2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Illicit Arms Turn › 2NC Link
Lillis et al. 22 - a CNN reporter covering intelligence and national security (Jeremy Herb is a national security reporter covering Congress for CNN Politics, Natasha Bertrand is a White House Reporter for CNN based in Washington, D.C., Oren Liebermann is a CNN Pentagon correspondent based in Washington DC., “What happens to weapons sent to Ukraine? The US doesn’t really know,” CNN Politics, 4-19-22, , Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)
Inevitably, some weapons ended up on the black market including anti-aircraft Stinger missiles, the same kind the US is now providing to Ukraine. The United States famously scrambled to recover Stingers after the Soviet war in Afghanistan. It wasn’t successful in finding all of them and when the US itself invaded Afghanistan in 2001, some officials feared that they could be used by the Taliban against the United States. Other weapons have ended up arming US adversaries. Much of what the US left behind to help Afghan forces became part of the Taliban arsenal after the collapse of the Afghan government and military. The problem is not unique to Afghanistan. Weapons sold to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates found their way into the hands of fighters linked to al-Qaeda and Iran. The risk of a similar scenario happening in Ukraine also exists, the defense official acknowledged. In 2020, the Defense Department inspector general released a report raising concerns about the end-use monitoring of weapons being sent to Ukraine.
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Illicit Arms Turn › 2NC Link
Lillis et al. 22 - a CNN reporter covering intelligence and national security (Jeremy Herb is a national security reporter covering Congress for CNN Politics, Natasha Bertrand is a White House Reporter for CNN based in Washington, D.C., Oren Liebermann is a CNN Pentagon correspondent based in Washington DC., “What happens to weapons sent to Ukraine? The US doesn’t really know,” CNN Politics, 4-19-22, , Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)
“I couldn’t tell you where they are in Ukraine and whether the Ukrainians are using them at this point,” a senior defense official told reporters last week. “They’re not telling us every round of ammunition they’re firing and who and at when. We may never know exactly to what degree they’ve using the Switchblades.” The Defense Department doesn’t earmark the weapons it sends for particular units, according to Pentagon press secretary John Kirby. Trucks loaded with pallets of arms provided by the Defense Department are picked up by Ukrainian armed forces – primarily in Poland – and then driven into Ukraine, Kirby said, “then it’s up to the Ukrainians to determine where they go and how they’re allocated inside their country.”
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Illicit Arms Turn › 2NC Link
Lillis et al. 22 - a CNN reporter covering intelligence and national security (Jeremy Herb is a national security reporter covering Congress for CNN Politics, Natasha Bertrand is a White House Reporter for CNN based in Washington, D.C., Oren Liebermann is a CNN Pentagon correspondent based in Washington DC., “What happens to weapons sent to Ukraine? The US doesn’t really know,” CNN Politics, 4-19-22, , Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)
The US has few ways to track the substantial supply of anti-tank, anti-aircraft and other weaponry it has sent across the border into Ukraine, sources tell CNN, a blind spot that’s due in large part to the lack of US boots on the ground in the country – and the easy portability of many of the smaller systems now pouring across the border. It’s a conscious risk the Biden administration is willing to take. In the short term, the US sees the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of equipment to be vital to the Ukrainians’ ability to hold off Moscow’s invasion. A senior defense official said Tuesday that it is “certainly the largest recent supply to a partner country in a conflict.” But the risk, both current US officials and defense analysts say, is that in the long term, some of those weapons may wind up in the hands of other militaries and militias that the US did not intend to arm. “We have fidelity for a short time, but when it enters the fog of war, we have almost zero,” said one source briefed on US intelligence. “It drops into a big black hole, and you have almost no sense of it at all after a short period of time.” In making the decision to send billions of dollars of weapons and equipment into Ukraine, the Biden administration factored in the risk that some of the shipments may ultimately end up in unexpected places, a defense official said. But right now, the official said, the administration views a failure to adequately arm Ukraine as a greater risk. Because the US military is not on the ground, the US and NATO are heavily reliant on information provided by Ukraine’s government. Privately, officials recognize that Ukraine has an incentive to give only information that will bolster their case for more aid, more arms and more diplomatic assistance. “It’s a war – everything they do and say publicly is designed to help them win the war. Every public statement is an information operation, every interview, every Zelensky appearance broadcast is an information operation,” said another source familiar with western intelligence. “It doesn’t mean they’re wrong to do it in any way.” For months, US and western officials have offered detailed accounts about what the West knows about the status of Russian forces inside Ukraine: how many casualties they’ve taken, their remaining combat power, their weapons stocks, what kinds of munitions they are using and where. But when it comes to Ukrainian forces, officials acknowledge that the West – including the US – has some information gaps. Western estimates of Ukrainian casualties are also foggy, according to two sources familiar with US and western intelligence. “It’s hard to track with nobody on the ground,” said one source familiar with the intelligence.
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Illicit Arms Turn › 2NC Link
France24 22 – (“Experts warn arms for Ukraine could end up in wrong hands,” France24, 5-17-22, , Accessed 6-23-22, LASA-AH)
Western countries have been ramping up weapons and ammunition shipments to Ukraine as Kyiv fights off a Russian invasion, but arms trade experts warn some of the lethal assistance could end up falling into the wrong hands. Ukraine in particular has a history as a hub of the arms trade during the 1990s, setting off alarm bells for those who study illicit flows. "There are very significant risks associated to the proliferation of weapons in Ukraine at the moment, in particular regarding small arms and light weapons," said Nils Duquet, a researcher and director of the Flemish Peace Institute. Western nations, above all the US, have announced successive shipments of both light and heavy weapons for Kyiv's forces since Russian troops crossed the Ukrainian border on February 24. Washington alone has delivered or promised military gear including hundreds of Switchblade kamikaze drones, 7,000 assault rifles with 50 million rounds of ammunition, laser-guided missiles and radar systems to detect enemy drones and incoming artillery fire. "While the response to provide more weapons to Ukraine is understandable..., it would be prudent to consider the immediate and long-term security implications," the US-based Stimson Center think-tank said in March. "We’ve seen time and time again how arms aimed at aiding an ally in one conflict have found their way to the frontlines of unforeseen battlefields, often in the hands of groups at odds with US interests or those of civilians," it added, pointing especially to small arms. 'Overwhelming challenge' Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many weapons stockpiled in Ukraine were shipped off to other countries and conflict zones around the world. That looting of the country's arms supplies resumed following Russia's 2014 annexation of the Ukrainian Black Sea peninsula of Crimea and the seizure of two regions in the east of Ukraine by pro-Moscow separatists. According to the Small Arms Survey (SAS) by the Geneva-based Institute of International and Development Studies, 300,000 light weapons were stolen or lost between 2013 and 2015, with just 4,000 retrieved since then. Rather than being shipped abroad as in the 1990s, most of these ended up on the black market within Ukraine, the SAS found. "The unresolved conflict in the eastern part of the country and general anxiety towards local security conditions" could explain increased demand for weapons among ordinary people, SAS researcher Matt Schroeder said. Looking ahead, "collecting these weapons and disposing of them properly would be an overwhelming challenge for any government, let alone one that is still fighting an existential threat," he added. 'Bank robberies with Javelins' Even before the current conflict, the US military's inspector general in 2020 questioned the level of surveillance of weapons sent to Ukraine. Annie Shiel of the Center for Civilians in Conflict (Civic) warned that "there has been very little transparency around what risk mitigation or monitoring steps the US and other countries sending weapons to Ukraine have taken, if any... to ensure the protection of civilians". The aid group has called for deliveries to be tied to human rights commitments and for the arms to be tracked after they are handed over. Other experts see the task of following arms through conflict zones as all but impossible. "It's an illusion to think that in a context of war you can actually have control of weapons there. We know that many weapons will not return to the official forces but they will remain in the region for many years," said Nils Duquet. "Look at Yugoslavia, success has been made but these weapons are still being smuggled in all parts of Europe," he added, predicting similar outcomes for Ukraine. One senior French military officer evoked a lurid possible outcome. "We'll be laughing on the other side of our faces once we're seeing bank robberies with Javelins," he said, referring to the US-made anti-tank missiles.
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Illicit Arms Turn › 2NC Impact
Van Oosterom 15 [Karel van Oosterom is ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland since 2020.; “The human cost of illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons”; May 13, 2015; https://www.permanentrepresentations.nl/documents/speeches/2015/05/13/statement-the-human-cost-of-illicit-transfer-destabilizing-accumulation-and-misuse-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons]//eleanor
Firstly, the human cost of the illicit trade, accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons is tremendous. Illegal small arms and light weapons are, on a global scale, responsible for 90 per cent of all deaths during armed conflict and for 60 per cent of all violent deaths outside of armed conflict. This makes small arms and light weapons the most deadly weapons worldwide, thereby justifying their qualification as a ‘global public bad’. Moreover, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons increases the risk that both smaller and larger conflicts give rise to mass atrocities. As the Security Council acknowledged in Resolution 2117, the misuse of these weapons can result in grave crimes and can thereby pose a threat to international peace and security. In this respect, the Kingdom of the Netherlands would also like to underline the importance of the protection of civilians in armed conflict and the Responsibility to Protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Illicit Arms Turn › Illicit Arms Turn---1NC
Teller 22 [Neville Teller has written about the Middle East for more than 30 years, has published five books on the subject; “Israel-Iran: Could The Proxy War Ignite? – OpEd”; Eurasia Review; May 13, 2022; https://www.eurasiareview.com/13052022-israel-iran-could-the-proxy-war-ignite-oped/]//eleanor
Of the many conflicts in the Middle East, the ongoing proxy war between Iran and Israel is potentially the most explosive. Built into the DNA of the Iranian Revolution from its start in 1979 was the aim of destroying Israel, as a preliminary step toward the destruction of Western democracy as exemplified by the US. In pursuit of this fundamental objective, Iran’s leaders have provided funding, weapons, and training to groups including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)) which have carried out attacks on Israel, and which have been designated terrorist organizations by many countries, Because Israel perceives the Iranian regime as a threat to its very existence, it has consistently opposed Iran’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. It seeks also to downgrade Iran’s allies and proxies, and prevent Iranian entrenchment in Syria, another sworn enemy of Israel. For years, Iran and Israel have engaged in a shadow war, quietly attacking each other –directly or by proxy – on land, by air and at sea. Escalation to all-out war has been deliberately avoided, and attacks usually remain either unattributed or plausibly denied. For example, the assassination of five Iranian nuclear scientists between 2010 and 2020 remains unexplained and unacknowledged, to say nothing of the series of mysterious explosions at various of Iran’s nuclear facilities in 2020. In April 2021, Iran blamed Israel and vowed revenge for an explosion at its largest uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, which it said caused significant damage to its centrifuges. It was the second time in less than a year that the site had been hit by a suspicious blast. Israel neither confirmed nor denied it was responsible for either attack. A cyber attack that paralyzed Iran’s gas stations nationwide on October 26, 2021, has also not been acknowledged. Backed heavily by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hezbollah’s military forces in Lebanon have, if the boasts of its leaders are to be believed, accrued a vast arsenal of rockets and missiles along the border. Israeli forces have repeatedly struck at Hezbollah’s rocket pipeline within Lebanon, and Hezbollah has on occasion retaliated by firing rockets into Israel and attacking Israeli troops along the border. As for Syria, ever since the civil conflict started in 2011 Iran has been strengthening its military presence in the country in support of Assad. Using its so-called “Shia Crescent” Iran transfers weaponry meant for Hezbollah through Iraq and Syria. In an effort to stop the arms flow and counter this second hostile presence on its northern border, Israel has conducted an increasingly open campaign of air strikes in Syria against the flow of weaponry and its storage. At sea, tit-for-tat attacks on commercial vessels in and around the Gulf of Hormuz began in 2019 – again with little by way of explanation for each incident. Since several targets have been Iranian tankers carrying oil towards Syria, media and the public have been left free to speculate. There is always a risk of this long-standing proxy war suddenly igniting into direct military conflict between Israel and Iran. Whether this nightmare scenario ever materializes turns on how Iran’s nuclear program emerges from the current negotiations in Vienna around reviving the nuclear deal. The administration of President Joe Biden seems dead set on concluding a new agreement which, all reports indicate, would delay but not eliminate Iran’s eventual acquisition of a nuclear military capability. Iran‘s leaders say they have no ambition to build nuclear weapons. The hoard of secret documents spirited out of Iran in 2018 suggests otherwise. In Washington on October 20, 2021 foreign minister Yair Lapid warned that Israel was prepared to use military force to stop Iran from gaining nuclear weapons capability. “Iran has publicly stated it wants to wipe us out,” said Lapid. “We have no intention of letting this happen.” Should force be required to stop an Iranian bomb, Israel would have to act, and almost certainly act alone. That is how the long-standing Israel-Iran proxy war could assume a terrible reality.
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Illicit Arms Turn › Illicit Arms Turn---1NC
Alaraby and Müller 20 [Muhammad Alaraby is a senior researcher at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina’s Center for Strategic Studies. He is also a fellow at the Cairo School for Liberal Sciences and Arts (CILAS), where he teaches future politics and philosophy of science. Alexander Müller is the Media and Events Coordinator at the Carnegie Middle East Center.; “Countering Illicit Arms Transfers In the MENA Region: the Case of Yemen and Libya”; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; MENA Peace & Security Project; October 2020; https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/16657.pdf]//eleanor
This policy paper aims to explore the new flows and trade of illicit arms across the MENA region that have created and continue to feed ongoing conflicts, most notably in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. This situation threatens the human and national security of the region’s nations. Combatting war economy activities in war-ridden countries will be a critical issue in the post-conflict context, and this pertains to countering small arms and light weaponry transfers that may reignite conflicts on both communal and ethnic levels. Examining illicit arms transfers in Libya and Yemen, the paper draws policy options that address the economic, social, and political aspects of this threat. Consequently, it will investigate the existing international legal framework and mechanisms employed by regional and international organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the UN, as well as how to fill the gap between them and the national authorities in charge of stemming out this threat. MAPPING OUT CONFLICT AND ARMS TRAFFICKING IN THE MENA REGION Legal arms and weaponry owned by the state and law enforcement are essential to peace and stability. Illicit arms transfer is key to enduring conflicts, social strife, and crime, notably terrorism. Illicit arms transfer or arms trafficking can be defined as those arms and weaponry possessed, stored, traded, and used in clear violation of national and/or international laws and without official government consent or control; these transfers may involve corrupt government officials acting on their own for personal gain (see Small Arms Survey definitions). Basically, non-state actors, whether they are terrorist organizations, militias, or criminal gangs, are the most relevant to the illicit arms transfer; nevertheless, states are major players in this trade since they are the main manufacturers and suppliers of illicit arms. For example, while the arms trafficking black market is dominated by criminal and trafficker groups, the illicit grey market arms transfer refers to deals done by governments, or their clients and agents, exploiting loopholes or intentionally circumventing national and international laws governing arms trade. By applying this understanding to illicit arms trade in the MENA region, this paper tends to focus on the implications of the arms proliferation of small arms and light weaponry (SALW) that refer to heavy machine-guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-aircraft guns; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti-tank missiles and rocket systems, etc. Therefore, proliferation in this regard does not include the use of non-conventional arms such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, which are subject to a different non-proliferation set of policies. In the MENA region, illicit arms transfer is both a cause and effect of the unfolding armed conflicts that continue to rage on. While arms trafficking had been always around the corner before the Arab Uprisings in 2011, and mostly related to the state-softness and the states’ clientelist political structure, the disintegration of the Arab states in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya gave rise to illicit arms trafficking and other criminal activities. Moreover, the rise of violent non-state actors and their trans-border networks, and the intensification of the regional geopolitical rivalries, namely between Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt in addition to the EU and USA, turned the conflict into prolonged proxy wars where local and national warring parties are provided with arms and funds to gain political ground. Setting aside direct military intervention by some of these powers in the conflicts of the four war-ridden countries, these interventions were in violation of the UN-imposed embargo designed to disarm the national conflict parties, be it national parties such as the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Libyan National Army (LNA) in Libya, the Assad Regime in Syria, or terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda across the region. On the other hand, the proliferation of arms, especially SALW, is perpetuating conflicts in many ways. It sustains the power balance between conflicting parties; and it entrenches war economy activities, such as human trafficking, drugs, and goods allowing local criminal organizations to become armed to the teeth. Additionally, it deteriorates social stability since it fuels communal and social strife, especially in sectarian, tribal, or ethnic conflicts, which is an underlying cause for most of the Arab civil wars. For these socio-economic and political reasons, disarmament and arms control is integral to post-conflict stabilization and regional security.
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Illicit Arms Turn › Illicit Arms Turn---1NC
Hudson 5/14/22 [John Hudson is a national security reporter at The Washington Post covering the State Department and diplomacy. He has reported from a mix of countries including Ukraine, Pakistan, Malaysia, China, and Georgia; “Flood of weapons to Ukraine raises fear of arms smuggling”; The Washington Post; May 14, 2022; https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/05/14/ukraine-weapons-trafficking/]//eleanor
This uncomfortable reality for the United States and its allies comes amid urgent pleas from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to provide artillery needed to counter Russian forces in the country’s east and south. The Ukrainian leader’s appeals are credited with uniting House lawmakers behind the latest funding request in a bipartisan 368-to-57 vote on Tuesday. But the unprecedented influx of arms has prompted fears that some equipment could fall into the hands of Western adversaries or reemerge in faraway conflicts — for decades to come. “It’s just impossible to keep track of not only where they’re all going and who is using them, but how they are being used,” said Rachel Stohl, an arms-control expert and vice president at the Stimson Center. A State Department spokesman said the United States has conducted thorough vetting of the Ukrainian units it supplies while forcing Kyiv to sign agreements that “do not allow the retransfer of equipment to third parties without prior U.S. government authorization.” But the means of enforcing such contracts are relatively weak — and made even weaker by Washington’s own mixed history of compliance, as recently as last month. In mid-April, the United States boosted its involvement in the Ukraine conflict by announcing that it would transfer a fleet of Mi-17 helicopters to Ukraine that it originally purchased from Russia about a decade ago. The initial sale of the aircraft required the United States to sign a contract promising not to transfer the helicopters to any third country “without the approval of the Russian Federation,” according to a copy of the certificate posted on the website of Russia’s Federal Service on Military-Technical Cooperation. Russia has denounced the transfer, saying it “grossly violates the foundations of international law.” Arms experts say Russia’s brutal aggression in Ukraine more than justifies U.S. support, but the violation of weapons contracts chips away at the foundations of counter-proliferation efforts. “Breaking of those end-use agreements is a serious threat to the underlying, but weak, capacity for countries to control how weapons are used,” said Jeff Abramson, an expert on conventional arms transfers at the Arms Control Association. A Pentagon spokesman dismissed the criticisms, calling Russian charges a distraction and the transfer “permissible under U.S. law and consistent with our national security priorities.” “Russia’s claims are a disingenuous attempt to distract attention from Russia’s unprovoked invasion and its history of aggressive actions against Ukraine since 2014,” said Marine Corps Lt. Colonel Anton T. Semelroth. The job of ensuring U.S. weapons are used for their intended purpose — a joint responsibility of the departments of State and Defense — is made all the more difficult by the sheer volume of arms making their way to Ukraine. The emergency spending bill awaiting approval in the Senate will cement Ukraine’s status as the world’s single largest recipient of U.S. security assistance, receiving more in 2022 than the United States ever provided to Afghanistan, Iraq or Israel in a single year. It will add to the stocks of weapons the U.S. already committed to Ukraine, including 1,400 Stinger antiaircraft systems, 5,500 antitank missiles, 700 Switchblade drones, 90 long-range Howitzers artillery systems, 7,000 small arms, 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition, and numerous other mines, explosives and laser-guided rocket systems. Shoulder-fired Stinger missiles, capable of downing commercial airliners, are just one of the weapon systems experts worry could slip into the possession of terrorist groups seeking to carry out mass-casualty events. The Biden administration’s funding request includes $8.7 billion to replenish U.S. stores of weapons shipped to Ukraine, $6 billion to train and equip Ukrainian forces and $3.9 billion for U.S. forces deployed throughout Europe in response to the security crisis that’s been set off by the war. Other NATO countries have transferred billions of dollars in arms and military equipment since the start of hostilities. “The assistance exceeds the peak year of U.S. military assistance to Afghan security forces during that 20-year war,” said William Hartung, an arms control expert at the Quincy Institute think tank. “In that case the U.S. had a major presence in-country that created at least the possibility of tracking where weapons were ending up. By comparison, the U.S. government is flying blind in terms of monitoring weapons supplied to civilian militias and the military in Ukraine.” Ukraine’s history as a hub for arms trafficking dates to the fall of the Soviet Union, when the Soviet military left behind large amounts of small arms and light weapons in Ukraine without adequate record-keeping and inventory control. According to the Small Arms Survey, a Geneva-based research organization, a portion of the Ukrainian military’s 7.1 million small arms in stock in 1992 “were diverted to conflict areas” underscoring “the risk of leakage to the local black market.” The problem grew more acute after Russia’s invasion in 2014, which saw combatants looting arms and munition-storage facilities of Ukraine’s Security Service, Interior and Defense ministries. “Irregular fighters on both sides progressively gained access to a wide range of military-grade equipment, including the full spectrum of small arms and light weapons,” according to a report by the Small Arms Survey in 2017. “Officials estimated that at least 300,000 small arms and light weapons were looted or lost between 2013 and 2015,” providing a boon the country’s black market run by Mafia-style groups in Donbas region and other criminal networks. The U.S. government is well aware of the country’s challenges with weapons proliferation, though it has been vague in describing the precautions it’s taking. Weeks after Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, a group of interagency officials in the Biden administration met with outside arms-control experts to discuss the risk of small-arms proliferation in the conflict. According to Stohl, who attended one of the meetings, U.S. officials offered assurances about vetting Ukrainian security forces and addressing reports of unauthorized transfer — but scant details on how the vetting or monitoring happens. “It does not inspire much confidence,” said Stohl. Other arms experts feel similarly in the dark. “It is unclear what risk mitigation or monitoring steps the U.S. and other countries have taken, or what guarantees they have obtained, to ensure the protection of civilians through these very large transfers,” said Annie Shiel, a senior adviser at the Center for Civilians in Conflict. Some of the recommended steps include establishing a special investigator as the U.S. government did in Afghanistan, ensuring any weapons transfers contain strong tracking procedures, adding human rights obligations in the terms of sale and including specifics about what units can be authorized to receive such transfers. (In 2018, Congress banned Ukraine’s Azov battalion, a far-right nationalist group associated with neo-Nazism, from receiving U.S. weapons.) There are additional concerns among watchdog groups about arms proliferation stemming from Moscow amid reports it has enlisted mercenaries from Libya, Syria and Chechnya, as well as the Wagner Group, a Russian contractor. During a televised meeting of Russia’s Security Council in March, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said 16,000 volunteers in the Middle East stood ready to fight alongside Russian-backed forces in Eastern Ukraine. In response, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered his approval, saying, “We need to give them what they want and help them get to the conflict zone.” At the same meeting, Shoigu proposed handing over captured U.S. Javelin and Stinger missiles to pro-Russian separatists in Donbas region. “Please do this,” Putin told Shoigu. The introduction of foreign fighters to a conflict runs the risks of weapons returning to those individuals’ countries of origin when the fighting in Ukraine ends. There are conflicting reports about the presence of foreign fighters there, however, and it’s unclear precisely how many have in fact traveled to Ukraine. The lack of information has spurred calls for answers from the administration and attention from Congress. “Some of the weapons being provided in the conflict in Ukraine are likely to be found years, and possibly decades later,” said Abramson. “Congressional leaders should be asking these questions, in classified briefings if needed, and the public should be better informed.”
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Illicit Arms Turn › Illicit Arms Turn---1NC
Lingzhi and Xiaoy 22 – reporters at The Global Times (Fan and Lin, “Weapons sent by US and NATO may fall into dark net and even to terrorists, leading widespread and unbearable cost,” Global Times, 6-9-22, , Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)
Heartless terrorists turned dreadful mercenaries, weapons scattered in a chaotic battlefield… These disturbing signs showed that a big, horrible disaster is sprawling in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Executive Director of Europol Catherine De Bolle told German media in late May that they were very concerned that the military equipment the West is sending to Ukraine will end up on the black market and in the hands of terrorists and criminals. Previous reports show that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) found the US was stepping up its efforts to recruit members of international terrorist groups, including extremist organizations, as mercenaries to fight in Ukraine and take part in sabotage operations against Russian forces. After US President Joe Biden formally signed the $40 billion aid package to Ukraine, this worry became more pressing. Can the flow of weapons from NATO and the US to Ukraine be monitored? Is it only a matter of time before terrorist groups take hold of those weapons? Who is laughing behind Europe's worried back? Several experts told the Global Times that it is difficult to control the flow of weapons on the battlefield. They noted that not only Europe, which has been deprived of its security autonomy by the US and NATO, but also the third world countries, will suffer the costs. Those who prefer to live by the sword will fall by the sword. While the military-industrial complex profiteers, it is only a matter of time before this backfires, experts noted. Flow of illegal weapons Jürgen Stock, the head of Interpol, warned that once the Russia-Ukraine conflict ends, guns and heavy arms will flood the international market, according to a Guardian report. "Once the guns fall silent [in Ukraine], illegal weapons will come. We know this from many other instances of conflict. Criminals are even now, as we speak, focusing on them," said Stock, stressing that the illegal weapons flowing into the criminal market will create a challenge.
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Solvency › NATO Says No
Gordon and Pancevski 22 – Reporter for the Wall Street Journal based in Washington, The Wall Street Journal's Germany correspondent, covering all aspects of Europe’s largest economy and its influence on the rest of the continent and beyond (Michael R. and Bojan, “Germany Blocks NATO Ally From Transferring Weapons to Ukraine,” The Wall Street Journal, 1-22-22, , Accessed 6-23-22, LASA-AH)
Estonia in recent weeks has sought permission from Berlin to send the artillery units to Ukraine, which is required under Germany export laws, the German and Estonian officials said. Finland, which isn’t a member of NATO, is also required to authorize the delivery of the weapons by agreement with Germany. A spokesman for the Finnish government said that the procedure was a mere formality unrelated to the current situation in Ukraine. Germany is one of the world’s largest arms exporters and ships weapons to non-allied countries such as Egypt or Pakistan. German officials have said however, that exporting arms to Ukraine is out of question due to the current tensions and because of Germany’s role in starting World War II and the Nazi atrocities committed in the region. “Our restrictive position is well known and is rooted in history,” Annalena Baerbock, Germany’s foreign minister, said Monday in Kyiv as she stood beside her Ukrainian counterpart. Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s foreign minister, sought to play down the dispute, saying his nation’s “dialogue with Germany on this issue will continue.” Ukraine’s ambassador to Germany, Andrij Melnyk, was more blunt: “This responsibility should be toward the Ukrainian people, who lost at least 8 million lives during the Nazi occupation of Ukraine.”
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Solvency › NATO Says No
Gordon and Pancevski 22 – Reporter for the Wall Street Journal based in Washington, The Wall Street Journal's Germany correspondent, covering all aspects of Europe’s largest economy and its influence on the rest of the continent and beyond (Michael R. and Bojan, “Germany Blocks NATO Ally From Transferring Weapons to Ukraine,” The Wall Street Journal, 1-22-22, , Accessed 6-23-22, LASA-AH)
Germany is blocking North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally Estonia from giving military support to Ukraine by refusing to issue permits for German-origin weapons to be exported to Kyiv as it braces for a potential Russian invasion. Unlike the U.S., Britain, Poland and other allies, the German government has declined to export lethal weapons directly to Ukraine. In the case of Estonia, a small country on Russia’s northern border, Berlin is also refusing to allow a third country to send artillery to Ukraine because the weaponry originated in Germany, according to Estonian and German officials. The issue is being seen by Western security specialists and Ukraine as a test of Berlin’s arms-transfer policy during a mounting crisis in Europe and points to the difficulties the U.S. and its European allies are facing in forging a common response to Russia’s military buildup near Ukraine and demands. “Germany, they have a lot of hesitation to deliver to us,” Ukraine’s Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. German officials said the impasse results from a longstanding policy regarding arms exports to tense regions. “The principle governing arms exports is always the same—whether they come directly from Germany or from third countries—and no permission has been issued at this stage,” a German government spokesman said. “It is not possible to estimate the outcome of the process at this moment,” he added.
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Solvency › NATO Says No
Erlanger 22 - the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017 (Steven, “NATO Countries Pour Weapons Into Ukraine, Risking Conflict With Russia,” NYTimes, 3-2-22, , Accessed 6-23-22, LASA-AH)
Divisions are opening among NATO members about how to boost military deployments in Eastern Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, amid disagreements about whether the Kremlin’s faltering battlefield effort means it cannot significantly threaten alliance territory. The debate underlines different assessments of the lessons from nearly three months of war in Ukraine. The Baltic states and Poland are asking for a significantly expanded military presence on their soil and new capabilities such as antiaircraft defense that could make it far harder for Russia to invade. Other policymakers, including from France and Italy, are voicing skepticism that the shambolic Russian invasion force will pose a threat to NATO territory anytime soon. An initial decision must be made by the end of June, when NATO leaders will meet at a summit in Madrid. At that gathering, they are also expected to give initial approval to Finland and Sweden’s membership applications, assuming Turkey dials back its objections. The expansion would itself significantly increase NATO’s military capability in the eastern part of the alliance. “Russia’s direct military aggression against NATO allies cannot be excluded,” according to a confidential joint proposal from the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia that was obtained by The Washington Post. “Russia can rapidly mass military forces against NATO’s eastern border and confront the Alliance with a short war and fait accompli,” the document said, proposing that a division-size contingent of about 20,000 troops be tasked with speeding to each of the countries if they are under threat. Other countries are more cautious about robust new commitments in Eastern Europe, wary of signing on to large deployments that would be costly and would divert troops from other areas.
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Solvency › NATO Says No
Emmott and Sytas 22 – repoters for Reuters (Robin and Andrius, “The Baltic states want more NATO. They won't get all they seek,” Reuters, 6-15-22, , Accessed 6-23-22, LASA-AH)
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been calling for their region to receive the biggest build-up of combat-ready NATO forces in Europe since the end of the Cold War, to be agreed at a summit on June 28-30 in Madrid. It will not happen, interviews with seven senior diplomats and officials from leading NATO allies show. This is partly because the proposals come as the NATO alliance faces a slew of demands not seen in decades: from countering Russia and China in the Arctic to quelling Islamic insurgencies in the Sahel, and tackling new frontiers in space. Since Russia invaded, the U.S. Congress has approved extra funds and the Pentagon sent F-35 stealth fighters, as well as attack helicopters, to Estonia; Britain doubled its force presence at Estonia's Tapa military base to around 1,700 personnel. But for many people in the region, which has been occupied by both Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany and which lies within striking distance of a Russian garrison at St. Petersburg, that is not enough. For instance, 84.6% of Latvian respondents to a Benu Aptiekas/Gemius poll in May said they were highly anxious about Russia's invasion. "The fact that we could be in danger, it's been on the table all the time," said Dzintra Bungs, 82, head of the Latvian Occupation Museum Association in Riga. "It is very important that we have woken up, and that all Europe awakes." The Baltics, with a combined population of just over six million, want the alliance to boost its pre-Ukraine invasion presence of around 5,000 multinational soldiers by as much as tenfold, as well as adding air and maritime defences. Many of NATO's 30 allies in Europe and the United States support the calls for a bigger force in principle, but in reality say allies can only commit to maintaining higher troop levels, pre-positioning more equipment, weapons and ammunition in the region and promising rapid reinforcements. The broad outline for leaders to agree at the summit, the diplomats and NATO officials said, is a model of larger multinational NATO battlegroups in the Baltics, with a commitment to quickly reinforce if Russia were about to invade. Planning for new air and maritime defences will come later. Many members, including Britain and the United States, do not favour permanent new bases in the Baltics, three of the diplomats told Reuters. They said it would cost billions and be hard to sustain: The states may not have enough troops and weaponry, and a permanent presence would be highly provocative for Moscow. "The Baltic states will not each get enough NATO troops to create a division," a NATO diplomat said, referring to their request for up to 15,000 troops across the region, as well as more on stand-by in allied countries to complement national forces. "Whatever is decided must be sustainable."
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › DOS CP › DOS CP---1NC
DSCA no date – (“FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS),” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, , Accessed 6-25-22, LASA-AH)
The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is a form of security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended [22 U.S.C. 2751, et. seq.] and a fundamental tool of U.S. foreign policy. Under Section 3, of the AECA, the U.S. may sell defense articles and services to foreign countries and international organizations when the President formally finds that to do so will strengthen the security of the U.S. and promote world peace. Under FMS, the U.S. Government and a foreign government enter into a government-to-government agreement called a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA).
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › DOD Tradeoff DA › DOD Tradeoff---1NC
Lailari 22 - Taiwan News, Contributing Columnist (Guermantes, “Does the US focus on aid for Ukraine make Taiwan more vulnerable to Chinese invasion?,” Taiwan News, 5-16-22, , Accessed 6-24-22, LASA-AH)
Taiwan suffers as well from the Biden Administration’s and Congress’ enthusiasm for supporting Ukraine. Why? First, U.S. extravagant gifting of weapons to Ukrainian forces tradeoffs in the U.S. ability to aid others. U.S. weapons stockpiles are shrinking to levels that imperil the ability of U.S. forces to fight. Until the U.S. replenishes those stockpiles, the U.S. will not be able to provide weapons to other countries that might fall victim to Russian, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), or other invasions. The CCP and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are pleased with this situation because the U.S. will neither have the funds nor the arms available to send to Taiwan. Second, a CCP-ordered embargo of non-PRC shipping and aircraft flying to Taiwan restricts U.S. and Asian allies’ options for supporting Taiwan. A nuclear war with China to end a Taiwan embargo is not a politically feasible policy option. Why would the U.S. and Taiwan’s allies not be able to send weapons or other supplies to Taiwan? Because the CCP will declare that providing arms or other materials to Taiwan is interfering in the internal affairs of China. In effect, acts countering the embargo would be considered casus belli, acts of war. If Russia had been able to close all of Ukraine’s borders, Russia would have made the same declaration regarding interference in Ukraine. Unfortunately for Russia, it did not control Ukraine’s western borders between Belarus and the Black Sea, which include the following NATO countries: Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. Through these NATO countries, military and other aid are flowing into Ukraine. Taiwan is an island and if the PLA Navy and Air Force control the ocean and the air around Taiwan, then the CCP could prevent other countries from helping Taiwan during a future conflict. On May 4, 2022, Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of United States Strategic Command, noted in his testimony to Congress that the CCP “is watching the war in Ukraine closely and will likely use nuclear coercion to their advantage in the future. Their intent is to achieve the military capability to reunify Taiwan by 2027, if not sooner.” The U.S. and Taiwan’s friends and allies should try to send military aid now and provide training before combat begins. Providing military aid and training now might be enough to deter the CCP long enough for Taiwan to become unpalatable for the CCP to “eat” at least for the short term. The anti-Russia coalition’s war fatigue, lack of supplies, funds, and foresight suggests Taiwan should prepare to defend itself.
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage Two › DIB Resilient---2NC
Caverley 18 – Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College, (4/6/18, Jonathan – also Research Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “America’s Arms Sales Policy: Security Abroad, Not Jobs at Home,” https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/, accessed on 5/10/19, JMP)
The United States has the most diverse export portfolio in the world. In the past five years, it has delivered weapons to nearly 100 countries. Its best customer over this period, Saudi Arabia, only bought 13 percent of all U.S. arms exports (all data from SIPRI). By contrast, 58 percent of Russia exports go to just three countries (India, China, and Vietnam). For China, it’s 64 percent (Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Algeria). Strong domestic demand also mitigates the pressure on a country to export. From 2010 to 2015 the United Kingdom, France, and Germany all exported about half of their defense production, while Russia exported 39 percent. The United States on average exports only a quarter of the arms produced by its firms. This combination of strong domestic demand and a diverse portfolio of client states makes America’s market power stronger than that of any other exporter. The United States is so economically advantaged in making and selling weapons that it can limit conventional-weapons proliferation, technology diffusion, and corruption in contracting arrangements (and maintain a robust defense industrial base) while retaining its commanding market position. Less powerful exporting states are generally too constrained by the economics of production to pursue any goals besides increased sales. There are a number of ways in which America’s leverage in the area of arms sales — and, therefore, its ability to exercise restraint — can further its foreign policy goals.
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage Two › Arms Sales Not Key---2NC
Leo Blanken 18, associate professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California., 1-29-2018, "America’s Military Is Choking on Old Technology," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/29/americas-military-is-choking-on-old-technology/
The current rate of technological change may make many current U.S. military systems obsolete in the coming decades Advances in artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, material science, and nanotechnology threaten to produce qualitative — not just incremental — change in the conduct of warfare in the near future. Although the U.S. has spent far more on standing military forces than other countries, for far longer, this accumulated advantage is also a vulnerability. It presents an opportunity for Washington’s international adversaries and competitors to reap the advantage of their backwardness and leapfrog the U.S. with emerging technology. This is exacerbated by the Pentagon’s commitment to significant investment in existing systems, the proverbial “last year’s model.” There are many hindrances to efficiently divorcing the U.S. military from old technologies. First, for technology to be widely adopted across an enterprise like the Pentagon, it needs to be woven into bureaucratic structures, which are inherently sticky. Recruitment and training of personnel for specialized skill sets, the development and implementation of standard operating procedures, costly facilities, maintenance, and other supporting investments are necessary to enable the use of technology. Further, bureaucracies often build their identities around technology, turning threats to the technology into threats to the organization’s very essence. The resulting entities are often large, complex, and full of self-interested actors who seek to maintain and expand their bureaucratic realms. Once these organizations exist, they are extremely difficult to dismantle. Therefore, if a bureaucracy and its culture have been “purpose-built” around a particular technology, then it may be extremely difficult to nimbly leverage new technologies. The revolution in naval architecture (wood to iron) and propulsion systems (sail to steam) in the late 19th century is a great example of this. Despite proving their value during the Civil War, steam-powered ironclads faced vociferous opposition in the 1870s from naval leadership, who sought to undermine these technologies and the new class of professional engineers associated with them. William McBride summarized this conundrum when he said, “Military hierarchies seek stability, and when a new technology challenges that stability, the reaction can be sharp and hostile.” The Pentagon and the supporting defense industrial base’s adverse reaction to the Third Offset Strategy underscored this dynamic. New technology may also offend the romanticized values of a profession. One anonymous British observer, upon seeing an ironclad ship for the first time in 1861, bemoaned: “It is not to be supposed for a moment that our high-spirited youth of the aristocracy, and our race of seamen … would practise a profession of butchery and destruction from behind iron walls … Those who know any thing of sailors must see the charm of the life which animates them; and it is only surprising that any who confess their sympathy for the profession should be advocating the construction of engines (they cannot be called ships) devoted to all the grossness and barbarity of war, while they are deprived of every thing attractive to a sailor.” The Pentagon has experienced a similar sentiment today with institutional pushback against drones. The Air Force and Navy continue to wrestle with recruitment, retention, and career advancement within the drone operator community, due to among other factors, a preference toward the existing manned warplane community. Compounding the challenge of cultural resistance is the fact that a set of external interest groups can accrue around the maintenance of a particular military technology. Major defense firms and lobbyists seeking profits and members of Congress seeking jobs in their districts ensure that legacy defense programs continue for years beyond their “state of the art” days. For these actors, replacing and upgrading existing systems with expensive new features (referred to as “gold-plating”) seems to be the safest way to satisfy their parochial interests. Nick Kotz’s classic study of the B-1 bomber shows how major investment in military technology can be driven by such interests. Rather than adjusting investments to changing conditions (improved Soviet air defenses), older concepts (manned strategic bombers) were fitted with ever more extravagant technologies. Such dynamics also exist with the Trident submarine, MX missile, and even the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. They run the risk of resulting in what Mary Kaldor coined a “baroque arsenal” of expensive and outdated platforms that bog down force structure. Simple logic dictates that a race to acquire new technology while simultaneously maintaining investments in obsolete technology will result in bankruptcy. The private sector would suffer from the same affliction if it were not for the fact that markets help tear down old technologies as soon as new ones emerge. But that doesn’t happen nearly as efficiently in government bureaucracies. Since their work is not disciplined by commercial market forces, they allow ineffective technologies and the companies that support them to survive — and even thrive — simply due to their ability to navigate the political system. This is best exemplified by Defense contractors that build their technology platforms in numerous congressional districts. Given the political cost of potential job losses, these platforms and their associated jobs become difficult not only to eliminate but even to modify in a significant way. Acquisition professionals in the Pentagon do not necessarily need to slash and burn their way through their existing technology but they do need to commit to a strategy that recognizes the changing technological landscape and the threats it already poses. A senior official, whether it be the chief management officer or the new undersecretary for acquisition and sustainment, should be specifically charged with identifying obsolete technological investments and supporting their replacement. This does not need to be a zero-sum game where equipment is scrapped never to be seen, or replaced, again. As the National Defense Strategy makes clear, defense leaders can reduce institutional resistance by ensuring new technologies directly address existing missions. There are several notable examples of initiatives that do so, such as the Defense Innovation Unit – Experimental, SOFWERX, and the U.S. Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group and Mad Scientist initiative. These specialized entities have been created to identify, vet, and integrate innovations from the emerging tech environment; a parallel effort needs to be focused on shedding obsolete technologies, as necessary.
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage Two › Arms Sales Not Key---2NC
Trevor Thrall, 4-5-2019, associate professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, "The False Promises of Trump’s Arms Sales", Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/04/false-promises-trumps-arms-sales/156071/
Weakening the economic rationale even further is the fact that in order to seal major deals, American defense contractors have to offer massive discounts, or offsets, to the purchasing nations in the form of coproduction arrangements or technology transfer. In 2014, for example, these offsets equaled roughly one-third of the value of total U.S. arms sales. These offsets mean not only that American arms sales are less profitable than they appear on paper, but also that they lead to fewer jobs created in the United States than many, including the president, would like to think. Trump’s big Saudi arms deal, for example, would likely lead to somewhere between 20,000 and 40,000 jobs, or less than two-tenths of one percent of the American labor market. The unpleasant truth is that the underwhelming economic benefits cannot justify Washington’s love of arms sales. Arms sales simply do not benefit the U.S. economy nearly as much as Trump likes to claim. Meanwhile, a large percentage of American arms sales goes to countries with horrible human rights records, to nations where arms are at risk of finding their way into the wrong hands, and to nations embroiled in dangerous and destabilizing conflicts. Given this, it is long past time to rethink American arms sales policy.
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage Two › Europe Shields---2NC
Theohary 16 (Catherine, Specialist in National Security Policy and Information Operations, Congressional Research Service. December 19. "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008-2015" https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44716.pdf)
The major West European suppliers, individually, have enhanced their competitive position in weapons exports through strong government marketing support for their foreign arms sales. All of them can produce both advanced and basic air, ground, and naval weapon systems. The four major West European suppliers have sometimes competed successfully for arms sales contracts with developing nations against the United States, which has tended to sell to several of the same major clients, especially to the Persian Gulf states that see the United States as the ultimate guarantor of Gulf security. The continuing demand for U.S. weapons in the global arms marketplace, from a large established client base, has created a more difficult environment for individual West European suppliers to secure large new contracts with developing nations on a sustained basis. Yet, as the data indicate, the major West European suppliers continue to make significant arms transfer contracts each year. In 2015, a contract with Qatar for the Rafale fighter jet and missiles for a value of $7.1 billion contributed to France’s record-setting export total, along with a contract with Egypt for two dozen Rafale fighter jets and a naval frigate worth nearly $6 billion.
An effort to enhance their market share of the arms trade in the face of the strong demand for U.S. defense equipment, among other considerations, was a key factor in inducing European Union (EU) member states to adopt a new code of conduct for defense procurement practices. This code was agreed on November 21, 2005, at the European Defense Agency’s (EDA) steering board meeting. Currently voluntary, the EU hopes it will become mandatory, and through its mechanisms foster greater cooperation within the European defense equipment sector in the awarding of contracts for defense items. By successfully securing greater intra-European cooperation in defense program planning and collaboration in defense contracting, the EU hopes that the defense industrial bases of individual EU states will be preserved, thereby enhancing the capability of European defense firms to compete for arms sales throughout the world. Some European arms companies have begun, and others completed the phasing out of production of certain types of weapon systems. These suppliers have increasingly sought to engage in joint production ventures with other key European weapons suppliers or even client countries in an effort to sustain major sectors of their individual defense industrial bases—even if a substantial portion of the weapons produced are for their own armed forces. Examples are the Eurofighter and Eurocopter projects. A few European suppliers have also adopted the strategy of cooperating in defense production ventures with the United States such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), rather than attempting to compete directly, thus meeting their own requirements for advanced combat aircraft while positioning themselves to share in profits resulting from future sales of this new fighter aircraft.7
2022
Michigan
Negative
PGM Neg – Compiled › Advantage Two › DIB Low---2NC
Aaron Mehta 3-20-2020 {Aaron Mehta is Deputy Editor and Senior Pentagon Correspondent for Defense News, covering policy, strategy and acquisition at the highest levels of the Department of Defense and its international partners. “How coronavirus could impact the defense supply chain.” https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2020/03/20/how-coronavirus-could-impact-the-defense-supply-chain/}//JM
WASHINGTON — As the American defense industry tries to assess the way forward under the new coronavirus pandemic, it should keep a close eye on the lower tiers of its supply chain, analysts warn. There are two key factors when considering supply chain logistics: production and delivery. On the production side, hurdles include the potential for workers to have to halt production work due to the spread of the virus — something that has happened, albeit temporarily, at F-35 production spots in Italy and Japan — as well as economic impacts. Paul Scharre, director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, said that trying to predict the supply chain’s future is like looking into a crystal ball that is zooming by your face at 100 mph. “For companies that are predominantly defense companies, government money is likely to keep coming,” he said. “The real source of disruption is if there are statewide mandated shutdowns saying: ‘Don’t go to work.’ ” Small businesses may feel the economic pain the most, and that could spell trouble down the road. A 2018 Pentagon report on the defense-industrial base warned of “domestic extinction” among the sole suppliers for critical industrial parts — shops that could fold under rough economic conditions as the world is seeing now. For instance, there are only four American suppliers with the capability to manufacture large, complex, single-pour aluminum and magnesium sand castings needed to support American air power. Those suppliers “face perpetual financial risk and experience bankruptcy threats and mergers mirroring the cyclicality of DoD [Department of Defense] acquisition,” the report said. And there is only one qualified source for the upper, intermediate and sump housing for an unnamed heavy-lift platform used by the Marines (potentially the CH-53 King Stallion) that around 2017 went through bankruptcy proceedings. “Without a qualified source for these castings, the program will face delays, impeding the U.S. ability to field heavy lift support to Marine Corps expeditionary forces,” the report said. Warned Martijn Rasser, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security: “For small business, a shutdown would be extremely difficult to get through because even with bailouts and economic stimulus, once those businesses close up, its really hard to get those started again.” “If an airline goes out of business, the planes don’t disappear — you can start over. If it’s a highly specialized manufacturing company, those employees are going to disperse and try to find other work. So I think that’s something to be very cognizant of because of all the consolidation in the defense industry,” he added. “If they have to curtail operations for an extended period of time, it’s extremely difficult to get it going again.” Transportation of goods is another potential issue to watch, particularly as the commercial aviation industry is shutting down huge chunks of its operations. Noted Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and International Studies: “What if parts of our transportation sector shut down so parts can’t ship, or they’re late shipping?” That may already be happening, with cargo carriers reporting increased demand for shipping goods globally. A Thursday report on industry trade publication Air Cargo World warned that the “air cargo industry is seeing daily slashes to airfreight capacity and massive jumps in rates due to the extensive number of passenger flights cancelled globally as part of the effort to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. As a result, space on most trade lanes is tight and some even have backlogs.” Travel restrictions between countries could complicate issues, given the increasing global nature of the supply chain on programs such as the F-35 fighter jet. A delay of parts getting from a tier 4 to tier 3 supplier could turn into a delay from a tier 3 to tier 2 supplier, and in turn could lead to a delay in delivery of a defense article to the Pentagon. Still, the delays don’t currently look likely to be too serious in context, said Byron Callan of Capital Alpha Partners.