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2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › No Solvency---Trust

Military diplomacy builds trust and relations

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute, )//BB

Moreover, in places where the U.S. military has maintained a long-term presence (e.g. Japan, South Korea, Germany), we see that military interoperability enhances regions economically—directly through commercial contracting and the resulting employment, servicemember contributions through commerce, and in some cases, contributions of military gear and equipment through foreign military sales or otherwise. The resulting “military diplomacy,” also referred to as “defense diplomacy,” “soft power,” “military public diplomacy,” and “strategic communication,” allows the military to have a direct impact on foreign policy through other means. Although not diplomacy in the traditional sense of a State Department mission, military relationships between countries build a foundation on which further connections between nations are developed.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › No Solvency---Trust

The DoD is best for improving strong relationships with host countries

Karlin 22, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (Mara, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)//BB

Our relationships provide us with a reservoir of strength. They allow us to operate by, with, and through our allies and partners to meet shared security challenges. The degree of partnership should not be measured by the quantity of security cooperation programs, but rather by their quality. The Department of Defense has learned from large-scale assistance programs that for lasting impact, a comprehensive engagement plan involves more than training and equipping. Importantly, we are building a culture of learning and adaptation, drawing on lessons from program successes, as well as, from programs that did not have the desired impact. We are building a learning agenda and integrating it into decision processes, and measure program impact in a way that assesses real change, rather than counting our own inputs into programs as successes in themselves. We seek to learn lessons and avoid the fallacy of sunk costs by ruthlessly prioritizing programs that are strategic, and setting appropriate expectations for programs that provide more of a tactical advantage. Through this approach, we can unlock the comparative advantages our allies and partners bring as we collectively work together to meet our shared objectives.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › No Solvency---Trust

Military-to-military contacts are necessary to build trust and avoid miscalculation

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute,

Within the main elements of national power (diplomacy, informational, military, and economic, or DIME), the military is often considered the last resort. However, the U.S. military has been a key player in, for instance, the spread of democracy, building partner countries’ strength through military-to-military relationships (including in the form of bi- and trilateral exercises to support standing Operation Plans, NATO, the United Nations, and Theater Security Cooperation), personnel exchange, and humanitarian assistance operations. Through these efforts, among others, the U.S. military helps to carry out the diplomatic mission of the United States (military diplomacy paved the way for NATO, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization, for instance). When military units participate in bilateral or multilateral exercises with other countries, for example, the purpose is several-fold: The interaction increases interoperability between the militaries, provides for cultural exchange and understanding, and offers an opportunity to expand each nation’s capabilities while exercising potential contingencies. The importance of military diplomacy in foreign engagement is to build dialogue that may facilitate further communication and, during a crisis, avoid confusion between cultures.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › No Solvency---Political Backlash

Diplomatic assistance causes political backlash---that wrecks solvency

Kralev 20, Executive Director @ WIDA, The Washington International Diplomatic Academy (WIDA) is an independent organization that provides practical professional training in diplomacy and international affairs — both in person and online — to students, recent graduates and professionals in government, NGOs and the private sector (Nicholas, “Why Politicians Don’t Trust Diplomats,” Washington International Diplomatic Academy,

So politicians’ lack of trust in the Foreign Service is based on perceptions that are largely divorced from reality. Like most Americans, they know very little about our diplomats. In a challenge to such a conclusion, previous administrations have often pointed to entrusting a few senior Foreign Service officers, including William J. Burns and Thomas R. Pickering, with top State Department posts as an example of the respective president’s reliance on professionals. That may speak of these officers’ capabilities, but it doesn’t make up for sidelining or ignoring the service as an institution. At least Bush and Obama understood that having held a prominent position under an administration of the other party is also a part of a career diplomat’s job. For example, Bush appointed R. Nicholas Burns ambassador to NATO and later undersecretary of state, even though Burns had been State Department spokesman under Clinton. And Obama appointed Victoria Nuland an assistant secretary of state despite her earlier role as a close adviser to Dick Cheney, Bush’s vice president. In contrast, Trump has retaliated against officers who held key positions during the Obama administration. Politicians’ decades-long distrust of the Foreign Service has significantly undermined the authority of the professionals and ultimately weakened U.S. diplomacy globally. The very real danger that there won’t be enough properly trained diplomats to restore America’s clout in the future worries us at the independent Washington International Diplomatic Academy. So much so that, although we were set up to offer short-term courses, we’ve decided to start a one-year post-graduate practical training program for people who aspire to become diplomats — the first such effort outside government. Our instructors, all former senior Foreign Service officers, have a lot to teach.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › No Solvency---Risk Aversion/Resources

The military doesn’t suffer from the same resource shortages that the State Department does

Serafino 8, Coordinator and International Affairs Specialist at CRS (Nina, “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, )//BB

In addition to its regional advantage, DOD enjoys two other advantages: greater planning and execution capabilities, and substantially greater budgetary resources. DOD can muster more [hu]manpower than any other agency. While U.S. military personnel may be stretched in wartime, there still exist substantial reserves of personnel that can be tapped to plan and carry out activities. The combatant commands enjoy considerably more personnel than do individual embassies, and their personnel are oriented toward planning activities, whereas State Department personnel are oriented toward collecting information and furthering U.S. policy through diplomacy, such as person-to-person contact. Despite waging a war in Iraq, CENTCOM created a new Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa (CJT-HOA) of roughly 2,000 U.S. military personnel (the number fluctuates regularly) to plan and carry out efforts in the Horn of Africa that include much foreign assistance activity. In Iraq, DOD temporarily provided military personnel to fill about 100 State Department PRT posts, until the State Department could contract persons with the needed expertise to fill them.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › No Solvency---Risk Aversion/Resources

That, combined with understaffing, decimates solvency

David, Acosta and Krohley 21, Colonel Arnel P. David is a US Army strategist assigned to the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. First Sergeant Sean A. Acosta is a civil affairs noncommissioned officer, and was the US Army’s 2018 NCO of the year. Dr. Nicholas Krohley is the principal of FrontLine Advisory. (“GETTING COMPETITION WRONG: THE US MILITARY’S LOOMING FAILURE,” Modern War Institute, )//BB

At present, we are engaged in global competition with China (and, to a much lesser extent, Russia). We are engaged in a regional contest with Iran. Global jihadist networks remain a potent threat. That said, we do ourselves a devastating disservice when we approach the rest of the world on the basis of its utility in these contests. American policy in Ukraine is downstream of our rivalry with Russia. The same is true for our engagement in Iraq with respect to Iran, and across much of the Global South vis-à-vis China. We instrumentalize bilateral relationships with smaller powers in pursuit of advantage against our rivals, while neglecting the local details that define the strategic landscape. This instrumentalization is readily apparent to those on the receiving end, provoking cynicism and frustration from Kyiv to Baghdad and beyond. Ultimately, it is exploitative and self-defeating—just as it was during the Cold War, when this same mentality led us to disaster from Vietnam to Nicaragua. The new great game will be won or lost based, above all else, on contextual understanding, partnerships, and alliances. It is not America’s responsibility to solve intractable problems in distant lands. However, we absolutely must understand said problems (as we have demonstrably failed to do over the past twenty years), so that we might manage our entanglements and the expenditure of finite resources. Across much of the globe, this task falls to the US military. The Department of State is understaffed, and isolated from ground truth by crippling risk aversion. The intelligence community’s priorities lie elsewhere. From sub-Saharan Africa to the South China Sea, the military is often our principal point of contact with contested terrain.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › No Solvency---Risk Aversion/Resources

Benghazi created excessive risk aversion

Hartig 21, Executive Editor of Just Security. He is also Executive Director of National Journal's Network Science Initiative and Fellow, International Security Program at New America. Former Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the National Security Council, former Deputy Director for Counterterrorism Operations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Luke, “Letting Diplomacy Lead US Counterterrorism: What Would That Look Like?,” Just Security,

But State Department management – and the broader U.S. government leadership – has at times struggled with how to effectively manage risk. Much of this is because of the highly politicized environment the department found itself in after the September 2012 Benghazi attack in Libya. To be sure, Benghazi exposed shortcomings, particularly in how the State Department’s security professionals plugged into policy discussions. But it also spurred much-needed changes to how the department trains its personnel and evaluates risks overseas. Yet, as Republicans used the attacks to launch escalating political attacks, the U.S. government seemed to retreat into a bunker mentality.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › No Solvency---Top-Shelf

The Department of State is structurally inept and incapable at effective diplomacy

Zeya and Finer 20, *American diplomat who has served as the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights in the Biden Administration since July 2021, **American journalist and diplomat who serves as Deputy National Security Advisor under National Security Advisor (Uzra and Jon, “Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” Council Special Report No. 89)//BB

It has become an article of faith among policymakers that principled American leadership has waned but remains in demand around the world. Moreover, America’s network of international relationships is its foremost strategic asset, even as the agency charged with advancing U.S. interests through diplomacy—the Department of State (DOS)— has fallen into a deep and sustained period of crisis. However, there is a third framing assumption: that the current crisis offers an opportunity to address this predicament and revitalize American diplomacy. Despite the decades-long failure to implement essential reforms—and even in the face of sustained hostility from the current administration—diplomacy remains the best tool the United States has to advance its foreign policy interests. The role of the State Department has received heightened attention amid the onslaught it has suffered under the Donald J. Trump administration, which has treated American diplomats and diplomacy with a mix of neglect and disdain. But many of the challenges facing the DOS have existed for decades. Deficits in diversity, institutional culture, and professionalization are endemic to the State Department as an institution, and a diminished policy role for career officials persisted under previous administrations. Too often, leaders from both major parties have taken public support for U.S. leadership in the world for granted without making a strong enough case to the American public for why it is essential. Concrete steps can, and should, be taken solely through executive action in the first year of an administration committed to revitalizing American diplomacy, with thought to cementing change through legislation. The most pressing challenges facing the State Department include a twenty-first-century policy environment that has, in some priority areas, evolved beyond the core competencies of most Foreign and Civil Service officers and an institution hollowed out by three years of talent flight, mired in excessively layered structure, and resistant to reform. Perhaps most important, they include the multigenerational challenge of a diplomatic workforce that falls woefully short of reflecting the diverse country it serves, particularly at the senior-most ranks, compromising its effectiveness and fostering a homogeneous and risk-averse culture that drives out rather than cultivates fresh perspectives. The State Department today risks losing the “war for talent,” not only to the private sector but increasingly to other government agencies, due to inflexible career tracks, self-defeating hiring constraints, and a lack of commitment to training and professional development. Finally, DOS is hampered by Congress’s failure over many years to pass authorizing legislation, leading to budgetary pressures and diminishing DOS’s status in the hierarchy of national security agencies rather than reinforcing the nation’s paramount foreign policy institution.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › Perm Do CP

Substantial security cooperation is funded and controlled by State

Lieutenant Colonel Toney Filostrat and Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth A. Medina, United States Army, 12 – paper written for the Harvard Kennedy School of Government National Security Fellowship Program (“SMART TOOLS: Integrating Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance in a Period of Constrained Resources” SC = Security Cooperation. SA = Security Assistance. FID = Foreign Internal Defense assistance

Significant portions of U.S. military security cooperation are funded as foreign assistance activities managed by the Department of State, and appropriated by Congress. With the amount of funding in the Defense appropriations bills, it’s not common knowledge that these military programs are funded under DoS budget authorities. The State Department has always taken its lead role on foreign assistance seriously, as a significant foreign policy tool. Over the past ten years, DoS focused on substantial internal reforms including foreign assistance planning and implementation. The U.S. government struggles to prepare for a future of persistent conflict and budget constraints. It is important to solidify reforms and institutionalize the integrating actions planned in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and the 3D Planning Framework to implement effective and efficient foreign assistance activities.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › Perm Do CP

Security cooperation includes the DOS

MAJ Nicholas R. Simontis, 13 - U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas “SECURITY COOPERATION: AN OLD PRACTICE FOR NEW TIMES”

How we deal with our adversaries is changing in response to these developments in the security environment. How we deal with our international allies and partners also should change. For many years, the term “security cooperation” referred to efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD) to promote U.S. security interests through the interaction with and development of friendly and allied security capabilities.2 This definition is evolving, however, as illustrated by recent strategic documents and statements by the President and Secretary of Defense.3 The term as used recently includes synchronized efforts by the whole-of-government to build the security capacity of U.S. friends and allies, including the development of economic and political capabilities. The most recent strategic guidance calls for increased emphasis on an interagency and interorganizational approach to building partner capacity and capability, focused on promoting stability and preventing conflict before it begins, all within a framework that emphasizes governance and rule of law. Put another way, recent strategic guidance advocates a whole-of-government approach as the means for translating national security objectives into the outcome of increased partner capacity. This change represents recognition that a wide variety of skill sets is necessary to address these changes in the security environment. Unfortunately, this change presents challenges for current security cooperation practices.

The current structure of security cooperation, that is, the infrastructure of government agencies that participate in security cooperation activities, does not readily support this new guidance. The current security cooperation organization originated in the aftermath of World War II, and continued to evolve through the Cold War. Although the Department of State (DOS) has responsibility for planning and executing security cooperation, the system primarily addresses the military component of security in terms of equipment and training. The DOD, under the auspices of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) executes these portions of U.S. Security cooperation endeavors, which constitute the preponderance of efforts, both in terms of labor and fund allocation. Furthermore, the DOD’s share has grown considerably in the past five years as Congress significantly increased funding authorities in order to facilitate stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 The key issue, then, is how to shift the emphasis from the Department of Defense to efforts shared among Defense, State, USAID, and other agencies as needed.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › Perm Do Both

Close collaboration is good

Karlin 22, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (Mara, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)//BB

A key aspect of the success of the security cooperation enterprise is the collaboration among and within the Department, most notably DoD’s close collaboration with the State Department ensures that programs are designed and executed with broader national security interests in mind. Internal to the Department of Defense, we recently reorganized – bringing the Defense Security Cooperation Agency under the umbrella of Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in the Office of the Secretary of the Defense for Policy to facilitate better collaboration and coordination. Success requires teamwork, and I can assure you that our entire team is focused on embracing it.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › AFFIRMATIVE › Perm Do Both

Military assistance does not trade off with State Department involvement

Early 11, Lt Col, USAF (Billie, “IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” Air War College, )//BB

When the three indicators of militarization are applied to DOD’s security assistance efforts, results indicate that the United States relies heavily on DOD to pursue foreign policy objectives, but not at the expense of State Department responsibilities. DOD uses security cooperation to build relationships with partner nations and respond to humanitarian efforts, and uses security assistance as a flexible tool to build the capacity of foreign military forces so they can respond to threats in their regions before conditions require a greater US military response. Whenever possible, DOD proactively shapes the global security environment promoting US interests. DOD has the option to use its new Section 1206 authority to respond to urgent and emerging threats based on regional command priorities, or to influence longer-term State Department programs in support of country requirements. Also, DOD’s considerable force presence and commander influence can sway security assistance decisions favorably toward US interests. However, the State Department maintains a high degree of direct involvement and oversight in all security assistance decisions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---BIOTECH › Solvency---Biotech---Norms/Cooperation

State Department leadership solves biosecurity norms and cooperation

Jenkins 22, US Ambassador, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (Denise, “Priorities Regarding the New and Emerging Challenges to International Security,” Department of State, )

Last Spring, Secretary Blinken set out the Biden-Harris Administration’s vision of a foreign policy that leads with diplomacy, revitalizes our global network of alliances to meet emerging global challenges, and delivers for the American people. It is a vison, as the Secretary noted, that springs from two fundamental principles: that American leadership and engagement matters, and those countries need to engage and cooperate, now more than ever. It is the role of the State Department – and America’s diplomats and development workers – to engage around the world and build that cooperation. Today, I am happy to be here to present my priorities as Under Secretary of Arms Control and International Security; known inside of the State Department as ‘T.’ The ideas I list today are in light of the many changes that we see in the international security landscape. I chose today to present my priorities, just as we mark the 50th Anniversary of the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) in 1972. To me, it is a humbling reminder that even as we face monumental international security challenges today, our predecessors prevailed through the power of diplomacy. In everything we do, we will look not only to make progress on short-term problems, but also to address their root causes and lay the groundwork for our long-term strength. I should note that while I am presenting these ideas, adjustments will be made as we continue to better understand the changes that are taking place and the security environment around us settles. Little did we know last year at the beginning of the Biden Administration that Putin would invade Ukraine. Things are continuing to change on a large scale. Some of today’s arms control and international security landscape remains the same, such as the DPRK’s insistence on advancing its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs and refusing to engage in diplomacy. The future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), still the most viable option to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, remains unclear. We remain strongly committed to our efforts regarding both the DPRK and the JCPOA. In the meantime, there are other changes – like Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war in Ukraine and the growing challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – that present us with many more questions than answers. Now is the time to consider a new way to address what are new challenges. Russia’s unprovoked invasion has led us to consider what gaps now exist. What does the new landscape mean for us and the issues within T such as arms control, deterrence, nonproliferation, security assistance, and emerging technologies? The People’s Republic of China is also posing new challenges in many areas of our responsibility. How do we address those challenges? Technology is advancing, as are the opportunities and challenges posed by an increased interest in space, while at the same time, climate change and resource limitations can lead to conflict if not addressed. We need to focus on the headlines of today, while keeping an eye on the trendlines for the challenges to come. The T Family is comprised of three Bureaus: The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. It is my honor to lead these Bureaus and work closely with their leadership to use our diplomatic engagements and programs and when needed, sanctions and other pressure, working with the interagency, to implement these priorities of mine. Let me give you a preview. I have nine priorities. They are as follows: Fortify Arms Control, Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and Related Activities Reimagine Security Sector Governance (SSG) and Security Assistance Address Emerging Technologies from a National Security Perspective Protect and promote the U.S. and Allies Technological, Military, and Economic Advantages Promote, protect, and advance the U.S. Civil – Nuclear Industry Strengthen Existing Alliances and Partnerships and Establish New Partnerships Building the “T Family Brain Trust” to Address New and Emerging Challenges to International Security Examine “New” Areas of Conflict in International Security Strengthen and Amplify the T Bureaus The three T Bureaus are developing or will develop a way forward on these priorities, including new priorities I have asked them to incorporate. While these are my priorities, I note that all of the work of the Bureaus are important to the U.S. and to international security. Priority One: Fortify Arms Control, Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and Related Activities The T Family will continue to engage the international community in strengthening existing arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament regimes, and related activities, including in light of recent challenges to those regimes. This includes, where possible, meaningful engagements and dialogues with Russia and the People’s Republic of China. I have worked in the areas of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament for 30 years and I can say that arms control remains as important today as it ever was. While there have certainly been challenges to and violations of international arms control agreements by a handful of countries, arms control is not dead as some would like you to believe. Arms control remains an important means to increase allied and global security by reducing risk and enhancing stability. The importance of arms control will also grow as we face competitors pursuing reckless and destabilizing buildups of their nuclear forces combined with opaque, nontransparent nuclear use doctrines. However, progress can only be made in a situation of de-escalation, not escalation. In all cases, we need willing partners sitting across and around the table. We remain committed to the implementation of New START and eventually getting back to the table to continue the dialogue on laying the groundwork for future arms control and to the pursuit of follow-on measures to the New START treaty. As you know, following Russia’s unprovoked and brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, we have suspended our Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSD). That said, the issues that have been laid out prior to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine are even more important now. In that respect, we want to sustain limits on the Russian systems covered under New START beyond 2026, limit the new kinds of nuclear weapons Russia has fielded or is developing, and address all nuclear weapons including Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons. We must also be flexible as we consider the ways in which we pursue risk reduction and future arms control measures. We will be looking at the different types of forms these efforts can take, including but not be limited to a traditional approach of focusing on negotiating treaties. The way forward in this new international security landscape may be in the form of initiatives like the U.S. voluntary commitment not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile testing recently announced by Vice President Harris, or codes of conduct, or best practices. We can see from the current crisis that the security environment remains complex and is becoming more complex. There is no single, elegant solution to managing nuclear or other 21st century risks. The U.S. is prepared to be creative in finding ways forward and partnering with others to make the world safer. That is what being a leader in arms control is about. On nuclear disarmament, we remain committed to a world without nuclear weapons in the context of enhancing international security overall. While our concerns about the ability of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) to achieve its goals have not changed, we remain committed to engaging in pragmatic efforts to pursue effective measures related to nuclear disarmament. This includes work conducted by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND), the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament, and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), with whom we work closely. We support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and will work to achieve its entry force while maintaining our moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. We also continue to seek negotiations on a cut-off in the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and call on all relevant countries to join us in declaring and maintaining a moratorium on such production. We will also continue to work with our P5 colleagues, circumstances permitting, to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its three pillars. The U.S. assumes coordination of the P5 Process in June, and we hope to build on previous efforts. The recent P5 statement on the prevention of nuclear war is a good example of the important work we can do together; we must hold each other to those commitments. We will put renewed focus on these efforts and now that travel restrictions have lifted, we are looking at when we can meet face to face with partners in these forums and discuss ways to move ahead, especially taking into account how the Kremlin’s further invasion of Ukraine has impacted the landscape of that work. Indeed, Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling only underscores the importance of preserving the record of non-use of nuclear weapons. Our Bureaus will also continue to lead efforts to maximize support for enhanced verification capabilities throughout the U.S. government by partnering with the interagency, academia, the scientific community, non-Governmental Organizations, private industry, and others. There are other new challenges that require continued attention. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is rapidly building up a larger, more diverse nuclear arsenal. The accelerating pace of the PRC’s nuclear expansion may enable it to have up to 700 nuclear warheads by 2027. The PRC likely intends to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030, exceeding the estimated size that the United States projected just two years ago in 2020. As I noted in my speech last year at the NATO Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Conference, and it remains true to this day, the U.S. continues to request that the PRC be more transparent about the purpose and direction of its nuclear strategy. There is currently no formal dialogue between our governments on this subject, and limited tools are available to mitigate risk and prevent crisis escalation with the PRC. We will continue to seek engagement with appropriate PRC officials on risk reduction. As you know, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, or NPT RevCon, will at long last take place in August in New York. With the Russian government’s reckless and destabilizing rhetoric, it is more important now than ever for all States Parties to reaffirm the importance of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and recommit to its goals. The August NPT RevCon provides an opportunity to do that. While the U.S. recognizes the challenges that Russia’s actions pose to the NPT, we will emphasize practical actions responsible nuclear powers can take to reduce nuclear risks and pursue a realistic path on arms control and disarmament, and to ensure that all NPT Parties can realize its full benefits. The RevCon presents an opportunity to reflect both on how much has been accomplished and on what can and must be done to preserve and extend that progress. The NPT remains instrumental in limiting the risk of nuclear war by avoiding a cascade of nuclear proliferation and laying the groundwork for progress on disarmament. The U.S. will use the Review Conference to promote its objectives in all three of the NPT’s pillars – the areas of nonproliferation and strengthened safeguards, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament. We plan to find areas of common ground on measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war and a positive dialogue among Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). The U.S. is also committed to the third pillar of the NPT – the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. In that respect, the U.S. and the UK have co-led an effort to build a multilateral deliverable, called the “Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses,” to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. The Sustained Dialogue aims to integrate non-traditional stakeholders in the NPT process to promote broader acceptance of peaceful uses as a solution to development challenges and to create a lasting framework that better captures peaceful use assistance as a dividend of the NPT. It provides a benefit of the NPT that often gets overshadowed by political debates on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Here, I want to thank my colleagues, Ambassador Adam Scheinman, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation, for his leadership as we prepare for the NPT Review Conference, and for the work that former Assistant Secretary Tom Countryman has accomplished since he agreed to return to us and assist in this process. We also see the Review Conference as an opportunity to recognize the continued need for a strong International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its work on safeguards, safety, and security. The IAEA has been doing significant work in the area of peaceful uses as well as in other areas of concern, including convening the recent first Review Conference of the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, its work on cybersecurity, on nuclear law, and in other areas. Strong U.S. leadership on nonproliferation will also involve continuing to promote the combination of an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol (AP) as the de facto international standard for verifying that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses. This year marks the 25th anniversary of the AP, and so now is the time to reinvigorate our efforts in support of its universal adoption. We will also reiterate our support for the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) and for all states to halt production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Moving on to the other important areas in priority one, there is a renewed focus on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). As I noted at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva last year, for the past two decades, efforts to strengthen the Convention have been treading water. States Parties have been unable to agree to significant action. We face a biological weapons threat that is real and, in many respects, growing. Some states continue to possess sophisticated, well-established biological weapons programs, while non-state actors have shown continuing interest in acquiring biological weapons capabilities. Additionally, the widespread availability of sophisticated scientific and technological tools and methods is gradually eroding barriers to the development of biological weapons. COVID-19 is a wake-up call for all of us. The astonishing human toll of the pandemic has illustrated our shared vulnerability to novel pathogens. In Geneva, I noted a two-pronged approach. The Review Conference should take near-term, concrete action to strengthen the Convention and benefit States Parties. These actions include further operationalizing assistance under Article VII; establishing a voluntary fund for technical cooperation; creating a mechanism to review advances in science and technology; deepening collaborations on biosafety and biosecurity; staffing the Implementation Support Unit to carry out these roles; and enabling more agile decision making. The second way forward is for the Review Conference to take steps to address the harder issues. It should establish a new expert working group to examine possible measures to strengthen implementation of the Convention, increase transparency, and enhance assurance of compliance. I was very happy this year to appoint a new BWC Special Representative and Deputy Special Representative to lead the government’s engagements on the BWC. I am pleased that the States Parties reached consensus to delay the Review Conference until November, which allows time for the newly nominated RevCon President to prepare for the meeting. Our Special Representative Ken Ward will spend the next few months working closely with allies and like-minded countries as we turn our broad concepts into specific proposals. Along with this effort is work by my team to enhance biosafety and biosecurity norms, practices, tools, and resources to bolster cooperation in forums such as the BWC, Global Partnership, and the Global Health Security Agenda. We will work to ensure the tools needed to address these challenges have the attention and resources needed to confront biological challenges. We will work to build national capacity to mitigate biological threats. Regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC, the United States is on track to complete destruction of its chemical weapons by September 2023, and we have destroyed over 97 percent of our fully declared stockpile. Given the potential chemical weapons threat to Ukraine, the United States is again leading and working closely with allies and partners. I am proud of the bilateral security assistance that the United States has provided to Ukraine, including over $100 million in life-saving protective and detection equipment and related medical countermeasures, in addition to funds provided to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that will be used to assist Ukraine to protect against the threat of chemical weapons. The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance is also continuing to work with the OPCW to hold Russia and Syria accountable for their past chemical weapons use and to deter further use. We look forward to additional OPCW reports this summer from its Investigation and Identification Team that will identify those responsible for chemical weapons attacks in Syria. The Bureau will continue to make advances in chemical forensics to improve the ability of the United States, allies, partners, and the OPCW to attribute the use of chemical weapons. The CWC States Parties Review Conference in 2023 is another opportunity for States Parties to reaffirm their commitment to the CWC and its implementation. We are now considering our goals for the Review Conference to advance its work. In all our work, we will continue to combat disinformation against U.S. activities and engagements. The U.S. has been a leader in the development of conventional arms control instruments, including the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Despite Russia’s war on Ukraine, we continue to see a role for conventional arms control in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond. This kind of arms control can enhance mutual confidence and transparency among states and reduce the risk of conflict. The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance continues to support full compliance with existing conventional arms control agreements and the development of new ideas for future confidence- and security-building mechanisms, including the modernization of the Vienna Document to reflect the new political-military realities in Europe. It is important to have a base of existing conventional arms control instruments that we can build on to restore a more enduring peace. Moving on to fortifying related activities as I also noted in this priority, we will enhance the role of export controls and counter proliferation measures in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, destabilizing advanced conventional weapons, and related technologies. The multilateral export control regimes – Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, and Australia Group – remain important bodies through which we work with our allies and partners to address proliferation challenges. The regimes protect nonproliferation imperatives while providing predictability for exporters and are the basis for preventing advanced technologies from falling into adversarial competitors. These regimes and institutions must adjust to the challenges in the international security landscape. We will enhance U.S. leadership in these regimes and institutions and advance novel approaches to the challenges each regime face. We will also support the important work of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation’s programmatic offices that promote adherence to the regimes’ guidance and updates to the control lists among non-member countries, thereby expanding the reach of nonproliferation norms. In that respect, I commend you to go online and learn more about the extensive programmatic work of the T Bureaus.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---BIOTECH › Solvency---Biotech---Expertise

The State Department has the expertise and leadership to promote biotech diplomacy

Bade 22, tech and policy analyst @ Eurasia Group (Scott, “Digital diplomacy gets a reboot,” Tech Crunch, )//BB

CDP [Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy] will have three policy buckets: international cyber security, digital policy and digital freedom. Each roughly corresponds to preexisting competencies: the cyber coordinator office (created back in 2011), the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, respectively. It will be run by a yet-to-be-confirmed ambassador-at-large; in the meantime, career diplomat Jennifer Bachus will run the team as principal deputy assistant secretary. While the new bureau will deal with the day-to-day, a separate special envoy position will also be created to focus on more long-term issues around emerging and critical technologies like AI, quantum and biotechnology. Missing in action no more? The “decision to stand up a new bureau is an indicator of how seriously [the Biden administration] sees these threats,” Eileen Donahoe, a former U.S. ambassador who now runs the Stanford Global Digital Policy Incubator, tells me. “They understand the need for more thought leadership and diplomatic capacity.” One sign of that seriousness is that both offices will, for at least a year, report directly to Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, the department’s number two official. This is a good thing, says Chris Painter, who was the Obama administration’s top diplomat on cyber issues. Sherman, he says, has a long history with cyber issues and worked to integrate technology issues at regional bureaus she ran earlier in her career. CDP will need that high-level support. The State Department is playing catch up, I’m told, and attempting to bring its expertise — diplomacy and knowledge of international relations — to more technical policymakers at the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and other agencies. The implication is clear: State’s voice has been missing in the interagency process and opportunities have been missed both at home and abroad. For example, as Nate Picarsic and Emily de la Bruyère have written, the U.S. has been largely absent from the politics of the intergovernmental organizations that are quietly setting the global standards of technology. As a result the U.S. has ceded ground to others, especially Russia and China, but even the European Union, with massive implications for who controls the future of technology. And as new international entities emerge, like the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council or the Quad’s technology working group, the State Department needs to be able to coordinate and advise. Under the Trump administration, you “had good, talented people,” working these issues, Painter tells me, “but no one at the leadership level [able] both to deal with the White House and senior counterparts and foreign counterparts. [The new bureau] helps fill that gap.” “This is a real down payment by the department,” says Yll Bajraktari, a former national security official who is now the CEO of Special Competitive Studies Project, an AI advocacy group. “Integrating the department’s capacity for cybersecurity, digital infrastructure and governance issues including internet freedom will help create a coherent diplomatic strategy.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---BIOTECH › Solvency---Biotech

State Department leadership on advanced biotech solves

Burns 19, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal (Random House, 2019), from which portions of this essay are adapted. He was a career diplomat in the U.S. State Department for 33 years, serving as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State from 2011 to 2014. (William, “The Lost Art of American Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-27/lost-art-american-diplomacy)//BB

Reaffirming the foundations of American diplomacy is necessary but not sufficient to make it effective for a new and demanding era. The State Department will also have to adapt in ways it never before has, making sure that it is positioned to tackle the consequential tests of tomorrow and not just the policy fads of today. It can begin by taking a cue from the U.S. military’s introspective bent. The Pentagon has long embraced the value of case studies and after-action reports, and it has formalized a culture of professional education. Career diplomats, by contrast, have tended to pride themselves more on their ability to adjust quickly to shifting circumstances than on paying systematic attention to lessons learned and long-term thinking. As part of a post-Trump reinvention of diplomacy, then, the State Department ought to place a new emphasis on the craft, rediscovering diplomatic history, sharpening negotiation skills, and making the lessons of negotiations—both successful and unsuccessful—accessible to practitioners. That means fully realizing the potential of new initiatives such as the Foreign Service Institute’s Center for the Study of the Conduct of Diplomacy, where diplomats examine recent case studies. The U.S. government will also have to update its diplomatic capacity when it comes to the issues that matter to twenty-first-century foreign policy—particularly technology, economics, energy, and the climate. My generation and its predecessor had plenty of specialists in nuclear arms control and conventional energy issues; missile throw-weights and oil-pricing mechanisms were not alien concepts. During my last few years in government, however, I spent too much time sitting in meetings on the seventh floor of the State Department and in the White House Situation Room with smart, dedicated colleagues, all of us collectively faking it on the intricacies of cyberwarfare or the geopolitics of data. The pace of advances in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and synthetic biology will only increase in the years ahead, outstripping the ability of states and societies to devise ways to maximize their benefits, minimize their downsides, and create workable international rules of the road. To address these threats, the State Department will have to take the lead—just as it did during the nuclear age—building legal and normative frameworks and ensuring that every new officer is versed in these complex issues.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---AI › Solvency---Military Bad---Private Involvement

Military-based AI cooperation fails. Public opposition and major private firms will refuse to cooperation.

Lin-Greenberg 20, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House (Erik, “Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making,” Texas National Security Review, 3.2)//BB

Tepid public support at home and abroad can stymie alliance military operations in two ways. First, public opposition to the use of AI among allied populations may lead policymakers to restrict the use of AI-enabled technologies for military operations. In the event of future hostilities, for example, the South Korean or German governments might oppose an ally’s use of AI-enabled lethal weapon systems on their territory.60 Indeed, advocacy from the public and activist groups has led a growing number of states — including U.S. allies like Pakistan and Jordan — to call for bans on the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems.61 Second, civilian engineers and researchers that develop AI technology may refuse to work on military AI contracts. Disruptions to AI development can hinder the fielding of new capabilities and generate mistrust between the government and civilian firms. Google employees, for instance, protested their involvement in Project Maven, a Defense Department program that uses AI to analyze video collected by military drones.62 In a letter to their CEO, the employees argued that “Google should not be in the business of war,” explaining that the company should not “outsource the moral responsibility of [its] technologies to third parties,” and that work on Defense Department-backed AI would “irreparably damage Google’s brand.”63 The resistance ultimately led Google to terminate its involvement in the contract and generated public criticism of the Defense Department’s AI efforts.64

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---AI › Solvency---AI Wars

State Department-led assistance solves AI rules-for-engagement and escalation

Blinken 21, US Secretary of State (“Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence’s (NSCAI) Global Emerging Technology Summit,”

We’re moving quickly, because we want to ensure that as AI and related technologies transform how we live, how we work, how we compete, how we defend ourselves, that we’re staying ahead of change, indeed that we are shaping change and, critically, making sure it delivers for our people. My colleagues, I think, have very capably covered the administration’s work on these issues as it relates to our domestic renewal, our economy, and our defense. So what I’d like to do today is to focus on the State Department’s distinct role, because diplomacy will be critical. Working with partners and allies to develop and deploy technology is going to help us tackle the most urgent challenges we face, from pandemics to the climate crisis. Diplomacy will also be essential to mitigating risks, from preventing cyber attacks that target our businesses, to regulating technology that threatens our privacy, to defending our democratic values and way of life. And let me just pause for a second on that last point, because I think it deserves emphasis. It’s fundamentally what’s at stake here. More than anything else, our task is to put forth and carry out a compelling vision for how to use technology in a way that serves our people, protects our interests and upholds our democratic values. It’s not enough to highlight the horrors of techno-authoritarianism, to point to what countries like China and Russia are doing, and say that it’s wrong and dangerous, even as it is. We’ve also got to make the positive case for our own approach, and then we’ve got to deliver. That is the challenge before us. We need the United States and we need its partners to remain the world’s innovative leaders and standard setters, to ensure that universal rights and democratic values remain at the center of all the innovation that’s to come, and that it delivers real benefits in people’s lives. That fundamentally is the test that we have to pass, and it’s a test I think you’ve heard President Biden allude to. In short, democracies have to pass the tech test together. And diplomacy, I believe, has a big role to play in that. Now, any time you hear someone from the State Department talking, we’re likely to throw in pillars and frameworks and tranches, so I can’t be any different today. We have to have our pillars, so let me walk you through six of them – (laughter) – that cover the approach to these issues. I know you’d be disappointed without it. The first is reducing the national security risks posed by malicious cyber activities and emerging technologies. This is the most basic thing our diplomacy has to do: protect our people, protect our networks, prevent conflict, and establish standards of responsible conduct in cyberspace. Already, we’ve brought countries together around an approach that recognizes international law to make it clear that countries are governed in cyberspace just like they are offline and that defines norms that apply not only in wartime but in peacetime too, because we’re now dealing with significant cyber incidents outside the context of war. We’ve also called for practical confidence-building measures; for example, steps as simple as establishing points of contact, so that in the event of a major cyber incident we actually know who to call. Under American leadership, UN member-states have come together repeatedly to reaffirm this basic framework. Now we’re working to bring allies and partners along to respond collectively when others engage in malicious cyber activity. That’s what happened after the SolarWinds intrusion. We attributed it to Russia; 22 countries, the European Union, NATO quickly supported that conclusion. And that’s important, because when we speak with one voice, we can more effectively deter future bad acts. Last month, as some of you will have noted, at the NATO summit, NATO reaffirmed that a cyber attack could trigger Article V – “an attack on one is an attack on all” – and that’s an important step too in deterring those attacks and protecting our national security in the cyber age. We’re also treating ransomware not only as a law enforcement issue but also as a national security issue. Ransomware and other cyber crimes affect all of us – our businesses, local governments; our most critical infrastructure, from power grids to hospitals. As you know, one in four Americans has been the victim of a cyber crime, at a cost of more than $4 billion every single year. That’s a direct threat to the safety, to the well-being of our people, and so it’s at the top of our diplomatic agenda. And it’s also why we’re elevating ransomware in our engagements with Russia. Our message is clear: Countries that harbor cyber criminals have a responsibility to take action. If they don’t, we will. We’re strengthening our diplomatic and foreign assistance tools to fight transnational cyber criminals, and we’re working to expand membership in the global cyber crime treaty known as the Budapest Convention. We’ll launch similar efforts on AI and other emerging technologies. If they’re going to be used as part of our national defense, we want the world to have a shared understanding of how to do that responsibly, in the same way that we’ve hammered out rules for how to use conventional and nuclear weapons. That’s how we reduce the risk of proliferation. It’s how we prevent escalation or unintended incidents.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---AI › Solvency---AI

The State Department plays a crucial role in AI development and deployment

Shrestha 21 (Madhav, “Artificial intelligence: Strategic tool in diplomacy,” The Himalayan,

Extensive research is being made in the developed world to create humanised artificial intelligence empowered with understanding, feelings, empathy and sympathy for diplomatic performance and to equip AI with trust, confidence and credibility. AI will also be enabled to recognise time and space and learn the necessary tacts. There is a need for the AI triad of data, talent (to develop algorithms) and computing power even to negotiate and represent national interest. Researchers describe the current times as the "AI spring" as the "AI winter" of the last century has already passed.It is well known that the U.S. government had approved the "National Artificial Intelligence Act 2020" to promote AI and advance all its essential constituents encompassing social, financial, environmental and public welfare. The State Department, which plays a crucial role in AI development and deployment, has provided policy guidance to implement trustworthy AI programmes through the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) AI Policy Observatory, a forum established in February 2021.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---AI › Solvency---AI

State Department leadership on AI solves before it can outpace restriction

Burns 19, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal (Random House, 2019), from which portions of this essay are adapted. He was a career diplomat in the U.S. State Department for 33 years, serving as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State from 2011 to 2014. (William, “The Lost Art of American Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-27/lost-art-american-diplomacy)//BB

Reaffirming the foundations of American diplomacy is necessary but not sufficient to make it effective for a new and demanding era. The State Department will also have to adapt in ways it never before has, making sure that it is positioned to tackle the consequential tests of tomorrow and not just the policy fads of today. It can begin by taking a cue from the U.S. military’s introspective bent. The Pentagon has long embraced the value of case studies and after-action reports, and it has formalized a culture of professional education. Career diplomats, by contrast, have tended to pride themselves more on their ability to adjust quickly to shifting circumstances than on paying systematic attention to lessons learned and long-term thinking. As part of a post-Trump reinvention of diplomacy, then, the State Department ought to place a new emphasis on the craft, rediscovering diplomatic history, sharpening negotiation skills, and making the lessons of negotiations—both successful and unsuccessful—accessible to practitioners. That means fully realizing the potential of new initiatives such as the Foreign Service Institute’s Center for the Study of the Conduct of Diplomacy, where diplomats examine recent case studies. The U.S. government will also have to update its diplomatic capacity when it comes to the issues that matter to twenty-first-century foreign policy—particularly technology, economics, energy, and the climate. My generation and its predecessor had plenty of specialists in nuclear arms control and conventional energy issues; missile throw-weights and oil-pricing mechanisms were not alien concepts. During my last few years in government, however, I spent too much time sitting in meetings on the seventh floor of the State Department and in the White House Situation Room with smart, dedicated colleagues, all of us collectively faking it on the intricacies of cyberwarfare or the geopolitics of data. The pace of advances in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and synthetic biology will only increase in the years ahead, outstripping the ability of states and societies to devise ways to maximize their benefits, minimize their downsides, and create workable international rules of the road. To address these threats, the State Department will have to take the lead—just as it did during the nuclear age—building legal and normative frameworks and ensuring that every new officer is versed in these complex issues.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---CYBER › Solvency---Cyber---AT DoD Key

New DoS-led cyber initiatives make existing DoD cyber efforts more effective. That solves.

Goldman 20, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State (Emily, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” Texas National Security Review, 3.4)//BB

The U.S. National Cyber Strategy’s guidance to promote a framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, one that ensures there are consequences for irresponsible behavior, is a key objective for the United States. To succeed, this framework should be pursued in tandem with an active approach to stem ongoing adversary cyberspace campaigns outside of armed conflict. The Department of Defense is now defending forward, outside its existing networks, to mitigate threats before they reach the United States. It is time for the State Department to join in these efforts. An informal division of labor currently exists between the departments of State and Defense, whereby the former promotes norms in traditional diplomatic channels while the latter pursues defend forward through military channels. Yet this leaves several problems unresolved. Parallel communication increases the risk of messaging fratricide across military and diplomatic channels in partner nations. Military cyber operations may engage foreign policy sensitivities that the State Department is better equipped to address. On the other hand, State Department desk officers may throw a wrench into planning because they do not understand Defense Department strategy. The United States needs to operate continuously alongside allies and partners. Leadership from the State Department can increase the speed, agility, and scale of defend forward activities and operations by working through diplomatic channels to set the conditions for the United States to operate by, with, and through foreign partners and their networks in order to expose, contest, and defend against adversary cyber aggression. Sustained diplomacy can help institutionalize these operational partnerships and make defend forward more anticipatory and effective. Institutionalized cooperation, including the conduct of joint and coalition operations and the development of agreed-upon legal and policy frameworks, is essential to prevail in long-term strategic competition. The State Department can set the conditions for consensual foreign partner-enabled discovery operations (i.e., “hunt forward” operations) through bilateral engagements.68 These operations enable the United States and its partners to understand an adversary’s tactics, techniques, and procedures. This will in turn enable network defense of U.S. partners, improve anticipatory resilience of U.S. and partner networks, and thwart cyberspace aggression. The State Department can scale the process of explaining the Defense Department’s defend forward strategy, enabling the United States to proactively set the conditions for “hunt forward” operations. The State Department can also actively ensure Defense Department cyber teams receive support from U.S. embassy country teams and benefit from insights about foreign partner networks gained through State and USAID-led cyber security capacity-building programs.