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2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Lashout Turn › AT: Concessions

Capacity – the Ukrainian invasion has already failed and Russia doesn’t have the capacity to expand further BUT pushing him too far causes irrational escalation

Robinson 22 - an English-American journalist, political commentator, and editor-in-chief of Current Affairs magazine (Nathan J., “The Idiotic Logic That Will Lead To Nuclear War,” Current Affairs, 5-22-22, , Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

Romney disagrees. Note that he does not argue against the proposition that present U.S. actions (massively escalating military support for Ukraine and getting closer to a “proxy war” while declining to push for a diplomatic settlement) make a nuclear response from Russia more likely. Instead, he appears to argue that it doesn’t matter that this makes Putin more likely to use a nuclear weapon, because the alternative would be “paying the cannibal to eat us last” and would mean that Putin can “invade and subjugate with near impunity.” Some may find this persuasive, thinking a diplomatic settlement would reward Russian aggression and encourage it to invade countries in the future. But this narrative is false. As foreign relations expert Anatol Lieven explained in a recent Current Affairs interview, it overlooks the crucial fact that Russia has already lost the war. Russia failed in its objective, which was to topple and replace the Ukrainian government. Russia has not even secured full control of the Donbas. Russia has suffered immense losses of troops, had its economy wrecked, become a pariah state, strengthened Ukraine as a nation, strengthened NATO, and shown its military to be a paper tiger that cannot even conquer territories within a few miles of its own border. This is a critically important fact to understand. A diplomatic settlement now would not result in a “victory” for Russia that encourages further invasions. Russia has proven that it is utterly and completely incapable of invasions. It cannot even conquer a poor country like Ukraine. It is not going to invade Finland. It is not going to invade the United States. Russia has shown that it is not, in fact, any kind of serious threat. Romney portrays Russia as a kind ravenous cannibal that, if not stopped, will devour the entire world. Since Russia cannot even devour the Donbas, this is an utterly deranged fantasy. It is pure fearmongering. Once we understand that Russia has already suffered a defeat, and has already been strongly disincentivized from pursuing future invasions, it becomes clear how insane it would be at this point to take steps that could make Russia more likely to use nuclear weapons. With the aggression having failed to pay off, what we need is to facilitate a deal between Ukraine and Russia that both parties can accept. Since Putin is likely secretly eager to find a way to end this calamity for his country without being completely humiliated or losing power, such a deal (basic details of which have been outlined by Lieven and Chomsky) should be within reach. Or, on the other hand, we could push Putin as far as possible in order to maximally punish him, knowing that at any point this irrational, violent, delusional man has a weapon in his back pocket that could lead to the end of the world. We would, of course, as Romney says, be doing this in the name of “freedom,” even though it could result in the gruesome deaths of millions. They would be dead, and Ukraine would be a radioactive wasteland, but at least Putin would have been taught a lesson.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Lashout Turn › AT: Concessions

Russia won’t keep expanding – Ukraine’s culturally unique AND its economy can’t support another invasion

Carugati 22 - a master’s student in International Studies at Laval University. Passionate about strategic studies, he works as a research assistant in the Department of Political Science under the supervision of Professor Jonathan Paquin (Rémy, “Ukraine: Why NATO Must Make Concessions,” Network for Strategic Assistance, 1-24-22, , Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

What would be Russia’s next steps if NATO accommodates it in Eastern Ukraine? It is unlikely that Russia would keep expanding if the Ukrainian crisis were resolved on terms that Moscow could live with. First, because Russia’s economy would endure massive costs to sustain the war effort just to hold Kyiv, not to mention other holds in Russia’s near-abroad. The maximum-pressure scenario – Russia’s exclusion from the global economy – would make it near impossible for Russia to finance expansionist policies in the long run, not to mention the local resistance Russia would face. Furthermore, Russia has high stakes in protecting the status of the Russian minority in Eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainization of Russian minority areas in Ukraine, and Kyiv’s indigenous law excluding Russian minorities (as well as Ukrainian), directly affects Russia’s identity as the protector of Russian minorities. This Russian emotional involvement favors Russian irredentism in Eastern Ukraine and militates against the idea that Russia contemplates expansionist aims. Ukraine’s ideational importance to Russia plays a significant part in motivating Russia’s revisionist policy towards Ukraine. Moscow ideational interests elsewhere in the post-Soviet sphere are not as salient as they are in Ukraine. Therefore, Russian expansion is unlikely, as not all land is equally valuable from an emotional (and security) standpoint.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Lashout Turn › AT: Concessions

Russia won’t go beyond Ukraine

Finnis 22 – Reporter (Alex, “Will Russia stop at Ukraine? What Putin wants from the invasion and how likely he is to attack other countries,” iNews, 3-1-22, , Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

Could Russia invade other countries? Russia has not stated any intentions to push beyond Ukraine, but Moscow also previously said it would not invade Ukraine, so a further invasion is certainly not impossible. Any further drive would be incredibly risky for Russia, particularly if its forces enter a Nato state. Nato uses a system of collective security, whereby its independent member states agree to mutual defence in response to an attack by any external party. That means if Russia were to invade, say Poland, Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia, it would automatically be at war with the US, UK and all 30 Nato members, and while Russia’s forces are strong they would be dwarfed by Nato’s collective power.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Lashout Turn › Link - Prolonged War

More weapons escalates the conflict

Scahill 22 - a Senior Correspondent and Editor-at-Large at The Intercept (Jeremy, “U.S. and NATO’s Unprecedented Weapons Transfers to Ukraine Could Prolong the War,” The Intercept, 3-10-22, , Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

The substantially expanded and expedited Western arms shipments, and increased intelligence support, could prolong large-scale military action. NATO has also said that any Russian attack against the supply lines facilitating the flow of weapons to Ukraine will trigger an invocation of Article 5 of the NATO charter, thus raising the specter of military action against Russia. Moscow, which has already labeled the sweeping sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies a declaration of “economic war,” has warned that nations sending weapons to Ukraine “will be responsible for any consequences of such actions.” The weapons will surely aid Ukrainian forces in waging counterattacks against Moscow’s invasion but will not be sufficient to defeat Russia militarily. Should Moscow succeed in forcibly taking major Ukrainian cities or even in toppling the government, the Western weapons are likely to be used in a protracted armed insurgency and war of attrition that may produce echoes of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Lashout Turn › Link - Prolonged War

Continued war increases the likelihood of escalation

Walters 22 - Journalist specializing in business, politics, energy markets and Russia (Greg, “Putin’s ‘Cornered Rat’ Story Might Be a Warning About His Next Move,” Vice News, 3-1-22, , Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

Dangerous hubris Putin appears to have dramatically overestimated Russia’s ability to quickly smash Ukrainian resistance, analysts said. None of Ukraine’s major cities have fallen, defying even Western expectations. Unprecedented sanctions have torpedoed Russia’s national currency and its stock market, and sent Russian citizens scrambling to join long lines at ATMs. Ukrainian resistance has proven much stiffer than seemingly anyone expected. Now, Putin seems to have few good options to resolve the conflict without losing face, analysts said. Simply backing down now could be perilous for him. The Kremlin strongman has spent two decades building a reputation as Russia’s all-powerful, irreplaceable leader, and racking up a string of swift military victories along the way. Russian forces have engaged in protracted, brutal military campaigns in Syria and in the Russian region of Chechnya, that killed thousands of civilians. Russian soldiers and leaders may balk at deploying similar tactics against Ukrainians, who have strong historic and linguistic ties to Russians. But at the same time, a humiliating climb-down in Ukraine could have implications for Putin’s future grip on power, Kremlin-watchers said. Russia would be left saddled with devastating sanctions and cornered in political isolation, with nothing to show for it. “If he throws in the towel and says, ‘My bad, we messed up,’ that takes the veneer off his image as Putin-the-mastermind,” said Joshua Tucker, director of New York University’s Jordan Center for Advanced Study of Russia. The crisis in Ukraine is already creating fissures in Russian society. Over the weekend, two of Russia’s richest and most loyal oligarchs openly called for peace in Ukraine, a rare sign of defiance among the country’s ultra-wealthy elite. Over 6,400 people have been arrested in anti-war protests in dozens of cities around Russia, according to OVD-Info, an independent group that tracks the arrests. Putin seems, for now, to have placed himself in a strategic position with few good options to resolve the conflict. Russia has publicly demanded concessions including ceding the region of Crimea to Russia, and the demilitarization of Ukraine. Yet as the assault has bogged down, the possibility that Ukraine would concede such demands appears increasingly remote, analysts said. Continuing with the assault will likewise carry steep costs for Russia. Western powers still have room to ratchet up the sanctions regime even further. And more casualties will only increase Russian domestic unrest over the conflict, analysts said. Even a conventional military victory by Russia using overwhelming force, which many experts believe Russia can still achieve, would create the possibility of a grinding guerrilla war for the foreseeable future. Putin has also raised long-dormant anxieties about Russia’s nuclear capabilities by putting the country’s nuclear forces on “high alert,” prompting nerve-wracking conversations about the possibility of nuclear war that not long ago would have been considered outlandish. Such talk is prompting Western officials to look for ways to provide Putin with some kind of acceptable offramp. President Joe Biden’s White House says it doesn’t want to overreact to Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. But it remains unclear whether Putin would find any Western proposals for deescalation acceptable. Like the big rat he once chased down a corridor in Leningrad, Putin may decide the best way out of a terrible situation is to ratchet up tensions even further. “The question becomes, which is the bigger fear: The fear that he’ll look weak if he walks it back, or the fear that the situation for Russia will get much worse if he steps it up? That’s what makes this a dangerous moment,” Tucker said.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Lashout Turn › Link - Prolonged War

Sending arms to Ukraine only prolongs the war – bogs down Putin

Daly 22 - an Irish politician and a member of the European Parliament (Clare, “Throwing in more arms to Ukraine will only escalate war with more Ukrainians dying: MEP,” Global Times, 4-21-22, , Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

GT: You recently tweeted that "anyone demanding the EU pumps Ukraine full of lethal weapons should read it carefully. It is not as simple as you think." Could you please elaborate on the stance? Daly: My position will be similar on the situation in any conflict area - sending more arms into a war can only result in prolonging that war. It's not that I don't believe that Ukrainians have the right to defend themselves. They do. But the reality is that over the past period, there has been a growing militarization in Ukraine. The EU throwing in more arms will not be sufficient to defeat the Russian army. It will only lead to the war being prolonged, and more Ukrainians dying. And worryingly, those arms are being distributed to people and organizations without any checks or balances. So god only knows where those weapons will end up and when, in years to come, they will come to be used in other situations. So, it's a very dangerous tactic. I know some of the people in Europe who are calling for this, believe that they are doing this out of the desire to protect the Ukrainian people. People would like to help innocent Ukrainians, as I would. But sending more arms in is not going to do that. The only solution is a negotiated peace settlement.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Lashout Turn › Link - General

US military support causes Russian insecurity – prompts lashout

Carugati 22 - a master’s student in International Studies at Laval University. Passionate about strategic studies, he works as a research assistant in the Department of Political Science under the supervision of Professor Jonathan Paquin (Rémy, “Ukraine: Why NATO Must Make Concessions,” Network for Strategic Assistance, 1-24-22, , Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

Western Support to Ukraine Russian current tenseness is in direct reaction to continuous Western support of Ukraine forces fighting Russian-backed separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions – collectively known as the Donbas. NATO’s support to Kyiv is channeled through the Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine. Since 2014 and the Russian annexation of Crimea and destabilization in Eastern Ukraine, NATO’s goal has been to increase capacity building and provide military training to allow Ukrainian forces to resist Russian-backed militias in the Donbas. The Biden administration has equipped Ukraine with arms and military equipment totaling $650 million in the last fiscal year alone. The U.K. signed a Memorandum of Implementation on naval contracts with Kyiv in 2021, while the U.S. signed a Strategic Defense Framework and a Charter on Strategic Partnership with Ukraine. 200 Canadian soldiers are deployed in Ukraine as part of Operation Unifier, and Ottawa has provided $700 million worth of aid to Ukrainian forces since 2014. As part of broader efforts to augment its deterrence posture following the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO has increased its deployments in the Black Sea (naval and air patrols) and reinforced the Alliance’s forward presence in Eastern and Southern Europe. More recently, France has declared it would send troops to Romania as part of NATO’s “Enhanced Advanced Presence” missions. A strengthening of NATO’s military posture can also be seen in the Baltic countries and Eastern Europe. Russia’s Grievances and Resolve All of this triggers great security concerns in Russia. Putin is suspicious of NATO’s defensive rhetoric, notably because of NATO’s interventions in Kosovo and Libya and its post-Cold War Eastern European expansion. For Russia, U.S. support to Ukraine equates to a de facto integration of Ukraine – short of the article 5 provision – in NATO. U.S.’ stated willingness to increase interoperability between Ukraine and NATO is unacceptable for Moscow, for security and ideological reasons. Ukraine’s insistence on joining NATO and NATO’s firm support of its Open-Door policy (article 10) is at the core of Russian grievances against the West. There is no way the Kremlin will ever allow Ukraine to move forward with its ambition of joining NATO, nor will NATO ever fight to help Ukraine do so.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Lashout Turn › Link - General

Militarizing Ukraine forces escalation – only minute concessions solve

Carugati 22 - a master’s student in International Studies at Laval University. Passionate about strategic studies, he works as a research assistant in the Department of Political Science under the supervision of Professor Jonathan Paquin (Rémy, “Ukraine: Why NATO Must Make Concessions,” Network for Strategic Assistance, 1-24-22, , Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

Defusing a Russian intervention and getting out of this crisis implies pressuring Ukraine to implement the constitutional reforms necessary to grant autonomy and amnesty to the Donbas republics. These separatist republics have significant support from the local population and are backed by a major power. They have thousands of civil servants, especially soldiers, who are more determined to fight – and die – than NATO. Ultimately, the main driver of Russian-Western tensions is Ukraine. Kyiv’s desire to join NATO is in direct opposition to Russia’s conception of national and territorial security. Russia is ready to fight to secure its interests, as are the Ukrainians. However, Ukrainians have no real chance of winning against Russia without Western support. The Atlantic Alliance lacks the cohesion and interest to pay the costs associated with real support for Ukraine. The current half-support is insufficient to deter Russia, and it even encourages a Russian intervention to stop Ukraine’s steady military modernization. To truly deter Russia, NATO would have to provide assets and endure costs that its members do not want to bear. This is why implementing a strategy that corresponds to NATO’s accurate means and interests would help to avoid crisis escalation. And such strategy entails convincing Moscow that a legal way out exists in the Donbas by reorienting Western pressure from Moscow to Kyiv.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Lashout Turn › Link - General

Increased arms to Ukraine puts more pressure on Putin to respond - miscalc

Friesdersdorf 22 - staff writer at The Atlantic and the author of the Up for Debate newsletter (Conor, “What Happens When We Back Putin Into a Corner,” The Atlantic, 3-2-22, , Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

Cornering Vladimir Putin In The Spectator, Harry J. Kazianis warns that backing Putin into a corner could result in the use of nuclear weapons: If both sides can’t come to a deal, Putin may decide to truly go all in against Kyiv, determining that a scorched earth policy and winning at any cost is better than taking weeks or months to take the country in full. The level of carnage we would see would be something akin to images from World War II: bombed-out cities, bodies on the streets, and total carnage everywhere. The world would be horrified—and would demand action against Russia. What would the West do? It’s likely that more weapons would flow into Ukraine on a grand scale, putting more pressure on Putin to respond. More sanctions would then follow, including disconnecting all of Russia’s banks and financial institutions from SWIFT, including entities tied to Russian energy, the lifeblood of Moscow’s economy. At that point, Russia’s way of life, its ability to exist, would be threatened. The Putin regime would be threatened. What, oh, what would Moscow do then? Think “escalate to deescalate”—and that could mean something horrible for all of us. Citing similar concerns, National Review editorializes that Putin should be given some way to avoid complete humiliation: There is a danger that Putin—trapped and risking a humiliating defeat—will choose a desperate escalation, threatening the West with nuclear blackmail or saber-rattling on the border of a NATO country. The United States must stand firm and support our allies, but we must also look for ways that might allow Putin to back down while retaining some semblance of face.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Lashout Turn › Link - General

Increased militarization forces Putin into a corner – he resorts to chemical and nuclear escalation

Gongloff 22 - a Bloomberg Opinion editor and writer of the Opinion Today newsletter (Mark, “A Losing, Humiliated Putin Is the Most Dangerous Putin,” Bloomberg, 4-28-22, , Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

Beware the Cornered Putin Many people and organizations, from cereal companies to Hogwarts houses, have animal mascots meant to represent their core values. Sometimes they’re almost too revealing. For example, the animal with which Vladimir Putin has publicly identified is the cornered rat. Not to be confused with Pizza Rat, which is just trying to bring dinner home on the subway, or Scabby the Rat, which is just trying to helpfully point out non-union workers, Cornered Rat is the most dangerous rat of all, because it will attack unexpectedly to escape. Putin is cornered in Ukraine, where no amount of war crimes have been able to break the will of a nation he expected to subjugate two months ago. Andreas Kluth sees hints Putin is now looking for new ways to attack. Cutting off gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria is one. A string of mysterious explosions in Moldova hints at another, darker avenue. And if he gets truly desperate, he has plenty of chemical and nuclear weapons. In a sense, the West is playing a game of chicken to see how much it can damage Russia’s economy and war machine, along with Putin’s standing at home, without triggering a nightmarish response. Russia, deprived of Western goods, must revert to being the starved autarky that made living in the Soviet Union such a pleasant experience, writes Leonid Bershidsky. Unfortunately for the Russian people, the only way to enforce it will be full-on fascism. It’s worth remembering that a young Putin escaped from the cornered rat that impressed him so much by attacking him. We should be so lucky.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Lashout Turn › 1NC - Russia Loss Bad

Even a small Ukrainian victory guarantees nuclear response

Fix and Kimmage 22 - Program Director in the International Affairs Department of the Körber Foundation and was previously a Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Visiting Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (Liana and Michael, “What If Ukraine Wins?,” Foreign Affairs, Accessed 6-1-22, , LASA-AH)

Another risk is that even a small Ukrainian victory might be preceded or followed by nuclear threats from Putin. Putin has departed from Cold War precedent by instrumentalizing nuclear weapons for political reasons rather than just for ones related to national security. His menacing statements have come across as bluster. But Putin could up the ante. To scare his adversaries, he could order technical preparations for the potential use of nuclear weapons. The West should react to such threats with deterrence, signaling clearly that Putin would achieve nothing through the use of nuclear weapons. If that does not work, and Putin acts on his threats, then NATO should consider carrying out a limited conventional response, either against Russian forces in Ukraine or within Russia itself. In the meantime, the West needs to build a broad coalition to condemn and deter nuclear saber rattling by linking sanctions and threats of retaliation to Putin’s nuclear brinkmanship. China might not join in, but out of fear of nuclear instability, it might approve of the idea. Finally, even if Ukraine wins small, Kyiv and its partners would have to prepare for years of continued conflict. Zelensky has indicated as much by saying that postwar Ukraine will resemble Israel in its full-time orientation toward self-defense. Putin, meanwhile, would continue to probe for Western vulnerabilities: much as he responded to Western sanctions in 2014 by meddling in the U.S. presidential election in 2016, he would likely mix cyberattacks, disinformation, and “active measures,” such as operations that would damage political parties and leaders Russia dislikes, undermine the internal stability of “anti-Russian” countries, and degrade the integrity of the transatlantic alliance and similar such alliances in the Indo-Pacific. The West would be forced to contain Russia for the foreseeable future. After all, the West can do little to influence Russia from within other than to hope for the emergence of less combative Russian leadership.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Lashout Turn › 1NC - Russia Loss Bad

Russian loss in Ukraine causes nuclear lash out AND an emboldened China

Fix and Kimmage 22 - a Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, in Washington, D.C, Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Visiting Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Liana and Michael, “What If Russia Loses?,” Foreign Affaris, 3-4-22, , Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

The consequences of a Russian loss in Ukraine would present Europe and the United States with fundamental challenges. Assuming Russia will be forced to withdraw one day, rebuilding Ukraine, with the political goal of welcoming it into the EU and NATO, will be a task of Herculean proportions. And the West must not fail Ukraine again. Alternatively, a weak form of Russian control over Ukraine could mean a fractured, destabilized area of continuous fighting with limited or no governance structures just east of NATO’s border. The humanitarian catastrophe would be unlike anything Europe has seen in decades. No less worrisome is the prospect of a weakened and humiliated Russia, harboring revanchist impulses akin to those that festered in Germany after World War I. If Putin maintains his grip on power, Russia will become a pariah state, a rogue superpower with a chastened conventional military but with its nuclear arsenal intact. The guilt and stain of the Ukraine war will stay with Russian politics for decades; rare is the country that profits from a lost war. The futility of the costs spent on a lost war, the human toll, and the geopolitical decline will define the course of Russia and Russian foreign policy for many years to come, and it will be very difficult to imagine a liberal Russia emerging after the horrors of this war. Even if Putin loses his grip on Russia, the country is unlikely to emerge as a pro-Western democracy. It could split apart, especially in the North Caucasus. Or it could become a nuclear-armed military dictatorship. Policymakers would not be wrong to hope for a better Russia and for the time when a post-Putin Russia could be genuinely integrated into Europe; they should do what they can to enable this eventuality, even as they resist Putin’s war. They would be foolish, however, not to prepare for darker possibilities. History has shown that it is immensely difficult to build a stable international order with a revanchist, humiliated power near its center, especially one of the size and weight of Russia. To do so, the West would have to adopt an approach of continuous isolation and containment. Keeping Russia down and the United States in would become the priority for Europe in such a scenario, as Europe will have to bear the main burden of managing an isolated Russia after a lost war in Ukraine; Washington, for its part, would want to finally focus on China. China, in turn, could try to strengthen its influence over a weakened Russia—leading to exactly the kind of bloc-building and Chinese dominance the West wanted to prevent at the beginning of the 2020s.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Lashout Turn › 1NC – Negotiated Settlement

That causes nuclear war

Sanger et al. 22 - a White House and national security correspondent, and a senior writer (David E., Eric Schmitt is a senior correspondent covering national security for The New York Times, Julian E. Barnes is a national security reporter for The New York Times covering the intelligence agencies, “Washington’s Newest Worry: The Dangers of Cornering Putin,” The Washington Post, 3-3-22, , Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

Senior White House officials designing the strategy to confront Russia have begun quietly debating a new concern: that the avalanche of sanctions directed at Moscow, which have gained speed faster than they imagined, is cornering President Vladimir V. Putin and may prompt him to lash out, perhaps expanding the conflict beyond Ukraine. In Situation Room meetings in recent days, the issue has come up repeatedly, according to three officials. Mr. Putin’s tendency, American intelligence officials have told the White House and Congress, is to double down when he feels trapped by his own overreach. So they have described a series of possible reactions, ranging from indiscriminate shelling of Ukrainian cities to compensate for the early mistakes made by his invading force, to cyberattacks directed at the American financial system, to more nuclear threats and perhaps moves to take the war beyond Ukraine’s borders. The debate over Mr. Putin’s next moves is linked to an urgent re-examination by intelligence agencies of the Russian leader’s mental state, and whether his ambitions and appetite for risk have been altered by two years of Covid isolation. Those concerns accelerated after Mr. Putin’s order on Sunday to place the country’s strategic nuclear weapons on a “combat ready” alert to respond to the West’s “aggressive comments.” (In the ensuing days, however, national security officials say they have seen little evidence on the ground that Russia’s nuclear forces have actually moved to a different state of readiness.)

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Lashout Turn › 1NC – Negotiated Settlement

Either side could win the war now BUT it’ll be close – the aff ensures a crushing defeat for Russia which spurs Putin lashout

Latham 22 - a professor of international relations at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minn., and a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities in Washington, D.C (Andrew, “The folly of humiliating Russia,” The Hill, 5-25-22, , Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

Calls that nothing short of a “true defeat” be visited on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s are growing in both frequency and intensity. And nowhere is this on more prominent display than in Anne Applebaum’s recent Atlantic piece calling for a victory over Russia that is rapid, comprehensive (involving military defeat, economic pain and even some type of NATO membership for Ukraine) and, above all, humiliating. According to Applebaum, only such a profound and profoundly humiliating defeat will permanently chasten Russia. Only such a true defeat will “force the reckoning that should have happened in the 1990s…. the moment when Russians should have realized the folly of Moscow’s imperial overreach, when they should have figured out why so many of their neighbors hate and fear them.” Only such a true defeat, she avers, will end the historical pattern of Russian aggression and bring about permanent peace on its periphery. But while it might be emotionally gratifying to issue such calls, and even to fantasize about inflicting terrible pain on such obvious malefactors, the goal of inflicting such a defeat on Russia must not become allowed to become policy. For if history teaches us anything relevant to the current conflict, it is that inflicting such a defeat would most definitely not have the salutary effect on international security that its advocates assume. Indeed, quite the opposite. Inflicting a comprehensive and humiliating defeat on Russia would be far more likely to set the stage for further discord, conflict and war on Europe’s eastern marches than to usher in an era of regional peace and tranquility. To put it bluntly, indulging fantasies of inflicting near-total defeat on Russia would be a terrible mistake — one that we can, and must, avoid making. To understand why inflicting a devastating defeat on Russia would be such a terrible mistake, it is necessary to pay attention to a motivating factor that is often overlooked or minimized in conventional accounts of foreign policy and grand strategy: humiliation. Most theories of international relations, of course, tend to assume rational actors, either anthropomorphized states or actual state officials seeking to rationally advance or defend the state’s national interest. While not entirely blind to “non-rational” factors in individual or collective decisionmaking, these approaches tend to systematically downplay or ignore the role of emotion in shaping the foreign policies of states. But, as Clausewitz cautioned us long ago, emotions in general (or the passions, as he called them) can and do play an important role in foreign policy, especially when it comes to war. And as Joslyn Barnhart argues in her recent book “The Consequences of Humiliation: Anger and Status in World Politics,” historically, the specific emotion of “humiliation” has proven to be a major driver of foreign policy – especially the kind of revanchist and revisionist foreign policy that all too often leads to war. Barnhart’s compelling argument begins with a definition: Humiliation “is a complex and negative self-conscious emotion, which combines the sense that one has been mistreated with a painful sense of self-doubt and helplessness in the face of this injustice.” It is the substrate for “national humiliation,” which “arises when individuals who identify as members of the state experience humiliation as the overwhelming emotional response to an international event.” National humiliation occurs, Barnhart further argues, either when a state suffers “rapid defeat to a state with lesser military capability” or when it has “been unfairly undermined by ill-intended others.” Either way, such humiliation involves a “loss of status or prestige which they [policy makers] believe has undeservedly threatened the state’s image on the world stage.” Finally, Barnhart shows how humiliated states have historically attempted to overcome their humiliation and restore their status and prestige by engaging in “the use of force against the state responsible for one’s humiliation or against third-party states that were not involved in the original humiliating event.” Although Barnhart’s book was published before Russia reinvaded Ukraine earlier this year, its implications for today’s Russo-Ukraine war are perhaps obvious. Indeed, it doesn’t take much imagination to see how inflicting a devastating defeat on Russia of the kind Applebaum advocates would both humiliate the country’s leaders and incentivize them to take whatever steps they deem necessary – up to and including starting another war – to overcome this humiliation. The strategic implications of this are perhaps obvious. As Barnhart notes in her conclusion, prudent policy that seeks to minimize both the humiliation of defeated states and all of the undesirable consequences of such humiliation should “avoid the codification of inferiority within formal and informal treaties and negotiations.” They should avoid, in other words, imposing punitive treaties and settlements that formalize inferiority or that seek to diminish the defeated nation’s status or standing beyond some unavoidable minimum. In the absence of a 1945-scale total victory by one side or the other (which is obviously not in the cards), this suggests that the goal now should be a negotiated settlement that leaves both Russia and Ukraine (a) exhausted, (b) relatively satisfied and (c) as little humiliated as possible.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › **Lashout Uniqueness CP › 2NC - Solvency

Diplomatic settlement succeeds now – failure causes US-Russia war

Robinson 22 - an English-American journalist, political commentator, and editor-in-chief of Current Affairs magazine (Nathan J., “The Idiotic Logic That Will Lead To Nuclear War,” Current Affairs, 5-22-22, , Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

We must avoid nuclear wars, and we can. A diplomatic settlement in Ukraine is feasible especially now that Russia has been defeated. But it requires U.S. officials to be committed to statesmanship and shed bizarre delusions about Russia cannibalizing the world unless its military is destroyed beyond repair. World War I showed that world leaders who think themselves perfectly reasonable can in fact lead millions to their deaths in total needless catastrophes. We have not yet seen the end of “crackpot realist” ideology—the mentality that presents itself as pragmatic and realistic while in fact agitating for the insanity of war as the solution to problems. The existence of op-eds like Romney’s should alarm every person who values the continued existence of human civilization. Instead of treating nuclear conflict as an unthinkable horror and focusing on steps to ensure that it never, ever happens, Romney thinks we should be making plans, and simply reassures us that things definitely won’t end in catastrophe, even though we would be depending on the (clearly delusional and violent) Vladimir Putin to act with caution and restraint. There is no need for a U.S.-Russia war to happen, but if one does come about, it will be because there are political elites in this country who do not understand the reality of war and accept no responsibility for actions that might exacerbate conflict. They peddle silly myths about Putin as a world-dominating Hitler type (he is more like George W. Bush, as even George W. Bush recently hinted). These people are dangerous and should not be published in mainstream newspapers.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › **Lashout Uniqueness CP › 2NC - Solvency

Sanctions are key to force Russia to the negotiating table BUT continued arms collapses negotiations

Acton 22 - holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (James, “To Support Zelensky, the United States Needs to Negotiate With Putin,” Carnegie, 3-10-22, , Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

“It’s not that I want to talk to Putin,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said last week about Russia’s president. “I need to talk to Putin. The world needs to talk to Putin. There is no other way to stop this war.” The United States should heed this plea. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s unprovoked and illegal invasion has been both heroic and effective, but its situation is precarious. For all their flaws, Russia’s armed forces may yet prevail in a prolonged conflict, and there is still a real danger that much of Ukraine will become a Russian vassal state under a puppet government. Moreover, even if Ukraine can hold off Russian forces indefinitely, the prospect of forcibly evicting them from its territory—particularly in the south—is daunting. All the while, Russia is slaughtering Ukraine’s citizens ever more indiscriminately. But as Zelensky’s statement suggests, Ukraine’s plan to end this war is probably not to vanquish the invading forces. Rather, its goal appears to be to make the prospect of continuing the war, and the occupation that could follow it, exceptionally painful for Russia—so painful that Putin comes to view a settlement agreement that preserves Ukraine’s independence as the lesser of two evils. Putin may already be feeling the pain. The United States believes that Putin embarked on this war seeking to conquer most or all of Ukraine. Today, Moscow has implicitly recognized Zelensky’s government by demanding, in return for an end to the war, that Kyiv agree to Ukrainian neutrality, acknowledge Crimea as Russian territory, and recognize Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states. If Ukrainian forces continue to perform well, Putin will have to settle for still less and may even have to pay Ukraine reparations. (Conversely, if Russian forces achieve breakthroughs, Putin will be able to drive a harder bargain.) Even in the best case, if Zelensky wants a negotiated settlement, he will likely have to make significant concessions to Russia—as he has acknowledged. Any such concessions will probably be bitterly opposed by many in the United States and Europe. Ultimately, though, it is not their call. The democratically elected government of Ukraine should get to decide what price it is willing to pay for an end to the slaughter of its citizens and the preservation of Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign state. The United States and its allies should support Zelensky in any diplomatic course he pursues. Indeed, he cannot end the war without them. Economic sanctions on Russia strengthen his hand at the negotiating table by raising the costs to Russia of continuing to fight. By the same token, however, it is virtually inconceivable that Russia would agree to a settlement without sanctions relief. For this reason, the United States and its allies must be prepared to lift sanctions—including on Russia’s central bank—if Russia and Ukraine negotiate and implement a settlement agreement. To date, the United States and its allies have sent out mixed messages about sanctions relief. U.S. Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland indicated an openness to it. By contrast, French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire has declared “economic and financial war on Russia” with the goal of causing “the collapse of the Russian economy.” In a similar vein, British Foreign Secretary Elizabeth Truss stated that “the purpose of the sanctions is to debilitate the Russian economy.” This ambiguity is dangerous because it risks obscuring the existence of an off-ramp for Putin and could thus prolong the conflict and increase the small but real chance of nuclear escalation. U.S. President Joe Biden should clear up the confusion by stating publicly that the purpose of sanctions is to end the war, not to remove the government of Russia. In coordination with Kyiv, he should dispatch a trusted lieutenant—such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken or CIA Director William Burns—to try to negotiate with Russia. Washington and its allies could also explore whether they could address Russian security concerns, and vice versa, through the implementation of reciprocal arms control measures—as the United States and NATO proposed in January. Success in this endeavor would be far from guaranteed, and the Biden administration would take heat for even trying. This criticism, however, could be undercut by Zelensky’s stating publicly that he would support sanctions relief for Russia in return for the implementation of any agreement he negotiated.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › **Lashout Uniqueness CP › 2NC - Solvency

Sanctions are key to effective negotiation

Treisman 22 - a writer and editor for the Morning Edition live blog, which she helped launch in early 2021 (Rachel, “How sanctions factor into negotiations between Russia and Ukraine,” npr, 3-30-22, , Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

The U.S. and other western allies have unleashed a barrage of economic penalties on Russia in the weeks since it first invaded Ukraine. As the violence continues — and the two countries return to the negotiating table — how much are sanctions actually helping push Russia to end the war? Morning Edition's A Martínez posed that question to Juan Zarate, a former assistant secretary of the Treasury who is now global co-managing partner at K2 Integrity. Zarate says the sanctions have had a dramatic impact on the Russian economy when it comes to things like the value of the ruble and the selloff of bonds and assets, but are not enough on their own to turn back the tanks, especially when there's "a committed actor like [Russian President Vladimir Putin] with a design on invading a country and potentially destroying its cities. "Sanctions have a tail to them — they take time to take effect, the effects on the economy in Russia are still just being felt, and so I think it's asking sanctions to do too much to actually stop the war. But it certainly can be part of a tableau of pressure that's put on Putin to try to change his behavior, change his calculus," Zarate explains, pointing to other factors like the Ukrainian resistance, diplomatic isolation and companies pulling out of Russia. Sanctions can, however, play an important role in the ongoing negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. And Zarate says we may also see more action taken against sanctions evaders, and countries that are continuing to do business with Russia. How sanctions factor into negotiations Zarate says sanctions could play two important roles in the ongoing peace talks. For one, they help shape how Russia feels the costs of its actions, something he says should play into the calculus of negotiators at the bargaining table. In other words, he says, they should understand that things are only going to get worse for Russia as its economy continues to feel the effects of sanctions. The conversation could also come to include the lifting of certain sanctions, such as restrictions on trade or investment. "Every sanction that is used as a stick can also be used as a carrot," Zarate says, adding that he has seen this in the case of Iran and other countries that are seeking to get out from under the pressure of economic sanctions.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › **Lashout Uniqueness CP › 1NC

The CP gives Russia a way out AND solves the Ukraine war

Aghjeh 22 - doctoral candidate in History at the University of Vienna where he is working on U.S. diplomatic history and international affairs (Amin E., “How the West Can Pull Russia to the Negotiating Table,” The National Interest, 6-23-22, , Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

Russia may also be incentivized to enter negotiations if it receives a pledge that incremental sanctions relief will follow its implementation of a negotiated peace deal with Ukraine. Another card that can be played by the West is NATO expansion into Sweden and Finland. The process of the two countries joining NATO has been stalled by Turkey’s opposition. Bringing Sweden and Finland into the alliance may have its pros and cons for the United States and its allies. On the one hand, adding two strong member states could strengthen the alliance. On the other hand, it will extend U.S. and allied commitments in Europe at a time when a bigger strategic challenge in Asia requires more resources and attention. But this issue aside, it would be hard to dispute that ending the war in Ukraine is not more important than Sweden and Finland joining NATO. Russia has long opposed Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO and will likely be willing to make concessions on Ukraine if their bid to join NATO seems imminent. Turkey may be willing to play nice if the resolution on the table could end the Ukraine war. After angering Russia by supplying effective Bayraktar TB-2 drones to Ukraine, Turkey returned to its policy of balancing between the West and Russia as soon as it became apparent that Ukraine is unlikely to fall. Turkey’s opposition to Sweden and Finland’s NATO bids should be seen primarily in this context. Inflation in Turkey recently hit a twenty-three-year high of 73.5 percent, and the war in Ukraine is doing even more harm to the Turkish economy. A recent survey shows that public support for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has fallen to 26.5 percent, a near-historic low. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will certainly welcome a boost to the Turkish economy, especially given next year’s presidential and parliamentary elections.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Uniqueness CP › 1NC Uniqueness CP

Solves DA uniqueness

Cancian 22 - Senior Adviser, International Security Program (Mark F., “U.S. Military Aid to Ukraine Accelerates,” CSIS, , Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)

The White House announced a new military aid package of $800 million on April 21, just five days after the previous $800 million aid package. The new package has many similarities to the earlier one described in a recent CSIS commentary: it expands U.S. support by including U.S. weapons, requires the United States to train Ukrainians in the use of these systems, and implicitly assumes a long war. The new aid package includes two new items: an increase in the overall rate of support and a mysterious custom-designed unmanned aerial vehicle.

2022 Michigan Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Illicit Arms Turn › 2NC Link

Weapons have no oversight – increased lethal arms inevitably ends up in the illicit arms market

Nanda 22 - Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda has been commenting on Indian politics, foreign policy on strategic affairs for nearly three decades (Prakash, “‘Road To Hell’: As Ukraine Receives Huge Consignments Of Foreign Arms, Why It Could Spell Doom For Rest Of The World,” The Eurasian Times, 3-9-22, , Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)

But these stories overlook the danger or risk of illegal diversion that comes with issuing weapons with little to no oversight, something that the Ukrainian government does not seem to realize, despite the fact that the diversion of military-grade weapons such as hand grenades, rockets, and landmines has been a profitable business in Ukraine in recent years, giving the country a very bad name in the process. A Hub Of Illicit Arms According to the Global Organized Crime Index, apart from being a source of transit and destination point for human trafficking, Ukraine is one of the largest arms trafficking markets, with a substantial stockpile of weapons, few barriers to accessing arms and millions of small arms and light weapons on the black market. “While it has long been a key link in the global arms trade, its role has only intensified since the beginning of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Most arms are reportedly trafficked domestically, but the illicit arms trade is also linked to criminal arms markets in Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, and Turkey, as well as countries in the EU and the former Yugoslavia,” the index points out. “Within Ukraine, the cities of Odesa, Dnipro, Kharkiv, and Kyiv are significant logistical centers for criminal networks. The increasing number of arms combined with relatively limited controls and conflict in parts of eastern Ukraine has resulted in a sharp increase in the size of the criminal market for small arms and light weapons, particularly Makarov and Tokarev pistols, AK-pattern assault rifles, and Dragunov sniper rifles. “Additionally, there is a smaller market for light machine guns. Firearm seizures have been the largest in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where fighting has been the most intense. Conflict-affected areas constitute the major sources of illicit flows for the rest of the country.”