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2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › Internal Link › IL---Resources Finite---Generic

Military resources are finite. New expenditures require a draw-down from other regions

Wasser 20 (Becca Wasser, fellow in the Defense Program and co-lead of the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security, “Making Critical Choices for Better Posture Approaches,” Center for New American Security, 2020,

The 2018 NDS was widely lauded for acknowledging that the United States has finite resources and therefore must prioritize its activities. A key element of the strategic guidance was the elevation of China and Russia as top threats to the United States. This move raised the importance of Asia and Europe to U.S. defense strategy.2 While creating a clear hierarchy of threats was commendable, the details of how the DoD would implement this guidance was and continues to be unclear and has resulted in haphazard attempts to adjust posture. U.S. posture in Asia—with the exception of a reported planned troop reduction in the Republic of Korea and increased freedom of navigation operations—has remained remarkably stagnant for the top geographic priority.3 Europe, on the other hand, has seen significant plans to alter the U.S. footprint and establish a new base in Poland, with the intent to better address the Russian threat.4 The Middle East, despite being an implied region of lesser importance, has received an influx of U.S. forces and capabilities since the strategy was published.5 High-demand, low-density assets that the United States had previously removed from there for use in Asia and Europe have since been returned, along with additional capabilities.6 Moreover, while the DoD has undertaken combatant command–level posture reviews, only minimal force reductions have been made in Africa and South America, areas where the U.S. footprint is already relatively small.7 Although the elevation of China and Russia in the NDS had obvious implications for U.S. posture, actualizing these changes has been difficult. This is in part because the prioritization within the last NDS still does not go far enough in forcing DoD policymakers to make difficult posture choices. Altering posture using finite resources, manpower, and capabilities involves a dynamic similar to that of a seesaw—to reinforce forces and capabilities in one region, forces and the same capabilities in another region will have to be restrained in order to balance things out. With the United States facing further resource constraints as a result of COVID-19, the next NDS[National Defense Strategy] must further prioritize adversaries and geographic regions to help determine a more aligned posture—one that better prepares the nation to prevail against other great powers while deterring lesser opponents.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › Internal Link › IL---Resources Zero-sum

Resources for Europe directly tradeoff with resources dedicated to Asian power projection

Simon, Desmaele and Becker 21 (Luise Simon, head of international security at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute. Linde Desmaele, doctoral fellow at the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. Jordan Becker, currently the US liaison to the French Joint Staff. He was previously a senior transatlantic fellow at the Institute for European Studies, “Europe as a Secondary Theater? Competition with China and the Future of America’s European Strategy,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 2021,

Because outcompeting China has become its most pressing strategic challenge, Washington is adjusting its policies and relationships elsewhere in the world to ensure that they support competition with Beijing. While the shift has been gradual, it is now apparent; it represents a significant change from the twentieth century when the US went to war twice in Europe and conflicts elsewhere were often driven by the logic of European security. Whereas during the Cold War the US enlisted European allies in a global struggle against a European power, today the US seeks to enlist European allies in a global competition with a non-European power. To be sure, neither competition with China nor the preservation of a favorable regional balance in the Indo-Pacific fully monopolizes US global strategy. Both the 2017 NSS and the declassified synopsis of the 2018 NDS emphasize America’s ongoing commitment to the preservation of “favorable balances of power in Europe and the Middle East.”31 The NSS even refers to Europe as the United States’ most “significant trading partner” and notes that America is “safer when Europe is prosperous and stable.”32 Yet there is growing concern in Washington about how China’s rise might affect European security. In this regard, the NSS warns about Beijing’s supposed efforts to “gain a strategic foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies and infrastructure.”33 A 2019 task force report published by the bipartisan Asia Society similarly identifies “China’s pursuit of a mercantilist high-tech import-substitution industrial policy” and its “economic and diplomatic statecraft to gain a military foothold beyond Asia,” including in Europe, as key grand strategic challenges.34 In other words, because US strategic objectives in Asia and Europe are increasingly interdependent, China and Asia are also becoming increasingly relevant in Washington’s dealings with and in Europe. This interdependence complicates America’s European strategy in two ways: by underscoring the problem resource trade-offs and by pushing the US to reconcile competing interests across the two regions.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › Internal Link › IL---Resources Zero-sum

The plan trades off with resources needed to deter China

Blackwill and Fontaine 22 (Robert Blackwill, senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations. Richard Fontaine, Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security, “Ukraine War Should Slow But Not Stop the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” Bloomberg, 2022,

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has upended this approach. Now Washington must deal with revisionist great powers in two regions, while the Middle East also continues to demand attention. The U.S. should continue a long-term shift to Asia, but in a way that better balances resources and engagements across the three strategic theaters. Paradoxically, Putin’s aggression demonstrates how this should be done. First, policy makers should absorb the enduring strategic logic behind a pivot to Asia. China combines the greatest capability and will to upend the international order. The Indo-Pacific represents the primary, but not the only, regional theater in which U.S.-China competition takes place. But a sustainable pivot to Asia is possible only in the absence of serious national security crises in Europe and the Middle East. No U.S. president will ignore a Russian-induced emergency in Europe, a major terrorist threat, or a nuclear and/or hegemonic Iran. America remains a global and not a regional power. The central challenge is allocating national security resources across all three regions, without either weakening vital U.S. national interests in one or imagining that America can do everything, everywhere. That problem is most acute in the military sphere. An increase in defense spending will be required, but how that money is spent is equally important. In the Middle East, for example, regular troops should relieve the burden placed on elite special operations forces in security cooperation missions. Washington should move expensive military equipment — like F-35 and F-22 aircraft — to the two arenas of great-power competition, employing less-capable aircraft, including unmanned systems, for counterterrorism missions. A combination of regional diplomacy and continued deterrence could limit Iran's regional ambitions, freeing up some of the forces that have deployed to the Middle East in recent years to deter a potential Iran threat. In Europe, the U.S. should build on its allies’ newfound willingness to enhance their military capabilities and deter further Russian aggression. This should involve moving American troops currently stationed in Europe further east, to countries such as Poland, Romania and the Baltics. Washington should also capitalize on the recent increase in intelligence sharing – including to NATO non-members – by eliminating barriers to sharing defense technology with allies newly willing to invest. For the Indo-Pacific, Washington should reserve the lion's share of military resources that matter most, including smaller naval surface ships, long-range missiles and next-generation fighter aircraft. Building on efforts like the Aukus security arrangement with Australia and the U.K. would give regional allies more leverage to strengthen their own defense, helping them better deter China and serve as the frontline in daily competition with it. Diplomatic resources are less zero-sum than military power, and economic engagement less still. Intense diplomatic work in Europe and the Middle East could bolster the coalitions in each that are willing and able to deal with threats there, and potentially reduce some of the threats themselves. Washington should couple this with an affirmative economic agenda, beginning with re-entry to or renegotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › Internal Link › IL---Resources Zero-sum

The plan requires a forced choice to sacrifice resources and focus needed to defend Taiwan

Colby 22 (Eldridge Colby, co-founder and principal of The Marathon Initiative, a policy initiative focused on developing strategies to prepare the United States for an era of sustained great power competition, “The U.S. Must Support Ukraine, But China Must Be Our Priority,” TIME Magazine, 2022, )

How should America respond to Russia’s abominable invasion of Ukraine? This is a question of immense importance. Right now, there is more heat than light in the discussion. Given the momentous stakes, Americans must respond to this crisis with clarity of mind and sobriety. Moscow’s invasion is likely to be a hinge point in history. If nothing else, it lays to rest the idea that history is over, that power politics and the threat of war are gone from the developed areas of the world. This is sad, but it is a reality. In developing our response to Russia’s brazen act, we must face and adapt to this reality. For too long, we have discounted the hard facts of international politics. But now America must look at the world situation much more soberly and strategically, proceeding from these hard facts rather than ignoring them or wishing them away. Above all, our response must be strategic—it must match our response to the threats we face in light of our resources and the risks we are willing to take on. The reality is that we face multiple serious threats in different parts of the world. The danger Russia poses, including to our NATO allies, is now very clear. But others have not gone away. We also must consider Iran, North Korea, transnational terrorists like al Qaeda, and, above all, the threat of a China that seeks first hegemony over Asia and then global preeminence. So far this is familiar. Less familiar but absolutely critical is the fact that we do not have a military large or capable enough to fight major wars against Russia and China in even roughly concurrent timelines. It is true that Europe is mainly a land theater and the Western Pacific is mainly a maritime one. But many of the things our forces would need to defeat Russia or China are needed in both theaters—like heavy penetrating bombers, attack submarines, advanced munitions, air defenses, and survivable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Even certain assets once thought most appropriate or necessary for Europe may well play a critical role in a fight against China, such as Army long-range missiles and artillery. These and other capabilities like them would be just as vital for beating back a Russian assault as they would be for denying a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan—and are already in short supply. Unfortunately, this is not a problem that we can solve easily, quickly, or cheaply. We should seek to redress it, but, even if we muster the will, it will take years and a significantly larger defense budget to build more of the things we need to fight a major war, like penetrating heavy bombers and nuclear-powered attack submarines. In the meantime, what we do have can only be used in one place at a time. A missile used in Europe can’t be used in Asia, and a bomber lost over Europe will take years to be replaced. We do also have an unparalleled network of allies. But a similar problem confronts us here. In theory our alliance network is far stronger than the threats we face. But in reality few of our allies have significant militaries, and it will take those that don’t significant time to develop their armed forces even if they gather the resolve. Over the long term, then, our strategy should be clear. We should reshape our military to field far more of the kinds of systems needed to fight a great power war and, with a few exceptions like sustaining our ongoing counterterrorism efforts, dispense with those elements that are ill-suited for it. Meantime, we should press and encourage our allies, especially Japan, Germany, and Taiwan, to build up their conventional defenses, and fully enable those, like Poland, Australia, and the United Kingdom, willing to do more for their and others’ defense. But this strategy will take time to bear fruit. This is the strategy the 2018 National Defense Strategy called for—yet four years later, due to factors ranging from inertia through political and bureaucratic resistance to allied footdragging, we still have a long way to go. In the coming years, then, we face what Henry Kissinger called “the necessity for choice.” We don’t have enough of the right military might to cover all the threats to our interests. So we must prioritize. This is far from unprecedented. The U.S. and Britain faced this dilemma in 1941, and elected a “Europe first” strategy, prioritizing defeating much stronger Nazi Germany before Imperial Japan. Similarly today, America must prioritize addressing the threat China poses in Asia. Asia is the world’s “decisive theater” and China by far the most powerful other state in the world. If China attains its goal of becoming dominant over Asia, it will control over half of the global economy. Americans’ fundamental liberties and prosperity will suffer grievously. This is the most dangerous outcome for Americans, and preventing it must be the priority of our foreign policy. In practical military terms, this means that we must ensure enough of the right military forces—bombers, submarines, munitions, ISR, and the like—are ready and available to defend Taiwan, and on relatively short notice. Taiwan is China’s best target for breaking apart the anti-hegemonic coalition that is the only way we can prevent Beijing from dominating Asia. If China seizes Taiwan, it will deal this coalition a huge—possibly mortal—blow. We cannot allow this. And, crucially, this is a problem right now. We don’t know Beijing’s assessment of the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to seize Taiwan. But we do know that America’s ability to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan has eroded very substantially in recent years, that it is continuing to erode, and that Beijing’s perceptions of its ability to take the island would rise dramatically if it knew we had expended or tied down critical parts of our military in or for Europe. In other words, we are in or very close to the window where a successful Chinese attack on Taiwan is possible, and we must hedge against this risk.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › Internal Link › IL---Resources Zero-sum

Washington has internalized a zero-sum relationship between Europe and Asia. They will trade-off resources, even if it’s not legally required.

Simon, Desmaele and Becker 21 (Luise Simon, head of international security at the Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute. Linde Desmaele, doctoral fellow at the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. Jordan Becker, currently the US liaison to the French Joint Staff. He was previously a senior transatlantic fellow at the Institute for European Studies, “Europe as a Secondary Theater? Competition with China and the Future of America’s European Strategy,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 2021,

First, to influence and maintain a favorable balance of power in Europe, Washington has traditionally relied on a strategy of forward military presence coupled with economic and diplomatic engagement. But US resources are limited, and increasing demand for them in Asia raises new questions about whether Washington can preserve a favorable European regional balance at a lower cost than in the past. In this context, Washington must consider how much influence it is willing to cede to European actors, including Germany, Russia, Britain, France and the European Union (EU). Second, as Europe becomes a secondary theater in US grand strategy, Washington is compelled to ensure that Europe’s key powers and institutions support US interests when it comes to competition with Beijing, or at least that they do not undermine US efforts in this regard. In reframing its relationship with Europe, the US is paying increasing attention to Europe’s positions toward China and Asia. Washington recently warned Europeans, for example, about China’s efforts to leverage investments and trade to gain technological and related strategic advantages relative to the United States.9 China-related considerations are also likely to gain relevance in the context of America’s calculations vis-à-vis Russia, a country that can play a direct—if limited—strategic role in China’s immediate periphery: Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Western Pacific. For now, the US continues to look at Russia (primarily) through a European lens and worries about Moscow’s potential to threaten US regional interests and upset the European balance. However, as competition with China becomes the focus of US grand strategy, Washington may increasingly consider how Russia can affect that competition—whether through its relationship with China, its ability to strain the European balance of power, or its propensity to create challenges elsewhere in the world. While it is certainly conceivable that the United States could retain such overwhelming advantages vis-à-vis all its peer competitors, or that China’s rise could organically slow or reverse, the US does not seem to be betting on either scenario.10 The centrality of China in US grand strategy appears to be structural, driven by the broader eastward shift in the distribution of global economic power. It is therefore unsurprising that as the United States becomes increasingly preoccupied with China’s rise, it adjusts strategy in other regions accordingly. The fact that Washington has labelled China as a “global” competitor makes it difficult to isolate SinoAmerican competition in Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific area from what happens in other theaters, particularly Europe.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › Link › Link---AT Cheap

Security Cooperation drains finite resources needed for other programs

Hamilton 21. PhD, Associate Professor of Eurasian Studies (Robert, “Taking Stock of US Military Assistance in Georgia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute,

A corollary to the problem of contractor-led assistance is the problem of “supply-side assistance.” This occurs when organizations involved in institutional capacity-building (ICB) in the U.S. “market” their services to partner nations, rather than assistance being contingent upon a demand signal from the partner nation, validated by the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the U.S. Embassy. Most partner nations, unwilling to appear ungrateful, will gladly accept whatever assistance is offered, even if it doesn’t address an important national interest and even if the partner nation lacks the ability to absorb and sustain it. While such “marketing” allows ICB-providers to claim relevance and secure funding, for the [Security Cooperation Organization ] SCO, it represents a drain on its finite resources without the payoff of achieving important U.S. or partner nation interests.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › Link › Link---AT Cheap

Every SC initiative generates financial op-costs

Gold 21, researcher at CNA (Zack, “A Better Way to Measure Returns on U.S. Security Cooperation Investments,” Defense One News,

Second, even if the returns were quantifiable, the real costs of security cooperation for the U.S. military are often unmeasurable. For example, past analysis indicates that the structure of the Navy’s cost accounting system makes it impossible to know the full, exact cost of any security cooperation deployment or activity. Additionally, there is opportunity cost in every decision about security cooperation. In Washington, the focus in recent years has been on realigning resources for great power competition. However, each geographic combatant command has dozens of partners. How, for example, can one accurately calculate the real and opportunity costs of conducting a bilateral exercise with Brazil as opposed to Colombia; or even with the UAE navy versus the UAE armed forces?

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › Link › Link---AT Cheap

Even if the plan seems cheap, it will outpace cost projections because of military squandering of resources

Munson 13 (Peter Munson, senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer, “The Limits of Security Cooperation,” War on the Rocks, 2013,

SC does work to build capacity in certain, relatively elite units that perceive a real need for improvement and hard training. Likewise, it works to build interoperability between already-capable partner forces and U.S. and coalition militaries. SC in the right doses can be a good way of showing solidarity with allies against other regional threats. But SC [Security Cooperation] is not a panacea and must be applied with significantly more discernment than the usual some-is-good-more-is-better logic of U.S. military spending. Planners should go to great lengths to ensure that SC is seen as a tool for a specific purpose, not a reward to condition behaviors. SC-as-a-conditioning-tool becomes bribery with diminishing returns. If policymakers want a quid pro quo, they need to admit as much and use much more precisely targeted incentives: paying a fee for access or head-of-the-line transit privileges for example. This becomes a much more predictable business transaction than trying to use SC funds, winks, and nudges to get one’s way. Finally, in the land of perverse incentives, SC is often seen as a means to drive defense business to U.S. contractors. This is true. By creating arms races and supplying prestige weapons, however useless, to unstable areas of the world, they are creating U.S. jobs. But wouldn’t taxpayer money and efforts be better spent if officials more precisely targeted domestic concerns with taxpayer funds rather than hoping that efforts trickle down predictably from collaboration with corpulent and unsavory foreign generals? In the land of perverse incentives, SC funding is one of the most egregious—and in the post-9/11 era, many officials see SC as a critical tool of strategic positioning. However, the premises of SC must be reconsidered before the U.S. military squanders more resources on white elephant projects.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › Link › Link---AT Normal Means = Budget Increase

Normal means is not an overall budget increase

Moulton 20, Congressman from Mass. (“Transcript: Rising to the Challenge: Regaining US Military Superiority During a Time of Uncertainty,” Hudson Institute, )

Rep. Seth Moulton: And part of the criteria is going to have to be cost. That’s just the budgetary environment that we’re facing. It’s very easy to sit in Congress and say, “I’m always going to spend more on national security, I’m always going to couch it in terms of supporting our troops or whatever. But the reality is, we, like every country in the world have finite resources. And what’s most important is that we make the tough decisions to spend those resources as wisely as we can to support our troops and to support our national security, that’s going to be tough.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › Link › Link---Cyber---2NC

Enhanced cybersecurity requires modified procurement standards. Makes all weapons more expensive

Schneier and Wheeler 21 (Bruce Schneier, fellow at the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School and a fellow at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University. Tarah Wheeler, CEO of information security consultancy Red Queen Dynamics, and a Cyber Project Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University‘s Kennedy School of Government, “Hacked drones and busted logistics are the cyber future of warfare,” Brookings, 2021,

An updated GAO report from earlier this year found some improvements, but the basic problem remained: “DOD is still learning how to contract for cybersecurity in weapon systems, and selected programs we reviewed have struggled to incorporate systems’ cybersecurity requirements into contracts.” While DOD now appears aware of the issue of lack of cybersecurity requirements, they’re still not sure yet how to fix it, and in three of the five cases GAO reviewed, DOD simply chose to not include the requirements at all. Militaries around the world are now exploiting these vulnerabilities in weapons systems to carry out operations. When Israel in 2007 bombed a Syrian nuclear reactor, the raid was preceded by what is believed to have been a cyber attack on Syrian air defenses that resulted in radar screens showing no threat as bombers zoomed overhead. In 2018, a 29-country NATO exercise, Trident Juncture, that included cyberweapons was disrupted by Russian GPS jamming. NATO does try to test cyberweapons outside such exercises, but has limited scope in doing so. In May, Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO secretary-general, said that “NATO computer systems are facing almost daily cyberattacks.” The war of the future will not only be about explosions, but will also be about disabling the systems that make armies run. It’s not (solely) that bases will get blown up; it’s that some bases will lose power, data, and communications. It’s not that self-driving trucks will suddenly go mad and begin rolling over friendly soldiers; it’s that they’ll casually roll off roads or into water where they sit, rusting, and in need of repair. It’s not that targeting systems on guns will be retargeted to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue; it’s that many of them could simply turn off and not turn back on again. So, how do we prepare for this next war? First, militaries need to introduce a little anarchy into their planning. Let’s have wargames where essential systems malfunction or are subverted—not all of the time, but randomly. To help combat siloed military thinking, include some civilians as well. Allow their ideas into the room when predicting potential enemy action. And militaries need to have well-developed backup plans, for when systems are subverted. In Joe Haldeman’s 1975 science-fiction novel The Forever War, he postulated a “stasis field” that forced his space marines to rely on nothing more than Roman military technologies, like javelins. We should be thinking in the same direction. NATO isn’t yet allowing civilians not employed by NATO or associated military contractors access to their training cyber ranges where vulnerabilities could be discovered and remediated before battlefield deployment. Last year, one of us (Tarah) was listening to a NATO briefing after the end of the 2020 Cyber Coalition exercises, and asked how she and other information security researchers could volunteer to test cyber ranges used to train its cyber incident response force. She was told that including civilians would be a “welcome thought experiment in the tabletop exercises,” but including them in reality wasn’t considered. There is a rich opportunity for improvement here, providing transparency into where improvements could be made. Second, it’s time to take cybersecurity seriously in military procurement, from weapons systems to logistics and communications contracts. In the three year span from the original 2018 GAO report to this year’s report, cybersecurity audit compliance went from 0% to 40% (those 2 of 5 programs mentioned earlier). We need to get much better. DOD requires that its contractors and suppliers follow the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification process; it should abide by the same standards. Making those standards both more rigorous and mandatory would be an obvious second step. Gone are the days when we can pretend that our technologies will work in the face of a military cyberattack. Securing our systems will make everything we buy more expensive—maybe a lot more expensive. But the alternative is no longer viable.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › Link › Link---Cyber---1NC

NATO cyber-defense is enormously expensive

Sanger 16 (David Sanger, White House and national security correspondent, and a senior writer @ NYT, “As Russian Hackers Probe, NATO Has No Clear Cyberwar Strategy,” New York Times, 2016,

At United States Cyber Command, which has expanded rapidly since the United States carried out cyberattacks against Iran in 2010, Russia’s networks are a regular target of surveillance. By next year, Cyber Command will have more than 130 teams fully in operation around the world, integrated into Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force units, in addition to teams that work alongside the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Md. It has built up a vast early warning network, placing tens of thousands of “implants” — sensors that can also be used to insert malware — into networks around the world. But NATO is only beginning to explore what it delicately calls “active defense,” and says it is not focused on offensive cyberweapons. The Russians have no such compunctions. But it is unclear what Russian hackers hope to achieve here in the Baltics, other than to make the point, as they did in 2007 when they brought Estonia to an electronic halt, that they can get into any system, anytime. “Whatever the Russians have in mind — mostly intimidation — it usually fails,” said Estonia’s president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who grew up in New Jersey before coming here to turn this small NATO country into a pioneer in introducing new web-based technology for governing a nation. The 2007 attacks backfired, he noted, because they drove Estonians far more solidly into the European and NATO camps. In Sweden and Finland, neutral nations in the Cold War, the politics are more complex. As the NATO exercise began in Finland last week, the Finnish foreign minister was in Moscow, meeting his Russian counterpart, Sergey V. Lavrov. The more Sweden and Finland turn to NATO, the more their networks, their news sites and their government ministries come under cyberattack. As Adm. John Richardson, the chief of United States naval operations, said at an event at the Council on Foreign Relations in May, “The fact is it’s a pretty hot war in the cyber domain going on right now.” A hot war, but a kind that suits Russia well: It is part of what military strategists call “gray zone” combat. For Mr. Putin, cyberespionage and cyberattacks keep NATO and its partners off balance. They are enormously difficult and expensive to defend against, and, at least for now, they have operated below the line that is likely to prompt a military or economic response. “It stays below the radar,” Martin Libicki of the RAND Corporation told a conference sponsored this month by the NATO cyber center here, officially known as the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. For the Russians, Mr. Libicki said, cyberespionage and weaponry are part of a larger strategy of information warfare and a blitz of propaganda that makes sorting out fact from fiction — say, the causes of the Malaysia Airlines crash in Ukraine — all the more difficult. But the attacks also remind the smaller nations here of their vulnerability, even if Russia’s troops stay on their side of the border. So far, NATO has found few effective means of deterring attacks.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
DOD Tradeoff DA › Link › Link---AI---2NC

AI interoperability requires serious investment from both sides of the Atlantic

Christie 22 (Edward Hunter Christie, senior research fellow @ Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe,” European View, 2022, 2.1)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence—for example, recognising patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions or taking action—whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems (Reding and Eaton 2020, 14). The range of potential military applications is at least as vast as the range of tasks that require human cognition, for example analysing and classifying visual data, organising logistics, operating support vehicles, or tracking and engaging hostile targets (Christie 2021b, 84). States are racing to achieve superiority in the AI domain (Lin-Greenberg 2020). Furthermore, like other digital technologies, AI diffuses rapidly and cheaply across areas of human activity and across borders. Nevertheless, as with other technological transformations, states with greater resources and levels of effort, and better policies, will reap the benefits of technology adoption more rapidly than others. In an alliance context, matters pertaining to cooperation and interoperability take centre stage. The good news is that Europeans are not starting from scratch. European states that are members of NATO can rely on decades of experience with the Alliance’s mechanisms of consultation and collaboration. In addition, European states that are members of the EU can pursue collaborative activities through the European Defence Agency (EDA). Furthermore, EU funding is available through the European Defence Fund for defence research and capability-development activities. At NATO the key processes address, most notably, the areas of defence research, military transformation, capability development, military–technical standardisation, and defence planning and capability targets. For these areas of work, formal consultative mechanisms—committees in which each Ally has a voice—include the Science and Technology Board, the Military Committee, the Conference of National Armaments Directors, the NATO Standardisation Board, and the Defence Policy and Planning Committee. Each of these committees relies on support staffs and structures. Of particular interest when considering AI are the Science and Technology Organisation, which has several facilities and is led by the Office of the Chief Scientist at NATO Headquarters; and, Allied Command Transformation. The latter, including its Innovation Hub, plays a particularly central role in driving innovation and force transformation for the Alliance. In addition, two staff units created in 2019 are of particular importance, namely the Innovation Unit and the Data Policy Unit, both of which are within the Emerging Security Challenges Division of the NATO International Staff. The Innovation Unit provides thought leadership and initiatives to accelerate technology adoption, while the Data Policy Unit provides policy thought leadership on how to treat data as a strategic resource. The Innovation Unit designs new initiatives for the promotion and financing of defencerelated innovation. A notable achievement in this area was the creation of the NATO Innovation Fund (NATO 2021). In the EU context, the EDA plays a central role in several areas of work. Among other activities, the EDA supports defence research cooperation, defence standardisation and pooled procurement programmes, while also contributing to the EU’s Capability Development Plan and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (Fiott 2018, 287). Most of the EDA’s functions are broadly analogous to ones that exist at NATO. Of particular interest is the intention to create a new Defence Innovation Hub within the EDA, as announced in the EU’s November 2021 draft Strategic Compass (European External Action Service 2021, 23). Before proceeding, it is worth spelling out the extent to which European security is dependent on NATO and in particular on the US. Of the EU’s 27 member states, 21 are members of NATO. These countries account for about 93% of the population1 of the EU. Within NATO, those Allies that are also EU members only account for about 20% of total defence expenditure across the Alliance, while the US alone accounts for about 70% of the same total.2 Beyond these aggregate indicators, it is furthermore the case that the US is considerably ahead of the EU in terms of practical adoption of AI. For illustration, in 2020 US private-sector investment in AI was around $23.6 billion, but was only $2 billion in the EU, implying a ratio of 12 to 1 in favour of the US (Zhang et al. 2021, 96). Scientific output indicators offer a more nuanced picture. In 2019, the EU accounted for 16.4% of the world’s peer-reviewed AI publications, ahead of the US with 14.6%, while China occupied the top spot with 22.4% (Zhang et al. 2021, 20). On the other hand, if one measures research output in terms of publications on the Arxiv database, the US is ahead of the EU (Zhang et al. 2021, 33) by a ratio of almost two to one, which is nonetheless much less than the large gap in private investment mentioned above. That the EU performs similarly to the US in terms of scientific research, but far less well in terms of investment and commercialisation of new digital technologies, is an old problem which has proven very difficult to address, whether at national or EU level (Baroudy et al. 2020). In the following sections, I offer reflections on three challenge areas for European and Allied defence institutions: interoperability challenges, international security challenges and investment challenges. These three challenges are effectively interdependent. While interoperability is a permanent goal in an alliance context, be it NATO or the EU, it is particularly salient in cases of rapid technological change, such as with AI, as there is a need for a higher tempo across areas of activity. Heightened international security challenges likewise increase the need for urgency to ensure that Western nations do not fall behind potential adversaries. Investment, in turn, is the engine for rapid change, enabling the dynamic adoption of new technologies, relevant capability-development activities and other adaptations along the value chain of military activities. Overall, my central argument is that the confluence of rapid technological change and heightened international security challenges requires a higher pace of change and adaptation that can only succeed if serious investments are made on both sides of the Atlantic.

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US-NATO AI interoperability requires a significant increase in funding

Christie 22 (Edward Hunter Christie, senior research fellow @ Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe,” European View, 2022, 2.1)

Much has already been achieved in terms of new structures, new initiatives and new policy developments to support the collaborative adoption of AI among NATO Allies and EU member states. In addition to pre-existing structures and mechanisms at both the NATO and EU levels, which have ensured that nations are not starting from scratch, national defence institutions are already able to refer to common policy commitments and to options, whether through NATO or the EDA, for research or capability-development activities. At the same time, ensuring a competitive edge in AI is a truly whole-of-government effort which requires considerable cross-over between the military and civilian realms. Large gaps remain between the US and the EU on certain key indicators. At the same time, the gaps pertaining to research are far smaller. To ensure greater European performance and relevance in AI in general, and its defence applications in particular, it seems desirable to focus on two strategic priorities: investment volumes, both public and private, which need to be significantly increased; and the full use of collaborative mechanisms involving the US. To that end, it would be beneficial for nations on both sides of the Atlantic to ensure that a clear and common vision is set out in forthcoming strategic documents, most notably the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s new Strategic Concept. This should include clear political commitments to increasing investment, both in general and in instruments for promoting collaborative innovation. There are opportunities for ‘more Europe’ through the EDA and the European Defence Fund. But while pursuing those avenues, European capitals should prioritise efforts that complement and enhance transatlantic approaches, in recognition of the reality that the US remains the indispensable ally for Europe’s security.

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Let US commitments to NATO die---that frees up resources to successfully defend Asian allies

Shifrinson 21 (Joshua Shifrinson, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor at Boston University's Pardee School of Global Studies, “The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future,” Quincy Report, 2021,

It is easy to get wrapped up in the rhetorical shifts and policy particulars of the moment, but the United States has consistently approached NATO through a combination of opportunism and geopolitics. Since the alliance’s creation in the late 1940s, the United States has attempted to strike a balance between its own contradictory impulses. Going forward, the question is whether this balance is sustainable in practice, if not in declared intent, given the emerging shape of international politics. It is not defeatist to be skeptical. Alliance commitments tend to change when new threats appear and strategic priorities shift. As America’s attention moves toward Asia, its longstanding attitudes toward European security should be reevaluated and accorded lower strategic priority. Western Europe, and much of Eastern Europe, are secure. No European hegemon is on the horizon. A balance of power exists and ought to be allowed to mature. This is good news. America’s postwar commitment to European security went on far longer and became far more expansive than policymakers envisioned in the 1940s and 1950s. Now the mission is accomplished. Western Europe, and much of Eastern Europe, are secure. No European hegemon is on the horizon. A balance of power exists and ought to be allowed to mature. Seventy-two years after NATO’s founding, America’s role in the alliance can change fundamentally with little risk to U.S. or European security — and much to gain for both.

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NATO effectiveness requires substantial military resources. Triggers tradeoffs.

Chollet et al 20 (Derek Chollet, executive vice president and senior advisor for security and defense policy at The German Marshall Fund of the United States, “Rethink and replace two percent,” Atlantic Council, 2020, )

To be clear, NATO’s effectiveness requires capable militaries, and this will be expensive. Tough decisions will always be required. Real work needs to be done to expand defense investment in equipment, readiness, emerging technologies, digitalization, and research and development. Substantial and targeted spending to create effective deterrence, particularly by large European countries like Germany, must remain a priority. We need to do all this in a way that avoids the pitfalls of oversimplification and acrimony that have too often defined the two-percent debate over the last decade.

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The US ruled out sending meaningful cooperation to Ukraine, because of finite resources

Chellaney 22 (Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, “America Is Focusing on the Wrong Enemy,” Project Syndicate, 2022, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-threat-to-us-global-leadership-is-china-not-russia-by-brahma-chellaney-2022-02)

So, while the US remains the world’s foremost military power, it has been stretched thin by the decisions and commitments it has made, in Europe and elsewhere, since 1991. This goes a long way toward explaining why the US has ruled out deploying its own troops to defend Ukraine today. What the US is offering Ukraine – weapons and ammunition – cannot protect the country from Russia, which has an overwhelming military advantage.

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Biden is shifting from Ukraine to focus resources on China now

Tharoor 22 (Isanan Tharoor, analyst at the Washington Post, “Biden pivots to Asia as Ukraine war rages on,” Washington Post, 2022, )

The past couple of months marked a rallying moment for the geopolitical West. The Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered a sweeping, united response from Europe and its allies across the Atlantic. It led to far-reaching, coordinated sanctions on Moscow. It provoked a new, steely approach from many Europeans to diplomatically and militarily confront Russia. And it spurred the imminent expansion of NATO, an alliance cast by critics not long ago as an obsolete relic of the Cold War. The United States and its E.U. partners are flooding Ukraine with weaponry and aid. By some accounts, the Biden administration alone has mustered more funding for Ukraine in recent weeks than it is committing in the next fiscal year for fighting the planetary peril of climate change. Yet in Washington, there remains a large elephant in the room: China. New battles with the Kremlin have energized the doyens of the city’s foreign policy establishment, many of whom cut their teeth during the Cold War. But the Biden administration is trying to show that it hasn’t lost sight of its key 21st century “strategic competitor.” And it recognizes that its contest with China requires closer partnerships well outside Europe. A new push started this week. On Thursday evening, the White House hosted a dinner with eight leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a part of a major U.S.-led summit with the regional bloc. On Friday, the Southeast Asian delegations are slated to continue discussions at the State Department before a plenary session with President Biden. Next week, Biden will embark on a five-day trip to South Korea and Japan, culminating in another meeting of the “Quad” grouping with Australia, Japan and India. U.S. officials recognize that a decade of talk about a strategic “pivot” to Asia has yet to yield concrete results. “Several administrations in succession in the United States have tried … to launch more fundamental efforts, policies, frameworks in Asia, East Asia, Indo-Pacific, and found themselves stymied or misdirected or directed toward other pursuits,” said Kurt Campbell, the White House’s lead official on Indo-Pacific policy, in a speech this week at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “And that has been something that I think all of us are deeply aware of in the formulation and execution of policy.”

The Biden administration aims to show that its heavy involvement in the Ukraine war is not a distraction from its priorities to the East. But it is climbing an uphill road with ASEAN countries, where many officials lament a lack of American engagement, especially during the years of the Trump administration.

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Aid to Ukraine doesn’t trigger perception of abandonment in Asia, yet. But, further moves to solidify US presence in Europe would

Walker 22 (Dustin Walker, nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, “Biden Must Do Better Than Obama on Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, 2022, )

The Winter Olympics are just around the corner. Russian President Vladimir Putin has Ukraine on his mind. In Washington, the Pentagon is preparing a new defense strategy that looks beyond the Middle East to focus on the Pacific and China. The White House, meanwhile, is concerned about costs and wants to rein in military spending. Sound familiar? Well, this is exactly what the world looked like once before—in 2014. When the Obama administration’s defense strategy was released in March 2014, the document was obsolete the day it was published. It did not mention Ukraine, even though Putin’s little green men had already seized Crimea. It did not mention the Islamic State by name, though the group’s fighters had already captured Fallujah. With the defense budget under spending caps and the threat of sequestration, the Pentagon had to spend tens of billions of dollars in contingency funds to rebuild European deterrence following Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine and to defeat the Islamic State in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the Obama administration’s attempt to pivot to Asia stalled, and the U.S. military edge over China continued to shrink. As history threatens to repeat itself, U.S. President Joe Biden—who served under Barack Obama as vice president—looks perilously close to following in his predecessor’s footsteps. Biden faces the same question as in 2014: How can the United States stay focused on China while dealing with the crisis in Ukraine? Just as it was then, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and countering China will not be strategically effective or politically sustainable if it is premised on sacrificing the commitment to credible NATO deterrence and defense. But given finite resources, the United States cannot confront China, the most powerful adversary it has ever faced, without substantially changing how it achieves strategic ends in Europe—especially when it comes to military power. That’s not just an urgent strategic question to answer now, as Washington decides how to deal with Russia’s threatened invasion of Ukraine. It also needs to be at the core of the Pentagon’s strategy that is set to be published as early as March. The administration must resist calls for a return to a strategy designed to win on two fronts simultaneously or in sequence. Right now, the United States can do a lot to support Ukraine, impose costs on Russia, and assure NATO allies without compromising its strategy to counter China. At the top of the list are accelerated deliveries of defensive military equipment to Ukraine—especially anti-armor, anti-ship, and air defense capabilities—as well as intelligence support and humanitarian assistance. If Russia does invade, Biden should get much more serious about sanctions than Obama was in 2014. Washington should target the wealth of Putin’s cronies in Western financial hubs, terminate Russian access to the SWIFT global payment system, prohibit transactions in Russian sovereign debt, sanction the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and cut off access to U.S. technology critical for industries favored by Putin, including defense. The Trump administration’s technology sanctions that have seriously hobbled the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei are an excellent precedent for this. The United States should also join NATO efforts to reinforce its eastern flank, including contributing U.S. troops to support the temporary activation and deployment of NATO’s Response Force. For this eventuality, the Biden administration has placed up to 8,500 U.S. military personnel on alert. But even as Washington reacts to Moscow’s threats to overturn the European security order, China and the Indo-Pacific must remain the primary focus of the United States’ strategic calculus. To that end, the administration should ensure sanctions do not inflict collateral damage on Indo-Pacific allies and partners. In particular, ensnaring India in Russia-focused sanctions for New Delhi’s planned purchase of the Russian S-400 air and missile defense system would be a mistake. Sanctions won’t stop the S-400 deal, but they would play into the narrative pushed by Moscow and Beijing that Washington is not a trustworthy partner for New Delhi. To keep its focus squarely on the Indo-Pacific, the United States must exercise restraint in what forces it sends to reinforce NATO should Putin invade Ukraine, and from where. Forces should not be taken from the Pacific. They should be relocated within Europe, from the United States, or from lower-priority theaters. For example, air and ground forces stationed in the Middle East could be moved to southeastern Europe to bolster NATO while remaining close enough to respond to any contingency. Deployment of an additional U.S. Army brigade combat team—of limited utility vis-à-vis China—may be sensible. But the Pentagon should avoid new, long-term deployments of assets in low supply, such as missile defense systems and advanced platforms for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Biden administration should also remember that allies provide the bricks, while the United States provides the mortar. NATO allies should contribute the bulk of any new forces deployed to guard the alliance’s eastern flank while the United States provides key military enablers such as command and control, logistics, and combat medicine. The good news is that allies are in fact stepping up: Denmark, France, Spain, and the Netherlands have all recently announced or proposed reinforcements of ships, fighter aircraft, and ground forces. Even as it responds to the crisis in Europe, Washington can take parallel steps to bolster deterrence in the Pacific—so that the current attention on Europe is not interpreted as a sign of weakness and distraction, as it was in 2014. For example, the Biden administration could announce plans to station a fifth and eventual sixth attack submarine in Guam. It could also back legislation on Capitol Hill to increase security assistance to Taiwan. Taking these steps during a crisis in Europe would send a powerful signal to Beijing and allied capitals that the United States’ priority on the Pacific perseveres. The Biden administration’s new defense strategy needs to confront the question of overstretch head-on. Given limited resources and the strength of the United States’ adversaries—especially China—the U.S. ability to prevail in a great-power conflict cannot be taken for granted. That’s why the administration must resist calls for a return to a strategy designed to win on two fronts simultaneously or in sequence. Such a force sizing is simply not realistic and would dilute the U.S. military’s focus on the Indo-Pacific as its priority theater, China as its pacing threat, and Taiwan as its pressing scenario. Critically, staying on track in the Pacific requires matching any new military commitments in Europe—even temporary ones—with new resources. The United States must not ask its military to do more with less or pretend that China and Russia can be deterred and confronted on the cheap. Now is not the time to cut defense spending as the Biden administration has proposed. Not when the U.S. military edge relative to China has so dangerously eroded. Not when inflation, aging platforms, rising personnel costs, and the failure to pass a budget on time are sapping the Pentagon’s buying power. The Biden administration and the U.S. Congress must provide the military with the sufficient, timely, and predictable funding demanded in these perilous times, and which U.S. service members deserve.

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China is top-priority now

Ferguson 22 (Niall Ferguson, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the founder of Greenmantle, an advisory firm, “Dust Off That Dirty Word Detente and Engage With China,” Bloomberg, 2022, )

The most remarkable thing about the foreign policy of the Biden administration is that helping Ukraine defeat Russia is not even its top priority. “Even as President Putin’s war continues,” declared Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a speech at George Washington University on May 26, “we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order — and that’s posed by the People’s Republic of China.” Blinken’s speech repays close study. About one-tenth of it was conciliatory. “We are not looking for conflict or a new Cold War,” he declared. “We do not seek to transform China’s political system. … We will engage constructively with China wherever we can.” But the rest was as hawkish a speech on China as the one delivered by then Vice President Mike Pence in October 2018, which for me was the moment Cold War II got going in earnest. In Blinken’s words: Under President Xi, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. We see that in how Beijing has perfected mass surveillance within China and exported that technology to more than 80 countries; how its advancing unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea, undermining peace and security, freedom of navigation, and commerce; how it’s circumventing or breaking trade rules … and how it purports to champion sovereignty and territorial integrity while standing with governments that brazenly violate them. Blinken spelled out how the US intends to “shape the strategic environment around Beijing,” citing the new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, announced by Biden on his recent Asia tour, and the Quad of the US, Australia, India and Japan, with its new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, not forgetting AUKUS, the US deal on nuclear submarines with Australia and the UK. But the most startling lines in Blinken’s speech were the ones on “the genocide and crimes against humanity happening in the Xinjiang region”; on US support for “Tibet, where the authorities continue to wage a brutal campaign against Tibetans and their culture, language, and religious traditions”; on Hong Kong, “where the Chinese Communist Party has imposed harsh anti-democratic measures under the guise of national security”; on “Beijing’s aggressive and unlawful activities in the South and East China Seas”; and — the coup de grace from a Chinese vantage point — on “Beijing’s growing coercion” and “increasingly provocative rhetoric and activity” toward Taiwan. The response of the Chinese Foreign Ministry to this confrontational speech was, I thought, surprisingly restrained. Taiwan is, of course, the key issue. As if to confirm Xi Jinping’s darkest suspicions, Biden went off script again at a press conference in Tokyo with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on May 23. A reporter asked if the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. “Yes,” the president answered. “That’s the commitment we made. We agree with a one-China policy. We've signed on to it and all the intended agreements made from there. But the idea that, that it (Taiwan) can be taken by force, just taken by force, is just not, is just not appropriate.”

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Biden is right-sizing the force posture now to prioritize finite resources on the China threat

Wasser and Joyce 21 (Becca Wasser, Fellow for the Defense Program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at CNAS. Her research areas include defense strategy, force design, strategic and operational planning, force posture and employment, and wargaming. Renanah Joyce, Professor of Political Science @ Brandeis, “All About Access: Solving America’s Force Posture Puzzle,” CNAS, 2021,

The Biden administration has promised to revise US global force posture and alter the vast constellation of overseas forces, bases, and capabilities that underpin America’s ability to deter adversaries, counter threats, and protect allies. It has signaled an intent to reduce US presence in the Middle East to make it more commensurate with the region’s relative strategic importance (i.e., “rightsize” forces) and bolster its posture in the Indo-Pacific, much like previous administrations attempted to do. To this end, the administration has a Global Force Posture Review underway and has already drawn down US combat forces in Afghanistan, effectively ending the almost 20-year US presence in the country. This impulse to remake the US global footprint reflects a desire to address a new era of strategic competition with China and to expend finite resources and taxpayer dollars more efficiently. It is not the first push to revise US force posture. The Trump administration also attempted to make changes, including controversial plans to draw down forces in South Korea and Germany, while simultaneously seeking to stand up a new base and enhance US troop numbers in Poland. Such moves were, in theory, intended to correct US global posture to be more in line with the Department of Defense’s refocus on preparing for a future conflict with China and Russia.