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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership › AT China Peaceful

China rise is hostile---prefer our evidence---China is adept at portraying itself as non-confrontational.

Mastro 19, Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University and Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. She is the author of the forthcoming book The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime, (Oriana Skylar, January/February 2019, “The Stealth Superpower: How China Hid Its Global Ambitions” Foreign Affairs Jan/Feb 2019 )

“China will not, repeat, not repeat the old practice of a strong country seeking hegemony,” Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, last September. It was a message that Chinese officials have been pushing ever since their country’s spectacular rise began. For decades, they have been at pains to downplay China’s power and reassure other countries—especially the United States—of its benign intentions. Jiang Zemin, China’s leader in the 1990s, called for mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation in the country’s foreign relations. Under Hu Jintao, who took the reins of power in 2002, “peaceful development” became the phrase of the moment. The current president, , insisted in September 2017 that China “lacks the gene” that drives great powers to seek hegemony.

It is easy to dismiss such protestations as simple deceit. In fact, however, Chinese leaders are telling the truth: Beijing truly does not want to at the top of the international system. China has no interest in establishing a web of global alliances, sustaining a far-flung global military presence, sending troops thousands of miles from its borders, leading international institutions that would constrain its own behavior, or spreading its system of government abroad.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership › AT China Peaceful

China is revisionist---the Xi doctrine declares Chinese territorial expansion and risks a CCP nuclear Pearl Harbor.

Thayer and Han 19, *Bradley A. Thayer is Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas San Antonio. *Lianchao Han is vice president of Citizen Power Initiatives for China and a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute. (June 12th, 2019, “The ‘Xi Doctrine’: Proclaiming and Rationalizing China’s Aggression,” National Interest, )

Using the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore this month, Chinese Minister of National Defense and State Councilor Gen. Wei Fenghe, delivered a sharp message to the United States, which may be termed the “Xi Doctrine” on China’s use of force, after Chinese premier Xi Jinping. Wei declaring both China’s resolve to aggress to advance its interests and a rationalization for the use of force. Wei’s de facto threat of war should not be lost in his nuances, deliberate ambiguity, or in translation. His remarks were so bellicose that the world has noticed, as was certainly intended by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Empirical evidence of China’s aggression is increasingly common, from its attempt to dominate the South China Sea, the neo-imperialist effort to gain control of states through the Belt and Road Initiative, to its technological imperialism to control 5G and artificial intelligence technologies. What is rather less frequent are statements from high-level Chinese officials proclaiming the country’s intent to be aggressive and offering an attempted legitimizing principle justifying that aggression.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership › AT Semiconductor Turn

Zero the turn—it’s a cartoon—China won’t invade to get semiconductors because it would never work

Calhoun 21 (George, Quantitative Finance Program Director, at Stevens Inst. of Technology, the same guy who probably wrote the other team’s card, but this one is 17 days later, “Why China (Probably) Won’t Go To War Over Taiwan’s Semiconductor Riches” 9/29/21 https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgecalhoun/2021/09/29/why-china-probably-wont-go-to-war-over-taiwans-semiconductor-riches/?sh=4d55e1d42aa4)

In a recent column, I drew the parallels between the economic and geopolitical tensions entangling Japan in 1941 and the challenges facing China today. The storyline is cartoonishly simple. In 1941, Japan’s constricted access to a critical resource (oil) led them to launch military action in Southeast Asia and the Pacific (including Pearl Harbor). It also aligned with their expansionist pretensions (they were already in Manchuria and parts of the mainland by then). In 2021, China is feeling similarly constricted for a critical resource (semiconductors), and Beijing’s policy options for addressing this problem might seem to converge with its expansionary tendencies, and its long-term concerns over the status of Taiwan. Could taking over Taiwan also solve the semiconductor problem? China has tried for over two decades to achieve a degree of self-sufficiency in semiconductor technology, with very limited success. Meanwhile, Taiwan has become a dominant power in the global semiconductor industry. Something like 75% of the world’s integrated circuit manufacturing capacity is based there. When it comes to the most advanced fabrication technologies, Taiwan outshines even the U.S. today – for example, 92% of the world’s capacity for the manufacturing “nodes” of 10 nanometers and below is currently located in Taiwan. Is the prize ripe enough to provoke Beijing to start a war? Does this construct make sense? Is military action by China, aimed at annexing Taiwan and taking control of Taiwanese semiconductor assets, likely? Is it even feasible? The short answer is No. War would not solve China’s problem. We should assume that Beijing understands that. The counterarguments against a military scenario – at least one that is driven by China’s semiconductor constraints – are very strong. The caveats fall into three inter-locking categories: Technological Issues Industry Structure Issues Supply Chain Issues [In pulling together what follows, I want to acknowledge – and recommend – two particularly valuable sources: A Report issued in June 2021 by The White House (& the Department of Commerce for the relevant section on Semiconductors), entitled “Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-Based Growth - 100-Day Review Under Executive Order 14017” A Report issued in April 2021 by the Boston Consulting Group and the Semiconductor Industry Association, entitled “Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era”] Technology Challenges The Japanese had it easy. In 1941, the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) was the fourth-largest exporter of oil in the world, behind the U.S., Iran, and Romania. When Japan invaded Southeast Asia in late 1941 and early 1942, their military strategy was predicated above all upon surprise – to secure these oil fields intact, denying the Dutch or the British the chance to destroy the wells and refineries. Japan was largely successful, and once in possession, could pump the oil without difficulty (until American forces eventually forced them out). It was feasible to take over the assets by force, and maintain them in full operation. The grab worked. This is not the case for Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturing facilities (“foundries”). Integrated circuit (IC) fabrication is probably the most complex manufacturing operation ever developed. It is also one of the most fragile, in the sense that it operates with extraordinarily tight tolerances for both the purity of the raw materials, and “the subatomic level of precision” at which many of the steps in the fabrication process are carried out. The technological challenges are severe, and constitute a significant barrier to the success of any hostile takeover. Complexity as a Barrier IC fabrication is “an incredibly complex process, involving hundreds of steps completed over several months” (White House Report). (It is also incredibly expensive – but that is another story. If the solution was simply financial, China might have an easier time of it.) There are many stages in the conversion of raw silicon into a finished integrated circuit, as shown in this graphic drawn from the BCG/SIA Report: This is not a single-loop process. Stages 1 through 4 here may be “repeated hundreds of times with different chemicals to create more layers, depending on the desired circuit features” (BCG/SIA). For the most advanced IC fab techniques, it takes 2 to 3 months to complete the fabrication of a wafer. The complexity is challenging even for the industry leaders, who have decades of experience. Even Intel, the largest semiconductor company in the world by sales, and generally regarded as the inventor of the first commercially available microprocessor IC’s, has stumbled in its manufacturing program, falling behind Taiwan Semiconductor Mftg Corp. and Samsung in the development of the latest generation of chip fabrication technologies. This is not a plug-and-play business. There is an immense amount of human know-how and expert technical skill involved in operating this mega-machine. Even if China were to find itself in intact possession of the physical infrastructure in Taiwan’s foundries tomorrow, would they know how to run it on their own? Of course not. They don’t have the experience. (Mainland Chinese IC companies have been frantic to recruit Taiwanese experts to help get their operations going.) Following a takeover, the new Chinese owners would still be heavily reliant upon the highly-skilled Taiwanese workforce they had just “annexed.” It takes little imagination to see how disaffection, or outright defection, of key employees could become the proverbial monkey wrench. The cotton fields in Xinjiang may be workable with forced labor, but an IC foundry is not. Fragility As A Barrier: The Challenge of the “11 Nines” Every stage of IC fabrication is based on extremely tight tolerances. This applies to the raw materials, all the inputs to the production process, “ultra pure gases, ultra pure water” - even the electricity must be ultra-reliable. The entire process must take place in “cleanrooms” – “Typical ambient room air contains 35,000,000 particles for each cubic meter in the size range 0.5 μm or larger while an ISO 1 cleanroom permits no particles in that size range and just 12 particles for each cubic meter of 0.3 μm and smaller.” (Wikipedia) The extreme purity required for the silicon wafers is indicative: “The semiconductor chain begins with polysilicon of ultra-high purity – 99.99999999999 percent pure… often referred to as “11 Nines” – with impurities equal to just one grain of sand in 16 Olympic-sized swimming pools.” - White House Report In other words, two grains of sand, or 13 specs of dust (so to speak) will bring down the house. Leaving aside the possibility of sabotage, as well as the sort of disruptions that occur in military operations, or indeed with management changes of any kind, the traditional “happy with crappy” approach of many mainland Chinese manufacturers is not likely to mesh well with these super-tight tolerances. All in all, transferring an IC fabrication facility and capability under the conditions of a Chinese takeover would not be a turn-key proposition. Industry Structure Issues Although it is often referred to as if it were a monolithic category, the Semiconductor industry includes companies with very different business models. A very simplified breakdown into the key sub-sectors is shown here. (There will be a more detailed column on this coming soon.) All of these functions must interact to produce an integrated circuit, and all these businesses are thus mutually dependent. Control of one segment is not enough to constitute self-sufficiency. For that, a country would need to have a strong presence in all of these segments. A rundown of the current national positioning in these segments would show the following: Design: This segment creates 50% of the total value added to a chip (according to the BCG/SIA report). The U.S. dominates the Design segment (e.g., the fabless IC companies like Qualcomm and Nvidia and many others). China has virtually no foothold. Fabrication (Foundries): This segment creates 24% of the value-added. It is dominated by Taiwan (principally Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp., TSMC). China is trying to become a player, but they are several generations behind the leader and have only a very small market share. Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment: This is the most tech-intensive segment, and accounts for 11% of the value-added. It is dominated by the U.S., with significant shares also held by Japanese and one Dutch company. China has no real share of this market. Assembly/Packaging/Test: This is the most commoditized segment, providing just 6% of the value-added. China has a modest presence in this business. Thus, even if we imagine that Taiwan’s presence in the foundry segment were to flip over, or be absorbed, without impairment, into the Chinese semiconductor economy, that would not provide Beijing with the self-sufficiency it wants. Foundries are expensive to build and challenging to operate, but the U.S. has the inherent capability to do it. It would be painful but we could cope. China as yet lacks the means to develop the Design and Manufacturing Equipment capabilities — without which the foundries cannot function. In other words, if there were to be a complete break – or, as the wonks like to put it nowadays, if there were a “decoupling” of the global semiconductor supply chain – which would hurt everyone, a lot, at least for a while – the U.S. would be in a better position to adjust than China would be. Supply Chain Challenges The reference to the global supply chain raises the third strategic obstacle to any plan to “solve” China’s semiconductor problem by annexing Taiwan and its foundries. As the White House Reports states, “The supply chains for semiconductor manufacturing are immense.” The micro-level technological fragility of the fabrication facility described above is mirrored at the macro-level by the tremendous complexity of the semiconductor supply chain, and the corresponding vulnerability of many of the linkages in those networks. The White House Report zeroes in on one example, involving one input category (chemicals) and one IC type (memory chips): “Aside from the immediately apparent inputs such as wafers and photomasks, the manufacturing of semiconductors requires hundreds of chemicals and dozens of gases. A 2018 study of chemical use in two memory device fabrication facilities found they each used over 400 chemical products weighing over 45,000 tons per year. As many as 49 gases alone may be used in semiconductor production. Many of these chemicals have their own extensive supply chains that may depend on limited or single sources of supply.” The networks created to support the production of a single IC can be vast. According to an Accenture report published in 2020 - “Each segment of the semiconductor value chain has, on average, 25 countries involved in the direct supply chain and 23 countries involved in supporting market functions. In fact, a semiconductor product could cross international borders approximately 70 or more times before finally making it to the end customer.” Individual companies are enmeshed in these networks to an astonishing degree of dependency. “The Semiconductor Industry Association notes that one of its members has over 16,000 suppliers, more than half outside the United States.” – White House Report Autarky Is Impossible The conclusion – that is, the rational conclusion – is that the military solution would not work for China. The Taiwanese dominance of the foundry segment is a very important feature of the semiconductor industry and indeed of the 21st century digital economy. But it is not a standalone asset, viewed from a macro perspective. It is part of a globalized eco-system that China cannot really escape from. Nor is it, as shown, a turn-key-able asset, a fungible capability that could easily be placed under “new management” in the event of a military takeover. The technological and logistical complexity of this critical sector invalidate any theory of “semiconductor autarky” or full self-sufficiency, certainly for China – and probably also for the U.S. (a caveat for the CHIPS bill and other measures gestating in Congress right now).

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership › AT Relations Turn

Power competition with China is inevitable—recent changes in doctrine prove they are trying lead the world order—relations are impossible

Hass 21 (Ryan, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, John L. Thornton China Center The Michael H. Armacost Chair Interim Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies Nonresident Fellow, Paul Tsai China Center, Yale Law School, “How China is responding to escalating strategic competition with the US” 3/1/21 )

There seems to be a growing consensus in Beijing that U.S.-China relations will remain rocky for the foreseeable future. Even so, President Xi Jinping and others have been touting that time and momentum are on China’s side in its quest to move closer to the center of the world stage. Chinese officials recognize that they will need to overcome obstacles in their country’s pursuit of its national goals. To do so, China appears to be pursuing a three-pronged medium-term strategy: maintaining a non-hostile external environment in order to focus on domestic priorities; reducing dependence on America while increasing the rest of the world’s dependence on China; and expanding the reach of Chinese influence overseas. At the same time, China’s actions are generating significant reactions, both at home and abroad. Whether China can learn from this feedback loop to address its own vulnerabilities remains an open question, one that only China will be capable of answering. Understanding China’s evaluation of – and response to – sharp shifts in U.S.-China relations and its international environment have rarely been more important. Given its expanding economic reach and growing strategic weight, China’s actions now directly impact lives in the United States and around the world. Yet, in some respects, it has become more difficult to see clearly what assumptions and decisions are guiding China’s changing approach to America and the world. There has been more heat than light in many recent American debates about China’s ambitions. Travel restrictions due to COVID-19 have eliminated opportunities for both informal in-person exchanges with Chinese officials and first-hand observation of Chinese society, which often have served as one of the richest sources of insight into the policy zeitgeist in Beijing. And into this vacuum, many American scholars have come to rely more on interpreting official and semi-official Chinese texts to develop conclusions on China’s strategic direction. ​My previous government service at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and in the White House National Security Council (NSC) has instilled me with humility about extrapolating China’s strategic designs from its publicly available statements and reports. Nevertheless, drawing from over 50 hours of Zoom-based dialogues with Chinese officials and scholars, a review of Chinese officials’ speeches and Chinese expert commentaries, and over a decade of interacting with senior Chinese officials on such questions, I do believe it is possible to draw some preliminary observations about China’s evolving approach to its changing international environment. ​The starting point of my analysis is to observe how far Chinese foreign policy has moved during the past two years. Writing for China Leadership Monitor in March 2019, former Obama administration National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for Asia Evan Medeiros observed that, “China’s reaction [to President Trump’s overtly hostile China strategy] was far more cautious – and even conciliatory at times – than confrontational. Beijing was primarily focused on limiting down-side risk and, to a limited extent, exploring opportunities for upside gains.”[1] Medeiros concluded, “A pattern became very clear in 2018: in the face of confrontational U.S. statements and actions, China maintained substantial engagement with a wide variety of Americans, made very careful public statements, and advocated negotiated solutions. Calibration and proportionality were driving China’s playbook far more than the tactics of opprobrium, isolation, and push-back.”[2] ​This evaluation of China’s orientation toward the United States remained largely intact through January 2020, when both sides finalized negotiations on a “phase-1” trade deal. In the weeks that followed, the bilateral dynamic shifted sharply. Facing the humanitarian and financial losses resulting from the uncontrolled spread of COVID-19, President Trump shifted from touting Xi Jinping as his friend to branding China as his enemy and the source of the pain that many Americans were feeling. And China largely reciprocated, pointing its propaganda cannons at America’s response to the public health crisis and the cascade of social, economic, and political problems that flowed from it. In subsequent months, a tit-for-tat pattern emerged, e.g., on treatment of each side’s journalists, on consulate closures, on recriminations over each side’s involvement in the origin of COVID-19, and on sanctions of high-level individuals in both countries. Beijing began mirror-imaging America’s economic pressure toolkit. Like the United States, China developed laws and regulations for export controls, national security investment screening, policy-related visa sanctions, and extraterritorial provisions in laws and administrative regulations. Beijing also grew less restrained in its actions at home and abroad. Chinese authorities advanced a campaign of brutal suppression in Xinjiang, tightened control of Hong Kong, crushed dissent across the country, engaged in deadly clashes with Indian troops for the first time in 45 years, punished countries and individuals that challenged China’s preferred narratives on sensitive issues, and pointedly criticized the performance of Western democracies. These actions represented a significant departure from the foreign policy focus on calibration and caution that HAD BEEN observable as recently as spring 2019. CHINA’S EVALUATION OF THE UNITED STATES There appears to be broad agreement among officials and experts in China that America’s power in the international system is declining relative to China’s. Many Chinese experts diagnose America’s anxiety about its relative decline as driving its reflexive efforts to undermine China’s rise. Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi gave expression to this viewpoint, for example, in his end-of-year interview with Xinhua on January 2, 2021. Reflecting on U.S.-China relations over the previous year, Wang concluded: ​In recent years, China-US relations have run into unprecedented difficulties. Fundamentally, it comes down to serious misconceptions of U.S. policymakers about China. Some see China as the so-called biggest threat and their China policy based on this misperception is simply wrong. What has happened proves that the U.S. attempt to suppress China and start a new Cold War has not just seriously harmed the interests of the two peoples, but also caused severe disruptions to the world. …China policy toward the United States is consistent and stable.[3] ​In other words, Wang put forward Beijing’s boilerplate explanation for the downturn in relations – it’s America’s fault. ​There are a diminishing number of Chinese officials or experts who remain willing, at least visibly, to question this explanation of the downturn in U.S.-China relations. One of the few to do so, albeit subtly, is Wang Jisi, president of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University. In a January 2021 op-ed, Wang observed, “Our actions at home and in the world determine to a large extent the attitude of the U.S. toward us. I believe that China, not the United States, can turn the tide of U.S.-China relations at historical junctures, although this position may be debatable.”[4] ​One issue where there does appear to be convergence of views inside China, though, is the expectation that there will be continuity in America’s strategic orientation toward China from Trump to Biden. Even as Chinese experts acknowledge that the Biden administration likely will adopt a more nuanced tone and professional approach for dealing with problems, they expect the root causes of American antagonism toward China will remain unchanged. Reflecting this view, Yuan Peng, an advisor to China’s top leaders and president of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), assesses, “A divided United States and polarized politics will limit Biden’s room to maneuver and force him to focus more energy on domestic challenges. …Biden’s first priority is to reunite the United States. …The U.S. will be consumed with dealing with its own structural challenges for many years.”[5] Peking University’s Wang Jisi similarly has concluded, “American policy toward China will continue unchanged under Biden.”[6] Beijing appears to be preparing for a long-term struggle with a declining but still dangerous United States. Privately, according to a well-informed policy advisor, China’s leadership has re-evaluated long-term trends and concluded that it no longer can base its national plans on expectations of generally stable relations with the United States.[7] Partly as a result, Chinese leaders have pulled forward plans to promote a “dual circulation” economic strategy. In rolling out the strategy, President Xi Jinping explained, “Only by being self-reliant and developing the domestic market and smoothing out internal circulation can we achieve vibrant growth and development, regardless of the hostility in the outside world.”[8] China’s spokespeople and official Chinese state media have sought to set public expectations for a long-term struggle with the United States. Key security officials, such as Politburo member and domestic security chief Guo Shengkun, have warned of the likelihood of a long-term struggle with the United States.[9] ​CHINA’S EVALUATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM China’s leaders now often refer to “profound changes unseen in a century” to describe their evaluation of the current fluidity IN the international system. These changes often are presented as a paradox, presenting both risks and opportunities for China. ​On one side of the coin, “profound changes unseen in a century” portend dangerous challenges to China. Politburo member and top diplomat Yang Jiechi framed the challenges by noting, “The world economy has been hit hard. …The pandemic has had a tremendous impact on international trade, investment, consumption, and other economic activities. …The pandemic [also] has exacerbated social cleavages, ethnic conflicts, and political confrontations. …The number of international security risks has increased.”[10] On the other side of the coin, Yang observed, “Reform of the international order has sped up. The PRC has taken the lead in controlling the epidemic on a global scale, and in achieving full resumption of work and production, all parties have increased their expectation and reliance on China.”[11] ​Thus, despite expectations of a protracted struggle with the United States, a view of China as an ever more central actor in the international system appears to be gaining traction inside China. At least outwardly, China’s leaders have grown self-congratulatory in their assessment of global trends working in China’s favor. In October, Xi Jinping told cadres at the 5th Plenum that “time and momentum are on our side.”[12] Similarly, Chen Yixin, secretary general of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission – the top oversight body for China’s domestic security – told a study session on January 15, “The rise of China is a major variable [in the world today]…the rise of the East and decline of the West has become a trend; changes of the international landscape are in our favor.”[13] CHINA’S STRATEGIC GOALS Discerning Beijing’s medium- and long-term strategic objectives has become one of the most heated debates in Western discourse on China. Proponents of viewing China as a malevolent power that seeks to impose its vision and its values on the rest of the world have been emboldened in recent years, largely as a result of China’s brutish behavior at home and abroad. China’s trampling of its citizens’ rights in Xinjiang and Hong Kong has undermined arguments outside of China that the country will pursue its national ambitions in a benign manner. From my vantage, Beijing sees itself as progressing along a continuum leading to China’s restoration as a central actor in Asia and a leading power on the world stage, a country with greater ability to shape rules, norms, and institutions toward its preferences. China’s leaders have consistently made clear their desire to have their political and economic models respected.[14] It also has been a consistent feature of Chinese foreign policy to push for deference to its “core interests.”[15] China’s foreign policy practitioners have explained that the country’s external relations should support its national goals, particularly its sustainable development.[16] These goals include realization of the country’s 14th five-year plan, its 2035 plan, and its second centenary goal of becoming a prosperous, strong, advanced country by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 2049.[17] In recent years, key Chinese voices also have become more willing to articulate China’s global ambitions. For example, Politburo member Yang Jiechi has written about the need for China’s foreign policy to lay a foundation “for national rejuvenation and provide an important guarantee for us to lead the world’s great changes and shape the external environment” (emphasis added).[18] ​To reach its long-term goals, Beijing recognizes it must first overcome near-term obstacles. One such potential obstacle is the formation of allied blocs to oppose Chinese initiatives and to obstruct China’s rise. Such concerns have taken on added urgency with Joe Biden’s election as President given Biden’s sustained emphasis on coordinating with allies and partners to push back against Chinese behaviors of concern.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership › AT Relations Turn

US-China relations are impossible—only maintaining competition and deterrence can preserve the LIO and create long-term cooperation

Ward 21 (Alex is a reporter covering the White House, with a focus on foreign policy and national security, “Don’t expect the US and China to be friendly anytime soon” 3/23/21 )

If the first meeting between the Biden administration and Chinese officials last week underscored anything, it’s that the US and China are unlikely to be friendly in the years to come. The two sides’ views of how the world should run are diametrically opposed — and competition more than cooperation will guide how Washington and Beijing interact for a long time. US Secretary of State Tony Blinken told his Chinese counterparts at the meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, that the Biden administration wouldn’t accept an international system that runs on Beijing’s concept of power, which he described as “a world in which might makes right and winners take all.” That, the top American diplomat said, “would be a far more violent and unstable world for all of us.” But Yang Jiechi, China’s top foreign affairs official, rejected that China should abide by the US-backed “rules-based international order” Blinken advocated for, which Yang noted is also “advocated by a small number of countries.” Instead, Yang asserted it was “important for all of us to come together to build a new type of international relations, ensuring fairness, justice, and mutual respect.” The yawning gap between the two sides makes it clear: “This is the battle for the international system,” Elizabeth Economy, an expert on China at Stanford University’s Hoover Institute, told me. “The challenge,” she added, is “fundamental.” Which is why, even though discord between the two countries is higher now than it’s been in decades, most experts I spoke to said the Biden administration shouldn’t try to improve relations with China. Washington should instead push Beijing hard on issues such as human rights, military aggression, economic coercion, and much more. Anything less, experts said, would implicitly invite China to run roughshod over the world. Progress can still be made despite the tensions. Where interests align — on climate change, North Korea, Afghanistan, and other issues — both sides can find common ground. But the American Enterprise Institute’s Zack Cooper told me cooperation for cooperation’s sake shouldn’t be the desired outcome. “The goal should be a results-oriented relationship,” he said. “What’s the point of discussion if we’re not actually going to resolve any of the problems?” Experts said this isn’t quite a new Cold War, though it may feel like it. That’s because the real sticking points are about trade, technology, and the rules of cyberspace rather than the threat of nuclear annihilation. This is a superpower rivalry for a new era — and it’s likely going to get worse before it gets better. “The relationship has deteriorated to the worst point that I’ve seen in the last two decades,” said Economy. While ties haven’t reached rock bottom, “we’ve got conflict in pretty much every single policy area.” Engagement with China didn’t work. Biden is pursuing a course correction. Engagement with China, meaning consistent and significant dialogue on areas of mutual interest, defined Washington-Beijing relations since the Nixon era. There was bipartisan agreement on that in the US, and recent presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama both approached Beijing in this way. Both wanted China to become a “responsible stakeholder.” That’s a wonderfully wonky Washington term that mostly means they hoped Beijing would come to abide by the global rules of the game on everything from trade to military affairs to international relations, even as the country gained immense power. Instead of bullying or threatening China to force it to stop doing things like cheating on international trade rules, stealing other countries’ intellectual property, and grievously violating human rights at home (among other things), the strategy was to develop close economic ties with China and encourage it to become more integrated into the world economy. The hope was that would lead Beijing to start acting more responsibly on its own because it would be in its self-interest to do so. That didn’t happen, though. Instead, China under President Xi Jinping became more authoritarian internally and far more aggressive on the world stage. Among many acts, China has forcibly placed roughly 2 million Uyghur Muslims in concentration camps, stripped Hong Kong of its democracy, and turned Taiwan into a global flashpoint that could erupt into a much larger conflict. And its aggressive behavior toward the US and its interests continues. Beijing has stolen US technological and personnel secrets for its own advantage, antagonized US allies in the South China Sea, killed or imprisoned more than a dozen American informants, and taken millions of US jobs over the past two decades. Most recently, China reportedly hacked America’s payroll agency. The Trump administration, then, felt it was time for the US to correct course. “What do the American people have to show now, 50 years on from engagement with China?” Trump’s then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo asked a crowd at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum last month. “The old paradigm of blind engagement with China simply won’t get it done. We must not continue it and we must not return to it.” Trump’s team confronted China mostly via a trade war, aiming to hurt Beijing’s economy by displacing it from the center of global supply chains and barring it from exporting some of its technology to the US and partner nations. That approach partially worked, in that some jobs in China moved elsewhere, Beijing suffered an economic slowdown, and certain allies were made more skeptical of Chinese technologies companies like Huawei. Trump’s actions also socialized the idea in Washington that competition with China was a worthwhile endeavor, even if his methods didn’t receive bipartisan support. But most experts warned that the administration’s unilateral plan of attack, without significant buy-in from other countries, wouldn’t be enough to compel Beijing to alter its behavior. They were right. As Trump left office, China, for example, proceeded to imprison Uyghurs and take more control of Hong Kong while doing little to change its trading practices with the US. All that bluster, then, didn’t accomplish Trump’s goal of fundamentally changing the way Beijing acted in the world. Enter the Biden administration. Biden’s China strategy is competitive by nature Biden has been clear on the need to counter China. “American leadership must meet this new moment of advancing authoritarianism, including the growing ambitions of China to rival the United States,” he said during a February speech. “We’ll confront China’s economic abuses; counter its aggressive, coercive action; to push back on China’s attack on human rights, intellectual property, and global governance. But we are ready to work with Beijing when it’s in America’s interest to do so,” he continued. Pushing Beijing to protect human rights and not use force or coercion to achieve its goals, while leaving the door to cooperate on areas of mutual interest, is the Biden administration’s China game plan. “Our relationship with China will be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be,” Blinken said during a March 3 foreign policy address. To do that, the Biden administration has two main plays. First, they hope to enlist allies and partners in an international effort to compel Beijing to change its ways. Biden firmly believes the US will only get the upper hand on China by proving it has a coalition of friends willing to thwart Beijing’s most troublesome policies in unison. Think of it like a geopolitical gang-up: the US and its crew versus a mostly lonely China. “We need to rally the democratic world together more than ever,” a former Biden staffer told me last year. “It’ll be a democratic alliance to save the world.” Biden’s meeting earlier this month with “the Quad” — a coalition of anti-China nations featuring India, Australia, and Japan — is case in point. While they don’t openly say the express aim of the group is to counter Beijing’s actions in the Indo-Pacific, most experts say that is very clearly the point of the group. Second, the Biden administration wants to revitalize America at home. That means, among other things, improving the nation’s democracy, pursuing racial equity, becoming more competitive economically and technologically, and rebuilding trust in the US as the world’s leader. This is an important part of the China plan, experts say. “We’ve got a lot of work to do,” said Bonnie Glaser, director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Washington, DC. “It’s a whole issue of rejuvenating America.” The thinking, most experts and US officials note, is that a stronger America working in lockstep with allies will give it more leverage to challenge China’s aggressions and influence when working with Beijing on shared concerns.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership › AT Relations Turn

Taiwan and NDDA thump

Bala 22 (Sumathi, “Asia’s top risk in 2022 will be U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan, says political risk analyst,” CNBC, )

The tense relationship between the U.S. and China over Taiwan will be the main challenge for Asia in the year ahead, according to a political risk analyst. Beijing sees any move by Washington on Taiwan as negative or infringing on its interests, said D.J. Peterson, president of Longview Global Advisors. he tense relationship between the U.S. and China over Taiwan will be the main risk for Asia in the year ahead, according to one political risk analyst. Beijing sees any move by Washington on Taiwan as negative or infringing on its interests, said D.J. Peterson, president of Longview Global Advisors, a research firm. “That is very much the top risk, I think in Asia in 2022. If you look at the relationship between the United States and China right now, it really is a ‘Cold War 2’ type relationship,” he told CNBC’s “Streets Signs Asia” on Tuesday. Late last year, President Joe Biden signed into law a defense bill known as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2022. Peterson said that has further eroded relations between the two countries. “The law, the NDAA that was signed just recently, has several provisions that the Beijing doesn’t like, including these overtures to Taiwan. Any overtures by any country to Taiwan is seen as a zero sum loss for Beijing — and they respond very harshly,” he noted.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership › AT Relations Turn

Relations are low and impossible

Qinggo 1-23-2022, Professor and former Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University (Jia, “Waiting for spring to come in China–US relations,” East Asia Forum, )

At the beginning of 2021, there were modest hopes. The good news was that Joe Biden had won the US presidential election. Trump’s trade war had sent the relationship into a deep dive. His manipulation of the China question for domestic political gain contributed to its further deterioration. His handling of the Taiwan issue towards the end of his term increased the risk of accidental conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Biden is the polar opposite of Trump. He belongs to the US policy mainstream, characterised as professional, decent and cool-headed. Some believed this was a positive sign for China–US relations and held prospect a more pragmatic approach toward China. The Chinese government shared this view and signalled its willingness to work with the new administration. After the Biden administration officially took office, Yang Jiechi, in charge of China’s foreign relations, said ‘it is a task for both China and the United States to restore the relationship to a predictable and constructive track of development and build a model of interaction between the two major countries that focuses on peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation’. But many in Washington interpreted Yang’s message as an effort to blame the United States for the problems between the two countries instead of an expression of goodwill. On assuming office, Secretary of State Antony Blinken defined the new administration’s approach towards China as a mixture of competition, confrontation and cooperation. It soon became clear that competition would continue to dominate US policy towards China. Washington blasted China’s behaviour on a range of issues, including Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan, the South China Sea and human rights. Blinken labelled China’s policies in Xinjiang as a ‘genocide’. The Biden administration also stepped up efforts to rally its allies to ‘push back’ on China. Washington’s uncompromising posture drew frustration and anger from Beijing. Many in China concluded that the Biden administration’s China policy was worse than the Trump administration’s since it sought to create an international anti-China front. A tit-for-tat exchange between Beijing and Washington followed. At the two countries’ first high-level face-to-face meeting in Alaska on 13 November 2021, there was a heated exchange. Despite some cooperation on particular issues, like climate change, the conflict between the two sides has increased. The issue that drew the most attention turned out to be Taiwan. Taiwan authorities’ efforts to push for independence coupled with increasing US endorsement and support elicited a tougher stance from China, which included sending military aircraft to patrol the vicinity of Taiwan. The vicious cycle of interactions between Beijing, Taipei and Washington increased the likelihood of a military showdown. Against this background, the virtual summit meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Biden on 16 November was more about how to set guard rails for the relationship than exploring the possibility of substantive cooperation. Despite the summit, the relationship between Beijing and Washington continues to slide. The most recent bickering includes a US official boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics, sanctions over Xinjiang and Chinese retaliation. Why has the relationship evolved in this way? The rise of China has elevated security concerns among US realists about China’s strategic intentions, especially in the light of China’s military moves to defend its proclaimed territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Political developments in China have also disappointed US liberals who had banked on the hope of encouraging political reform in China through engagement. Trump’s race-to-the-bottom anti-China rhetoric provided a vent for frustration with China for both US realists and liberals alike and contributed to a political atmosphere in the United States in which being tough is the right and only posture when it comes to China. Given the anti-China consensus in the US Congress and the slim majority the governing Democrats enjoy, Biden has had to remain tough on China to get anything done at home. This includes the appointment of cabinet officials, passing bills to contain COVID-19 and rebuilding infrastructure. How the two countries interacted with each other, which was characterised by megaphone diplomacy for domestic consumption, undermined any goodwill that remained for stabilisation and improvement of the relationship. In the short run, these factors are unlikely to change. The 2022 mid-term elections bode ill for China–US relations because the Republicans who stand on an even tougher policy toward China appear likely to win. Under these circumstances, the Biden administration is unlikely to be able to advance a pragmatic approach toward China. Ahead of the 20th Party Congress, China is also unlikely to compromise. The stabilisation and improvement of China–US relations is likely to remain a distant prospect for some time yet.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership › AT Relations Turn

Relations low – Ukraine war

Quinn 3-13-2022 (Michelle, “Eyeing China, US Business Community Waits for Washington to Make Next Move,” VOA, https://www.voanews.com/a/6482856.html)

Sino-U.S. relations continue to be strained and further exacerbated by China’s close ties with Russia and Beijing’s desire to stay neutral on the war in Ukraine.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership › AT Tech Bad

4th wave technologies are inevitable—the only question is does the U.S. get left behind

XR Association White Paper 21, THE INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY LANDSCAPE OF THE FUTURE AND THE SYNERGISTIC EFFECT OF IMMERSIVE TECHNOLOGIES, https://xra.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/EFA-White-Paper-Final.pdf

III. ENSURING THE UNITED STATES SHAPES THE FUTURE TECHNOLOGY ECOSYSTEM The new industrial revolution is already underway, and immersive technologies are playing a crucial role. In combination with other technologies, as well as on their own, immersive technologies will bring dramatic changes to society and to people’s individual lives. Currently, VR applications can be classified as industry applications or public applications. The former includes areas such as manufacturing, medicine, education, military, and e-commerce. The latter includes games, social networking, movies, and live broadcast. As noted above, according to Goldman Sachs, the VR/AR industry will reach USD $80 billion by 2025. The XR era has emerged. China recognized the outsized potential of immersive technology years ago and has taken impressive steps towards controlling its future. XR is featured prominently in the CCP’s Made in China 2025 strategy, and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Culture, and the Ministry of Commerce have all released detailed strategies concerning XR. In addition, Chinese provincial and municipal local governments are proactively building industrial parks and labs to promote the development of local VR industries.14 China is not the only nation investing heavily in XR. Countries that had early 5G commercialization plans, including Japan and South Korea, planned for VR as a key 5G application field. Indeed, governments are generously funding XR research and development, and XR-related inventions are increasing exponentially. 16By the end of May 2017, the number of global VR patents had reached 59,000, with about 29,000 patent families. Those numbers have continued to grow. Now is the time for the U.S. to step-up its public investment in immersive technology and to forge mutually-beneficial XR development and production partnerships with U.S. allies like the countries of NATO, Southeast Asia, and India.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership › !---AI Leadership Good

U.S. AI leadership solves geopolitical conflict

Dukeman ’20 – senior fellow at FP21 and a Ph.D. student at Princeton University, where he researches institutional reform in U.S. foreign policy agencies

(Ryan Dukeman, Nov 25, 2020, “WINNING THE AI REVOLUTION FOR AMERICAN DIPLOMACY,” ability edited, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/winning-the-ai-revolution-for-american-diplomacy/)

Precognition algorithms. System-of-systems [shutdown] paralysis. An “all-seeing digital system of social control.” To nonexperts, these technologies may seem incomprehensible — the stuff of science fiction and 1984. But to authoritarian states’ military and political leadership, these are game-changing advances that could be the key to upending the international system. Perhaps most importantly, some of these technologies could be integrated sooner than one might think. According to one prominent journalist, in China and soon elsewhere, “the panopticon is already here.” Big data and artificial intelligence (AI) are restructuring the geopolitical divide between nations that harness its potential and those that do not, transforming the nature of conflict, empowering asymmetric and nonstate actors, and yielding increasing returns for first movers. As oil factored significantly into the great geopolitical conflicts of the 20th century, so too will the politics of data and artificial intelligence quickly become the politics of international security, for better or for worse. As the Department of Defense’s 2018 AI strategy notes, “AI refers to the ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence — for example, recognizing patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions, or taking action — whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems.” The United States is the global leader in such technologies for now, but its national security bureaucracy is poorly configured to capitalize on this advantage. In particular, the government is sidelining the very agency that could both lead on the global policy challenges of AI and benefit from applying AI to its way of working. I’m talking, of course, about the State Department. Yes, you read that right: For the United States to win the data wars, the State Department should become an interagency leader in AI. While the AI and national security debate has predominantly focused on its applications in warfare, espionage, and homeland security (including election security), it has so far missed the critical relevance of AI for American diplomacy. This is a mistake, because in the coming decades AI will be essential both as a top-tier agenda item in strategic competition against digital authoritarianism and as a tool for more responsive, informed, and effective foreign policymaking. AI is the next “gray rhino” security threat: a slow-building event that, when it finally hits, can be even more disruptive than conventionally recognized threats like interstate rivalry or terrorism. As such, it deserves an affirmative, cross-issue digital democracy agenda championed by the State Department. The department is uniquely positioned to lead on this agenda, leveraging the interdependent security, human rights, and economic dimensions of AI to advance governance in line with American values. Relatedly, the State Department can also help right the “institutional imbalance” of a militarized foreign policy and empower civilian diplomats by capitalizing on AI in its ways of working, including areas like strategic planning, crisis response, and other core diplomatic functions. A Digital Democracy Agenda for the Next “Gray Rhino” The ongoing pandemic has broadened the national security community’s conception of threats to include so-called gray rhinos. In addition to disease and the accelerating climate crisis, AI presents the third such threat, but is unfortunately under-resourced in current foreign policy budgeting. While the defense budget treats AI as a technological innovation for guarding against other threats, the national security and defense strategies do not treat it as a significant threat in its own right. This is a mistake. If poorly managed, the economic, security, and human rights impacts of authoritarian-enabling AI pose a serious threat to the American way of life, and should be planned for and prioritized accordingly. First and foremost, frontier technologies constitute a digital battleground for near-peer competition between the United States, China, and Russia. China in particular has focused diplomatic and state-capitalist efforts on shaping a global approach to digital governance that allows for unmitigated domestic surveillance and state infringement on free speech. This effort is not just a mercantilist attempt to supplant American firms’ AI leadership with that of Chinese state-owned enterprises — it is also meant to shape an international order reflective of China’s abusive domestic system. These techno-authoritarian models of digital governance are in direct opposition to American values and pose a threat to U.S. leadership on issues of human rights, economic security, and protection of intellectual property. AI similarly enables disinformation campaigns and election interference (e.g., through generative networks used to create deepfakes), as well as more advanced, detection-evading cyber attacks, and thus should be internationally regulated as an anti-democratic force multiplier.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership › !---LIO

LIO solves nuclear war, climate change and tech disruption---all existential.

Harari 18, Professor of History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Yuval Noah, “We need a post-liberal order now,” The Economist, )

The second thing to note about this vision of friendly fortresses is that it has been tried—and it failed spectacularly. All attempts to divide the world into clear-cut nations have so far resulted in war and genocide. When the heirs of Garibaldi, Mazzini and Mickiewicz managed to overthrow the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, it proved impossible to find a clear line dividing Italians from Slovenes or Poles from Ukrainians. This had set the stage for the second world war. The key problem with the network of fortresses is that each national fortress wants a bit more land, security and prosperity for itself at the expense of the neighbors, and without the help of universal values and global organisations, rival fortresses cannot agree on any common rules. Walled fortresses are seldom friendly. But if you happen to live inside a particularly strong fortress, such as America or Russia, why should you care? Some nationalists indeed adopt a more extreme isolationist position. They don’t believe in either a global empire or in a global network of fortresses. Instead, they deny the necessity of any global order whatsoever. “Our fortress should just raise the drawbridges,” they say, “and the rest of the world can go to hell. We should refuse entry to foreign people, foreign ideas and foreign goods, and as long as our walls are stout and the guards are loyal, who cares what happens to the foreigners?” Such extreme isolationism, however, is completely divorced from economic realities. Without a global trade network, all existing national economies will collapse—including that of North Korea. Many countries will not be able even to feed themselves without imports, and prices of almost all products will skyrocket. The made-in-China shirt I am wearing cost me about $5. If it had been produced by Israeli workers from Israeli-grown cotton using Israeli-made machines powered by non-existing Israeli oil, it may well have cost ten times as much. Nationalist leaders from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin may therefore heap abuse on the global trade network, but none thinks seriously of taking their country completely out of that network. And we cannot have a global trade network without some global order that sets the rules of the game. Even more importantly, whether people like it or not, humankind today faces three common problems that make a mockery of all national borders, and that can only be solved through global cooperation. These are nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption. You cannot build a wall against nuclear winter or against global warming, and no nation can regulate artificial intelligence (AI) or bioengineering single-handedly. It won’t be enough if only the European Union forbids producing killer robots or only America bans genetically-engineering human babies. Due to the immense potential of such disruptive technologies, if even one country decides to pursue these high-risk high-gain paths, other countries will be forced to follow its dangerous lead for fear of being left behind. An AI arms race or a biotechnological arms race almost guarantees the worst outcome. Whoever wins the arms race, the loser will likely be humanity itself. For in an arms race, all regulations will collapse. Consider, for example, conducting genetic-engineering experiments on human babies. Every country will say: “We don’t want to conduct such experiments—we are the good guys. But how do we know our rivals are not doing it? We cannot afford to remain behind. So we must do it before them.” Similarly, consider developing autonomous-weapon systems, that can decide for themselves whether to shoot and kill people. Again, every country will say: “This is a very dangerous technology, and it should be regulated carefully. But we don’t trust our rivals to regulate it, so we must develop it first”. The only thing that can prevent such destructive arms races is greater trust between countries. This is not an impossible mission. If today the Germans promise the French: “Trust us, we aren’t developing killer robots in a secret laboratory under the Bavarian Alps,” the French are likely to believe the Germans, despite the terrible history of these two countries. We need to build such trust globally. We need to reach a point when Americans and Chinese can trust one another like the French and Germans. Similarly, we need to create a global safety-net to protect humans against the economic shocks that AI is likely to cause. Automation will create immense new wealth in high-tech hubs such as Silicon Valley, while the worst effects will be felt in developing countries whose economies depend on cheap manual labor. There will be more jobs to software engineers in California, but fewer jobs to Mexican factory workers and truck drivers. We now have a global economy, but politics is still very national. Unless we find solutions on a global level to the disruptions caused by AI, entire countries might collapse, and the resulting chaos, violence and waves of immigration will destabilise the entire world. This is the proper perspective to look at recent developments such as Brexit. In itself, Brexit isn’t necessarily a bad idea. But is this what Britain and the EU should be dealing with right now? How does Brexit help prevent nuclear war? How does Brexit help prevent climate change? How does Brexit help regulate artificial intelligence and bioengineering? Instead of helping, Brexit makes it harder to solve all of these problems. Every minute that Britain and the EU spend on Brexit is one less minute they spend on preventing climate change and on regulating AI. In order to survive and flourish in the 21st century, humankind needs effective global cooperation, and so far the only viable blueprint for such cooperation is offered by liberalism. Nevertheless, governments all over the world are undermining the foundations of the liberal order, and the world is turning into a network of fortresses. The first to feel the impact are the weakest members of humanity, who find themselves without any fortress willing to protect them: refugees, illegal migrants, persecuted minorities. But if the walls keep rising, eventually the whole of humankind will feel the squeeze.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership › !---LIO

Tech leadership is key to US norm setting---saves the LIO

Allen 3-1-2021, analyst @ The Hill (John, “To outpace China on technology, the US needs a 'full-stack' strategy,” )

From the COVID-19 pandemic and a deeply struggling economy to the critical need for racial justice and immediate action on climate change, President Biden now confronts one of the most daunting inheritances of any U.S. president in at least a century. His administration also faces a looming strategic challenge: whether the United States and its allies and partners will be able to find common cause in accelerating the development of next-generation technologies. If the United States and its democratic partners develop and deploy next wave technologies first, they will generate significant strategic advantages and strengthen their position in rule-setting forums. In turn, this will enable them to help craft norms and regulations for emerging technologies that are reflective of democratic values. Simply put, technological competition sits at the core of great power competition and ideological rivalry for the 21st century and beyond. And with the U.S. and its democratic allies seeking to outpace authoritarian regimes such as those in Beijing and Moscow, tech innovation will be a critical determinant of the continued strength and resilience of the liberal international order.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership › !---Leadership Terminal

U.S. leadership prevents nuclear war and global repression

Manville 18 Brook Manville is Principal of Brook Manville LLC, consulting on strategy and organization Why A Crumbling World Order Urgently Needs U.S. Leadership

Still angry about Justice Kavanaugh? Or are you anxious about the latest UN climate report, warning of faster-rising oceans? Or do you fret about wrong-headed immigration laws? Or can’t we just talk about the Red Sox getting to the World Series? No, we can’t. Read Robert Kagan’s new book, The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World (Knopf, 2018), and you’ll find a full-throated case for drop-everything-emergency aid for something more existential, the colorless oxygen of today’s civilization we dangerously take for granted: the liberal world order. This plain-spoken senior fellow of Brookings wants to grab you by the lapels and scream urgency in your face—because if we lose the American-guaranteed collection of laws, democratic values, economic and defense treaties that have produced seven unprecedented decades of peace and prosperity, you’ll wonder why you ever worried about anything else. If U.S. global leadership slides, Kagan asserts, the invisible protective bubble we’ve enjoyed since 1945 won’t just deflate. It will explode. Good-bye rules-based trade, hello shortages of food and essential products. Dictators not just threatening but using nuclear weapons. More innocents repressed or killed in civilized countries. Cross-border migrations magnitudes beyond the crises of today’s detention centers and Mediterranean rescues. Dark Forces Re-emerging The botanical metaphor in Kagan’s book title began our recent conversation. “We’ve been living in a tranquil garden of largely peaceful practices and liberal expectations across much of the world, ignoring the dark forces of jungle multiplying under the rocks. If we don’t defend civilization’s cultivation—especially American’s guarantee of peace and economic integration across the world—the toxic creatures and weeds will roar back.” Thus China’s determined military rise, Russia’s continuing aggressions, fiery authoritarians on the march in so many once democratic countries. As Kagan continued, “Trump has been damaging the system—he too seems to have forgotten what good it has delivered—but actually America’s desire for maintaining the global order has been diminishing for years. After the dissolution of the Soviet empire in the 1990s, people talked about ‘the end of history”—that America didn’t have to worry anymore about war or aggression. History doesn’t end, it simply paused. The ugliest aspects of human nature are surging again.” Vanishing Leadership, Vanishing Peace Kagan’s apocalyptic message, repeated in other recent writings, is lucid and terrifying, all the more devastating for its relentless use of history. It’s a footnoted plea that “we’ve seen this movie before.” He reminds us that Americans have frequently turned away from defending world order, with regrettably familiar outcomes: to be dragged in later at greater cost (e.g. helping to stop Hitler earlier might have prevented World War II); or, simply hoping that “the problem would go away,” to watch it get ten times worse (e.g. Obama’s policy in Syria). Kagan acknowledges that America has sometimes misstepped (e.g. Viet Nam, Iraq), but he still argues that overall our foreign engagement has produced more peace and prosperity than not. “History shows,” he summarized, “that world order has never been achieved without some constructive force to keep the peace. The relative harmony and fair play we’ve created in the modern world will vanish if the U.S. forsakes international leadership.”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership

Solves through start-up talent

PTI 1-26-2022 (“New legislation supported by Joe Biden proposes startup visas to attract talent,” Business Today, )

The ambitious America COMPETES Act of 2022, which was introduced in the US House of Representatives on Tuesday, proposes to open up new visas for talented individuals from across the world with a new startup visa. President Joe Biden, who supports the legislation, said the America Competes Act, 2022 is an important step forward in advancing legislation that will make the supply chains stronger and reinvigorate the innovation engine of the country's economy to outcompete China and the rest of the world for decades to come. The Act, among other things, amends the Immigration and Nationality Act to create a new classification of "W" non-immigrants for entrepreneurs with an ownership interest in a startup entity, essential employees of a startup entity and also their spouses and children. According to the provisions of the bill released by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, the bill when signed into law directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish procedures for foreign nationals with an ownership interest in a startup entity to self-petition for lawful permanent resident status as an immigrant entrepreneur if the entity demonstrates a proven track record of success through job creation and significant revenue generation or receipt of investment capital. It also directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish procedures for foreign nationals with an ownership interest in a startup entity to self-petition for classification as a W-1 non-immigrant and to receive extensions of such classification for up to eight years if the entity meets certain growth benchmarks. It also provides for a limited number of W-2 visas for personnel who are essential to the growth and success of the startup entity if the startup serves as the basis for the W-1 status of a founder. The bill exempts from the numerical limits on immigrant visas certain foreign nationals (and the spouses and children of such aliens) who have earned a doctoral degree in science, technology, engineering or mathematics (STEM) from a qualified US research institution or a foreign institution if the degree is the equivalent to a doctoral degree issued by a qualified US research institution. The bill provides the Secretary of Homeland Security discretion to classify an individual as a W-1 non-immigrant for a three-year period initially if the individual possesses an ownership interest of not less than 10 per cent in a startup entity, the foreign individual will play a central and active role in the management or operations of the startup entity or the applicant possesses the knowledge, skills or experience to substantially assist the startup with the growth and success of the business. During the 18-month period preceding the filing of the petition, the startup entity needs to have received at least USD 250,000 in qualifying investments from one or more qualified investors or at least USD 100,000 in qualifying government awards or grants, the bill notes. In a statement, Biden said the proposals laid out by the House and Senate represent the sort of transformational investments in American industrial base and research and development that helped power the United States to lead the global economy in the 20th century and expand opportunities for middle-class families. "They will help bring manufacturing jobs back to the United States and they are squarely focussed on easing the sort of supply chain bottlenecks like semiconductors that have led to higher prices for the middle class," he said. "Building on the historic investments in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that I signed last year -- and on signs of progress like last week's Intel announcement and today's GM announcement -- comprehensive competitiveness legislation will power our economy to create good-paying jobs for all Americans, no matter where you live or whether you have a college degree, and will help tackle the climate crisis," Biden said. "Today, the House takes action to transport our nation into the future, with the America COMPETES Act: bold, results-oriented legislation that will strengthen America's national and economic security and the financial security of families, and advance our leadership in the world," Pelosi said. "America COMPETES makes historic investments to strengthen America's economy, security and global leadership. To compete effectively with the People's Republic of China (PRC), the legislation leverages our core strengths and values, and presents a positive, whole-of-government agenda that rises to the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century," said Congressman Gregory Meeks, Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee. To bolster economic competitiveness, America COMPETES has provisions to secure critical supply chains, shape the rules and standards that govern global commerce and development, empower American workers and businesses, and invest in science and innovation, he said. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer said the introduction of the vital America COMPETES Act of 2022 in the House is an important step forward to setting up a conference with the Senate-passed US Innovation and Competition Act, so that they can quickly negotiate a final bill for the president to sign into law. "We have no time to waste in improving American competitiveness, strengthening our lead in global innovation and addressing supply chain challenges, including in the semiconductor industry," he said.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership

It's necessary and sufficient for US tech leadership

Krach 6-17-2021, unanimously confirmed as U.S. under secretary of State and is former chairman and CEO of DocuSign and Ariba. He also served as Chairman of the Purdue Board of Trustees. (Keith, “The Senate just passed the next Apollo program,” The Hill, )

It’s one small step for Congress, one huge leap for American competitiveness. By passing the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) with strong bipartisan support, the Senate went a long way in countering what Secretary of State Antony Blinken called “the biggest geopolitical test of the 21st century” — China’s growing military, geopolitical, and economic aggression under the leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping. Xi’s biggest fear is for the United States to have another Sputnik moment and commit to the equivalent of a moonshot. USICA is designed to do exactly that by taking the technological advantage away from China Inc. and returning it to the United States. Ensuring tomorrow’s technology is trusted technology that empowers free societies facing perpetual authoritarian threats. From my experience of creating categories by building four market-leading companies, I can tell you securing these advanced industries is not cheap. However, when the government targets smart investment in research and development with partners from the private sector, we get a tremendous bang for our buck. Just look at the Apollo program. Our $140 billion investment (today’s dollars) put a man on the moon. The program not only led to American leadership in aerospace but resulted in hundreds of spin-off products — from kidney dialysis machines to micro-electronics. It’s still paying dividends. In 2018, U.S. leadership in aerospace and commercial aviation contributed $2.3 trillion in GDP to the U.S. economy. That initial $140 billion investment continues to yield $4.1 trillion in annual recurring GDP. Since the 1960s, however, U.S. government long-term investments in research have been declining. We once led the world. Now, we rank 9th globally in total R&D and 12th in publicly financed R&D. Corporate investments are crucial, but they are typically constrained to be shorter-term in nature due to the 90-day shot clock for quarterly earnings. For the sake of our national security and continued global leadership, it's critical that high-tech R&D is a public-private partnership. The U.S. Innovation and Competition Act has quite a few valuable provisions. The main one is its Endless Frontier Act component which authorizes about $150 billion over five years for scientific and technological research in 10 tech-intensive industries that America simply cannot cede to China Inc., including semiconductors, 5G, AI, clean energy, cybersecurity, quantum, robotics, biotechnology, and others. The CHIPS Act portion of the USICA is derived from our team’s historic $12-billion onshoring of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), appropriates nearly $53 billion to bring back American semiconductor manufacturing after we lost it. The bill’s crucial emphasis on Taiwan puts real muscle behind the Lee Economic Prosperity Partnership and the Science and Technology Agreement we signed as a result of my trip to Taiwan last fall as the highest-ranking State Department official in 41 years. That Taiwan trip was one of the reasons why this small-town Ohio boy ended up No. 3 on Dictator Xi’s sanctions list. I received this distinction not for what I said as under secretary of State, but for serving my country and getting results. However, the main reason was building the Clean Network Alliance of Democracies, which defeated Xi’s master plan to control 5G through Huawei. The Wall Street Journal called the Clean Network “an undisputed success” and perhaps the “most enduring foreign-policy legacy” of the last four years. With Huawei now neutralized, USICA’s $1.5 billion infusion for 5G innovation will accelerate American companies’ efforts to get back in the 5G game. The Clean Network was a product of my mission to take economic statecraft to the next level by developing and operationalizing a Global Economic Security Strategy (GESS) — which later became another bipartisan bill, The Global Economic Security Strategy Act of 2019 — aimed at driving economic growth, maximizing national security, and combating economic aggression. It consisted of three pillars: 1) turbocharge economic competitiveness and innovation; 2) safeguard American’s assets, such as intellectual property, supply chains, financial and education systems; and 3) form a network of trusted partnerships comprised of like-minded countries, companies, and civil society that operates by a set of democratic trust principles for all areas of economic collaboration, which turned into the Clean Network. The Endless Frontier Act, initially conceived in October 2019, was one of the byproducts of the first pillar of the Global Economic Security Strategy. Our team at the State Department worked with Senate Majority Leader Charles Schumer, a Democrat from New York, and Sen. Todd Young, a Republican from Indiana, to reboot America’s technological leadership at a time when we face an urgent threat from the Chinese Communist Party. The bipartisan legislation which was introduced a few months later was designed to spawn tomorrow’s trusted technology by boosting investment in high-tech research vital to our national security. Most significantly, USICA is a catalyst for such private-sector, and even allied, R&D investments. The strategic plan presented by Paul Touw, my senior advisor and fellow founder of Ariba, and me to senators and congressmen demonstrated how to grow this critical high-tech research investment to $500 billion with matches from the private sector and our closest technological allies. We later validated this and garnered significant interest from companies and countries that became members of the Clean Network. The beauty of this approach is that it not only compounds the government’s R&D funding in 10 national security sectors but also maximizes the commercialization of those investments by leveraging private-sector resources and know-how. From an economic diplomacy standpoint, it also enhances collaboration and increases economic competitiveness with our Techno-Democracies-10 (TD-10) partners to counter China Inc. The TD-10 was designed as a powerful coalition of 10 to 12 like-minded countries assembled to compete with China Inc. by focusing on the development, protection, dissemination, and use of emerging technologies. USICA’s focus on economic statecraft with its investment in alliances and partnerships, coupled with the increase of the Development Finance Corporation’s (DFC) funding from $60 billion to $100 billion, significantly bolsters the continued expansion of Clean Network beyond the original six lines of effort. USICA also gives a shot in the arm to the clean infrastructure initiative we rolled out as the Blue Dot Network, aptly renamed the Clean Green Network. It was gratifying to see the G-7 recently get behind this initiative because it serves as an equitable and unifying alternative to China’s “One-Belt One-Way Toll Road to Beijing,” as one Asian foreign minister called it. By passing the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, the Senate did its part to send a powerful message to our citizens, private sector, allies and the Chinese Communist Party itself that America is united in its commitment to preserve our precious freedom from authoritarianism. It’s now the House’s turn to take the baton and then, let’s get on with the moonshot.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › !---Tech Leadership

China will is key to US tech leadership. Prevents Chinese dominance.

Murray 12-19-2021 (Ashley, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, )

A proposal in Congress to boost U.S. competitiveness in advanced technology could mean millions of education and industry dollars for the region and be a “generational opportunity” for Pittsburgh, a city that boasts its status as the birthplace of driverless tech and the cradle of numerous start-ups. Bills in both chambers outline billions in investment to support initiatives all the way from K-12 STEM education to semiconductors, quantum computing, climate science research and “high intensity laser” exploration. And could ensure U.S. leadership and security — namely from China’s creeping dominance — for decades to come, advocates and lawmakers on both sides of the aisle say. While the D.C. spotlight has been focused on the massive bipartisan infrastructure law and President Joe Biden’s stalled social and climate spending bill, tech insiders in Pittsburgh see the innovation-focused legislation as one of the most significant moves the U.S. could make. Under consideration is an estimated $200 billion Senate bill titled the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, or USICA. The sprawling, bipartisan 2,000-page proposal aims to establish National Science Foundation programs for the commercialization of artificial intelligence, advanced computing and other areas while also protecting domestic research and expanding trade provisions with China. On the House side, bipartisan support is strong for multiple bills that would double the National Science Foundation research funding to $78 billion over five years and direct $50 billion over the same time period for Department of Energy projects. “This is a generational scale investment in that type of economic development, in strengthening our core research universities, but also putting money in there for translational research [to private industry],” said Brian Kennedy, senior vice president of operations and government affairs for the Pittsburgh Technology Council, which represents 1,000 companies in the Pittsburgh region. The tech leader estimates that in “the very short term” roughly $100 million to $200 million in funding could roll into southwestern Pennsylvania. “But in all honesty I think that’s just the tip of the iceberg,” said Mr. Kennedy, who cited what previous investments have done for the university lab-to-company pipeline. “If you look at Pittsburgh’s story in terms of tech, it’s really hard to tell it without mentioning Carnegie Mellon and the University of Pittsburgh,” he continued. Mr. Kennedy traced the thread from inside the robotics and computer science labs to the marquee Pittsburgh-based manufacturing hubs and tech companies across the city. Carnegie Mellon University’s Advanced Robotics Institute established itself where once the city’s steel mills sat on Hazelwood Green. Argo AI has led Pittsburgh to the forefront of autonomous vehicle testing, he said, and Astrobotic soon will direct a mission to the moon from its North Side-based control room. “It’s the kind of investments that are front-and-center on the planet right now — AI, biotechnology, cybersecurity. These are all the core capabilities of Pittsburgh, and they’re also the core things pressing everyone on the planet.” China China’s advances in technological innovation have become a top concern among tech leaders, defense officials and lawmakers. The world’s second largest economy became the top manufacturer of high-tech goods in 2020, and it either already has sped ahead or is poised to overtake the U.S. in the next decade in various advanced technologies, according to a report published this month by the Harvard Kennedy School. China has become a major competitor to the U.S. in artificial intelligence, and America’s 5G infrastructure rollout is years behind its rival, the study reported. Additionally, the report asserts that while the U.S. is a leader in other areas, including semiconductor design, green energy and cell therapy, China is building competitive capacity in manufacturing and biotechnology. This leads some experts to conclude that America’s plan is behind the curve. “I wish they passed this bill 10 years ago,” said Kevin Chen, a professor with the University of Pittsburgh’s Swanson School of Engineering. “This is really a no brainer. I can tell you what happens if this bill is not passed. The United States as a country is going to continue to under invest in technology, especially in this important technology,” he said. “Think about 5G. The U.S. government didn’t invest a lot of R&D into 5G. Who’s leading right now? I think you know that: Huawei,” he said, referring to the Chinese tech company. “... You don’t want to be in that situation for semiconductors.” In either substance or rhetoric, both U.S. chambers point to the innovation bills as an answer to this threat.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › I/L Tech Leadership – Foreign Workers

USICA provisions for foreign workers are necessary for competition

Romanoff 22 [Tom Romanoff is the Director of the Technology Project at the Bipartisan Policy Center. Before working with BPC, he led IT initiatives for several US Federal agencies and advised executive leadership on the impact of new and emerging technologies on government operations. He worked for several years with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), publishing federal-wide IT/Cybersecurity policy and developing modernization initiatives. Before his work with the Federal government, Romanoff helped the United Nations Development Program modernize its global data collection and analytics system. He graduated from Carnegie Mellon University with a Master’s degree in Public Policy and Management and currently serves on their Alumni Board. https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/competition-needs-talent-why-success-for-usica-competes-means-letting-foreign-stem-workers-stay/]//LP

To continue to lead innovation, the U.S. needs more STEM-focused Ph.D.s and consider prioritizing green cards for immigrants with these skills. Not doing so yields the technological advantage and edge to countries with strategic interests in technology. The America COMPETES Act, “which is being conferenced with the Senate-passed USICA bill, includes an immigration provision under section 80303 that exempts advanced degree holders in STEM fields from green card caps. In 2020, international students supported an estimated 410,000 American jobs, particularly in STEM. In 2021, 54% of international students pursued a major in a STEM field, and in 2019 almost half of all masters and doctorates awarded in STEM fields went to international students. Yet, in 2019, over 918,000 IT jobs went unfilled. American companies, not only technology-focused ones, struggle to meet the STEM critical skills shortage and find it increasingly challenging to hire graduates with the degrees needed to drive innovation. To address this issue, the Department of Homeland Security recently announced an expansion to the Optional Practical Training program, a 12 month temporary work permit available to international students graduating from U.S. degree-granting institutions. The new measures add 22 qualifying fields of study to the STEM Designated Degree Program list, increasing the number of international STEM students in emerging tech fields. However, this will not be enough to meet the labor shortage. The United States Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) aims to develop domestic capacities in semiconductor R&D using $52 billion authorized through the CHIPS for America Fund, and in key technology areas such as artificial intelligence and quantum science, as part of the $120 billion Endless Frontiers Act investment to ensure the U.S. remains competitive in these fields. However, funding these fields means hiring qualified candidates to do the work. Many of those candidates are international students who want to stay in the U.S. after graduating from their programs. Expanding green card caps for international students graduating in these fields will go a long way toward filling that need for tech experts in the United States. This is not the first time the U.S. has expanded green card access to meet critical skill shortages. The Immigration Act of 1965 included a crucial provision that “gave preference to professionals with skills in short supply in the United States.” This brought thousands of medical professionals and engineers to the U.S. to fill labor shortages across the country. This program was widely considered a bipartisan success and led to the growth of critical domestic industries. Many of those families still reside in the U.S., and their children lead the next generation of innovation. The crucial difference between then and now is that the IT sector is globally competitive and projected to grow as more countries invest in their domestic tech capabilities. Demand for STEM skills in the U.S. and abroad Graduates of STEM programs are in high demand across the globe. As the IT sector grows, demand for STEM skills in the U.S. will also increase. In January 2022 alone, over 340,000 unfilled IT jobs were posted in the U.S., up by 12% from last year. Since 2016 the sector has grown 209%. Globally the shortage of IT workers is predicted to reach 82 million by 2030. Training these graduates in the U.S. and exporting them to their home countries fills unmet demand abroad, leaving U.S. companies without the labor needed for domestic innovation. Approximately half of the international students studying in the U.S. are enrolled in STEM-related programs. Nearly half of the 2019 graduate students in STEM fields were foreign nationals on student visas. At the master’s level, in 2019, 50% of all engineering degrees and 57% of computer science degrees were awarded to international students, and international students composed one-third of all doctorates in science and engineering. Even so, the U.S. is only third in the world in awarding science and engineering bachelor’s degrees, according to the National Science Board, behind India and China. However, the U.S. has produced the most Ph. D.s in science and engineering for many decades, although China has led since 2007 if you count only natural sciences and engineering. Partially due to the challenges in staffing, U.S. companies have been shifting their R&D operations overseas for many years. By 2015, U.S. multinationals had invested more than $50 billion in overseas R&D operations, with increasing shares in China, India, and Israel. Given the aims of USICA and America COMPETES to re-shore much of these operations in the U.S., ensuring access to the necessary skilled engineers, scientists, and inventors to continue this work will be essential. Debates over Green Cards for STEM Graduates Three relevant debates are being considered as Congress considers expanding access for green cards in USICA. The first is whether the H1-B Visa is the more appropriate mechanism for filling the labor gap. Green cards provide permanent residence and offer the possibility of citizenship, but currently are extremely backlogged due to annual per-country caps. We have previously described some of the tradeoffs between the two mechanisms. There is a need to dual-track reforms to each as there are issues with how they are administered, from wait times to expiring unused visas. For this piece, we are highlighting how green cards can address STEM skill gaps since USICA is explicitly addressing that issue. The second is the argument that U.S. workers will be displaced if we increase access to green cards for international students graduating in the U.S. This assumes that domestic U.S. citizens are available to compete in the labor market, but many of these roles are going unfilled. However, this argument also presumes that the market for graduates in STEM is fixed, but the intent of retaining graduates, from all countries, in key STEM fields is to kickstart innovation and R&D in the U.S., increasing demand for many more jobs. This is not an “either/or” situation. The U.S. should pursue domestic policies that provide education and retraining in the STEM fields for U.S. citizens, and we have recommended that Congress prioritize these areas. But we should also take advantage of the foreign talent already training in the U.S. to continue to keep our advantage and grow these critical sectors. The final common argument is that because the current green card process has country quotas, prioritizing STEM fields would disproportionally favor applicants from countries with a robust STEM workforce, such as China or India. Those who have been “waiting in line” but do not have a STEM education do not qualify for this new prioritization. Congress needs to address green card application procedures from a historical perspective, and reforms are required to streamline the process. BPC has recommendations on these issues. However, of critical importance to the U.S. as a whole, in the field of STEM, there is a national competitiveness issue that also needs to be addressed. India and China have advanced technology sectors that directly compete with U.S. interests. If the U.S. can keep international students in the U.S. to fill our labor needs and provide them a path to citizenship, we will not have to compete with those graduates once they return to their country of origin. Final Thought As Congress conferences on USICA, they should consider how the policy goals will get done with our current labor and skill shortages. Suppose we are to spend billions to boost our competitiveness in relation to countries with advanced STEM industries. In that case, we must increase the number of workers, including international students at American universities, with STEM skills in the U.S. By increasing the number of green cards for international Ph.D. students, the U.S. can ensure that we have the people in place domestically to remain competitive internationally. Requiring these critical graduates to return home means we are subsidizing the development of competitive labor markets abroad. Careful consideration should be made to reform the immigration process in the U.S. In this case, a minor tweak in the process will yield dividends for years.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › I/L Tech Leadership – Semiconductors

To stay competitive the US must pass USICA

Bajarin 22 [Tim Bajarin has been recognized as one of the leading industry consultants, analysts and futurists, covering the field of personal computers and consumer technology.https://www.forbes.com/sites/civicnation/2022/05/20/students-with-mentors-reap-personal-and-academic-benefits/?sh=251e630d22ed]//LP

I grew up in San Jose, CA. When I was born here, this city and area was filled with orchards of apricot, peach, cherry, and other fruit trees and was known then as "The Valley of Heart’s Delights." Two of the largest canning factories were only a few miles from my house, and during the summer, I would wake up in the morning to the smell of apricots, peaches, and plums cooking as the fruit was prepared for canning. However, with the birth of the semiconductor industry in the late 1950s, our region underwent a radical transformation that made it what is known today as Silicon Valley. Companies like Shockley Semiconductor, Fairchild, Intel, and dozens of others who created semiconductors and related technology took root in our region. Now thousands of tech companies call this area their home. Sadly almost all of the orchards are gone and replaced by business complexes and housing to support the growing tech companies in the Valley. In our digital age, semiconductors have become a foundational technology not only in digital devices but in everything from refrigerators and a plethora of home appliances to cars, planes, and just about every form of transportation that exists today. Initially, all semiconductor manufacturing was in the U.S. But by the end of the last century, that had primarily shifted to Asia. Today over half of the world's chip-making is in Taiwan, and only about 12% is in the U.S. In January of 2021, Congress passed the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductor (CHIPS) for America Act. Then in June 2021, the U.S. Senate passed the United States Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) which appropriates funds to finance the programs outlined in the CHIPS Act. USICA includes $39 billion for chip plant construction over five years and another $11.2 billion for the CHIPS act for research and development. In a report from the Center for Strategic and International studies, they pointed out that- "USICA is a sweeping piece of legislation which includes a range of initiatives meant to boost innovation within the United States, including investment in regional technology centers across rural and micropolitan America. Despite passing the Senate with a 68-32 vote, some House Democrats disagreed with portions of the bill dealing with funding for federal research and technological innovation. After a failed attempt to attach USICA to the FY22 National Defense Authorization Act in November 2021, Senate Democrats agreed to wait until 2022 to reconcile the bill with their House counterparts. In late January, House Democrats unveiled their own version of USICA, titled the America COMPETES Act, which includes identical funding for the CHIPS Act ($52 billion) but cuts roughly $200 billion, which USICA dedicated towards other programs like regional technology hubs. The bill received praise from Senate Democratic leaders and President Biden, but the America COMPETES Act will still likely face a lengthy reconciliation period as lawmakers deliberate over provisions that the House bill omits.” While the Senate and House dawdle with this urgent issue, the threat of China taking control of Taiwan, a goal from which they will not be deterred, grows daily. Just imagine if China had Taiwan under their control and, by default, would be lord over 50% of the world's semiconductor manufacturing. Some legislatures argue that it is up to the industry to solve this problem. Yet, over history, the U.S. government and military-funded significant technological achievements that have benefited it and society. Moreover, this argument holds little water given the major threat of China's move on Taiwan and possibly controlling a large percentage of semiconductor manufacturing that it could hold hostage and use as bargaining chips to get its way in the future. Intel, Samsung, and even TSMC are working hard to build semiconductor plants on U.S. soil, but at best, they will not be up and running until 2024-2025. Add to that the concern that the U.S. cannot even field the amount of tech talent needed to run these plants when they come on line in the future. "A new report estimates the U.S. will need to add 70,000 to 90,000 jobs to serve up to 20 domestic fabs in coming years for the most critical semiconductor applications. To meet that number, the U.S. needs to increase its workforce talent by 50%, according to Eightfold A.I.'s report." Our legislatures need to wake up to this desperate need to bring control of semiconductor manufacturing back to the U.S. and allow the U.S. to control its technology destiny. These big semiconductor companies invest billions of their own money in these U.S. fabs. A significant boost of funds from the U.S. government could go a long way towards speeding up the process and also help train more tech workers needed to operate these new fabs. This week, GlobalWafers Co. said it planned to put a factory in Sherman, Texas, that would be the first U.S. silicon wafer factory in more than two decades in the U.S. and create as many as 1,500 jobs. However, the company stated that the plant would require financial incentives included in the CHIPS Act to move forward. The WSJ reported the following statement from GlobalWafers' president about the importance of passing the CHIPS act for them to proceed- "If the CHIPS Act is not passed, we have to pivot to South Korea," said the company's president, Mark England, who said costs there would be substantially less. “ All three branches of the U.S. government must prioritize and push this legislation with broad support from both parties and reconcile these bills quickly. Every day they wait to pass this vital act is another day closer to the potential of China's ability to control the future of at least 50% of semiconductor manufacturing.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › I/L Tech Leadership – Semiconductors

America Competes Act is key to American innovation

FAS 7/1 [The Federation of American Scientists is a nonprofit policy research and advocacy organization founded in 1945 to meet national security challenges with evidence-based, scientifically-driven, and nonpartisan policy, analysis, and research. After the devastating bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a group of atomic researchers, deeply concerned about the use of science for malice, created an organization committed to using science and technology to benefit humanity. The group they created – the Federation of Atomic Scientists – soon became the Federation of American Scientists in recognition of the hundreds of scientists across diverse disciplines who joined together to advance science policy and counter scientific misinformation.https://fas.org/press-release/competes-usica/]//LP

Today the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) calls upon Congress to reach a final agreement by the end of July on H.R. 4521, the America Creating Opportunities for Manufacturing, Pre-Eminence in Technology, and Economic Strength (COMPETES) Act, and S. 1260, the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA). “The need for this legislation is broadly recognized, and delay or failure should not be an option. We believe sensible bipartisan compromises can be reached on many of the outstanding issues and that a final agreement coupled with supplemental funding would bolster U.S. competitiveness, address supply chain issues, and enhance U.S. security,” the letter reads. Congress is at the cusp of making major policy improvements and much-needed investments that will enable the U.S. to remain the global leader in science and technology. Without these improvements, however, the U.S. stands to not only lose its status as global innovator, but lose scientific talent seeking opportunity elsewhere. “American scientific excellence and technological leadership is not magically sustained – it is fostered by policy that nurtures and funds innovation. Congress should make a down payment on American competitiveness, sponsor a generation of world-class technological talent, and let the fruits of that talent make the case for America’s competitive edge,” says FAS CEO Dan Correa. “The need for a new American investment in research and development is widely recognized, so what better moment for Congress to invest than now? The bipartisan bills before Congress share a similar goal – to supercharge American science. Congress should seize the moment and make the robust investments we need,” says FAS Associate Director of Research & Development and Advanced Industry Matt Hourihan. “Congress has a once-in-a-generation opportunity to pass legislation that will strengthen our nation’s commitment to prioritizing science and technology, advancing American innovation and bolstering global leadership. We urge both chambers of Congress to support this bipartisan, bicameral legislation—investment in science and innovation is essential for America’s future,” says American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) CEO Sudip Parikh. “After nearly three years of bipartisan efforts to craft this legislation, it’s time to finish strong and deliver a final agreement that helps propel American science, innovation, and competitiveness into the next decade and beyond,” says Association of American Universities (AAU) President Barbara R. Snyder. “Congress is on the brink of passing legislation with the potential to bolster U.S. research and development investments to better support innovations that not only spark new discoveries, but also solve intractable challenges facing our country and world. APLU urges Congress to heed the recommendations of the research university community and pass this critical competitive legislation,” says Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (APLU) President Peter McPherson.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › Internal Links › I/L Tech Leadership – Semiconductors

The entire America Competes Act must pass for it to be successful in retaining STEM competition

Post 7/2 [Editorials represent the views of The Washington Post as an institution, as determined through debate among members of the Editorial Board, based in the Opinions section and separate from the newsroom. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/02/semiconductor-legislation-china-competition/]//LP

Congress might be nearing the finish line on the bill supposed to safeguard the nation’s technological supremacy — at a crawl rather than the sprint lawmakers and the president alike seem to think is necessary. The package must pass now or never; yet, as important as getting the job done is getting it done right. Sign up for a weekly roundup of thought-provoking ideas and debates Despite some rhetorical cold water thrown by Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), legislators and administration officials alike are hopeful that the America Competes Act is close to finally passing. The legislation would send billions into technological research from artificial intelligence to quantum computing to nanoscience, as well as to help foreign scientists and engineers stay in the United States. Perhaps most notably, it would funnel a whopping $52 billion into shoring up domestic manufacturing of semiconductors, $39 billion of that subsidizing new factories through $3 billion grants. While this sort of industrial policy has brought dubious benefits in the past, a new argument for the investment arrives every day. Under the current status quo, 75 percent of production of these critical computer chips takes place in East Asia — rendering this economy all too vulnerable to supply shocks, whether from pandemics, extreme weather events or geopolitical tensions. The last of these risks seems higher than ever as China adopts an increasingly threatening posture toward Taiwan, whose chipmaker TSMC alone makes up 50 percent of the global market. Meanwhile, President Xi Jinping’s regime has announced a $150 billion program to bolster its own domestic semiconductor industry. This fund, combined with similar offers from nations in Europe and elsewhere, might lure even U.S. firms away from home. Already, TSMC, as well as major American manufacturers Intel and GlobalWafers, have warned they might scale back their plans to construct facilities here if the promised incentives remain on hold. Still, that doesn’t mean Congress should give these firms a handout without doing all it can to ensure the money benefits the nation and its taxpayers rather than merely the manufacturers and their shareholders. Some safeguards are already in place, but there is plenty of room for tightening. Particularly important are protections that screen firms’ outbound investments to ensure they’re not redirecting funds into propping up competitors; so, too, is a robust process to review whether proposed projects will provide a national security benefit to the United States. Limits on stock buybacks by grant recipients would also help ensure this strategic giveaway doesn’t turn into a boondoggle. The biggest mistake Congress could make now is focusing solely on the tens of billions in factory-building subsidies and letting the rest of the America Competes Act fall by the wayside. These grants alone will not on their own catch the United States up to its East Asian peers. Other changes, some of them included in the bill, will prove even more important — from cultivating and retaining STEM talent here to coordinating with allies to keep enough chip-making capacity outside China. But as long as Congress is set on handing money to manufacturers, legislators should also make sure the manufacturers end up giving something back.