2022
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Topicality
**Topicality** › SC – Not OHDACA
Defense 18 [The Office of the Secretary of Defense is a headquarters-level staff of the United States Department of Defense; “Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget Security Cooperation Consolidated Budget Display”; February 2018; ] //CH
DoD provides a range of humanitarian activities funded by the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation, from foreign disaster relief operations authorized by the Secretary of Defense to GCC security cooperation efforts. Although the purpose of foreign disaster relief operations is not security cooperation, the byproduct often strengthens existing bilateral security relationships and provides a bridge to new partners. Steady-state humanitarian assistance (HA) includes activities designed to relieve or reduce endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, hunger, and privation. HA may also bolster a host nation’s capacity to reduce the risk of, prepare for, mitigate the consequences of, or respond to humanitarian disasters.
2022
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Topicality
**Topicality** › SC – Includes the DHS
DHS 22 [The United States Department of Homeland Security is the U.S. federal executive department responsible for public security; “DHS to Increase Security Cooperation with Israel through New Arrangements”; 3/3/22; ] //CH
WASHINGTON – This week, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Under Secretary for Policy Robert Silvers visited Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, Israel to sign security agreements with the Government of Israel, engage with key Israeli government and private sector partners on a range of joint security issues, and deliver keynote remarks on DHS cybersecurity priorities at the CyberTech Global Conference.
“DHS is proud to continue to strengthen the bilateral relationship between the United States and Israel through new security arrangements,” said DHS Under Secretary for Policy Robert Silvers. “The arrangements signed this week between our Department and the Government of Israel underscore that Israel is a critical partner in advancing a broad range of international technology and security priorities.”
2022
Michigan
Topicality
**Topicality** › SC – Includes Training and Interoperability
Cooper 21 [R. Clarke Cooper is a Senior Fellow, Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, and the Former U.S. Alternative Representative to the UN Security Council; 12/23/21; ] //CH
US security cooperation historically encompasses facilitating arms sales, staging military training and exercises, developing interoperability among allies and partners, and bolstering the sovereign defense capabilities of security partners. All these efforts need to continue at a deliberate pace—but in a post-Cold War world, the United States no longer has a monopoly on arms sales with an overt technological advantage in all areas.
2022
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**Topicality** › SC =/= frameworks
CRS 16 (Congressional Research Service, informing the legislative debate since 1914, “DOD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues”, 8/23/16, ) // EL
This report provides a general overview of current DOD Title 10 authorities to assist foreign governments, militaries, security forces, and populations funded by the DOD budget. It presents background information on the evolving DOD security cooperation mission and the recent development of the statutory framework through which DOD conducts security cooperation activities. It provides summary overviews of nine categories of security cooperation assistance and activities, including the amounts of congressionally authorized funding, where available, and any legislatively required State Department input. It discusses recent issues related to the development, implementation, sustainment, and coordination of security cooperation to support continuing congressional oversight. Two tables in the appendix provide information on current Title 10 security cooperation authorities. The first catalogs current security cooperation authorities, noting legislative mandates for State Department input and notification and reporting requirements. The second provides a snapshot of authorized and/or appropriated funding levels for select security cooperation authorities.
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Aff Answers › 2AC---AT: I/L---Forward Defense Fails
Mengelkamp et al 7/27 [Lukas Mengelkamp, historian based at the University of Marburg / Alexander Graef, Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy / Ulrich Kuhn, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; “A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING DEFENSE FOR NATO”; JUNE 27, 2022; ; Accessed 7/23/22; Lowell-ES]
The problem with forward defense, however, is that while it sounds good, it is not clear what it would mean in practice, or how it would play out against the many divergences and disagreements between NATO members. Instead, allies should embrace a strategy of confidence-building defense. To revive this late Cold War concept, NATO’s eastern members would create a highly mobile net of dispersed artillery, while more powerful European allies would build and supply heavy weapons depots in those countries, then prepare to rapidly deploy significant forces in case of a crisis. This approach would enable European allies to contribute to their own security, lessen first-strike pressures, and avoid deepening a dangerous new security dilemma with Russia.
No matter how confident allies seem to be about NATO’s current unity, there are a number of key uncertainties that could make forward defense difficult to implement effectively. If Russia’s military continues to struggle in Ukraine, or if America’s commitment to European security falters again, NATO would benefit from a more flexible, less forward strategy.
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Aff Answers › 2AC---N/L---Pressure
Schnaufer 21 [Tad, doctoral candidate in Security Studies at the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida ; “The US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure on Allies”; January 15, 2021; DOA: 7/18/22; ; Lowell-ES]
It may seem that these tensions and fears will only lead to negative outcomes, but some disunity within an alliance can yield positive results. Several articles researching the implications of free-riding and burdening-sharing in alliances have supported this notion. In Olson and Zeckhauser’s seminal article on burden-sharing, they wrote, “This fact leads to the paradoxical conclusion that a decline in the amity, unity, and community of interest among allies need not necessarily reduce the effectiveness of an alliance…” and “The United States, at least, should perhaps not hope for too much unity in common ventures with other nations. It might prove extremely expensive.” Similarly, Plumper and Neumayer note in reference to the smaller allies (non-US allies), “Unless the interests of alliance members are independent, the existence of NATO allows the smaller allies to free-ride to some extent.”
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Aff Answers › 2AC---N/L---AI Logistics
Franke 21 [Ulrike, Senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations; “ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI”; January 2021; DOA: 7/23/22; ; Lowell-ES]
However, military AI includes many non-controversial uses, such as ‘sustainment’, which encompasses logistics as well as support activities such as financial management, personnel services, and health care. AI helps make these services more efficient and cost-effective; for example, predictive maintenance helps in monitoring a system, such as an aircraft, and can do things such as use various sensory inputs and data analysis to predict when parts of a system will need to be replaced. Equally, AI can help improve logistics’ efficiency by, for instance, ensuring that supplies are delivered in appropriate quantities and at the right time. Transatlantic cooperation in this field is uncontroversial, but extremely useful – especially when carried out within NATO, as this could help bring allies closer together, establish joint procedures, and thereby ensure interoperability.
2022
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Aff Answers › 2AC --- N/L --- Stratcon
NATO 6/29/22 [North Atlantic Treaty Organization; “NATO 2022 STRATEGIC CONCEPT”; June 29, 2022; DOA: 7/1/22; ; Lowell-ES]
25. Maintaining secure use of and unfettered access to space and cyberspace are key to effective deterrence and defence. We will enhance our ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace to prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, using all available tools. A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space; could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We recognise the applicability of international law and will promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace and space. We will also boost the resilience of the space and cyber capabilities upon which we depend for our collective defence and security.
2022
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Aff Answers › 2AC --- N/L --- Spending
Miller 6/29/22 [Maggie, cybersecurity reporter for POLITICO; “NATO establishes program to coordinate rapid response to cyberattacks”; 06/29/2022; DOA: 7/5/22; ; Lowell-ES]
NATO member countries on Wednesday agreed in Madrid to create a new program to quickly respond to cyberattacks.
Russian threat: The “virtual rapid response cyber capability” comes after months of Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine as part of the war and amid concerns that Moscow may target the United States and other NATO countries in retaliation for assistance to Ukraine.
2022
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Aff Answers › 2AC --- Aff Solves Cyber OStretch
Maigre 4/6/22
(Merle, senior cybersecurity expert at e-Governance Academy in Estonia. In 2017–2018, she served as director of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (CCDCOE)in Tallinn; in 2012–2017 as the security policy adviser to Estonian Presidents Kersti Kaljulaid and Thoomas Hendrik Ilves; and in 2010–2012 in the Policy Planning Unit of the Private Office of NATO Security General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. She is a member of the Executive Board of the Cyber Peace Institute in Geneva and the International Advisory Board of NATO CCDCOE, “NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security,” pg online @ //um-ef)
More operational- and technical-level joint activities should be practiced among allies and with like-minded partners in order to contribute to imposing costs to malicious actors in cyberspace. Given that NATO’s cyber response teams are stretched thin due to protecting NATO’s own networks, bi- and multilateral collaboration enables countries to share best practices and, in the event of an emergency, provide mutual rapid assistance in crisis response.
2022
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Aff Answers › 2AC --- Unity = Fake
Lee 7/1/22 [James, reporter for Express UK; “NATO cracks exposed: Call for members to be KICKED OUT as alliance 'only inch deep'”; July 1, 2022; DOA: 7/4/22; ; Lowell-ES]
However, the cracks are beginning to show with one commentator suggesting the thinly veiled family photo may not be one of a happy alliance. Matthew Karnitschnig, Politico's chief European correspondent who was at the summit, said: “Look beyond the staged backslapping, bonhomie and self-congratulation in Madrid, however, and one can see that while the alliance’s unity might be a mile wide, it’s also only an inch deep, its collective sense of purpose as varied as its 30 members.” Much discussion has arisen over the financial commitment seen by NATO members. In fact, at one point, Mr Trump threatened to pull out of the alliance as a matter of point, resulting in a quick pledge by members to increase their spending. Germany, France and the UK have all hinted at increasing defence spending over the next decade, with the UK aiming to hit 2.5 percent of GDP following pressure by Defence Secretary Ben Wallace to increase the budget. The US is still by far the largest contributor to the alliance, with around 3.5 percent of its GDP dedicated to defence.
2022
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Aff Answers › 2AC --- L/T --- NATO Solves Disagreements
Koegler et al ‘18
(Torsten Gojowsky, Sebastian Koegler, Bernardus Haspels, Flemming Haar, and Sverre Wetteland,Torsten Gojowsky is a U.S. Army officer. Ben Haspels is a Royal Netherlands Army officer. Flemming Haar is a Danish Navy officer. Sebastian Koegle is a German officer. Sverre Wetteland is a Norwegian officer. All are students at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, “Resistance to Innovation in NATO,” pg online @ https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/8/16/resistance-to-innovation-in-nato)
Innovative technologies face the dilemma of military leaders who are uncertain of their possible benefits versus their potential risks. Yet the pacing gap has kept military leadership from confronting this dilemma in a timely manner. Tactical Assault Kit can form the base of a future communication platform for NATO SOF. However, this vision for the future will only be feasible if the need for connectivity among NATO special operations forces is persistently socialized and eventually accepted. NATO Special Operations Headquarters can function as a key hub of this socialization process. As a premier NATO special operations schoolhouse, it trains and educates member states special operations soldiers in areas including communication technology. Such education can focus on learning the basics of emerging technology and how to employ those unique technical capabilities. By creating a consensus for a way ahead and also facilitating basic courses via their schoolhouse in Belgium, NATO special operations forces as a whole might be able to step into the future outfitted with the best possible means of fighting in an increasingly complex world of near-peer competitors and hostile networks.
2022
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Aff Answers › 2AC---NUQ
RANE 6-30-2022. Risk Assistance Network + Exchange, risk intelligence company used by 400 corporations, government agencies, academic institutions and over 1.5M members. "Placing NATO’s New Strategic Concept in Context". Stratfor. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/placing-nato-s-new-strategic-concept-context. DL
The 2022 Strategic Concept highlights new cybersecurity, climate change, authoritarian governance and other non-military threats as well. Climate change was mentioned only once in the 2010 Strategic Concept. But in the 2022 version, it is mentioned 11 times, including the ambitious statement that NATO should “become the leading international organization when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security.” Additional attention is also given to cyberattacks. The alliance reaffirmed its longstanding policy that a “single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space” could prompt NATO to trigger its Article 5 mutual defense clause — another measure directed first and foremost toward Russia and China and intended to deter cyberattacks causing physical damage, as otherwise the alliance would be skeptical of triggering Article 5 because of a cyberattack. Finally, the 2022 Strategic Concept on several occasions notes the challenge to the alliance’s interests and values posed by advancing authoritarianism — a threat not acknowledged directly in 2010.
NATO’s updated Strategic Concept acknowledges non-military threats such as identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, including with respect to critical infrastructure, supply chains and health systems. These new threats underscore the increasing importance of reliable partners in geographies outside the NATO alliance such as in Asia, from where the alliance must ensure the stability and security of supplies of critical components and resources.
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Aff Answers › 2AC---NUQ
NATO 6-30-2022. "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept". https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/. DL
24. We will expedite our digital transformation, adapt the NATO Command Structure for the information age and enhance our cyber defences, networks and infrastructure. We will promote innovation and increase our investments in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability and military edge. We will work together to adopt and integrate new technologies, cooperate with the private sector, protect our innovation ecosystems, shape standards and commit to principles of responsible use that reflect our democratic values and human rights.
25. Maintaining secure use of and unfettered access to space and cyberspace are key to effective deterrence and defence. We will enhance our ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace to prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, using all available tools. A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space; could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We recognise the applicability of international law and will promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace and space. We will also boost the resilience of the space and cyber capabilities upon which we depend for our collective defence and security.
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IMPACTS › Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves › Internals --- Unity over DIANA
Edward H. Christie 22, Defence Economist and Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit, lead author of NATO’s policy White Paper on Artificial Intelligence and lead consultant to NATO for the development of the Alliance’s Artificial Intelligence Strategy, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe,” European View, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 13–21, doi:10.1177/17816858221089372/micahw
Building on these considerations, the NATO Innovation Unit has developed two new instruments for Allied use which were announced to the public in October 2021 (NATO 2021a; 2021b). Both instruments aim to foster technological innovation with a deliberate focus on dual-use applications and on enterprises with mixed (potential) revenue streams. The first instrument is the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which is a NATO instrument, that is, it involves the participation of all 30 NATO Allies. The second instrument is the NATO Innovation Fund, which in NATO terminology is a ‘multinational’ instrument, namely one that Allies freely opt into.
DIANA will aim to accelerate the adoption of dual-use technological solutions through several interlocking components.6 First, it will develop a network of national organisations, in particular test centres and innovation accelerators. Second, it will competitively select private-sector innovators and allow them to use national organisations in the network to interface with military end users and military capability-development specialists. Third, it is envisaged that DIANA will provide mentorship and education services for private innovators to familiarise them with the opportunities and responsibilities inherent to the defence and security sector. Fourth, DIANA will develop a database of trusted financial investors from Allied nations and support matchmaking between investors and innovators. Fifth and finally, DIANA will also provide expert advice on defence and security innovation to all relevant stakeholders, including private-sector and academic entities.
2022
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IMPACTS › Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves › Internals --- Must be OUTSIDE Mil-Mil
Nelson ‘21
(Nicholas, Nicholas Nelson is a Senior Fellow for Emerging Tech and Policy with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Nicholas Nelson is an experienced leader in aerospace and defense (A&D), working at the nexus of innovation and national security. In addition to his work at CEPA, Mr. Nelson is Senior Technology Advisor at the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI), focused on emerging defense and dual-use technologies. He also advises a range of deep tech venture-backed startups. Previously, he was the Director of Strategic Development at a six billion dollar A&D and technology company, leading strategy, mergers and acquisitions, and corporate venture capital initiatives. Prior to this, Mr. Nelson worked in management consulting and technology scouting in Europe and North America, as well as civilian roles with the U.S. Department of Defense. His research and writing are focused on emerging defense technology, hypersonics, unmanned systems, and great power competition.“Getting NATO Innovation Right,” pg online @ //um-ef)
The Defense Innovation Accelerator and NATO Innovation Fund announced at the NATO Summit are welcome developments, but they require new authorities and differentiated talent. Swift technological change has meant governments and the military created new organizations and approaches to innovation and rapid acquisition. Unfortunately, many do not have the necessary authority, budget, or workforce to succeed, meaning that meaningful change and impact have been sacrificed for theater. For the newly announced Defense Innovation Accelerator North Atlantic (DIANA) – with planned locations in Toronto and Cambridge, UK – and the NATO Innovation Fund (NIF) to succeed, they must address authority and budget concerns, and then bring in the right personnel to lead and staff them. Authorities There are three key authorities that NATO must get right for DIANA and NIF: reporting lines, patience (or willingness to accept failure), and decision making. First, DIANA and NIF should operate independently with a direct line into the most senior decision-makers (the Secretary General, SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation — SACT, etc). Second, they need to be allowed to fail. The most impactful defense organizations (and indeed commercial organizations, particularly in the startup world) normalize taking big bets, with the knowledge that many will likely fail, and even the ones that succeed may take years to realize their full impact. Third and finally, these new NATO bodies need to invest in or provide support to initiatives and startups without requiring external permission or consensus. At the same time, they also need a clear transition partner for promising capabilities to be handed off to (e.g. DARPA transitioning tech to the U.S. Department of Defense), which can move from development to deployment. This will enable the Alliance to more readily identify, develop, and deploy emerging and disruptive technologies. Similar efforts including the U.S. Department of Defense’s DARPA and Defense Innovation Unit, CIA’s In-Q-Tel, and USAF’s Strategic Capabilities Office, are effective because they exist outside of traditional bureaucracies, leverage non-traditional talent strategies, and have consistent budgets. Budget Allocating funding seems obvious, but too often limited forethought is given to this issue. To ensure success, organizational funding must be significant, multi-year, and consistent or include inbuilt annual growth. A number of high-potential initiatives have either been announced with no dedicated funding or have had sizable funding gaps in subsequent years damaging their brand and relationships with defense companies and startups alike. The NIF in particular will likely rely on the willingness of Alliance members to make contributions beyond other NATO obligations. If so, multi-year commitments are crucial, as are success metrics, such as return on investment, which are rarely used within NATO or national government departments. Talent Finally, and most overlooked, is getting talent right. External talent is crucial. It is not enough to simply construct new organizations staffed in the traditional manner. To realize their full potential, NATO must attract talent with startup and/or venture capital (VC) experience, and pair them with top subject-matter experts from R&D communities, both government, and commercial. This cannot be done with NATO’s current Byzantine, long, drawn-out hiring process, which can last six months or even longer, and advantage insiders versus external candidates. As such the Alliance must engage and attract this talent. The good news is NATO has a number of potential examples to draw on for potential hiring pathways. In the U.S. the Defense Digital Service hires design and technical experts for one-to-two “tours of duty,” using their skillsets and operate outside the traditional civil service. In the UK, strategy and technology professionals are seconded into the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Trade, and intelligence organizations such as GCHQ, to provide experience or skills that may not exist within the current civil service workforce. But providing pathways alone is not enough: attracting this talent to apply and convincing them to join is just as important. This requires identifying areas where they might work, including industry, academia, and startups, and VC. At the same time, other steps are needed. Upskilling existing NATO civilians – among the international and international military staff (IS and IMS) — and Alliance service members are needed to address this skill and understanding gap. To do so, it is helpful to expose them to startup and VC environments. Programs like Shift’s Defense Ventures Program in the U.S. have succeeded in building understanding between the Department of Defense’s civilian and military workforce and startups and VCs. They’ve done so by bringing in high-performing defense personnel for eight-week immersions with growing venture-backed startups or VC firms. This cultivates the necessary connective tissue between startups, VCs, and the military. NATO could readily follow a similar process by providing its highest performers the opportunity to temporarily work alongside leading North American and European startups and investors. What’s Next? Accelerating the development, deployment, and integration of emerging and disruptive technologies into the strategic and tactical environments is at the core of future NATO operations. The Alliance’s move to build DIANA and NIF, along with incorporating the right language into strategic documents are significant first steps. But building these initiatives from scratch will require significant planning to establish the right authorities, budget, and talent environment to enable these organizations to thrive. In order to do so, they need to build outside of traditional NATO structures and models while creating a differentiated talent and organizational culture.
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IMPACTS › Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves › Impacts --- DIANA Now Solves
Christie ‘22
(E. H. Christie, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe,” European View 2022, Vol. 21(1) 13 –2 //um-ef)
Investment challenges go beyond issues of scale. The US also has greater experience in the setting up and operation of structures to promote both military and dual-use innovation. While the best-known institution is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, other US government structures are also relevant in discussions on fostering innovation in AI for military applications. A much-discussed example is In-Q-Tel, which was originally set up as the state venture-capital arm of the Central Intelligence Agency. To illustrate the influence of the In-Q-Tel example, one may note that both its current Chief Executive Officer, Chris Darby, and one of its former Chief Executive Officers, Gilman Louie, served among the 15 commissioners of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence.4 This was a temporarily created expert commission mandated 18 European View 21(1) by the US Congress to provide policy recommendations for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach for US AI policy.5 With In-Q-Tel, the idea is to learn from private-sector practices in the area of venturecapital investment and repurpose them for state needs and more patient time horizons. A supported company should pursue product development strategies aimed at serving both civilian markets and government needs. In this way, rather than effectively taking over a commercial company and limiting its growth potential to future government contracts alone, the government body encourages an intermediate trajectory made up of mixed revenue streams, in the hope that this will generate greater returns to scale and higher efficiency thanks to the disciplining effect of private-sector competition. Conversely, the advantage of this approach as compared to not intervening at all is that the commercial company will integrate current and likely future government needs into its product and business-development strategy, rather than ignoring them and finding itself, at a later date, unable to supply the government sector according to the latter’s requirements. A related issue which falls between what can be achieved with new investment instruments and new protections that can be assured through the screening of foreign direct investment is the provision of investment from trusted private investors to the technology sector. Certain technology companies that are not part of the traditional defence industry may be developing dual-use products that are of potential interest to the defence sector while having limited awareness of national security concerns. This may make them vulnerable targets for both licit and illicit attempts to acquire their technologies on the part of foreign state actors. At the same time, their business development needs may lead them to seek investment from any potential source, thus exposing them to potential risks. To respond to this challenge, the US Department of Defense has launched a scheme called the Trusted Capital Marketplace (US Department of Defense 2021a). Building on these considerations, the NATO Innovation Unit has developed two new instruments for Allied use which were announced to the public in October 2021 (NATO 2021a; 2021b). Both instruments aim to foster technological innovation with a deliberate focus on dual-use applications and on enterprises with mixed (potential) revenue streams. The first instrument is the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which is a NATO instrument, that is, it involves the participation of all 30 NATO Allies. The second instrument is the NATO Innovation Fund, which in NATO terminology is a ‘multinational’ instrument, namely one that Allies freely opt into. DIANA will aim to accelerate the adoption of dual-use technological solutions through several interlocking components.6 First, it will develop a network of national organisations, in particular test centres and innovation accelerators. Second, it will competitively select private-sector innovators and allow them to use national organisations in the network to interface with military end users and military capability-development specialists. Third, it is envisaged that DIANA will provide mentorship and education services for private innovators to familiarise them with the opportunities and responsibilities inherent to the defence and security sector. Fourth, DIANA will develop a database of trusted financial investors from Allied nations and support matchmaking between investors and innovators. Fifth and Christie 19 finally, DIANA will also provide expert advice on defence and security innovation to all relevant stakeholders, including private-sector and academic entities. Regarding the NATO Innovation Fund, 17 Allies had opted into the Fund as of the date of its announcement in October 2021. The participating Allies will inject up to €1 billion into Allied innovation ecosystems over the next 15 years. The Fund aims to attract additional private investments due to the de-risking effect, both financial and technological, thanks to state co-funding and diligence and screening efforts. The funds are intended to be used for long-term support of ‘deep tech’ innovative companies, that is, for advanced research into AI, quantum and related technologies that may have both military and civilian applications. Due diligence and security screening practices will aim to ensure that both private investors and fund recipients are trusted entities.
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IMPACTS › Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves › Impacts --- Solves Aff (DARPA)
By , and 21, Borchet directs Borchert Consulting and Research AG, a consulting boutique focusing on strategic affairs, John Rutherford Allen is a retired United States Marine Corps four-star general, and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces, Marcin Zaborowski is the Former Executive Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), 12/13/21, “Emerging technology, the geo-economic Achilles’ heel NATO needs to address,” Euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/emerging-technology-the-geo-economic-achilles-heel-nato-needs-to-address/
To ensure NATO’s relevance and to keep “our people safe”, the Alliance “must continue to strengthen and modernize our deterrence and defence,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said at the Riga Summit on 30 November 2021. Innovation plays a critical role in modernizing armed forces amid a complex strategic environment.
To this purpose, Stoltenberg unveiled the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) on 22 October 2021. DIANA shall bring defence and commercial companies together with military users to develop novel solutions that meet the needs of the future battlefield. He also launched the NATO Innovation Fund to invest up to €1bn to support innovators developing emerging technologies.
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IMPACTS › Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves › Impacts --- Solves Aff (DARPA)
and 22, Goda holds a bachelor’s degree in communication from the University of Nottingham and a master’s degree in data journalism from Cardiff University, Fintan have a BSc in Biotechnology and an MSc in Science Communication, both from Dublin City University, 4/12/22, “NATO to launch €1B fund for high tech start-ups in dual use technologies,” Science Business, , JH
NATO has launched a new research programme called DIANA to bring industry, start-up companies and academia together to research new dual-use technologies that address both societal problems and national security issues.
The Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is focusing on technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, autonomy, biotechnology, novel materials and space.
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IMPACTS › Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves › Impacts --- Solves Aff (DARPA)
Machi ‘21
(Vivienne Machi is a reporter based in Stuttgart, Germany, contributing to Defense News' European coverage. She previously reported for National Defense Magazine, Defense Daily, Via Satellite, Foreign Policy and the Dayton Daily News. She was named the Defence Media Awards' best young defense journalist in 2020, “NATO hopes to launch new defense tech accelerator by 2023,” pg online @ https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/06/22/nato-hopes-to-launch-new-defense-tech-accelerator-by-2023/ //um-ef)
STUTTGART, Germany — In less than two years, NATO hopes to have its own, modified version of the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) up and running. Alliance members agreed at the 31st annual summit, held June 14 in Brussels, to launch a new initiative dubbed the Defence Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic, or DIANA, meant to speed up trans-Atlantic cooperation on critical technologies, and help NATO work more closely with private-sector entities, academia and other non-governmental entities. The goal is to have DIANA reach initial operating capability (IOC) by 2023, David van Weel, assistant secretary-general for emerging security challenges, said at a Tuesday virtual roundtable with reporters. By next year, the hope is to have “the initial parts … starting to come up into fruition,” he added. In the long term, DIANA will have headquarters both in North America and in Europe, and link to existing test centers throughout NATO member countries that will be used for “validating, testing, and co-designing applications in the field of emerging and disruptive technologies,” van Weel said. DIANA will also be responsible for building and managing a network meant to help relevant startups grow and support NATO’s technology needs via grant programs. The focus will be on national security and defense purposes, and DIANA will not ask for or solicit companies’ intellectual property, van Weel noted. While he singled out artificial intelligence, big-data processing, and quantum-enabled technologies, DIANA is meant to support all seven of the key emerging and disruptive technologies — or EDTs — that NATO has identified as critical for the future. The other four include: autonomy, biotechnology, hypersonics and space. Sometimes a technology company may not realize that their product could be viable for the defense community, he added. One key component of DIANA will be a trusted capital marketplace, where smaller companies can connect with pre-qualified investors who are interested in supporting NATO’s technology efforts. Ensuring that investors are vetted ahead of time will allow NATO to ensure “that the technology will be protected from illicit transfers,” van Weel said. The fund is modeled after a The U.S. Defense Department set up its own trusted capital marketplace in 2019 as a tool that then-DoD acquisition czar Ellen Lord said could help encourage domestically based venture capitalists to fund national security and defense projects. That marketplace served as inspiration for the announced NATO trusted capital marketplace, per the alliance. Members also agreed for the first time to build up a venture capital fund to support companies developing dual-use and key technologies that could be useful to NATO, and which will be optional for member-nations to participate in. The NATO Innovation Fund, as it’s called, would have a running time of about 15 years to start, and would be underwritten by about 70 million euro (about $83 million) per year, per van Weel. The goal is not for NATO headquarters or for its member-nations to run the innovation fund, he noted. “The actual running of a venture capital fund, we believe, should be done by companies that have a broad range of experience in the field.” He cited the U.S.-based capital venture firm In-Q-Tel as an example of the type of partner NATO would seek to run the “day-to-day” business of the fund. “I read somewhere that NATO is not a bank—we’re not,” van Weel said. “But it will be the nations providing the funds, and giving the general direction.” These two initiatives of a technology accelerator and innovation fund are “hopefully going to … bring the alliance forward into the 21st century,” van Weel said. NATO has previously invested in information technology (IT) and software through the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), but the difference with the innovation fund, and DIANA, is that the alliance wants to better connect with early-stage startups, rather than larger software companies or traditional defense firms, van Weel said. “DIANA is not about taking over innovation for the NATO enterprise,” he said. “It’s a different community, and requires different funding mechanisms and different types of engagement.” These two initiatives have been long awaited and demanded by NATO observers, and versions of both a “DARPA-like” technology accelerator and an alliance-wide investment bank were included in a 2020 list of recommendations by NATO’s advisory group on emerging and disruptive technologies. But it is still early days. While the IOC goal is 2023, “step one is we want to know from allies what they want to offer to DIANA,” van Weel said. Once the NATO Innovation Fund has its participating members, for example, a charter will be set up that will lay out the funding models, rapid contracting processes, and leadership guidelines. “We are trying to do this as fast as we can,” van Weel assured, but then noted, “we do want to get it right, because … with the startup community, you only get one chance.”