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2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Iran War › 2AC---Iran War---Soft Power

United States hegemony in the Middle East aligns with Iran’s interests

Allison 16 – is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School, March 2016. (Graham, “US and Iranian interests: Converging or Conflicting?”, Belfer Center, , accessed 7/5/22)//jd

The nuclear issue has dominated relations between the US and Iran over the past decade. Now that the two countries have shelved that issue by agreeing to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, it is appropriate to ask where and how the national interests of both countries converge and conflict. In my class at Harvard, to lift students’ sights above the instant images and chatter that consumes most of their attention, I sometimes ask them to step back -- way back -- and consider the perspective of a strategist from Mars. Reviewing recent history, and setting the nuclear issue aside, what would this Martian observe about US-Iranian relations? As a start, the Martian would note that since it took power in 1979, the Islamic Republic has faced three primary enemies: Soviet Union, Saddam’s Iraq, and the Taliban’s Afghanistan. The Martian would point out that, in 1991, the United States won the Cold War and the Soviet Union disappeared. In 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban. And in 2003, the United States invaded Iraq and quickly overthrew Saddam’s government. He would, of course, add that the United States did not undertake these efforts for the sake of Iran. But it is indisputable that, in all three cases, Iran was a major beneficiary. Looking to the future, are US and Iranian national interests more likely to be aligned or opposed? The vitriol of the current political season in both countries suggests the latter. But the Martian, and perhaps wise leadership on both sides, would recognize distinct areas of convergence. Two in particular stand out as opportunities for further (if unstated) collaboration: Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, Iranian and American interests align in the desire for a stable, majority-dominated and thus Shia government in Bagdad, and in the war against ISIL. First, consider how both countries’ military capabilities complement each other. While the US is unwilling to commit large numbers of troops in Iraq, Iran has aggressively deployed special forces advisers, weaponry and intelligence assets on the ground to combat ISIL. On the other hand, while the Iranian air force is essentially obsolete, the United States has sent some of its most sophisticated aircraft to prosecute the war from the skies. The uncomfortable but undeniable fact is that Iranians and Americans are working in concert to fight ISIL in Iraq. The mechanisms allow both a degree of deniability – such as using Iraqis as intermediaries – but the result is clear, and positive: ISIL’s rampage across Iraq has been halted and they have suffered significant defeats, such as in Tikrit. This cooperation will continue to be critical as Iraqi forces fight in Anbar Province and prepare to take back Mosul. Politically, in the short term, both Iran and the US seek to create a stable and unified Iraq (although these goals diverge in the long-term). The interests of the two nations converge more than they conflict in Afghanistan as well. This convergence dates back to 2001 when Iran provided critical support to US forces in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban and played a decisive role in the formation of the new, US-backed Afghan government. According to Jim Dobbins, who lead the US diplomatic efforts in Kabul in 2001, it was the Iranians who suggested the inclusion of elections in Afghanistan’s new constitution. Last year, Iran helped facilitate the political compromise between Ashraf Ghani and Abdallah Abdallah that allowed for Afghanistan’s first democratic transfer of power. Today, both the United States and Iran are concerned with the revival of the Taliban, the remnants of Al-Qaeda and the newly formed Islamic State province in Afghanistan, and Iran is particularly concerned about the drug trafficking and lawlessness that prevails along its 900 km border with Afghanistan. The list of issues on which American and Iranian interests diverge is a long one, including the security of Israel, the political future of Syria, and Iran's support for various groups across the region whom Americans see as terrorists. But the dispassionate Martian observer's main point would be to insist that the two states have much more in common than the political leadership of either acknowledge.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Iran War › 2AC---Iran War---Soft Power

Heg key to Iran containment – hard and soft power solve

Esfandiaryis 20 - holds a PhD in the War Studies Department at King’s College London and master’s degrees from King’s College London and the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, 2/11/20 (Dina, “A Practical Policy to Re-Engage and Contain Iran”, The Century Foundation, , accessed 7/5/22)//jd

It is by now clear that Donald Trump does not have an answer to one of the most bedeviling foreign policy problems of the last four decades: Iran. In this, he is not alone. Since the Islamic Republic’s founding in 1979, no American president has been able to figure out how best to manage the challenge that Tehran poses for stability and American interests in the Middle East. But three years into the Trump administration’s erratic and aggressive Iran policy, Washington’s aims and strategy are more adrift than ever. Although it is uncertain whether Trump’s presidency will last another year or five—and whether a progressive administration will eventually succeed him—the time is ripe for the United States to develop an intentional, coherent, and effective policy toward Iran. American voters of different political stripes are raising fundamental questions about their role in the world—about U.S. core interests and priorities in a changing global order—creating an unprecedented opportunity to rethink U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Middle East. When the time comes, a new plan with a strong foundation will be needed. The principles of de-escalation, diplomacy, and containment should guide U.S. policy toward Iran going forward. The 2015 nuclear deal with Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) would have provided an ideal springboard for such a policy. But Trump has withdrawn from that agreement, and rejoining will not be possible. If the deal collapses entirely, Washington will have to rebuild trust in order to start new, broad negotiations; dial down conflict points; and find less risky ways to challenge and contain Iran. To this end, the United States’ first step must be to accept that, while Iran is a problematic actor, Washington has only a limited capacity to control its behavior. Second, the United States must compartmentalize regional and foreign policy as it relates to Iran. Iran cannot continue to be the lens through which Washington evaluates relationships with every other country in the region, or its basis for responding to every crisis. Third, the United States must right-size the perception of the Iranian threat—and manage political expectations about the possibility of reducing it. Fourth, the U.S. government must decide how best to engage Iran in diplomacy, and what format this engagement should take. In the formulation of a new Iran policy, taking lessons from the past will be important. Barack Obama’s policy of engagement held promise, especially the nuclear deal. Importantly, the JCPOA successfully mitigated the possibility that Iran could pursue nuclear weapons. The agreement thus put a tangible constraint on one aspect of Iran’s most threatening behavior, and avoided further U.S.–Iran tension over Obama’s most serious Iran policy priority. Further, the JCPOA created a framework to negotiate on other important matters, including Iran’s missile program and involvement in regional wars. Obama’s diplomatic engagement came with its own controversies, however. It didn’t slow down Tehran’s regional meddling, whether in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, or elsewhere. Opponents of the JCPOA also argued that Iran accelerated its missile program while Washington was focused on negotiating the nuclear deal.1 More than likely, though, the JCPOA would have yielded additional positive results down the road. We will never know. Worse still, the Trump administration’s post-withdrawal campaign, which it dubbed “maximum pressure,” has only emboldened Iran. Tehran has increased its military activity, raised its political demands on partners, and begun to downgrade its implementation of the nuclear deal (which is supposed to remain in force for the remaining members, but is critically weakened without the United States). The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign has only emboldened Iran. Still, new policy must go further than a repudiation of Trump’s failures. Through both the Trump and Obama administrations—and indeed those of all the other presidencies since 1979—there has been a lack of reasonable and balanced assessments of the true threat that Iran poses to the United States and its interests. In some ways, the chaos of the Trump presidency has opened a door to reevaluate old assumptions, and to reconsider the goals for Iran and the Middle East that Washington’s strategists and politicians have long taken for granted. Barriers to Dialogue with Iran The basis for formulating a new approach to Iran must be a clear-eyed assessment of the challenges that Iran poses—and the ways that past American policy has failed to meet those challenges or evolve with them. One of the biggest barriers to Washington’s dialogue with Iran is mutual lack of trust, which dates to the founding of the Islamic Republic. Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, anti-Americanism became one of the main tenets of the new regime. Washington, for its part, was scarred by the 444-day hostage crisis, during which a group of Iranian students and revolutionaries detained fifty-two Americans in the U.S. embassy in Tehran.2 This watershed moment traumatized the minds of Americans and their officials alike. It also affected officials of the Islamic Republic, some of whom later regretted the hostage taking, believing it has since “colored relations between the two countries.”3 This history of mistrust made the 2015 JCPOA agreement, between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany), all the more significant. The nuclear deal not only resolves a long-standing international concern, but was also the culmination of years of dialogue, which only came to fruition when the United States engaged Iran directly. But, as mentioned above, the nuclear deal had its limitations: while it ensured that the United States and Iran could engage and compromise on one important matter of substance, the nuclear talks did not curb or counter Iran in the region. Candidate Trump made it clear that, as president, he would not hesitate to pull the United States out of the deal, and he did exactly that in May 2018. As a result, American credibility, reliability, and reputation as a state party to an international agreement has taken a real hit. The argument goes: why negotiate and make deals with the United States if subsequent administrations can then choose to ignore them—and seek to punish allies simply for upholding their end of the agreement? American credibility, reliability, and reputation as a state party to an international agreement has taken a real hit. The problems created by the withdrawal, however, go beyond damage to American credibility and reliability. The increased partisan nature of U.S. politics has become brutally apparent to Iranians. Iranian officials now believe that it is futile to negotiate with a Democratic administration, because a later Republican administration will likely overturn its decisions. To them, engagements taken on by a Republican administration are more likely to last and be respected by subsequent administrations. This effectively means that Iranians are less likely to engage with a Democratic president than they are with a Republican. In addition, today, as a result of Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, Iran and the United States are locked in a spiral of escalating tensions with little or no off-ramp. The lack of direct communication between the two governments means that there are more serious risks of escalation following a miscommunication or misperception. The campaign has also led to a hardening of Iranian positions vis-à-vis Washington: the domestic political cost of negotiating with the United States for an Iranian official is too high, especially after the assassination of Qassem Soleimani—a high-level and popular Iranian official.4 Many Iranians do not condone what Soleimani did, and those who protested against the regime in November 2019 have not forgotten their discontent. But the threat from an external enemy has brought them together, at least momentarily, in a show of unity. The persistent problem when assessing U.S.–Iran relations is that anti-Americanism is endemic to the political and security leadership of the Islamic Republic under the current supreme leader, and being anti-Iran is endemic to the American political sphere (and arguably so for both major political parties). Because of these dynamics, many influential decision-makers in the United Kingdom, for example, believe that a new deal is “inconceivable until [Iranian supreme leader Ali] Khamenei dies,” according to a recent research paper that polled officials and analysts.5 In the short term, the political climate in both Iran and the United States will make it difficult for either side to compromise. The United States is in full election mode, and after parliamentary elections in February 2020, Iran will hold presidential elections in 2021. These elections will happen at a turbulent time for the Islamic Republic, following the nationwide protests in November 2019, which it brutally suppressed, and the show of unity that followed Soleimani’s assassination. The current environment, as well as the Iranian Guardian Council’s disqualifying of thousands of moderate candidates from the parliamentary elections, suggest that the Iranian government is likely to become yet more conservative.6 The greater alignment between factions in Iran’s political system, which Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign has partly caused, could make it easier to build a consensus in favor of a new deal. However, conservatives in Iran are tougher negotiators and less likely to compromise—in other words, the new Iranian consensus may be for an even more hard-line position. American Priorities in the Region The United States has not clearly articulated what its policy objectives are for Iran: To contain it? To change the current government? To integrate it into international relations in order to moderate its behavior? Each successive U.S. presidency has focused on one or a combination of the above. But American objectives for Iran, and the wider Middle East, have hit a wall, because events in the region have often overtaken decisions and affected which policy options are available. The United States must build internal consensus on what it wants from Iran and the region. In other words, it should carefully consider and revise its “list of grievances.” American priorities in the Middle East have included counterterrorism, stability, Israel’s security, and energy security—though the latter is becoming somewhat less important.7 Ideally, the United States should also prioritize fostering the establishment of good governance in the region. But the American government and voters are tired of their country’s decades of risky and costly involvement in the Middle East. Expensive ventures and considerable policy failures have done little to effectively secure the United States.8 Washington must decide how much it can and wants to continue to contribute to regional security. Iran policy can only be determined in the context of a wider Middle East strategy, which should promote regional peace and stability; de-emphasize military means of promoting American interests; and seek to de-escalate abusive governance and militarism by regional governments, whether allied or opposed to the United States. American priorities in Iran should include the release of dual nationals, the respect of human rights, and containing Tehran’s proxies, partners, and allied hybrid actors, such as Hezbollah. With regard to Iran, Washington should also be clearer about its aims. These will include the release of dual nationals currently detained in Iran, the respect of human rights in Iran, and containing Tehran’s proxies, partners, and allied hybrid actors, such as Hezbollah. The United States should perhaps even explore cooperation with Iran in specific, limited areas, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. But Washington must ensure these goals are achievable: issuing a twelve-point plan that is tantamount to calling for Iran to utterly capitulate to the United States—as U.S. secretary of state Michael Pompeo did in May 2018—will only make dialogue and the pursuit of these goals more difficult.9 Such an approach simply entrenches Iranian positions. Accepting Limits The first and most important component of a new U.S. policy on Iran is to understand that Iran is a threat that can be managed, but not eradicated. Washington can try to balance Tehran, contain it, discourage bad behavior, and encourage better behavior, but it must also accept that it has a limited ability to control Tehran. Further, Iran will continue to be an important regional player. The United States also cannot forcibly prevent Iran from seeking a nuclear weapon or running militias in the region, if that is what Tehran is set on doing—no amount of brute force will remove Iranian knowledge of the nuclear program or erase intent, for example. However, the United States can deal with Iran in such a way as to secure incremental gains for American interests in the Middle East. Washington’s ability to coerce Iran is limited, but it can persuade or induce Iran to adopt certain policies. As such, Washington should treat Iran as a problematic actor, whose behavior it cannot control or change by force. Expectations on what the United States can achieve with Iran must be lowered. It is crucial to understand that even if one problem area is resolved or managed, the United States will always have areas of contention with the Islamic Republic. The United States must manage the Iranian “problem,” while publicly stating what aspects of its behavior it finds most problematic, so that Washington is able to maintain the moral high ground as it navigates the complicated and difficult field of Middle Eastern politics. Part of accepting that not everything is within Washington’s control involves deciding, firstly, what the United States can and cannot abide in the region, and secondly, what it can and cannot abide with respect to Iran, specifically. A formal policy review by a new U.S. administration would help whittle American priorities down to a realistic and limited set. In addition to justified fears of Iranian nuclear capabilities and missile range, the United States could, for instance, seek to limit Iran’s ability to strike regional energy infrastructure. Washington could also accept shared influence in contested zones such as Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq, rather than always seeking to dominate them. On the other hand, the U.S. government would have to grudgingly accept that Iran will continue to wield influence and counter American priorities through its proxies and partners in Iran’s near neighborhood, which includes current or former U.S. priority areas such as the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Levant. A meaningful prioritization would allow the United States a better chance to politically manage Iran: work with it when it serves American interests, but at the same time contain Tehran and its influence. The United States has ample experience dealing with problematic countries whose policies it cannot simply ignore. For example, Turkey frequently operates counter to American interests even though it is a NATO treaty ally; China and Russia sometimes undermine and sometimes directly resist U.S. policy in the region, but are far more powerful than Iran and intersect with U.S. interests—sometimes productively—on a global scale, rather than regionally. None of these examples is an exact parallel to Iran, but each provides lessons from which Washington can draw. In sum, the United States must establish realistic priorities, and then manage domestic political expectations about what can be achieved. Concretely, this would involve making some difficult decisions that many in the U.S. system will struggle with. For example, the United States will have to accept that Hezbollah and its link with Tehran are intractable problems. The Islamic Republic’s relationship with Hezbollah is one that Tehran will not give up—there is no scenario in which this is something that Tehran will consider. Iran played a key role in setting up the group, and Hezbollah represents and symbolizes the scale of Tehran’s reach into the region.10 As a Tehran-based Iranian academic close to the government put it: “The link between Iran and Hezbollah is very close. It takes two to three weeks for the cabinet to see the supreme leader, but Hassan Nasrallah will be granted an audience faster and with more ease than [Iranian president Hassan] Rouhani.”11 Nasrallah’s access to Iranian leadership demonstrates the depth of Hezbollah’s ties to Iran. Washington’s insistence on imposing wide-ranging sanctions on Lebanese officials associated with Hezbollah, and its withholding of assistance to Lebanon because of Iran’s influence over the country (through Hezbollah), are counterproductive. These measures prevent American officials from engaging with a group that is problematic (to say the least), but nevertheless, a significant player in the Lebanese political scene. Like it or not, Washington must work with the fact that Hezbollah has evolved into a status quo movement operating largely within the framework of the Lebanese state. The United States’ longtime designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist group is of similarly questionable expediency: the designation cuts off first-hand insight into the powerful militia-cum-political party. In addition, the designation prevents “deconfliction” (the term for avoidance of military engagement between two adversaries). Diplomatic contact with groups like Hezbollah would be integral to the de-escalation of tensions and crisis management. As it stands, the lack of communication that the terrorist designation requires makes it more likely that, say, a misunderstanding at the Lebanon–Israel border erupts into a major conflict. Washington doesn’t need to approve of or endorse troubling groups in order to accept that dealing with such groups might be practical. In addition, Washington’s current stance on Hezbollah is problematic because it sets the breaking of ties between Tehran and Hezbollah as a precondition to meaningful dialogue with Iran. Since Tehran will not give up that relationship, this precondition only limits the United States’ flexibility in its foreign policy. This is not to say that a new approach will be easy to effect: changing Washington’s position on Hezbollah and Iran in this manner would represent a major shift, and require overcoming political and psychological blockages in place since 1979.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Multilateralism › 2AC---Multilat Fails---Outdated

Multilateralism is ineffective and outdated

Amrita Narlikar 1/23/20 [Professor Amrita Narlikar is the President of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Honorary Fellow of Darwin College (University of Cambridge), Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Observer Researcher Foundation, Distinguished International Fellow of the Indian Association of International Studies (IAIS), and Non-Resident Distinguished Fellow of the Australia India Institute., “The malaise of multilateralism and how to manage it”, Observer Research Foundation]//AA

Why multilateralism is in such a mess today boils down to three reasons: disillusionment with globalisation, lacklustre narratives in support of multilateralism, and the inadequacy of existing multilateral rules to meet new challenges. Ups and downs in the lives of individual international institutions are not new, but the malaise that now afflicts multilateralism is unprecedented in range and depth. It transcends issue-areas, and occurs at a time when the need for sensible rules of international cooperation has greater urgency than ever before. Even as trade wars rage outside, the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) finds itself paralysed due to the blocked appointments/re-appointments of judges in its Appellate Body. Public awareness of climate change as a global emergency may have increased, but the United States has at the same time delivered a serious blow to the mitigation regime by moving to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. In his remarkable interview with The Economist in November this year, French President Macron declared the “brain-death” of the NATO and pointed to the fragility of Europe. Impending Brexit is one thorn in the side of the European project; the rise of the Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) party in Germany is another. Multilateralism, in both its universal and non-universal versions, and across economic and security issues, is under severe strain. Explaining the malaise It is commonplace — especially by those with liberal and/or centrist inclinations in politics — to attribute the crisis of multilateralism to two factors. First, many observers point the finger at President Trump and his “America first” agenda. Is it surprising then, they ask, that others follow suit when the world’s largest economy behaves with such great irresponsibility and chooses to turn its back on the very system that it had once led the way in creating? Second, some see Trump’s politics as part of a broader phenomenon involving the rise of strongmen leaders with populist inclinations who fan nationalist sentiment, framing the rights and interests of local populations as pitted against those of a “global elite.” Both explanations, however, are deeply misguided. Nor is the wrong-headedness of such applications purely an academic matter. Rather, the knee-jerk solutions that they result in are likely to worsen the malaise of multilateralism. Reacting to Trump’s message of “Make America great again,” Macron countered with “Make our planet great again.” This was not a bad response per se, especially given the crudeness of Trump’s pledge. Yet, the Yellow Vests protests showed that Macron’s (probably well-meant) moral high-horsiness did not find many takers. The problems of multilateralism predate the arrival of Trump on the international scene; failure to recognise this will keep taking us down the same cul-de-sac as Macron’s “Make our planet great again.” Take the case of trade multilateralism. True, Trump may have called the WTO “the single worst deal ever made” and severely dented the system by launching his supposedly “good, and easy to win” trade wars. But amidst this drama, it is too often forgotten that dissatisfaction with WTO functioning has been brewing for years. The recurrence of deadlocks in the Doha Round for over the last 15 years is a clear sign of discontent from multiple stakeholders (and not just the US). Similarly, it is worth recalling that although many blame the Trump administration for the wreckage that is the WTO’s Appellate Body today, the practice of actually blocking appointments and re-appointments of judges in fact goes back to the Obama administration (although admittedly not on the same scale as practiced by the current US administration). It was also under President Obama that the US dabbled in the rhetoric of protecting American workers, showed great reluctance to make concessions during Doha negotiations. And again, it was the Obama administration that precipitated a turn away from the multilateralism of WTO and towards the (mega-) regionalism of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and Trans-Pacific Partnership. Trump’s angry and public pronouncements against various multilateral institutions, or the rhetoric of some populist movements against the global order, have certainly multiplied the problems facing multilateralism. But they are not the root cause. Why multilateralism is in such a mess today boils down to three reasons: disillusionment with globalisation, lacklustre narratives in support of multilateralism, and the inadequacy of existing multilateral rules to meet new challenges. First, backing Trump’s narrative of “America First” or the Brexiters’ slogan of “Take back control” is the fact that significant proportions of the electorates of these countries believe that the gains of globalisation have passed them by. They attribute increasing inequality within their society, and the job losses and declining wages that they personally endure, to the costs of international trade. The hardships that these groups suffer have several causes, which range from technological change to inadequate welfare mechanisms that could allow for better wealth distribution. But trade is often the easy scapegoat, especially as blame can be all too conveniently attributed to international deal-making. The current US administration is an example of a government that has effectively harnessed this discontent — perhaps even stirred it further by building a narrative that links domestic inequalities and poverty within the US to multilateral governance. But this disillusionment with the system is a real and potent force, which will survive irrespective of what happens in the upcoming US elections. Second, a solid and convincing counter-narrative has been missing. Telling the malcontents and the disillusioned — especially if they face personal economic hardships amidst increasing inequality — that they should think about the planet first will not reassure them. If anything, such narratives will only exacerbate the backlash against those increasingly seen as part of a “global elite” and the values of internationalism that they represent. The takeaway for many parts of the electorate (in different countries) from such cavalier attitudes will likely be along the lines of ‘only Mr Trump understands my pain, only the AfD is willing to stand up for my rights.’ Third, the liberal fixation on Trump as the root cause for the decline of multilateralism diverts attention from another equally serious cause: the rise of an increasingly assertive China. One reason for this blind spot may be that China itself has been doing an impressive job — at least until recently [1] — in presenting itself as a guardian of globalisation and multilateralism. Declarations of support for the system, for example at the World Economic Forum by President Xi, stand out in stark contrast to the havoc wreaked on the system via President Trump’s angry tweets and trade wars. But recent scholarship by Henry Farrell and Abe Newman on “weaponized interdependence” has begun to highlight the use of global economic networks for geostrategic purposes.[2] Combine these insights with China’s meteoric rise and controversial expansionism in its region and beyond (e.g., via the Belt and Road Initiative), and it is clear that the underlying premises of the postwar multilateral system are being put into question. Much of the post-war order was built on an assumption of the virtues of economic interdependence, which were supposed to bring nations together and promote peace. But if multilateral rules to promote economic interdependence have been used — or could be used in the future — by “systemic rivals” to gain geo-economic advantage, then a backlash against these rules is bound to come sooner or later. While the US has voiced these concerns most vociferously, others too have been raising them in different settings as they argue in favour of institutional reform and updating. Finding sustainable solutions To fix the malaise of multilateralism, technical solutions — for example, improving the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism — will of course be important. But given the deep-rooted nature of the challenge, a purely technocratic response will not suffice. Four sets of additional measures will be crucial. First, the only way that we will be able to bring the discontented many on board (and bring them on board we must, if we are to restore trust in the system) is by taking their concerns seriously. This means reconsidering past trade-offs and developing a new bargain on globalisation with better distributive mechanisms, both domestically and internationally. Trump-bashing — and its equivalent in other countries — on its own and ridiculing populist supporters will only exacerbate polarisation. Second, multilateralism will need a brand new narrative. This narrative will have to convey clearly why reformed multilateralism is of direct benefit to citizens across the board, and not only tomorrow but also today. Appealing to global public goods and the welfare of future generations are likely to prove insufficient as rationales, especially to those who feel shortchanged and are enduring economic hardships. This new narrative will need to have individual and group appeal. It will also need to work across different levels of politics — local, regional, national, and global. [3]

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Multilateralism › 2AC---Multilat Fails---Pandemic/CC

Multilateralism fails---failed to tackle the pandemic and can’t deal with climate change

David McNair 21 - David McNair is executive director for Global Policy at ONE, and an ECFR Council member., “Multilateralism’s failure to tackle our biggest challenges is compounding them”, European Council on Foreign Relations, https://ecfr.eu/article/multilateralisms-failure-to-tackle-our-biggest-challenges-is-compounding-them/ //AA

Our collective failure to end the pandemic now will cause even deeper and more costly problems in the future At the Global Health Summit in May 2021, G20 leaders declared that the pandemic “will not be over until all countries are able to bring the disease under control and therefore, large-scale, global, safe, effective and equitable vaccination … remains our top priority.” Campaigners could be forgiven, then, for feeling optimistic that meaningful action to address vaccine inequity would be taken at the G7 leaders’ meeting in Cornwall in June, or the G20 finance ministers’ meeting in Venice in July. Alas, they have been sorely disappointed. The members of the G7 pledged to share just 870 million of their 3 billion surplus doses by the middle of 2022, a paltry sum compared with the 11 billion doses that are urgently needed to reach global herd immunity. And the G20 produced little more than excruciatingly vague “support for collaborative efforts” on global vaccine distribution. Meanwhile, since that grand declaration in May, covid-19 has continued to wreak havoc around the world: an additional 400,000 people have died as the global death toll has ticked past four million. Africa finds itself in the grips of a truly devastating third wave of infections, with only 1.4 per cent of the continent’s population fully vaccinated. There will be a price to pay for this inaction even beyond the untold human cost. Our collective failure to end the pandemic now will create and compound even deeper and more costly problems in the future. The immediate knock-on effects, including for the West, will be severe. But this historic failure of multilateralism is also undermining the trust and incentives necessary for effective international cooperation on the other existential challenges of the day – most notably, climate change. In the short term, for as long as the virus is raging anywhere in the world, variants will continue to emerge that have the potential to send us all back to square one. The World Health Organisation warned last week that there is a “strong likelihood” that more dangerous variants will develop that may be even more challenging to control, underlining that “the pandemic is nowhere near finished”. We’re already seeing the damage that can be done by such variants, even in highly immunised countries. Cases are rising in Australia among fully vaccinated people due to the spread of the highly transmissible Delta variant. The United Kingdom, having vaccinated 68 per cent of its population, is now facing worker shortages, with up to 20 per cent of the workforce in some firms self-isolating. In June, a covid-19 outbreak at China’s Yantian port threatened to hold up 5 per cent of global freight capacity. These disruptions are, in turn, contributing to rising inflation due to increased commodity prices. But the economic impact of the ‘great divergence’ in the global pandemic response is just beginning. Last year, the International Chamber of Commerce estimated that vaccine hoarding by rich countries could cost the global economy $9 trillion, half of which would be borne by rich countries facing supply chain disruptions. In the medium term, the needlessly prolonged pandemic is likely to undermine global security and stability. Pandemic-driven social unrest is on the rise around the world, including in Africa. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has warned that frustration over governments’ handling of the crisis, as well as mounting inequality and corruption, may lead to “a new wave of unrest” that could hinder the recovery from the pandemic, especially in developing countries. Again, we’re already seeing this play out. Nigeria reported recently that the pandemic has worsened the security situation in the country, as 100 people have been killed during a nationwide lockdown. Nigerian Minister of Interior Rauf Aregbesola attributed the killings to the frustration caused by rising unemployment and restrictions on movement. In South Africa, more than 70 people have been killed and over 1,300 arrested amid riots triggered by the jailing of former president Jacob Zuma. The health ministry warned that the country’s vaccination rollout and other essential healthcare services have been severely disrupted, and there are also reports of an impending food shortage. The European Asylum Support Office warned that the risk of conflict-related displacement is likely to increase due to the pandemic – raising the spectre of the 2015 refugee crisis, which pushed the EU’s multilateral institutions to the brink of collapse. Of course, the greatest threat to global stability is climate change. There are depressing parallels between the international responses to the covid-19 pandemic and climate change. Like the climate crisis, the pandemic reveals a lot about our inability to act in our own enlightened self-interest when faced with an urgent and obvious threat, and provides overwhelming evidence of the humanitarian and economic costs of inaction. As so eloquently argued by the Financial Times’s Martin Wolf, “even against such a self-evidently global threat, where the costs are huge and immediate, we seem unable to act with essential urgency,” and, consequently, when it comes to the climate, “it is impossible to imagine we will do much more than fiddle while the planet burns.” Needless to say, truly global cooperation is required to effectively address the climate crisis, which is arguably an even more complex and profound problem than covid-19. But the trust and goodwill such cooperation demands have been decimated by the West’s short-sighted nationalism in the face of the pandemic. It is hard to overstate the anger that vaccine inequity has created in Africa, where a meagre 4.3 vaccines have been administered per 100 people (compared to 77 per 100 in North America and 75 per 100 in Europe). We have the resources and capabilities to end the pandemic everywhere; it is simply a matter of political will.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Indo-Pak War › 2AC---Alt Cause---Terrorism

Terrorism is an alt cause to Indo-Pak war

Center for Preventive Action 5/12/22

(Global Conflict Tracker, “Conflict Between India and Pakistan”, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan//KRS)

With continued violence in Kashmir and a heightened threat of terrorist activity by Pakistan-based militant groups, tensions and concerns over a serious military confrontation between nuclear-armed neighbors India and Pakistan remain high. In August 2019, following a deployment of tens of thousands of additional troops and paramilitary forces to the region, the Indian government moved to revoke Article 370 of the Indian constitution, removing the special status of Jammu and Kashmir. India-administered Kashmir remains under lockdown, with internet and phone services intermittently cutoff and thousands of people detained.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Indo-Pak War › 2AC---Link Turn---Nuclear Exhange

Link turn---US heg prevents India-Pakistan nuclear exchange.

White 19, associate professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution, Former senior adviser and director for South Asian affairs at the National Security Council, 3-6-2019, (Joshua, "Why America can’t escape its role in the conflict between India and Pakistan," Brookings, , kav)

Here is what we know about the most serious India-Pakistan crisis in more than a decade. On February 14, the Pakistan-based terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked a paramilitarfy convoy in Pulwama in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. India, on the cusp of a general election, retaliated against its neighbor in the early hours of February 26 with a deep air strike targeting a terrorist camp near the town of Balakot, squarely within Pakistani territory. The following day, Indian and Pakistani forces were involved in an air skirmish in which at least one Indian MiG-21 was shot down; its pilot was captured and subsequently released. Both nuclear-armed countries placed their military forces on alert, and sustained vigorous artillery barrages across the Line of Control that divides them.

Although it might be too early to reconstruct precisely what transpired, the crisis yields some important lessons for the United States. With perhaps the exception of the Korean peninsula, India and Pakistan represent the world’s most likely venue for nuclear conflict. And Washington remains deeply involved with both countries, viewing India as a long-term partner that can play a supporting role in blunting China’s rise, and Pakistan as a frustrating but indispensable player in the negotiations to conclude America’s 17-year war in Afghanistan.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Econ Decline › 2AC---Heg Stops Extinction

American economic strength stops extinction from emerging tech and U.S.-Russia-China war.

Burrows ’16 [Matthew; September 2016; Director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Foresight Initiative, PhD in European History from the University of Cambridge; Global Risks 2035, “The Difficult Transition to a Post-Western Order,” Ch. 8, http://espas.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/Global_Risks_2035_web_0922.pdf]

The multilateralist global system that the United States and the West built after the end of the Second World War was premised on an economically strong United States and West. In 1945, the United States was the only victor that was not completely devastated. World War II had brought the country out of the Great Depression, and the US GDP constituted more than 50 percent of the world’s total. Into the twenty-first century, the members of the Group of Seven (G7) were the world’s political and economic heavyweights. It has only been in the past several years that the collective GDP of the developing world—led by China—has surpassed the developed world’s. Even as non-Western powers grow, it is psychologically hard for the West to think about relinquishing its reins.

Demographically, the West has, for a long time, been in the minority. What’s more recent is the aging of the Western population (analyzed in chapter 2), which is already occurring in Japan and Europe, beginning to squeeze the availability of resources for anything but health, social security, and interest payments on debt. Unless healthcare becomes far more efficient, the US economy will be overburdened with healthcare and pension costs as the “baby boomer” generation ages. Healthcare constitutes a whopping 18 percent of the US GDP—significantly more than is the case for other industrialized countries—without necessarily providing better results.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Econ Decline › 2AC---Heg k2 Free Trade

US hegemony needed to protect free trade

Aydin 2019 {Gülşen AYDIN, Assistant Professor, Ataturk University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations, “The Ebb and Flow in the US Trade Policy: Does The Hegemonic Stability Theory Have Explanatory Power?”, pp 1347-1348, //KS}

Kindleberger belongs to the Liberal tradition and his arguments about the stability of the hegemonic systems are based on the game theory. He argues that international economic stability is a collective good to the benefit of all states. Small and medium states know that their individual contributions won’t be enough to provide public goods. Therefore, they are not expected to contribute to the provision of public goods. Rather, they tend to free ride and pursue their individual interests. As a result, the public goods of stability and free trade won’t be available in an international system composed of only small and medium-sized countries. Only a hegemon possesses enough power and motivation to provide these public goods (Webb and Krasner, 1989: 184). Therefore, for Kindleberger, one hegemon required for a stable world economy (Kindleberger, 1981: 247).

Krasner is another important scholar in the HST. Coming from the Realist tradition, he argues that the interests and capabilities of states with the aim of maximizing national interest set the structure of the international trade (Krasner, 1976: 317). He emphasizes that empirical data largely substantiate the argument that is there is a hegemonic distribution of economic power in the international system, this brings about an open trading system (Krasner, 1976: 318)

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Econ Decline › 2AC---Heg k2 Free Trade

US hegemony key to free trade and NATO resilience

Cambanis 17 {He teaches at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs .Thanassis Cambanis is a senior fellow and director of the international policy program at The Century Foundation in New York “Why It Pays to Be the World’s Policeman—Literally”, //KS}

The essential fact is that the United States sits at the pinnacle of a world order that it played a central role in designing, and which benefits no other country so much as it does — you might have guessed — America itself.

America runs a world order that might have some collateral benefits for other countries, but is largely built around US interests: to enrich America and American business; to keep Americans safe while creating jobs and profits for America’s military-industrial complex; and to make sure that America retains, as long as possible, its position as the richest, dominant global superpower. Rather than global cop, it’s more accurate to call America the world’s majority shareholder, investing its resources in global stability less out of charity than self-interest.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Econ Decline › 2AC---Heg k2 Economic Growth

Having a strong military can spur economic growth

ISA 2018 {International Strategic Analysis is one of the world’s leading providers of international market analysis, economic forecasting and country intelligence for many of the world's leading companies, organizations and governments, with clients in more than 115 countries. The Importance of Military Power in the 21st Century, //KS}

Just as these other power factors influence a country’s ability to develop military power, a country’s military power also plays a key role in its development of these other factors of power.

Economic: A state that can protect its territory, resources and trade routes has a major economic advantage over others that are unable to do so. Furthermore, military power can be a catalyst for economic growth, if applied properly.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Econ Decline › 2AC---Heg Prevents Econ Decline

Hegemony is necessary to prevent economic decline

Norrlof 17 [17 July 2017, Norrlof, Carla, Carla Norrlöf is Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, a Senior Fellow of Massey College and a non-resident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council. Her research is on theories of international cooperation with a special focus on great powers particularly US hegemony in the areas of money, trade and security., “Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Unipolarity: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of Hegemonic Order Studies”, Oxford University Press]//AA

Rationale for the Hegemonic Order Several international relations theories of dominance have emerged: the public goods version of hegemonic stability theory, the security version of hegemonic stability theory, the dyadic-hierarchy model, and unipolarity. All of these perspectives agree that it is worthwhile to study a concentration of power across different dimensions. Public Goods Version of Hegemonic Stability Theory (Kindleberger) Kindleberger proposed that a dominant power was necessary for stable, harmonious economic relations (Kindleberger, 1973, 1981). He explained international economic cooperation as a public goods problem, from which everyone could benefit but no one could be excluded (Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1970). Since beneficiaries can enjoy public goods irrespective of their contributions, by free-riding, large groups encounter difficulties providing public goods (Olson, 1965). If everyone fails to contribute, the public good will not be fully provided. However, a single actor with sufficient interest in bearing the full costs of public good provision can solve the problem (Olson, 1965; Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966). In Olson’s (1965) famous assertion, “The small exploit the large.” From the theory outlining the difficulty of collective action, Kindleberger derived his proposition that, for “the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer—one stabilizer” (1973, p. 304). For Kindleberger, global economic stabilization meant “some country . . . would undertake to provide a market for distress goods, a steady if not countercyclical flow of capital, and a rediscount mechanism for providing liquidity when the monetary system is frozen in panic” (Kindleberger, 1981, p. 247). He also added exchange-rate stabilization and coordination of monetary policies. In the late 1980s, Webb and Krasner (1989, p. 196) invited scholars to validate Kindleberger’s argument, which they said “might not have been truly tested . . . The real test of hegemonic leadership arises in times of crises.” Two decades passed before scholars met this call. The 2008 financial crisis brought renewed interest in the question of whether the United States, as the world’s dominant power, performed crucial stabilization functions during the crisis. Scholars were invited to reorient around real problems to explain the emergence and maintenance of global financial orders (Drezner & McNamara, 2013). Drezner (2014, p. 153, p. 156) drew on some of Kindleberger’s criteria to examine whether the United States and multilateral institutions helped stabilize the world economy and found that both played a role. Cohen (2015a) used Kindleberger’s five functions to explore whether China’s rise as a monetary power could be successfully accommodated, and concluded that accommodation is possible. However, his investigation did not settle whether and how stabilization occurred during the crisis. Norrlof and Reich (2015) examined Kindleberger’s five functions and asked whether the world economy requires one stabilizer or if these functions were shared between the United States and China. They found limited support for the first proposition, with stronger support for shared stabilization, during the global financial crisis. As more Chinese data become available, alternative methods should be used to determine the robustness of these findings and the validity of Kindleberger’s version of hegemonic stability theory. McDowell (2012) provided a detailed case study of the capabilities and incentives that resulted in the United States acting as an international lender of last resort during the global financial crisis, arguing that the Federal Reserve’s swap program is an example of U.S. structural power as conceived by Strange (1988b). Norrlof (2014) provided empirical snapshots of the dollar’s sustained preeminence despite deficits, wars, and the global financial crisis, and theorized how U.S. monetary capabilities translate into currency influence using power analysis. Cohen also explained the dollar’s supremacy after the financial crisis through a power lens, seeing autonomy as especially important for understanding the dollar’s global role (Cohen, 2015b). Helleiner (2014) described the continuity in the global financial order since the 2008 crisis, concurring with McDowell (2012) that Federal Reserve swap lines reflect U.S. structural power, and that the dollar’s reserve role has remained largely unchanged but Helleiner’s metrics are flawed. Security Version of Hegemonic Stability Theory (Gilpin & Krasner) More than any other scholar, Gilpin (1975, 1977, 1981) was the progenitor of hegemonic stability theory: “Just as the Pax Britannica provided the security and political organization for the expansion of transnational economic activity in the nineteenth century, so the Pax Americana has fulfilled a similar function in the mid-twentieth century” (Gilpin, 1975, p. 111). Krasner’s (1976) work was seminal in providing theoretical justification for why, and under what conditions, a hegemonic power supported free trade. Gilpin went beyond claims relating dominance to economic openness, arguing that the “Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, like the Pax Romana, ensured an international system of relative peace and security” (Gilpin, 1981, pp. 144–145). Reflecting on his contribution, Gilpin observed, “Stephen Krasner and I each appropriated Kindleberger’s basic idea that a political leader was needed to create and manage an international liberal economy. However, each of us made several modifications that placed Kindleberger’s insight within a state-centric intellectual framework of political analysis and thus fashioned a state-centric version of the theory of hegemonic stability” (Gilpin, 2001, p. 99). In this version of hegemonic stability theory, the hegemon provides an open economy as long as the distribution of gains does not compromise its security. As Webb and Krasner (1989, p. 184) explained, “. . . the dominant state can promote liberalization without jeopardizing essential security objectives. This is because an open system increases the income, the growth, and the political power of the hegemonic state without seriously affecting its social stability, and because the hegemonic state has symbolic, economic, and military capabilities that can be used to entice or compel others to accept an open trading structure . . . If the pattern of relative gains threatens the security of powerful states, international economic liberalization will be restricted even though those states could have increased their absolute welfare by participating in a more open system.” Thus, the hegemonic power will only support openness as long as other states do not gain more than the hegemon from international economic exchange. If the distribution of gains were to shift toward other states, economic gains could be transferred to the security arena, undermining the hegemon’s dominance. These contributions have had tremendous impact and still resonate four decades later. The central claim embodied in Gilpin and Krasner’s version of hegemonic stability is that an economically open and peaceful international system is more likely to emerge when a hegemon is rising and has the capability and interest to foster open, peaceful interstate relations (Krasner, 1976, p. 323; Gilpin, 1981). Dominance breeds stability because only a dominant power has the incentive to single-handedly provide public goods from which everyone benefits.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: China/Russia › 2AC---AT: Offshore Balancing

Offshore balancing fails – it encourages instability, human rights abuses, and nuclear proliferation.

Brands et al. ’16 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy. PETER FEAVER is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University. JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School.; November 2016; "Should America Retrench?”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/should-america-retrench; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

It sounds too good to be true, and indeed, it is. Once the historically dubious claims and flawed strategic assumptions are corrected, the case for offshore balancing collapses. The concept may remain popular in certain academic circles, but it is no wonder senior policymakers have consistently rejected it in practice. REWRITING HISTORY Offshore balancers argue that their strategy represents the United States’ traditional approach to global affairs, and one that has consistently proved effective in advancing U.S. interests. In reality, however, U.S. policymakers have pursued offshore balancing only when they have been overly focused on avoiding short-term costs, such as those associated with overseas military deployments, and have thus been willing to accept a high level of strategic risk. The results have been ambiguous at best and disastrous at worst, which is why the strategy has so often been discarded in favor of a more engaged approach. In the 1920s and 1930s, for instance, the United States pursued a version of offshore balancing, by relying on regional governments to uphold power balances in Europe and East Asia. Those efforts failed, forcing the United States to enter World War II and launch major campaigns in both theaters. After sacrificing more than 400,000 American lives and spending the equivalent of $4.1 trillion today in the process, the United States rightly discarded offshore balancing as too costly and risky a way of defending its interests in those regions. Instead, U.S. policymakers committed the country to an onshore military presence that continues seven decades later, as well as to an ultimately successful effort to shape the internal politics and security dynamics of those areas. The United States’ next foray into offshore balancing, in Cold War Korea, ended no more successfully. In 1950, North Korean troops—responding in part to the U.S. withdrawal from South Korea the previous year—overran nearly the entire peninsula. U.S. forces then intervened, and, after some 36,000 U.S. soldiers were killed and the equivalent of $320 billion today was spent, the United States once again shifted to an onshore strategy, which has helped prevent a recurrence of the Korean War to this day. The United States’ longest reliance on offshore balancing has come in the Middle East—from 1945 until 1990 and again from 2011 to 2014. The United States did make brief onshore interventions (notably, in Lebanon in 1958 and again in 1982–84 and in Libya in 2011), but it primarily used economic aid, diplomatic support, covert intervention, and arms transfers to get major powers such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Saudi Arabia to defend a favorable balance of power. Even after the Iranian Revolution knocked out a key U.S. partner, the United States stuck with offshore balancing, supporting Saddam Hussein as the price of maintaining an acceptable balance of power in the Gulf, while also developing the over-the-horizon military capabilities needed to intervene in an emergency. It ended up having to do just that in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened to overrun crucial Saudi oil fields, thereby threatening the regional balance and bringing yet another experiment in offshore balancing to a bloody conclusion. The subsequent discovery of an unexpectedly advanced weapons-of-mass-destruction program in Iraq, along with concerns over the weak Gulf states’ ability to balance against Baghdad on their own, convinced U.S. leaders to shift to an onshore strategy, which President George W. Bush doubled down on after the 9/11 attacks by invading Iraq. President Barack Obama’s decision to withdraw from the country at the end of 2011 marked a shift back to offshore balancing in the Middle East, with the exception of Afghanistan, on the periphery of the region. But the rapid advance of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) in 2014 convinced Obama to commit nearly 5,000 U.S. ground troops to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria, along with thousands more operating from air bases and ships in the region. In short, when leaders have tried offshore balancing, the strategy has tended to fail in costly ways, convincing them to shift to a more forward-leaning approach. Thus, Mearsheimer and Walt’s sunny claim that “for nearly a century, . . . offshore balancing prevented the emergence of dangerous regional hegemons and preserved a global balance of power that enhanced American security” masks a much darker reality: offshore balancing has succeeded only if one considers World War II, the Korean War, the Persian Gulf War, and the rise of ISIS an acceptable price for remaining offshore. If this is success, one shudders to imagine what failure might look like. FUZZY MATH Offshore balancing’s costs are not limited to the wars that must be fought when regional balances collapse. There are also the costs of maintaining those balances even when the strategy appears to be working. Offshore balancing requires the United States to become more dependent on morally bankrupt regimes, subordinating all else to the narrow realpolitik requirement of short-term stability. In the Middle East alone, offshore balancing tied the United States to its partnership with the ill-fated shah of Iran during the 1970s and caused it to turn a blind eye to Saddam’s domestic terror, international aggression, and widespread use of chemical weapons during the 1980s. In both cases, the consequences for human rights, as well as for longer-term regional stability, were problematic, to say the least. To make matters worse, offshore balancing encourages nuclear proliferation. Throughout the postwar era, maintaining an onshore presence has given the United States leverage to restrain allies’ nuclear ambitions while also mitigating the insecurity that might otherwise have driven such countries as Germany, Japan, and South Korea to pursue the bomb. Withdrawing offshore threatens to have the opposite effect. It is no surprise that South Korea expressed nuclear aspirations when the United States gestured at withdrawing its troops from the peninsula during the 1970s, or that Taiwan did likewise when U.S. rapprochement with China appeared to jeopardize the United States’ commitment to the island’s security. Offshore balancers may wave away the dangers of proliferation; given the destructive power of nuclear weapons, policymakers can hardly be so cavalier.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: China/Russia › 2AC---AT: Spheres of Influence

Allowing Russian and Chinese spheres of influence increases authoritarianism

Brands ’20 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 4-20-20; " Don’t Let Great Powers Carve Up the World”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-20/dont-let-great-powers-carve-world; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

GIVE THEM AN INCH… The post–Cold War moment is over, and the prospect of a divided world has returned. Russia is projecting power in the Middle East and staking a claim to dominance in its “near abroad.” China is seeking primacy in the western Pacific and Southeast Asia and using its diplomatic and economic influence to draw countries around the world more tightly into its orbit. Both have developed the tools needed to coerce their neighbors and keep U.S. forces at bay. Allison is one of several analysts who have recently advanced the argument that the United States should make a virtue of necessity—that it should accept Russian and Chinese spheres of influence, encompassing some portion of eastern Europe and the western Pacific, as the price of stability and peace. The logic is twofold: first, to create a cleaner separation between contending parties by clearly marking where one’s influence ends and the other’s begins; and second, to reduce the chances of conflict by giving rising or resurgent powers a safe zone along their borders. In theory, this seems like a reasonable way of preventing competition from turning into outright conflict, especially given that countries such as Taiwan and the Baltic states lie thousands of miles from the United States but on the doorsteps of its rivals. Yet in reality, a spheres-of-influence world would bring more peril than safety. Russia’s and China’s spheres of influence would inevitably be domains of coercion and authoritarianism. Both countries are run by illiberal, autocratic regimes; their leaders see democratic values as profoundly threatening to their political survival. If Moscow and Beijing dominated their respective neighborhoods, they would naturally seek to undermine democratic governments that resist their control—as China is already doing in Taiwan and as Russia is doing in Ukraine—or that challenge, through their very existence, the legitimacy of authoritarian rule. The practical consequence of acceding to authoritarian spheres of influence would be to intensify the crisis of democracy that afflicts the world today. The United States would suffer economically, too. China, in particular, is a mercantilist power already working to turn Asian economies toward Beijing and could one day put the United States at a severe disadvantage on the world’s most economically dynamic continent. Washington should not concede a Chinese sphere of influence unless it is also willing to compromise the “Open Door” principles that have animated its statecraft for over a century.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: China/Russia › 2AC---China/Russia---T/L

Heg checks Russian and Chinese revisionism through military deterrence

Brands ’20 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 4-20-20; " Don’t Let Great Powers Carve Up the World”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-20/dont-let-great-powers-carve-world; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

What a difference two decades make. In the early years of this century, the world appeared to be moving toward a single, seamless order under U.S. leadership. Today the world is fragmenting, and authoritarian challengers, led by China and Russia, are chipping away at American influence in East Asia, eastern Europe, and the Middle East. In its 2002 National Security Strategy, the George W. Bush administration envisioned the end of great-power rivalries. In 2020, the question is how great powers can navigate their rivalries without stumbling into war. Writing in Foreign Affairs (“The New Spheres of Influence,” March/April 2020), Graham Allison offers a road map for this new environment: the United States should accept the return of “spheres of influence” and effectively let China and Russia dominate swaths of their respective geopolitical neighborhoods. Doing so, Allison contends, is actually in keeping with the United States’ best diplomatic traditions, considering that Washington tolerated a Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe during the Cold War. Reviving that tradition is necessary, simply because the United States no longer has the military and economic dominance to deny China and Russia their geopolitical due. And it is desirable, because mutually accepted spheres of influence can promote stability and peace in a more rivalrous world. Allison’s argument is alluring but wrong. In truth, the United States has resisted the creation of rival spheres of influence for most of its history, even as it has worked assiduously to build its own. Ceding ground to China and Russia today would be not a recipe for stability but a blueprint for coercion and conflict, and it would weaken the United States’ geopolitical hand vis-à-vis its rivals. Nor is a return to spheres of influence foreordained—Washington still has the power to prevent Beijing and Moscow from dominating their regions, so long as it rejects Allison’s advice to cut loose its vulnerable frontline allies. A tougher, more competitive world is unavoidable. A far more dangerous world, divided into competing superpower fiefdoms, is not. AN AMERICAN TRADITION Spheres of influence have been common throughout history, but Americans have never been quite comfortable with them. In fact, much of U.S. foreign policy dating back to independence has consisted of efforts to prevent rival powers from establishing such domains. In the nineteenth century, U.S. leaders rejected the idea that any European power should have a sphere of influence in North America or the Western Hemisphere at large. They maneuvered—often quite ruthlessly—to evict European powers from these areas. At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States took this regional policy global. The so-called Open Door policy aimed to dissuade foreign powers from carving up China, and later all of East Asia, into exclusive spheres. Washington joined World War I in part to prevent Germany from becoming the dominant European power. A generation later, the United States fought to deny Japan a sphere of influence in the Pacific and prevent Hitler from establishing primacy over the entire Old World. During and after World War II, Washington also engaged in quieter diplomatic and economic efforts to accelerate the dissolution of the British Empire. Even during the Cold War, Americans never fully accepted Soviet control over eastern Europe. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations sought to roll back the Iron Curtain through ideological warfare and covert action; later administrations expanded trade and diplomatic ties with Warsaw Pact states as a subtler way of undermining Kremlin control. The Reagan administration overtly and covertly supported political movements that were challenging the Kremlin’s authority from within. And when Washington had a chance to peacefully destroy the Soviet sphere of influence after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it did, supporting German unification and the expansion of NATO. Opposition to spheres of influence, in other words, is a part of U.S. diplomatic DNA. The reason for this, Charles Edel and I argued in 2018, is that spheres of influence clash with fundamental tenets of U.S. foreign policy. Among them is the United States’ approach to security, which holds that safeguarding the country’s vital interests and physical well-being requires preventing rival powers from establishing a foothold in the Western Hemisphere or dominating strategically important regions overseas. Likewise, the United States’ emphasis on promoting liberty and free trade translates to a concern that spheres of influence—particularly those dominated by authoritarian powers—would impede the spread of U.S. values and allow hostile powers to block American trade and investment. Finally, spheres of influence do not mesh well with American exceptionalism—the notion that the United States should transcend the old, corrupt ways of balance-of-power diplomacy and establish a more humane, democratic system of international relations. Of course, that intellectual tradition did not stop the United States from building its own sphere of influence in Latin America from the early nineteenth century onward, nor did it prevent it from drawing large chunks of Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East into a global sphere of influence after World War II. Yet the same tradition has led the United States to run its sphere of influence far more progressively than past great powers, which is why far more countries have sought to join that sphere than to leave it. And since hypocrisy is another venerable tradition in global affairs, it is not surprising that Americans would establish their own, relatively enlightened sphere of influence while denying the legitimacy of everyone else’s. That endeavor reached its zenith in the post–Cold War era, when the collapse of the Soviet bloc made it possible to envision a world in which Washington’s sphere of influence—also known as the liberal international order—was the only game in town. The United States maintained a world-beating military that could intervene around the globe; preserved and expanded a global alliance structure as a check on aggression; and sought to integrate potential challengers, namely Beijing and Moscow, into a U.S.-led system. It was a remarkably ambitious project, as Allison rightly notes, but it was the culmination of, rather than a departure from, a diplomatic tradition reaching back two centuries.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: China/Russia › 2AC---China/Russia---T/L

Expansion of US hegemonic influence in Eastern Europe is vital to deter China and Russia – perception is key.

Rothman 22 – has a M.A. in International Relations from the University of Seton Hall, 1/24/22 (Noah, “What the Right Gets Wrong about Ukraine, Russia, and American Hegemony”, Commentary, , accessed 6/26/22)//jd

With Russia bearing down on Ukraine and Western nations demonstrating more willingness to deter Moscow from starting another shooting war on the European continent, some on the American right are wondering why the West is invested in Ukrainian security at all. Indeed, they don’t see America’s commitment to deterring Russian aggression as deterrence. It is, to them, America sleepwalking into a disastrous conflict that is none of our business. They have gotten the stakes of this standoff and America’s interests precisely wrong. One of the primary sources of confusion among those on the right who favor a more introverted American foreign policy is that they have adopted Moscow’s confused rationale for its own aggression. Of this impulse, New York Times columnist Ross Douthat’s analysis is instructive. In his latest column, Douthat lays most of the blame for the current crisis at the Kremlin’s feet, but not all of it. He writes that, in the supposedly bygone era in which the United States was a “hyperpower,” America backed the eastward expansion of NATO that was both provocative and risky. This, he writes, was an aspirational foreign policy, not one that accounted for “the realities of power.” Douthat adds, “the attempt to draw Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit, the partway-open door to Ukrainians who preferred westward-focused alliances, was a foolish overcommitment even when American power was at its height.” This outlook is flawed in two ways. First, it assigns all agency to Washington and robs America’s non-allied partners of sovereignty. Washington didn’t grab Ukraine by the hand and guide it toward integration with the West. Ukrainians themselves have made that desire plain, and they have demonstrated a repeated willingness to fight for it. Ukraine’s present conflict with Moscow arguably began with the “Orange Revolution” of January 2005, xwhich culminated in the ascension of Viktor Yushchenko to the presidency. Almost immediately after that regime change, Ukraine and NATO inaugurated an “intensified dialogue” around a Membership Action Plan (MAP) that would one day result in Ukrainian ascension into NATO. But the conditions NATO attached to ascension were never met and, by 2008, a NATO summit in Bucharest that agreed to Ukraine and Georgia’s ascension only in the distant and indefinite future signaled the end of Ukraine’s progress toward becoming a NATO member. At the same time, the rise of “non-aligned” Viktor Yanukovych to serve as prime minister and, eventually, the president seemed like a concession to the “realities of power” in the region. But that proved a concession that Ukrainians were unwilling to make. A second revolution in 2014 ousted the Yanukovych regime, but the Ukrainians who fought and died fighting their own government in Maidan weren’t carrying NATO flags to the front. They carried the flags of both Ukraine and the European Union because the event that catalyzed that rebellion was the Yanukovych government’s unilateral suspension of a free trade agreement with the EU, not NATO’s enlargement. Westward alignment isn’t something that Ukrainians are ambivalent about. As recently as December, polling indicated that only about one-fifth of Ukrainians support joining a customs union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. They back integration with the EU and NATO by 58 and 54 percent respectively—a national ambition so central to Ukraine’s identity it is codified in its constitution. Consigning Ukraine to the Russian sphere of influence wouldn’t be the natural course of affairs if we only extricated ourselves from Europe’s complexities, and that sentiment won’t go away just because we want it to. That brings us to the second flaw in Douthat’s analysis: Ukraine’s ascension into NATO was and remains a distant prospect. It is Kyiv’s desire to integrate economically and politically with the West that Moscow views as an imminent threat. Russia retails the notion that the present crisis is a response to the West’s heedless expansionism, but there’s no reason to lend credence to that dubious narrative. It’s Ukraine’s independence that so irritates the Kremlin. Douthat proposes an “ideal retreat” from Ukraine which would leave “NATO expansion permanently tabled, with Ukraine subject to inevitable Russian pressure but neither invaded nor annexed, and with our NATO allies shouldering more of the burden of maintaining a security perimeter in Eastern Europe.” He concedes that it would be a struggle to execute an immaculate retrenchment, as our bitter experience in Afghanistan suggests. But it might be the “least-bad” of our available options. This is exactly the concession Russia is demanding from the West. How else could you interpret Moscow’s demands in exchange for ratcheting down tensions? The Kremlin has insisted, in writing, that the United States and the West must commit not just to halting NATO expansion but must remove all troops and weapons from nations that entered the NATO alliance after 1997; namely, the entire former Warsaw Pact. Thus, Russia has effectively asked the West to gift them a sphere of influence they cannot secure militarily, diplomatically, or economically. To do so would abrogate the sovereignty of our partners and allies in Europe, shatter confidence in America across the globe, and represent a profound misreading of the imbalance of forces arrayed against Russian interests in its own backyard. Those who are attracted to Douthat’s argument appear to believe that the West’s only course of action short of war with Russia is retreat. There is, in the estimation of the American Conservative editor Rod Dreher, an “eagerness” among “American elites” to get involved in a real shooting war with Russia. “We have no realistic choice but to cede to at least some of Russia’s demands,” he writes, lest we abandon the geostrategic imperative of containing a revisionist China. Such a theory confuses deterrence with war-making. The dispatching of lethal arms into Ukraine, as well as the deployment of troops, naval assets, and area denial technology, is designed to raise the stakes of conflict to the point that Moscow blinks. That would be the best of all imaginable resolutions to the present conflict, because the refugee crisis, economic disruptions, and war of attrition in Europe that would follow a Russian invasion would be catastrophic. After all, the likelihood that U.S. could avoid becoming entangled in a conflict on NATO’s borders that involves America’s ratified allies is negligible. Nor is deterrence a zero-sum game. Both the Chinese and Taiwanese are watching events in Eastern Europe closely, the latter with a sense of existential dread. In recent weeks, Taiwan has committed to deepening its bilateral ties with post-Soviet states (in particular, Lithuania) including the establishment of a billion-dollar fund designed to offset Beijing’s economic pressure on these and other nations to abandon Taipei. In a 2019 report to Taiwan’s parliament, the country’s National Security Bureau warned that “the Chinese Communist Party is copying the methods used by Russia to annex Crimea against Taiwan.” The Taiwanese would rightly view a Western capitulation to Russian demands that acknowledges the legitimacy of a security architecture that robs Kyiv of its right to freely join foreign military alliances as a precursor to its own abandonment. Douthat is wrong insofar as the “least-bad” resolution to the crisis in Europe would be to defuse it without sacrificing either the post-Cold War order or Westphalian sovereignty. And the only way to secure that outcome amid the crisis Moscow has inaugurated would be to force it to back down—through troop deployments, diplomatic offensives, preventative sanctions, or even the provision of face-saving offramps like the restoration of defunct security agreements. But back down it must. What we cannot do is consign Ukraine to Russian domination. Even if we could, the Ukrainians themselves have proven they would never accept it. That is a challenge, indeed, but it’s a manageable challenge. By contrast, the wages of appeasement would be too costly to bear.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: China › 2AC---Heg Solves China War

Heg prevents Chinese military expansion and nuclear war through containment

Brands ’20 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 4-20-20; " Don’t Let Great Powers Carve Up the World”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-20/dont-let-great-powers-carve-world; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

Such costs might be acceptable in exchange for peace and security. But spheres of influence during the Cold War did not prevent the Soviets from repeatedly testing American redlines in Berlin, causing high-stakes crises in which nuclear war was a real possibility. Nor did those spheres prevent the two sides from competing sharply, and sometimes violently, throughout the “Third World.” Throughout history, spheres-of-influence settlements, from the Thirty Years’ Peace between Athens and Sparta to the Peace of Amiens between the United Kingdom and Napoleonic France have often ended, sooner or later, in war. The idea that spheres of influence are a formula for peace rests on assumptions that often go unexamined: that revisionist powers are driven primarily by insecurity, that their grievances are limited and can be easily satisfied, that the truly vital interests of competing powers do not conflict, and that creative statecraft can therefore fashion an enduring, mutually acceptable equilibrium. The trouble is that these premises don’t always hold. Ideology and the quest for greatness—not simply insecurity—often drive great powers. Rising states are continually tempted to renegotiate previous bargains once they have the power to do so. Offering concessions to a revisionist state may simply convince it that the existing order is fragile and can be tested further. Conceding a sphere of influence to a great-power challenger might not produce stability but simply give that challenger a better position from which to realize its ambitions. Consider the situation in the western Pacific. The most minimal Chinese sphere of influence would surely include Taiwan. Yet if Taiwan became a platform for Chinese military capabilities, the defense of other U.S. allies in the region, such as Japan and the Philippines, would become vastly more difficult. Nor would such a concession likely satisfy Chinese ambitions. A growing body of literature by scholars such as Toshi Yoshihara, James Holmes, Liza Tobin, and Elizabeth Economy suggests that China desires at the very least to push the United States beyond the chain of islands running from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines. Even a limited Chinese sphere in the western Pacific would serve as a springboard to this larger objective. Meanwhile, the United States will have sacrificed a number of critical advantages by pulling out. A free Taiwan offers proof that Chinese culture and democracy are not incompatible; subjugating Taiwan would also allow Beijing to remove this ideological threat. Worse still, the United States would lose the edge that comes from being the only great power without significant security hazards near its borders. It was only after the United States achieved dominance in the Western Hemisphere that it could project power globally. Russia and China, by contrast, still have to deal with U.S. allies, partners, and military presences in their own backyards—a circumstance that diverts resources they might otherwise use to pursue more distant ambitions and compete with the United States at a truly global scale.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: China › 2AC---Heg Solves China War

US Power checks Chinese revisionism – without it, China will invade Taiwan and take over the Pacific

Brands ’20 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 10-1-21; "The End of China’s Rise”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-01/end-chinas-rise; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-23-2022; AH]

RING OF FIRE Eurasia has often been a deathtrap for aspiring hegemons: there are too many nearby enemies that can make common cause with offshore superpowers. For almost 40 years, a rising China avoided strategic encirclement by downplaying its global ambitions and maintaining friendly relations with the United States. But that period is over. As Beijing has become more aggressive in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and elsewhere, it has engendered hostility nearly all around. Over the past five years, the United States has abandoned engagement and embraced neo-containment. Washington has carried out its largest naval and missile expansion in a generation, imposed its most aggressive tariffs since World War II, and implemented its tightest restrictions on foreign investment since the Cold War—all directed at China. Arms sales and military support to frontline states have increased; U.S. technological sanctions are threatening to destroy Huawei and other Chinese firms. In 2021, China’s deputy foreign minister complained that “a whole-of-government and whole-of-society campaign is being waged to bring China down.” The United States’ turn against China has contributed to a broader backlash against Beijing’s power. In Northeast Asia, Taiwan has become more determined than ever to maintain its de facto independence, and the government has approved a bold new defense strategy that could make the island extremely hard to conquer. Japan has agreed to cooperate closely with the United States to fend off Chinese aggression in the region. Through its own belligerence, Beijing has given the U.S.-Japanese alliance an explicitly anti-China cast. The countries around the South China Sea are also starting to hedge against China. Vietnam is acquiring mobile shore-based missiles, Russian attack submarines, new fighter aircraft, and surface ships armed with advanced cruise missiles. Singapore has quietly become a significant U.S. military partner. Indonesia increased its defense spending 20 percent in 2020 and another 21 percent in 2021. Even the Philippines, which courted China for most of President Rodrigo Duterte’s term, is now reiterating its claims in the South China Sea and ramping up air and naval patrols. China’s ambitions are provoking a response beyond East Asia, too, from Australia to India to Europe. Everywhere Beijing is pushing, a growing cast of rivals is pushing back. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a strategic partnership that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—has emerged as a focal point of anti-China cooperation among the most powerful democracies in the Indo-Pacific. The new AUKUS (Australia–United Kingdom–United States) alliance unites the core of the Anglosphere against Beijing. The United States is forging overlapping mini-coalitions to ensure that advanced democracies stay ahead in key technologies, while the G-7 and NATO are staking out tougher positions on Taiwan and other issues. To be sure, counter-China cooperation remains a work in progress, because many countries still rely on trade with Beijing. But these interlocking partnerships could eventually form a noose around Beijing’s neck. FLAMING OUT China is a risen power, not a rising one: it has acquired formidable geopolitical capabilities, but its best days are behind it. That distinction matters, because China has staked out vaulting ambitions and now may not be able to achieve them without drastic action. The CCP aims to reclaim Taiwan, dominate the western Pacific, and spread its influence around the globe. Xi has declared that China seeks a “future where we will win the initiative and have the dominant position.” Yet that dream is starting to slip away, as growth slows and China faces an increasingly hostile world.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: China › 2AC---No China Rise

Independently, water and resource scarcity restrict Chinese power

Brands ‘21 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 12-29-21; "China Is Running out of Water and That’s Scary for Asia”; https://www.aei.org/op-eds/china-is-running-out-of-water-and-thats-scary-for-asia/; AEI; accessed 6-23-2022; AH]

Of all Bejing’s problems — demographic decline, a stifling political climate, the stalling or reversal of economic reforms — dwindling natural resources may be the most urgent. Nature and geopolitics can interact in nasty ways. The historian Geoffrey Parker has argued that changing weather patterns drove war, revolution and upheaval during a long global crisis in the 17th century. More recently, climate change has opened new trade routes, resources and rivalries in the Arctic. And now China, a great power that often appears bent on reordering the international system, is running out of water in ways that are likely to stoke conflict at home and abroad. Natural resources have always been critical to economic and global power. In the 19th century, a small country — the U.K. — raced ahead of the pack because its abundant coal reserves allowed it to drive the Industrial Revolution. Britain was eventually surpassed by the U.S., which exploited its huge tracts of arable land, massive oil reserves and other resources to become an economic titan. The same goes for China’s rise. Capitalist reforms, a welcoming global trade system and good demographics all contributed to Beijing’s world-beating economic growth from the late 1970s to the early 2000s. The fact that China was nearly self-sufficient in land, water and many raw materials — and that its cheap labor allowed it to exploit these resources aggressively — also helped it to become the workshop of the world. Yet China’s natural abundance is a thing of the past. As Michael Beckley and I argue in our forthcoming book, “The Danger Zone,” Beijing has blown through many of its resources. A decade ago, China became the world’s largest importer of agricultural goods. Its arable land has been shrinking due to degradation and overuse. Breakneck development has also made China the world’s largest energy importer: It buys three-quarters of its oil abroad at a time when America has become a net energy exporter. China’s water situation is particularly grim. As Gopal Reddy notes, China possesses 20% of the world’s population but only 7% of its fresh water. Entire regions, especially in the north, suffer from water scarcity worse than that found in a parched Middle East. Thousands of rivers have disappeared, while industrialization and pollution have spoiled much of the water that remains. By some estimates, 80% to 90% of China’s groundwater and half of its river water is too dirty to drink; more than half of its groundwater and one-quarter of its river water cannot even be used for industry or farming. This is an expensive problem. China is forced to divert water from comparatively wet regions to the drought-plagued north; experts assess that the country loses well over $100 billion annually as a result of water scarcity. Shortages and unsustainable agriculture are causing the desertification of large chunks of land. Water-related energy shortfalls have become common across the country. The government has promoted rationing and improvements in water efficiency, but nothing sufficient to arrest the problem. This month, Chinese authorities announced that Guangzhou and Shenzhen — two major cities in the relatively water-rich Pearl River Delta — will face severe drought well into next year. The economic and political implications are troubling. By making growth cost more, China’s resource problems have joined an array of other challenges — demographic decline, an increasingly stifling political climate, the stalling or reversal of many key economic reforms — to cause a slowdown that was having pronounced effects even before Covid struck. China’s social compact will be tested as dwindling resources intensify distributional fights. In 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao stated that water scarcity threatened the “very survival of the Chinese nation.” A minister of water resources declared that China must “fight for every drop of water or die.” Hyperbole aside, resource scarcity and political instability often go hand in hand.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: China › 2AC---No China Rise

No China rise – failing economy, population loss, and lagging technology prove

Brands 4/14 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 4-14-22; "The Dangers of China’s Decline”; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/14/china-decline-dangers/; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-23-2022; AH]

China’s ascendance shook the world intellectually as well as geopolitically: It undermined post-Cold War Western beliefs that prosperity would lead inevitably to political liberalization, that democracies produced higher rates of growth than autocracies, and that tyranny was incompatible with sound economic management. As China became a global heavyweight, a new orthodoxy solidified—that a hegemonic transition was approaching as Beijing surpassed the United States. One dissenter was the political scientist David Shambaugh. In 2015, Shambaugh argued that China was suffering from a deep internal malaise and that Xi’s increasingly repressive rule was a sign of insecurity, not confidence. “[F]or all the Western views of it as an unstoppable juggernaut,” he wrote, China’s economy “is stuck in a series of systemic traps from which there is no easy exit.” Shambaugh struck a discordant note at a time when Beijing was tightening its control of the South China Sea and spreading its influence across multiple continents. He also happened to be right. Not least of the oddities surrounding contemporary China is that much of the world deemed its ascent inevitable just as its prospects started to dim. This may sound absurd, given all the hype surrounding China’s rise. After all, that country is supposedly destined, as the Harvard University political scientist Graham Allison (channeling legendary Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew) has written, to become “the biggest player in the history of the world.” It’s true that China does boast many apparent advantages. It has an enormous domestic market and is the leading trade partner of roughly 130 countries around the world. It is making concerted investments in artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, and other critical technologies. If the United States doesn’t up its game, a national commission chaired by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt warned in 2021, China could become the premier “AI superpower.” But look closer, and China’s trajectory starts to seem more tenuous. For one thing, many of China’s technological achievements are narrower and less impressive than they first appear. For example, Beijing has made great strides in AI applications focused on surveillance (no surprise there), but the United States still leads significantly across the wider expanse of AI subfields and uses. Despite vast state subsidies, China’s Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. is years behind in the creation of cutting-edge semiconductors that make up the foundation of advanced economies in the information age. Just this year, Peking University published a candid assessment—which the CCP then predictably censored—of China’s progress in science and technology. The verdict was that China is “following [the United States] in most fields, running side by side in a few, and leading in very few.” And while China’s other strengths are not illusory, neither can they hide a reality that Beckley and I discussed last year: The magic that made China’s economic miracle is unmistakably fizzling. The country’s resource abundance is old news: Overuse devastated much of China’s arable land; industrialization and pollution left the country with severe water scarcity. More damaging still, China’s abundance of human resources is also a thing of the past. The one-child policy was a devil’s bargain that is now causing demographic implosion. China’s total population is set to peak by 2028 (or perhaps as soon as this year, by some estimates) and then plummet by as much as half by century’s end. Its working population crested in 2015; it will fall by 70 million between 2020 and 2035 and even faster after that. China will soon combine an enormous geriatric population with a rapidly shrinking workforce. It will experience one of the worst peacetime demographic crunches on record, a formula for stagnation at best and catastrophic economic contraction at worst. Making matters worse, the era of enlightened economic policy is over. The reform agenda has been stalled for more than a decade because further liberalization—necessary to make the leap to a more innovative, knowledge-based economy—would threaten the privileges of entrenched elites. If anything, Xi has thrown the country into reverse. Politically, he is taking China into neototalitarianism through pervasive repression and indoctrination. And economically, his policies have a decidedly retrograde feel. Xi’s agenda has featured a preference for state-owned enterprises at the expense of the more vibrant private sector; the imposition of severe, politically motivated restrictions on wide swaths of the economy; attacks on the autonomy of relatively technocratic institutions such as the central bank; and the empowerment of political minders in companies of nearly all sizes. China’s leaders may talk about the need to transition to a high-tech, services-based economy, but Xi’s policies are stifling the competence, creativity, and spontaneity necessary to make that shift. It all constitutes a “great leap backward”—a reversion to pre-Deng-era policies that condemned China to stagnation. There is also the question of what Xi’s consolidation of power means for the country’s long-term resilience. As the political theorist Francis Fukuyama has written, for nearly 40 years after Mao’s death China avoided the “bad emperor” problem—the worst pathologies that accompany authoritarian rule—by imposing term limits on its rulers and making them more accountable to other CCP elites. Yet Xi has systematically disassembled this system by purging rivals, sidelining potential successors, and entrenching himself in power. By doing so, he is enabling China to move faster and more decisively. But he is also leaving the country vulnerable to impulsive or unwise decision-making—a perpetual problem of one-man rule—and creating the potential for terrible instability when his reign finally ends. Xi’s centralization of authority, while seemingly impressive, is setting the country up for a fall. Finally, it doesn’t help that a more assertive China is now facing more international resistance. Trade barriers against Chinese companies and products proliferated in the decade after the global financial crisis. Washington has waged a technological cold war against Huawei, seeking to deprive that Chinese firm of high-end semiconductors and keep it out of the world’s 5G networks. Dozens of countries are more carefully scrutinizing their economic, financial, and technological ties with Beijing; the Japanese government is offering to pay companies to reduce their China exposure. China is still central to the global economy, but the days when the United States and other powerful countries eagerly abetted its ascent are over. Indeed, Xi’s effort to cultivate the domestic market is an implicit admission that China, which rose on the strength of an export-focused economy, now confronts a very different world. China’s predicament has been thrown into relief, ironically, by COVID-19. Early on, the pandemic seemed to herald an epochal global shift. Prominent U.S. analysts saw it as a “Suez moment,” the terminal crisis of the U.S. empire. Xi touted his regime’s success in containing COVID-19 at home (albeit after allowing it to escape to the world) as an advertisement for Chinese authoritarianism. Two years later, it’s clear that COVID-19 was a turning point but not in the way that Xi hoped. The pandemic hypercharged global anti-China sentiment, after Beijing concealed the initial outbreak and then exploited the resulting chaos to bully nations from Australia to Germany and the United Kingdom. It thereby encouraged a host of efforts—through multilateral institutions such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, AUKUS, and the G-7, as well as the United States’ bilateral alliances in the Pacific—to counter Chinese power. “A Cold War mentality” had reemerged, a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry complained, as the United States and its friends pursued “anti-China encirclement.” COVID-19 also confirmed how patchy China’s rise had been: The country’s biotechnology sector couldn’t produce anything like the revolutionary vaccines that democratic innovation economies in the United States and Europe churned out. Even China’s heavy-handed success in containing COVID-19 at home became a trap: The combination of “zero-COVID” policies, low levels of natural immunity, and vaccines that proved weak or worthless against highly contagious variants condemned the country to recurring lockdowns of major cities, with all the accompanying disruptions. Even before COVID-19, in fact, China’s economic vital signs were worrying. The government claimed a growth rate of 6 percent, but Chinese insiders and academic research indicate that the true number is considerably lower—and even that growth is inflated by the relentless injection of capital into a less and less efficient economy. As a result, overall debt grew eightfold between 2008 and the end of 2020, reaching 335 percent of GDP. In other countries, this combination of slumping productivity and growing debt usually presages sharp crises that turn into lasting economic quagmires. Xi’s Chinese dream involves catching up to the United States. In reality, his country is slowing down.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: China › 2AC---No China Transition

American leadership in Asia-Pacific key to China deterrence

Hass 17 - served as the director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia at the National Security Council (NSC) staff and served as a Foreign Service Officer in U.S. Embassy Beijing, 12/29/17 (Ryan, Brookings, , accessed 6/20/22)//jd

There is a sense that the U.S. has pressing needs at home, that the North Korea challenge feels dangerous and intractable, and that China’s national power is on the rise — so China or others should do more to manage problems in their own backyard. While I support focusing on getting our house in order at home, I fear that it would be dangerously shortsighted for the U.S. to retreat from its 70-plus-year status as the leading power and agenda-setter in the Asia-Pacific region. We have to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time. Here’s why: First, the Asia-Pacific region is rapidly becoming the most important area in the world for the U.S. It accounts for nearly 60 percent of global economic growth, and U.S. exports to the region create more jobs (3.4 million) than any other part of the world. It is home to five U.S. treaty allies, many of the world’s most capable militaries and the most proximate threat to America’s national security: North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. When America has been active in the region, it has spurred Asian countries to share the burden in responding to humanitarian disasters, dealing with climate change, increasing pressure on North Korea and agreeing on trade rules for nearly 40 percent of the global economy. At the same time, the U.S. has led efforts to push China to emerge as a constructive — and not a coercive — actor. If the U.S. withdraws from these roles, there is no other country capable of pulling the region together in common purpose to address shared challenges. Second, America’s long and steady presence in the region has helped deter aggression, cool historical rivalries, and support the spread of market-based democracies. While the people of the region deserve credit, the U.S.-provided security umbrella also enabled progress. Up to now, the U.S. has served as a buffer in regional disputes, and a check against China or others seeking to use their military to move borders or seize resources. If confidence in U.S. resolve to protect the peace recedes, the risk of interstate conflict will rise. Countries will confront a choice between becoming more deferential to Beijing’s interests in exchange for hoped-for security and economic benefits, or developing military capabilities — including nuclear weapons — to guard against coercion by China or North Korea. If Japan goes nuclear, for example, South Korea and Taiwan could follow. A pattern of nuclear dominoes would elevate risk of a catastrophic conflict that could crater the global economy and create unimaginable destruction.