2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – AI
Shaed, 21 (Sam Shead, 12-17-2021, “UN talks to ban ‘slaughterbots’ collapsed — here’s why that matters,” CNBC, , LASA-CSK)
A UN conference failed to agree on banning the use and development of so-called “slaughterbots” at a meeting in Geneva last week, raising alarm bells among experts in artificial intelligence, military strategy, disarmament and humanitarian law. Slaughterbots are weapons that select and apply force to targets without human intervention. Instead, they make their decisions with artificial intelligence software, which is essentially a series of algorithms. For the first time ever this year, the bulk of the 125 nations that belong to the United Nations’ Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) said they wanted new laws to be introduced on killer robots. However, some countries that are developing these weapons including the U.S. and Russia, were in opposition, making a unilateral agreement impossible. The U.K. and several other nations also objected. “We would have liked to have seen everyone get behind that,” Emilia Javorsky, a physician scientist who leads the Future of Life Institute’s advocacy program on autonomous weapons, told CNBC. “All it takes is one,” she added. The conference concluded Friday, with the group pledging to “intensify” discussions and consider possible steps that are acceptable to all. The fact that the CCW failed to agree on anything concrete last week was hailed as an “epic failure” by Javorsky. “It is now blatantly clear this forum — whose unanimity requirement makes it easily derailed by any state with a vested interest — is utterly incapable of taking seriously, let alone meaningfully addressing, the urgent threats posed by emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence,” she said. Verity Coyle, a senior advisor at Amnesty International, said in a statement that the window of opportunity to regulate killer robots grows ever smaller as research and testing of these weapons presses forward. “The CCW has once again demonstrated its inability to make meaningful progress – it’s now time that committed states take the lead on an external process that can deliver the type of breakthrough we’ve previously seen on landmines and cluster munitions,” she said.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Aff › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – AI
Fournier-Tombs, 21 (Eleonore Fournier-Tombs, 5-31-2021, "The United Nations needs to start regulating the 'Wild West' of artificial intelligence," Conversation, , LASA-CSK)
Conversely, the lack of regulation at the United Nations can be considered a challenge for agencies seeking to adopt more effective and novel technologies. As such, many systems seem to have been developed and later abandoned without being integrated into actual decision-making systems. An example of this is the Jetson tool, which was developed by UNHCR to predict the arrival of internally displaced persons to refugee camps in Somalia. The tool does not appear to have been updated since 2019, and seems unlikely to transition into the humanitarian organization’s operations. Unless, that is, it can be properly certified by a new regulatory system. Trust in AI is difficult to obtain, particularly in United Nations work, which is highly political and affects very vulnerable populations. The onus has largely been on data scientists to develop the credibility of their tools.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › NB › 2NC – Internal NB – Cyber-Specific
Hagebölling , 4/12 (David Hagebölling, 4-12-2022, "The Geopolitical Struggle for Technology Leadership," No Publication, , LASA-CSK)
Fourth, amidst the growth of cyber capabilities as a destabilizing force in international security, the norms and rules for how to govern them are now at a crossroads. In the past, a sequence of six UN Governmental Groups of Expert (GGE) has worked toward defining norms of responsible state behavior and affirmed the applicability of international law to cyberspace. In 2019, the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) was established as a de facto parallel track to the GGE, mainly on Russia’s initiative. The agreement on the OEWG’s final report reached less than a year ago marked the first time that consensus, including on language and recommendations from the GGE, has been reached in a process open to all UN member states. However, major divergences on the way forward remain, particularly on questions of implementation and multi-stakeholderism in the ongoing diplomatic initiatives. A French-Egyptian Program of Action aimed at invigorating cooperation in a permanent United Nations forum is at risk of fading into obscurity if not urgently advanced this year. Above all this looms the possibility that Russia further escalates its use of cyber capabilities against Ukraine and—possibly inadvertently—other countries, which would weigh heavily on the prospect for progress on cyber diplomacy at the United Nations.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › NB › 2NC – RCA NB
Ku, 4/7 (Julian G. Ku, Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Law at Hofstra University, 4-7-2022, "China Has Ditched Its Own Principles to Back Russia," Foreign Policy, , LASA-CSK)
“China always opposes the use of force in international relations.” This boilerplate statement, frequently repeated by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reflects Beijing’s long-standing, publicly stated opposition to the use of military force outside the limitations imposed by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. It is a fundamental principle of its approach to international law and a significant feature of its self-portrayal as neutral, peaceful state in contrast to the United States. Yet China, which has repeatedly refused to criticize Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, appears to have abandoned its long-standing legal and diplomatic position. Beijing’s silence on Ukraine may represent a temporary accommodation of its most important geopolitical ally, but it could also represent a meaningful shift in the Chinese government’s views on the propriety of the use of force. Either way, China’s silence as Russia blatantly violates one of its most cherished principles of international law deserves both criticism and careful attention if it also represents a shift toward a more aggressive and dangerous Chinese foreign policy. Since its admission into the United Nations in 1971, China has emerged as a reliable defender of the centrality of the world body and the U.N. Charter to the conduct of international relations. In a revealing 2005 position paper on proposals for U.N. reform, China lauded the United Nations’ “indispensable role in international affairs.” It made such statements even as it rejected calls at the time to endorse a “Responsibility to Protect” principle that would allow the use of force to prevent humanitarian atrocities. The U.N. Security Council, China argued at that time, “is the only body that can decide the use of force.” This position is consistent with both prior and subsequent Chinese government statements. For instance, even before it joined the U.N. but after it had diplomatically split with the Soviet Union, China publicly condemned the Soviet Union’s use of force in Czechoslovakia in 1968. And unlike its current silence on Russia, the Chinese foreign ministry didn’t hesitate to call the U.S. military action in Panama a “military invasion” that “constitutes an infringement against a sovereign state of the third world and violates the norms of international law and the aims and purposes of the United Nations Charter.” This condemnation was made even though China and Panama had no diplomatic relations at that time, with Panama instead recognizing Taiwan. A decade later, the Chinese government aggressively opposed NATO’s military intervention against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis and joined only Russia and Namibia in supporting a U.N. Security Council resolution that would have condemned NATO’s use of force. As China’s U.N. ambassador declared months earlier, NATO’s use of force “violated the purposes, principles, and relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter, as well as international law and widely acknowledged norms governing relations between states.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › NB › 2NC – RCA NB
Laurenti 98, Executive Director of Policy Studies, UNA-USA (Jeffrey, “Different Security Roles: The Security Council and NATO,” Global Policy,
In contrast to the NATO treaty (that is, the North Atlantic Treaty as it was written, not as some in Washington might wish to reinvent it), the U.N. Charter creates a comprehensive security organization. The North Atlantic Treaty is quite intentionally one-dimensional: responding collectively to an "armed attack" upon the home territory of any of its members, in exercise of inherent "self-defense" as recognized by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter (and even that, only till the Security Council can "take measures necessary to maintain international peace and security" in that situation). NATO's mission is narrowly one of repelling illegal armed force (against its own members, of course)--the restricted scope that some contributors to this forum would crabbedly apply to the U.N. as well.
The U.N. Security Council's mandate is far broader--dealing with ANY "threat to the peace". Add to that its functions in peacekeeping, peaceful resolution of disputes, and the work of other parts of the U.N. in building the economic and social foundations of peaceful relations, and you have a multidimensional and comprehensive security system.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › NB › 2NC – Politics NB
Tingley and Tomz, 12 (Dustin Tingley, Harvard University, and Michael Tomz, Stanford University, 11-2012, "How does the UN Security Council Influence Public Opinion?," University of Virginia, , LASA-CSK)
UNSC resolutions could affect public opinion not only by signaling that military action is warranted, but also by implying that other countries will share the burden. Citizens may think the likelihood of success is higher if countries fight collectively than if their own country acts alone. Moreover, citizens may expect to pay less if coalition partners share the human and financial costs of defeating an adversary. For these reasons, the public should be more enthusiastic when they believe that other countries will help. By raising expectations about multilateral action, UNSC resolutions could, therefore, increase public support for war. If UNSC resolutions sway public opinion by signaling that other countries will contribute, several patterns should appear in the data. First, the belief that other countries will contribute should be higher when the UNSC has voted for war than when it has not. Second, public expectations about the human and financial costs of war should be lower, and public expectations about the probability of success should be higher, when the UNSC has voted for war than when it has not.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › NB › 2NC – Politics NB
Tingley and Tomz, 12 (Dustin Tingley, Harvard University, and Michael Tomz, Stanford University, 11-2012, "How does the UN Security Council Influence Public Opinion?," University of Virginia, , LASA-CSK)
Publics do not have complete information about foreign crises, and therefore rely on domestic and international actors for cues about the appropriate course of action. The UNSC could play an important role in this process. By authorizing the use of force, the UNSC could convince domestic audiences that there must be a good case for military action. A UNSC resolution could change peoples’ estimates about the material costs and benefits of using force. An affirmative UNSC vote could help convince domestic audiences that the foreign crisis is genuine and severe, such that failure to take military action could threaten the material interests of the United States and/or other countries. An affirmative vote could also suggest that the human and financial costs of military action would be low, either in absolute terms or relative to the anticipated benefits. Finally, an affirmative vote could signal to domestic audiences that the probability of military success would be high, or at least sufficiently likely to warrant a positive recommendation. In all these ways, a UNSC resolution could alter the public’s calculations about whether the benefits of war would outweigh the costs. A UNSC resolution could also signal that military action would be morally appropriate, independent of the material costs and benefits. A positive vote in the Security Council could be seen as confirmation that some country has committed a moral wrong, such as an act of aggression against its own citizens or a foreign target, and that the international community has a duty to respond. The vote might also suggest that war would be “fair” – an action to which nearly all countries could consent, rather than a war that would serve the parochial interests of particular countries. Finally, a war undertaken with the blessing of the UNSC would be legal, whereas war without UNSC approval might be seen as a (potentially immoral) violation of international law. Thus, UNSC resolutions could prove influential not only by conveying information about material costs and benefits, but also by signaling whether military action would be morally justified.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › Theory › 2NC – NATO v UN
Sponeck, 9 (Hans Von Sponeck, 2-17-2009, "The UN and NATO: Which Security and for Whom?," Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, , LASA-CSK)
A comparison of the mandates of the United Nations and of NATO shows clearly how opposed the purposes of these two institutions are. In the 63 years of its existence, the United Nations mandate has remained the same.
The United Nations was created to promote and maintain worldwide peace. NATO exists to assure the self-interest of a group of 26 UN member countries. Its mandate, grounded in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, originally dealt with the defense of its member states. At the end of the Cold War, in 1989, its mandate appeared to have been fulfilled. Nevertheless, the NATO members wanted to maintain this Western alliance. This launched the search for a new role for NATO.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › Theory › 2NC – NATO v UN
Boothby, 99 (Derek Boothby, 07-14-1999, " NATO and the United Nations," No Publication, , LASA-CSK)
NATO and the U.N. are two organizations trying to work together despite the fact that they have very different philosophies: NATO is an organization designed to fight war, if necessary, in order to defend peace; whereas the U.N. is an organization designed to avoid war in order to maintain peace. In other words, the effectiveness of NATO is directly proportional to the amount of military force available for use; whereas the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping is inversely proportional to the amount of military force used.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › Theory › 2NC – AT: Multi-Actor Fiat
Shraga, 7 (Daphna Shraga, 11-8-2007, "The United Nations as an actor bound by international humanitarian law," Taylor & Francis, , LASA-CSK)
The United Nations as an actor bound by international humanitarian law. Although for many years the United Nations has been reluctant to formally recognize the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) to UN peacekeeping operations, the changing role and nature of UN peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s made this recognition imperative. In discussing the principle and scope of application of IHL to UN forces, the article examines the main arguments in the UN‐ICRC debate; the UN undertaking in the Status of Forces Agreements to observe and respect the spirit and principles of IHL Conventions; the international responsibility of the United Nations for activities of UN forces, and the relationship between the applicability of IHL to UN forces and the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel. The article argues that IHL applies to UN forces when they are actively engaged in military operations as combatants, but that its applicability is mutatis‐mutandis, taking into consideration the nature and legal status of the United Nations Organization and its capacity to be bound by its provisions.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › Theory › 2NC – AT: Multi-Actor Fiat
Auto, 12 (Emilia Autio, 12-4-2012, "One UN for Development? The United Nations as an Actor in International Development," No Publication, , LASA-CSK)
Based on the analysis, the UN can be seen as an independent actor, its many different functions and especially its expertise in development making it an authoritative actor in international development. The organization is both supporting the work of its member states and actively promoting ideas important to its own agenda. The ideas presented already in the UN charter in 1945 are still evident in the work of the organization and guide the work of the organization over the often conflicting interests of the member states. The UN has various means to affect the decision-making of the member states and, thus, contribute to the development activities not only by regulating but also constituting understandings of development. One of the most important result of this thesis is therefore the abundance of action apparent in the work of the UN in development, presenting the organization not so much as an employee of the member states but as an independent, active authority. The results, therefore, are in line with the core ideas of the bureaucracy theory.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › Perm › 2NC – AT: PDB
Patomäki , 18 (Heikki Patomäki, 07-30-2018, "Kosovo and the end of the United Nations?," Manchester Open Hive, https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526137517.00010, LASA-CSK)
The UN’s General Assembly has been the only truly global public political forum for which all states are equal. It has provided a framework for decolonisation and the pursuit of the reform of international institutions. The UN Charter has provided seeds for a claim made on behalf of an alternative organising principle of world affairs, namely for a democratic community of states, with equal voting rights in the General Assembly of nation states, openly and collectively regulating international life in accordance with the UN Charter and human rights conventions.80 Despite its many practical shortcomings and problematic state-centrism, the UN has thus provided a forum, constituted by legal procedures and rules, where differences have encountered each other in a peaceful manner and where, sometimes, common policies on a number of issues have been worked out. The domestication of the UN by the US has severely damaged both the moral basis of UN pluralism and the legal procedures and rules on which the UN has been based. After the events of the last fifteen years, very little of the spirit of the UN Charter is left; and NATO is seriously aspiring to the role of the global security organisation. There are also very few signs to indicate that the US would allow a rejuvenation or a democratisation of the UN, or even grant more autonomy to the present UN. Nor is it easy to organise resistance against US hegemony in the struggle for transformations within the UN without becoming just another enemy for the US, given its economic privileges and interests, its Manichean tendencies, and the entanglement of its public politics with the functioning of the short-sighted, self-referential and simulatory commercial media. It is likely that the consequent confrontation would quickly bring any progress made to a halt.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › Perm › 2NC – AT: PDB
Sponeck, 9 (Hans Von Sponeck, 2-17-2009, "The UN and NATO: Which Security and for Whom?," Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, , LASA-CSK)
UN mandate makes NATO obsolete Any evaluation of the UN/NATO pact must take into account that NATO is a relic of the Cold War; that NATO, as a Western alliance, is regarded with considerable mistrust by the other 166 United Nations member states; that a primary NATO aim is to assert, by military means, its energy and power interests in opposition to other United Nations member states and that the United States, a founding member of the NATO community, in the most unscrupulous ways, has disparaged the United Nations and broken international law. (7) Finally, it must be pointed out that the Charter of the United Nations provides for a Military Staff Committee, whose mandate is to advise and assist the United Nations Security Council “on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security.” (8) If it is thus a matter of NATO countries looking after the well-being of the international community and not the interests of small group of states, then the United Nations mandate makes NATO obsolete!
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – AT Russia
Remler, 20 (Philip Remler, 1-22-2020, "Russia at the United Nations: Law, Sovereignty, and Legitimacy," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, , LASA-CSK)
In analyzing how Russia goes about promoting its status as a global power at the UN, the concept of international law stands out as Russia’s most important battle line. In speech after speech, both Putin and Lavrov have stressed the importance of upholding international law. Lavrov often contrasts this law with an alternative that he maintains the West is promoting to expand Western interests and values; in a 2018 address, for example, he charged: “Today we can trace a tendency to substitute for international law, as we all know it, some kind of ‘rules-based order.’ That is what a series of our creative Western friends call it.”2
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – AT Countries Don’t Follow
Koliward, 21 (Priya Koliwad, 10-06-2021, "Is the United Nations Still a Relevant International Body? — The World Mind ," World Mind, , LASA-CSK)
The United Nations is still relevant, especially since the world has become interconnected and where current global problems, such as hunger and climate change have emerged, thus the UN’s collective efforts are essential to tackle these modern challenges. The UN has attempted to improve its structure, however, the lack of willingness by member states has impeded the UN’s progress. The reform agenda should be directed towards strengthening the UN’s outstanding thinking and could be a solution that would encourage \ member states to be involved in building such a network which could ultimately lead to better adherence to the UN’s structural reform agenda. Clearly, it is relatively complicated to determine the measures that can generate the will and it is not going to be easy to design a new UN once these measures are discovered either. However, if the member states notice that the only alternative without the UN is to address the growing number of complicated interconnected and wide scope challenges by themselves. They will be left with no choice but to accept the fact that it might be better to collectively repair the UN rather than be left alone to face the dramatic challenges of today's world.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – AT UN Bad
Daalder, 99 (Ivo H. Daalder, President, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 3-1-1999, "NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force," Brookings, , LASA-CSK)
Of the many issues relating to the threat and use of force by NATO that have divided the allies, none have been as contentious as the so-called mandate question, i.e., under what authority or on which legal basis can NATO threaten or use military force in other than a collective defense contingency. At the outset of this debate, most allies believed that NATO should not act in this type of situation without an explicit mandate or authorization from the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Allied leaders agreed as much at their 1994 Brussels Summit: “We reaffirm our offer to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the CSCE.” In recent years, however, there has been a growing division within the Alliance about the role and authority, if any, of the UN and other organizations in legitimizing or mandating the use of force by NATO. Two competing perspectives have emerged—a French perspective that gives the UN Security Council the primary role in authorizing NATO’s use of force; and a U.S. perspective that essentially argues that NATO has the right to use force whenever the interests of its members so require. The French perspective is based on the notion that the use force in international affairs, by a single state or group of states like NATO, is ultimately governed by the United Nations Charter. The UN Security Council is empowered by the Charter to determine the existence of any threat to or breach of peace (Article 39). At the same time, the Charter recognizes that states have the right to defend themselves individually and collectively (Article 51) and that regional arrangements or agencies can maintain peace and security within their region, provided they do so in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN (Article 52). The first purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security (Article 1) and one of its key principles requires members to refrain from “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations” (Article 2). Given this legal foundation, it follows that NATO can resort to force in self-defense, either of a member state that is attacked or of a non-member state so long as the government of that state requests NATO’s assistance. The former situation falls squarely within the collective defense commitment of the Washington treaty; the latter, as the case of Bosnia demonstrated, follows logically from the right of collective self-defense. At the same time, NATO cannot use force against another UN member state without its government’s consent if the action is not itself in defense of another UN member state unless the action is specifically authorized by the UN Security Council. That is the import of both Article 2 (which prohibits the use force against the territory or political independence of another state) and the proviso of Article 52 which limits action by regional arrangements such as NATO to those that are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. It follows from this reasoning that NATO can only use force in non-Article 5 contingencies either if it is invited to do so by the state involved or if it is explicitly authorized by the UN Security Council. Accordingly, France (with support from some allies) has insisted that the revised NATO strategic concept should explicitly predicate the use of force by NATO in these circumstances on the Alliance receiving a mandate from the UN Security Council.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – AT Military Key
ICRC, 96 (ICRC, 5-15-1996, "UN, Guidelines for UN Forces," ICRC News, , LASA-CSK)
1.1 The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set out in the present bulletin are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-defence.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – Enforcement
Sponeck, 9 (Hans Von Sponeck, 2-17-2009, "The UN and NATO: Which Security and for Whom?," Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, , LASA-CSK)
21st century NATO incompatible with UN Charter In 1999, NATO acknowledged that it was seeking to orient itself according to a new fundamental strategic concept. From a narrow military defense alliance it was to become a broad based alliance for the protection of the vital resources’ needs of its members. Besides the defense of member states’ borders, it set itself new purposes such as assured access to energy sources and the right to intervene in “movements of large numbers of persons” and in conflicts far from the boarders of NATO countries. The readiness of the new alliance to include other countries, particularly those that had previously been part of the Soviet Union, shows how the character of this military alliance has altered. In the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, the Charter of the United Nations was declared to be NATO’s legally binding framework. However, the United Nations monopoly of the use of force, especially as specified in Article 51 of the Charter, was no longer accepted according to the 1999 NATO doctrine. NATO’s territorial scope, until then limited to the Euro-Atlantic region, was expanded by its member to encompass the whole world in keeping with a strategic context that was global in its sweep. At the Budapest summit, on 3 April 2008, NATO declared that it intended to meet the emerging challenges of the twenty-first century “with all the possible means of its mission.” It added that the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty of the founding countries had been ratified by the current parliaments and thereby had become international law. This did not hold for later NATO strategies and doctrines.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – Enforcement
Divac, 5 (Marko Divac, 11-1-2005, "Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ," OUP Academic, , LASA-CSK)
Ratione materiae, the binding effect of SC resolutions belongs to the realm of international peace and security38 and includes enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,39 but is not limited to that.40 Since just about any significant international event or situation can be characterized as a threat to peace and security,41 the scope of the SC’s binding powers, if combined with an overriding binding force, would make the SC a dauntingly powerful organ. Whether a specific SC resolution is binding is determined by the language used in it, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked, etc.,42 all with the purpose of establishing the intent of the SC.43 The precise content of the binding effect is left to the SC itself,44 but the Court has found certain ‘implicit’ legal effects and, inversely, put some limits on the effects45 when these conflict with the principles and purposes in Chapter I of the UN Charter.46 This limitation is too vague to have much practical value in the absence of any organ competent to review the validity of SC resolutions.47 Ratione personae, an SC decision may bind all UN Member States, including ‘those members of the Security Council which voted against it and those Members of the United Nations who are not members of the Council’.48 As for non-Member States, the most coherent interpretation of a difficult passage in the Namibia opinion rejects any direct binding effect.49 This interpretation respects the basic principle that treaties only bind parties, and avoids the difficult question of whether the UN Charter is subject to special rules within the law of treaties. It also leads to the same practical outcome since just about every state is now a member of the UN.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › Solvency › 2NC – Solvency – Enforcement
Joyner, 17 (Dan Joyner, 1-9-2017, "Legal Bindingness of Security Council Resolutions Generally, and Resolution 2334 on the Israeli Settlements in Particular," EJIL: Talk!, , LASA-CSK)
I thought this would be a good opportunity to write briefly to clarify that the legal obligation for U.N. Charter states parties to comply with the decisions of the Security Council, contained in Article 24 and 25 of the Charter, is not contingent upon the Council’s acting in exercise of its Chapter VII powers. Any decision of the Security Council is legally binding upon all U.N. member states, whether or not the text of the resolution explicitly references Chapter VII.