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2023 Northwestern Evidence
AT: Dedev › Impact › Impact---AT: Resource Wars

Resource wars are fake

Emily Meierding 16, assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., 5-19-2016, "Oil wars: Why nations aren’t battling over resources," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/19/oil-wars-why-nations-arent-battling-over-petroleum-resources/?utm_term=.b334c10dbcbd

The confrontation died down, but a critical question remains: Do countries fight over oil resources? The question isn’t just pertinent to the South China Sea. The Arctic, Caspian, East China Sea and eastern Mediterranean have all been identified as potential “hot spots” for international oil conflicts. Numerous conflicts, including Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Japan’s invasion of the Dutch East Indies in World War II, Germany’s attacks against the Russian Caucasus in the same war, the Iran-Iraq War, the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, and even the Falklands War, have been described as international “oil wars.” However, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the risk of international oil wars is slim. Although oil is an exceptionally valuable strategic and economic resource, fighting for it does not pay. The belief that countries fight for oil rests on a flawed foundational assumption: Countries reap the same benefits from foreign oil resources as from domestic oil resources. In reality, profiting from oil wars is hard. Countries face at least four sets of obstacles that discourage them from fighting for oil: invasion costs, occupation costs, international costs and investment costs. Invasion costs are the damage that wars inflict on oil fields and infrastructure. Occupation costs arise from local resistance to foreign occupation, which can target oil industry infrastructure and personnel. International costs are imposed by the international community, which can respond to oil grabs with economic sanctions and military interventions. Investment costs are the challenges of attracting foreign capital and technical expertise to occupied oil fields. Collectively, these four sets of costs dramatically reduce the payoffs of fighting for oil and the appeal of oil wars. When the many other costs of war, including manpower and materiel, are taken into account, fighting for oil becomes even less attractive. From a purely rational standpoint, countries shouldn’t launch oil wars. But, countries don’t always act rationally. To test the oil war hypothesis, we have to take another look at historical so-called oil wars. Closer examination shows that oil has not been the fundamental cause of any international wars. The Falklands War in 1982 was triggered by national pride and Argentine officials’ fear that their window of opportunity for retaking the islands was closing. Rather than fight over oil, Britain and Argentina tried to use it as a catalyst for cooperation. In the 1970s and 1990s, they tried to jointly develop the Falklands’ oil resources. The Iran-Iraq War, from 1980 to 1988, was also not an oil war. Iraq initially aimed only to gain control over the Shatt al-Arab waterway and 130 square miles of contested territory. In the early stages of the war, Iraq repeatedly offered to withdraw from Iran, if Tehran would accept those demands. However, Iranian officials accused the Iraqis of fighting for oil in order to discredit them internationally. The Chaco War, from 1932 to 1935, was also launched for other reasons. Bolivia and Paraguay knew that oil discoveries in the Chaco region were unlikely. They fought because of national pride and to avoid further territorial dismemberment, after major losses in the 19th century. The oil explanation didn’t appear until the war bogged down, when leaders tried to transfer responsibility for the devastating conflict onto international oil companies. On three occasions, countries have launched major military campaigns targeting oil resources. However, these were fundamentally wars for survival, not for oil. In World War II, Japan invaded the Dutch East Indies and Germany attacked the Russian Caucasus because leaders realized that, without more oil, their regimes would collapse. Japan would have to withdraw from China, which was “tantamount to telling us to commit suicide,” as Japanese Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori put it. Hitler was even more succinct: “Unless we get the Baku oil,” he stated, “the war is lost.” Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was a war for survival. Contrary to popular beliefs, Saddam Hussein was not attempting to greedily grab more oil resources. Instead, he was afraid that the United States was trying to overthrow his regime. The United States had supported the Kurds’ rebellion in the 1970s, perpetrated the Iran-Contra scandal in the 1980s, and by 1990, seemed to be squeezing Iraq economically. According to Hussein, the United States was driving down oil prices by directing Kuwait to exceed its OPEC production quota. Hussein believed that seizing Kuwait offered the only means of eluding the United States’ hostile designs. By controlling his neighbor, Hussein could raise oil prices, escape his economic crisis and regain domestic support. He knew that the maneuver was a long shot. Regime records show that Hussein expected the United States would try to force him out of Kuwait. Still, it was either that or regime collapse. As Hussein’s deputy, Tariq Aziz, said after the war, “You will either be hit inside your house and destroyed, economically and militarily. Or you go outside and attack…” Japanese, German and Iraqi leaders believed that they were fighting wars for survival. Participants in other so-called oil wars were fighting for additional reasons, like national pride. None of the conflicts were driven by oil ambitions. This is good news for contemporary international relations. Oil competition in areas like the South China Sea is not a serious threat to international security. Countries may engage in minor oil spats, like China and Vietnam’s rig confrontation, to reinforce their resource claims. However, these incidents will not escalate into international wars. There is also little risk of oil imperialism. Countries like China will not satisfy their oil needs by seizing foreign oil fields. Historically, leaders have only initiated oil grabs when they believed that their survival depended on it. This condition is exceedingly rare, even in wartime. And, it’s unrelated to the price of oil. The United States considered grabbing Middle Eastern oil in 1975, after the first energy crisis drove up prices. However, the Ford administration refrained, because the costs of aggression were too high. Lastly, oil won’t inspire great power wars. The United States and China may eventually come to blows. Some of their military campaigns may target oil resources, if controlling them seems necessary for regime survival. However, oil will not be the fundamental cause of a Sino-American conflict. It’s not worth fighting for.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
AT: Dedev › Impact › Impact---AT: Food

No food wars

Jonas Vestby 18, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO, and Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU); and Associate Editor of the Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography, “Does hunger cause conflict?”, 5/18/18, https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/

It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests.

Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
AT: Dedev › Impact › Impact---AT: Disease

Disease can’t cause extinction

Dr. Toby Ord 20, Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University, DPhil in Philosophy from the University of Oxford, The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, Hachette Books, Kindle Edition, p. 124-126

Are we safe now from events like this? Or are we more vulnerable? Could a pandemic threaten humanity’s future?10

The Black Death was not the only biological disaster to scar human history. It was not even the only great bubonic plague. In 541 CE the Plague of Justinian struck the Byzantine Empire. Over three years it took the lives of roughly 3 percent of the world’s people.11

2023 Northwestern Evidence
AT: Dedev › Impact › Impact---AT: Biodiversity

Biodiversity loss won’t cause extinction

Peter Kareiva 18, Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al., September 2018, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” Futures, Vol. 102, p. 39-50

The interesting question is whether any of the planetary thresholds other than CO2 could also portend existential risks. Here the answer is not clear. One boundary often mentioned as a concern for the fate of global civilization is biodiversity (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2012), with the proposed safety threshold being a loss of greater than 0.001% per year (Rockström et al., 2009). There is little evidence that this particular 0.001% annual loss is a threshold—and it is hard to imagine any data that would allow one to identify where the threshold was (Brook, Ellis, Perring, Mackay, & Blomqvist, 2013; Lenton & Williams, 2013). A better question is whether one can imagine any scenario by which the loss of too many species leads to the collapse of societies and environmental disasters, even though one cannot know the absolute number of extinctions that would be required to create this dystopia.

While there are data that relate local reductions in species richness to altered ecosystem function, these results do not point to substantial existential risks. The data are small-scale experiments in which plant productivity, or nutrient retention is reduced as species numbers decline locally (Vellend, 2017), or are local observations of increased variability in fisheries yield when stock diversity is lost (Schindler et al., 2010). Those are not existential risks. To make the link even more tenuous, there is little evidence that biodiversity is even declining at local scales (Vellend et al., 2013, Vellend et al., 2017). Total planetary biodiversity may be in decline, but local and regional biodiversity is often staying the same because species from elsewhere replace local losses, albeit homogenizing the world in the process. Although the majority of conservation scientists are likely to flinch at this conclusion, there is growing skepticism regarding the strength of evidence linking trends in biodiversity loss to an existential risk for humans (Maier, 2012; Vellend, 2014). Obviously if all biodiversity disappeared civilization would end—but no one is forecasting the loss of all species. It seems plausible that the loss of 90% of the world’s species could also be apocalyptic, but not one is predicting that degree of biodiversity loss either. Tragic, but plausible is the possibility of our planet suffering a loss of as many as half of its species. If global biodiversity were halved, but at the same time locally the number of species stayed relatively stable, what would be the mechanism for an end-of-civilization or even end of human prosperity scenario? Extinctions and biodiversity loss are ethical and spiritual losses, but perhaps not an existential risk.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
AT: Dedev › Impact › AT: Environment---2AC

The overall environment is resilient---‘existential’ threats are false

Ronald Bailey 20, Science Correspondent at Reason, Member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, “The Global Environmental Apocalypse Has Been Canceled”, Reason Magazine, 8/1/2020, [grammar edit]

According to these activists and politicians, humanity is beset on all sides by catastrophes that could kill off civilization, and maybe even our species. Are they right?

Absolutely not, answers the longtime environmental activist Michael Shellenberger in an engaging new book, Apocalypse Never: Why Environmental Alarmism Hurts Us All. "Much of what people are being told about the environment, including the climate, is wrong, and we desperately need to get it right," he writes. "I decided to write Apocalypse Never after getting fed up with the exaggeration, alarmism, and extremism that are the enemy of positive, humanistic, and rational environmentalism." While fully acknowledging that significant global environmental problems exist, Shellenberger argues that they do not constitute inexorable existential threats. Economic growth and technological progress, he says, can ameliorate them.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
AT: Dedev › Impact › Yes Econ War

Decline causes civil wars---those draw-in major powers and cause World War III

David Kampf 20, Senior PhD Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School, MA in International Affairs from Columbia University, BA in Political Science from Bates College, “How COVID-19 Could Increase the Risk of War”, World Politics Review, 6/16/2020, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28843/how-covid-19-could-increase-the-risk-of-war

But that overlooked the ways in which the risk of interstate war was already rising before COVID-19 began to spread. Civil wars were becoming more numerous, lasting longer and attracting more outside involvement, with dangerous consequences for stability in many regions of the world. And the global dynamics most commonly cited to explain the falling incidence of interstate war—democracy, economic prosperity, international cooperation and others—were being upended.

If the spread of democracy kept the peace, then its global decline is unnerving. If globalization and economic interdependence kept the peace, then a looming global depression and the rise of nationalism and protectionism are disconcerting. If regional and global institutions kept the peace, then their degradation is unsettling. If the balance of nuclear weapons kept the peace, then growing risks of proliferation are disquieting. And if America’s preeminent power kept the peace, then its relative decline is troubling.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
AT: Dedev › Impact › Yes Econ War

Decline is likely to cause war.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Vladimir Popov 19, Jomo Kwame Sundaram, a former economics professor, was United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, and received the Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought in 2007, Vladimir Popov, a former senior economics researcher in the Soviet Union, Russia and the United Nations Secretariat, is now Research Director at the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute in Berlin, “Economic Crisis Can Trigger World War,” Inter Press Service, 2/12/19, http://www.ipsnews.net/2019/02/economic-crisis-can-trigger-world-war/

KUALA LUMPUR and BERLIN, Feb 12 2019 (IPS) - Economic recovery efforts since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis have mainly depended on unconventional monetary policies. As fears rise of yet another international financial crisis, there are growing concerns about the increased possibility of large-scale military conflict.

More worryingly, in the current political landscape, prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising economic inequality, chauvinistic ethno-populism as well as aggressive jingoist rhetoric, including threats, could easily spin out of control and ‘morph’ into military conflict, and worse, world war.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
AT: Dedev › Impact › Yes Econ War

Crisis causes war.

Tania Lațici and Elena Lazarou 21. Tania Lațici is a Non-resident Fellow with the Transatlantic Leadership Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis. Elena Lazarou is the Head of the External Policies Unit of the European Parliamentary Research Service. “Peace and Security in 2021”. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/690669/EPRS_STU(2021)690669_EN.pdf

The link between financial crises and a deterioration in democracy, peace and security has been highlighted by several studies. As noted by Matthias Goldmann, 'in recent years, more and more data has become available which reveals a correlation between sovereign debt crises and the outbreak of civil wars. 225 Thomas Piketty and Branko Milanović have stressed the link between financial crisis, inequality and social collapse. 226 In addition to economic recession and falling trade volumes, global economies are strongly affected by chronic deflation. Historically, there is a correlation between inflation-deflation cycles and the debt cycles: deflationary pressure increases during peace years, and inflationary, during war years. 227 Writing for The Economist, Qian Liu has warned that the next economic crisis could cause a 'global conflict'.228 This is concerning, particularly in the context of the current debate on a new 'cold war' brewing between the US and China, in the paradigm of a 'Thucydides's trap'.229

The combination of global social risks, increased international tensions due to rising protectionism and the Covid-19 pandemic, has raised some concerns regarding the risk of a repetition of the 1930s scenario, which eventually led to World War II. 230 The US 'America first' protectionist trade policy developed under former president Donald Trump could reignite under Joe Biden's stimulus package. Under the Biden administration, protectionism may be more targeted and subtle, but it is not going to disappear. Furthermore, high rates of unemployment, and unconventional monetary policy measures, including possible 'modernisation' of the main central banks' legal mandates and their impact on debt cycles and inequality, have all been cited as causes for concern. 231 The dangerous link between the state of the global economy and peace has, once more, come to the fore – this time as a result of the 21st century's gravest health crisis. Massive stimuli by central banks and governments, such as US$120billion in monthly bond purchases by the US Federal Reserve, or the $1.9 trillion stimulus bill adopted by US Congress (American Rescue Plan Act of 2021) awoke, in January 2021, not only hope of economic growth but also fears of rising inflation. The US Treasury yield curve has steepened to four-year high and, as noted by Standard & Poor's Global Market Intelligence Unit, 'A steep yield curve – when there is a large spread in interest rates between shorter-term Treasury bonds to longer-term bonds – often precedes a period of economic expansion, as investors bet that a central bank will be forced to raise rates in the future to tamp down higher inflation'.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
Dedev › Transition › Framing Issue---2NC

Framing issue---try or die means the transition’s worth it---our evidence does the impact calculus.

Samuel Alexander 15. Lecturer at the University of Melbourne, Australia, co-director of the Simplicity Institute and research fellow at the Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute. Prosperous Descent. The Simplicity Institute. Book. pp. 201-202.

While Tainter’s theory of social complexity has much to commend it, in this chapter I wish to examine and ultimately challenge Tainter’s conclusion that voluntary simplification is not a viable path to sustainability. In fact, I will argue that it is by far our best bet, even if the odds do not provide grounds for much optimism. Part of the disagreement here turns on differing notions of ‘sustainability’. Whereas Tainter seems to use sustainability to mean sustaining the existing civilisation, I use sustainability to mean changing the form of civilization through voluntary simplification, insofar as that is required for humanity to operate within the carrying capacity of the planet (Vale and Vale, 2013). Given that Tainter (1988) seems to accept, as we will see, that his own conception of sustainability will eventually lead to collapse, I feel he is wrong to be so dismissive of voluntary simplification as a strategy for potentially avoiding collapse. It is, I argue, our only alternative to collapse, and if that is so, voluntary simplification ought to be given our most rigorous attention and commitment, even if the chances of success do not seem high. I feel Tainter is flippant about our best hope, and given what is at stake, his dismissal of voluntary simplification should be given close critical attention. Furthermore, even if attempting to sustain the existing civilisation through ever-increasing complexity continues to be humanity’s dominant approach to solving societal problems, I maintain the alternative path of voluntary simplification remains the most effective means of building ‘resilience’ (i.e., the ability of an individual or community to withstand societal or ecological shocks). This is significant because it justifies the practice and promotion of voluntary simplification, irrespective of the likelihood of it ever being broadly accepted. Directed toward the highly developed regions of the world, I argue that environmental sustainability requires voluntary simplification; but if that strategy is not embraced, I maintain we should still embrace the strategy as far as possible, in order to build resilience in preparation for forthcoming civilisational deterioration or collapse. The aim is not to achieve some passive socio-ecological stasis, but to move toward a way of life that achieves some form of dynamic equilibrium within ecologically sustainable limits.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
Dedev › Transition › Collapse Inevitable---2NC

It’s a structural feature of the laws of physics, asset pricing, and tech development.

Morgan ’21 [Tim; 11/16/21; Ph.D. in Political Philosophy and Economics from the University of Cambridge, former head of research at Tullett Prebon, founder of Surplus Energy Economics; “#215. The price of equilibrium,” https://surplusenergyeconomics.wordpress.com/2021/11/16/215-the-price-of-equilibrium/]

The simplest way to define the current economic and broader situation is that consensus expectations and realistically probable outcomes have become polar opposites.

One of the most predictable consequences of this disparity is a sharp fall, both in asset pricing and in the viability of forward financial commitments.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
Dedev › Transition › Transition---Ext

3. BUTTERFLY DEFECT---small disruptions spread threats that erode vital functions modern societies.

Jones ’21 [Aled; 7/21/21; Director of the Global Sustainability Institute at Anglia Ruskin University, Ph.D. in Cosmology from the University of Cambridge, M.A. in Natural Science, Theoretical Physics from the University of Cambridge, Nick King; Visiting Researcher at Anglia Ruskin University, M.Sc. in Environmental Engineering, Technology, and Environmental Technology from the Imperial College London; "An Analysis of the Potential for the Formation of ‘Nodes of Persisting Complexity’," Sustainability, Volume 13, 8161, p. 1-32]

The risks arising from the extreme complexity and interconnectivity has developed as human society has grown and evolved through to the modern era [49,50]. Civilisation comprises an agglomeration of human and natural systems that interact in highly complex ways, and as such, there is an ever-growing probability that the smooth operation of the vital functions that underpin societies may be disrupted in the future. The increasing hyper-connectivity of the globalised economy [49] is a process characterised by the reduction in system resilience in favour of increased efficiency and complexity, which may increase the risk of initially small disturbances being subject to enhancing feedbacks that spread and potentially eventually create system-level threats (the ‘Butterfly Defect’). An alternative viewpoint [50] is that complex, integrated societies have a natural resilience to a range of stresses and shocks, i.e., that they tend to self-correct when internal and external shocks occur (e.g., as seen in the response to the ‘Global Financial Crisis’). However, perturbation in excess of ‘tipping point’ thresholds can create propagations leading to major changes in the state of such systems.

Whether the propagation of systemic risks is subject to threshold effects or has the potential to build from even minor disturbances, the risks of large-scale failures due to increasing globalisation, complexification, interdependency and the speed of fundamental societal support systems (particularly in the more developed regions of the world) creates significant global risks. This is particularly acute for the proportion of the human population that is entirely reliant on systems such as automated wastewater management and industrial food production (i.e., large urban populations). Furthermore, the global system may now have moved beyond human control or understanding [35] and may therefore be even more prone to catastrophic behaviour modes that can propagate in coupled systems through a range of unpredictable mechanisms [51]. This creates an interconnected global system that fails to adequately understand the nature of these complex, dynamic systems [52].

2023 Northwestern Evidence
Dedev › Transition › Transition---Ext

2. SHIFT---it prompts alternative lifestyles and voluntary downscaling.

Alexander ’15 [Samuel; 2015; co-director of the Simplicity Institute and lecturer at the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne; "10 The Deep Green Alternative: Debating Strategies of Transition," Sufficiency Economy, Simplicity Institute, p. 270-272]

In many ways this final ‘pathway’ could be built into all of the previous perspectives, because none of the theorists considered above (especially the DGR camp) would think that the transition to a deep green alternative could ever be smooth, rational, or painless. Even many radical reformers, whose strategy involves working within the institutions of liberal democracy rather than subverting or ignoring them, clearly expect political conflict and economic difficulties to shape the pathway to the desired alternative (Gilding, 2011). Nevertheless, for those who are deeply pessimistic about the likelihood of any of the previous strategies actually giving rise to a deep green alternative (however coherent or well justified they may be), there remains the possibility that some such alternative could arise not by design so much as by disaster. In other words, it is worth considering whether a crisis situation – or a series of crises – could either (i) force an alternative way of life upon us; or (ii) be the provocation needed for cultures or politicians to take radical alternatives seriously. Those two possibilities will now be considered briefly, in turn.

As industrial civilisation continues its global expansion and pursues growth without apparent limit, the possibility of economic, political, or ecological crises forcing an alternative way of life upon humanity seems to be growing in likelihood (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 2013). That is, if the existing model of global development is not stopped via one of the pathways reviewed above, or some other strategy, then it seems clear enough that at some point in the future, industrial civilisation will grow itself to death (Turner, 2012). Whether ‘collapse’ is initiated by an ecological tipping point, a financial breakdown of an overly indebted economy, a geopolitical disruption, an oil crisis, or some confluence of such forces, the possibility of collapse or deep global crisis can no longer be dismissed merely as the intellectual playground for ‘doomsayers’ with curdled imaginations. Collapse is a prospect that ought to be taken seriously based on the logic of limitless growth on a finite planet, as well as the evidence of existing economic, ecological, or more specifically climatic instability. As Paul Gilding (2011) has suggested, perhaps it is already too late to avoid some form of ‘great disruption’.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
Dedev › Transition › Transition---Ext

1. CRISIS---it breaks institutions and their societal habits.

Koch ‘20 [Max; 5/30/2020 Professor of Social Policy at the Lund University School of Social Work, Ph.D. in Sociology from the Free University Berlin; "Structure, action and change: a Bourdieusian perspective on the preconditions for a degrowth transition," Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy, Volume 26, Issue 1, p. 4-14]

According to Bourdieu, the chance that the customary correspondence between structure, habitus, and practice breaks and that alternative ways of thinking and acting become hegemonic depends upon the existence of a crisis. In this event, the economic, political, cultural, and symbolic structures of society undergo a process of transition leading to a “collapse, weakening, or obsolescence of traditions or of symbolic systems” that provided the principles of people’s “worldview and way of life” (Bourdieu 1991, 34). Crises can first take the form of a crisis within the ancien régime: the institutional structure of the old social order turns out to be flexible enough for the actors to enter new kinds of alliances (on welfare and social inclusion, for example), that is, without questioning its fundamental principles. Hence, the social order, including its corresponding values, habitus forms, and so forth is maintained based on some gradual or incremental change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010); second, crises can take the form of a crisis of the existing social order. Its institutional structure turns out to no longer be capable of giving a realistic future perspective to satisfying the needs, wishes, and desires of a majority of citizens. We may conclude with Bourdieu that in this event, the traditional correspondence of habitus, practice, and structure breaks, making the economic, social and symbolic institutions of society crumble. At once, the social specificity of relations, which is normally taken for the natural order of things and goes largely unquestioned, becomes transparent, and the simple formula of societal reproduction according to “doxa” – structure-habitus-practice-structure – ceases to apply. To the extent that what is normally unconscious becomes conscious, the habitus stops generating social practice and is gradually replaced by other organization principles such as rational calculus and conscious action. Bourdieu (1977; 1990a; 2000) refers to this possibility as “heterodoxy” or “heresy.”

However, while alternative discourses and heterodox social forces gain ground during a crisis of the social order so do those that opt for its authoritarian defense, which may include the marginalization or abolition of democratic institutions and civil rights (Figure 2). Bourdieu calls this alternative exit strategy of crisis “orthodoxy.” In contrast to heterodoxy, which tends to “open up the future,” orthodoxy refers to periods of restoration, in a sense to “stop time, or history, by closing down the range of possibles so as to try to induce the belief that ‘the chips are down’ for ever” (Bourdieu 2000, 235).6

2023 Northwestern Evidence
Dedev › Transition › Transition---2NC

The transition will be forced.

Morgan ’21 [Tim; 5/5/21; Ph.D. in Political Philosophy and Economics from the University of Cambridge, former head of research at Tullett Prebon, founder of Surplus Energy Economics; “#197. “Life After Ideology”?” https://surplusenergyeconomics.wordpress.com/2021/05/05/197-life-after-ideology/]

That context is involuntary economic de-growth, caused by a deterioration in the dynamic which has powered economic activity for well over 200 years.

The Industrial Age began when the first efficient heat engines enabled us to access vast reserves of energy contained in coal, petroleum and natural gas. This triggered parallel expansions, exponential in nature, in human population numbers and in the economic means of their support.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
Dedev › Sustainability › AT: Sustainable---Ext

7. MORAL HAZARD---reliance locks in fossil fuels.

Pfefferle ’16 [Tim; 12/14/16; M.S. in Global Governance and Diplomacy from Oxford University; "The Paris Climate Plan is on Life Support: Can Negative Emissions Deliver on Global Climate Ambitions?" https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/the-paris-climate-plan-is-on-life-support-can-negative-emissions-deliver-on-global-climate-ambitions/]

NETs are measures to take carbon out of the air after the fact. There is a variety of ways to go about doing that. Carbon Brief, for example, lists ten different NETs. These range from reforestation to tinkering with the composition of ocean water and agricultural soils. A number of these technologies are really quite speculative and many years away from development.

The most promising NET is called bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). This involves burning biomass and subsequently storing the resulting emissions. Effectively, this takes carbon out of the air. While BECCS may sound like a pipe dream, we already assume that it can be deployed successfully. 101 of the 116 IPCC scenarios that achieve a “likely” chance of staying below 2°C rely on BECCS. In two thirds of them, BECCS would account for at least 20 percent of the world’s primary energy by the end of the century. Through the backdoor, NETs have become a central part of global climate plans. In fact, it’s the dirty secret of the Paris deal.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
Dedev › Sustainability › AT: Sustainable---Ext

6. IRREVSIBLE HARM---overshoot guarantees it from peak temps.

Pollitt ’21 [Hector; 11/17/21; director and the head of modelling at Cambridge Econometrics. He is also a research fellow at the Cambridge Centre for Environment, Energy and Natural Resource Governance (CEENRG) at the University of Cambridge; "Can Economic Growth Last Forever?" in Economic Policies for Sustainability and Resilience, p. 45-90]

There is a further issue with the IPCC model results. Many of the results rely on ‘negative emissions’ through a process of burning biomass and capturing the CO2 emissions in the second half of the century. Even leaving aside the unproven nature of the technology and the potentially vast amounts of land required for growing the biomass (Anderson & Peters, 2016; Fuss, 2014), these results could be misleading because they confuse peak and final temperature change. This issue is important because climate processes are generally non-reversible, so the impacts of a 1.5 °C temperature change in 2100 are different if a higher temperature threshold was passed mid-century. For example, if high temperatures in 2050 drive a species to extinction, this species does not reappear when the earth subsequently cools 30 years later.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
Dedev › Sustainability › AT: Sustainable---2NC

5. COGNITIVE COLLAPSE---that independently causes extinction.

Annunziata and McManus 19—former Chief Economist and Head of Business Innovation Strategy at General Electric AND Visiting Research Fellow at Autodesk, Senior Advisor at BCG (Marco and Mickey, “The Great Cognitive Depression,” , dml)

We have seen a dramatic increase in the amount of complexity that exists in the world. Mickey McManus’s book Trillions noted that as early as 2010, the semiconductor industry had reached the point where they were making more transistors than grains of rice, cheaper. Connectivity has amplified the global amount of aggregate complexity by enabling it to break out of any given domain and spread across the world. The rise of the so called “Internet of Things”—starting with mobile devices and now connected products and vehicles and platforms—is flooding every corner of our homes, factories, and communities. Everything becomes connected—to everything else and to us.

The global economy has also become inextricably interconnected; our society is more and more interdependent. Across multiple fields, our knowledge gets deeper and more detailed; we solve old problems and create new ones at accelerating speed. No matter our walk of life, today we are asked to grasp a widening range of increasingly complex issues: climate change, energy policy, advances in health care, the likely impact of robotics and Artificial Intelligence.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
Dedev › Sustainability › AT: Sustainable---2NC

4. RENEWABLES---transition requires emissions, resources, and are too inefficient.

Morgan ’21 [Tim; 9/19/21; Ph.D. in Political Philosophy and Economics from the University of Cambridge, former head of research at Tullett Prebon, founder of Surplus Energy Economics; "#211. The case for contingency planning," https://surplusenergyeconomics.wordpress.com/2021/09/19/211-the-case-for-contingency-planning/]

The solutions offered conventionally for this predicament are, to put it very mildly, far from wholly persuasive. Essentially, we’re told that REs can take over from fossil fuels, with any associated problems overcome by the relentless power of technology.

Far from being assured, this transition is very far from proven. The efficiencies of wind and solar power are governed by laws which set limits to their capabilities. Best practice is already pretty close to these physical limits to efficiency.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
Dedev › Impact › AT: Econ---Ext

Decline increases cooperation.

Christina L. Davis & Krzysztof J. Pelc 17, Christina L. Davis is a Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton; Krzysztof J. Pelc is an Associate Professor of Political Science at McGill University, “Cooperation in Hard Times: Self-restraint of Trade Protection,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(2): 398-429

Conclusion Political economy theory would lead us to expect rising trade protection during hard times. Yet empirical evidence on this count has been mixed. Some studies find a correlation between poor macroeconomic conditions and protection, but the worst recession since the Great Depression has generated surprisingly moderate levels of protection. We explain this apparent contradiction. Our statistical findings show that under conditions of pervasive economic crisis at the international level, states exercise more restraint than they would when facing crisis alone. These results throw light on behavior not only during the crisis, but throughout the WTO period, from 1995 to the present. One concern may be that the restraint we observe during widespread crises is actually the result of a decrease in aggregate demand and that domestic pressure for import relief is lessened by the decline of world trade. By controlling for product-level imports, we show that the restraint on remedy use is not a byproduct of declining imports. We also take into account the ability of some countries to manipulate their currency and demonstrate that the relationship between crisis and trade protection holds independent of exchange rate policies. Government decisions to impose costs on their trade partners by taking advantage of their legal right to use flexibility measures are driven not only by the domestic situation but also by circumstances abroad. This can give rise to an individual incentive for strategic self-restraint toward trade partners in similar economic trouble. Under conditions of widespread crisis, government leaders fear the repercussions that their own use of trade protection may have on the behavior of trade partners at a time when they cannot afford the economic cost of a trade war. Institutions provide monitoring and a venue for leader interaction that facilitates coordination among states. Here the key function is to reinforce expectations that any move to protect industries will trigger similar moves in other countries. Such coordination often draws on shared historical analogies, such as the Smoot–Hawley lesson, which form a focal point to shape beliefs about appropriate state behavior. Much of the literature has focused on the more visible action of legal enforcement through dispute settlement, but this only captures part of the story. Our research suggests that tools of informal governance such as leader pledges, guidance from the Director General, trade policy reviews, and plenary meetings play a real role within the trade regime. In the absence of sufficiently stringent rules over flexibility measures, compliance alone is insufficient during a global economic crisis. These circumstances trigger informal mechanisms that complement legal rules to support cooperation. During widespread crisis, legal enforcement would be inadequate, and informal governance helps to bolster the system. Informal coordination is by nature difficult to observe, and we are unable to directly measure this process. Instead, we examine the variation in responses across crises of varying severity, within the context of the same formal setting of the WTO. Yet by focusing on discretionary tools of protection—trade remedies and tariff hikes within the bound rate—we can offer conclusions about how systemic crises shape country restraint independent of formal institutional constraints. Insofar as institutions are generating such restraint, we offer that it is by facilitating informal coordination, since all these instruments of trade protection fall within the letter of the law. Future research should explore trade policy at the micro level to identify which pathway is the most important for coordination. Research at a more macro-historical scope could compare how countries respond to crises under fundamentally different institutional contexts. In sum, the determinants of protection include economic downturns not only at home but also abroad. Rather than reinforcing pressure for protection, pervasive crisis in the global economy is shown to generate countervailing pressure for restraint in response to domestic crisis. In some cases, hard times bring more, not less, international cooperation.

2023 Northwestern Evidence
Dedev › Impact › AT: Econ---Ext

Empirics prove austerity pressures overwhelm.

Christopher Clary 15, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5 Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination? Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.