2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: Undersea Cables › 1NC/2AC
Isberto 2020 - Michael, "Why Internet Satellites Will Replace Subsea Cable Technology," Mar 4, https://www.colocationamerica.com/blog/internet-satellites-will-rebuild-the-internet
There are some obvious disadvantages to this old system of submarine cables. The underwater cable installation is very slow, tedious, and expensive. Underwater creatures including sharks have been seen chewing on the cables. Underwater cables have vulnerabilities including boat anchors, natural disasters, etc. Underwater cables are also not easy to repair if repairs are needed. Some of these cables are 6,500 feet underwater making it difficult to reach. Lastly, underwater cables have a life expectancy of 25 years, and then they will need to be replaced. All of these disadvantages are pushing companies like SpaceX to rebuild the internet.
Rebuilding the Internet in Space
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: Undersea Cables › 1NC/2AC
Matsakis 2018 - Louise, "What Would Really Happen If Russia Attacked Undersea Internet Cables," Jan 5, https://www.wired.com/story/russia-undersea-internet-cables/
Because faults happen so frequently, cable repair ships patrol nearly all of the world’s waters. Even if Russia did start snipping, there are crews equipped to rapidly repair them. Besides, Russia’s epic hypothetical cable attack would primarily harm its own people, as another Telegeography analyst pointed out in a video. “It would hurt the Russians perhaps even more than it would hurt [Americans]. They’re far more dependent on international networks than we are, because so much of our content is stored locally” says senior analyst Jonathan Hjembo.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: Undersea Cables › 1NC/2AC
Hinck 2018 - PhD Student @ Columbia Garrett, "Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables," Mar 15, https://www.lawfareblog.com/evaluating-russian-threat-undersea-cables
Hundreds of cables criss-cross the oceans. They provide the connectivity that allows Microsoft to keep major data centers in Ireland and to have that data nearly instantly accessible to U.S. customers. Although each undersea cable transmits huge quantities of data, the cable network has significant redundancy capacity. Rupturing one cable can cause temporary disruptions but does not cut off service. When a major cable to Vietnam failed last year, customers in Ho Chi Minh City briefly lost connectivity. Because internet routing protocols direct data around points of failure, traffic flows adjust to the lost connection and send data over other cables to the same endpoint. Wayward anchors and storms regularly cause cable faults, about 200 a year; repair ships are readily available to mend broken lines. Cutting the United States off from the rest of the world would require severing a large number of cables: at least 18 in the North Atlantic alone, according to Telegeography’s cable map, and many more connecting the U.S. to Latin America and Asia.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: OCOs › AT: EMPs
Gault 19 – The National Interest is an extremely un-biased and factual news source funded by an established think tank (Matthew Gault, 11-10-2019, "The World Won't End: The Danger of an EMP Attack Is More Fantasy Than Fact," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/world-wont-end-danger-emp-attack-more-fantasy-fact-94681)//KH
Key point: A nuclear war is scarier and besides it isn't so easy to generate a really large EMP burst.
Few weapons are as scary as those that exist only in our minds.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: OCOs › AT: Russia Attacks
Wolff 22 JOSEPHINE WOLFF (Wolff is associate professor of cybersecurity policy at The Fletcher School at Tufts University), 3-2-2022, "Why Russia Hasn't Launched Major Cyber Attacks Since the Invasion of Ukraine," Time, https://time.com/6153902/russia-major-cyber-attacks-invasion-ukraine/
But as the invasion continues with few signs of any sophisticated cyber conflict, it seems less and less likely that Russia has significant cyber capabilities in reserve, ready to deploy if needed. Instead, it begins to look like Russia’s much vaunted cyber capabilities have been neglected in recent years, in favor of developing less expensive, less effective cyber weapons that cause less widespread damage and are considerably easier to contain and defend against. For instance, many of the cyberattacks directed at Ukraine in the past month have been relatively basic distributed denial-of-service attacks, in which hackers bombard Ukrainian government websites and servers with so much online traffic that those servers cannot respond to legitimate users and are forced offline for some period of time. Denial-of-service attacks can be effective for short-term disruptions but they’re hardly a new or impressive cyber capability—in fact, they’re what Russia used to target Estonia more than a decade ago in 2007. Moreover, launching these types of attacks requires no sophisticated technical capabilities or discovery of new vulnerabilities, and they typically have fairly contained impacts on the specific, targeted computers. Similarly, recent reports that Belarusian hackers are trying to phish European officials using compromised accounts belonging to Ukrainian armed services members suggests that not only are these efforts relying on fairly basic tactics like phishing emails, they are not even being carried out by Russian military hackers directly.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: OCOs › AT: Aldanova 22
1AC Aldanova 22 - Master’s Candidate at Georgetown University’s Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies Program (Dina, May 30, 2022, National Interest, “Will Russia Launch a New Cyber Attack on America?,” )recut//KH
Policy circles in Washington are now debating how Vladimir Putin might respond to a major contraction of the Russian economy and clear signs that Moscow is losing the war in Ukraine. Some posit that a cornered president, furious and facing a near defeat, might indeed respond brutally—moving the proxy confrontation of a new Cold War front to a cyber battlefield, where Russia has a greater advantage, and launching a massive cyberattack against the United States. However, several key factors call this thesis into question.
Similar to Iran and North Korea, Russia is known to be responsible for some of the most aggressive, large-scale cyberattacks. However, these cyber tactics have played a rather peripheral role, either in supporting conventional warfare or through disinformation campaigns that serve to spread chaos and panic among targeted societies. For the first time, a known state-backed attack occurred in 2007 and lasted for twenty-two days when the Russian military intelligence unit, the GRU, targeted Estonian commercial, government, and Domain Name System (DNS) servers, and online banking systems. The attacks fell under the Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) categories that include methods such as ping flooding, spam distribution, botnets, and phishing emails. In 2008, as a part of hybrid warfare amid the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia defaced Georgian state websites. In 2015, following the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of eastern Ukraine, a GRU proxy group named Sandworm attacked the Ukrainian power grid and deprived more than 200,000 people of electricity for six hours. In 2017, the NotPetya malware attack directed at Ukraine had an unprecedented impact hitting major Western companies in Europe and the United States such as Mondelez International and Maersk, and even striking back at Russian oil company Rosneft. It paralyzed thousands of networks. The global cost the malware had provoked reached $10 billion—encapsulating the most consequential cyber attack in history. In addition, just a month ago, Russia unsuccessfully attempted to attack the Ukrainian power grid with advanced malware classified as a wiper. Overseas, a Russian group of hackers called FancyBear meddled with the United States 2015 presidential campaigns and 2016 federal elections at the county level. To this point, while the Russian cyber tactics are common and multifarious, they represent a secondary function in hybrid warfare that Moscow conducts along with disinformation campaigns and conventional military operations.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: OCOs › AT: Nadesan 14
Van Zandt 20 – D. Van Zandt, 10-31-2020, "The Millennium Report," Media Bias/Fact Check, https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/the-millennium-report/KK
Reasoning: Extreme Right, Propaganda, Conspiracy, Fake News, Lack of Transparency Country: USA World Press Freedom Rank: USA 45/180 History Founded in 2014 and according to their about page “The Millennium Report provides the most important news during these times of meteoric change and pervasive upheaval.” The website does not provide information about who owns the site. The domain is registered in the USA. Funded by / Ownership The Millennium Report does not disclose ownership. There does not appear to be a source of revenue for this website. Analysis / Bias In review, The Millennium Report is an extreme right biased website that promotes pro-Russia and pro-Assad propaganda. Throughout the website, there is significant anti-Clinton rhetoric with the term “Lock Her Up” used frequently. There is significant use of loaded words in headlines and articles such as this: “Here’s the proven Deep State conspiracy that will hang ’em all!” The primary source of information for this website is State of the Nation 2012, which is another extreme-right conspiracy site that occasionally publishes fake news. Mostly the Millennium Report is a tin foil hat conspiracy website with themes running from Pizzagate, the New World Order to the Deep State conspiracy. They have also failed fact checks. Did the U.S. government finally admit to conducting chemical geoengineering using chemtrail operations? – FALSE Was the Virginia Beach mass shooting a “false flag” attached ordered by the “Deep State” to distract attention away from the investigation of “SPYgate”? – FALSE Overall, we rate The Millennium Report Questionable based on extreme right bias and promotion of propaganda and conspiracy theories.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: Cyber Impacts › Ext – @Cybersquirrel1
@CyberSquirrel1 2016 – tracks grid outages and responds to outlandish claims
"The Threat to America’s Electrical Grid Is Much Bigger Than You Can Possibly Imagine," Jul 31, foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/31/the-threat-to-americas-electrical-grid-is-much-bigger-than-you-can-possibly-imagine-cyberwar-squirrels-rodents-hackers/amp/
We are everywhere, and yet almost impossible to find. There are other events that have impacted critical infrastructure: a water pump failure in Illinois, power outages in Brazil, a pipeline explosion in Turkey, a cyberattack on a dam in New York; even a blast furnace in a German steel plant was supposedly put into an uncontrolled shutdown from a cyberattack. In each case, the initial cause for the failure was blamed on cyberattacks — but in each case, once the evidence was actually examined, hackers were nowhere to be found. Still, that lack of evidence hasn’t stopped the cyberwar hawks from pointing to these analog events as examples of the coming digital doom. When that doesn’t work, the threatmongers and profiteers point to previous widespread blackouts, known as “black swan” events because of their rarity, such as the Northeast blackout of 2003 or the Southwest blackout of 2011. In both cases, a string of unlikely events occurred, including human error, before the lights went out. In both cases, most of the power was restored in just a few hours. There were no riots, no financial meltdowns, and democracy continued unabated. Then there’s what we affectionately call the “nine substation problem.” After a bunch of armed assailants opened fire on a substation outside of Metcalf, California, in 2013, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) conducted a study of the national power grid and found that if just nine substations were attacked in a similar manner as the one in Metcalf, the entire United States would be without power for over 18 months. Are you freaked out yet? Good. But the problem is: This scenario is extremely unlikely. First, that FERC study only looked at physical damage to the transformers, which are usually custom-built for each location, and are only manufactured by a few companies — meaning a substation could take months to replace. Second, the study only looked at physical damage, which in the event of a cyberattack is extremely unlikely. But still, the prophets of doom ask, what if hackers had guns? Didn’t you see Skyfall?! No, we didn’t. We’re squirrels. Look, even for our billion-strong army of small rodents — in the United States alone — the “attack surface” for the U.S. electric grid is absolutely huge. There are over 7,000 power plants in the United States run by over 3,000 companies. There are over 55,000 substations and over 450,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines. We squirrels have a hard enough time trying to take out small sections of it, let alone nine substations at once. Anyone attempting to conduct a major coordinated effort to turn out power over a large region for a long period of time is going to find it a rather difficult task. Not that we’re not trying. As of July of this year we squirrels (and our fellow animal operatives) have conducted over 1,400 unclassified operations that have resulted in aggregate of more than 67 days without power, affecting over 3.6 million people. That works out to the entire population of the state of Connecticut losing electricity for more than two months. And remember: Our unclassified ops are just a fraction of the total. On average, we cause dozens of outages every day impacting about 5,000 people each for around two hours. Compare that with the number of outages caused by cyberattack, which in the United States is exactly zero. And yet we get no respect. We’ve hit the NASDAQ stock exchange twice, as well as the Large Hadron Collider in Geneva. We’ve hit 64 schools, 30 universities, 13 hospitals, six government buildings, four airports, and even two military bases. And yes, our unclassified operations have caused seven confirmed deaths. Despite that carnage, your policy officials still just worry about massive cyberattacks directed by Beijing and Moscow. (Oh, don’t worry: We’ve got agents there too.) Look, cyberwar in one form or another has been prophesied for over 35 years. But if things got so bad China and Russia were to intentionally cause a widespread, long-term power outage, you’ve got to believe the United States — and the world — would have much greater things to worry about at that point. The ICBMs would already be flying. Minor threat actors such as North Korea, hacktivists, or the Islamic State lack the time, money, and coordination to pull off a black swan event. Not that they lack the skill, mind you. Let’s face it: The cybersecurity of the U.S. electrical grid is absolutely pitiful. It wouldn’t take a team of geniuses to cut off the power to any large city. However, simply causing an electricity outage and keeping the power offline are two different things. In Ukraine, for example, linemen drove out to each substation and switched them back to manual control; power was back on in just a few hours. Yes, there is a risk to the electric grid from a cyberattack, but that threat is nowhere near the levels of fear, uncertainty, and doubt being peddled by policymakers, threat reduction firms, and cyberwar hawks. If you really want to stop the ongoing, constant attacks on the U.S. electrical grid, there’s an easy way: call Orkin. Until then, we are anonymous, we are legion, we are your unfriendly neighborhood squirrels.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: Cyber Impacts › AT: Cyber Impacts
Mueller '22 - Political Scientist at the Ohio State University [John, 3/22/2022, "The Cyber-Delusion Digital Threats Are Manageable, Not Existential, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-03-22/cyber-delusion]
When Russian forces launched their invasion of Ukraine last month, governments and experts worldwide warned about the danger of catastrophic cyberattacks. Indeed, in the days leading up to Moscow’s invasion, hackers defaced Ukrainian websites, unleashed malware on government systems, and targeted the country’s banking system—albeit with limited effect. Although no cyber-Armageddon has materialized, officials increasingly fear that Russia might eventually step up its efforts and even target the United States.
Russia’s invasion is no doubt catastrophic. But in reacting to it and preparing for what comes next, leaders in Washington and elsewhere should eschew the alarmism that has long warped cybersecurity policy. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claimed in 2011 that “the single biggest existential threat out there, I think, is cyber.” The following year, his successor, Martin Dempsey, noted that “a cyberattack could stop our society in its tracks.” Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta sternly warned in 2012 of an impending “digital Pearl Harbor.” Nicole Perlroth, a cybersecurity reporter at The New York Times, has routinely asked insiders when “a cyber-enabled cataclysmic boom will take us down” and has always been told “18 to 24 months.” She began her survey well over 100 months ago.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 1AR---No Link
Anderson and Dalton 19 [Dr. James Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities. Prior to his current appointment in the Department of Defense, Dr. Anderson served for three years as the vice president for academic affairs at the Marine Corps University. His previous positions include dean of Academics and deputy director at the Marine Corps War College, director of the program in Advanced Security Studies at the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, and director of Middle East policy in the International Security Affairs Office of the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Anderson earned his doctorate in international relations and master of arts in law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts University; Melissa Dalton, the Cooperative Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; "Shifting the Burden Responsibly: Oversight and Accountability in U.S. Security Sector Assistance"; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); Published: 4-25-2019; Accessed: 6-25-2022; https://www.csis.org/analysis/shifting-burden-responsibly-oversight-and-accountability-us-security-sector-assistance-0; KL]
Security cooperation is often behind the news we read at night but rarely the frontline story. Luckily we’re also blessed with another influential group that cares deeply about security cooperation – the Congress. In FY ’17 Congress undertook the largest, most sweeping, and most substantial reforms to security cooperation in our nation’s history. The FY ’17 NDAA consolidated dozens of authorities into a narrow band of activities in Chapter 16. It set up requirements for human rights vetting, institutional capacity building, and assessment monitoring and evaluation.
With lots of work in the trenches by both DOD and Congress, this all hit at once, and it was welcome. Implementing an ambitious vision remains a challenge, particularly for those activities that were funded out of service accounts or regional initiatives. Many security cooperation activities were not being looked at holistically across the spectrum. Programs were siloed and oversight sometimes limited.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 1AR---No Link
Bushley 17 [U.S. Army Capt. Adam Bushley, Rule of Law attorney for Task Force Wolverine, 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team; "Governance: The Missing Ingredient in Security Cooperation"; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Published: 2017; Accessed: 6-18-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1038564.pdf; KL]
DOS has long had oversight over SC/SA programs in order to define, synchronize, and deconflict U.S. strategic objectives. This is because Congress has consistently authorized, expected, and in many cases, mandated DOS to provide this oversight role.
There is an overlap between DOS and DOD when it comes to arms trades, training, and military alliances. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates helped popularize the term “shared responsibility” regarding SC/SA as it refers to the joint responsibility between DOD and DOS in supporting U.S. foreign SC/SA programs, relationships overseas, and national security interests.89 According to ADP 1, the DOD’s role is to deter enemies, counter threats, and fight and win the nation’s wars. The DOS is responsible for foreign policy and U.S. diplomatic relations. DOS’s role in the shared responsibility of SC/SA programs is to calculate and measure associated trade-offs between short-term limited scope program objectives and long-term national interests. Some have described DOS as having veto power over some DOD developed plans, even when they are DOD directed authorities. 90
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 1AR---Ukraine Thumper
Brian 5/13 [Danielle Brian is the executive director of the Project On Government Oversight, a nonprofit watchdog that investigates and exposes waste, corruption and abuse of power. https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/3487430-theres-no-oversight-of-billions-in-ukraine-aid-we-need-an-inspector-general/]//LP
As the Senate works to pass the almost $40 billion in emergency supplemental funds for Ukraine just passed by the House, leaders in Washington must also ensure proper oversight of this spending. They can and must do both quickly. The Biden administration and Senate must also prioritize installing permanent inspectors general to government agencies so they can monitor aid to Ukraine. These independent watchdogs can ensure that taxpayer money is not siphoned off by fraudsters or war profiteers and that weapons remain in the hands of the Ukrainian military. The simplest route would be to install permanent inspectors general at existing offices tasked with doling out the aid and ensure those offices have the resources they need to oversee surge funding like this. The Pentagon and State Department, the two agencies overseeing the bulk of spending for Ukraine assistance, are both missing permanent internal watchdogs — and the Pentagon has been missing one for over six years The need for effective inspectors general is already apparent given the level and nature of U.S. assistance committed to Ukraine. The speed at which the U.S. has transferred this defense material to the country presents real oversight challenges in terms of both spending and monitoring its use. Oversight and monitoring of arms transfers are generally difficult in the first place, but without U.S. personnel on the ground in Ukraine, something we do not advocate for, it’s even more challenging to monitor whether U.S. arms are staying in the hands of the Ukrainian military. The State and Defense Departments desperately need internal watchdogs to prevent, detect and investigate abuse of funds as well as ineffective or insufficient tracking of weapons by the agencies’ respective monitoring programs.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 1AR---Ukraine Thumper
Harrigan 6/16 [https://reason.com/2022/06/16/the-u-s-is-spending-130-million-a-day-on-military-aid-for-ukraine-without-meaningful-congressional-oversight/]//LP
Yesterday the Biden administration announced that it would send an additional $1 billion in military aid to Ukraine as the country continues to combat invading Russian forces. The new aid package comes on the heels of The Wall Street Journal reporting earlier this week that the U.S. is now "sending roughly $130 million a day in military aid to Ukraine plus economic and other assistance." American financial support for Ukraine has largely been uncontroversial in Congress. Lawmakers approved a $40 billion aid package in May, adding billions of dollars to the money President Joe Biden originally requested. "The leaders of both parties raised few questions about how much money was being spent or what it would be used for," wrote The New York Times. Just 11 senators voted against the bill's passage as it breezed through Congress. One of them, Sen. Rand Paul (R–Ky.), drew criticism from both parties for delaying Senate approval of the $40 billion package after expressing concern that Congress was "trying yet again to ram through a spending bill" and had failed to outline oversight mechanisms. Paul unsuccessfully sought to add language to the bill appointing an inspector general to supervise the spending. Meanwhile, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R–Ky.) emphasized the need to get help to Ukraine "right now," and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D–N.Y.) charged that Paul "doesn't want to aid Ukraine." Unfortunately, those arguments are helping lawmakers avoid important debates about the amount and nature of aid the U.S. is sending to Ukraine, as well as the potential for future misuse as billions of fast-passed dollars flood into a war zone without proper oversight. American politicians have chosen a risky course of action and are neglecting to realistically discuss the U.S. role in this conflict. American officials told The Wall Street Journal that they have "little direct knowledge" of where equipment goes once it reaches the Ukrainian government. One military aid component of the May package, totaling $6 billion, is a transfer account that Congress doesn't have strong control over. "The statutory language requires that [the Department of Defense] report to Congress 15 days before any transfers occur," explains the Center for Strategic International Studies. "Congress could block such transfers, but that is difficult to do politically and procedurally." Oversight experts warn that issues surrounding transfers are inevitable. "Even if it's a noble cause, there's going to be theft. There's going to be misconduct," warned Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John Sopko, whose office has uncovered rampant misuse of U.S. funds that took place during nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. "If there's one thing we learned from Afghanistan, you've got to have oversight in the beginning." Many components of the May package and other aid installments deserve more scrutiny from lawmakers than they have received. Not-insignificant chunks of money are going toward countering "Russian disinformation and propaganda narratives," bolstering the Department of Justice's "efforts to pursue high value asset seizures from sanctioned individuals," paying the salaries of Ukrainian government officials, and prepping munitions for military skirmishes that aren't related to the conflict in Ukraine. In rushing the passage of aid, Congress has neglected to debate whether these are appropriate spending priorities for the U.S.—especially, as Paul notes, when the American economy is already in such bad shape. And there's a deeper, more conflict-relevant concern at hand. The end goals for U.S. assistance are still murky, even as American politicians repeat their opposition to Russian aggression and support for Ukraine regaining its territory and sovereignty. Rajan Menon, director of the Grand Strategy program at Defense Priorities and a professor at the City College of New York, argues that the U.S. must determine what its precise aims are in order to shape responsible policy. Without establishing clear objectives, politicians can shift the goal posts and more easily justify staying involved. Menon asks, for instance, whether the eventual goal is to restore Ukrainian borders to their pre-2022 state or if it's to reclaim Crimea. "The latter is…ambitious, it's far more dangerous, and it will make the war even longer than [it] otherwise will be," Menon explains. "To say…this is all up to Ukraine to decide is to overlook the fact that we are its principal arms supplier and therefore are deeply implicated in this war. Kyiv is certainly entitled to make its choices but that doesn't release us from the obligation to make our one." In eschewing proper debate over military aid to Ukraine, American lawmakers are opting out of an uncomfortable—but necessary—conversation. "If we ramp up arms supplies to Ukraine, which is already urgently calling for more, we should take into account that Russia may at some point treat us as a co-belligerent," Menon points out. "Simply assuming that that would be a bridge too far for them would be a mistake." U.S. politicians need to discuss the line not to be crossed before America is effectively acting as a co-combatant rather than allowing Russia to make that determination itself. Providing military aid to Ukraine strikes many Americans as the right move. It might seem like the best available option, given that alternatives include putting American boots on the ground or securing a no-fly zone over Ukrainian airspace—both of which would prove disastrous. But those impulses don't relieve U.S. lawmakers of their responsibility to ensure aid is being directed toward appropriate uses and being used properly. To willingly avoid those discussions all but ensures that the war in Ukraine will be another conflict involving fiscal irresponsibility on America's part.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 1AR---Uniqueness
Bies 19 [John E. Bies is Chief Counsel at American Oversight, a non-profit focused on government accountability. He served for eight years in the Obama administration at the Department of Justice, first as Counselor to Attorney General Eric Holder and then spending seven years as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel where he advised White House and executive branch officials on FOIA, Congressional oversight, executive privilege, ethics, separation of powers, and other constitutional, statutory, and administrative law issues. https://www.lawfareblog.com/constitutional-hardball-and-congresss-oversight-authority]//LP
At least since Watergate, if not for longer, the executive branch has recognized the important role congressional oversight plays in the constitutional system and has understood itself to have a constitutional obligation to accommodate legitimate oversight requests from Congress. This long-standing executive branch perspective is embodied in a 1982 memorandum to all agency heads regarding how to respond to congressional requests, often referred to as the Reagan memo. This memorandum, which remains in force, explicitly states that it is executive branch policy “to comply with congressional requests for information to the fullest extent consistent with the constitutional and statutory obligations of the Executive Branch.” While the Reagan memo recognizes there may be times when it is necessary to withhold information to protect important executive branch confidentiality interests, it emphasizes the expectation that such impasses should be rare and limited to “compelling circumstances.” Instead, the Reagan memo underscores the importance of engaging in a good faith negotiation to accommodate the interests of both branches: “Historically, good faith negotiations between Congress and the Executive Branch have minimized the need for invoking executive privilege, and this tradition of accommodation should continue as the primary means of resolving conflicts between the Branches.” This process of good faith negotiation has become known as the accommodation process. To be sure, in nearly every administration since the Reagan memo, there have been a handful of contentious issues where a dispute between Congress and the executive branch regarding access to executive branch information reached a high-profile impasse. These instances of interbranch conflict have been controversial matters that garnered significant media coverage and public interest. But the salience of these occasional instances of conflict should not obscure the extent to which the branches have been able to resolve the vast majority of disputes through good faith engagement in the accommodation process. Every year Congress issues hundreds if not thousands of oversight requests to the White House and executive branch agencies. Yet the number of disputes that reach the level of public consciousness in a presidential term can usually be counted on one hand. This is because in most oversight matters, the branches reach a reasonable accommodation, which often includes some disclosure of agency information arguably subject to a potential executive privilege claim, and thus avoid impasse and escalation. This approach to accommodation is not driven just by policy but also by recognition of a constitutional obligation to seek such reasonable accommodations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has explained this constitutional mandate in a manner worth quoting at length in light of present circumstances: The framers ... expect[ed] that where conflicts in scope of authority arose between the coordinate branches, a spirit of dynamic compromise would promote the resolution of the dispute in the manner most likely to result in efficient and effective functioning of our governmental system. Under this view, the coordinate branches do not exist in an exclusively adversarial relationship to one another when a conflict in authority arises. Rather, each branch should take cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact situation. * * * [Because] it was a deliberate feature of the constitutional scheme to leave the allocation of powers unclear in certain situations, the resolution of conflict between the coordinate branches in these situations must be regarded as an opportunity for a constructive modus vivendi, which positively promotes the functioning of our system. The Constitution contemplates such accommodation. Negotiation between the two branches should thus be viewed as a dynamic process affirmatively furthering the constitutional scheme. In 1981, Reagan’s attorney general described the essence of this process: “The accommodation required is not simply an exchange of concessions or a test of political strength. It is an obligation of each branch to make a principled effort to acknowledge, and if possible to meet, the legitimate needs of the other branch.” There are important ramifications of recognizing a constitutionally based obligation to engage in a serious and good faith effort to reach a reasonable accommodation when there is a disagreement between the branches. Every executive branch official swears an oath to uphold the Constitution upon taking office, and this commitment should be understood to include the constitutional mandate to engage in good faith to seek reasonable accommodations.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 1AR---Uniqueness
Foster 20 [Jason Foster served as counsel to four congressional committees in the U.S. House and Senate, where he directed fact-finding inquiries to inform their oversight and legislative functions. He draws on his decades of experience navigating a broad array of high-profile disputes to help clients develop strategic research and intelligence useful in tackling legal, regulatory, and public affairs challenges. https://thefederalist.com/2020/08/15/congressional-oversight-is-broken-heres-how-to-fix-it/]//LP
The interview was a rough listen: two political allies frustrated with each other and with the reality that accountability in Washington, D.C., is hard. Hugh Hewitt seemed to think that a subpoena from Chairman Ron Johnson’s committee to James Comey would force the former FBI Director to confess his role in an attempted coup on President Donald Trump—if Johnson only had the guts to issue it. Johnson seemed to think that he was powerless to force more transparency on the issues that concern Hewitt and his conservative radio audience. Both are mistaken. Similar conversations are often heard on the other side of the political spectrum too, as the base of each party demands that the subject of the latest outrage be “hauled” up to Capitol Hill and “grilled” under the TV lights. Except that almost never works. From Ollie North 33 years ago to Bill Barr three weeks ago, it hardly ever goes well for the committee or satisfies the base voters hungry for red meat. Sally Yates versus Lindsey Graham is another recent example. This model of congressional hearing—confronting a lone hostile witness—has an awful track record. It should be obvious why. Who’s going to do most of the talking? The witness chews up most of the clock arguing with the premise of hostile questions from one side of the aisle and fielding soft balls from allies on the other. By contrast, in a well-designed hearing, a majority of the witnesses testify to facts that the majority of the committee wants to highlight. At its best, a congressional hearing tells a story with friendly witnesses. Victims and whistleblowers should outnumber villains. And a credible, neutral figure, like an inspector general or subject matter expert, can refute any disingenuous political spin. But even a well-designed hearing is a bad way to gather facts. That’s not its purpose. The hearing comes after doing the hard work behind the scenes. That means first scouring reams of documents and questioning key witnesses with trained, professional interrogators who don’t need to play to the cameras for sound bites. It’s not sexy, but it’s effective. Unfortunately, too many judge the success of oversight by the amount of press coverage rather than the facts uncovered. The media and Members alike prefer the dopamine of the confrontation over data. These one-witness show trials, where politicians grandstand and berate a single “target” witness simply don’t work, no matter how much people might want them for the entertainment value or how much a chairman might fancy himself as Perry Mason. If Senator Johnson could subpoena James Comey to appear on Hugh Hewitt’s radio program, it would be quite a show even though we probably wouldn’t learn much. Comey has already testified multiple times on Trump-Russia issues. Of course, Hugh Hewitt doesn’t have to yield half of his time to adversaries like Kamala Harris on the other side. Senator Johnson does. Outside critics like Hewitt are right to be frustrated with how ineffective congressional oversight has become. However, they need to understand the process, study the procedural limitations that committee chairmen face, and work constructively to support reforms that could make a real difference. Sometimes the problem is lack of guts, but more often, it’s a lack of experience, procedural tools, and the expertise to use them. A subpoena is not a magic bullet. In the modern era, Congress has essentially forgotten how to enforce them. It abandoned the historical practice of using its inherent constitutional authority to impose consequences directly on witnesses who are in contempt. Now, it turns to the Executive or Judicial Branches for help rather than standing up for itself and the people it’s elected to represent. Reclaiming the Legislative Branch’s proper role as the First Branch of government would mean re-learning the full scope of its own authorities and summoning the political will to use them. It would mean allocating resources to recruit and retain more senior, more experienced staff—or failing that, contracting with top-notch outside professionals to help do battle with the legal talent arrayed against it. The most effective practitioners of legislative oversight have been long-serving, career legislators—like John Dingell and my former boss, Chuck Grassley—who stay close to their constituents back home while devoting significant time and staff resources to the job of acting as a check and balance on the Executive Branch. Too few aspire to be like Dingell and Grassley. Too many Members and staff see their time on Capitol Hill as just a stepping stone to something bigger and better, and it shows. Rather than just cursing the problem, critics could help by focusing on solutions. There are organizations working to strengthen the Legislative Branch to serve the people it represents more effectively. If you are concerned about countering the permanent, unelected bureaucracy in Washington, then you should join them in working for a stronger, more competent Congress.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Oversight Fails---Polarization
Devins 09 [Neal Devins is a Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and Mary. “Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today's Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop” Willamette Law Review 45 https://heinonline-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?collection=usjournals&handle=hein.journals/willr45&id=402&men_tab=srchresults]//LP
Finally and, for my purposes, most significant, party polarization contributes to the rise of presidential unilateralism. When the Congress is polarized, members of the President's party are not likely to break ranks and vote to limit presidential initiatives. When government is unified, this means that no bill will get through Congress to limit presidential initiatives. When Congress is divided, members of the President's party will resist any opposition party efforts to repudiate the President. More than that, since divided government is increasingly common (thirty of the past forty years), it is also increasingly difficult for Congress to enact significant legislation. As such, Presidents have even more incentive to act unilaterally-since they cannot get Congress to enact their legislative agenda Consider, for example, Bill Clinton's health care reforms and George W. Bush's faith-based initiatives. In both instances, the President went to Congress seeking legislative authorization for his policy agenda. In both cases, Congress did not bite, leaving it to the President either to abandon his policy initiative or pursue his initiative through unilateral action. Clinton did so by issuing several directives that, among other things, "established a patient's bill of rights for federal employees . . . and set penalties for companies that deny health coverage to the poor and people with pre-existing medical conditions."51 Bush likewise acted unilaterally, establishing the White House Office of Faith Based Initiatives and ordering an audit of government agencies to make sure that their practices did not improperly discourage or forbid faith-based organizations.5 2 Political polarization, moreover, encourages Presidents to act unilaterally and take greater control of the administrative state. Specifically, with political polarization and divided government shifting the locus of government policymaking away from lawmaking and towards executive and administrative action, Presidents (beginning with Ronald Reagan) have used the Office of Management and Budget to review agency policymaking.53 Likewise, in an effort to ensure that agency policymaking conforms to the President's policy agenda, Presidents (again beginning with Ronald Reagan) have made use of signing statements and pre-regulatory directives.54 Finally, Presidents have used their appointments power to ensure agency loyalty to the President's agenda.55 More than any President before him, George W. Bush pushed the boundaries of presidential unilateralism. "What almost no one disputes," wrote Adam Liptak in The New York Times, "is that a central legacy of the Bush presidency will be its distinctively muscular vision of executive power." 56 The architect of this campaign was Vice President Dick Cheney. 7 A witness to Watergate and its aftermath, Cheney helped staff the "White House with conservative veterans of the 1970s and 1980s who believed that" the President should push his agenda "without having to compromise" and that Watergate-era reforms had wrongly "emasculated the presidency."'5 8 More to the point, just as the Nixon administration pushed the boundaries of executive power, the Bush administration extended the efforts of Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton to assert broad inherent power over national security, to make use of executive orders to unilaterally advance policy objectives, and to centralize presidential control of the administrative state. To cite a few well known examples: the assertion of the power to indefinitely detain so-called enemy combatants, the establishment of a military tribunal system without formal congressional approval, the warrantless wiretapping of U.S. citizens, the robust use of executive privilege, and the expansive use of presidential signing statements to direct agency policymaking-including agency non-enforcement of laws that the President deems unconstitutional.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Oversight Fails---OCOs
Lorber 13 [Eric Lorber, Principal, Cyber, Risk & Regulatory; “Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?”; 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961 2013; DOA: 6/24/22; ; Lowell-ES]
The lack of congressional oversight of offensive cyber operations under the Intelligence Authorization Act also likely does not seriously shift the balance between congressional and executive war-making powers. The reason is inherent in the limitations of the legislation itself: the Intelligence Authorization Act specifies reporting requirements, but does not require the non-use or withdrawal of forces.234 Further, these reports must be made in a “timely” fashion (the definition of which is undefined) and only to a small number of Congressmen (at most eight).235 Thus even if the President had to report offensive cyber operations to Congress, it is unclear he would have to do so in a way that gave Congress an effective check, as these reports would be made only to a small group of Congressmen (who would not be able to share the information, because of its classified nature, with other members of the legislature) and could be done well after the employment of these capabilities. The resulting picture is one of increased presidential flexibility; the War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Authorization Act—while arguably ineffective in many circumstances—provide increased congressional oversight of presidential war-making actions such as troop deployments and covert actions. Yet these statutes do not cover offensive cyber operations, giving the President an increasingly powerful foreign policy tool outside congressional reach.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Oversight Fails---Cybersecurity
Cordero and Thaw 20 [Carrie Cordero is the Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow and General Counsel at CNAS. Her research and writing interests focus on homeland security and intelligence community oversight, transparency, surveillance, cybersecurity, and related national and homeland security law and policy issues. David Thaw is a professor at the University of Pittsburgh and holds appointments in the School of Law and the School of Computing and Information. He is also an Affiliated Fellow of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep27475.pdf?acceptTC=true&coverpage=false&addFooter=false]//LP
Cybersecurity oversight is due for a reboot. This paper explores the need for refreshed congressional oversight of cybersecurity. After laying out why cybersecurity oversight presents special challenges, this paper suggests that the disparate nature of the cybersecurity policymaking legal framework is mismatched to the nature of the cybersecurity problem, resulting in difficulty legislating in this space. It then provides two key recommendations to guide a congressional cybersecurity oversight reboot. Cybersecurity is a broad challenge spanning many disciplines and industries. This paper argues that the current “patchwork” legal framework is ill suited to address cybersecurity questions either for legislative oversight or effective policymaking. The paper provides an overview of the nature and scope of the cybersecurity problem, with a focus on how the complexity of the field affects congressional oversight activities. Congress has been conducting a substantial amount of oversight in this area in recent years. Those efforts, however, have not yet resulted in legislative actions that have demonstrably improved national cybersecurity. This paper seeks to aid the effort to craft legal authorities that deal with an increasingly complex set of cyberthreats. This short exposition provides a path to rebooting Congress’ approach to cybersecurity oversight in a way that would allow these issues to be addressed more comprehensively. Cybersecurity is a complex, integrated challenge spanning topics as diverse as (but not limited to) international affairs, national security and defense, criminal law, civil liability, data protection, privacy and personal responsibility. Cybersecurity also involves many different actors, ranging from governments to companies to organizations to individuals. And it involves virtually every type of computing and information technology in use today, representing a plethora of technologies far more diverse than the personal computers and servers of yesteryear. Thus, perhaps the greatest challenge of developing a comprehensive cybersecurity governance framework is the fact that it is a highly complex problem, pervasive and interrelated across many aspects of government, the private sector, and society. From a federal government perspective, cybersecurity presents a set of interrelated challenges. Cybersecurity responses to malign cyber activities of hostile nation-states cannot be resolved the same way traditional kinetic defense threats would be handled. For example, cybersecurity cannot just be handed off to one agency, such as the Department of Defense (DoD) or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Although those departments play important roles, neither can—as a result of limits on legal authorities and their appropriate roles and responsibilities— address the problem comprehensively. The current “patchwork” legal framework is ill suited to address cybersecurity questions either for legislative oversight or effective policymaking. Most commonly, the term cybersecurity refers to some type of defensive technical security problem. Its meaning varies both descriptively and normatively across industrial sectors, types of actors, and disciplinary backgrounds. In reality, however, cybersecurity problems generally describe only one piece of a complex puzzle. The lack of a framework for defining these issues diminishes the ability of policymakers to create policy that adequately addresses the full spectrum of cybersecurity problems. This spectrum is broad and is not limited to traditional defensive boundaries. It includes strategic and adversarial planning and operations, spanning parties from private sector targets to law enforcement to military operations. In a fully internetworked world of connected appliances, vehicles, Internet of Things devices, and mobile devices, holistic consideration of cybersecurity questions is necessary. This discussion takes an expansive view of the elements that impact “cybersecurity”— ranging from technical aspects of system security to principles of international law in the context of armed conflict. This wide view is unified by the theme of efforts to improve the health of the U.S. information and computing infrastructure as an empirical matter, agnostic of any particular normative policy prescription of consumer protection, economic policy, or related issues. The technological aspects of cybersecurity further complicate this problem in two ways. First, they create a degree of opacity for nontechnologists in understanding key elements of the problem. Second, the highly technical nature of cybersecurity lends itself to the false belief that technical measures can provide complete solutions. Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, solutions focusing on technological “silver bullets” often are beneficial to adversaries because of the false sense of security they provide. Many of the most effective methods of “hacking” often rely on human vectors. Just as a technological perimeter is an infeasible system in an interconnected world, a cyber border defended by the Armed Forces is impractical.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Oversight Fails---Cybersecurity
Cordero and Thaw 20 [Carrie Cordero and David Thaw; Member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, CNN legal and national security analyst and professor of law at Georgetown / Professor at the University of Pittsburg in the School of Law with a focus in cybersecurity; “Rebooting Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight”; January 30, 2020; DOA: 6/24/22; ; Lowell-ES]
Currently, existing laws, executive structure, and congressional oversight mechanisms are a mismatch for the nature of the cybersecurity challenges presented by a complex, technologically integrated society. Existing mechanisms for congressional cybersecurity oversight are likewise disjointed and uncoordinated. Unlike in many other policy areas, there is no one clear committee or clear set of committees responsible for cybersecurity issues. These are divided among many committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, often along historical lines that may not match current expertise. The Judiciary committees often encounter cybersecurity issues in the context of surveillance, cybercrime enforcement, and privacy issues. The Armed Services committees are called upon to consider cybersecurity issues when evaluating legislation concerning offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, which are part of the government’s response to counter hostile cyber activities by foreign nation-states. The Intelligence committees engage on cybersecurity activities most recently from the perspective of protecting electoral system infrastructure from foreign influence and malign cyber activities related to foreign interference in democratic processes. And the Homeland Security committees are heavily involved in cybersecurity oversight due to the critical cybersecurity functions that DHS provides in securing the federal government’s civilian networks and in coordinating information sharing between government entities and the private sector. The lack of a coordinating function among these committees limits Congress’ ability to obtain a comprehensive picture of the cybersecurity problem, particularly when these committees advance legislation solely from their own jurisdictions.39
To develop a successful cybersecurity approach, Congress must first be able to obtain a comprehensive picture of the problem. This is challenging, and not just because of the lack of committee coordination. The complex nature of the problem itself, previously illustrated, requires gathering information about the interaction of a large set of actors, economic sectors, and government departments. How would increased organized criminal investigative activities impact the incentives of potential nation-state actors? How would the responses by those foreign actors alter the availability of malicious tools and code to third parties targeting private organizations and individuals? How might proposals to legalize “hacking back” affect adversaries’ incentives to engage in false-flag operations? These are complicated questions spanning many different areas yet attempts to address any one area impact nearly all others. This is no easy challenge for Congress, made worse by the fact that it is happening in real time, and pressure to act is growing on executive agencies Congress must oversee.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
AFF › Oversight DA › 2AC---Oversight Fails---Cybersecurity
Marks 21 [Joe Marks writes The Cybersecurity 202 newsletter focused on the policy and politics of cybersecurity. Before joining The Washington Post, Marks covered cybersecurity for Politico and Nextgov, a news site focused on government technology and security. He also covered patent and copyright trends for Bloomberg BNA and federal litigation for Law360 https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/12/08/congress-cant-even-pass-easy-cyber-stuff/]//LP
Expansive new cyber reporting requirements now appear dead in Congress. Congress has cut requirements for companies to share cyber threat information with the government from its must-pass defense bill, which passed the House last night and is expected to pass the Senate shortly. The failure of such a popular and bipartisan effort – which would have marked the largest expansion of government involvement in private-sector cybersecurity in years – raises questions about whether Congress is up to the task of responding to a wave of ransomware and other attacks that have battered industry in recent years. It would have required companies in critical industry sectors such as energy and transportation to alert the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency whenever they’re hacked or hit with other significant cyber incidents. It would have required disclosures from a far broader group of companies if they paid ransoms to hackers. But the measure also looked meager given the hacking threats facing industry. More than 90 percent of cyber experts and current and former officials supported the changes in a recent Cybersecurity 202 poll. The government has already imposed far more stringent cyber requirements on several key industry sectors in just the past few months. “This result is beyond disappointing and undermines national security,” said House Homeland Security Chairman Bennie G. Thompson (D-Miss.) and Rep. Yvette Clarke (D-N.Y.), chair of the committee’s cyber panel and a sponsor of the House version of the bill. Sen. Rick Scott (R-Fla.) wanted to curtail a cyber reporting provision in a major defense policy bill. It ended up getting cut entirely. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post) The dispute centered on the ransomware provision, which Sen. Rick Scott (R-Fla.) considered too broad, Senate aides told me. Scott wanted to substitute a provision that would have limited ransomware reports to just critical infrastructure — that’s a group of 16 industry sectors that includes financial services, health care and chemical facilities among others. The fight over the provision lasted so long that by the time they’d reached a compromise, House and Senate negotiators who were putting together the final bill ended up leaving it out entirely, as Tim Starks reports for CyberScoop. The fine print Because of some peculiarities about how the bill came together this year, lawmakers could still try to add amendments in the Senate, including the cyber reporting provisions. But leaders of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees are begging them not to out of fear one or more of those amendments will prevent the bill from passing entirely. If that happens, it would mark the first time in more than five decades Congress has failed to pass the bill, known as the National Defense Authorization Act. Sen. Gary Peters (D-Mich.) championed a cyber reporting provision that got cut from the National Defense Authorization Act. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post) The blame game: Thompson and Clarke laid the blame for provision being cut at the feet of Senate Republican leaders as did Senate Homeland Security Chairman Gary Peters (D-Mich.). “I am disappointed Senate Republican leaders blocked these common sense provisions that have broad bipartisan support — including from the bipartisan leaders of the Senate Homeland Security and Intelligence Committees,” Peters said. “Cyberattacks, including ransomware attacks, are one of the greatest threats to our national and economic security.” An aide for Scott told The Hill’s Maggie Miller that Scott was disappointed the full provision got left out of the NDAA and that he’d only wanted to limit its scope. He denied Republicans were to blame.