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Pallone 16 [Frank Pallone, Jr. was sworn in for his 17th full term in the U.S. House of Representatives on January 3, 2021. Pallone represents New Jersey's Sixth Congressional District, which includes most of Middlesex County as well as the Bayshore and oceanfront areas of Monmouth County. Pallone is the Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which has one of the broadest jurisdictions of any congressional committee. He has served as Chairman since the beginning of the 116th Congress in 2019 and before that he served as the Committee’s Ranking Member in the 114th and 115th Congresses. The Committee’s jurisdiction includes issues pertaining to health care, energy, environment, commerce, food and drug safety, consumer protection, telecommunications, and the internet. Pallone has held a seat on the Committee since 1993. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg25164/html/CHRG-114hhrg25164.htm]//LP
We need to ensure that this Panel's work does not become yet another undertaking by experts whose recommendations go unanswered. Congressional oversight is key to ensuring that Federal departments and agencies are meeting their mandates and doing so in an effective and efficient way. And therefore, I urge the committee to follow through on the Panel's recommendations by holding not just this session, but a series of hearings to assess the Nation's ability to prepare for and respond to biological threats. I would like to thank our panelists once again for coming and sharing their expertise. I look forward to hearing from each of you about what our Nation can do to improve our biodefense network. Thirdly, there is a major revolution in our understanding of how the biological world works and our ability to manipulate it. The advances in bioscience and biotechnologies should be part of the foundation of U.S. biodefense against both natural and deliberate epidemics. These advances are going to be extremely beneficial to humankind across many different fields that go beyond biomedicine. But it also means that we now have created a world in which there is wide access to advanced biological knowledge and the materials needed to build and disseminate biological weapons. As the Defense Science Board said in 2001, an age ago in terms of scientific advances, there are no technical barriers to nonstate actors, including terrorist groups and lone wolves, carrying out devastating bioattacks that could kill millions and cost billions. But these advances in science and in biotechnology also, for the first time, give us powerful tools that could allow us to prevent and to rapidly detect and quench epidemics, whatever their cause. And I'm going to give you some examples of critical technologies which might help realize the Panel's assertion that innovation is a key ingredient and that dramatic improvements in biodefense are within reach. First of all, the potential destructive power of biological weapons is akin to that of nuclear weapons. In 1993, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment estimated that a kilogram of aerosolized anthrax dropped on Washington, DC, in ideal weather conditions would result in 1 to 3 million deaths. That's about the same toll as a 1-megaton hydrogen bomb. These statements are not based on speculation, but on decades of development and field testing by the U.S. military during the Offensive Biological Weapons program of the United States, which was ended by President Nixon in 1969. We also know that the USSR had a massive secret offensive BW program created after they signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972. These were both ambitious, and at least in the case of the U.S., highly successful programs. During the cold war, the U.S. field tested many different bioweapons in realistic conditions, including releases from air, boats, ships, and subways. Declassified U.S. documents from the '60s clearly recognized the strategic power of bioweapons. We do not now know the fate of the Soviet effort. In the half-century since the U.S. ended its Offensive BW program, there has been a revolution in bioscience. Advances in many fields, including pharmacology and aerosol biological, and our ability to read, write, and edit DNA, the code of life, have resulted in tremendous beneficial achievements. But these advances have also meant the global spread of bioknowledge and access to sophisticated biotechnologies. The materials and know-how needed to build a bioweapon have many legitimate uses. These are dual-use technologies, and as the chairman said, this makes the task of collecting intelligence about covert bioweapons programs exceedingly difficult. We are going to see an increase in the tempo of naturally occurring epidemics, which we can talk about in the discussion. I want to end by saying that there are two critical technologies that have not gotten sufficient attention in our biodefense program. The first is rapid diagnostics, upon which we've spent very little money and for which there is a very big market problem that makes it difficult for private companies to pursue diagnostics. And the second is vaccines.
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Kibbe 10 [Jennifer Kibbe, Associate Professor of Government at Franklin & Marshall College; “Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Is the Solution Part of the Problem?”; March 10, 2010; DOA: 6/24/22; ; Lowell- ES]
Despite the difficulty involved, however, something must be done. The last seven years have shown that intelligence is more crucial than ever to national security, but as the executive branch and the intelligence community try to maximize the utility of intelligence in meeting national security needs, it is imperative that the congressional overseers meet their obligations as well. The importance of legislative oversight of the executive branch in general has long been recognized. ‘Quite as important as legislation’, noted Woodrow Wilson, ‘is vigilant oversight of administration’.3 In the intelligence arena, however, congressional oversight is at an added premium. The first, most obvious reason is the inherent secrecy of the subject. In other areas, such as the environment or banking, the media plays a valuable role in helping Congress monitor the actions of the federal government on behalf of the public. In the largely classified world of intelligence, in all but a few exceptional cases, the media is effectively precluded from playing that supporting role, thus enhancing the importance of legislative oversight.
A second less recognized but equally important reason that oversight is so critical to the intelligence enterprise is that, because ‘ . . . the intelligence community is constrained in its ability to convince the American public that it can be trusted and deserves their support’, Congress also plays an important role in explaining and representing the intelligence community to the public.4
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Trautman 15 [Lawrence J. Trautman, Associate Professor, Business Law & Ethics, Prairie View A&M University - College of Business; "Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight: Who’s Who and How It Works"; Journal of Law and Cyber Warfare; Published: 9-10-2015; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2638448; KL]
Cybersecurity remains perhaps the greatest challenge to the economic and physical well being of governments, individuals, and businesses worldwide. During recent months the United States has witnessed many disruptive and expensive cyber breaches. No single U.S. governmental agency or congressional committee maintains primary responsibility for the numerous issues related to cybersecurity. Good oversight stands at the core of good government. Oversight is Congress’s way of making sure that the administration is carrying out federal law in the way Congress intended. So many aspects of cybersecurity have the potential for use by: terrorists; by foreign entities as a tool to conduct industrial espionage against U.S. business; and by nation state adversaries, or others intent upon creating serious disruption. These various threats mean that cybersecurity policy in many ways must be treated just like the strategic and operational plans of a country at war.
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Broeders et al. 17 [Dennis Broeders is Associate Porfessor of Security and Technology and Senior Fellow of the Hague Program for Cyber Norms and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364917300675#s0110]//LP
The use of Big Data in the security domain requires intensified oversight. An effective and confidence-inspiring oversight regime, in its turn, requires a higher degree of data processing transparency. In this, transparency is not an aim in itself but serves the interests of accountability. Citizens and organisations must also have opportunities to discuss the accuracy and proportionality of decisions based on data analyses and made by government institutions and, if necessary, to have them assessed by the courts. 13.1. Big Data, big oversight? Current oversight of data processing leaves a lot to be desired, even more so in view of the ongoing rapid digitisation of government and use of data analysis. DPAs and the various forms of oversight on security and intelligence agencies do not appear to be properly equipped to face the challenges of the Big Data era in terms of powers, expertise and financial resources.74 In the Netherlands, many parties, including the oversight committee CTIVD itself75, believe that the planned expansion of the powers of the Dutch general and military intelligence agencies requires oversight capacity and technical expertise to be significantly expanded at all levels.76 Although the powers and resources of national DPAs will in principle be increased through the entry into force of the GDPR, it is up to the national legislatures to allocate the corresponding financial resources, powers and capacity. As indicated above, oversight of the analysis phase will be of paramount importance. Therefore, if possibilities for collecting and analysing data increase, independent oversight should be strengthened. For regulating the intelligence services, it would be appropriate, in view of the need to protect fundamental rights, to introduce an overriding power/the possibility of passing judgments regarding lawfulness.77 13.2. Increasing (layered) transparency Big Data also requires greater transparency in the government's data-processing activities. There is still a lot to be gained on this point, as data processing is a ‘black box’ in many cases. In addition, data subjects are not so quick to invoke their right to information because they often simply do not know that their data is being collected. Given the sensitive nature of the work of law enforcement and national security agencies, there cannot be full transparency, which is precluded by the danger of ‘gaming the system’ and the need to protect sensitive and classified information. Nevertheless, it is possible to work with a layered system of transparency, as was suggested above in relation to reports by the police and the intelligence services to the competent oversight authorities, which, in their turn, report to parliament. It would also be desirable to give citizens more insight into the frequency of data collection, the reasons why it is done, and, if possible, what effect complex data analyses have. In the field of security, some organisations have the legal right to keep all or parts of their operations secret from data subjects and the general public. However, the growing amount of data that the government can obtain under existing secrecy provisions is out of step with the data processing transparency that is required. There are indications, moreover, that the agencies involved in national security are prone to a culture of ‘overclassification’.78 Furthermore, better information meets a democratic need; a well-informed discussion of the use of Big Data solutions requires a better understanding of the use of data by government organisations in the area of security policy. Therefore, data processing transparency should be enhanced, and a better balance should be achieved between the secrecy requirement and the interests of openness as regards Big Data applications that affect fundamental freedoms. Greater transparency is needed in at least two areas. A growing number of organisations in the field of security is involved in Big Data applications, above all in the area of fighting fraud. There is a lack of good regulation in this area. Although a lot of relevant information about data processing in partnerships is contained in publically available covenants and decisions, this is not very accessible. Citizens should not have to be detectives to find the relevant information. There should be greater openness when organisations intend to work with Big Data applications, for example, by requiring them to draw up a policy plan detailing what Big Data applications they use, what public policy they pursue, at what cost and what results they expect from the application. At the accountability level, too, more is possible than is currently being done, for example in annual reporting. Compared to the Netherlands, some European countries are practising a significantly higher degree of openness about their intelligence techniques and operations, without this hindering the work of their intelligence services in any noteworthy way. This is being done in Belgium, for example, with the aim of being able to conduct an informed discussion about how the intelligence and security services work, what their powers are and how they are monitored and regulated.79
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Adler, Polisci Professor at ISU, 96 — David Gray Adler, Professor of Political Science at Idaho State University, 1996 (“The Judiciary and Presidential Power In Foreign Affairs: A Critique,” Perspectives on Law and the Public Interest (1 Persp. on L. & Pub. Int. 1), Fall, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Hein Online, p. 1-9)
Secrecy undermines the foundation of learning: criticism. People on the inside of the national security establishment cannot be trusted to make reasonable judgments—not because they are bad people (one assumes that, for the most part, they are deeply committed and well-intentioned)—but because they inhabit a deeply error-prone system that lacks the basic elements of self-correction. Saddam Hussein is dead today because he created a system in which no one could tell him that if he kept obscuring the fact that he had no WMD, he would die. Open societies thrive not because they have smarter people, or better armies, or perfect markets. They thrive because, in their very imperfection, they enable continuous learning. Open societies can’t always act as effectively as non-open societies. For a while, planned economies looked like they were better at putting Sputnik in orbit, and spy agencies unfettered by democratic qualms, we feared, could foment revolution from Korea to Cuba. But in the long run, openness made us learn, adapt, and become better. That is why, eventually, either China will open up or America will continue to lead into the twenty-first century. But only if we stay an open society. Secrecy has been allowed to metastasize under the Bush-Obama national security system. As the FISA Court order to Verizon showed, even the operation of the law is secret. The Department of Justice issues secret memos; these become unchallenged interpretations of law that FISA Court judges are asked to endorse without the benefit of an opponent's criticism. Any good lawyer knows that if you read the briefs of one side only, they seem overwhelmingly persuasive—until you read the other side's brief. These decisions, in turn, remain secret, and thus immune to criticism even after they have been issued. And that complete immunity from criticism insulates them from good reason. They are, by design, hobbled, incapable of embodying good judgment.
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Manley et al 19 [Laura Manley was the inaugural Director of the Technology and Public Purpose (TAPP) Project at the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. The project aims to steer rapid technology-driven change in directions that serve net, long-term public good. At TAPP, Laura launched several new initiatives including the TAPP Fellowship, Tech Fact Sheets for Policymaker Series, and the Tech Spotlight to make advances in tech more inclusive, safer, and fairer. She has also testified twice to Congress on her research to improve science and technology expertise in government. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/building-21st-century-congress-improving-congresss-science-and-technology-expertise]//LP
The Constitution of the United States of America gives Congress the power to draft legislation for the nation and to conduct oversight of the executive and judicial branches.
As the world has become more complex, so too have Congress’s responsibilities. When paradigm-shifting technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computers are created, Congress’s role is to pass legislation that protects the public while encouraging innovation, and to conduct oversight on how the executive branch uses the technologies.
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Coolidge 21 [Kelsey Coolidge is a social science researcher and non-profit professional with a specialization in peace and conflict, gender, urbanization, and environmental sustainability. This expertise is crafted from a curiosity to better understand current global challenges in order to create a more just, sustainable, and peaceful future. Kelsey is driven to translate vision into action by employing monitoring and evaluation techniques as well as data-based evidence to help non-profits thrive https://peacesciencedigest.org/artificial-intelligence-in-u-s-counterterrorism-and-the-inescapable-fog-of-endless-war/]//LP
It is not surprising that the question of how artificial intelligence data is analyzed and made meaningful is a thorny one, especially considering recent controversies within Google’s own “ethical AI” team. Timnit Gebru was abruptly fired (along with others who supported her) from her position as co-lead of the ethical AI team at Google in what appeared to be retaliation for refusing to retract a paper that identified how AI data analytics could perpetuate bias in Google’s own search engine. This move called into question the credibility of AI research emanating not just from Google but from all big tech firms who regularly produce research papers. If AI can perpetuate and amplify bias, this emerging technology—an increasingly powerful tool for state surveillance—cannot be understood to be separate from the broader social and political context in which it is situated. In the context of war and the preparation for war, the application of AI to military activities should raise even greater alarm because perpetuating bias in this scenario is lethal to civilian populations under threat of covert U.S. drone strikes. This reality must heighten demands for civilian oversight of and accountability mechanisms for U.S. military operations globally and also call into question the legal authority by which military operations are conducted without congressional oversight.
The troubling implications of AI in military operations is not lost on AI researchers and professionals, 4,500 of whom have signed on to the campaign to stop killer robots according to the non-profit organization AI for Peace. The campaign calls on countries to legislate a ban on AI weapons through national laws and to create a new international treaty banning AI weapons and “establish[ing] the principle of meaningful human control over the use of force”; it further calls on all tech companies and organizations to pledge not to contribute to the development of AI weapons. Yet, it is equally important to draw attention to the potential that AI and other types of emerging technology hold for preventing violence and building peace. Technological innovations have included the tracking and countering of hate speech, models helping countries understand and act on COVID’s impact on marginalized communities, and early warning and response systems with regard to election violence.
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Lee and Lai 22 [Dr. Nicol Turner Lee is a senior fellow in Governance Studies, the director of the Center for Technology Innovation, and serves as Co-Editor-In-Chief of TechTank. Dr. Turner Lee researches public policy designed to enable equitable access to technology across the U.S. and to harness its power to create change in communities across the world. Her work also explores global and domestic broadband deployment and internet governance issues. She is an expert on the intersection of race, wealth, and technology within the context of civic engagement, criminal justice, and economic development. Samantha Lai is a Research Assistant within the Center for Technology Innovation at The Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2022/05/17/the-u-s-can-improve-its-ai-governance-strategy-by-addressing-online-biases/]//LP
The fact of the matter is that if the federal government gets bias identification and mitigation wrong, it will erode the trust in the efficacy of autonomous systems, especially among everyday citizens whose lives are becoming more dependent on them. Below are some of the use cases in housing, hiring, criminal justice, healthcare, finance, political disinformation, and facial recognition that are already raising red flags due to limited oversight.
A history of biased and discriminatory laws has reinforced racism in the criminal justice system, which disproportionately polices and incarcerates low-income people and people of color. Black people are incarcerated at five times the rates of white people. And the introduction of AI in this space has only created an additional perpetrator of injustices within the system. The PATTERN algorithm, created by the Department of Justice as part of the First Step Act, was used to predict recidivism and shorten criminal sentences based on good behavior. Yet the algorithm has been shown to exhibit biases against people of color, overpredicting recidivism among minority inmates at rates of two to eight percent compared to white inmates. Other risk assessment algorithms have exhibited similar biases, taking for example the COMPAS algorithm that had been used in the states of New York, Wisconsin, California, and more. A ProPublica article found that Black people were twice as likely as white people to be labeled high risk but not re-offend, while white people were more likely to be labeled as low risk but then re-offend. Such risk-assessment tools receive widespread use across the criminal justice system, from initial sentencing to determining early releases, exacerbating existing biases within the system with little oversight
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Sahay 21 [Usha Sahay, senior editor at Politico Magazine, where she focuses on foreign policy and global affairs. She is a 2021 graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School, where she received a Master in Public Policy. While at the Kennedy School, Usha was a Belfer Center student fellow, working as a research assistant to Prof. Fredrik Logevall and the Belfer Center Cyber Project. Her paper “Revitalizing NATO: A Role for the U.S. Congress” was the co-winner of the Robert Belfer Award for Best Policy Analysis Exercise in International and Global Affairs. Usha is the creator and host of the War on the Rocks podcast series “A Most Terrible Weapon.” Prior to graduate school, Usha was managing editor of War on the Rocks, and has also been an editor at the Wall Street Journal and HuffPost. She started her career as a Herbert Scoville, Jr. Peace Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Usha graduated magna cum laude from Columbia University, where she majored in political science and history; "Revitalizing NATO - A Role for the U.S. Congress"; Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School; Published: 9-2021; Accessed: 6-24-2022; https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Revitalizing%20NATO%20-%20A%20Role%20for%20Congress%20-%20Sahay.pdf; KL]
Congress’ defense of NATO against the Trump administration’s efforts to undermine the alliance illustrates the direct and indirect ways in which lawmakers can push back against the executive-branch. Congress inserted language in the National Defense Authorization Act to block withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany, while the House passed a resolution prohibiting the use of U.S. funds to withdraw from NATO. In a highly symbolic move, Congress invited NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to address the legislature.50 In addition, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi led a delegation to the Munich Security Conference, a prominent transatlantic policy conference, where members emphasized Congress’ involvement in foreign policy to counteract allies’ fears about Trump’s behavior. 51 Congress’ active efforts during this period affirm the broader proposition of this report – that Congress does play a role in foreign policy issues like alliance management.52 The question is whether lawmakers will be willing to play that role in future administrations when alliances are no longer seen as being under threat.
“Bad cop” for allies. The function of critiquing undesirable actions extends to foreign nations. Congress frequently serves as a useful source of pressure on other countries, drawing attention to problematic behavior and opening the door for the executive branch to follow up with negotiations or other measures.
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Bergmann and Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College; Alexandra Schmitt, a senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School; "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance"; Center for American Progress; Published: 4-22-2015; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/; KL]
While U.S. laws technically prohibit providing security assistance to units found to violate human rights—the Leahy laws—the provisions are riddled with loopholes and are too weak to effectively prioritize human rights in U.S. security assistance.71 Offices and agencies responsible for elevating human rights in U.S. foreign policy, such as the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, are too often cut out of the decision-making process for security assistance programs—especially those run out of the Pentagon. At the same time, the Pentagon maintains its own security assistance accounts, such as Section 127e, that are not required to conduct human rights vetting and operate with little transparency—furthering opportunities to militarize foreign policy.72 And often, such as in the case of Egypt, security assistance is accompanied by paltry amounts of democracy, human rights, and governance funding (DRG), or certifications on human rights are waived entirely, to make providing arms more palatable.73 These small DRG funds or certification stops do little to change the underlying political challenges or are sometimes even hampered by the regime the United States is funding.
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Bushley 17 [U.S. Army Capt. Adam Bushley, Rule of Law attorney for Task Force Wolverine, 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team; "Governance: The Missing Ingredient in Security Cooperation"; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Published: 2017; Accessed: 6-18-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1038564.pdf; KL]
Typically, guides, best practice manuals, and actual policies describe how the organization will address specific challenges through developed and approved programmatic approaches. When done correctly, these approaches reflect state-of-the-art concepts grounded in evidence that provide staff direction in a specific subject matter. Using DOS’s SC/SA oversight authority, such reference material could help ensure SC/SA programs are appropriately tailored, based on country context, and implemented effectively in accordance with clearly articulate national strategic or operational level end states for the region and the U.S. as a whole. If done correctly, these policy directives would coordinate and prioritize SC/SA programs (based on allocation of resources) within the ICS and the rest of the interagency.106 In essence, such material would be a road map with do’s and don’ts based upon best fit approaches and lessons learned. According to one RAND study commissioned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), “Military planners in the field often have little experience managing security cooperation and rotate every two to three years.”107 Since most Security Cooperation Officers (SCO) are new to the field of SC/SA, by the time they understand the position and how power and resources are distributed and contested, they often redeploy. DOD civilians, while more experienced, are too few in number to make up the difference; specific and direct DOS guidance on how to implement SC/SA programs in order to meet strategic country or NSS objectives through tailored and effective SC/SA programming could help. 108
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Young 20 [Thomas-Durell Young, Senior Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School; "The "Politics" of Security Cooperation and Security Assistance"; Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation; Published: 9-10-2020; Accessed: 6-18-2022; https://www.dasadec.army.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2344014/the-politics-of-security-cooperation-and-security-assistance/; KL]
Perhaps it is inaccurate to characterize DOD as an elephant (in any room); in reality, it is more like a herd of independently minded creatures. Title 10 makes it clear that the individual MILDEPs exist in splendid political if not geographical isolation from each other, let alone from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The MILDEPs’ Major Force Programs reflect the clear objective of Congress that the former retain a high degree of autonomy from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, notwithstanding largely ignored verbiage in the law that explicitly states in the preamble to the three departments’ sections that the exercise of their functions are “subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.”11 The record demonstrates that the intent of Congress’s annual appropriations and authorizations easily trumps this provision of the law. The canonical source of the MILDEPs’ autonomy is found in the 12 roles and missions assigned to them in Title 10.12 It is the particular authority of training under which the MILDEPs’ authority to conduct SC and SA reside (for example, continental U.S.-based professional military education and all forms of training).
Other key players in the planning and execution of these programs include the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which provides policy guidance and priorities; DSCA, with its newly enhanced powers granted to it via the FY 2017 NDAA (discussed below); the combatant commands, which act as planners and coordinators of these activities (under the authority of the Unified Command Plan); the Service components that execute many of the in-country training events; and finally, as extensions of the combatant commands, defense cooperation offices resident in-country that manage and direct both training programs and equipment transfers. Given the number of stakeholders, the politics of agreeing priorities, approaches, timing, scope, and so forth, the execution of SC and SA activities can be frightfully untidy.
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Boyd 10 [“Improving U.S. Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Services: A Comparative Policy Approach”; Vol. 28, No. 1 of American Intelligence Journal, pp. 29-39; DOA: 6/23/22; ; Lowell-ES]
When in the 1970s the Congress created the two committees dedicated to the oversight of intelligence, the overall goal was to achieve awareness of intelligence activities." Since then, the Intelligence Community size, budget, and capabilities have grown exponentially, increasing the challenge of maintaining this awareness and conducting oversight. Many of the advantages and disadvantages of the three courses of action above relate to the ability of the Congress to effectively maintain accountability of the intelligence services rather than increased transparency to the public. All three involve trade-offs with regard to the cost of conducting oversight, measured in dollars, hours, and trees (to create paper). A strong argument can be made that, despite the criticism of the 9/11 Commission, academics, and the press, U.S. Congressional intelligence oversight is among the best in the world. Oversight is occurring and there has been greater accountability and transparency in the past three years in particular. Because effective oversight is occurring, option one, maintaining the status quo of a strong oversight mandate, is the most acceptable option. Option two is not recommended because there is likely never to be sufficient political will to adopt a joint intelligence oversight committee. However, if the Congress does want to make a change and still keep its strong oversight committees, option three is unique in that it creates a central point of contact into Congress to liaison directly with the public. This type of position may fill a gap that may grow wider in the post-9/11 world—the gap between the public and its government that is best bridged through accountability and transparency. Despite the best intentions of the government, its actions can be flawed in practice and a law can be the cause of inequity or injustice. The German Bundestag model of a Petitions Committee can serve as a central point of contact for citizens to contact Congress with a complaint or suggestion for legislation. This can be a bold new way for Congress to express its commitment to transparency and accountability and mitigate growing concerns, in particular, regarding the activities of our intelligence services.
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Francis and Ginsberg 16 [ Kathryn A. Francis is an Analyst in Government Organization and Management at the Congressional Research Service. Wendy Ginsberg is an Analyst in American National Government at the Congressional Research Service “The Federal Cybersecurity Workforce: Background and Congressional Oversight Issues for the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security” https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/79313/CRS_Federal_Cybersecurity_Workforce.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y]//LP
The absence of data may make it difficult for Congress to determine to what extent the flexibilities are used, and what challenges may inhibit their maximum use. Ultimately, this could affect future decisions regarding the authorization of additional flexibilities or changes to the structure of existing flexibilities. For example, suppose that DHS uses the OPM-issued hiring flexibility to fill 200 cybersecurity positions—20% of the maximum allowed by the flexibility (up to 1,000 positions). If DHS had no additional positions to fill, additional flexibilities might not be needed. If DHS encountered implementation challenges that prevented further use of the flexibility, however, structural changes to the flexibility may be needed. Similarly, suppose that DHS does not use the pay flexibilities authorized under P.L. 113-277. While the lack of use could indicate that the flexibilities are not needed, it may also stem from budget constraints. A lack of data on how frequently the flexibilities for DOD intelligence positions are being used to fill positions affiliated with the U.S. Cyber Command may make it difficult for Congress to gauge the utility of new flexibilities authorized for Command positions under P.L. 114-92. It appears that some positions affiliated with the Command are being filled using the existing flexibilities for DOD intelligence positions. The Departments of the Army and Navy, for example, are using the flexibilities to fill cybersecurity positions in units that support the Command. 79 The flexibilities, therefore, might not be needed as much or used as often as envisioned if a sizeable portion of covered positions can be filled using existing flexibilities. Pursuant to its oversight authority, Congress could consider several oversight policy options to enhance its knowledge and awareness of identification and recruitment efforts for the federal cybersecurity workforce. Seven options are presented in this section, though other policy options exist. The first two policy options relate to monitoring OPM and OMB initiatives to define and identify federal cybersecurity positions. The remaining five options relate to monitoring the implementation of hiring and pay flexibilities used to fill DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions. CRS takes no position on the advisability of these and other potential policy options. DOD and DHS could be required to report their use of OPM-issued hiring flexibilities for cybersecurity positions. The requirements could include, (1) the number of positions filled using the flexibility; (2) the pay plan, occupation, series, and grade of the position; (3) the nature of action of each hire; and (4) any challenges encountered in implementing the flexibilities. Such data might enhance Congress’s capacity to determine the extent to which these flexibilities are being, or have been used—and any barriers to maximizing their use. This information could, in turn, assist Congress in addressing any barriers to using statutorily authorized flexibilities and determining the utility of additional flexibilities
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Bailey 20 [Dr. Christopher E. Bailey is an Associate Professor at the National Intelligence University in Bethesda, Maryland specializing in national security law, international law, and professional ethics. He is also an adjunct instructor in the Master of Science in Cyber Security program at the University of Charleston (West Virginia). Dr. Bailey is licensed to practice law in California and the District of Columbia and is a member of the American Society of International Law. “Offensive Cyberspace Operations: A Gray Area in Congressional Oversight” Boston University International Law Journal https://heinonline-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/builj38&id=253&men_tab=srchresults]//LP
Next, there are new questions about the nature of presidential and congressional oversight. The new statutory authorization allows for a range of offensive cyberspace operations that could be properly characterized as a covert action, but absent executive oversight required, such as is required for a presidential finding and Memorandum of Notification to the Congressional intelligence committees. 50 The new language creates an important change in congressional reporting requirements; the statute provides that "[the Secretary of Defense] shall brief the congressional defense committees about any military activities or operations in cyberspace, including clandestine military activities or operations in cyberspace, occurring during the previous quarter during the quarterly briefing required by section 484 of this title."'5 1 In other words, the DoD and U.S. CYBERCOM can conduct a broader range of offensive cyberspace operations, some which may be construed by an adversary as a hostile or wrongful act in violation of international law, but the Secretary of Defense is no longer constrained by the requirement of a presidential finding, Congressional leadership. In one sense, the 2019 NDAA has a broader requirement for congressional reporting than the covert action statute; the 2019 NDAA does not include a provision that could be used to limit congressional reporting on sensitive military cyber operations to the "gang of eight. '5 4 The traditional controls on uses of force, whether involving covert actions or armed conflict, exist to ensure executive and congressional oversight, as well as political accountability through elections, in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.55 There is a distinct difference between purely defensive actions, which are either responses against an on-going attack or the preparation of capabilities for prospective conflict, and offensive operations that could initiate or escalate a crisis. On one hand, it is true that the DoD experienced difficulties in obtaining mission approval within the executive branch for peacetime cyber operations that involved conduct beyond intelligence collection or a response to an on- going attack. That there has been disagreement over the propriety of certain activities is no doubt a reflection on the unique nature of certain cyber activities and the perhaps unknowable consequences that may result from them. Indeed, the United States has periodically faced intelligence crises resulting from ill- advised operations, such as the 1985-87 Iran-Contra affairs, that had been decided within a limited group of senior officials, without the benefit of interagency review and debate.56 Thus, the short-circuited approval process encapsulated in the 2019 NDAA albeit to intended to facilitate timely responses to on-going attacks is not necessarily a positive development. However, strong presidential control and prior congressional notification perform an important function: they ensure that the United States uses unacknowledged force only in pursuit of "identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States."'5 7 The need to inhibit unintended escalation with a foreign adversary mandates high quality intelligence to minimize the risk of misattribution and collateral damage, as well as tight political control. Now, however, the DoD can conduct a range of offensive cyberspace operations (i.e., "defend forward" 52 prior or contemporaneous reporting to Congress, 53 or even reporting to the senior through "persistent engagement" 58 ) independent of any explicit finding to that effect. The DoD has the authority to conduct a broad range of activities that it may consider "short of hostilities," 59 but ones that an adversary may consider as a hostile or internationally wrongful act.
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Lewallen 20 [Jonathan Lewallen, Assistant Professor, University of Tampa; "Cybersecurity Information Sharing and Congress's Oversight Role"; 66 Wayne Law Review 151; Published: 2020; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/waynlr66&div=7&id=&page=; KL]
Members of Congress value position-taking and credit-claiming opportunities, and legislative activity and constituent service tend to provide those opportunities to a greater degree than oversight; legislative action tends to be more visible than all but the highest-profile oversight hearings. 4 0 To the extent that oversight provides clear position-taking opportunities, it does so when either district, state, or party interests are involved. Cybersecurity information sharing may be a case where the lack of a clear partisan dimension hinders the prospects for effective oversight; members of the presidential out-party lack obvious incentives to elevate attention to information sharing by embarrassing the current administration
Another challenge is not necessarily unique to cybersecurity information sharing: how to measure whether oversight activities were successful. The stated congressional policy (as expressed through law) is for agencies to coordinate information exchange about cybersecurity threats with SLTT governments and the private sector. Sharing more information cannot be the end goal because too much information can actually be less helpful.' 4 ' Cybersecurity threats change over time and, thus, so will the specific information about those threats that would need to be shared, which in turn changes some of the appropriate metrics of "success." Is sharing the information alone enough to consider the policy successful, or does that information also have to be timely and acted upon?
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Hathaway et al. 21 [Oona A. Hathaway, Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Tobias Kuehne, J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School; Randi Michel, J.D., Yale Law School & Ph.D., Yale University; Nicole Ng, J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School; "Congressional Oversight of Modern Warfare: History, Pathologies, and Proposals for Reform"; William & Mary Law Review, Volume 63, Issue 1, Article 4; Published: 10-2021; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3914&context=wmlr; KL]
B. Siloing and Its Implications for Oversight and National Security
While committees may gain political benefits from guarding their turfs, information siloing frustrates Congress’s ability to carry out effective oversight of the executive branch. The information gaps resulting from siloing of reporting and notification may lead to poorly informed and under-vetted congressional decision-making. Ultimately, information siloing of modern military operations can harm national security and foreign relations.
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CRS 21 [Congressional Research Service; “Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems”; November 17, 2021; DOA: 6/25/22; ; Lowell-ES]
Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are a special class of weapon systems that use sensor suites and computer algorithms to independently identify a target and employ an onboard weapon system to engage and destroy the target without manual human control of the system. Although these systems are not yet in widespread development, it is believed they would enable military operations in communications-degraded or -denied environments in which traditional systems may not be able to operate. Contrary to a number of news reports, U.S. policy does not prohibit the development or employment of LAWS. Although the United States does not currently have LAWS in its inventory, some senior military and defense leaders have stated that the United States may be compelled to develop LAWS in the future if U.S. competitors choose to do so. At the same time, a growing number of states and nongovernmental organizations are appealing to the international community for regulation of or a ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns. Developments in both autonomous weapons technology and international discussions of LAWS could hold implications for congressional oversight, defense investments, military concepts of operations, treaty-making, and the future of war.
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Stone 21 [Corin R. Stone is a Scholar-in-Residence at the Washington College of Law, where she is conducting research, developing programming, and contributing to the Tech, Law and Security courses. She is on leave from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) where, until August 2020, she served as the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Strategy & Engagement. From 2014-2017, Ms. Stone served as the Executive Director of the National Security Agency (NSA). https://www.justsecurity.org/79254/artificial-intelligence-in-the-intelligence-community-oversight-must-not-be-an-oversight/]//LP
Throughout this series, I have explored the most pressing foundational issues impacting the Intelligence Community’s (IC) ability to meet the urgency of this moment in the global artificial intelligence (AI) race. The current bipartisan support for taking bold action to drive national security use of AI is key to the IC’s success. That support must propel change in the priority areas I have already identified: modernizing the IC’s budget and acquisition processes and enabling a risk-tolerant culture with a new IC AI risk assessment framework
that helps IC officers navigate the uncertainty that necessarily accompanies technological innovation. There is one other area, however, that cannot be ignored if the IC is to keep pace with our nation’s adversaries and provide policymakers with accurate, timely, and impactful insights: congressional oversight.
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Burton and Soare 19 [Dr Joe Burton, New Zealand Institute for Security and Crime Science, University of Waikato, Dr Simona R. Soare, Institut d’Etudes Européennes, Université Saint Louis; "Understanding the Strategic Implications of the Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence"; 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle, NATO CCD COE Publications; Published: 2019; Accessed: 6-23-2022; https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_14_Understanding-the-Strategic-Implications.pdf; KL]
Politics in this respect will be integral to outcomes in the deployment of military AI across domains. Strategy has always been the use of force to achieve political objectives, but we assert that politics will shape how AI is used as much as being the goal of the deployment of AI. What AI will not be able to do for combined arms operations, or any other type of operation for that matter, any time in the near future, is lift the fog of war: the veil of uncertainty around the interests driving opponents’ actions. It will not alleviate the security dilemma and may complicate arms control and disarmament efforts as barriers to entry are lowered due to the acceleration of technological progress in the civilian sector.
5. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS