25% of their income, whereas low income individuals spend their entire income on consumer goods and services (Stiglitz 2013: 106). Therefore, greater inequality reduces demand in an economy and is a major contributor to the ‘secular stagnation’ (persistent insufficient demand relative to aggregate private savings) that the largest Western economies have been experiencing since the financial crisis. Inequality also increases the level of debt, as lower-income individuals borrow more to maintain their standard of living, especially in a climate of low interest rates. Combined with deregulation, greater debt increases instability and “was a major contributor to, if not the underlying cause of, the 2008 financial crash” (Brown 2017: 35–36). Another key economic effect of income inequality is that it leads to reduced welfare spending and public investment. Since a greater share of the income distribution is earned by the very wealthy, governments have less income available to fund education, public amenities, and other services that the poor rely heavily on. This creates social separation, whereby the wealthy opt out in publicly funding services because their private equivalents are of better quality. This causes a cycle of increasing income inequality that is likely to eventually lead to a situation of “private affluence and public squalor” (Marmot 2015: 39). Lastly, it has been proven that economic instability is a by-product of increasing inequality, which harms innovation. Both countries and American states with the highest inequality have been found to be the least innovative in terms of the amount of Intellectual Property (IP) patents they produce (Dorling 2018: 129–130). Although income inequality is predominantly an economic subject, its effects are so pervasive that it has also been linked to a host of negative health and societal outcomes.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
1AC › Inequality Adv

Income inequality spurs gridlock- causes extinction

Cribb, 17 -- Australian National University Emeritus Faculty

[Julian, Fellow, Australian Academy of Technology, Science and Engineering, Surviving The 21st Century: Humanity’s Ten Great Challenges and How We Can Overcome Them, Switzerland: Springer International, 2017, p. 166-167, accessed 2017]

The argument that income inequality leads to legislative stalemate and government indecision was advanced by Mian and colleagues in a study of the political outcomes of the 2008–2009 Global Economic Recession (Mian et al. 2012 ), stating “…politically countries become more polarized and fractionalized following financial crises. This results in legislative stalemate, making it less likely that crises lead to meaningful macroeconomic reforms.” It also affects intergenerational cohesion, explains Nobel economics laureate Joseph Stiglitz: “These three realities – social injustice on an unprecedented scale, massive inequities, and a loss of trust in elites – define our political moment, and rightly so…. But we won’t be able to fix the problem if we don’t recognize it. Our young do. They perceive the absence of intergenerational justice, and they are right to be angry” (Stiglitz 2016). From the perspective of the survival of civilization and the human species, financial inequality does not represent a direct threat—indeed most societies have long managed with varying degrees of income disparity. Where it is of concern to a human race, whose numbers and demands have already exceeded the finite boundaries of its shared planet, is in the capacity of inequality to wreck social cohesion and hence, to undermine the prospects for a collaborative effort by the whole of humanity to tackle the multiple existential threats we face. Rich-against-poor is a good way to divert the argument and so de-rail climate action, disarmament, planetary clean-up or food security, for instance. Disunity spells electoral loss in politics, rifts between commanders and their troops breed military defeat, lack of team spirit yields failure in sport, disharmony means a poor orchestra or business performance, family disagreements often lead to dysfunction and violence. These lessons are well-known and attested, from every walk of life. Yet humans persistently overlook the cost of socioeconomic disunity and grievances when it comes to dealing with our common perils as a species. For civilisation and our species to survive and prosper sustainably in the long run, common understandings and co-operation are essential, across all the gulfs that divide us—political, ethnic, religious and economic. A sustainable world, and a viable human species, will not be possible unless the poverty and inequity gaps can be reduced, if not closed. This is not a matter of politics or ideology, as many may argue: it is the same lesson in collective wisdom and collaboration which those earliest humans first learned on the African savannah a million and a half years ago: together we stand, divided we fall. It is purely an issue of co-existence and co-survival. Neither rich nor poor are advantaged by a state of civilisation in collapse. An unsustainable world will kill the affluent as surely as the deprived.

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1AC › Inequality Adv

Global co-op is key to solve guaranteed existential threats

Sasnal, 20 -- Polish Institute of International Affairs head of research

[Patrycja, "Mistaking Panacea for Pathogens: The Case for Existential Multilateralism," Challenges of Global Governance Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic, May 2020, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/challenges-of-global-governance-amid-the-covid-19-pandemic.pdf, accessed 8-18-20]

The majority of the global population only fears a handful of international threats. According to a Eurobarometer poll, the greatest EU concerns are immigration (34 percent), climate change (24 percent), the economic situation (18 percent), and terrorism (15 percent). According to a Pew survey, the top three concerns in Asia-Pacific and Latin America are cyberattacks, climate change, and terrorism. In most polls, Africans fear economic hardship the most, but the 2019 Afrobarometer also found that a majority think climate change is making their lives worse. According to an early Pew survey after the pandemic in the United States, Americans feared infectious diseases the most (79 percent) followed by terrorism (73 percent), nuclear weapons (73 percent), cyberattacks (72 percent), a rising China (62 percent), and climate change (60 percent).

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1AC › Inequality Adv

Tackling inequality is key to catalyze international coop and inoculate the US against nationalism

Kupchan, 21 – Georgetown University international affairs professor

[Charles A. Kupchan, CFR senior fellow, served on the National Security Council during the Obama administration, and Peter L. Trubowitz, London School of Economics and Political Science IR professor, Associate Fellow at Chatham House, “The Home Front: Why an Internationalist Foreign Policy Needs a Stronger Domestic Foundation,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2021, accessed 6-23-21]

The Home Front: Why an Internationalist Foreign Policy Needs a Stronger Domestic Foundation

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1AC › Inequality Adv

Growing economic inequality drives diversionary nationalism and makes war inevitable.

Frederick Solt 11. Ph.D. in Political Science from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, currently Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa, Assistant Professor, Departments of Political Science and Sociology, Southern Illinois at the time of publication. “Diversionary Nationalism: Economic Inequality and the Formation of National Pride.” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 73, No. 3, pgs. 821-830, July 2011.

One of the oldest theories of nationalism is that states instill the nationalist myth in their citizens to divert their attention from great economic inequality and so forestall pervasive unrest. Because the very concept of nationalism obscures the extent of inequality and is a potent tool for delegitimizing calls for redistribution, it is a perfect diversion, and states should be expected to engage in more nationalist mythmaking when inequality increases. The evidence presented by this study supports this theory: across the countries and over time, where economic inequality is greater, nationalist sentiments are substantially more widespread. This result adds considerably to our understanding of nationalism. To date, many scholars have focused on the international environment as the principal source of threats that prompt states to generate nationalism; the importance of the domestic threat posed by economic inequality has been largely overlooked. However, at least in recent years, domestic inequality is a far more important stimulus for the generation of nationalist sentiments than the international context. Given that nuclear weapons—either their own or their allies’—rather than the mass army now serve as the primary defense of many countries against being overrun by their enemies, perhaps this is not surprising: nationalism-inspired mass mobilization is simply no longer as necessary for protection as it once was (see Mearsheimer 1990, 21; Posen 1993, 122–24). Another important implication of the analyses presented above is that growing economic inequality may increase ethnic conflict. States may foment national pride to stem discontent with increasing inequality, but this pride can also lead to more hostility towards immigrants and minorities. Though pride in the nation is distinct from chauvinism and outgroup hostility, it is nevertheless closely related to these phenomena, and recent experimental research has shown that members of majority groups who express high levels of national pride can be nudged into intolerant and xenophobic responses quite easily (Li and Brewer 2004). This finding suggests that, by leading to the creation of more national pride, higher levels of inequality produce environments favorable to those who would inflame ethnic animosities. Another and perhaps even more worrisome implication regards the likelihood of war. Nationalism is frequently suggested as a cause of war, and more national pride has been found to result in a much greater demand for national security even at the expense of civil liberties (Davis and Silver 2004, 36–37) as well as preferences for “a more militaristic foreign affairs posture and a more interventionist role in world politics” (Conover and Feldman 1987, 3). To the extent that these preferences influence policymaking, the growth in economic inequality over the last quarter century should be expected to lead to more aggressive foreign policies and more international conflict. If economic inequality prompts states to generate diversionary nationalism as the results presented above suggest, then rising inequality could make for a more dangerous world. The results of this work also contribute to our still limited knowledge of the relationship between economic inequality and democratic politics. In particular, it helps explain the fact that, contrary to median-voter models of redistribution (e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981), democracies with higher levels of inequality do not consistently respond with more redistribution (e.g., Bénabou 1996). Rather than allowing redistribution to be decided through the democratic process suggested by such models, this work suggests that states often respond to higher levels of inequality with more nationalism. Nationalism then works to divert attention from inequality, so many citizens neither realize the extent of inequality nor demand redistributive policies. By prompting states to promote nationalism, greater economic inequality removes the issue of redistribution from debate and therefore narrows the scope of democratic politics.

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1AC › Inequality Adv

Inequality decreases social cohesion, causing violence and political unrest

Ferreria et al 22, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark; Rachel M Gisselquist. UNU-WIDER- Finland; Finn Tarp- Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark; “On the Impact of Inequality on Growth, Human Development, and Governance”, Oxford Academic, 12 January 2022, https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/24/1/viab058/6460467//Isim

Several theoretical explanations exist across disciplines for the effects of inequality on socioeconomic and political outcomes. Before we describe in more detail these channels of influence and the resulting outcomes, we highlight a broader set of arguments, which act as a roadmap for the rest of the section. provides a schematic overview. Starting from the left- to the right-hand side, the diagram represents different channels of transmission of the effects of higher levels of inequality, their intermediate effects, and the resulting positive or negative impact on our three outcomes of interest: growth, human development, and democracy. We broadly divide these channels according to their underlying drivers: the poor, the population at large or the average, and the wealthy. Overall, the diagram suggests that high inequality has predominantly harmful effects on our three outcomes of interest, according to theoretical explanations advanced in the literature. The dominant view then runs contra the expectations of the classical theorists, i.e., that inequality has a positive impact on growth, via savings and investment (shown at the top of ). We highlight six main transmission channels. First, inequality affects incentives for savings and investment and the overall level of institutional quality through its influence on policy making and increased political instability, and consequent effects on property rights and the regulatory framework. This has implications for growth both directly and indirectly via governance. Second, by favoring private over public investment, inequality affects investment in public goods, namely health and education, with implications across the three outcomes. Third, and related, inequality results in underinvestment on human capital resulting from credit constraints, and high fertility, which affects education levels and overall economic growth. Fourth, high taxation will be demanded by a well-endowed median voter and the likelihood of transition to and stability of democracy will also depend on the pressure for redistribution, which is higher with lower levels of equality. Moreover, and fifth, a small middle class will affect the demand not only for democracy but also for manufactures. Finally, high levels of polarization will lead to weak social cohesion via their effects on social capital, as well as low trust and potential high levels in violent crime, which affect health directly and indirectly via investment in public health. Additionally, the concentration of power on the rich leads to increased probability of political violence and affects political engagement. Some of these channels affect all of the outcomes. For instance, the effect through investment in public goods has detrimental effects on human development, and on growth and democracy. Moreover, the resulting polarization and social discontent, which increase the chances of political violence, again negatively impact the three outcomes. However, there is also some indication that, when it comes to growth, the effect might be ambiguous depending on the predominance of the effects of transmission mechanisms. The channel through savings (and investment) points to a potential positive effect, while the different effects through public investment, taxation, the structure of demand, imperfect credit markets, fertility, and social discontent suggest potential negative consequences for growth. This section uncovers more details about these different theoretical predictions. It starts by introducing the main hypotheses advanced for the effects of inequality on growth. While the approach in this article considers the three outcomes separately, we recognize that they are not disjointed or orthogonal and refer to the links between them. Nevertheless, a full discussion of these interlinkages is beyond the scope of this article. As suggested in and described in more detail below, some of these channels point to the impact of inequality on our remaining outcomes of interest, namely education and health, or governance. We return to them in the remaining two subsections, where we expand to consider the insights from other strands of literature.

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1AC › Inequality Adv

A UBI is needed to solve issues of income inequality

Wignarajaet al., 20 -- Kanni Assistant Secretary-General, UN Balazs Chief Economist

[Kanni Wignaraja, Balazs Horvath, “Universal basic income is the answer to the inequalities exposed by COVID-19,” World Economic Forum, 4-17-2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/covid-19-universal-basic-income-social-inequality/, accessed 6-22-2023]

It is time to add a new element to the policy packages that governments are introducing, one we know but have abandoned: Universal Basic Income (UBI). It is needed as part of the package that will help us to get out of this yawning pit. The naysayers, and there are plenty, will point out that it won’t work because no country can afford to regularly dole out money to every citizen. They will argue that we will run unsustainable deficits, which cannot be financed. This is a valid concern. But the alternative – not strongly addressing COVID-19 repercussions – will result in a greater surge in inequality, increasing social tensions that would cost governments even more and open countries to heightened risk of societal conflict. The pandemic that began in China has raged across Asia and beyond, exposing inequalities and vulnerabilities of huge populations in the region. This includes informal workers – – as well as migrants, with almost 100 million dislocated, in India alone. If a large part of an entire generation loses its livelihood, with no social safety net to catch it, the social costs will be unbearably high. Economic instability will follow the flare-up of social tensions. During these times, when we need to kickstart sputtering economies, the payoff of social stability would be tremendous, making an even more powerful argument for UBI. So a new social contract needs to emerge from this crisis that rebalances deep inequalities that are prevalent across societies. To put it bluntly: The question should no longer be whether resources for effective social protection can be found – but how they can be found. UBI promises to be a useful element of such a framework. Countries like the United States and Canada are already making such plans. Alaska, in fact, has been making annual UBI-type payments, to every state resident, for decades. Canadian prime minister , for the next four months, to workers who have lost income due to the pandemic – a short-term form of UBI. Now we need to expand it and make it work in the long-term, and we can. We must approach it differently from how we have in the past. We should neither view it as a hand-out, nor as a Band-Aid solution to add on to systems already in place. Instead, we should use the current twin crises to re-evaluate where we are “still digging”. To make UBI fly, we will need fair taxation. Countries will have to work together, exchanging data across borders, to stop people and corporations from evading taxes. Simply put, we must all pay our fair share. With good conscience, we can no longer privatize profit and socialize loss. Then stop the subsidies, notably fossil-fuel subsidies, which hinder the path to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals – especially climate-change targets. This would benefit us all, while generating financial resources not just for UBI, but also to support affected fossil-fuel companies. Warren Buffet and Bill Gates, among the richest people on the planet, have both advocated for the rich to pay more in taxes, the lack of which has led to a growing and enormous disparity. According to , 10% of the world’s richest own 85% of its wealth. According to some research, Europeans were already in favour of UBI prior to coronavirus. Multinationals too are not paying their fair share. Apple, Amazon, Google and Walmart to name just a few, generate mind-boggling profits and pay limited amounts in taxes, after taking advantage of all the wrinkles in tax systems. If the top 1,000 corporations in the world were fairly taxed, it would allow for a modest UBI to be tightly and reasonably dispensed in countries across the world. Something is simply wrong and broken when governments are deprived of funds they should justifiably have to construct a better state. Lest the naysayers think this is a theory from the left, the idea of tax competition has been touched upon, for years on end, by the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Its members include the US, Canada and Western European countries. This is what its fiscal policy experts say: “To work effectively, a global economy needs some acceptable ground rules to guide governments and business. Such a framework can help business to move capital to locations where it can optimize its return, without impeding the aim of national governments to meet the legitimate expectations of their citizens for a fair share in the benefits and costs of globalization.” To achieve “acceptable ground-rules” and “a fair share in the benefits and costs” will require global coordination; because if one country begins taxing this way, highly mobile capital will flee to countries that do not. There is no question that UBI will be hard to get going. It is important to impartially consider the pros and cons, the reasons why it has not been implemented at scale so far, and what modalities would make it workable. A key complicating factor with implementing UBI – beyond its fiscal cost – is that it would not arrive in a vacuum. It would need to fit into and complement the existing set of social programmes, both insurance-based and needs-based. And rules would be needed to prevent double-dipping of benefits. Moving to such a system would need to ensure that the incentives to have a job remain intact. That is relatively simple to do: A UBI should be sufficient, to sustain a person at a modest minimum, leaving sufficient incentives to work, save, and invest. Finally, good arguments can be made for having very selective conditions – for instance, some that relate to public goods, like vaccinating all children and ensuring they attend school. Such selective conditions would not undermine the main purpose of eliminating poverty and allow low-income people to take calculated risks, to try to lift themselves out of poverty. DISCOVER What is the World Economic Forum doing about the coronavirus outbreak? Show more The alternative to not having UBI is worse – the rising likelihood of social unrest, conflict, unmanageable mass migration and the proliferation of extremist groups that capitalize and ferment on social disappointment. It is against this background that we seriously need to consider implementing a well-designed UBI, so shocks may hit, but they won’t destroy.

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1AC › Inequality Adv

Inequality is growing – strategies are needed

Orchard 22

Jacob Orchard Doctoral Canadate in Economics, University of California, San Diego, Inflation Inequality: Poorest Americans are hit hardest by soaring on necessities, University of California, San Diego, 22 January 2022

https://theconversation.com/inflation-inequality-poorest-americans-are-hit-hardest-by-soaring-prices-on-necessities-174853

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1AC › Innovation Adv

Slow growth breaks down global cooperation and causes war

Landay 17 (Jonathan – Reuters National Security Correspondent, 1/9/17, “U.S. intelligence study warns of growing conflict risk”, )

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The risk of conflicts between and within nations will increase over the next five years to levels not seen since the Cold War as global growth slows, the post-World War Two order erodes and anti-globalization fuels nationalism, said a U.S. intelligence report released on Monday. “These trends will converge at an unprecedented pace to make governing and cooperation harder and to change the nature of power – fundamentally altering the global landscape,” said “Global Trends: Paradox of Progress,” the sixth in a series of quadrennial studies by the U.S. National Intelligence Council. The findings, published less than two weeks before U.S. President-elect Donald Trump takes office on Jan. 20, outlined factors shaping a “dark and difficult near future,” including a more assertive Russia and China, regional conflicts, terrorism, rising income inequality, climate change and sluggish economic growth. Global Trends reports deliberately avoid analyzing U.S. policies or choices, but the latest study underscored the complex difficulties Trump must address in order to fulfill his vows to improve relations with Russia, level the economic playing field with China, return jobs to the United States and defeat terrorism. The National Intelligence Council comprises the senior U.S. regional and subject-matter intelligence analysts. It oversees the drafting of National Intelligence Estimates, which often synthesize work by all 17 intelligence agencies and are the most comprehensive analytic products of U.S intelligence. The study, which included interviews with academic experts as well as financial and political leaders worldwide, examined political, social, economic and technological trends that the authors project will shape the world from the present to 2035, and their potential impact. ‘INWARD-LOOKING WEST’ It said the threat of terrorism would grow in coming decades as small groups and individuals harnessed “new technologies, ideas and relationships.” Uncertainty about the United States, coupled with an “inward-looking West” and the weakening of international human rights and conflict prevention standards, will encourage China and Russia to challenge American influence, the study added. Those challenges “will stay below the threshold of hot war but bring profound risks of miscalculation,” the study warned. “Overconfidence that material strength can manage escalation will increase the risks of interstate conflict to levels not seen since the Cold War.” While “hot war” may be avoided, differences in values and interests among states and drives for regional dominance “are leading to a spheres of influence world,” it said, The latest Global Trends, the subject of a Washington conference, added that the situation also offered opportunities to governments, societies, groups and individuals to make choices that could bring “more hopeful, secure futures.” “As the paradox of progress implies, the same trends generating near-term risks also can create opportunities for better outcomes over the long term,” the study said. THE HOME FRONT The report also said that while globalization and technological advances had “enriched the richest” and raised billions from poverty, they had also “hollowed out” Western middle classes and ignited backlashes against globalization. Those trends have been compounded by the largest migrant flows in seven decades, which are stoking “nativist, anti-elite impulses.” “Slow growth plus technology-induced disruptions in job markets will threaten poverty reduction and drive tensions within countries in the years to come, fueling the very nationalism that contributes to tension between counties,” it said. The trends shaping the future include contractions in the working-age populations of wealthy countries and expansions in the same group in poorer nations, especially in Africa and South Asia, increasing economic, employment, urbanization and welfare pressures, the study said. The world will also continue to experience weak near-term growth as governments, institutions and businesses struggle to overcome fallout from the Great Recession, the study said. “Major economies will confront shrinking workforces and diminishing productivity gains while recovering from the 2008-09 financial crisis with high debt, weak demand, and doubts about globalization,” said the study. “China will attempt to shift to a consumer-driven economy from its longstanding export and investment focus. Lower growth will threaten poverty reduction in developing counties.” Governance will become more difficult as issues, including global climate change, environmental degradation and health threats demand collective action, the study added, while such cooperation becomes harder.

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1AC › Innovation Adv

Econ decline causes nuclear wars

Dr. Mathew Maavak 21, PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, External Researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University, Expert and Regular Commentator on Risk-Related Geostrategic Issues at the Russian International Affairs Council, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?”, Salus Journal – The Australian Journal for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, Volume 9, Number 1, p. 2-8

Various scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Onceinexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals. Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset. INTRODUCTION. The new decade is witnessing rising volatility across global systems. Pick any random “system” today and chart out its trajectory: Are our education systems becoming more robust and affordable? What about food security? Are our healthcare systems improving? Are our pension systems sound? Wherever one looks, there are dark clouds gathering on a global horizon marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998). The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020). An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity. COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach. METHODOLOGY. An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020):

• Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006);

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1AC › Innovation Adv

Small businesses are key to the U.S. economy – economic growth, diversity, and adaptability

Duplain 23 (Rachel Duplain - experienced content, marketing, and business professional at Podium, the premiere marketing and communications platform for local businesses. “Small Business, Big Impact: Why Small Businesses are Essential to Our Economy.” Podium. 3/3/23. https://www.podium.com/article/why-small-businesses-are-essential/)

So, how important are small businesses to the economy? 3 Reasons Small Businesses are Essential to Our Economy Small businesses are the lifeblood of the U.S. economy as they create new opportunities. That’s new opportunities for jobs, new opportunities for innovation, and new opportunities to serve niche communities. Operating with agility and the ability to adapt quickly, small businesses have an important role to play in society. 1. Small Businesses Drive Economic Growth With the recent onset of a recession as a stark reminder of how important a growing economy is, small businesses play an essential role in keeping things running smoothly as they are responsible for 44% of U.S. economic activity. This economic success doesn’t only benefit business owners but also leads to team expansion and new roles. In fact, 62% of the new jobs created between 1995 and 2020 were created by small businesses—more than large enterprises! That’s a staggering impact that benefits the people in the local community. As well as supporting the local community with the creation of jobs, small businesses often source their supplies from the local community, boosting the local economy once again. This is an easily traceable and low carbon footprint supply chain that larger businesses that operate on mass just can’t compete with. Speaking of large enterprises, small businesses keep them on their toes. While well-known brands tend to have better brand awareness, recognition, and trust, small businesses are still strong competition. They have a unique perspective that drives innovation and are more personable, enabling them to build strong relationships with customers. Due to small businesses innovating, large enterprises have to innovate too if they want to maintain their market share. This produces better options for the target market all around. 2. Small Businesses Offer a Diverse Range of Products and Services By nature, large enterprises operate on a large scale. So, they won’t implement changes unless it is appealing to a broad customer base and viable across area-wide, state-wide, nationwide, or even international locations. They are often limited to being generalists meaning they can’t appeal to the locals in the same way small businesses can. That’s a major pitfall as about 50% of customers have switched to a competitor that was more relevant and met their needs better. Small businesses can leverage the power of niching by focusing on meeting the needs of, marketing to attract, and nurturing their relationship with a specific target audience. That could be a local community with specific needs that brand names aren’t meeting. Or they could leverage globalization and digital transformation by appealing to a niche market that doesn’t have large numbers locally but does on a wider scale and will interact with the business online. A niche market that has grown in demand recently is eco-conscious shoppers. Big supermarkets tend to be slow in the uptake of new innovations like sustainable products. But by looking online these consumers can find plenty of options for making their home more eco-friendly such as Bee’s Wrap, which offers sustainable food storage options to cut down on plastic usage. Specificity is profitable. You only have to look at the rise of personalized marketing, enabled by the technological development of data-driven segmentation, as evidence of this. In the age of information that can lead to marketing overwhelm, direct marketing that speaks to a certain niche cuts through the noise. By adding diversity to the products and services on the market, small businesses give consumers the power of choice. 3. Small Businesses are Resilient and Adaptive Small businesses can use their small scale to their advantage. They can adapt to changes in the market, come up with an action plan for overcoming economic downturns, and meet new demands with speed and efficiency that isn’t possible in a large enterprise. This agility was put to the test during the Covid-19 pandemic. While 9.1 million jobs were lost in the first two quarters of 2020, small businesses created 5.5 million jobs in the following four quarters, recovering 60% of jobs lost. That’s quite the bounce back, and it shows how well small businesses can adapt to new circumstances and return to serving their customers. For example, Battery Watering Technologies only had 50 employees at the onset of the pandemic. They were able to keep all of them working by using the equipment they had to operate in the battery sector to start making face shields which they sold through an e-commerce website. It was a massive success that led to sales of 6,000 face shields a day. Such adaptability leads to a high level of resilience. It’s not just once-in-a-lifetime pandemics that resilience protects the business against, but the fast pace of technological developments as well. To keep up with innovation and continue to meet customer expectations, digital transformation is a commitment all businesses need to make and small businesses have the advantage of implementing developments much faster.

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1AC › Innovation Adv

Maintaining our innovative lead solves nuclear war

Kroenig and Gopalaswamy 18 – Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council; Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council

Matthew Kroenig and Bharath Gopalaswamy, "Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11-12-2018, 

Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict.