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2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC - State Important

Feminist strategies must engage the state

Mansbridge 03 (Jane, “Professor of Political Leadership and Democratic Values @ Harvard, Anti-statism and Difference Feminism in International Social Movements,” International Feminist Journal of Politics)

Feminist strategies that neglect or consistently deplore state action cannot accomplish what women need – because individuals need collectives such as states to solve collective action problems and to move toward more just social arrangements. Strategies that rely heavily on women’s differences from men also cannot accomplish what women need – because women are like men in many ways relevant to individual and collective action. Despite these truths, social movements also need some strategies of action that work separately from and sometimes against the state. Moreover, strategies that accentuate the differences between oppressed and oppressing bring needed energy to a movement. The best overall strategy is, therefore, to realize that both states and difference theories are dangerous weapons, and proceed with caution. In this important paper, Jane Jaquette sounds the alarm. She exposes the dangers of ignoring the state and the dangers of ‘difference feminism’. She also shows how these are linked. Although I will underscore the merits of anti-state activity and difference feminism, I agree that a feminist strategy that neglected or deplored state action would be weak indeed. So would a strategy that relied on women’s differences from men. First, the merits of Jaquette’s argument. One strand in feminist theory and practice greatly suspects the state. This suspicion can escalate into outright rejection, with potentially grave consequences for women. The philosophical case for the state is relatively simple. Collective action can improve human lives. Efficient collective action requires coercion. Instru- ments of collective action involving coercion can, paradoxically, increase human freedom. We are freer to do many things if we can bind ourselves with legally enforceable contracts. Rather than enforcing these contracts privately, it is more efficient and potentially more just to give a monopoly of legitimate violence to one entity, so long as that entity can reasonably claim to be more just than the alternatives. Humans have long struggled to devise relatively legitimate forms of coercion. The history of democracy is part of that struggle, although that history has nowhere produced national-level institutions that are highly legitimate. Despite their incapacity ever to be fully legitimate, however, we still need both states and international institutions to help solve collective action problems and to give scope to the human capacity for justice. Regarding women, the practical case for the state, must be grounded in contemporary realities. In some states, such as Sweden, women do better, compared to men, than in the most egalitarian of known pre-state entities, such as the Kung!. Moreover, although the dangers of state power for women are great, it is not practical to contemplate returning to pre-state entities. Human beings seem to want the goods produced by more extensive forms of cooperation, including those that require legitimate coercion. Given that states will not disappear in the near future, what stance should we take toward them? My answer is: wary usage. State power will be used against women, just as other forms of power are used against women, unless we intervene. One response is to establish barriers, such as constitutional or internationally enforceable rights, to certain kinds of invasions by state power. Another is to make states more likely to act in the interests of women. In the United States both theory and institutional practice carry suspicion of the state farther than in most countries, with some malign consequences. Ours has been a ‘liberalism of fear’ more than an Enlightenment liberalism that envisions a common good. Americans are wary of state power, encouraged in that wariness by powerful capitalist interests. Jaquette rightly warns against this. State power can serve both as a brake on the negative externalities of capitalism and as a positive force for material redistribution. Particularly when patriarchal power takes violent forms in the private sphere, state power can help women struggle against that violence as well as other non-state evils. The question, then, is how far to carry wariness of state power and of theories of state universalism and impartiality. I believe we must both use state power and place bounds on. Because the state as a tool is dangerous and flawed, we need to use it with caution. Jaquette faults contemporary feminist anti-state theorists not for wanting to abolish the state but for spending their energies on wariness rather than on how to use it for redistribution. How important one thinks this problem is depends on how one judges the current balance within feminist theory. Many feminist theorists – e.g. Susan Okin, Nancy Fraser, Iris Young – call for redistributive reforms requiring state power. Perhaps in Latin America, from 356 International Feminist Journal of Politics ––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 12:19 04 August 2014 which Jaquette takes her lead, theorists of the North are represented by anti- state theory. In that case, one must ask why these are the theorists Latin American feminists choose to read. Anti-state discourse may have informed radical practice in Latin America not because anti-state theory is dominant in the North but because activists in Latin America find that anti-state discourse meets their organizing needs. Anti-state discourse may reflect the reality of individuals working on the margins of states that either are relatively corrupt or, even more obviously than most, enforce the interests of dominant classes. Jaquette also rightly warns of the dangers of valorizing action in civil society to the neglect of state action. However, we need evidence that the more women participate in NGOs the less they participate in the state. Without such evidence it seems equally plausible that the more women participate in NGOs the more they will acquire the skills and contacts required for involve- ment in state politics. Some individuals also will not be able to deal with the hierarchy, coercion and male dominance embedded in all states. They will need to work in social movements. Political activism usually sustains a division of labor, with the individuals who can best deal with established institutions doing just that and those who are most repelled by those institutions charting another course. The directions they take sometimes conflict with one another. Women and feminists trying to achieve places in the state, whether as femocrats or politicians, face major barriers but also major attractions. I do not know how much we should worry that they will not be attracted to these jobs because of radical anti-state discourse. In the United States this does not seem to be a huge problem. In some countries, women who could be agents of feminist change turn down jobs in the state because those jobs are boring and unsatisfying. When these women speak of their frustrations, radical anti- state discourse appears to play a small or non-existent role. In short, Jaquette is right that an established anti-state discourse within radical movements makes productive interaction with states less likely, but I am not sure that such discourse is created by feminist theory. Jaquette also points to distortions produced by difference feminism. It is true that any stress on women’s differences reinforces the tendency of dominant groups such as white or middle-class women to interpret ‘women’s’ experiences primarily in light of their own experiences. In recent years, women of color have produced the greatest advances in feminist theory, forcing white feminists to look more closely at their hegemonically defined concepts of commonality; this work has given all feminists the tools to understand better differences within their groups and subgroups. In addition, in most areas of presumed personality difference between men and women, the differences are extremely small. The currently definitive meta-analysis of studies on Carol Gilligan’s hypothesis shows that – at least in the United States, in the highly educated populations where she argues that differences should appear – only very small differences can be found. –––––––––––––––––– Jane Mansbridge/Anti-statism and difference feminism 357 Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 12:19 04 August 2014 Most studies do not show women taking a different approach to justice or behaving more cooperatively than men. Studies designed to elicit behavioral gender differences often generate practically none. In-groups, we now know, exaggerate similarities within their group and their differences from other groups. The human brain makes these predictable cognitive and emotional mistakes in in-group/out-group differentiation. Recognizing this tendency, we should constantly struggle to take into account the fact that our social and first-order cognitive estimates of such differences are usually exaggerated. In the case of gender, all societies also engage in ‘gratuitous gendering’ – giving gendered meanings to nouns and patterns of action that do not functionally require that identification. These processes increase even more our perceptions of gender difference. Today we have little idea what differences might or might not emerge between men and women in a non-oppressive society. It seems mistaken, therefore, to insist on difference rather than focusing on the effects of dominance. Finally, as Jaquette warns, promising different political results based on the premise that women are different from men is dangerous. We are almost certain not to deliver on that promise, at least in the short run. The backlash after the US suffrage movement was undoubtedly caused in part by disillusion at the lack of change when women won the vote. And yet, small differences that do appear between men and women can take on major symbolic significance, precisely because of our human tendency to exaggerate group differences. Although using that significance is danger- ous, not only because it exaggerates reality but also because it underlines the very stereotypes that have been used to keep women in their place, the existence of danger does not mean that we should forswear this tool – any more than for swearing the tool of state action. Just remember: when using a dangerous tool, take active precautions against its potential harms. Difference arguments for electing women are not just arguments from ‘utility’, as Jaquette reports Marian Sawer’s point. For example, the fact that women are perceived as more honest than men can advance an attack on corruption by associating its female leaders with honesty. Using positive stereotypes of women in this way need not be degrading. Successful uses may even result in males adopting certain features of female symbolism to signify their own adherence to better standards. In another example, among professional populations in the United States, women are somewhat more likely than men to adopt participatory, egalitarian styles of leadership. The difference probably derives from women’s relative powerlessness, which teaches skills of persuasion rather than command. In the US women’s movement of the late 1960s and 1970s, women used the gender differences they perceived in listening, interpreting body language and participatory style to create significant departures from the prevailing styles of left politics in organizations dominated by men. The message, ‘We do things differently’ is exhilarating. It prompts greater effort in trying to 358 International Feminist Journal of Politics ––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 12:19 04 August 2014 forge a new model, because the effort is associated not only with a different culture that can replace the old one but also with a different self and associated selves. Turning from practical politics to political theory, concepts are also often gender-coded. Freedom and self-interest, for example, are often coded as male, community and altruism as female. It is not surprising, then, that when feminist theorists entered the field of theory, some explicitly supported certain values previously denigrated as female. Although the arguments made for these values might not be female, their proponrnts often were. Moreover, having been raised in a subculture that had been allocated cultural respon- sibility for these values, women had often thought about them more thor- oughly than men. Women had also usually experienced the denigration of these values first-hand. In short, Jaquette is right that stressing women’s differences from men is fraught with danger. But values and practices that many cultures associate with women are often good in themselves, denigrated because of their association with women. Asserting the value of these ideals and practices from a stance as women often makes emotional, cognitive and political sense. Importantly, Jaquette identifies a link between anti-state discourse and difference feminism. A number of anti-state theorists who are also strongly anti-essentialist would deny this identification. But in social movements themselves, the identification makes sense. The state is male; hence difference feminists should be anti-state. The state is instrumental, self-interested and hierarchical; women are communal, nurturing and participatory. To the degree that these associations are simply accepted as unchangeable truths, they compound the most problematic anti-state mistake. I agree wholeheartedly with Jaquette’s fears in seeing no visible trend toward a renewed interest in the politics of economic justice, at least in the United States. In contrast to the creativity in the struggle against globalization, there has been an absence of ‘street-level’ activism against, for example, the revolutionary shift in tax burdens in the USA. More positively, the anti- sweatshop movement has had some good effects in raising consumer con- sciousness and bringing younger activists in touch with international labor movement organizing. As for the causes of the shift away from the politics of economic justice, I agree with Jaquette that it is related to the post-Cold War era and the temporary triumph of capitalism. I am not so sure that it has much to do either with activists’ anti-state discourse or with difference feminism. This commentary has concentrated on the caveats to Jaquette’s thesis. I conclude by stressing again my fundamental agreement with her argument. Feminists have a ‘stake in a capable state’. It would be catastrophic to be so carried away by the theoretical virtues of civil society or by anti-state discourse as to deaden oneself to the practical need to work with the state to improve the lives of women. Because ideas have influence, it is worth stressing Jaquette’s point that –––––––––––––––––– Jane Mansbridge/Anti-statism and difference feminism 359 Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 12:19 04 August 2014 ‘norms adopted internationally depend on states to implement them’; and only states can change the rules for women and other disadvantaged groups. The welfare state is a huge improvement over the arbitrary power of men in private families. Women’s groups must therefore work closely with govern- ments or remain on the fringe. Feminists will not only have to ‘learn to live with the state’. They should learn to work with the state. For those who do not already know this, Jaquette’s article is required reading.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC - Essentialism DA

Essentialism DA: Their analysis reductively reifies gender norms.

Reiter 15 (Dan, Department of Political Science, Emory University. 10/2015. “The Positivist Study of Gender and International Relations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 59, no. 7, pp. 1301–1326.)

Summary This wide array of positivist gender/IR work offers three major sets of contributions and challenges to existing IR scholarship. First, this scholarship has provided positivist evidence shedding light on many of the theoretical and descriptive suppositions developed in nonpositivist gender/IR work. Furthermore, the positivist evidence has argued for the substantive as well as statistical significance of gender in explaining critically important phenomena. As noted, Hudson et al. (2012) propose that gender has a larger impact on conflict onset than economic development or democracy. Erik Melander (2005a) found that measures of gender equity have at least as much impact on civil war onset as factors such as economic development, democracy, and ethnic fractionalization. Gizelis (2009) found that improved gender equity, as measured by higher female life expectancy, increases the likelihood of the success of UN peacekeeping missions several fold. Some of the positivist work critiques the simple view that women are always more peaceful than men are, supporting the general feminist perspective that the effects of gender on behavior are sophisticated, especially because gender is cultural/social as well as biological. For example, the role of women in terrorist and insurgent groups varies widely, as women are sometimes combatants, even engaging in sexual assault. The effects of gender on public opinion are also complex. Contra some 1980s perspectives about the hypermasculinity of nuclear weapons, for example, there is some evidence that American women are not significantly less likely than American men to favor nuclear weapons use. Second, this positivist work has helped address some scholarly questions that nonpositivist scholars had identified as important and underexplored. At a very simple level, positivist data collection has helped shed more light on the monumental scope of gender-related violence, a set of behaviors that significantly negatively affect the lives of hundreds of millions of people who happen to be women (Hudson et al. 2012). Positivist work has helped describe and understand the effects of elements of the global economy on the lives of women. It has also helped improve our understanding of the role women play in the foreign policy process, especially female heads of state, cabinet members, and members of parliament. Third, positivist work has helped identify new questions related to gender and IR. Positivist work has explored the role gender plays in the formation of trade policy preferences, the different political roles of female as compared with male casualties, the international determinants of the spread of gender equity, and others. New Directions Positivist scholarship has not yet come close to answering all existing questions relating to gender and IR. Much work remains to be done. Perhaps the single most important priority is for scholars to be aware of making essentialist assumptions that the meaning and behavioral consequences of gender are constant across space and time. Some of the positivist gender/IR work assumes that gender has essentialist effects, using research designs that do not allow for the possibility of varying effects of gender across context. Future positivist gender/IR work would benefit from relaxing essentialist assumptions, developing ideas as to how the effects of gender might vary across contexts. For example, a female national leader emerging from a society with weaker gender equity norms might behave differently than a female national leader emerging from a society with stronger gender equity norms. Research already suggests that the consequences of gender vary drastically across insurgent and terrorist groups, a phenomenon that deserves greater attention.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 1AR – Binary DA

The neg oversimplifies feminist ir theory – the strict binary works to recreate the patriarchal hierarchy they seek to destroy

Stephan 14 (Rita, foreign affairs officer at the United States Department of State and a visiting researcher for at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University. “War and Gender Performance”. p. 5-7. International Feminist Journal of Politics. )

The question of incentives here certainly applies to some women who were rewarded for their consent. Complying with their gender roles made their evacuations safer and less traumatic. However, in most of the stories in this article, men and women fall along a spectrum between hero and victim, rather than entirely as one or the other. The protective masculine and vulnerable feminine model represents a broad view that sometimes abstracts the changes that are taking place on the global level. Patriarchy ought to be seen “not only as an arrangement of political institutions, but also, and perhaps even primarily, as a broadly understood value system that revolves around identity constructs which support and entrench gender-specific hierarchical visions of society” (Bleiker 2000, 32). Looking at the 2006 war from the micro level, I find that the binary relationship that international relations feminists claim in their model of patriarchal violence does not always apply, or applies only in a rigidly logical way. The stories in this study show that women, men and children were all victims of military aggression. However, in some cases, women were the only agents available to save the children; in other cases, representatives of the patriarchal order, such as fathers or fathers-in-law, were either left behind or uninvolved. While the men did protect the womenandchildren in some instances, women, who subscribed to their gender roles as mothers and wives, acted in instances when men were impotent to act, thus in a sense protecting the men also. While some would argue that these women’s performances lie outside the realm of gender norms, one could clearly see that such binary distinction is not possible.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC - Binary DA

The dualistic nature of equating militarism and patriarchy reinforces the cultural basis of Western gendered power relations

hooks 95 (bell, Distinguished Professor of English at City College, The City University of New York. A lecturer and the author of Ain't I A Woman: Black Women and Feminism. Women's Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3/4, Rethinking Women's Peace Studies (Fall - Winter, 1995), pp. 58-64)

By equating militarism and patriarchy, these feminists often structure their arguments in such a way as to suggest that to be male is synonymous with strength, aggression, and the will to dominate and do violence to others and that to be female is synonymous with weakness, passivity, and the will to nourish and affirm the lives of others. While these may be stereotypical norms that many people live out, such dualistic thinking is dangerous; it is a basic ideological component of the logic that informs and promotes domination in Western society. Even when inverted and employed for a meaningful purpose, like nuclear disarmament, it is nevertheless risky, for it reinforces the cultural basis of sexism and other forms of group oppression. Suggesting as it does that women and men are inherently different in some fixed and absolute way, it implies that women by virtue of our sex have played no crucial role in supporting and upholding imperialism (and the militarism that serves to maintain imperialist rule) or other systems of domination. Often the women who make such assertions are white. Black women are very likely to feel strongly that white women have been quite violent, militaristic in their support and maintenance of racism.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC - Case Outweighs

Our impact outweighs and the alt fails— forwarding claims about representations over resolving the violence of war-torn areas is simply academic complicity.

Hudson 15 (Heidi, professor of International Relations and Director of the Centre for Africa Studies at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa, “(Re)framing the Relationship between Discourse and Materiality in Feminist Security Studies and Feminist IPE,” pg 413-419, Politics & Gender; Cambridge Vol. 11, Iss. 2, June 2015)

Critical Perspectives on Gender and Politics While feminists usually try to ground the meanings that they study, theorizing the mundane or the everyday may very well represent a detour--or even a dead end--if bread-and-butter issues related to the security and economic well-being of ordinary women and men [people] are ignored. What value does feminist theorizing (even if it draws from women's lived experiences) have in war-affected contexts where meeting immediate needs is paramount? At what point does the theorizing of the body under such circumstances become a means to satisfying intellectual fetishes? Theorizing the everyday is messy because it has to contend with the immediate social setting in which popular culture is inseparable from the economic materiality of the conditions of oppression. In response to this dilemma, my aim is to argue for a productive rather than a reductive relationship between Feminist Security Studies (FSS) and Feminist (International) Political Economy (FPE), achieved through a reframed relationship between discursive subjectivity and a structure-centred materiality. I argue for a more systematic feminist analysis that reunites FPE and cultural FSS critiques. This analytical synthesis is based on an understanding of the co-constituted agency of discourse and materiality underpinned by a postcolonial-feminist attention to the politics of space. After the Cold War, security became a catch-all concept for critical variants of IR, but instead of working against disciplinary fragmentation, "security has settled into each new camp in particularistic ways" (Sylvester 2013, 618). For FSS the main concern is to underscore the conceptual necessity of gender to understanding security. Although scholars have also emphasized the theoretical and methodological diversity of FSS, I contend that there is an implicit hierarchy of sorts when it comes to which critical tradition matters more theoretically or epistemologically--with a subtle but distinct privileging of the discursive as evidenced by the influential contributions of, among others, Judith Butler (1993), Karin Fierke (2013a), Lene Hansen (2006), and Laura Shepherd (2008). FSS thus tends to focus on the gendered, discursive construction of forms of violence with less attention paid to materialities of economic insecurity. In contrast, FPE tends to avoid the security frame and its discursive implications and concentrates more on gender as a social relation of inequality and the gendered effects of capitalism or economic globalization. Poststructuralist scholarship in FSS insists that the discursive is not privileged over the material and that objects in the material world and human subjects both take their forms and agencies relationally, as they are embedded within particular locations. Similarly, gendered and embodied security is theorized to be the outcome of relational processes--performed in, by, and through those relations. Theory thus makes practice (Foucault 1972). Yet, thinking about our bodies as cultural constructs, produced as objects in security discourse, has a high level of abstraction. Before we can analyze discourse about bodies, shouldn't we first make the bodies from "other worlds," rooted in everyday struggles of human insecurity, feature in IR? How is attention to contextualized discourses of individuals or groups without considering their basic needs different from what liberal feminists are doing, namely treating those whose security is at stake as abstract, silent, rights-bearing individuals with no culture? Moreover, for all this talk about interactions between language and matter (as if they were equal), "language" remains the star of the show, as evidenced in Karin Fierke's claim that "embodied security is ... fundamentally bound up in the interaction between humans and their material environment, both of which are constituted in and through language" (Fierke 2013b, 16). Theoretically, materiality should gain agency through the fact that it cannot ontologically be separated from discursive forces but in practice discourses treat material practices (bodies) as effects (objects) rather than causes (subjects), and consequently maintain agency (Wilcox 2012). A subtle hierarchy is therefore imposed. Reversing the starting point of the inquiry may succeed in troubling dualistic thinking but does not transcend it. We may have thrown the baby out with the bathwater when we privileged the effects of cultural constructions of gender difference at the expense of the material effects of bodies, economic justice, and security (see Fraser 2013). There are clearly limits to discursive analysis, especially when it comes to connecting physical insecurity and the materiality of insecurity linked to structures. We must therefore look to the so-called "new materialisms" on posthumanist agency (Connolly 2013), material feminisms (Hughes 2013), and Feminist IPE. Feminist IPE as a diverse body of scholarship studies structures, social practices, and the meanings of the global political economy (Griffin 2010; Peterson 2007). The emphasis falls on specifically gendered bodies while also foregrounding differences that are based upon material and structural inequalities as well as intersectional relations of disadvantage (e.g., gender, institutionalized racism, or ethnicity). In this regard, FPE may find itself closer than FSS to a radical definition of human security as everyday life experiences embedded in global structures of inclusion and exclusion and can keep FSS honest by guiding it back to a concern with everyday (economic) insecurities. While FPE reminds us to consider the global picture of inequality, a systematic feminist political economy theory of security/conflict/violence is yet to emerge. That said, revisiting the material conditions that influence the socioeconomic production of gender as a relation of inequality is a potentially agency-inducing factor that could complement (together with attention to new materialisms) the discursive analytics of FSS, as will be shown in the discussion that follows on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). FSS research has highlighted the harmful discursive misrepresentations that characterize international attention on rape as a tool of war in the DRC (e.g., Baaz and Stern 2013). However, feminist poststructuralism on its own is not a suitable lens to understand the hybridity of how women in the DRC adapt SGBV discourses to fit in with local cultural practices and to fulfil particular sociomaterial needs within their specific context. One needs a postcolonial feminism for that. To keep the international community interested and maintain the status that funding brings, women's organizations in the eastern DRC tend to emphasize the brutal and extensive nature of SGBV. The outcome is not straightforward--women's victimhood is reinforced--but at the same time, it could mean that so-called "victims" fight back, negotiating the "global patriarchal bargain" from below, simultaneously engaging with discourse and the material aspects of socioeconomic justice and empowerment (Jean-Bouchard 2013). This case also underlines the necessity to consider a broad range of materialities (i.e., not only those that are discursively produced, but also "conventional" political economy materialities during and after war). During war, rape as a form of gendered accumulation by dispossession was used in Mozambique and Rwanda to strip women of their productive and reproductive labor power, as well as their possessions and access to land and livestock. Postwar, Baaz and Stern (2013) found that Congolese men rape due to a complex mix of cultural and political economy perceptions about masculinity, women as property, and a sense of entitlement to sex as compensation for their loss of status as providers. Borrowing Claudia Card's (2003) term "social death" to describe the cultural shame as a consequence of rape, I argue that the loss of social vitality is not just a loss of identity and meaning for one's existence, but also a deeply material loss of political, economic, and social relations. Both FSS and Feminist IPE should therefore pay more attention to the political economy of social relations and inequalities of the everyday.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC - Link Turn (Arms Control)

War turns gendered violence, but analysis isn’t enough – only material engagement with the circulation and use of weapons makes feminist advocacy effective

Mhajne 18 (Anwar, a Palestnian citzen of Israel, recently received her Ph.D. in Politcal Science from the University of Cincinnat in the US. Her current research focuses on gender, politcs, and religion. "THE FUTURE OF FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY: TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF WOMEN’S (AND MEN’S) SECURITY." )

As opposed to the aforementioned foreign policies, an effective feminist foreign policy needs to acknowledge existing power structures and analyse the causes and consequences of patriarchy, militarisation, and neoliberalism as the dominant order. Profiting from arms production creates a vested interest in sustaining the systems of war. The manufacture, trade, proliferation, possession, and use of weapons facilitate sexual and gender-based violence, human trafficking, and armed conflicts, which are integrally tied up with violent masculinities. Governments need to reallocate resources spent on the military towards activities that benefit women and humanity in general, such as implementing the Sustainable Development Goals. As Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) have always argued, bloated military spending raids funds set aside for human security and sustainable development: “If the [1.6 trillion USD] spent on military security in 2015 was directed towards human security, this would provide a substantial portion of the total needed to realise the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals” (WILPF, 2017: 20). Militarism and arms trades are tightly connected. An emphasis on militarism might serve the interests of those profiting from arms production, thus sustaining the systems of war. As various studies produced by WILPF and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) demonstrate (see: Gaynor, 2015 & WILPF, 2016), women and girls often disproportionately suffer from the use of weapons in conflict due to “forced displacement, sexual violence, trafficking, lack of access to health care (including sexual and reproductive health), and lack of access to victim and survivor assistance” (WILPF, 2016: 6).

Therefore, a more impactful approach to feminist foreign policy should be based on challenging militarism and preventing arms from reaching entities that will utilise them to violate the rights of men and women. A feminist foreign policy should not only focus on addressing women’s needs during conflict, but also focus on preventing conflict itself and reducing its intensity through controlling the influx of weapons and limiting arms trade. It is important to ensure that peace processes are inclusive and gender-sensitive, but this alone is insufficient. Rather, to ensure peace, policymakers need to focus on how militarism and arms trade fuel conflicts and increase civilian casualties for men and women alike. A feminist foreign policy should enable effective conflict prevention through disarmament, women’s meaningful participation, and providing effective conditions for women’s empowerment.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 1AR - Perm

The aff and alts methods should be synthesized – rejecting the permutation creates a methodological hierarchy that limits both theories

Sjoberg et al. 16 (Laura Sjoberg, Kelly Kadera, and Cameron G. Thies, Department of Political Science, University of Florida, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University, 9-23-2016, accessed on 11-4-2020, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 62, Issue 4, "Reevaluating Gender and IR Scholarship: Moving beyond Reiter’s Dichotomies toward Effective Synergies", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022002716669207)

These two broad research traditions talk about similar subjects but in different ways. Postpositivists problematize, while maintaining an interest in, questions of where and how women participate in political violence. Likewise, the best positivist analyses of where and how women participate in political violence are theoretically informed by complex understandings of gender and gender relations. Yet, these two groups of scholars’ adherence to their own intellectual traditions limit their ability to produce synergistic understandings of gender and violence. Because many feminist researchers reject positivists’ tendency to use dichotomized understandings that reduce gender to sex in order to formulate testable hypotheses, they find it difficult to directly engage those hypotheses and the associated statistical results. Yet feminist scholars are well situated, for example, to provide deeper sociological interpretations of the findings of positivist data analysis and to use the results of that data analysis to tell more complicated stories. Positivists’ tools, on the other hand, are poorly suited to addressing the questions with which feminist research is most concerned. First, positivists’ implicit assumptions that sex categories are stable, dichotomous, and contain essential characteristics that can be read onto people hamper their ability to account for gender differences as constitutive of sex differences in political violence. In other words, it impedes their ability to recognize statistical problems with which they are otherwise quite familiar: correlations (between sex and violence) may be spurious (with gender as the underlying cause) and correlations can be produced by unseen or difficult to measure intervening variables (Kadera and Mitchell 2005). Second, standard regression analyses are constrained by the difficulty of detecting coconstitution and the challenges of directly testing relationships between quantifiable and unquantifiable phenomena.4 Neither research program is above reproach on its own terms either. Large-n statistical work on women’s political violence encounters difficulties other large-n statistical work does not: it is, for example, limited by difficulties in obtaining data, including criminalization of most political violence, the fact that politically violent women commit (and often hide) transgressions of gender norms, secrecy of politically violent groups, personal security risks in conflict zones, and political interests of both researchers and their funders. Feminist work, even as it seeks to resist sensationalization and stereotyping, can struggle with sex, race, and cultural essentialism as it tries to make sense of performance, presentation, and policy surrounding women’s violence in global politics.5 The two research approaches cannot—and do not aim to—analyze identical subjects. Furthermore, neither can provide sufficient leverage on all forms of relevant questions related to women’s political violence to warrant excluding or superseding the other. A deeper, more engaged dialogue that accepts these differences (and sometimes incommensurabilities) would provide significant intellectual purchase. In order to build effective positivist–feminist bridges, we must recognize what each piece of research analyzes and evaluates, and its analytical strengths and weaknesses. Dialogues can then address and engage the knowledge parameters that limit the generalization of particular claims, resulting in richer conversations about both extant work and trajectories for future research. Seeing Effective Synergies The syntheses we envision, then, do not equate or compare apples and oranges or create a hierarchy among approaches. Instead, they leverage difference as a source of complementarity and differences as a source of dialogue. Recognizing the rich nuances of a variety of work in gender and IR, rather than dichotomizing understandings, produces more effective engagement. Below, we provide three examples from the literatures on conflict sexual violence, international norms and Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and terrorism and political violence, of actual and potential dialogues.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC - Perm

Perm: Do both - Working with both critical feminist IR and traditional IR is most productive and consistent with the neg’s literature

Hudson et al 10 (Valerie M., Prof. of Poli Sci @ Texas A&M, PhD in Poli Sci from Ohio State R. Charli Carpenter, Associate Prof. of Poli Sci @ the University of Massachussetts-Amherst, PhD in Poli Sci from the University of Oregon; Mary Caprioli, Associate Prof. of Poli Sci and Director of the International Studies program @ the University of Minnesota-Duluth, PhD from the University of Connecticut; “Gender and Global Security,” in The International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert A. Denemark, 2010)

We acknowledge the important role played by some IR feminists in critiquing/expanding security studies to be more inclusive of women's needs. But it is also true that deploying gender as a variable and a category of analysis has contributed important insights to security studies, which must be taken seriously by security studies scholars not only for feminist reasons, but because security scholars – and policy makers – miss much of what is going on by ignoring gender. We reject the claim that IR feminist approaches require non-quantitative methods or a critical theoretical epistemology, a claim which has in the past been reified both by IR feminists (Tickner 2005) and by those writing within the IR mainstream (e.g., Carpenter 2003). As Mary Caprioli has argued, much quantitative work is also relevant to feminist questions (Caprioli 2004). We agree with Robert Keohane (1989) that gender as a category of analysis can contribute something to IR as conventionally defined, and it is this contribution which we explore in this essay. In our view, seeking to integrate gender more fully into the discipline of security studies serves to validate the empirical insights yielded by many feminist IR scholars by taking them seriously within the mainstream. While methodologies and specification of explanans and explanandum may differ from the work cited above, such analysis can indeed be consistent with “rethinking security on feminist grounds.” By drawing on empirical insights from gender theory, while speaking to the major concerns of international security studies as a discipline, the literature on gender and security can speak to both IR feminists and security studies scholars. In this essay, we will concentrate on what this literature can say to mainstream security studies, whose primary concerns are, following Walt: “the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war (1991:212). Taking a gender perspective need not entail a rejection of conventional concepts, methodologies, or questions that define the discipline. Unlike the critical feminist scholarship, which is skeptical of conventional methodologies, this literature review includes a range of empirical scholarship on gender, whether qualitative or quantitative, positivist or constructivist, that make a meaningful contribution to security studies.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC – Extinction O/W

Preventing extinction isn’t liberal futurity or naïve optimism---mobilizing against dangerous conditions is preferable to fatalism that consigns the planet to nuclear war.

Stevens 18 (Tim, Lecturer in Global Security, King’s College London, “Exeunt Omnes? Survival, Pessimism and Time in the Work of John H. Herz,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 283-302) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]

Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct. His pessimism about the latter did not preclude working towards the former.

As Herz recognised, it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice. What was required was a collective, transnational and inherently interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear and environmental issues and to problematize notions of security, sustainability and survival in the context of nuclear geopolitics and the technological transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’.68

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 2AC – War First

Case turns the K – War is qualitatively different then everyday life - The affs pragmatic approach to security is compatible and necessary to accomplish feminism goals in IR

Peach 4 (Lucinda Joy, Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at American University, 2004, “A Pragmatist Feminist Approach to the Ethics of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Hashmi, p. 436-441)

The pragmatist feminist perspective that I develop in this chapter is deeply indebted to and affirms in many respects the antiwar feminist approach outlined by Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick in the preceding chapter, but with some marked differences. These differences, I argue, reveal more completely both the promise and the limitations of antiwar feminism.

At the outset, it is important to note that there is neither a single "feminism" nor a single "pragmatism" with which it might be aligned. Instead, there are multiple feminisms, just as there are multiple pragmatisms. The "pragmatist feminism" developed in this essay draws on several elements from American Pragmatism, a philosophical school developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most prominently by Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF › 1AR – Realism Good

Realism is politically useful even if its not theoretically perfect---their reductionism results in ahistoricity that triggers worse violence

Abraham 17 (Kavi Joseph, Johns Hopkins University. “Making Machines: Unlikely Resonances between Realist and Postcolonial Thought,” https://academic.oup.com/ips/article-abstract/11/3/221/3798787)

This passage marks out one of the biggest obstacles to connecting realist and postcolonial thought: race. One would be hard pressed to find in realist theorizations anything resembling a supple understanding of race and racism (Vitalis 2015)— though Carr (2001b, 107) demonstrates a comparatively great deal of reflexivity on postcolonial liberation (see fn. 2 above). Even in Williams’s (2005) “wilful” realist tradition, there is scant discussion of how an embedded ethic of critical self-limitation fared in the context of racial or other forms of radical difference. Absent an engagement with the analytics of postcolonial thinking, or the diverse ways in which white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity inflect past and present liberal imperial formations, willful realism does not address the categories that threaten to push prudential skeptics toward violent responses, that pose limitations to an ethos of limits. As evidenced in Morgenthau, failure to think critically about race opens up the way for Morgenthau’s theoretical practice to be driven toward resentful rather than careful ends. It is at this juncture that those concerned with contemporary imperial formations are confronted with a number of possible responses: one is to deem realism, in all its complex and contradictory manifestations, as a failed, unethical, and fundamentally racist/imperial project. A second response is to politically align against liberalism, while holding this partnership at arm’s length. A third response, derived from Ayoob’s (2002) subaltern realism, is to work on an epistemic register, selectively taking insights from realist traditions that help better explain the neocolonial world. Morgenthau’s racist interjections should be critiqued and confronted—perhaps by outlining the innumerable non-Western contributions to the making of so-called Western modernity (Hobson 2004)—but this failing does not delegitimize other realist insights. What is important for Ayoob’s (2002) accommodationist stance is to combine plausible realist insights with other categories that can grasp the extent of global politics, including the dynamics of the postcolonial experience, better.

The final response is the one I advance. To adopt a mode of argumentation concerned with building a counter-imperial machine is to neither dismiss constituencies that become caught up in imperial formations, nor merely to tactically align with them; rather, establishing resonant connections among postcolonial and realist lines of thought, highlighting shared dispositions to difference, is to push the latter toward repositioning itself on new ethical lines that limit contemporary forms of violence. To recover a minor position in realism is not to accept all realist positions, nor is it to synthesize or convert any theoretical line into a coherent framework. It is, however, to amplify the shared spirituality that informs both realist and postcolonial thinking, drawing constituencies toward prudential rather than imperial defenses of difference. It is to furnish current research agendas with an anti-imperial focus, to seek the creative possibilities that may arise when divergent constituencies meet, interfuse, and shift. Thus, our response to Morgenthau, as to other realists, is to cultivate the connections that do exist, not for epistemic reasons but for a political project that strengthens counter-imperial movements.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Affirmative › **AT Impact** › Recession Inevitable

Recession is inevitable – politics can’t save the economy

White 6-22-22 [Ben White is POLITICO Pro's chief economic correspondent and author of the “Morning Money” column covering the nexus of finance and public policy, "Actually, a recession is inevitable", POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-nightly/2022/06/22/actually-a-recession-is-inevitable-00041577] GBS-HW

RECESSION IS COMING! — You read it here first, people. Take it to the bank. The U.S. is headed toward an economic downturn. Because it always is. We have clearly not — as some hoped during recent booms — repealed the business cycle and entered a period of permanent growth. Recessions always arrive. So the question is not whether we are headed toward one. Because, well, duh. The questions are: When will recession hit? What will cause it? And how bad will it be? And while we may not be in one yet (though it’s possible we are), I’m sorry to report that the conditions are ripe for a slide in gross domestic product growth that lasts at least two quarters, the technical definition of recession. I say we may already be in one because growth in the first quarter slid 1.5 percent. And analysts are mostly downgrading estimates for the second quarter to close to zero, based on slipping retail sales, plunging consumer and business sentiment and an aggressive Federal Reserve bumping up historically low interest rates to battle runaway inflation of close to 9 percent. The Atlanta Federal Reserve’s “GDP Now” model pegs second quarter growth at 0.0 percent. For real. Exactly zero. They probably won’t nail it on the head. So the question is whether we’ll get just a tiny bit of growth or a small decline. If the latter, well, that’s a recession. But probably not one that people will notice very much — some of the recent declines had quirky inventory changes in them that should get reversed. Consumer and business spending (the big drivers of the economy) have held up remarkably well, meaning if we do get a negative second quarter, we should bounce back at least a bit in the second half of the year. The scary bit is really what happens next year and beyond. And economists, politicians, Wall Street traders and pretty much everyone else is growing more concerned that a significant downturn could arrive in 2023. The main reason is obvious: Steady and significant rate hikes from the Fed often trigger at least mild recessions. It’s a feature, not a bug. Fed Chair Jerome Powell and his colleagues will never say it out loud. But they’d take a recession rather than allow prices to continue to spin out of control. The intent of hikes, after all, is to slow down consumer and business spending and thus arrest rising prices. And the current Fed has its foot hard on the brakes at the moment, with a second three-quarter-point increase expected next month, followed by half-point increases in September and November, then by another quarter point in December. These would still get the Fed’s target rate only into somewhat normal range from effectively below zero. But mere anticipation of the moves has already driven mortgage rates to 6 percent. Interest rates on everything else, from auto loans to credit cards, will likely be headed significantly higher. And this will happen as consumers are already drawing down their significant Covid-era savings to keep up with inflation. Credit card debt is rising, and servicing that debt is growing more expensive. After booming during Covid, Americans’ savings rate has taken a major dive. The figure hit just 4.4 percent in April, the lowest since September 2008 during the Great Recession. Big companies like Tesla, Netflix and the trading platform Robinhood have spoken of hiring freezes and potential layoffs. The once-booming cryptocurrency market is a giant mess. JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon is talking about a “hurricane” possibly hitting the economy. Oh, and politics won’t help. The midterms could very well lead to divided government again in D.C., with Republicans taking at least one chamber on Capitol Hill. If that happens, it could easily take us back to the days of debt ceiling and government shutdown fights that plagued the economy and the Obama administration after the 2010 midterms. Mix it all together — big rate hikes, strapped consumers, freaked-out executives and possibly gridlocked government — and there is potential for a quite significant recession.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Affirmative › **AT Impact** › Recession Inevitable

Wage-price spiral makes a recession inevitable

Philip Marey, 6-9-2022, "US: The inevitable recession," RaboResearch - Economic Research, https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2022/june/us-the-inevitable-recession//DG

The negative supply shocks related to COVID and the Russian invasion of Ukraine are causing headwinds for the US economy, which contracted in the first quarter of this year. However, as consumption and investment remain robust, the US is likely to avoid a recession this year Meanwhile, a wage-price spiral has started that will be difficult to stop without the Fed hiking the economy into recession next year, Therefore, a recession seems inevitable: even if the US is able to absorb the exogenous shocks to the supply side of the economy, the response of the central bank to the wage-price spiral will cause a recession from within.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Affirmative › **AT Impact** › No Recession

Inflation effects will be mild – well-supported banks, high saving, and plentiful jobs prove

Lee 6-22-22 [Don Lee covers the U.S. and global economy out of Washington, D.C, "Yes, a recession looks inevitable. But it may not be that bad. Here's why", Los Angeles Times, https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-06-22/recession-looks-unavoidable-but-will-it-be-that-bad] GBS-HW

WASHINGTON — Whether it’s President Biden insisting a recession is avoidable or his critics arguing that the wolf is at the door, both sides are acting as if the nation faces an unprecedented catastrophe. Partly it’s political theater — Biden fighting on behalf of an already beleaguered presidency and many of the doomsayers hoping a downturn could be the coup de grace for Democrats. Behind the rhetoric, the reality is that recessions are a normal part of American economic life. The U.S. has had one, on average, every 6½ years since 1945. And in the present case, most professional economists think any downturn now is likely to be relatively mild, with a fairly quick recovery. “We’re calling for a small ‘r’ recession,” said Jack Ablin, chief investment officer at Cresset Capital. “It means it’s not going to be protracted and things aren’t going to fall apart,” as they did during the Great Recession and again in 2020 when the pandemic struck. Many households are flush with cash, and jobs are plentiful with demand for new workers strong. Banks are well capitalized, which gives them a solid buffer against a business contraction. What may be different this time is the public’s state of mind, coupled with a handful of unusual factors — first among them the grinding war in Ukraine. For most Americans, the pandemic and its accompanying economic upheaval came after an extraordinarily long period of relative economic stability. The economy was not growing much and real incomes were stagnating, but unemployment was low among most population groups, prices were stable, interest rates were at rock bottom and stores were flooded with low-cost goods made overseas. Most people had adjusted to the status quo. So the COVID-19 downturn hit like a thunderbolt, and the outbreak of inflation — driven largely by consumers suddenly beginning to spend their pandemic-induced savings — was another jolt to popular expectations. Now, economic indicators look primed for a recession. The broad-based Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index is down more than 20% since its high Jan. 3. U.S. consumer confidence has sunk to record lows, thanks largely to high inflation. Retail spending, home-building and manufacturing output all declined last month. And consumers, who drive the U.S. economy, are starting to cut back on discretionary purchases, things such as appliances and services. Tom Straus, owner of Straus Carpets in Oakland, has seen a sudden drop-off in orders for new flooring jobs at homes in the San Francisco Bay Area. Typically his commercial business includes about $1 million in projects for schools during the summer; such orders so far this year total just $30,000. “Our future work is diminishing,” he said. Many other leaders of businesses, small and large, as well as workers, are bracing for harder times, with fears stoked by the Federal Reserve’s plans for more fat interest rate increases to combat high inflation. “We’re skating on the edge of recession, especially with the Fed bringing out these big guns,” said Christopher Rupkey, chief economist at the financial market research firm Fwdbonds. Larry Summers, Harvard economist and former Treasury secretary, notes that whenever inflation tops 4% (it was more than double that in May) and unemployment drops below 4% (it was 3.6% last month), that’s an indication of an overheating economy that in the past has always brought recession within a year or two. Whether inflation is avoidable, the real question may be: How bad and how long will the next downturn be? And on this score, there is greater consensus among experts that it’ll probably be nothing like the most recent episodes. One common definition of a recession is two consecutive quarters of negative economic growth, that is, shrinking gross domestic product. But an official designation is made by a nonprofit research organization, which looks at a broad set of data and declares a recession, usually months after it’s begun. The Great Recession that began in late 2007 lasted 18 months — the longest in 90 years — and was also one of the deepest. Millions of Americans lost their jobs and homes after the real estate bubble burst and large banking companies cratered. The unemployment rate shot up to 10%. The pandemic-inflicted recession in 2020 was the shortest on record, just two months from peak to trough, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. But the sudden collapse in the economy was unparalleled as businesses across the country closed and consumers sheltered in place for weeks. Some 22 million jobs evaporated between February and April that year. The rebound since then has been fast and strong, largely because of unprecedented government aid to households and businesses. Several rounds of stimulus checks helped boost consumer spending and demand, contributing to higher inflation. Much of that money hasn’t been spent yet, which will provide a cushion for many households. Americans overall had excess savings of $2.7 trillion in the first quarter, according to Moody’s Analytics’ calculations based on Fed and other government data. Although more than half of that was held by households in the top 10% of income, those in the bottom 20% had on average about $5,700 more cash in hand than they otherwise would have without the federal aid and the effects of the pandemic. Those extra savings, along with historically low household debt and loan-servicing burden — many homeowners locked in low mortgage rates before the recent increases — suggest that most people are better positioned financially and could help make the next recession milder. At Bank of America Institute, economist David Tinsley saw a noticeable uptick in BofA customers using their credit cards last month, as was the case at many banks. High gas prices, he says, are hitting lower-income families hard and also cutting into spending for goods. But looking at BofA customers’ savings deposits and checking account balances, Tinsley said, “households continue to have high buffers relative to before the pandemic.” For John Barone, 58, the difference between where he was on the eve of the Great Recession and today is like night and day. In 2007, he was running his own home renovation business in Baltimore, making payments on a $1-million loan. When the housing market crashed, he laid off 20 workers and eventually lost his business, his home and his wife. Today Barone and a business partner operate out of Washington, D.C., giving tours with their seven golf carts. His business debts are modest — $32,000 in bank loans for two electric vehicles. Barone has seven seasonal workers and lives modestly in an apartment on Capitol Hill. “I don’t have a car, don’t have to buy gas,” he said. “I go to the day-old bread shelf and buy my bread for half price.” Barone is more sanguine than most. Nationally, small-business owners were asked last month by the National Federation of Independent Business how they see conditions over the next six months. The result was the lowest reading in 48 years. At larger companies, a May survey of 750 top executives by the Conference Board found that more than 60% of them see a recession coming or already here. Both surveys, however, suggest employers aren’t sure what that may mean as far as employment and potential for layoffs. Many employers are still struggling to fill job vacancies and could be reluctant to let go of workers right away. The jobless rate stood at 3.6% in May, a notch above the half-century pre-pandemic low, and there are still nearly two job openings for every person officially unemployed. New unemployment claims, a proxy for layoffs, have been edging higher in recent weeks but remain low by historical standards. Job growth in May was the slowest in 12 months, but still a robust 390,000. “Of course we’re slowing down, but let’s remember how fast we had been growing,” said Carl Tannenbaum, chief economist at Northern Trust in Chicago. One thing that worries Tannenbaum is the risk of knock-on effects from the Fed’s move to jack up interest rates. The pivot has already taken a big bite out of the U.S. housing market, but the tightening by the Fed and other central banks could also slam developing countries and the global economy as investors reshuffle funds. That could circle back to drag down the U.S. Economists say the Fed misread the threat of inflation and was slow to abandon its easy-money policies, but it’s now racing to catch up and raise its benchmark interest rate aggressively to cool demand and slow growth, including in the job market. “I think they’re seeing it like the worst of two worlds — either stagflation or recession,” said Beth Ann Bovino, chief U.S. economist at Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services. Stagflation — a condition of high inflation and stagnant activity — plagued the economy in the 1970s and ended only after the Fed raised interest rates high and drove the economy into a deep doubled-dip recession in the early 1980s. “My belief is that in order to avoid stagflation, I think they would risk the economy and go for the recession rather than suffer stagflation for however many years,” Bovino said. Jeffrey Korzenik, chief investment strategist at Fifth Third Bank in Tampa, Fla., said the country will avoid a recession, barely, largely because of the strength of the labor market. He figures the Fed’s tightening will create more layoffs but said, “We have so many openings, it’ll be easier to get workers recycled into the job market. It’s not bulletproof, but it means the economy is less likely to fall off a cliff.”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Affirmative › **AT Impact** › Bill Doesn’t Solve Inflation

Deficits don’t cause inflation – use logic.

Tamny 22 [John Tamny is editor of RealClearMarkets, Vice President at FreedomWorks, a senior fellow at the , and a senior economic adviser to Applied Finance Advisors, 3-8-2022, "Let's Be Serious For Once, Budget Deficits Do Not Cause Inflation", RealClearMarkets, https://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2022/03/08/lets_be_serious_for_once_budget_deficits_do_not_cause_inflation_820120.html, DOA: 6-23-2022 //ArchanSen]

In 1815, Great Britain could claim government debt that was 261% of GDP. Did inflation ensue? No. The pound was tied to gold. In 1945, war spending had U.S. federal debt well north of 100%. Did the dollar subsequently collapse? No. The dollar was defined as 1/35th of a gold ounce. Too much gold for you? That’s fine. Let’s move to Asia. Japan in particular. Its government debt has soared over the decades. During that time the yen has risen pretty substantially against the dollar from 360/1USD to 114/1USD. And what about the U.S.? In 1980, total U.S. federal debt was a little bit above $900 billion. At the time, the yield on the 10-year Treasury note was over 11%. Fast forward to 2022, and total federal debt has zoomed upward to $30 trillion. The yield on the 10-year is 1.71%. If readers are confused, Treasuries pay dollar income streams. In other words, if all the debt amassed over the decades by the U.S. had resulted in inflation, Treasury yields would have risen, not fallen. The above stats are just a few data points to call into the question the increasingly popular narrative among economists, pundits, and very deep thinkers about the alleged relationship between government debt and inflation. There is none. To be clear about what was just said, this opinion piece is not a defense of government spending or borrowing. Government spending is a freedom and economy-sapping tax, period. When governments spend either thanks to taxation or borrowing, the economy-neutering effect is the same. And it’s harmful. If you believe otherwise, and most economists puzzlingly do, you believe Nancy Pelosi and Mitch McConnell are better capital allocators than Jeff Bezos and Peter Thiel. The main thing is that statistics or history aren’t necessary to show why government debt doesn’t cause inflation. Logic is all that’s required. Inflation is a devaluation of the currency. Yet budget deficits signal a willingness on the part of investors to buy future income streams from the government taking on the debt. Ok, so by the thought processes of the pundit and economics classes, investors eagerly fund the borrowing of the very nations that intend to stiff them with devaluation. No, it doesn’t work that way. Or it doesn’t have to. Indeed, it’s no doubt true that more than a few nations have devalued their way out of massive debt over the decades and centuries. But it’s a reminder that debt doesn’t cause inflation, as much as some nations choose to foist their profligacy on their citizens and creditors. Which means the pundit class is reversing causation. While nations that do a reasonable job of protecting their currencies can run up lots of debt, nations that inflate it away cannot. All of which is a long or short way of saying that inflation restrains government borrowing. Which is a statement of the obvious. Many in the pundit class will say “central banks” conduct just that sort of lending. Oh dear….So we’re supposed to believe that arms of government can finance government? If this were even remotely true, the Soviet Union would still exist today care of Gosbank. Despite the tendency of the deep in thought to get deficits and inflation backwards, they keep making their silly cases. In an opinion piece last week for the Wall Street Journal, Thomas Sargent and William Silber cited Milton Friedman’s quip in the 1970s that inflation had resulted from “ever more goodies” sans commensurate tax hikes as the cause of the 1970s inflation. Oh yes, nothing to do with the explicit devaluation of the dollar in 1971 whereby President Nixon severed the dollar’s link to gold. Naaah. Nothing to see there.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Affirmative › **AT Impact** › Bill Doesn’t Solve Inflation

Biden’s bill can’t undo tremendous surge of cash from relief bills and threats to increase taxes drive inflation and destroy business confidence

Buchanan 6/20

Republican Vern Buchanan represents Florida’s 16th District in the United States House of Representatives and is the co-chairman of the bipartisan Florida delegation. Buchanan is second in seniority on the Ways and Means Committee, where he serves as the lead Republican of the Health Subcommittee., “Biden and Democrats keep striking out on inflation – here are 4 ways to fix things fast” 6-20-22 dmr

U.S. inflation among highest in developed world Wall Street Journal Editorial board member Kim Strassel and Rightforge founding partner Christopher Bedford discuss the U.S.’s mounting inflation issue and the fed ordering largest rate hike in 28 years on ‘WSJ at Large.’ Like hapless baseball players in a big-time slump, President Biden and Democrats in Congress just keep striking out when it comes to lowering the historic levels of inflation they caused by massive spending and threats of tax increases. Eighteen months of unified Democratic control in Washington have taught us that it’s easier to break an economy than to fix it – and this economic hardship isn’t on track to end anytime soon. Still, there are some commonsense steps we can take to bring some relief to the American people. Democrats have taken their eye off the ball when it comes delivering economic relief and we are all paying the price. Gasoline prices have hit a record $5 a gallon and overall inflation has surged to its highest level in 40 years. Bidenflation has cut the pay of every American worker, causing real wages to drop nearly 4% since the current administration took office. Yet Democrats continue to double down on their same failed policies. They ignore studies from the San Francisco Federal Reserve, former top Obama-Biden economic advisers Jason Furman and Larry Summers and even the president’s own favorite economic forecaster, showing that Biden's agenda will make inflation worse. Grocery shoppers in New York and Virginia shared how the economy under Joe Biden has impacted them after the president's outburst during an AFL-CIO conference. President Biden and Democrats in Congress continue to swing and miss when it comes to finding workable solutions, opting instead to attack bogeymen like big corporations, COVID or the war in Ukraine. First, we should soak up some of the excess money floating around in the economy and reduce the deficit. Inflation skyrocketed immediately following passage of the $1.9 trillion Democrat/Biden backed American Rescue Plan (ARP). With supply chains still struggling to come back online, and a labor shortage induced by President Biden paying people more to stay at home than to go to work, this so-called stimulus flooded the economy with too much money chasing too few goods. With the public health emergency behind us, Congress should repurpose the unobligated ARP funding, estimated to be $200 billion, to deficit reduction. That would help remove some of the inflation-causing money from the economy. But you guessed it: Democrats in Congress show no interest in redirecting those funds. Second, let’s unleash American energy independence. With gasoline prices at all-time highs, we can make it easier to get permits to drill, transport and refine domestic energy, which would increase supply and lower prices. By rejecting Republican bills that expand American energy production, President Biden and the Democrats are committing economic malpractice. They claim inflation is their top priority, but their knee-jerk reaction against increasing the supplies of natural gas and oil and building pipeline infrastructure proves their war on fossil fuel is the real priority. American consumers and workers are the casualties. Third, remove the barriers that prevent our job creators from expanding. Too much red tape and burdensome federal regulations raise costs for businesses that then gets passed on to consumers. Whether it’s new Labor Department paperwork, burdensome environmental regulations, or lengthy permitting requirements, the Biden administration is building a mountain of new costs that directly lead to price increases for consumers. According to an analysis of Biden’s first year in office by the American Action Forum, his administration’s regulatory costs are three times that of Obama’s first year and nearly 40 times that of Trump’s. Each individual regulation may not increase inflation, but collectively the sum total of this activist regime drives costs and inflation higher. Fourth, make Republican tax reform permanent and lock in its historic achievement of higher wages for the lowest earners, the lowest unemployment in 50 years and rapid economic growth. President Biden's persistent threat to deliver on his campaign promise of repealing these tax cuts and raising taxes further fuels inflation. Businesses need certainty to create a stable environment to invest and grow, yet Democrats continue to talk about imposing crippling tax hikes and policies that expand welfare-without-work policies that keeps Main Street understaffed, store shelves empty and prices high. By doubling down on policies that have put us on the brink of a recession, the president is sending all the wrong signals when it comes to getting our country back on track.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Affirmative › **AT Impact** › Fed Solves

Recession not inevitable---fed checks inflation

John Cassidy , 6-22-2022, Staff Writer at the New Yorkey "A Recession Isn’t Inevitable," New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/whats-behind-all-the-talk-of-a-recession//DG

Pushing back against this gloomy narrative are the current leadership of the Federal Reserve—which raised a key interest rate by three quarters of a percentage point last week to fight inflation—and the Biden Administration. In testimony to Congress on Wednesday, the Fed chair Jerome Powell said, “The American economy is very strong and well positioned to handle tighter monetary policy.” On Monday,  said, “there’s nothing inevitable about a recession,” echoing an argument that the Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen had made twenty-four hours earlier. Yellen told reporters, “Staying in the neighborhood of tight labor markets, what people would dub full employment, I believe it’s possible.”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Affirmative › **AT Impact** › Fed Solves

No risk of recession – the Fed will hike interest rates and solve OR a recession will be short – Congress is not key

Pickert & Martin 6-24-22 [Reade Pickert is a Bloomberg business reporter, Eric Martin is a Trade, IMF, World Bank, Latin America reporter for Bloomberg in Washington, "US Economy Will ‘Narrowly Avoid’ Recession in 2022 and 2023, IMF Says", Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-24/us-economy-to-narrowly-avoid-recession-in-2022-23-imf-says#xj4y7vzkg] GBS-HW

The US economy is likely to slow in 2022 and 2023 but will “narrowly avoid a recession” as the Federal Reserve implements its rate-tightening plan to curb inflation, the International Monetary Fund said. “The policy priority now must be to expeditiously slow wage and price growth without precipitating a recession” the IMF said in a statement Friday. “This will be a tricky task,” as global supply constraints and domestic labor shortages are likely to persist, and the war in Ukraine creates additional uncertainties, it said. The Fed’s plan of quickly getting its benchmark rate to 3.5% to 4% “should create an upfront tightening of financial conditions which will quickly bring inflation back to target,” Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva told reporters following the release of the concluding statement on its article IV consultation, the IMF’s assessment of countries’ economic and financial developments following meetings with lawmakers and public officials. Based on the policy path outlined at the June Federal Open Market Committee meeting, and an expected reduction in the fiscal deficit, the IMF expects the US economy will slow, Georgieva said. The fund has “also just concluded a very useful set of discussions” with Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Fed Chair Jerome Powell, she said. “We are conscious that there is a narrowing path to avoiding a recession in the US,” Georgieva said. “We also have to recognize the uncertainty of the current situation.” Georgieva at the press conference on Friday went on to say there are “very significant” downside risks this year and especially in 2023. If there ultimately is a recession, it would likely be relatively short, said Nigel Chalk, deputy director in the IMF’s Western Hemisphere department. Policy makers raised interest rates by 75 basis points last week -- the single-biggest move since 1994 -- and Powell signaled that another increase either of the same magnitude or of 50 basis points was on the table for July. The Fed chief and his colleagues have pivoted aggressively to fight the hottest inflation in 40 years amid criticism that they left monetary policy too easy for too long as the economy recovered from Covid-19. They’ve raised rates by 1.5 percentage points this year and officials forecast about 1.75 points of further cumulative tightening in 2022.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Affirmative › **AT Impact** › Tariff XO Solves

Biden can unilaterally lift tariffs on China – that reduces inflation quickly and significantly

Tan 6/20

Su-Lin, Senior Correspondent with CNBC, “Former U.S. ambassador says lifting China tariffs could slash inflation by 1% over time, help Biden in midterms” June 20, 2022 dmr

Removing tariffs on imported Chinese goods will strip 1% off inflation in the U.S. over time and return confidence to the economy which could help President Joe Biden at the ballot box, former U.S. ambassador David Adelman says. “Inflation will be No. 1 issue in midterm elections in the U.S. in November,” Adelman told CNBC’s “Squawk Box” on Monday. “While the president is limited in his ability to control inflation, there is one important tool in his toolbox,” said Adelman, who served as U.S. ambassador to Singapore during the Obama administration. “That is the ability to relieve the pressure on the American economy and American consumers that is caused by these very high tariffs rates that are imposed on more than $370 billion annually of Chinese imports.” “Many economists are saying that over time, you can have a full 1% decrease in the CPI, something that is very meaningful for American consumers,” he said, referring to the consumer price index, a key measure of inflation.” While former President Donald Trump’s trade war with China was popular among American voters on both sides of the aisle in 2018, Adelman said the effort was economically futile and did not create “meaningful” trade benefits. “I think the proof is in the pudding. Not only was there no negative impact on the Chinese economy, it had an impact on the U.S. economy. It has acted as a boomerang on the U.S. economy,” Adelman, who is also managing director of KraneShares, said. “Biden is starting to realize as the election is shaping up, it’s going to be the economy that is most important to voters. If the president can do anything to ease pressure, he should do so. Ultimately, good economics should make good politics,” he said. The U.S. government is reviewing the Trump-era trade tariffs on Chinese goods, a process that was triggered by legal provisions rather than a U.S. political willingness for a reset in relations. A growing number of economists, political observers and analysts have called on the Biden administration to slash tariffs as inflation and recession fears grow. Former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers echoed Adelman’s comments earlier Sunday, saying lifting tariffs on Chinese imports was “the right to do.” “It will hold down prices [and] enable us to take a more strategic approach when dealing with China. It will take 1% or more off CPI over time, cutting tariffs is the right thing to do. I hope the administration will find a way to do it, ” Summers said on NBC News’ “Meet the Press.” Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said some tariffs on China served “no strategic purpose” and that Biden was considering removing them as a means of cooling inflation. Not only did China not meet targets set by the U.S. in the trade deal, analysis from the Peterson Institute for International Economics show the tariffs increased inflation for both U.S. consumers and producers. In the year to November 2021, U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods added 0.26 percentage points to the CPI, PIIE’s non-resident senior fellow in trade policy Katheryn Russ said in an analysis earlier this year. In the year after the U.S. imposed tariffs on Chinese goods, producer prices also rose by 1%, Russ’s analysis also said. In March, PIIE’s senior trade policy fellow Chad Bown said China had not bought any of the additional $200 billion of U.S. exports it committed to purchasing under the phase one deal. As far as a dent to the Chinese economy was concerned, tariffs knocked off just over 0.5% of China’s GDP, Capital Economics chief Asia economist Mark Williams said in a note last week. “Some Chinese firms were able to evade them by re-routing shipments to the U.S. through third countries, mainly in south-east Asia. This may have offset as much as half of the drag,” Williams said. Adelman, the former ambassador, said Biden could remove certain tariffs without the onerous task of seeking permission from Congress in two ways. He could order temporary exclusions to certain tariffs or sign an executive order to lift the tariffs while protecting distinct U.S. industries that China was competing with. Not only will removing tariffs be good for American consumers in the short run and over time, it will help the President reset U.S.-China relations.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Affirmative › No Defense Spending Link › No L – Executive Action Shields

They’ll stay hands off

Sovocool 9, *Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and Globalization. He is also an Assistant Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore AND ** Senior Research Associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore (Benjamin and Kelly, 34 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 333, “Preventing National Electricity-Water Crisis Areas in the United States,” Lexis)

The courts and Congress, in other words, do not want to deal with potentially controversial issues. Given the politicized nature of interstate conflicts over environmental pollution, Noah D. Hall argues that “the Supreme Court does not want the job, especially when technical and scientific uncertainty dominates these disputes.”297 Congress, in turn, has rarely taken formal action on those states violating the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, and is often reluctant to take on heated interstate controversies.298 This could be an especially important concern in areas of water policy, since the states with the largest populations will also have the most significant water needs and the most sway in Congress, giving them somewhat disproportionate control over the national water agenda. An Executive Order is a logical alternative given the constraints faced by environmental and energy related legislation and Supreme Court rulings.