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2022 SDI Affirmative
Offcase Answers › A2: Other DAs › Readiness DA/Ethics Bad DA – 2AC

Infusing ethical principles into AI do not detract from military readiness.

Zoe Stanley-Lockman, 2022 (Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” , Retrieved 6/11/2022)

Additionally, infusing AI development with certain ethical principles and values can have operational advantages and benefits, and NATO can, in particular, promote the ethical principles as operational standards for the Allies. A common critique within the ethics debate is that approaching new technology with an ethical or democratic values-driven perspective translates into comparative military disadvantage. Essentially, if your adversary develops technology without the constraints of ethical principles then there will be diminished effectiveness on the battlefield.56 We find this critique unfounded because it assumes there is a false trade-off between ethics and effectiveness; instead, we argue ethical foundations are built into the architecture of modern warfare.57 As such, ethics is a background condition for battlefield effectiveness, which is already infused in military decision-making and helping to guide the boundaries of international humanitarian law. As such, ethical guidelines do not have to detract from a military’s capacity or competency to devise means and methods of warfare that will serve their national or coalition interest.58 If anything, a first-mover advantage can incentivize an ethical and values-driven AI to establish the threshold of technological standards globally.59

2022 SDI Affirmative
Offcase Answers › A2: Other DAs › Readiness DA/Ethics Bad DA – 2AC

Incorporating ethics into AI will bolster US capabilities to create effective AI.

Benjamin Boudreaux, 1/11/2019 (professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, “Does the U.S. Face an AI Ethics Gap?” , Retrieved 6/12/2022)

Even with differences in how ethical risks are interpreted between the U.S. and its adversaries, this is not a gap that will debilitate the U.S. but could instead be a source of U.S. strength. Ethical conduct by the DoD is essential to bolster domestic popular support and the legitimacy of military action. This is especially important in the context of open source access to details about military operations that previously would have been opaque to most Americans. Further, an emphasis on ethical action could also help the military build partnerships with the private sector to leverage the most advanced technologies, attract AI talent, and promote multinational alliances with like-minded countries in Europe and elsewhere. So ethical considerations could become a fundamental component of how the U.S. builds the partnerships and capabilities essential for both its hard and soft power. But in addition to these pragmatic reasons to care about ethics, the U.S. should also recognize that the ethical risks raised about AI reflect real humanitarian values that matter deeply. Instead of worrying about an ethics gap, U.S. policymakers and the military community could proudly demonstrate a commitment to leading in AI ethics, and build standards of responsible AI behavior reflecting American values that can rally the international community. Indeed, U.S. leadership on AI ethics could be essential to ensuring that risks are mitigated and the AI arms race does not become a race to the bottom.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Offcase Answers › AT: Rogue AI DA › Rogue AI DA – No Extinction – 1AR

Superintelligence is a practical impossibility.

Edward Moore Geist, 8/9/2015 (MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, “Is artificial intelligence really an existential threat to humanity?” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

Convinced that sufficient “intelligence” can overcome almost any obstacle, Bostrom acknowledges few limits on what artificial intelligences might accomplish. Engineering realities rarely enter into Bostrom’s analysis, and those that do contradict the thrust of his argument. He admits that the theoretically optimal intelligence, a “perfect Bayesian agent that makes probabilistically optimal use of available information,” will forever remain “unattainable because it is too computationally demanding to be implemented in any physical computer.” Yet Bostrom’s postulated “superintelligences” seem uncomfortably close to this ideal. The author offers few hints of how machine superintelligences would circumvent the computational barriers that render the perfect Bayesian agent impossible, other than promises that the advantages of artificial components relative to human brains will somehow save the day. But over the course of 60 years of attempts to create thinking machines, AI researchers have come to the realization that there is far more to intelligence than simply deploying a faster mechanical alternative to neurons. In fact, the history of artificial intelligence suggests that Bostrom’s “superintelligence” is a practical impossibility.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Offcase Answers › AT: Rogue AI DA › Rogue AI DA – No Extinction – 1AR

Doomsday AI scenarios won’t happen—multiple reasons.

Michael Shermer, 3/1/2017 (Presidential Fellow at Chapman University, “Artificial Intelligence Is Not a Threat—Yet,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

I'm skeptical. First, all such doomsday scenarios involve a long sequence of if-then contingencies, a failure of which at any point would negate the apocalypse. University of West England Bristol professor of electrical engineering Alan Winfield put it this way in a 2014 article: “If we succeed in building human equivalent AI and if that AI acquires a full understanding of how it works, and if it then succeeds in improving itself to produce super-intelligent AI, and if that super-AI, accidentally or maliciously, starts to consume resources, and if we fail to pull the plug, then, yes, we may well have a problem. The risk, while not impossible, is improbable.” Second, the development of AI has been much slower than predicted, allowing time to build in checks at each stage. As Google executive chairman Eric Schmidt said in response to Musk and Hawking: “Don't you think humans would notice this happening? And don't you think humans would then go about turning these computers off?” Google's own DeepMind has developed the concept of an AI off switch, playfully described as a “big red button” to be pushed in the event of an attempted AI takeover. As Baidu vice president Andrew Ng put it (in a jab at Musk), it would be “like worrying about overpopulation on Mars when we have not even set foot on the planet yet.” Third, AI doomsday scenarios are often predicated on a false analogy between natural intelligence and artificial intelligence. As Harvard University experimental psychologist Steven Pinker elucidated in his answer to the 2015 Edge.org Annual Question “What Do You Think about Machines That Think?”: “AI dystopias project a parochial alpha-male psychology onto the concept of intelligence. They assume that superhumanly intelligent robots would develop goals like deposing their masters or taking over the world.” It is equally possible, Pinker suggests, that “artificial intelligence will naturally develop along female lines: fully capable of solving problems, but with no desire to annihilate innocents or dominate the civilization.” Fourth, the implication that computers will “want” to do something (like convert the world into paperclips) means AI has emotions, but as science writer Michael Chorost notes, “the minute an A.I. wants anything, it will live in a universe with rewards and punishments—including punishments from us for behaving badly.” Given the zero percent historical success rate of apocalyptic predictions, coupled with the incrementally gradual development of AI over the decades, we have plenty of time to build in fail-safe systems to prevent any such AI apocalypse.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Offcase Answers › AT: Rogue AI DA › Rogue AI DA – No War – 1AR

Claims that AI will cause World War III are overstated rhetoric.

Michael Horowitz, Dec. 2019, (Political Science Prof @ University of Pennsylvania, “A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence,” Retrieved Apr. 28, 2022 from )

In early 2017, Klaus Schwab of the World Economic Forum argued that the world is on the cusp of a Fourth Industrial Revolution, wherein several technologies – but most prominently AI – could reshape global affairs.5 Many defense experts around the world share Schwab’s recognition of the potentially transformative effects of AI.6 The most prominent statements about the impact of AI on warfare, however, tend to be extreme. Elon Musk, for instance, has vocally contended that AI run amok could risk World War III.7 This overheated rhetoric masks the way that advances in automation, autonomous systems, and AI may actually influence warfare, especially in the vital areas of nuclear deterrence and warfighting. The intersection of nuclear stability and artificial intelligence thus raises critical issues for the study of international politics.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Offcase Answers › AT: Rogue AI DA › Rogue AI DA – Link Turn – 1AR

NATO can lead the establishment of responsible technological development in AI to steward military development on a responsible trajectory.

Zoe Stanley-Lockman, 2022 (Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” , Retrieved 6/11/2022)

This chapter explores a role for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the emerging military artificial intelligence (AI) governance architecture. As global powers compete for capabilities that AI can offer, NATO has the challenging task of recalibrating strategic relationships in the coming years. NATO has begun to recognize technological change as a necessary variable and, in turn, adapt its organizational composition and strategy to increase the Alliance’s capacity to meet emerging security challenges. As NATO bodies and Allies prepare for the impact of AI on future military operations, NATO has its own responsibility to steward AI in ways that promote harmonization among Allies and advance the NATO mission. Toward this effort, the chapter highlights two governance mechanisms within NATO’s competency—strategic and policy planning, and standards and certification—as practices that exemplify NATO’s power to shape the trajectory of technological development. We operationalize these governance tools by examining the three pillars that are particularly challenging for AI governance: ethics and values, legal norms, and safety and security. Within each pillar, we examine NATO’s facilitation of strategic policy planning and standards and certification to emerge as a leader in establishing responsible technological development and, ultimately, a more secure international security environment. This chapter finds there is space for NATO to pursue its agenda to maintain technological superiority not just to protect and defend its way of life, but to build on AI governance pillars to steward military innovation on a responsible trajectory.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Offcase Answers › AT: Rogue AI DA › Rogue AI DA – Link Turn – 1AR

Greater transatlantic cooperation on AI is necessary to prevent the advancement of harmful AI.

Christie Lawrence & Sean Cordey, 2020, (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence,” , Retrieved 6/12/2022)

Despite all of these changes, the importance of a strong relationship between the United States and the European Union has been a constant. The transatlantic disagreements that have characterized the past few years—and have hampered a united front on emerging technologies like 5G and AI5—are not the first time US-EU relations have suffered, but they should not further divide allies that share common values.6 Deepened US-EU cooperation across the entire AI ecosystem7 is necessary to advance a more secure, safe, and prosperous world, but to do this the current level of AI-related coordination and partnership needs to be increased. This report’s purpose is twofold: first, to inform policymakers and researchers about the current state of transatlantic AI efforts; and second, to recommend specific areas where transatlantic AI collaboration should be strengthened. Based on a comprehensive study of over 260 documents and reports covering the period from December 1997 to June 2020, we proposes more than 16 recommendations to increase US-EU AI collaboration across the entire AI ecosystem, as well as 9 recommendations for AI cooperation in the healthcare, environmental sciences, and defense sectors. Greater transatlantic efforts are needed to prevent the advancement of an AI vision that is adversarial and harmful to the wellbeing of the United States, the European Union, and allies.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Offcase Answers › AT: Rogue AI DA › Rogue AI DA – 2AC

Case turns disad: Nuclear war would lead to the annihilation of all life on Earth.

António Guterres, 1/2/2022 (Secretary-General of the United Nations, “Threat of nuclear war: Not a thing of the past,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

We live in worrying times. The climate crisis, stark inequalities, bloody conflicts and human rights abuses, and the personal and economic devastation caused by the Covid-19 pandemic have put our world under greater stress than it has faced in my lifetime. But the existential threat that cast a shadow over the first half of my life no longer receives the attention it should. Nuclear weapons have faded from headlines and Hollywood scripts. But the danger they pose remains as high as ever, and is growing by the year. Nuclear annihilation is just one misunderstanding or miscalculation away—a sword of Damocles that threatens not only suffering and death on a horrific scale, but the end of all life on earth.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Offcase Answers › AT: Rogue AI DA › Rogue AI DA – 2AC

Technological limits prevent AI from being an existential threat to humanity.

Edward Moore Geist, 8/9/2015 (MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, “Is artificial intelligence really an existential threat to humanity?” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies is an astonishing book with an alarming thesis: Intelligent machines are “quite possibly the most important and most daunting challenge humanity has ever faced.” In it, Oxford University philosopher Nick Bostrom, who has built his reputation on the study of “existential risk,” argues forcefully that artificial intelligence might be the most apocalyptic technology of all. With intellectual powers beyond human comprehension, he prognosticates, self-improving artificial intelligences could effortlessly enslave or destroy Homo sapiens if they so wished. While he expresses skepticism that such machines can be controlled, Bostrom claims that if we program the right “human-friendly” values into them, they will continue to uphold these virtues, no matter how powerful the machines become. These views have found an eager audience. In August 2014, PayPal cofounder and electric car magnate Elon Musk tweeted “Worth reading Superintelligence by Bostrom. We need to be super careful with AI. Potentially more dangerous than nukes.” Bill Gates declared, “I agree with Elon Musk and some others on this and don’t understand why some people are not concerned.” More ominously, legendary astrophysicist Stephen Hawking concurred: “I think the development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race.” Proving his concern went beyond mere rhetoric, Musk donated $10 million to the Future of Life Institute “to support research aimed at keeping AI beneficial for humanity.” Superintelligence is propounding a solution that will not work to a problem that probably does not exist, but Bostrom and Musk are right that now is the time to take the ethical and policy implications of artificial intelligence seriously. The extraordinary claim that machines can become so intelligent as to gain demonic powers requires extraordinary evidence, particularly since artificial intelligence (AI) researchers have struggled to create machines that show much evidence of intelligence at all. While these investigators’ ultimate goals have varied since the emergence of the discipline in the mid-1950s, the fundamental aim of AI has always been to create machines that demonstrate intelligent behavior, whether to better understand human cognition or to solve practical problems. Some AI researchers even tried to create the self-improving reasoning machines Bostrom fears. Through decades of bitter experience, however, they learned not only that creating intelligence is more difficult than they initially expected, but also that it grows increasingly harder the smarter one tries to become. Bostrom’s concept of “superintelligence,” which he defines as “any intellect that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest,” builds upon similar discredited assumptions about the nature of thought that the pioneers of AI held decades ago. A summary of Bostrom’s arguments, contextualized in the history of artificial intelligence, demonstrates how this is so. In the 1950s, the founders of the field of artificial intelligence assumed that the discovery of a few fundamental insights would make machines smarter than people within a few decades. By the 1980s, however, they discovered fundamental limitations that show that there will always be diminishing returns to additional processing power and data. Although these technical hurdles pose no barrier to the creation of human-level AI, they will likely forestall the sudden emergence of an unstoppable “superintelligence.” The risks of self-improving intelligent machines are grossly exaggerated and ought not serve as a distraction from the existential risks we already face, especially given that the limited AI technology we already have is poised to make threats like those posed by nuclear weapons even more pressing than they currently are. Disturbingly, little or no technical progress beyond that demonstrated by self-driving cars is necessary for artificial intelligence to have potentially devastating, cascading economic, strategic, and political effects. While policymakers ought not lose sleep over the technically implausible menace of “superintelligence,” they have every reason to be worried about emerging AI applications such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s submarine-hunting drones, which threaten to upend longstanding geostrategic assumptions in the near future. Unfortunately, Superintelligence offers little insight into how to confront these pressing challenges.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Offcase Answers › AT: Rogue AI DA › Rogue AI DA – 2AC

NATO is vital to effectively managing AI technology—multilateral approaches and cohesion are necessary to solve.

Zoe Stanley-Lockman, 2022 (Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” , Retrieved 6/11/2022)

NATO structures around strategic and policy planning both set Allied ambitions and priorities and have the competency to implement them through its many consultative bodies, coordination formats, and albeit to a lesser extent, technology foresight capacities. NATO has facilitative power among Allies, both for defense planning and for the conduct of operations. A cornerstone in modern architecture of international security is coalition warfare—or, more broadly, joint operations. Working with military partners has become a critical feature of modern security policy, where there is more power in enhancing numbers, but also in having allies that lend political and practical legitimacy to deterrence and operations.49 NATO is vital to that effort for many reasons, but also because NATO’s facilitative power is significant to promote coordination and cooperation. Simply put, partners and allies are a necessary feature of modern military behavior, and strategic and policy planning are necessary functions to encourage and underpin cohesion in alliance settings. This is important for AI governance because the nature of AI poses new strategic challenges and will require multilateral approaches and some degree of cohesion to effectively incorporate RRI frameworks in policy planning. As such, the necessity of working with security partners extends to the AI-policy frontier.

2022 SDI Affirmative
Offcase Answers › AT: Rogue AI DA › Rogue AI DA – 2AC

NATO coordination on joint operations with AI can promote coordination on the ethical guidelines for the development of AI.

Zoe Stanley-Lockman, 2022 (Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” , Retrieved 6/11/2022)

NATO’s influence in the functioning of joint operations and multinational military operations situates the Alliance to coordinate between how Allies implement ethical principles in their own national AI development. Specifically, NATO is well-situated to advocate for transparency, accountability, and data governance, which are also adoption factors that can translate into operational benefits, among other values.69 For example, these factors can promote coordination among Allies on ethical guidelines on the development and use of AI, as this will be a necessary foundation in any future joint operation that uses this technology. “The transatlantic partnership must focus on coordinating these core principles and systematic governance to ensure AI systems development aligns with the rule of law and democracy. In particular, this must ensure answering questions about human dignity, human control, and accountability … NATO remains the organization that can bring these two (U.S. and EU) together and establishes the ethical bottom line.”70 The issues of transparency and accountability will define the scope of future implementation.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Add-Ons › Pandemics Add-On – 2AC

New pandemics threaten human extinction:

Lakshmi Supriya, PhD., 4/19/2021 (Lakshmi Supriya got her BSc in Industrial Chemistry from IIT Kharagpur (India) and a Ph.D. in Polymer Science and Engineering from Virginia Tech (USA)., “Humans versus viruses - Can we avoid extinction in near future?”, , Retrieved 8/2/2021)

Expert argues that human-caused changes to the environment can lead to the emergence of pathogens, not only from outside but also from our own microbiome, which can pave the way for large-scale destruction of humans and even our extinction. Whenever there is a change in any system, it will cause other changes to reach a balance or equilibrium, generally at a point different from the original balance. Although this principle was originally posited by the French chemist Henry Le Chatelier for chemical reactions, this theory can be applied to almost anything else. In an essay published on the online server Preprints*, Eleftherios P. Diamandis of the University of Toronto and the Mount Sinai Hospital, Toronto, argues that changes caused by humans, to the climate, and everything around us will lead to changes that may have a dramatic impact on human life. Because our ecosystems are so complex, we don’t know how our actions will affect us in the long run, so humans generally disregard them. Changing our environment Everything around us is changing, from living organisms to the climate, water, and soil. Some estimates say about half the organisms that existed 50 years ago have already become extinct, and about 80% of the species may become extinct in the future. As the debate on global warming continues, according to data, the last six years have been the warmest on record. Global warming is melting ice, and sea levels have been increasing. The changing climate is causing more and more wildfires, which are leading to other related damage. At the same time, increased flooding is causing large-scale devastation. One question that arises is how much environmental damage have humans already done? A recent study compared the natural biomass on Earth to the mass produced by humans and found humans produce a mass equal to their weight every week. This human-made mass is mainly for buildings, roads, and plastic products. In the early 1900s, human-made mass was about 3% of the global biomass. Today both are about equal. Projections say by 2040, the human-made mass will be triple that of Earth’s biomass. But, slowing down human activity that causes such production may be difficult, given it is considered part of our growth as a civilization. Emerging pathogens Although we are made up of human cells, we have almost ten times that of bacteria just in our guts and more on our skin. These microbes not only affect locally but also affect the entire body. There is a balance between the good and bad bacteria, and any change in the environment may cause this balance to shift, especially on the skin, the consequences of which are unknown. Although most bacteria on and inside of us are harmless, gut bacteria can also have viruses. If viruses don’t kill the bacteria immediately, they can incorporate into the bacterial genome and stay latent for a long time until reactivation by environmental factors, when they can become pathogenic. They can also escape from the gut and enter other organs or the bloodstream. Bacteria can then use these viruses to kill other bacteria or help them evolve to more virulent strains. An example of the evolution of pathogens is the cause of the current pandemic, the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). Several mutations are now known that make the virus more infectious and resistant to immune responses, and strengthening its to enter cells via surface receptors. The brain There is evidence that the SARS-CoV-2 can also affect the brain. The virus may enter the brain via the olfactory tract or through the angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) pathway. Viruses can also affect our senses, such as a loss of smell and taste, and there could be other so far unkown neurological effects. The loss of smell seen in COVID-19 could be a new viral syndrome specific to this disease. Many books and movies have described pandemics caused by pathogens that wipe out large populations and cause severe diseases. In the essay, the author provides a hypothetical scenario where a gut bacteria suddenly starts producing viral proteins. Some virions spread through the body and get transmitted through the human population. After a few months, the virus started causing blindness, and within a year, large populations lost their vision. Pandemics can cause other diseases that can threaten humanity’s entire existence. The COVID-19 pandemic brought this possibility to the forefront. If we continue disturbing the equilibrium between us and the environment, we don’t know what the consequences may be and the next pandemic could lead us to extinction.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Add-Ons › Pandemics Add-On – 2AC

AI solves pandemics.

Ania Syrowatka, et al, 6/10/2021 (Division of General Internal Medicine, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Boston, MA, USA, “Leveraging artificial intelligence for pandemic preparedness and response: a scoping review to identify key use cases,” Retrieved 6/12/2022 from https://www.nature.com/articles/s41746-021-00459-8)

Artificial intelligence (AI) represents a valuable tool that could be widely used to inform clinical and public health decision-making to effectively manage the impacts of a pandemic. The objective of this scoping review was to identify the key use cases for involving AI for pandemic preparedness and response from the peer-reviewed, preprint, and grey literature. The data synthesis had two parts: an in-depth review of studies that leveraged machine learning (ML) techniques and a limited review of studies that applied traditional modeling approaches. ML applications from the in-depth review were categorized into use cases related to public health and clinical practice, and narratively synthesized. One hundred eighty-three articles met the inclusion criteria for the in-depth review. Six key use cases were identified: forecasting infectious disease dynamics and effects of interventions; surveillance and outbreak detection; real-time monitoring of adherence to public health recommendations; real-time detection of influenza-like illness; triage and timely diagnosis of infections; and prognosis of illness and response to treatment. Data sources and types of ML that were useful varied by use case. The search identified 1167 articles that reported on traditional modeling approaches, which highlighted additional areas where ML could be leveraged for improving the accuracy of estimations or projections. Important ML-based solutions have been developed in response to pandemics, and particularly for COVID-19 but few were optimized for practical application early in the pandemic. These findings can support policymakers, clinicians, and other stakeholders in prioritizing research and development to support operationalization of AI for future pandemics.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Add-Ons › North Korea Add-On – Goes Nuclear

(--) Carefully considered diplomacy is necessary to solve the risk of a miscalculated nuclear conflict with North Korea—assumes Trump actions late in his administration:

Louis Rene Beres, 10/21/2020 (Professor Emeritus of Political Science and International Law at Purdue. He is the author of twelve major books and several hundred journal articles in the field. Professor Beres’ writings appear in many leading newspapers and magazines, including The Atlantic, The Hill, U.S. News & World Report, The National Interest, The Jerusalem Post, The New York Times and Oxford University Press. In Israel, where his latest writings were published by the BESA Center for Strategic Studies, the Institute for Policy and Strategy and the Institute for National Security Studies, he was Chair of Project Daniel (PM Sharon, 2003). Dr. Beres’ strategy-centered publications have been published in such places as The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; JURIST; Special Warfare (Pentagon); Infinity Journal (Israel); The Strategy Bridge; The War Room (USA War College); Modern War Institute (West Point); The Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard Law School); Modern Diplomacy; Yale Global Online; The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Israel Defense (Tel Aviv); World Politics (Princeton); International Security (Harvard) and the Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs. Professor Louis René Beres was born in Zürich, Switzerland, at the end of World War II, ““Hic Sunt Dracones”: Still Expanding Risks of a US-North Korea Nuclear War,” , Retrieved 1/27/2021)

Once again, on October 9, 2020, with immodest displays of tangible hardware, North Korea mocked Donald Trump’s lingering expectations of “denuclearization.” Here, in Pyongyang, President Kim Jong Un smugly revealed a “monster” intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Further highlighted at Kim’s extravagant military parade were the Hwasong-15, which is the longest-range missile ever tested by North Korea, and also what appeared to be a newly-refined submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). How did US President Trump respond? The only apparent reaction from Washington was to call this strategic exposure “disappointing.” Nary a polite nod about the corresponding legal consequences and implications was offered by the White House. None of this should come as any surprise. Massive state-of-the-art nuclear weapons remain North Korea’s most conspicuous expression of global power and influence. To be sure, Kim will never voluntarily surrender such weapons. Realistically, all focused US efforts to deal with this rapidly growing nuclear threat should center on long-term mutual deterrence. Creating this plausibly stabilizing condition by law and diplomacy will be indispensable. For the United States, prudent decision-making in this unstable theatre of potential nuclear conflict will be necessary. Among other things, President Donald J. Trump should take scrupulous care not to exaggerate or overstate America’s military risk-taking calculus. In part, at least, such aptly considered diplomatic caution would stem from the absence of any historically comparable crises. By this absence, prima facie, American military planners and decision-makers remain starkly limited in their capacity to learn from the past. Still, preventing nuclear war with North Korea is not a seat-of-the-pants process for strategic amateurs or political showmen. In the final analysis, the primary battlefield of any war, including nuclear war, must be intellectual. There is more. By definition, there are no “go to” experts on the subject of a nuclear war, civilian or military. As there has never been such a war, there could be no way for American planners or decision-makers to ascertain the mathematical probability of a US-North Korea nuclear conflict. It follows, inter alia, that there exist ample grounds for US decisional modesty. For the United States, it is high time to display profound humility on all strategic and law-based dealings with Kim Jong Un. When a prospectively belligerent path has never been walked upon before, it is incumbent on the calculating “traveler” to advance slowly, purposefully and with recognizable deliberateness. In essence, all strategic issues are many-sided matters of science, law and logic, not just wishful thinking or faith. Though Trump’s original reference to the June 12, 2018 Singapore Summit was to an occasion where the two leaders “fell in love,” there remain few if any residual benefits to this earlier “romance.” This does not mean that Trump’s senior strategists and counselors should in any fashion steer away consciously from clear-eyed assessments of nuclear costs and risks, but only that such assessments be drawn from a constantly shifting and hard to decipher geopolitics. In terms of international law, this geopolitics remains much like its original form in the seventeenth century; that is, anarchic, force-based and unmitigated by any well-intentioned global authority. There is more. It goes without saying that the “pandemic variable” could sometime prove decisive in strategic terms. Unalterably, calculating plausible connections between this novel biological variable and US national security would represent an unprecedented task of Herculean proportion. President Trump will also have to bear in mind that many continuously transforming and mutating strategic developments throughout Asia will be impacted by “Cold War II.” This “War” references an ongoing and primary oppositional stance with Russia, and – more or less derivatively – with China. How shall the United States plan? Proceeding with assorted time-urgent considerations of US – North Korea policy, all significant US strategic calculations will be fraught with intersecting, overlapping and daunting uncertainties. Always, it will be necessary for President Trump and his relevant counselors to remain ready to offer the best available war-peace estimations. Among potential causal factors – some of them maximally interdependent or authentically “synergistic” – the calculable risks of a nuclear war between Washington and Pyongyang (or between Pyongyang and South Korea) will depend upon whether such a fearful conflict would be intentional, unintentional or accidental. Ipso facto, this three-fold distinction would also have pertinent jurisprudential differences. Whatever the particular cause, useful calculations will have to include presumed North Korean conflict orientations to certain regional American allies, not just to the US directly. Such inclusion, in turn, will have to factor in China. As always, in these calculations, refined strategic theory will be a necessary “net.” Only those who “cast,” can be expected to “catch.” This tripartite distinction on cause could prove important to any hoped for success in US-North Korea nuclear war prediction and prevention. Any accidental nuclear war between the US and North Korea would be unintentional or inadvertent, but not all unintentional nuclear wars would be the result of an accident. An unintentional nuclear war could sometime be the result of decisional miscalculation or irrationality, by either one or both of the two contending parties/presidents. Such an understanding is entirely plausible, and ought to underscore the need for decision-maker humility rather than flagrantly chauvinistic bravado. There is much more to know. Facing future North Korean negotiations – proceedings governed by authoritative international law – it will be necessary that competent US policy analysts systematically examine dynamic configurations of foreseeable nuclear risk. When expressed in the orthodox game-theoretic parlance of formal military planning, these shifting configurations could present themselves singly or one-at-a-time (the expectedly best case for Washington); but, they might also arise more-or-less suddenly, unexpectedly, with an apparent diffusiveness and in multiple or overlapping “cascades” of strategic complexity. Whatever their nuances, these examinations will be intellectual and legal tasks, not political ones. To understand any such “cascades” will require carefully-honed, well-developed and formidable analytic skills. Correspondingly, this will not be a graspable task for the analytically faint-hearted. It will require generally rare combinations of historical acquaintance, legal erudition and well- demonstrated capacities for advanced dialectical thinking. In essence, this points to a task that will require thinkers who are as comfortable with elucidating holistic computation prescriptions of Plato and Descartes as with more narrowly technical elements of modern strategic planning. Certain understandings here will call for crucial bifurcations. Currently, it is worrisome that neither Washington nor Pyongyang is likely paying sufficient attention to the specific risks of an unintentional nuclear war. Moreover, to this point in their ongoing relations, each President would seem to assume the other’s decision-making rationality. If, after all, there were no such mutual assumption, it would make no calculable sense for either side to negotiate any further nuclear security accommodations with the other. Goals here must be plain. Stable and viable deterrence, not Pyongyang’s “denuclearization,” must become the overriding US strategic goal vis-à-vis North Korea. This complex goal is always contingent upon certain basic assumptions concerning enemy rationality. But are such assumptions valid in the particular case of a potential war between two nuclear powers? If not, if President Donald Trump should sometime begin to fear overt enemy irrationality in Pyongyang, issuing any explicit threats of US retaliation might only make matters less stable. This is especially worrisome where the new threats were expressly disproportionate. In the past, in his escalating bravado detached from any secure intellectual foundations, Donald Trump has favored such utterly vacant and law-violating threats as “complete annihilation” or “total destruction.” No such crudely lawless preference stands even a scintilla of chance to meet legitimate American security goals. What might sound reasonably “tough” to an American President comfortable only with metaphors of the street may nonetheless only reduce US nuclear deterrent persuasiveness. At some point, if made too contingent upon seat-of-the-pants bellicosity, American national security could come to depend on some presumptively viable combinations of ballistic missile defense and defensive first strikes. Settling upon such untested and legally-problematic combinations would lack decisional input from any tangible/quantifiable historical evidence, and would be existentially risky. In the conceivably worst case, the offensive military element could entail a narrowly situational preemption – a defensive first strike. At that manifestly late stage, of course, all previous hopes for bilateral reconciliation would already have become moot. At that portentous point, there could remain no “ordinary” circumstances wherein a preemptive strike against a nuclear North Korea would still be rational. In Washington’s nuclear relations with Pyongyang, none of these decisions should ever be made casually or without fully substantive intellectual foundations. More precisely, with the steadily expanding development of “hypersonic” nuclear weapons, determining optimal US policy combinations from one crisis to another could very quickly become overwhelming. Though counterintuitive, the fact that the United States is recognizably “more powerful” than North Korea could prove to be largely irrelevant. Even worse, it could become the underlying cause of some actual military nuclear engagement between the two countries. Some years back, Donald Trump, speaking of Kim Jong Un, bragged that both leaders may have a nuclear “button,” but that “my button is bigger than his.” In such urgent matters of national strategy, however, size would likely not matter. In matters of strategic nuclear deterrence, even a seemingly “weaker” nuclear force could still inflict wholly unacceptable harms. In these delicate matters, the weaker party could remain fully capable of wreaking “assuredly destructive” retaliations. In all such foreseeable circumstances, there would obtain various overlapping issues of law and strategy. Under international law, which remains an integral part of US law, the option of a selective or comprehensive defensive first-strike might sometime be correctly characterized as “anticipatory self-defense.” This juridical correctness would apply, however, only if the American side could argue persuasively that the “danger posed” by North Korea was “imminent in point of time.” Discernible “imminence” is specifically required by the authoritative standards of international law – that is, by criteria established and codified after an 1837 naval incident famously called “The Caroline.” Today, in the perplexing nuclear age, aptly precise characterizations of “imminence” could also prove sorely abstract or densely problematic. What then? For the time being, at least, it seems plausible that Kim Jong Un would value his own personal life and that of his nation above any other conceivable preference or combination of preferences. In any corresponding scenario, Kim is assumed to be technically rational, and thus remains subject to US nuclear deterrence. Nonetheless, it could still become important for any negotiating American president to distinguish accurately between authentic instances of enemy irrationality and instances of feigned or pretended irrationality. Such an expectation might not be easily satisfied in the midst of any already-ongoing nuclear crisis; that is, in extremis atomicum. As for the potential effects of disease pandemic upon accurate adversarial assessments, these would inevitably be significant. They could also be more-or-less indecipherable. There is more. Although neither side would likely seek a shooting war, especially if both adversaries were fully rational, either or both heads of state could still commit catastrophic errors in making strategic choices. Any such errors would likely represent an unintended consequence of jointly competitive searches for “escalation dominance.” Arguably, these sorts of prospectively crucial errors are more apt to occur in circumstances where one or both presidents had chosen to reignite exclamations of gratuitous bravado or belligerent rhetoric. An inadvertent nuclear war between Washington and Pyongyang could take place not only as the result of certain misunderstandings or miscalculations between rational national leaders, but also as the unintended consequence (singly or synergistic) of mechanical, electrical, computer malfunctions, or certain “hacking”-type interventions. Going forward, these interventions could surely include unprecedented intrusions of “cyber-mercenaries.” What are the essential “nuclear bargaining” dynamics that now need to be studied? In any crisis between Washington and Pyongyang, each side will expectedly strive to maximize two overriding goals at the same time. These objectives are (1) to dominate the dynamic and largely unpredictable process of nuclear crisis escalation; and (2) to achieve desired “escalation dominance” without sacrificing vital national security obligations. In the final analysis, this second objective means preventing one’s own state and society from suffering catastrophic or existential harms. What is the “bottom line”? All underlying issues of strategic contention between Washington and Pyongyang are enormously complicated and (as an inevitable corollary) subject to irremediable failure. Faced with such complexities – both operational and legal – each side must now proceed warily, in suitably deliberate fashion, with a posture that is both militarily purposeful and prudentially risk-averse. Reciprocally, any aggressive over-confidence by President Trump and/or President Kim will have to be consciously avoided. Recalling the terrible costs of excessive leadership pride chronicled in Greek tragedy – that is, existential costs of “hubris” – the American President must also understand that there will be no rescues from any Deus ex machina. In the end, these must all be matters of problematic human judgment. Although everything on the bargaining table could appear simple, it would be wise to keep in mind the classic “friction-centered” warning of Carl von Clausewitz. “Everything is very simple in war,” says the Prussian military thinker in On War, “but even the simplest thing is very difficult.” Always, this difficulty must extend to corresponding matters of law.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Add-Ons › North Korea Add-On – Goes Nuclear

(--) Risk of war with North Korea is the #1 foreign policy threat—miscalc is a particular scenario—prefer most recent evidence:

Scott A. Snyder, 1/19/2021 (senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), where he had served as an adjunct fellow from 2008 to 2011, “Top Conflicts to Watch in 2021: A North Korea Crisis,” , Retrieved 1/27/2021)

As we turn the calendar on 2020 and embark on 2021, the incoming Joe Biden administration faces no shortage of challenges. The priority areas identified by his transition team include overcoming the pandemic, reviving the economy, achieving racial justice, and addressing climate change. Russia, China, and Iran have also been singled out as issues to be addressed. However, the number one concern identified in CFR’s annual Preventive Priorities Survey of foreign policy experts about potential geopolitical risks to worry about in the coming year—namely, a renewed crisis on the Korean Peninsula—has received scant attention in comparison. This is surprising as the issue has hardly gone away—to the contrary, in fact. President Obama warned President-elect Trump in November 2016 that the most vexing international security threat he would face would emanate from North Korea. Two nuclear tests, myriad long-range missile tests, and three Trump-Kim summits later, the magnitude and likelihood of North Korea posing a catastrophic threat to U.S. national interests is greater than it was four years ago. Despite President Trump’s assertions that he averted a war with North Korea by developing a close personal relationship with Kim Jong-un, Trump’s diplomacy appears to have only changed the tone of the relationship while failing to address the underlying problems posed by North Korea’s ability to launch a nuclear strike on the U.S. mainland. It is not clear that Kim’s self-restraint on long-range missile testing will continue. At the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) Eighth Party Congress staged only days prior to the Biden administration’s inauguration, Kim characterized the United States as its “foremost principal enemy,” and criticized U.S. perceived “hostile policy” toward North Korea despite North Korea’s “good-will efforts.” Military parades staged in conjunction with the Eighth Party Congress and on the October 10, 2020, 75th anniversary of the WPK revealed that North Korea has strengthened its conventional forces and has developed but not yet tested several new types of missiles capable of delivering a nuclear strike on the United States. While the Trump administration has left the door open to diplomatic negotiations since a one-day meeting with North Korean officials in Stockholm in October 2019, North Korea has refused to come to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, Kim’s 2018 summitry gambit and accompanying economic hopes have turned to distress in the face of ongoing sanctions, North Korea’s COVID quarantine, and flooding from a series of typhoons, putting even greater pressure on Kim to achieve an economic breakthrough. North Korea’s Eighth Party Congress addressed these and other economic challenges while pledging to continue its military development and promising to respond to “force with toughness” and “good faith in kind.” This was as close as Kim came during the eight-day Party Congress to providing a signal of intent to open negotiations with the Biden administration. In addition, many analysts expect North Korea to revert to its traditional playbook by returning to nuclear and missile tests as means by which to test new leaders as Kim has previously done with Obama, Xi Jinping, Park Geun-hye, and Trump. North Korea’s purpose in pursuing provocations would be to push North Korea closer to the top of the Biden administration’s agenda by generating a crisis atmosphere and shaping the space and prospects for diplomatic negotiations. Anticipation of North Korean provocations is so high that analysts have either rushed to recommend that Biden extend an early olive branch to North Korea in an effort to forestall a crisis or speculated about how to capitalize on a crisis to induce North Korea to return to denuclearization negotiations. Regardless of whether Kim Jong-un is motivated by domestic economic distress or the desire to redress long-held international grievances, North Korea’s insistence on presenting itself as an entrenched nuclear weapons state remains at odds with the longstanding U.S. policy and international security norms upheld by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But North Korea’s capabilities are also an undeniable reality and an international security threat that must be managed to avoid catastrophic results. The Biden administration will need to devise a set of early actions to reassure North Korea of its willingness to engage in negotiations, reduce the risk of North Korean miscalculation, and forestall likely attention-grabbing provocations by North Korea, regardless of whether they emanate from manifestations of Kim’s military strength or his economic weakness.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Add-Ons › North Korea Add-On – 2AC

North Korean nuclearization leads to extinction

Peter Hayes, & Michael Hamel-Green, 2009 (Honorary Professor, Center for International Security Studies & professor in social sciences in the College of Arts at Victoria University Melbourne) The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia, Dec. 14, 2009. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2016 from http://apjjf.org/-Peter-Hayes/3267/article.html

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Add-Ons › North Korea Add-On – 2AC

AI technology can lay the groundwork for nuclear arms control with North Korea.

Jessica Cox, 2021 (Director of Nuclear Policy at NATO, “The Unavoidable Technology: How Artificial Intelligence Can Strengthen Nuclear Stability,” WASHINGTON QUARTERLY)

Similarly, the work of open source intelligence experts, such as the Open Nuclear Network of One Earth Future,38 could be buttressed by applying AI tech¬nology that could recognize and analyze missile activity in North Korea. Arms control with North Korea still seems unlikely as the Kim regime has not expressed an interest in relinquishing its nuclear weapons, but in the meantime, improved information about North Korea’s nuclear activities and plans can improve situa¬tional awareness and understanding of their nuclear program and processes, potentially providing the groundwork for denuclearization and cooperative arms control at a later time. Human involvement would still be essential to provide important contextual information, but these developments might facili¬tate arms control verification by identifying treaty-prohibited items or activities in record time and provide convincing intelligence to the international community.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Add-Ons › NATO Add-On – Plan Bolsters NATO

AI is key to the speed and effectiveness of US military operations.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 2/12/2019 (“SUMMARY OF THE 2018 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY,” Retrieved 6/12/2022 from .)

AI is rapidly changing a wide range of businesses and industries. It is also poised to change the character of the future battlefield and the pace of threats we must face. We will harness the potential of AI to transform all functions of the Department positively, thereby supporting and protecting U.S. servicemembers, safeguarding U.S. citizens, defending allies and partners, and improving the affordability, effectiveness, and speed of our operations. The women and men in the U.S. armed forces remain our enduring source of strength; we will use AI-enabled information, tools, and systems to empower, not replace, those who serve.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Add-Ons › NATO Add-On – Plan Bolsters NATO

Political oversight of AI operations adds legitimacy and military effectiveness to the alliance.

Zoe Stanley-Lockman, 2022 (Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” , Retrieved 6/11/2022)

The political dimension of the Alliance rests on the bedrock of a shared commitment to the “principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law,” as enshrined in the foundational North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.60 Shared values are important for NATO operations because they help constitute their legitimacy. In addition to the North Atlantic Council exerting civilian oversight over NATO operations, legitimacy also includes respect for international legal principles including the core principles of international humanitarian law, or the laws of armed conflict, distinction, proportionality, and necessity. Without political oversight and legitimacy, NATO’s military power would be less effective at shaping norms and promoting stability in the international system. The introduction of AI means that NATO has the moral and strategic imperative to adopt technologies that confer legitimacy and responsible innovation.61 Acting on a shared commitment to democratic values is vital to the political cohesion of the NATO Alliance, just as much as it is a determinant of military effectiveness in a predictable security environment.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Add-Ons › NATO Add-On – Plan Bolsters NATO

Interoperability on AI is key to respond to threats that would undermine NATO.

CENTER FOR EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS, 2/17/2021 (“NATO Leadership on Ethical AI is Key to Future Interoperability,” ., Retrieved 6/15/2022)

If individual nations or groups are left to develop their own ethical principles without wider alignment to NATO, the result will be a number of AI-based systems with varying technical specifications based on the legal and policy decisions made by individual governments when answering the key questions. As has been demonstrated in areas such as facial recognition and policing algorithms, the assumptions made by those developing the tools and answering the key questions have a significant impact on the real-world functioning of the tool and societal acceptance of its ethics. The risk of tools failing to gain acceptance depends on the legal and ethical decisions made by governments. For the military, this may mean one state using an AI-based system that is seen as unacceptable by another, and in a joint operation one state fielding a system that cannot be used by another. Or worse yet, this could render a joint operation impossible. Without the ability to interoperate across NATO, the inability to effectively and efficiently respond to future threats would undermine the Alliance.