2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Security K
International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2021 [(iPRAW) coordinated by: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July “Building Blocks for a Regulation on LAWS and Human Control Updated Recommendations to the GGE on LAWS” https://www.readkong.com/page/building-blocks-for-a-regulation-on-laws-and-human-control-8617434 Acc 2/27/22 TA]
2 BUILDING BLOCK I: UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGES In order to establish a normative and operational framework aimed at tackling the challenges posed by LAWS, it is imperative to understand the technological, military, legal, ethical, and security aspects. In fact, a profound grasp of the technological aspects, especially with regard to computational methods, like artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, is the starting point of any discussion on a regulatory framework on LAWS. By the same token, it is of pivotal importance to bear military considerations in mind and to comprehend the nature and structure of military operations, in particular the targeting cycle. The same holds true for legal considerations. International law, especially international humanitarian law (IHL) constitutes the fulcrum of the debate on LAWS. Furthermore, human dignity needs to be taken into account properly, as emerging technologies in the military realm threaten to touch upon or even violate human rights. Last but not least, security aspects should be considered thoroughly. The increased resort to autonomous functions in combat operations will have repercussions on conflict escalation and international stability and may even lead to an AI arms race, potentially having devastating consequences.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Security K
Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” TA]
The Role of Confidence-Building Measures AI potentially generates risks for international security due to ways AI could change the character of warfare, the limitations of AI technology today, and the use of AI for specific military missions such as nuclear operations. Especially given the uncertain technological trajectory of advances in AI, what are options to reduce the risks that military applications of AI can pose to international stability? To advance the conversation about ensuring that military AI adoption happens in the safest and most responsible way possible, this paper outlines a series of potential confidence-building measures aimed at mitigating risks from military uses of AI.39 We introduce these ideas as preliminary concepts for future research, discussion, and examination, rather than to specifically advocate for any of these options. But progress in mitigating the risks from military AI competition requires moving beyond the recognition that risk mitigation is important to the hard work of suggesting, evaluating, and examining the benefits and drawbacks of specific mechanisms.40
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Security K
Scharre, 2021 - Director of Studies at Center for New American Security [Paul, Texas National Security Review Vol 4, Iss 3 Summer “Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory” https://tnsr.org/2021/06/debunking-the-ai-arms-race-theory/Artificial Intelligence Acc 5/27/22 TA]
AI Competition and the Security Dilemma Even if military AI spending does not rise to the level of an “arms race,” many nations are nevertheless engaged in a security competition in the adoption of military AI, a competition that does pose risks. The situation that states find themselves in with regard to AI competition is much more accurately described as a security dilemma,16 a more generalized competitive dynamic between states than the more narrowly defined “arms race.” In his 1978 article, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” Robert Jervis defined the security dilemma as follows: “[M]any of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.”17 As Charles Glaser has pointed out, it is not obvious from this definition why it would be intrinsically bad for an increase in one state’s security to come at the expense of another’s security.18 In fact, decreasing the security of other states could have beneficial effects in enhancing deterrence and reducing the risks of aggression or achieving a favorable balance of power in a region, which could lead to greater political influence. The problem comes in the second- and third-order effects that could develop when another state reacts to having its security reduced. Responses could include counterbalancing with a net effect of no change in security (or worsening security). Glaser argues that there are some situations in which security competition is a rational strategy for a state to pursue even if competitors will arm in response. In other situations, arming may be a suboptimal strategy for a state, which would be better served by restraint or pursuing arms control.19 Security competition could even leave both states worse off than before. This can occur during a traditional arms race if nations expend vast sums of money in an unsuccessful attempt to gain an advantage over one another, with the result that both nations divert funds from non-defense expenditures. If the outcome of a security competition is the same relative military balance as before, the balance of power may not have meaningfully changed, but both nations could face diminished economic and social well-being at home relative to if they had avoided a security competition. Even absent this “guns vs. butter” tradeoff, however, there are other ways in which security competition can lead to a net negative outcome for both states. One way this could occur is if military innovation and the development of new capabilities alter the character of warfare in a manner that is more harmful, more destructive, less stable, or otherwise less desirable than before. In his 1997 article, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” Glaser gave the example of military capabilities that shifted warfare to a more offense-dominant regime.20 There are other ways in which warfare could evolve in a net negative direction as well. For example, in World War I, Germany’s interest in developing and deploying chemical weapons was spurred in part due to fears about France’s developments in poison gas.21 The result was the introduction of a weapon that increased combatant suffering on both sides, without delivering a significant military advantage to either. The same could occur with AI: It could alter the character of warfare in a way that would be a net negative for all participants.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Cybernetics K
Kewley, 2021 – Cohead of the Tech Group at Clifford Chance LLP [Jonathan, Dec 7, “Artificial intelligence: Can we go from chaos to cooperation?” AEI Panel Discussion - Moderator: Elisabeth Braw https://www.aei.org/events/artificial-intelligence-can-we-go-fromchaos-to-cooperation/ Acc 5/11/22 TA]
Jonathan Kewley: I suppose my closing point is about making this all human centered. And what does that fix mean? It means putting the human at the heart of technology. And what we’ve seen in other areas so far — and we’ve got good precedence — is that if you take the human out and you just go over a profit motive or in the defense sector, kind of a kill motive, then you’ve got a real issue. So, putting morality, human beings at the heart of this will ensure that we don’t have chaos, because that moral compass will be there. And we all have a part to play in this. And finally, I would say that multilateralism is so important. We can’t have this debate on our own in Europe and not include China and not include the US. It needs to be a big conversation, a global conversation and a nonexclusive one.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Cybernetics K
Sauer, 2021 - Senior Research Fellow at Bundeswehr University [Frank serves on the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons IRRC No. 913 March “Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible” https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/stepping-back-from-brink-regulation-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-913 Acc 4/5/22 TA]
How regulating weapon autonomy is feasible: Fostering a human control norm The United States and China are demonstrating awareness of the strategic risks of unmitigated weapon autonomy. The US directive on weapon autonomy,95 albeit attempting to square the circle of using autonomy while not inviting the accompanying risks, can be interpreted this way. China has coined the term “battlefield singularity”, a dreaded situation in which war waged at machine speed is too fast for human cognition to keep up.96 Nevertheless, the current great power rivalry between the United States, China and Russia, all racing for dominance in the field of military AI, is clearly not conducive to regulation of weapon autonomy. With presidents Trump, Xi and Putin in power, a breakthrough is not to be expected any time soon. But political will for regulation can also be generated from the ground up. Growing political will from the grassroots Surveys consistently show publics from all over the world rejecting LAWS. Opposition globally increased from 56% in 2016 to 61% in 2018, according to KRC survey data.97 This conforms with earlier online polling conducted by the Open Roboethics Initiative98 as well as Heather Roff via IPSOS.99 Opposition in the United States, China and Russia is at 52%, 59% and 60% respectively.100 In Europe, the numbers range from 60% in Finland up to 81% in Ireland.101 Survey data also suggest that the public's opposition is primarily fueled not by legal concerns or worries about unwanted escalation or crisis instability but by the notion that delegating decisions over life and death on the battlefield crosses a bright red moral line.102 So while there is certainly an interesting philosophical debate to be had about the cultural pervasiveness of human dignity as a concept and its relevance to the LAWS issue from utilitarian versus deontological viewpoints, the concern as presented in the preceding section quite clearly resonates with the general public. The notion that there is something fundamentally wrong with having humans killed by mindless machines is thus well suited to creating grassroots pressure on governments in order to muster more political will on the issue. This point is granted even by sceptics of the human dignity argument as a whole: “There could be some campaigning advantages. Saying that something is against human dignity evokes a strong visceral response.”103
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Ban LAWs CP
Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman, 2022 – prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Lena and Zoe, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA]
The second pillar examines legal norms as a domain wherein legal uncertainty regarding AI has tangible implications for Allied legal interoperability, a subset of larger coalition interoperability. Thus far, the legal debate regarding AI has been largely fixed on the issue of a treaty banning the use of LAWS. In this section, we advocate for a more nuanced legal picture in which NATO can facilitate legal coordination and tackle some of the foundational legal issues which will prevent successful legal interoperability in future operations. The third pillar identifies safety and security of AI systems as prerequisite to trustworthy and responsible AI in any context, but especially so for the conduct of military activity. At the NATO level, Allied forces must ensure their systems interoperate safely and predictably both to ensure effective command and control (C2) internally, and to prevent disruptions from attacks. It is a foundational facet of coordination that shows the overlap between NATO interests in military effectiveness and incentivization for responsible innovation.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Ban LAWs CP
Thornton, 2019 - Senior Lecturer in the Centre for Defence Education Research and Analysis, King’s College [Rod, “One to ponder: the UK’s ethical stance on the use of Artificial Intelligence in weapons systems https://defenceindepth.co/2019/06/17/one-to-ponder-the-uks-ethical-stance-on-the-use-of-artificial-intelligence-in-weapons-systems/ Acc 4/16/22 TA]
Given its declared position, it might seem logical for the UK to push for an international ban on the use of LAWS. Trying to level the playing field so that no other state possessed them would seemingly work to the UK’s advantage. A ban is also the favoured UN option. UN Secretary General António Guterres has, for instance, described LAWS as ‘morally repugnant’. Within the UN, however, the UK is part of a group of states (alongside Australia, Israel, Russia and US) that has collectively stated that currently they do not want to see any regulation that forbids the use of LAWS. To explain the UK’s position, an MOD spokesperson said that, ‘We believe a pre-emptive ban is premature as there is still no international agreement on the characteristics of lethal autonomous weapons systems’. We are thus back to the thorny problem of definitions. If we do not know what something is then how can it be banned? The question here, though, is why is the UK trying to prevent a ban on a weapon it has ‘no intention’ of developing itself? This does not look very ethical or, indeed, sensible. It seems to be giving licence to potential adversaries to continue with their own development of LAWS while the UK sits on its AI hands. Whatever the UK’s position, it seems that LAWS will prove impossible to ban anyway. Firstly, because the world’s major states will be seeing the benefits of LAWS there will probably (and maybe conveniently?) never be an internationally agreed definition on them, which would then allow any ban to accrue. Secondly, the technology that underpins any ‘killer robot’ will come to be developed anyway in the civilian sector – with systems designed, for instance, to deliver parcels or to tackle forest fires. Any military organisation could simply buy such systems off the shelf and convert them readily into LAWS. The genie will thus be out of the bottle on LAWS fairly soon anyway and can never be put back in. It will therefore, and unfortunately, be very hard for the UK to maintain a credible stance as a ‘pioneer in ethical AI’.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Ban LAWs CP
Nadibaidze, 2021 - Ph.D. Student at the University of Southern Denmark [Anna Entry submitted for the Second OSCE-IFSH Essay Competition “Commitment to Control over Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/507341.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
In response to the risks outlined in this section, several states, scholars and civil society organisations have been arguing for a ban on LAWS. Since 2013, this issue has been discussed within the framework of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). A Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS was established in 2016 to pursue the debate in a more formal setting. However, the discussions are often framed in a futuristic way, focusing on ‘killer robots’ and their potential to operate with full autonomy and without human oversight. As this section has demonstrated, this perspective misses the fact that existing weapons systems with increasingly autonomous features already have the potential to affect security and stability.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Ban LAWs CP
Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman, 2022 – prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Lena and Zoe, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA]
Lawyers, researchers, and civil society grapple with existing legal regimes relevant to military operations and the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding automated decision-making, particularly in lethal decision-making. Thus far, the legal dialogue has been heavily anchored in the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL), and other relevant legal regimes, to lethal autonomous weapons systems.72 IHL, also known as the laws of war or the laws of armed conflict, regulate the means and methods of warfare and, as such, is pivotal to the emergence of military technology and how existing legal structures are disrupted. The legal debate often revolves around the prospect of a “treaty ban” of LAWS.73 But the legal debate is much more nuanced than the likelihood of international treaties banning any particular weapon system. Especially because NATO is not a regulatory body, it cannot institute measures to regulate emerging technology for the Allies. Instead, NATO’s function in the legal domain may be more effective outside the traditional legal debates around emerging military technology and more embedded in fostering cooperation and coordination among military partners. Other avenues of legal regulation may fall short of an international convention or prohibition, but nevertheless factor significantly in regulating and/or delineating state policies. Additionally, non-lethal applications of AI, as well as applications of AI that do not figure into autonomous systems, also raise important legal questions under international law. Arguably, norms around non-lethal applications are more urgent as their development is more advanced, harder to define, and less controversial in integration.74 Ultimately, NATO’s facilitative power can help ensure that integration of EDTs like AI into military capabilities and into multinational coalition operations is consistent with member states’ legal obligations.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Ban LAWs CP
Sauer, 2021 - Senior Research Fellow at Bundeswehr University [Frank serves on the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons IRRC No. 913 March “Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible” https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/stepping-back-from-brink-regulation-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-913 Acc 4/5/22 TA]
In the case of LAWS, however, the old pattern of defining and then regulating a discrete category of military hardware is not applicable.11 After all, almost any current and future weapons system can conceivably be endowed with autonomous functions, and no one will be able to tell what any given system's level of dependence on human input is by merely inspecting it from the outside. In the past, bilateral nuclear arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union, later Russia, implemented quantitative arms control by developing precisely defined, shared understandings of counting rules and employing them in verification regimes.12 Similarly, in the realm of multilateral conventional arms control, the now defunct Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe relied heavily on defining and counting military hardware items.13 The challenge regarding LAWS, however, is not met by trying to define a category of weapons system – “LAWS”, as separated with a list of specific criteria from “non-LAWS” – and then counting and capping its numbers. In fact, in a modern military's system-of-systems architecture, “some AWS [autonomous weapons system] components are intangible and can be geographically distributed, [so] it is far from clear … where and when an AWS begins and ends”.14 Hence, the challenge, broadly speaking, lies in developing a new norm in order to adjust the relationship between humans and machines in twenty-first-century warfighting. A qualitative rather than quantitative approach is required, which, in turn, requires new diplomatic language to grasp the underlying technological developments, something that neither States Parties nor civil society are well versed in yet.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Ban LAWs CP
Del Re, 2017 – US Army Major [Amanda “Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Take the Human Out of the Loop A paper submitted to the Faculty of the US Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the Ethics of Emerging Military Technology Graduate Certificate. 16 June 2017 https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1041804 Acc 12/27/20 TA]
In conclusion, the US should lead the effort to employ Lethal Autonomous Weapons in warfare. As other nations are already employing LAWS, the US needs to utilize them so that they are fully understood. This understanding and experiencing is necessary to establish international norms and treaties. As a superpower, it is the United States’ burden to set the example in employing new technology in accordance with international norms. Finally, LAWS should be employed in warfare because they will save money and most importantly, lives.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Ban LAWs CP
Freedberg, 2019 – deputy editor for Breaking Defense [Sydney J “The frontline of a new age in defense Artificial Intelligence” https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/2097098/MCM120_BreakingDefense_AI_ebookR1%20(1).pdf Acc 5/25/22 TA]
What happens when Artificial Intelligence produces a war strategy too complex for human brains to understand? Do you trust the computer to guide your moves, like a traveler blindly following GPS? Or do you reject the plan and, with it, the potential for a strategy so smart it’s literally superhuman? The Pentagon wants AI to assist human combatants, not replace them. The issue is what happens once humans start taking military advice — or even orders — from machines. The reality is this happens already, to some extent. Every time someone looks at a radar or sonar display, for example, they’re counting on complicated software to correctly interpret a host of signals no human can see. The Aegis air and missile defense system on dozens of Navy warships recommends which targets to shoot down with which weapons, and if the human operators are overwhelmed, they can put Aegis on automatic and let it fire the interceptors itself. This mode is meant to stop massive salvos of incoming missiles but it could also shoot down manned aircraft. Now, Aegis isn’t artificial intelligence. It rigidly executes pre-written algorithms, without machine learning’s ability to improve itself. But it is a long-standing example of the kind of complex automation that is going to become more common as technology improves. While the US military won’t let a computer pull the trigger, it is developing target-recognition AI to go on everything from recon drones to tank gun sights to infantry goggles. The armed services are exploring predictive maintenance algorithms that warn mechanics to fix failing components before mere human senses can detect that something’s wrong, cognitive electronic warfare systems that figure out the best way to jam enemy radar, airspace management systems that converge strike fighters, helicopters, and artillery shells on the same target without fratricidal collisions. Future “decision aids” might automate staff work, turning a commander’s general plan of attack into detailed timetables of which combat units and supply convoys have to move where, when. And since these systems, unlike Aegis, do use machine learning, they can learn from experience — which means they continually rewrite their own programming in ways no human mind can follow.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT Ban LAWs CP
Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
7 This point has also been made in relation to the difficulties of a prematurely prohibitive ban on lethal autonomous weapon systems. Although autonomy is beyond the scope of the study, NSCAI Executive Director Yll Bajraktari makes a similar point on the relationship between ethics and interoperability: “The effects of a prohibition agreement likely would run counter to the U.S. strategic interests as commitments from states such as Russia and China are likely to be empty ones. So, the primary impact of an agreement would be to increase pressure on those countries that abide by international law, including the United States and its democratic allies and partners. If U.S. allies joined an agreement while the United States did not, the diversion would likely hinder allied military interoperability. That would be something really difficult for us and our allies. For these reasons, we believe that practical and strategic problems with a prohibition treaty outweigh the potential benefits for the United States and its allies and partners.” Craig Smith and Yll Bajraktari, “Episode #071: AI and Center for Security and Emerging Technology | 72 National Security: US vs China,” Eye on AI, May 5, 2021, transcript available at: .
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT EU CP
Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
355 EDF’s IP rules state that only EU-based entities can own IP from projects and US firms are excluded from receiving defense funds. Some worry these rules may lead to the exclusion of US firms from EDF and PESCO, negatively impacting military interoperability and joint R&D (See Christian Larsen, EU Should Remain Open to US Defense Industry, National Defense (December 13, 2019).) While others like Ulrike Franke believe EDF and PESCO are primarily European collaboration vehicles and should not be the main avenue for transatlantic cooperation.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT EU CP
Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
340 The European Union is not completely unified on its position regarding European defense capabilities or the application of AI in this realm. Ulrike Esther Franke, Policy Fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations, has noted that France tends to lead conversations about the use of AI in the military, while other countries like Germany and Austria are concerned about the use of AI to create autonomous weapons systems (“killer robots”). Additionally, the exit of the UK from the EU hinders US military cooperation with the EU as the UK had a strong military and intelligence relationship with the US, particularly given its place in Five Eyes.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT EU CP
Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
What this means is that the Federal Ministry of Defence is left with a backseat role.124 This also heightens the stakes of multilateral efforts on responsible and ethical military AI, including for assessments of ethical risk stemming from issues like explainability or reliability. Indeed, Germany may be more active in these formats, especially in facilitating coordination between the EU and NATO given its longstanding interest in encouraging and facilitating EU NATO cooperation.125 Cooperation is already visible in other efforts related to technology and ethics—most notably in that the German Bundeswehr Defence Policy Office came up with views on future implications of human augmentation in collaboration with the U.K. Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre.126 The two countries share views on the future of operations, which may be productively channeled through activities related to policy alignment or, potentially, standardization.127 Rather than going it alone, the German preference to cooperate—in bilateral and especially multilateral formats—may be seen as one way to focus on these issues with less domestic political pressure, and to substantiate contributions to defense partnerships.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT EU CP
Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
Other Opportunities for Multilateral Collaboration on Responsible and Ethical AI in Defense: the European Union (EU) and Five Eyes Working with a number of multilateral institutions is critical to the United States’ stewardship of AI aligned with democratic values and interests.164 In addition to NATO and the PfD, the EU and Five Eyes are highlighted as relevant formats for cooperation on ethical and responsible military AI. European Union Of course, the EU is not an alliance—and the United States is not a member. But the EU’s potential contributions to responsible military AI are worth discussing here because of the implications of supranational EU policy on allies’ own approaches to ethical and responsible AI in defense, as well as on EU-NATO cooperation.165
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT EU CP
Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
Both in the US and in the EU there seems to be political appetite for international collaboration on AI; however policymakers view specific US-EU cooperation with some degree of skepticism. At the European level for instance, the EU’s AI strategy underlines that addressing risks generated by AI should be a global effort. Accordingly, the EC mentions “strengthening cooperation with like-minded partners such as Japan, Canada or Singapore,” particularly on ethical norms.266 The US, however, is not specifically mentioned. The US is instead depicted as a competitor with greater capacity, resources, and ability to attract skilled researchers and funding. At first blush, it seems the US has also failed to treat US-EU cooperation with the prioritization one would expect given the prominence placed in the American AI Initiative on international cooperation to achieve a global environment aligned with American values—values Europe largely shares.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT EU CP
Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
Challenges Due to the socio-technical transformative power of AI, governing and harnessing its benefits is a complex affair. There are three fundamental issues the EU needs to overcome: A fragmented market and landscape: This patchwork landscape results from the EU’s political configuration of 27 different Member States, all of which have different levels of maturity and competitiveness with regard to its AI ecosystem. Some, like France or Germany, are major players in their own right, but the majority of EU Member States carry little weight on their own.248 This disparity in capability drives the EU to pool its resources together. The UK’s decision to leave the EU constituted a serious blow to the EU’s standing, as it deprived it of one of its most mature, rich and innovative AI environments.249 In addition, European AI assets (e.g., talent, education, expertise, research, start-ups, and capital) are highly fragmented and decentralized.250 As Professor of Theoretical Philosophy Thomas Metzinger pointed out, this makes effective coordination of all the different stakeholders complex but highly important. One example where coordination could be improved is research funding both within the existing EU research frameworks and between the EU government, academia, industry, and the Member States.251 Europe is also fragmented along market and cultural lines. Indeed, compared to the US or China, the EU’s AI market is not yet consolidated nor harmonized. In addition, some major sectors of the economy such as automotive, agriculture, energy, as well as the public sector, present varying degrees of AI maturity, penetration, and integration.252 According to a McKinsey study,253 in 2017 only 25% of EU large enterprises and 10% of small and medium enterprises used big data analytics.254 This slow uptake of AI relates, in part, to the lack of trust of the general public and companies around issues of algorithmic transparency and biases. Meanwhile, the EU’s AI governance must also be able to navigate and transcend potentially divisive differences that come from the cultural, historical, strategic, and institutional differences that characterize each and every Member State.255 Underlying structural factors impede its development and competitiveness: Europe lacks tech giants that characterize the US and Chinese tech landscape. As a result, European start-ups and tech companies compete against peers that have not only considerably larger investment capabilities, which enable them to acquire the latest technologies and companies, but also provide ample access to data and a greater ability to attract and retain a skilled workforce.256 The lack of easily available data, which impedes innovation, has emerged as a key issue for the EU and its private sector companies.257 These concerns are additionally fueled by the relatively more restrictive European privacy laws—and maybe soon mandatory ethical guidelines.258 “Brain drain,” meanwhile, poses a unique challenge to the EU as promising European researchers often choose to move to the US, Canada, or the UK for academic opportunities. Regarding the former for instance, 19% of Europe’s undergraduates move to the US to study, while 14% of European graduates move to the US to work. Overall, 11% of the US’s top tier AI workforce—which represent 59% of the global workforce— comes from Europe.259 In some cases, AI talent also moves to the US to work at larger international companies that acquire their start-ups.260 Examples include the French Moodstock (acquired by Google) and the UK’s Magic Pony Technology (acquired by Twitter).261 A strong but slow regulatory process: While the policy process regarding AI has, under the impetus of the EC, accelerated over the last few years, the overall regulatory process cannot be as easily accelerated and might take years. According to the EC’s calendar (see Figure 8), the AI-related regulatory process will begin at the end of this year (2020), but the actual drafting and passage of the associated legislation is likely to take several years. As such, the EU runs the risk of not keeping up with the pace of technological evolution in AI as well as further politicization of regulation similar to the process of passing GDPR. Finally, as with most democracies, the EU will also face the challenge of operationalizing related regulations and principles, carefully and skillfully, balancing private and public sector interests throughout the process.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Off Case Responses › AT CCW CP
International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2021 [(iPRAW) coordinated by: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July “Building Blocks for a Regulation on LAWS and Human Control Updated Recommendations to the GGE on LAWS” https://www.readkong.com/page/building-blocks-for-a-regulation-on-laws-and-human-control-8617434 Acc 2/27/22 TA]
Scope of application: Since human control is to be understood as a feature of the design as well as use, the regulation would cover the development and deployment of weapons – effectively prohibiting the development of weapons without sufficient options for human control, i.e. LAWS. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that the CCW and the Protocols related thereto merely apply in armed conflict and not in peacetime. This would also hold true in case another Protocol within the CCW framework was adopted, regulating LAWS. Thus, the use of LAWS in policing scenarios would not be covered by a future Protocol. However, human rights law and other (international) legal regimes would still be applicable. Furthermore, a CCW regulation would only apply to conventional weapons and would not cover autonomous cyber or nuclear capabilities.