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2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: ME---Impact

Turkey’s key to ME stabilization

Sandano 3/4- Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Sindh (IMRAN ALI SANDANO, “Change in Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East,” MAR 04, 2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/change-in-turkish-foreign-policy-toward-the-middle-east)//mcu

Turkish foreign policy mainly aims to protect its interests in a strained global and regional environment. Turkey always tried to create conditions for sustainable peace and development with both neighboring and more distant states. Ankara has recently become more involved and active in the Middle East. Some analysts are of the view that this change indicates Turkey is moving away from the West, as they observe that Turkey's confidence in the region is mismatched with its Western coordination. However, others believe that security, power projection, rational considerations and a mix of national interests have forced Turkey to drive its foreign policy toward the Middle East. After the Arab uprising, regional geopolitics and security challenges opened new channels for Turkish foreign policy, which led Ankara to even get involved in the region. It started humanitarian and economic engagements. With the passage of time, Ankara’s involvement in the Middle East has extended and it has become the third party in the regional conflicts. To normalize ties with the Middle Eastern countries, especially with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel, would open new channels for augmenting Turkey’s diplomatic, strategic and economic assets in its foreign policy. The strained ties the between leading regional actors have proven deleterious to understanding the true prospect of economic relations. A shift and a response The shift in Ankara’s Middle East policy is a response to external factors – both regional and international, and domestic issues related to security and economy. Turkey has begun to change its positions and restart its relations, which had previously been based on hostility. Washington has always remained a key player in the Middle East, but the United States administration under President Joe Biden prioritized East Asia, focused on its own domestic matters and has pushed away diplomacy in the Middle East, unlike the previous Donald Trump administration. In the meantime, the U.S. has started reevaluating its military forces from the region. The U.S. has made it clear that it will not be part of the Saudi intervention of Yemen, and Washington may go back to the nuclear deal with Iran. These changes triggered and pushed Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt and the UAE towards a de-escalation process. On the other hand, Russia's growing influence and the U.S. decreasing engagement in the region pushed Turkey to act it to balance between the two. Turkey has a long relationship with the U.S. and Russia, but with some differences – however, it has maintained a good balance in Syria and Libya. In this context, Ankara’s Middle East policy has shifted into a new track to rebalance the region. Saudi Arabia a key actor Last year at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit, Gulf countries signed the Al-Ula declaration and formally ended the dispute with Qatar. This regional development created further encouragement for Ankara to take the plunge with Riyadh, Cairo and Abu Dhabi. Since then, Turkey and Qatar have started negotiations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE for reconciliation. Saudi Arabia is one key regional player in the Middle East region. The good relations between Ankara and Riyadh would prove to be a game changer for this region. The cooperation initiative has been started between Ankara and Riyadh, their relations have appeared in a positive dynamic after a phone conversation between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Saudi Arabia’s King Salman ahead of a G-20 leaders summit in 2021. Recently, Erdoğan visited the UAE for bilateral and economic cooperation with a flurry of agreements during his first visit to the Gulf state since 2013. No doubt, Riyadh also wants close relations with Ankara, which will help Saudi to counter rivals or disrupters. The normal ties between Riyadh and Ankara would take preference over all regional reconciliation efforts. This move would be a good option for Saudi Arabia to get much-needed space to enhance its capacity for political activity, connectivity, and cooperation with various other regional states, which are perceived as Riyadh’s rivals. Better relations between both states would open new economic, political and defense opportunities, where Saudis may retain their traditional regional role and effectively deal with security challenges. The regional power game between the main stakeholders of the region is persistent strategic competition, which will only destabilize their diplomatic positions, and create more economic cost than benefits. The current developments and the changing nature of their regional de-escalation approach is a sign of a reconciliatory drift in the region, which will normalize the strategic and economic situation in the region. To sum up, regardless of the problems in balancing Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel, the current change in the foreign policy of the Middle East is a good option for Turkey to move forward with win-win cooperation. Certainly, Turkey possesses such capability to go with Middle Eastern countries for their collective cooperation.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: ME---Link

Turkey won’t play the spoiler in the Middle East

Dalay 21- Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme (Galip Dalay, “Middle East policy shows Turkey's new desire for allies,” Chatham House, May 20 2021, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/05/middle-east-policy-shows-turkeys-new-desire-allies)//mcu

But Turkey is now recalibrating its Middle East policy, with Ankara using more conciliatory language and, more importantly, taking steps to repair the ties with Egypt with a Turkish delegation headed by deputy foreign minister Sedat Onal visiting Cairo and foreign ministers of both countries expected to meet towards the end of May. It is plausible to anticipate Cairo and Ankara will exchange ambassadors and have more ministerial-level meetings, but a presidential-level meeting is not on the horizon For Ankara, a demarcation deal with Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean outweighs all other considerations because such a deal further prevents the emergence of a regional energy and security order in the Eastern Mediterranean without Turkey. But Egypt’s priority is the Libyan conflict and the presence of the Egyptian opposition actors and media in Istanbul. Given the long existence of shared border and security concerns, Libya is to Egypt what Syria is to Turkey, and so the broader context of Turkish outreach efforts towards Egypt is the sense in Ankara that the Middle East is in a post-Arab Spring era with the significance of political Islam – specifically the Muslim Brotherhood – in regional politics dramatically decreased. Agreement through compromise Instead of a full-fledged normalization, Turkey and Egypt will end up meeting each other halfway at best. Egypt is unlikely to sign a maritime demarcation deal with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean anytime soon, but will be mindful of Turkey’s claimed maritime borders and the parameters of the Turkish-Libyan maritime deal when signing deals with third countries or international energy companies. In response, Turkey will likely adopt a more accommodating stance towards Egypt in Libya, with Ankara more receptive to Egyptian demands to withdraw pro-Turkish Syrian fighters from there. But this withdrawal will be conditional on the withdrawal of other foreign fighters from Libya, including Russian Wagner fighters, and Ankara continues to resist the demand for Turkish forces leaving, citing the argument they are there as a result of an agreement with Libya’s UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). To placate Egypt, Turkey is pressuring the Istanbul-based Egyptian opposition media to tone down criticism of the regime, but is unlikely to ask Egyptian opposition figures to leave Turkey as many of them have acquired either Turkish citizenship or legal residence. It is plausible to anticipate Cairo and Ankara will exchange ambassadors and have more ministerial-level meetings, but a presidential-level meeting is not on the horizon. Saudi relations in deep crisis On the Turkish-Saudi front, relations were left in deep crisis by a personal vendetta between the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which developed following the killing of journalist Jamal Khassoghi at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul. This means a thaw in the relations is more difficult to achieve, and the prospect appears to be for a more turbulent period in Ankara-Tehran relations as the number of disputes between them increases. Motivation for this desire to repair relations with the Arab states is the fact that any new nuclear deal between the US and Iran is highly likely to affect the regional blocks But Turkish desires to mend the ties with Saudi Arabia are strong, as evidenced by Turkey foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visiting Riyadh despite the announcement eight Turkish schools are to close in the kingdom and the imposition of an unofficial boycott on Turkish goods. On the Yemen conflict, Ankara is likely to adopt a more pro-Saudi position and to continue reaching out to Saudi Arabia for a rapprochement. Motivation for this desire to repair relations with the Arab states is the fact that any new nuclear deal between the US and Iran is highly likely to affect the regional blocks. In fact, Tehran and Ankara are increasingly engaging in acrimonious exchanges, leaving their relations currently rather tense – these growing strains in Turkish-Iranian relations further reinforce Turkish desire to mend the ties with the Arab states. Turkey’s militarized regional policy – heavily in vogue from 2016-20 and relatively risk-free thanks to Donald Trump’s US presidency – has now run its course, with the exception of operations in Iraq. In its place, there are now three major factors shaping the new Turkish approach – the new US administration, a prospective deal between the US and Iran and its impact on regional blocks in the Middle East, and an anti-Turkey geopolitical realignment in the Eastern Mediterranean. From a wider foreign policy perspective, it is clear Turkey is working hard to end both its international isolation and its loneliness in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: ME---Link

Turkey is key to effective Afghanistan stabilization

Yazici 21- is the Evans Hanson Fellow and Turkey researcher at the Institute for the Study of War. Ezgi leads ISW’s research efforts on Turkey and Turkey’s military and political activities abroad. She received her Bachelors of Arts in International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from Tufts University where she also studied Arabic. Ezgi wrote her undergraduate thesis on the Turkish political and military intervention in northern Syria and published a paper on the de-facto Turkish control in northern Syria in Tufts University’s Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs. (Ezgi Yazici, “TURKEY AIMS TO PLAY STABILIZING ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER NATO WITHDRAWAL” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 3, 2021, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/turkey-aims-play-stabilizing-role-afghanistan-after-nato-withdrawal)//mcu

Turkey will likely perceive one or multiple of the following objectives in the near term as advantageous to its regional and global standing: Deliver legitimacy to a new Afghan government: As a Muslim NATO country, Turkey could be a useful partner for the Taliban leadership to gain international acceptance and legitimacy as well as access to global financial systems. Advance the Turkish security role in line with, and beyond, NATO goals: Turkey has been offering military training and security cooperation deals to an increasing number of developing countries. Turkish forces have hosted Afghan, Somali, Azerbaijani, Pakistani, Libyan, and other security forces for capacity-building trainings as part of, or beyond, NATO missions. Turkey will likely continue its trainings with Afghanistan and offer new technical and military cooperation opportunities to the Taliban government. Insert Erdogan-friendly Turkish companies to Afghanistan for profit: Turkish companies with strong ties to the Erdogan government have won significant reconstruction contracts in Libya, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, and elsewhere. Turkey will likely look for similar construction and investment opportunities in Afghanistan for profit and to benefit the crony network Erdogan cultivates for government-friendly companies. Improve Turkey’s position within NATO: Turkey is one of the few, if not the only, NATO countries that will maintain a diplomatic mission in Afghanistan. It has also been in frequent contact with many NATO allies to discuss developments in Afghanistan and demand financial support.[12] Ankara will seek to use its unique position in and access to Afghanistan to improve relations with NATO allies, particularly the United States, and gain concessions. Position Turkey as a regional power for security and stabilization: President Erdogan suggested that Turkey, Turkic Central Asian countries, and Pakistan could work with the Taliban if they take “positive steps” during a speech on August 29.[13] Erdogan has not specified what those steps include or how Turkey might support them, but Turkey could leverage its ties to Central Asian countries to promote regional security initiatives. Meanwhile, Ankara also faces the risks of deteriorating public opinion, increased refugee flows, and growing financial costs

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: ME---AT NATO Withdrew

True, but that makes Turkish alignment with NATO all the more important

Yazici 21- is the Evans Hanson Fellow and Turkey researcher at the Institute for the Study of War. Ezgi leads ISW’s research efforts on Turkey and Turkey’s military and political activities abroad. She received her Bachelors of Arts in International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies from Tufts University where she also studied Arabic. Ezgi wrote her undergraduate thesis on the Turkish political and military intervention in northern Syria and published a paper on the de-facto Turkish control in northern Syria in Tufts University’s Undergraduate Journal of International Affairs. (Ezgi Yazici, “TURKEY AIMS TO PLAY STABILIZING ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN AFTER NATO WITHDRAWAL” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 3, 2021, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/turkey-aims-play-stabilizing-role-afghanistan-after-nato-withdrawal)//mcu

The Turkish Armed Forces left Afghanistan, but Ankara is poised to play key security and diplomatic roles in the country. Turkish officials announced the evacuation of the Turkish military contingency from the Kabul Airport on August 25, 2021, despite separate discussions with the United States and the Taliban for Turkey to continue running the Kabul International Airport.[1] Top Turkish officials had argued that the Turkish forces could continue to manage the security and operations of the airport as they had since 2015 if the Taliban so desired.[2] Ankara also pivoted to establishing relations with the Taliban through the Turkish Embassy in Qatar at least as early as August 15, when the Taliban reached Kabul, in a likely bid to maintain and expand the Turkish role in Afghanistan.[3] The bulk of Turkish forces left Afghanistan by August 27 under reported Taliban pressure, but the Turkish Embassy is continuing its operations as of September 3.[4] Recent statements by both the Taliban and Ankara indicate that Turkey is exploring ways to help run the Kabul Airport and support the new Taliban government.[5] Ankara and the Taliban both believe Turkey can play a role in shaping the new Afghanistan. Ankara will likely double down on its political and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan to prove its ability to stabilize and shape conflicts as a regional power. Turkey has provided training for Afghan security forces, political outreach to various Turkic communities, aid and private sector investment, and non-combatant military services. Turkey refrained from participating in military campaigns against the Taliban and instead took on logistical and security duties like Kabul Airport security, intelligence sharing, and funding and training at Afghan military schools.[6] Turkish officials leveraged this non-combatant history when they offered the Taliban further “technical and security assistance” in August.[7] Taliban spokesperson Mohammad Naeem said that the Taliban wants Turkey’s support in areas ranging from reconstruction and economy to healthcare and education on August 25.[8] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan views such a Turkish role as a natural one, underlining Turkey’s long-standing ties to its fellow Muslim country with a significant Turkic population. Ankara and the Taliban are also in talks about the future of Kabul Airport. President Erdogan stated that the Taliban asked Turkey to run the operations of Kabul International Airport if the Taliban provided its security instead of Turkish forces. However, anonymous Turkish officials claimed that Turkey would only run the airport in partnership with Qatar and only if security was provided by a private security firm of former Turkish soldiers.[9] SADAT International Defense Consultancy, known for credible reports of its supervision and payment of Turkish-backed Syrian fighters in Libya and Azerbaijan, is the only private Turkish security company that could adopt such a duty.[10] Discussions are ongoing as of September 3 and the Taliban’s position remains unclear. Turkey’s Ambitions and Constraints Afghanistan is a theater of opportunity, but not an existential security problem for Ankara. Afghanistan poses little direct threat to Turkish national security, in contrast to the perceived terrorism and internal stability threats the country is fighting in northern Iraq and Syria. Afghanistan’s current situation presents an opportunity for Ankara to maximize its political and security reach by filling growing gaps in foreign investment, projects, and support and by advancing NATO interests. Turkey can advance its mutual interests with NATO in Afghanistan while pursuing its own objectives as an aspiring power in the region. A successful bid in helping stabilize Afghanistan could elevate Turkey as a necessary and capable security player in the region and to its allies—two longstanding goals of the Erdogan government. During an August 25, 2021, speech to celebrate the anniversary of a historic Turkic battle, Erdogan said “We transformed from a country of existential battles inside its own borders to one that has a say in every critical matter in the world.”[11] This self-perception of Turkey as a regional powerbroker helps drive President Erdogan and Ankara’s top leadership’s pursuit of more activist policies beyond Turkey’s immediate neighborhood—including in Afghanistan.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › Expulsion Bad---ME

Specifically, Afghanistan unstable now and will escalate drawing Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia

CPA 5/11- aims to help policymakers devise timely and practical strategies to prevent and mitigate armed conflict around the world, especially in places that pose the greatest risk to U.S. interests.(Center for preventative Action, “War in Afghanistan,” Global Conflict Tracker, May 11 2022, )//mcu

In February 2020, after more than a year of direct negotiations, the U.S. government and the Taliban signed a peace agreement that set a timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Under the agreement, the United States pledged to draw down U.S. troops to approximately 8,500 within 135 days and complete a full withdrawal within fourteen months. In return, the Taliban pledged to prevent territory under its control from being used by terrorist groups and enter into negotiations with the Afghan government. However, no official cease-fire was put into place. After a brief reduction in violence, the Taliban quickly resumed attacks on Afghan security forces and civilians. Direct talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban began months after the agreed upon start of March 2020, faced multiple delays, and ultimately made little progress. Violence across Afghanistan continued in 2020 and 2021 as the United States increased air strikes and raids targeting the Taliban. Meanwhile, the Taliban attacked Afghan government and Afghan security forces targets and made territorial gains. Civilian casualties across Afghanistan have remained high over the past several years. The United Nations documented a then–record high of 10,993 civilian casualties in 2018. Although 2019 saw a slight decline, civilian casualties exceeded 10,000 for the sixth year in a row and brought the total UN-documented civilian casualties since 2009 to more than 100,000. Despite another decline in 2020, the first half of 2021 saw a record high number of civilian casualties as the Taliban ramped up their military offensive amid the withdrawal of international troops. In addition to the Taliban’s offensive, Afghanistan faces a threat from the Islamic State in Khorasan, which has also expanded its presence in several eastern provinces, attacked Kabul, and targeted civilians with suicide attacks. Uncertainty surrounding the future of international assistance has strained the Afghan economy. Although the United States and its allies pledged in late 2020 to continue providing support to the Afghan government, they could reduce aid following the Taliban takeover. Such a move could compound Afghanistan’s deteriorating economic situation. Concerns The United States has an interest in attempting to preserve the many political, human rights, and security gains that have been achieved in Afghanistan since 2001. The Taliban takeover of the country could once again turn Afghanistan into a terrorist safe haven, as the group is believed to maintain ties with al-Qaeda. The takeover also threatens to reverse advances made in securing the rights of women and girls. Moreover, increasing internal instability, a mass exodus of refugees, and a growing humanitarian crisis could have regional ramifications as neighboring countries respond. In addition, Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia are all likely to compete for influence in Kabul and with subnational actors.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › Expulsion Bad---ME

Turkey is an essential ally in NATO key to stabilization measures in the middle east

Pamir et al 20-- Ahmet Üzümcü- Former Director-General of the OPCW, Former Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO, Mehmet Fatih Ceylan- Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2013-2018, Ümit Pamir- Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2004-2006 (“Turkey and NATO: resolving the S-400 spat,” European leadership network, 16 December 2020, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/turkey-and-nato-resolving-the-s-400-spat/)//mcu

But the critics do not stop there. There is the wider accusation of Turkish unreliability. It should not be forgotten that Turkey has been a reliable member of NATO for the past seven decades. It contributed significantly to the Alliance’s collective defence and deterrence in the Cold War. By tying up a large portion of Soviet troops in its region, it considerably reduced the pressure on Central Europe. Ironically, the Western European countries were able to build their Union gradually in a secure and stable environment ensured by NATO, with Turkey shouldering a heavy military burden. With the end of the Cold War, alone among the existing allies, Turkey’s security situation worsened. Turkey found itself increasingly exposed in a region of turmoil engulfed by several armed conflicts. The new and emerging security risks, including terrorism, have impacted Turkey as much, if not more, than any other Ally. Turkey feels itself on a new front line. But throughout this period, Turkey has remained an island of stability in a volatile region. Even though instability and disorder are on our doorstep, Turkey has fulfilled all its NATO obligations and provided security and stability rather than consuming them. Turkey has stood solid behind every key NATO decision. NATO invoked Article V of the Treaty for the first time following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the U.S. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan had become a haven for international terrorism. As a staunch ally, Turkey has played a significant role in NATO’s stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. It has deployed troops and other military assets in harm’s way alongside other allies and partners. Turkey has never deviated from the NATO policy “in together-adjust together-out together“. Moreover, Turkey’s especially close and long-standing ties with Afghanistan has enabled the Alliance as a whole to benefit from its knowledge, expertise and political weight in that country. Moreover, the fight against ISIS, a serious concern for the whole world, would not have been so successful without Turkey’s participation and assistance. Turkey has become an essential partner in this struggle by joining the coalition against ISIS. It made three air bases, including Incirlik, available for the Allies, enabling decisively effective military operations. Elsewhere, in the Balkans and Iraq, Turkey has contributed to NATO’s stabilization efforts. In terms of NATO’s priority core task, collective defence, successive governments in Turkey have never wavered in their commitment to the Alliance. Turkey’s current contribution cannot be overstated. It currently hosts a range of NATO commands and and assets, essential to NATO’s collective defence, including Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) in Izmir and the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC) in Istanbul. Significantly, Turkey will be the lead nation in 2021 in command of the ‘Spearhead Force’ of NATO (VJTF). This force can be deployed at short notice to any allied country considered under threat. We, as former Turkish Ambassadors to NATO, are proud to confirm that our country has assumed its responsibilities toward the Alliance in their entirety. Turkey is one of the few allies to fulfil its commitment to spend 2% of its GDP on defence; it has the second largest army in NATO, and it ranks fourth in contributions to NATO operations and fifth in NATO expenditures. In an Alliance of thirty nations, there are inevitably ups and downs in the relations between allies. In the past, these differences have turned out to be circumstantial and temporary. They were eventually resolved, mostly bilaterally, but sometimes with the use of good offices of the Secretary General or other Allies. There is no reason to suppose that the current spate of disputes will not be resolved in the same way. During the recent tension in the eastern Mediterranean, the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, took the welcome initiative of inviting Greece and Turkey to agree upon deconfliction measures. The parties concerned must be engaged in a dialogue in order to achieve an equitable solution in line with international law. Other countries should facilitate this process by encouraging dialogue among two longstanding allies. To conclude, there needs to be a solution to the impasse presented by the procurement of Russian-made S400s and the U.S. decisions both to disengage Turkey from the F35 program and to apply sanctions on its ally’s defence procurement agency. A compromise would unleash much positive momentum. We believe that Turkey will continue to observe its obligations and commitments as a reliable member of the Alliance. It will continue to support the Alliance efforts toward global peace and security. The Alliance would, no doubt, be weaker without the active participation and support of Turkey.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: Prolif---AT NPT Dead

Security commitments are key to effective non-prolif---sustains the NPT – Russia cooperation is irrelevant in a world with the NPT BUT we can walk and chew gum at the same time with prolif and Russia

Daalder 20 [Ivo Daalder, president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013, “Can 50 Years of Minimizing Nuclear Proliferation Continue?” 3-5, , y2k]

Imagine we are living in the year 2030. New seismic activity indicates an underground nuclear explosion somewhere near the Arctic Circle. One more country announces it’s joining the once-exclusive club of nuclear weapons states that has now grown to 20 nations — more than double the number in 2020.

The trouble started in 2023, when a group of former allies of the United States renounced their adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and opted to acquire the very nuclear weapons capabilities that they foreswore decades earlier.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: Prolif---AT NPT Dead

Even if it collapsed, the US can use the alliance network to tamp down proliferation

Onderco 20 [Michal Onderco, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “If Kroenig is right, the United States needs a new nonproliferation policy. Soon,” New Perspectives, 2020, Vol. 28(1) 118–122, , y2k]

An argument could be made that even if the rest of the world somehow lost interest in the NPT, the United States would remain the ‘‘enforcer of last resort’’ (cf. Horovitz, 2015 for a version of this argument). This argument is consistent with the standard account of the success of the United States’ unilateral attempts to constrain the nuclear developments among friends and enemies alike (Gavin, 2012; Miller, 2018). Yet many of the tools that the United States would use to compel countries to give up their nuclear ambitions stem from the United States’ unique position within the international system, where the United States sits in the center of various political and economic networks (cf. e.g. Winecoff, 2015). These tools, however, work only as long as the United States and its allies dominate the world (Nexon, 2018). Yet the centrality of the United States in various networks comes under strain, not least because the United States decided to ‘weaponize’ these interdependence networks (Farrell and Newman, 2019). One only needs to listen to the repeated calls for alternative payment channels (such as the EU’s Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, known as INSTEX, a channel for conducting business with Iran) and different currencies to settle transactions to understand the phenomenon (for a recent overview, see McDowell, 2019). And while the rising powers do not fundamentally question the goal of nonproliferation, they are not as heavily invested in it. Shell

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: Prolif---AT NPT Dead

NPT will survive despite member backlash over various issues

Lyon 20 [Rod Lyon is a senior fellow at ASPI. “Will the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Survive the 2020s?” 2-21, , y2k]

Treaty members will vent about a range of issues during the upcoming five-yearly review conference, scheduled to take place in New York from 27 April to 22 May. North Korean nuclear and missile developments, the trials of the Iranian nuclear deal, the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the continuing modernisation programs of the five recognised nuclear weapon states—instead of disarmament—provide plenty of new grist for the mill.

Still, every review conference seems to precipitate a sense of unease over the future of the treaty. This year’s no different. Yet the NPT will survive this conference, too, because most treaty members continue to believe that an uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons would make for a more dangerous international security environment than the one we already have. Moreover, few states would want the NPT to collapse and leave the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (which still hasn’t been ratified by enough states to enter into force) in sole possession of the field.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: Prolif---Link

US has 50 nukes in turkey—removal from NATO causes them to prolif

Fernholz 19- covers space, the economy and geopolitics for Quartz (Tim Fernholz “The US is rethinking the 50-plus nuclear weapons it keeps in Turkey,” Quartz, October 13, 2019, ty owen

Turkish forces are pushing into northern Syria, replacing and sometimes even firing on the US troops retreating at Donald Trump’s orders. The question of whether Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is really a US ally was put to US defense secretary Mark Esper on Fox television this morning. “No, I think Turkey, the arc of their behavior over the past several years has been terrible,” he said. Which brings up a problem: The US is storing perhaps 50 air-dropped thermonuclear bombs at its Incirlik Airbase in southern Turkey, less than 100 miles from the Syrian border where this conflict is taking place. The nuclear stockpile dates back to the Cold War, when the US sought to keep a sufficient supply of atomic weapons deployed in Europe to deter potential Soviet aggression. Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy also host similar arsenals, and the US trains the participating nations in the use of the doomsday devices. Today, these bombs remain in place largely because of inertia, and the hope that countries like Turkey will see the depot as sufficient reason not to develop nuclear weapons of their own. It doesn’t seem to be working: Last month, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he could “not accept” efforts to prevent Turkey from developing its own atomic bombs. But instability in Turkey and the region, along with Ankara’s close relationship with Russia, have had American strategists talking about re-locating their weapons for years. (The US does not officially discuss the arsenal, but there is no indication that the stockpile has been removed.) A 2016 coup attempt against Erdogan saw power to the base cut off for several days, raising questions about the safety of the stash. More recently, Turkey has purchased advanced air defense technology from Russia, which has raised hackles in the US defense community because Turkey was a partner in developing the US F-35 fighter-bomber. The US Air Force canceled the partnership over worries that Russia would be able to learn from Turkey how to better shoot down US aircraft. Now, Russia and Turkey are coordinating military policy in northern Syria, with the US as a bystander. The move to exploit a civil conflict in Syria to gain a geopolitical advantage typify how strategists see a new era of great power competition playing out. One reason to be worried is that the recent shift in US strategy launched by Trump appears to have caught the US military establishment by surprise. It’s not clear how prepared the US is to deal with the knock-on effects of the about-face, whether it is disappointed former allies like the Kurds (paywall) or ISIS fighters escaping from prison camps, much less the calculus of nuclear deterrence.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: Prolif---Link

Studies prove

Philip Baxter 15, Ph.D. Candidate in International Affairs, Science, and Technology at the Georgia Institute of Technology and a Senior Research Associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Turkey’s Nuclear Move: Deciphering the Developments”, https://duckofminerva.com/2015/10/turkeys-nuclear-move-deciphering-the-developments.html

A recent  in the National Interest by Hans Rühle, former Head of the Planning Staff in the German Ministry of Defense, argues that Turkey is positioning itself similarly to Iran in its leveraging of civilian nuclear power for potential nuclear weapons breakout capability. His argument, meant largely to justify German spying on the NATO-ally, posits that since Turkey is developing nuclear power plants, potentially developing its own nuclear fuel production capacity, and does not have a provision for spent nuclear fuel to be return to suppliers (a provision not necessary if producing fuel domestically), it is obviously shadowing the Iranian proliferation formula. These arguments are significantly flawed. While the Turkish movement into the nuclear arena could be afforded more clarity, particularly on the heels of a decade of efforts to corral the Iranian program, nefarious purposes should not be assumed; nor, are they immediately apparent. Rühle argues that the size of the nuclear industry that Turkey is planning, as well as the amount of fuel that would be needed to supply that industry, would provide ample material for a nuclear weapon. From a purely technical perspective, nuclear fuel from most civilian power reactors is not ideal for a weapons program. Turkey plans to construct four light-water pressurized reactors. These light-water reactors make breeding the type of plutonium necessary for nuclear weapons difficult – as purity is key in having a safe and reliable arsenal. Rühle dismisses the point that the less-pure plutonium from a civilian power reactor would not be used for military program. Rather, Ruhle argues that regardless of plutonium purity, a state will seek to acquire any form of nuclear material and use it for a nuclear arsenal. However, the quality of plutonium is a critical factor in understanding and forecasting proliferation strategies. Not all plutonium is created equal. Having impure plutonium in a nuclear arsenal, an arsenal that a nation would use to deter attack by other states, would be extremely dangerous. When uranium (particularly civilian reactor-grade uranium) is used in a power reactor, plutonium-239, the fissile material used for the production of nuclear weapons, is created. However, other by-products and isotopes of plutonium are also generated. The ratio of these by-products depends on the type of fuel you start with and how long the fuel is used in a power reactor. The longer it is in there, the less pure the plutonium output. While Rühle dismisses this point, other isotopes of plutonium which would be created in the civilian power reactor would be dangerous in a nuclear arsenal, particularly Pu-240 due to its unstable neutron flux which makes the long-term viability of the warhead questionable. With a quicker decay rate than Pu-239, comes the potential for spontaneously released neutrons – which is what starts the chain reaction to detonation. In the short-term, this is less of an issue, but the risk of unintended detonation increases over time. For a state that wishes to have a nuclear arsenal that will be able to deter the use or proliferation of nuclear weapons, a stable arsenal is critical for reliable use if necessary and for the warheads not to detonate on your own territory. The type of reactor that is used is also important. The reactor models that Turkey plans to build make hiding illicit activities, such as diverting material, difficult. Reloading the fuel in the models being sought halts reactor operations and would stop operations for days or weeks at time. Turkey desperately needs energy. It imports roughly . Domestic energy production, particularly electricity, is lacking. Expanding its energy capacity is critical to Turkey’s economic development strategy. Shuttering a nuclear reactor for weeks or months at a time in order to extract costly fuel does not align with this policy objective. Further, plans for a nuclear energy sector of two dozen or so power reactors, with contracts in place already for eight, points to a desperate need for energy, not a mask for illicit activities. There are also significant differences in Iran and Turkey’s nuclear sectors. Iran purchased one power facility, Bushehr, from Russia, and then justified its expansion of uranium enrichment by the need for medical isotopes. This justification enabled Iran to enrich up to 20% U-235, which accounts for roughly 80% of the work load to get to weapons-grade material. In terms of breakout capacity, this strategy is designed to conduct enrichment in the open, and then quickly escalate to weapons-grade. Turkey, on the other hand, is justifying its nuclear expansion for economic reasons, driven by shortages in energy. Additionally, recent studies have found that a could be developed in Turkey. With developing nuclear energy sectors in number of countries (China, Vietnam, UAE, etc.), uranium ore and fuel services will likely be in greater demand. Again, the economic motivations appear to outweigh the security explanations. Furthermore, the International Atomic Energy Agency would also have greater access in Turkey than it did in Iran in the early years of the Iranian program. Currently, Turkey is a member in good standing and a signatory to the (AP). The current safeguards regime in Turkey, which includes the advanced monitoring and access that comes from the AP, requires early notification and cooperation with the IAEA as sites that deal with nuclear energy are developed. This access is well beyond what Iran was subjected to during the early stages of its program. As Turkey expands into nuclear energy, be it mining and milling or energy production, under the current safeguards regime, the IAEA would be engaged during the planning stages and would be able to identify at the outset possible anomalies. Turkey, in order to move into the nuclear arena, also , known informally as a 123 Agreement, with the United States in 2008. This agreement places stringent controls on the technologies that Turkey receives from the US, or the technologies from any other state that has a 123 Agreement with the US. With the IAEA safeguards system and other international regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, this additional layer of protection would help to prohibit illicit use of materials Finally, Turkey’s external security outlook and alliance structure are also dramatically different than that of Iran’s. Scholars have examined in depth the determinants of proliferation, with security demands often found to be the primary motivating factor. However, Philipp Bleek and Eric Lorber, among others, have that security guarantees significantly reduce the likelihood for proliferation. While Iran could be said to have sponsor states in China and Russia, these relationships are largely driven by economic interests and self-interested foreign policy. Conversely, Turkey is a long-standing member of the NATO alliance. The Article V security guarantee ensures Turkey’s existential security. Iran lacked this protection.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › ---xt: Prolif---Link

NATO prevents Turkish prolif now---but it’s the last barrier.

Larrabee & Nader 13, *PhD, holds the Distinguished Chair in European Security at the RAND Corporation. **MA, former International Policy Analyst at the Rand Corporation. (F. Stephen and Alireza, “Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East”, RAND, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR258/RAND_RR258.pdf)

Turkey’s approach to the nuclear issue will heavily depend on U.S. policy and the credibility of the commitment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members to Article V of the Washington Treaty on collective defense. As long as Turkey feels that NATO takes seriously Turkish security concerns, Ankara is unlikely to rethink its nuclear policy. However, if Turkish confidence in the U.S. and NATO commitment to its security weakens, Ankara could begin to explore other options for ensuring its security, including the possible acquisition of its own nuclear deterrent. Thus, maintaining the credibility of the commitment of alliance members to Article V remains critical.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › Expulsion Bad---Prolif

Regional arms racing and nuclear war

Adam Garfinkle 18, Founding Editor of The American Interest and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “The U.S.-Turkish Unraveling and the Arabs”, American Interest, 09-03-2018, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/09/03/the-u-s-turkish-unraveling-and-the-arabs///SJ

Now, the logic of the security dilemma is such that in the absence of the credible U.S. provision of extended deterrence, Turkey would feel pressure to develop its own nuclear weapons. That it has not exerted itself in that direction, despite its formidable engineering and scientific capacities, illustrates the stability of Turkish trust in U.S. protection—until recently—and the ability of both sides to bracket the core security relationship away from various disagreements. As with other nuclear-armed states, should Turkey go its own way it would do so with no active intention of actually using such weapons, but rather as a kind of insurance policy against diplomatic extortion at the hands of other nuclear-armed powers.

But of course if Turkey, no longer tethered to U.S. security protection in one way or another, developed nuclear weapons for such a purpose, other regional states would probably feel obliged to develop or otherwise acquire their own weapons, if they could, as an insurance policy against nuclear extortion by Turkey.3 They have already practiced that way of thinking in reaction to the possibility of an Iranian nuclear breakout, of course.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › Expulsion Bad---Prolif

Kicking Turkey out causes fast prolif

F Stephen Larabee 13, PhD in Political Science, holds the Distinguished Chair in European Security at the RAND Corporation, served as vice president and director of studies of the Institute of East–West Security Studies in New York, “Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East”, RAND, 2013, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR258/RAND_RR258.sum.pdf//SJ

Turkey’s approach to the nuclear issue will heavily depend on U.S. policy and the credibility of the commitment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members to Article V of the Washington Treaty on collective defense. As long as Turkey feels that NATO takes seriously Turkish security concerns, Ankara is unlikely to rethink its nuclear policy. However, if Turkish confidence in the U.S. and NATO commitment to its security weakens, Ankara could begin to explore other options for ensuring its security, including the possible acquisition of its own nuclear deterrent. Thus, maintaining the credibility of the commitment of alliance members to Article V remains critical.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › Expulsion Bad---NATO

Nukes in İncirlik are key to NATO nuclear defense

Ergin 21- B.A. degree in international relations from Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University, Ergin has been active in journalism since 1975 when he began to work for Turkish News Agency as a general assignment reporter. He served as diplomatic reporter at daily Cumhuriyet’s Ankara office from 1979 to 1987. (Sedat Ergin, “What Biden said about nuclear weapons at İncirlik base and what he can do,” Daily News, May 06 2021, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/sedat-ergin/what-biden-said-about-nuclear-weapons-at-incirlik-base-and-what-he-can-do-164487)//mcu

İncirlik’s place on NATO’s nuclear deterrence In other words, when Biden was entering the presidential run of 2020, he started out stating his discomfort regarding the nuclear weapons in Turkey. The person who has expressed such worry is currently sitting at the White House. Can these statements of Biden reflect on the policies he will follow during his presidency? Let’s try to answer this question by examining the moves Biden has made on foreign policy. Biden sees strengthening transatlantic ties, that is, relations between the U.S. and Europe, and institutional cooperation structures as one of his primary foreign policy goals. In this context, NATO appears as the most strategic institution for the U.S. president. His strategy against Russia, which NATO continues to see as the main threat, is to protect nuclear deterrence, as reflected in all relevant documents of the alliance. In this context, we can remember the decisions of the NATO summit in Brussels in 2018. According to these, NATO’s nuclear deterrence is based on “the nuclear weapons deployed by the U.S. in the allied countries in Europe and the capabilities and infrastructure provided by the relevant allied countries” - as well as the contributions of the U.S. strategic forces and the U.K. and France. One of the “relevant allied countries” is Turkey. Without a doubt, İncirlik has a very essential place in the infrastructure provided to the U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. By allowing the possession of U.S. nuclear weapons in İncirlik and becoming the host to these weapons, Turkey has assumed a significant role in NATO’s nuclear deterrence. In this respect, İncirlik forms one of the most critical pillars of NATO’s nuclear umbrella under current conditions. Of course, the proximity of this base to not only Russia but also to the Middle East is undoubtedly a factor that needs to be taken into account. Biden will continue the old policy but… Given that İncirlik is so heavily integrated into NATO’s nuclear planning, it seems unrealistic to expect Biden’s sentiment in his interview with New York Times to be reflected in the U.S. official policy - unless there arises a major policy change. Next month, the NATO summit in Brussels, where Erdoğan and Biden will meet face to face for the first time in the new period, will probably be finalized with a result that will emphasize NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy once again. Nevertheless, if the Turkish-U.S. relations do not enter a period of recovery and continue to be the scene of crises as they are today, the possibility of further strengthening of the questioning view of the U.S. press, opinion leaders and the U.S. public opinion regarding the nuclear inventory in İncirlik should not be underestimated.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › Expulsion Bad---NATO

Expulsion of turkey weakens NATO—increased antagonism, influence, loss of second largest military and Incirlik Air Base

Blaha 19- graduated from the University of Michigan School of Education in 2012. Prior to law school, he served as a Logistics Officer in the United States Army (JONATHAN BLAHA, “Married for Life? Can and should NATO divorce itself from Turkey?,” MJIL, )//mcu

While NATO may ultimately be able to expel Turkey, it would not be in NATO’s best interest to do so. First, the expulsion of Turkey could lead to increased antagonism between Turkey and NATO. Second, the loss of Turkey’s military contributions would be a significant loss to the alliance. Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus placed it in conflict with fellow NATO member Greece.[23] While NATO membership did not prevent the conflict, in part because Cyprus was not a member of NATO, Cyprus has maintained an uneasy peace since the invasion, managing to accede to the European Union in May of 2004.[24] An unaligned Turkey may be more likely to disrupt the peace in Cyprus, which is not a NATO member and may not be defended by the international community. The preserved peace in Cyprus, and the value of the NATO forum for preserving that peace, may be instructive for influencing potential future actions by Turkey. While the results of Turkey’s incursion into Kurdish controlled parts of Syria are currently unknown, NATO is more likely to influence Turkey as a member than a non-member potentially allied with Russia. Additionally, a loss of Turkey’s military contributions to NATO would significantly weaken the alliance. Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base serves a critical role in NATO operations. At the peak of the fighting, missions from the base dropped an average of 180 bombs per day.[25] Turkey is the geographically nearest member to Syria and Russia, as well as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,[26] and a loss of the base would hamper NATO operations in the region. NATO has invested over $5,000,000,000 on infrastructure in Turkey.[27] The importance of Incirlik Air Base to NATO was affirmed by the inclusion of $48,000,000 for its improvement in the National Defense Authorization Act for the fiscal year 2018.[28] In addition to its strategically vital location, Turkey’s military contributions to the alliance would be missed. Turkey has the second-largest military in NATO, larger than the third and fourth largest militaries combined,[29] as well as the seventh-highest defense expenditures.[30] Turkey has been part of the NATO mission in Afghanistan since 2001 and may have advantages in peace brokering due to shared Islamic religion.[31] There are clear benefits to maintaining Turkey’s membership and this course of action has advocates.[32] However, the question of membership may not matter. The United States is considering removing nuclear weapons from Turkey .[33] This would signal that NATO does not trust Turkey, making it a member in name only, and one unaligned with the rest of NATO, making the question of membership strategically irrelevant.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › Expulsion Bad---NATO

NATO needs turkey—acts as a peace bridge to the middle east, Muslim majority, and decisive ally versu China and Russia

Oguzlu 15- Associate Prof. Dr. in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University. He holds a Ph.D. degree in IR, taken from Bilkent University in 2003. He holds a Master of Science degree in IR, taken from the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2000 and another Master of Arts degree in IR taken from Bilkent University in 1998 (Tarik Oguzlu, “TURKEY’S NATO MEMBERSHIP IS AN ASSET FOR BOTH TURKEY AND THE ALLIANCE,” https://www.turkheritage.org/en/publications/analysis-by-tho-contributors-and-liaisons/turkeys-nato-membership-is-an-asset-for-both-turkey-and-the-alliance-9620)//mcu

Just as Turkey derives immense benefits from NATO membership, the alliance in general and the United States in particular also benefit from Turkey's membership. First, since its entry to the alliance Turkey has played a key role in European security by shielding the continent from the east and the south. Turkey does not only act as a buffer zone insulating the Kantian Europe from the Hobbesian Middle East but also as a spearhead enabling NATO allies to reach out to the Caucasus, Black Sea, Central Asia and wider Middle East. During the Cold War Turkey acted as a bulwark against Soviet penetration into the wider Middle East and helped lessen the Soviet military pressure on central Europe by tying up sizable Soviet troops. Turkey's role as an unsinkable aircraft carrier has been well noted. Second, Turkey is the only ally within NATO which has a Muslim-majority population. Turkey's membership serves as an antidote to the claims that NATO is an alliance of Christian nations. This has become more and more important in the post-9/11 era, as civilizational and identity-related considerations have increasingly colored international politics. For NATO's military operations across the globe not to be seen as biased against Islamic nations, Turkey's presence inside the alliance has been vitally important. Third, if the Biden administration is sincere about revitalizing the rules-based international order and committed to strengthening NATO as a bulwark against Russia and China, securing Turkey’s cooperation within NATO would be decisive. Turkey is too important an ally to lose to the Russian-Chinese axis. Fourth, as NATO's current Secretary General has underlined many times, Turkey's cooperation within NATO has been vital to the defeat of radical religious terrorism in the wider Middle East. Besides, Turkey is home to millions of refugees who would like to otherwise go to European countries. Fifth, having the second largest army within the alliance and participated in almost all NATO military operations to date, Turkey has decisively contributed to NATO's overall military capabilities. Turkey's participation in multinational NATO operations in Afghanistan and taking command of it numerous times speak volumes in this regard. Turkey hosting the upcoming negotiations between the Afghan government and Taliban could potentially facilitate the peace process. Sixth, Turkey's membership in NATO provides western countries with important opportunities to have an influence on Turkey's international and internal policies/orientation as well. Why to lose this prerogative by pushing Turkey further away from the alliance? All in all, both Turkey and NATO allies gain from Turkey’s membership. Unless NATO turns out to become an ideological weapon at the hands of the liberal hawkish cabals in the West, Turkey would feel quite comfortable within the alliance.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › Expulsion Bad---Turkish Aggression

Turkey expulsion collapse Black Sea deterrence, sparks Greece-Turkey war, and creates a European refugee crisis.

Peter Pry 19, chief of staff of the Congressional EMP Commission and served on the staff of the House Armed Services Committee and at the CIA, “Expelling Turkey from NATO would create a dangerous foe”, TheHill,10-23-2019,

Some analysts evaluate Turkey as among the most militarily powerful nations, ranking ninth among 137 military powers worldwide.

Do we really want to kick Turkey out of NATO and have its military power and strategic geography aligned with Russia?

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › Expulsion Bad---L-List

Turkish inclusion into NATO solves Russia, Middle Eastern and Caucasus war

Hess 6-22-2022, Central Asia fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Maximillian, “Why the West Should Make Peace With Erdogan Now: He is the one unsavory character the West urgently needs better relations with.,” Foreign Policy,

The democratic West has a long and controversial history of entering alliances of convenience with dictators and strongmen around the world—unsavory but necessary partners in confronting threats to the international order. Denounced as ethically dubious, this sort of stance is also realist, balance-of-power politics par excellence. It enabled the world to unite to defeat Adolf Hitler in World War II and the West to win the Cold War. Atop the list of unsavory partners the West urgently needs better relations with today sits Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. That he is unsavory is clear: He has actively undermined Turkish democracy, undone decades of liberalization, weaponized migration, terrorized the Kurdish minority both at home and in neighboring Syria, and helped Iran violate U.S. sanctions. Most recently, he has threatened to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. It will take a long time before the West can genuinely trust him. However, the reality is that the West needs Erdogan more than ever. Russia’s brutal, all-out war against Ukraine has vastly raised Turkey’s profile on the geostrategic chessboard. Ankara has emerged as a key supplier of drones to Kyiv—shipments it has luckily shown no intention of halting. Ukraine’s chances of victory would be significantly improved if Turkish arms deliveries were expanded. Erdogan, who controls access to the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, crucially shut the passage to warships in late February. At the same time, Ankara has also been willing to cooperate with Moscow on Ukraine where Erdogan sees an opportunity. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu discussed plans to secure a route for Ukrainian grain exports with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Ankara on June 8, reportedly asking for a 25 percent discount on Turkish grain purchases as part of the deal. Without Ankara on board, any Western proposals to break the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports are dead on arrival. The West also needs Turkey on its side in the economic war against Russia. Ankara’s support alone can restrict the flow of sanctioned Russian goods in and out of the Black Sea, which continue even as Ukrainian ships are stuck in port. Ankara’s help is crucial in cutting ratlines for Russian money and kleptocrats. Turkey has become a major destination for Russian money (and oligarchs’ yachts) fleeing sanctions and plays a growing role in supporting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s new autarkic economy. Turkey is one of the few major countries that freely accept Russian payment, undercutting the impact of Western banking sanctions. Bringing Turkey onboard would plug one of the largest holes in the sanctions regime. Russia’s brutal, all-out war against Ukraine has vastly raised Turkey’s profile on the geostrategic chessboard. But most importantly, Turkey will be a key player in the reordering of European energy supplies, not least because it controls energy access through a number of crucial pipelines. The key to Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor strategy, for example, is gas from Azerbaijan supplied via Turkey’s Trans-Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic pipelines—inaugurated in 2018 and 2020, respectively—and feeding into the European gas grid in the Balkans and Italy. Erdogan is also actively seeking to develop Turkey’s own gas resources and potentially even link Israeli and Cypriot offshore gas fields to the European pipeline network. Such efforts are of course complicated by Greco-Turkish disputes over Cyprus and its surrounding waters. A revived European-Turkish partnership may be the only way the Eastern Mediterranean’s rich energy resources can be fully utilized. Such a partnership might also nudge Erdogan to make an about-face vis-à-vis Russia, where the inauguration of the TurkStream pipeline in 2020 signaled a new high point in Turkish-Russian relations. Finally, aligning with Erdogan would offer the West more geostrategic leverage over the Kremlin beyond the war in Ukraine. Turkey is also a key player in three additional conflicts where Russia is involved: Syria, Libya, and the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Erdogan moved from a policy of benign neglect to active intervention in these conflicts over the past decade, motivated by a desire to boost Turkey’s role as a regional power independent of the West. A resumed partnership with Erdogan offers further pressure points in the effort to constrain Moscow’s global influence. For Erdogan’s drift away from the West and closer relations with Moscow to be reversed, it is important to understand what motivated it. Today, the West is paying a price for failing to listen to his concerns. The drift initially began in 2011, as the Arab Spring swept across North Africa and the Middle East. Erdogan was ebullient, as the uprisings offered the prospect of bringing Islamists similar to himself to power across the region. He felt betrayed when then-U.S. President Barack Obama failed to uphold his redlines in Syria and abandoned then-Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and publicly backed by Erdogan, when the Egyptian military ousted Morsi in a coup. “Turkey has learned the hard way that the U.S. is unwilling to invest in the region,” Muhammet Kocak, an international relations specialist based in Ankara, told me. Similarly, “Turkey’s security concerns have not been perceived as a particularly relevant issue in the NATO agenda,” said Elizabete Aunina, a doctoral researcher at the University of Amsterdam focused on Turkish security policy. But what accelerated Erdogan’s drift away from the West—and shift to Moscow—was his sense of betrayal after the 2016 failed Turkish coup, which he publicly accused the United States of fostering. He also felt abandoned by his NATO allies when Washington withdrew its Patriot missile defense systems from Turkey and when NATO barely even reacted after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter aircraft intruding on its airspace, the first such incident involving NATO and Russian or Soviet airpower in 60 years. Since then, Erdogan felt that Moscow offered a better route to improving his regional and domestic position. Turkish-Russian cooperation since then includes the TurkStream pipeline, plans for Russia to build a $20 billion nuclear power plant in Turkey, and the 2017 announcement that Ankara would buy Moscow’s S-400 missile defense system. And although Turkey and Russia have occasionally sparred—they back differing sides in the Syrian and Libyan civil wars, for example—relations have remained broadly warm and manageable. That only increases the potential strategic leverage the West would gain if it reversed Erdogan’s orientation. What carrot could the West offer Erdogan for abandoning Moscow? Turkey’s economic crisis may be just the opportunity. With annual inflation reaching 73.5 percent in May, currency reserves near all-time lows, and the Turkish lira down by 30 percent versus the dollar year-to-date following a 44 percent drop in 2021, Turkey’s risk of default has spiked. Foreign investors have fled the market. Desperately searching for fresh foreign capital, Erdogan even patched up relations with his key regional rival, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. It would be better for the West to offer Erdogan an economic lifeline than to allow Moscow to do so. The U.S. Federal Reserve and European Central Bank, for example, should consider offering Erdogan a currency swap line, a stabilizing instrument they have significantly expanded in recent decades. Access to dollars and euros could alleviate many of Ankara’s mounting economic challenges and set the stage for a more cooperative partnership. Erdogan knows he has a strong hand and is likely to make other demands. He has already exerted his leverage over Sweden’s and Finland’s desired accession to NATO, linking it to a freer hand for Turkey against the Syrian Kurds, who have been the West’s valiant allies in the fight against the Islamic State. Earlier this month, Erdogan announced plans for a new operation targeting them. He may well make demands about other regional interests, and he will certainly seek to blunt Western criticism of his domestic governance. These concessions could prove costly to other Western interests. There is clear hesitancy to engage Erdogan at the moment. The West’s strategy appears to be to “count on the possibility Erdogan will lose the [June 2023] elections,” according to Kocak. Counting on Erdogan to allow a free and fair election and a potential peaceful transfer of power a year from now is idealistic at best and hopelessly naive at worst. Erdogan is an unsavory character and will likely remain one. But it is in the West’s interest that he be on its side—not Russia’s—in order to weaken Putin and ensure Ukraine’s survival. The opportunity is there, and it would be unwise of the West not to try.

2022 Michigan Evidence
AFFIRMATIVE › AT Expulsion---No Link

Turkey won’t leave NATO or respond to the plan

TASS 5-30 (TASS, 30 MAY 2022, “Turkey will not leave NATO, but press for its interests — expert,” ; accessed 6/23/2022) ng

MOSCOW, May 30. /TASS/. Turkey will continue to pursue an independent military policy, but will refrain from "challenging" the United States or quitting the North Atlantic alliance, the head of the Russian International Affairs Council, Andrey Kortunov, told TASS on Monday. "Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while being a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Alliance, pursues an independent, externally unrestrained military policy. The way I see it, he will continue like this this further on," Kortunov said. Erdogan "firmly defends his interests, for he is well aware that Turkey will not be expelled from NATO, while he will not leave on his own," the analyst said. At the same time, Kortunov predicts Ankara’s conflicts with NATO. "There will be harsh statements and threats from both sides, but I don't think it will come to Turkey's withdrawal or expulsion from NATO. It would cost both sides too much." Turkey’s interests Without Turkey, Kortunov explained, "NATO's southern flank will lose a lot, if not everything," since the country is the bloc’s leading member and its armed forces are inferior only to those of the US. For this reason, he continued, the Turkish leadership will be pressing for concessions from the US and EU countries, "but it will never challenge them." Erdogan has a whole list of complaints against the United States, Kortunov recalled. For instance, Turkey wants the lifting sanctions related to its purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense systems and its return to the US F-35 fighter program. "There is as great deal to bargain about. Clearly, Erdogan will not get everything, but he will be able to get something in the end," he believes. The expert also suggested that the Turkish side might be able to defend its interests on the issue of Finland and Sweden joining NATO. For one, the Turkish leadership wants these countries to curtail their traditional support for the Kurdish opposition. "I think they will eventually come to an agreement. Here, concessions are expected not only from Stockholm, but also from Brussels," Kortunov explained. While commenting on the Turkish leader's contacts with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the expert noted: "In the alliance, no one would want Erdogan to play his own game with Moscow behind its back. But it be impossible to prevent it, so they will have to leave everything as it is." The analyst stressed that Turkey had long had a very special relationship with the North Atlantic Alliance and declared certain interests that often do not coincide with the stance of other NATO members. The Turkish leadership, Kortunov forecasts, will continue to pursue a policy that, in a sense, might violate the unity of the bloc. "However, in this regard, Erdogan will go as far as he will be allowed to," he stressed. "He will be declaring his special interests in Libya or the Eastern Mediterranean, he will put himself in opposition to some European countries, or position himself as a global advocate of Islam, but I don't think he will go to extremes."