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2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Aff answers › No China War

No US-China war

Lei 20 (Cui Lei, PhD and MA in International Politics, associate research fellow with the China Institute of International Studies, 7-24-2020, "Despite heated talk, risk of a US-China hot war is small", South China Morning Post, )

Many observers are pessimistic about deteriorating US-China relations and believe the two countries are heading towards a cold war. Even worse, some argue that the situation might be more dangerous than the US-Soviet Union Cold War, and that a hot war might break out between the two. This argument is unconvincing. First of all, deterrents to a flare-up are much stronger in US-China relations than in US-Soviet relations. Although economic and people-to-people ties between China and the US are declining, they are still close compared to US-Soviet ties. It is hard to decouple two closely intertwined economies and societies. Take two examples. China is expected to become the world's largest consumer market, a temptation hard to resist for exporters, including those from the US. And in education, more than 300,000 Chinese students study in the US, bringing in huge revenues for the US education industry. Many universities go to great lengths to woo international students. Recently Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology even sued the government over its new visa restrictions, now aborted, on international students. Second, even if there is decoupling, the pain would not be too great and can be kept out of the national security sphere if properly handled. In fact, for national security reasons, a modest degree of isolation will make both sides more secure and comfortable. For instance, if China’s information technology equipment cannot capture Western markets, the US will be more relaxed. If China cannot get advanced technologies from the US and its technological progress slows down, the US will be less anxious. In the same vein, China feels assured knowing that if the Trump administration does impose a travel ban on Communist Party members, it would be abandoning one of the tools available to the US to promote “peaceful evolution” in China. Economic decoupling is undeniably more painful for China than for the US. But unlike Japan during WWII, which was hit hard by the US oil embargo because of its lack of natural resources, China has no such problems. Given its large domestic market, losing the US as a major customer is not a disaster for China, and can be compensated through more dynamic economic activities at home. China can also make up for being freezed out of technological exchanges by turning to indigenous innovation. As for the US, it can import goods from other developing countries, albeit less cheaply. The relative loss is acceptable when weighed against the heightened perception of economic independence and security. Third, the ideological confrontation between China and the US is less intense than that during the Cold War. Unlike the obsession with ideology in those days, the line between capitalism and socialism is blurred today. The market economy has become universally recognised as the best way to promote economic growth and, politically, many countries have embraced democracy. Even North Korea calls itself the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although ideological hawks in the US still long for the day when the beacon of freedom will light up the world, after many years of fighting bloody wars overseas, most American people are not interested in promoting democracy abroad. Meanwhile, China just wants to preserve its political system and has no interest in exporting it to other countries, as the Soviet Union did. Thus, ideological antagonism in China-US relations can easily be eased by calculations of realistic interests, which create conditions for compromise and cooperation. Fourth, both China and the US have many options other than war to achieve their policy goals. While they have no allies to serve as a buffer, given the nature of the potential conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, both countries are adept at operating in grey zones and fighting psychological, public opinion or diplomatic warfare below the threshold of war. The forced closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston by the US government is just the latest act of brinkmanship. In addition, given China’s huge economic and financial interests in the US, the latter can wield the stick of sanctions when use of force is highly risky or not worth it. When both sides have many tools and options, why would they rush to war to achieve their goals? Last but not least, the imbalance of power will act as a deterrent. Some say the US and Soviet Union did not fight a hot war because they were evenly matched. It was not the case, actually. At the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was at a relative military disadvantage. Moreover, a country needs the will to fight before going to war, even if it is stronger militarily than its adversary. Having fought years of meaningless wars, the US is weary of war. China, too, abhors war. Having a clear understanding of US strength, especially when its own economy is slowing down and it is facing various domestic challenges, China would not wish to recklessly start a war with the US. In summary, the possibility of a hot war between China and the US is very small. The greatest danger for China is not a cold or hot confrontation with the US, but policymakers’ interpretation of the momentary hostility towards Beijing of a portion of the American population and the larger world. An erroneous interpretation could end China’s march to further opening up, and see it turn instead towards self-isolation.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Aff answers › China Not a Threat

The US has the overwhelming military advantage

Sawant 21 (Mangesh Sawant, a master’s in international affairs from Columbia University, where he concentrated in international security policy, “Why China Cannot Challenge the US Military Primacy,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 2021,

The US military dominates the strategic, tactical, and operational levels of warfare across the spectrum. The Pentagon is implementing sophisticated network warfare programs such as the Advanced Battle Management System, Project Convergence, and Joint All Domain Command and Control. China is concerned about the lethal and distributed US military, equipped with a potent combination of quantity and quality of weapon systems. The USN surpasses the PLAN in rapid deployment, maneuverability, and expeditionary warfare capabilities. The overwhelming display of US military power since 1945 is a credible deterrent for Beijing. Since the First Gulf War, the United States has demonstrated its capability of destroying the adversary through preemptive strikes consisting of long-range weapon systems such as cruise missiles in the first few days of the war, giving no time for the adversary to retaliate.75 According to Taylor Fravel, China is not a military superpower.76 There is not much evidence about China’s plans for global military capabilities on par with the United States. China’s military power is miniscule as compared to United States’ former adversary the Soviet Union. China’s military will be thinly stretched defending the third-largest country in the world. The top echelons of the CCP and PLA acknowledge US military advantages. Chinese scholars like Xu Ruike and Sun Degang admit that China is an economic heavyweight but is a military featherweight and will remain so for the coming decades.77 US primacy in the post–Cold War world has prevented World War III. The two most likely contenders for expansion, North Korea and China, have restricted their militaries within their borders. The United States retains unrivaled military power, and China is not in a position to challenge it.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Aff answers › US-Europe Relations Solve China War

Europe is a key counterbalance against Chinese leadership

Khatiri 21 (Shay Khatiri, studied Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, “Why Has America Forsaken Europe?,” The Bulwark,

The United States needs Europe to be peaceful because it needs NATO and the EU to be productive. The size of Europe’s economy makes it an important counterbalance to China’s growth. British, French, and Spanish ties with Africa are important in pushing back against China’s growing influence in the continent. European universities still produce stellar research which is crucial in the technological competition with China. Each of Europe’s strengths in a competition with China also makes it an important region in its own right. With three-quarters of a billion people, it is an important trade partner and plays a key role in the American economy. It is home to many U.S. military bases used for important missions, most recently during the evacuation from Afghanistan. Its scientific and technological achievements contribute to American prosperity—the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine that the president of the United States and millions of others recieved would not have been made without German partnership. America can’t afford to take Europe for granted anymore. They need us and we need them. The hard part of alliance management is supposed to be responding to the needs, wants, and objectives, and insecurities of the other side. But lately, the United States has had more trouble figuring out what its own needs, wants, and objectives in Europe are—or if it has any at all.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Aff answers › US-Europe Relations Solve China War

US-Europe relations are a force-multiplier that solve Chinese aggression

Sukin 21 (Lauren Sukin, MacArthur Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “How Biden can improve European relations while pivoting to Asia,” The Bulletin,

France’s fretting should serve as a warning to the Biden administration. The US focus on East Asia continues to rock relations between Washington and its European allies. In transitioning its strategic priorities towards the Pacific, the United States cannot succeed alone. Incorporating allies and partners—including those in Europe—in the planning, negotiating, and implementation stages of its efforts to manage threats from China will be critical. The effort should also pay dividends. By restoring and reinvigorating damaged European alliances, the United States will be better positioned to manage threats in East Asia and elsewhere.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Aff answers › Asia Pivot Bad

Asia pivot causes Russian aggression and solve focus on Asia can’t solve Chinese aggression

Gerecht and Takeyh 22 (Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former Middle Eastern targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Folly of the ‘Pivot to Asia’: China is a rising challenge, but neglecting Europe and the Middle East won’t help America confront it.,” Wall Street Journal,

Seldom has a diplomatic phrase been more reckless than the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia.” The U.S. has never been able to disentangle itself from key regions of the world, as the war in Ukraine demonstrates. But the notion that a new “Pacific century” should become the nation’s defining priority surely has emboldened adversaries elsewhere and called into question other alliances, including the most indispensable, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The question that ought to haunt the White House today is whether its ignominious retreat from Afghanistan in the name of ending so-called forever wars, and its stream of press releases insisting that China is the only rival worthy of attention, prompted an impetuous Vladimir Putin to undertake the largest land invasion in Europe since World War II. In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a speech placing Korea outside America’s defense perimeter, thus inviting aggression from North Korea. Often overlooked in that speech is Mr. Acheson’s insistence that “it is a mistake . . . to become obsessed with military invasions” when thinking strategically about Asia and the Pacific. Acheson seemed to assume that the dilemmas of newly independent Asian states came from internal subversion stemming from economic stagnation. To be fair, the Truman administration didn’t shrink from its responsibilities in Europe when war broke out in the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. has been a global power for a century and has always given some regions and countries priority over others. Early in the Cold War, Europe’s economic rehabilitation and its military defense preoccupied America’s politicians and strategists. In the 1960s, as the Cold War stabilized in Europe, the U.S. turned its gaze toward Asia, where a truculent China and an eastward-looking Soviet Union were both bent on exporting revolution. With 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, the Far East became a priority. And in the aftermath of 9/11, the Middle East took on importance as Washington hunted down terrorists and sought, however haphazardly, to refashion a political culture that had generated so much hate. Before Barack Obama, no president had insisted that the exigencies of one region mandated ignoring others. The U.S. fought prolonged wars in East Asia, yet Washington didn’t claim that these conflicts meant that it had to pivot from Europe or Latin America. Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon were beset by Vietnam; they didn’t complain about “forever wars” and the need to leave the Far East. When George W. Bush found himself mired in Iraq, he didn’t proclaim that Europe and Asia no longer mattered. Burden sharing has been an objective of all U.S. presidents. The strategic neglect of Asia-firsters is new. Joe Biden must be considered the least authentic of China hawks. Much more than Mr. Obama, he has brandished the China threat as cover for isolationism. Even the hasty departure from Afghanistan was in part justified as a means of focusing on China. Leaving Afghanistan would somehow, Secretary of State Antony Blinken told us, make the U.S. stronger vis-à-vis Xi Jinping. At home Democrats partly justified exorbitant domestic spending as a means of rebuilding an America better able to resist China. Yet Mr. Biden hasn’t taken any serious military measures, or reinitiated a free-trading alliance, to confront Beijing. This disconnect between words and deeds might have been starkest when, soon after his inauguration, Mr. Biden held a summit meeting with Mr. Putin—whom Democrats had denounced throughout Donald Trump’s presidency as a threat to democracy—where he pressed for a “stable and predictable” relationship with Moscow. Much of the cheap talk about pivoting stems from U.S. frustrations in the Middle East. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan caused the political class to question its assumptions about American power. Yet the Middle East remains. Energy markets are still global. Fracking hasn’t made Persian Gulf oil less important to America’s national security. The perverse interplay between Arab authoritarian states and Islamic radicalism (the former feeds the latter) continues. Iran’s nuclear ambitions, unimpeded by arms-control diplomacy, will soon confront the international community. As Mr. Putin has shown, a revisionist leader, armed with nuclear weapons and nursing grievances, can easily rattle, if not upend, financial markets and cherished assumptions. For the foreseeable future, the Far East will have a prominent place in America’s strategic imagination. China’s conversion from a communist laggard to a rich and militarily powerful fascist state has Western leaders in a bind, given that they literally bet the bank on the hope that investment and trade would somehow pacify Beijing’s ambitions. But China’s rise doesn’t mean that Europe matters little or that the Middle East can be ignored. The U.S. isn’t Sweden. When America retreats, everyone suffers.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Aff answers › Asia Pivot Bad

Pivot to Europe solves Russia war, pivot to Asia causes it

McKinley 22 (Michael McKinley, non-resident senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “It’s Time to Pivot Back to Europe,” Politico, 2022, )

President Vladimir Putin’s recognition of the separatist republics of Luhansk and Donetsk, which opened the door to the wider assault on Ukraine that is now underway, is a game-changer on a historic scale. It underscores, like nothing else, that the drift away from Europe by the United States over the past 20 years in pursuit of wars and priorities elsewhere has been short-sighted. Like 1949, the year in which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being, America and its European allies are facing a moment requiring a profound redefinition of their security, political and economic ties. Going forward, a strategic, not tactical, pivot back to Europe should be the driving imperative of American foreign policy. In doing so, it is important to accept reality: Putin called the bluff of the not-very-collected West, which was equivocating by placing only selective sanctions on Russia for its virtual annexation of part of Ukraine. Putin is unlikely to be deterred by a staggered escalation of these measures meant to allow room for him to change course: He is dead set on achieving at least a partial reconstitution of the Russian empire as he sees it and forcing the creation of a new security architecture for Europe. Putin’s words need to be taken seriously instead of being dismissed as ramblings or misleading. For all the lingering suggestions that there is still time for diplomacy, Putin could not have been clearer this week that he was also setting the stage for more aggressive steps in the very near future. He even raised a non-existent nuclear threat to Russia from a NATO-dominated Ukraine and again dismissed Ukrainian national identity as a fiction. Arriving at this point, too many commentators and politicians spent months resorting to dismissive rhetoric about Putin even as he outmaneuvered Western leaders. They belittled Russia — as a declining power, a declining economy and as a nation fearful of democratization on its borders. They argued that the United States and NATO allies could force Putin to rethink his actions — even though there has been no sign of him reconsidering course. Some argued that Putin would not risk war given the likely costs. It is now possible to see the limits of their world view. The inviolability of a nation’s sovereignty and its right to decide its own security alliances have also been presented as self-evident truths. In the case of Ukraine, however, many of us side-stepped uncomfortable questions about why NATO did not invite the country to join, and about the precedents set for Finland and Austria after World War II to ensure their neutrality. A now prophetic article by Henry Kissinger in 2014 makes it clear that something like the neutrality option would have been a more desirable outcome for Ukraine and reflected the reality of Ukraine’s situation. The West will find it difficult to break the momentum that Russia is building, or to reverse the new realities Putin is creating. Russia may not be a colossus, but it remains one of the most powerful countries in the world, with a nuclear arsenal, a modernized military and a serious player in international oil and gas markets. It cannot, in other words, be dismissed only as a “regional power threatening its neighbors out of weakness,” and while it is becoming an outright dictatorship by smothering democracy at home, that is not a central concern in the current crisis. Russia can project its military globally — as its interventions in Syria and elsewhere have shown. It can wage cyberattacks on Europe and the United States with relative impunity. Putin has triumphed in political showdowns with leaders like Turkey’s President Erdogan and, even as Russia’s relationship with Europe in general turns adversarial, the likes of Serbia and NATO member Hungary appear more sympathetic to Putin. World leaders until last week came to Putin as he limited his own international travel — and gave little away. Russia’s diplomatic fortunes are hardly crumbling elsewhere, as evidenced by a rising entente between China and Russia — aligned in their security interests against perceived Western encroachment. There is another factor at work, and that is that Putin’s view of history, often seen as opportunistic, does appear to be a primary driver of his actions. And it is not his worldview alone. The incorporation of Russian-speaking populations inside neighboring borders after 1991 remains an issue for nationalists in Moscow; and the West has systematically downplayed how NATO expansion since 1997 has looked to a generation of Russian leaders, and not just President Putin. It is not dovish, as a recent New Yorker article suggested, or appeasement as a British defense minister stated, to take these perceptions into account in the current crisis. The deep undercurrents of historical myth drive almost every nation into destructive paths. It is in this context that the United States and its allies have chosen to draw a line in the sand over a further Russian military intervention in Ukraine which has now materialized on a major scale. The relative success of President Joe Biden in preserving a united front with European allies on a gradual escalation of sanctions masks the lingering challenges of fully cohering on strategy. There have been differences between the responses by the United States and Britain on the one hand; the French and the Germans on another; and disparate governments like Italy (opposed to energy sanctions as late as this past weekend) and Hungary (offering veiled sympathy to Russia’s demands). French President Emmanuel Macron until recently was openly discussing the need for a new security architecture for Europe. Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany told national reporters on his return from Moscow that “we just can’t have a possible military conflict over a question that is not on the agenda” regarding Ukraine’s future membership in NATO. As EU foreign ministers met in Brussels this week, there were continued differences between those arguing for “incrementalism” on sanctions like Germany and Italy, and those wanting a more forceful response. There may be greater unity now as the scale of the Russian invasion becomes clear, but the proof will only be evident in the coming days. The allies’ caution in recent days contrasted with President Zelensky’s increasing concern as options close around him. The gathering of senior NATO and EU ministers at the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 18-20, as well as the presence of a U.S. delegation led by Vice President Kamala Harris, did not convey the strongest confidence on an agreed approach to Russian aggression. President Zelensky’s speech at the gathering was a searing indictment of the lack of decisiveness of Western nations over the last many years, and Ukrainian ministers were publicly critical of the slow pace of the imposition of sanctions since the recognition of the separatist republics by Russia. Western governments are now at a real, not hypothetical crossroads. The invasion is underway, and Putin would appear to be achieving his long-stated objectives, some of which he began to make clear 15 years ago in a speech to the 2007 Munich Security Conference. He has torn up the 2015 Minsk agreement which was meant to be the foundation for talks between Ukraine and Russia regarding the future of the Donbas. Putin is calculating he can survive sanctions for an indefinite period as he builds a significant war chest of foreign reserves. He is also betting on a swifter and easier military victory in Ukraine than Western analysts are predicting. If either of these scenarios were to hold, NATO, EU and American threats or actions would end up ringing hollow to most of the rest of the world. Putin, in short, means to complete what he has started, and more. As Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis suggested, Ukraine may not be the end of the story, and Belarus’ renewed and total subservience to Moscow can, in retrospect, be seen as prelude to Putin’s attempt to do the same to Ukraine. In responding to Russia’s expanding aggression in Ukraine, Western nations will build towards ever more severe sanctions. There will be United Nations resolutions and condemnations. Russian oligarchs may lose their right to residence and investment in London and Paris. Nord Stream 2 is being suspended and may be canceled. NATO may be strengthened; European members may finally spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense. NATO may accelerate military assistance to Ukraine or arm an insurgency in Ukraine in the future. The broader international community may be galvanized into supporting harsher measures to punish Russia depending on the scale of the conflict. Longer-term, however, the latest developments suggest it is time to rethink the West’s approach to the next phase of dealing with Putin. That will entail recognizing that the security landscape of Europe is being changed as we watch, in real time, and is unlikely to be turned back to what it was any time soon. The response must stop Russia from destroying the post-World War II architecture that has largely preserved peace for 70 years. Doing so will require another historic decision and response. We need to revitalize NATO and the transatlantic economic and political relations which have been weakened for two decades as the United States prioritized Asia, abandoned trade agreements, diverted NATO to fight wars farther afield and allowed allies to take for granted the alliance’s centrality to their own collective defense. In the process, we may rediscover that the future of the United States is still most fundamentally impacted by what happens in Europe.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Aff answers › No Link

It's cheap

Kelly et al 10 (Terrence Kelly, principal mathematician at the RAND Corporation, “Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team: Options for Success,” RAND,

The United States conducts a wide range of security cooperation missions and initiatives that can serve as key enablers of U.S. foreign policy efforts to assist and influence other countries. For a relatively small investment, security cooperation programs can play an important role by shaping the security environment and laying the groundwork for future stability operations with allies and partners. Security cooperation,1 in the form of noncombat military-to-military activities, includes “normal” peacetime activities, such as building the long-term institutional and operational capabilities and capacity of key partners and allies, establishing and deepening relationships between the United States and partner militaries, and securing access to critical areas overseas. Security cooperation also can include conducting quasi-operational efforts, such as helping U.S. partners and allies manage their own internal defense.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Aff answers › ---xt: Not Zero-Sum

The US can focus on both regions at once

Kroenig 22 (Matthew Security, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Washington Must Prepare for War With Both Russia and China,” Foreign Policy, 2022,

As Russia threatens the largest land invasion in Europe since World War II, the most consequential strategic question of the 21st century is becoming clear: How can the United States manage two revisionist, autocratic, nuclear-armed great powers (Russia and China) simultaneously? The answer, according to many politicians and defense experts, is that Washington must moderate its response to Russia in Europe to focus on the greater threat posed by China in the Indo-Pacific. This would be a mistake. The United States remains the world’s leading power with global interests, and it cannot afford to choose between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Instead, Washington and its allies should develop a defense strategy capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating Russia and China at the same time. In recent weeks, Biden has sent several thousand U.S. troops to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank—and for good reason. A major war in Ukraine could spill across international boundaries and threaten the seven NATO allies that border Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Moreover, if Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeds in Ukraine, why would he stop there? Putin has shown a clear interest in resurrecting the former Russian Empire, and other vulnerable Eastern European countries—Poland, Romania, or the Baltic states—might be next. A successful Russian incursion into a NATO ally’s territory could mean the end of the Western alliance and the credibility of U.S. security commitments globally. The threat posed by China is also serious. Adm. Philip Davidson, former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, predicted China could invade Taiwan within the next six years. This is a war the United States might lose. If China succeeds in taking Taiwan, it would be well on its way to disrupting the U.S.-led order in Asia, with an eye to doing the same globally. Moreover, Russia and China are increasingly working together. As this month’s summit between Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping shows, Moscow and Beijing are forging a closer strategic partnership, including on military matters. These dictators could coordinate dual attacks on the U.S. alliance structure or opportunistically seize on the distraction provided by the other’s aggression. In other words, there is a serious risk of simultaneous major-power wars in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. To address this problem, many have proposed answers that simply will not work. The Biden administration initially hoped to put relations with Russia on a “stable and predictable” footing to focus on China, but Putin had other ideas, as the world is now seeing in Ukraine. Unfortunately, Washington does not get to decide how its adversaries sequence their aggression. Others have expressed hope that Washington can peel these powers apart or even align with Russia against China, but these are not realistic solutions. The misguided view gaining the most recent acceptance, however, is that Washington should simply choose the Indo-Pacific over Europe. Politicians and experts argue that the United States lacks the resources to take on both Russia and China. They point to China’s power and Asia’s wealth and argue that Asia should be the priority. While Washington pivots to Asia, wealthy European countries, such as Germany, should step up to provide for NATO’s defense. Indeed, the Biden administration’s National Defense Strategy, which has been delayed due to the Ukraine crisis, is expected to focus on China without offering a clear solution to the two-front-war problem. A good strategy starts with clear goals—and Washington’s objectives are to maintain peace and stability in both Europe and Asia. A good strategy, however, starts with clear goals, and Washington’s objectives are to maintain peace and stability in both Europe and Asia. U.S. interests in Europe are too significant to let them be worked out solely between Putin and the United States’ European allies. Indeed, the European Union, not Asia, is the United States’ largest trade and investment partner, and this imbalance is much starker when China (which the United States seeks greater economic decoupling from), is removed from the equation. Furthermore, China has conducted military exercises in Europe and the Middle East. Competing with China militarily means competing globally, not just in Asia. In addition, Xi is gauging U.S. resolve, and a weak response in Ukraine might make a Chinese move on Taiwan more likely. Moreover, the United States is not France; it is not compelled to make gut-wrenching strategic choices about its national security due to constrained resources. In short, publishing a defense strategy that can only handle one of the United States’ great-power rivals (which is what is expected from the forthcoming national defense strategy) is planning to fail.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Aff answers › ---xt: Ukraine Thumper

Security Cooperation with Ukraine is high now

DoS 22 (US Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine,” , 5-6-2022,

The United States, our allies, and our partners worldwide are united in support of Ukraine in response to Russia’s premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war against Ukraine. We have not forgotten Russia’s earlier aggression in eastern Ukraine and occupation following its unlawful seizure of Crimea in 2014. The United States reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, extending to its territorial waters. Ukraine is a key regional strategic partner that has undertaken significant efforts to modernize its military and increase its interoperability with NATO. It remains an urgent security assistance priority to provide Ukraine the equipment it needs to defend itself against Russia’s war against Ukraine. Since January 2021, the United States has invested more than $4.5 billion in security assistance to demonstrate our enduring and steadfast commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This includes more than $3.8 billion since Russia’s launched its premeditated, unprovoked, and brutal war against Ukraine on February 24. Since 2014, the United States has provided more than $6.5 billion in security assistance for training and equipment to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO.

United States security assistance committed to Ukraine includes:

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Aff answers › Ukraine Thumper + Not Zero-Sum

Distraction now AND the military is unprepared in Asia

Montgomery and Bowman 22 (Mark Montgomery, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Bradley Bowman, senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at FDD, “Apply the lessons from Ukraine in the Taiwan Strait,” Defense News, 2022,

With the world’s attention fixed on the national security and humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine caused by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked invasion, a similar disaster is brewing in the Pacific. Taking a page from Putin’s playbook, the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP, is methodically assembling combat power to coerce or conquer the free people of Taiwan. Preventing that from happening will require Washington to learn the right lessons from the disaster in Ukraine. Among them is the need for Washington to spend less time worrying about provoking authoritarian bullies and more time working to defend threatened democracies before the invasion starts. This is especially critical as U.S. forces are much more likely to be directly involved in a response to coercion against Taiwan. For 25 years, Beijing has pursued a determined strategy featuring military modernization, technological advancements, economic infiltration, cyberattacks and persistent disinformation campaigns. These efforts have focused on building a world-class military, erasing American military supremacy in the seas and skies around Taiwan, and preparing for a potential attack designed to establish CCP dominion over Taiwan. Meanwhile, the United States has been distracted elsewhere, unable to focus its strategic and fiscal efforts on the rising power in China. This has been compounded by consistent congressional failures to provide the Pentagon with the timely, sufficient and predictable funding necessary to modernize U.S. forces and maintain sufficient readiness and capacity. Indeed, the Department of Defense has received on-time funding only once in the last 13 fiscal years. Exacerbating these dynamics, Washington has been slow in addressing serious concerns and specific requests for resources identified by Indo-Pacific Command in successive reports to Congress. Just last year, the command again warned that the military balance of power in the region continues to become “more unfavorable” for America and its allies.

2022 UTNIF Disadvantage
Aff answers › Ukraine Thumper + Not Zero-Sum

Ukraine thumps the Asia pivot AND it’s not zero-sum

Madhani and Megerian 22 (Aamer Madhani and Chris Megerian, “Biden’s China ‘pivot’ complicated by Russia’s war in Ukraine,” AP News, 2022,

President Joe Biden set out to finally complete the “pivot to Asia,” a long-sought adjustment of U.S. foreign policy to better reflect the rise of America’s most significant military and economic competitor: China. But Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has made that vexing move even more complicated. China’s government has vacillated between full embrace and more measured responses as Russian President Vladimir Putin prosecutes his war, making the decisions for Biden far more layered. Biden and China’s Xi Jinping are scheduled to speak by phone on Friday, a conversation that the White House says will center on “managing the competition between our two countries as well as Russia’s war against Ukraine and other issues of mutual concern.” The Biden administration is left needing to focus east and west at the same time, balancing not simply economic imperatives but military ones as well. “It’s difficult. It’s expensive,” Kurt Campbell, the coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs on the White House National Security Council, said during a recent forum of maintaining a high-level U.S. focus in two regions. “But it’s also essential, and I believe we’re entering a period where that’s what will be required of the United States and of this generation of Americans.” Biden has been deeply invested in rallying NATO and Western allies to respond to Russia with crippling sanctions, supplying an overmatched Ukraine military with $2 billion in military assistance — including $800 million in new aid announced Wednesday — and addressing a growing humanitarian crisis. Eastern flank NATO allies, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, have made clear to the Biden administration that they want the U.S. to increase its military presence in the region and do more to address the worst humanitarian crisis in Europe since World War II. More than 3 million Ukrainian refugees have fled their country in recent weeks. Though the war in Ukraine has dominated Biden’s focus of late, White House officials insist they haven’t lost sight of China — and are watching intently to see how Xi decides to play his hand.

2022 UTNIF Evidence

2AC – Threats Good

Threat scenario-analysis is good.

Mahnken & Junio ’13 (Thomas; September 2013; Ph.D. and M.A. in International Affairs from Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in International Relations and History from the University of Southern California, Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College and a Visiting Scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies; Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania, M.A. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in International Studies from Johns Hopkins Univeristy, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University; International Studies Review, Vol. 15, Issue 3 “Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations,” p. 374-395; RP)

This article introduces political scientists to scenarios—future counterfactuals—and demonstrates their value in tandem with other methodologies and across a wide range of research questions. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method and argue that scenarios contribute to theory building and development, identifying new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating “world views,” setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching. The article also establishes the low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader context of political science methods. The conclusion offers two detailed examples of the effective use of scenarios. In his classic work on scenario and Duncan 1993; Leufkens, Haaijer-Ruskamp, Bakker, and Dukes 1994; Baker, Hulse, Gregory, White, Van Sickle, Berger, Dole, and Schumaker 2004; Sanderson, Scherbov, O'Neill, and Lutz 2004). Scenarios also are a common tool employed by the policymakers whom political scientists study. This article seeks to elevate the status of scenarios in political science by demonstrating their usefulness for theory building and pedagogy. Rather than constitute mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future, as critics might suggest, scenarios assist scholars with developing testable hypotheses, gathering data, and identifying a theory's upper and lower bounds. Additionally, scenarios are an effective way to teach students to apply theory to policy. In the pages below, a “best practices” guide is offered to advise scholars, practitioners, and students, and an argument is developed in favor of the use of scenarios. The article concludes with two examples of how political scientists have invoked the scenario method to improve the specifications of their theories, propose falsifiable hypotheses, and design new empirical research programs. Scenarios in the Discipline What do counterfactual narratives about the future look like? Scenarios may range in length from a few sentences to many pages. One of the most common uses of the scenario method, which will be referenced throughout this article, is to study the conditions under which high-consequence, low-probability events may occur. Perhaps the best example of this is nuclear warfare, a circumstance that has never resulted, but has captivated generations of political scientists. For an introductory illustration, let us consider a very simple scenario regarding how a first use of a nuclear weapon might occur: During the year 2023, the US military is ordered to launch air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait to aid in a crisis. These highly visible patrols disrupt trade off China's coast, and result in skyrocketing insurance rates for shipping companies. Several days into the contingency, which involves over ten thousand US military personnel, an intelligence estimate concludes that a Chinese conventional strike against US air patrols and naval assets is imminent. The United States conducts a preemptive strike against anti-air and anti-sea systems on the Chinese mainland. The US strike is far more successful than Chinese military leaders thought possible; a new source of intelligence to the United States—unknown to Chinese leadership—allowed the US military to severely degrade Chinese targeting and situational awareness capabilities. Many of the weapons that China relied on to dissuade escalatory US military action are now reduced to single-digit-percentage readiness. Estimates for repairs and replenishments are stated in terms of weeks, and China's confidence in readily available, but “dumber,” weapons is low due to the dispersion and mobility of US forces. Word of the successful US strike spreads among the Chinese and Taiwanese publics. The Chinese Government concludes that for the sake of preserving its domestic strength, and to signal resolve to the US and Taiwanese Governments while minimizing further economic disruption, it should escalate dramatically with the use of an extremely small-yield nuclear device against a stationary US military asset in the Pacific region. This short story reflects a future event that, while unlikely to occur and far too vague to be used for military planning, contains many dimensions of political science theory. These include the following: what leaders perceive as “limited,” “proportional,” or “escalatory” uses of force; the importance of private information about capabilities and commitment; audience costs in international politics; the relationship between military expediency and political objectives during war; and the role of compressed timelines for decision making, among others. The purpose of this article is to explain to scholars how such stories, and more rigorously developed narratives that specify variables of interest and draw on extant data, may improve the study of IR. An important starting point is to explain how future counterfactuals fit into the methodological canon of the discipline.

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2AC – Realism/Perm

Perm do both – IR is reflexive, constantly changing and can be re-appropriated

Abraham, 17—Johns Hopkins University (Kavi Joseph, “Making Machines: Unlikely Resonances between Realist and Postcolonial Thought,” International Political Sociology (2017) 11, 221–238, dml)

This passage marks out one of the biggest obstacles to connecting realist and postcolonial thought: race. One would be hard pressed to find in realist theorizations anything resembling a supple understanding of race and racism (Vitalis 2015)— though Carr (2001b, 107) demonstrates a comparatively great deal of reflexivity on postcolonial liberation (see fn. 2 above). Even in Williams’s (2005) “wilful” realist tradition, there is scant discussion of how an embedded ethic of critical self-limitation fared in the context of racial or other forms of radical difference. Absent an engagement with the analytics of postcolonial thinking, or the diverse ways in which white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity inflect past and present liberal imperial formations, willful realism does not address the categories that threaten to push prudential skeptics toward violent responses, that pose limitations to an ethos of limits. As evidenced in Morgenthau, failure to think critically about race opens up the way for Morgenthau’s theoretical practice to be driven toward resentful rather than careful ends. It is at this juncture that those concerned with contemporary imperial formations are confronted with a number of possible responses: one is to deem realism, in all its complex and contradictory manifestations, as a failed, unethical, and fundamentally racist/imperial project. A second response is to politically align against liberalism, while holding this partnership at arm’s length. A third response, derived from Ayoob’s (2002) subaltern realism, is to work on an epistemic register, selectively taking insights from realist traditions that help better explain the neocolonial world. Morgenthau’s racist interjections should be critiqued and confronted—perhaps by outlining the innumerable non-Western contributions to the making of so-called Western modernity (Hobson 2004)—but this failing does not delegitimize other realist insights. What is important for Ayoob’s (2002) accommodationist stance is to combine plausible realist insights with other categories that can grasp the extent of global politics, including the dynamics of the postcolonial experience, better. The final response is the one I advance. To adopt a mode of argumentation concerned with building a counter-imperial machine is to neither dismiss constituencies that become caught up in imperial formations, nor merely to tactically align with them; rather, establishing resonant connections among postcolonial and realist lines of thought, highlighting shared dispositions to difference, is to push the latter toward repositioning itself on new ethical lines that limit contemporary forms of violence. To recover a minor position in realism is not to accept all realist positions, nor is it to synthesize or convert any theoretical line into a coherent framework. It is, however, to amplify the shared spirituality that informs both realist and postcolonial thinking, drawing constituencies toward prudential rather than imperial defenses of difference. It is to furnish current research agendas with an anti-imperial focus, to seek the creative possibilities that may arise when divergent constituencies meet, interfuse, and shift. Thus, our response to Morgenthau, as to other realists, is to cultivate the connections that do exist, not for epistemic reasons but for a political project that strengthens counter-imperial movements. Thinking from the Present By way of conclusion, it is important to reiterate the politics that motivates a theoretical project of linking realist and postcolonial thinking. If the ends of this project were to simply gather critiques of liberalism and its relationship to imperial practices, then certainly a return to classical realist thought adds little epistemic value over and above postcolonial approaches. However, the ends of this argument are to outline and energize a counter-imperial machine, to cultivate a shared spirituality that can gather diverse and divergent constituencies to confront dangerous practices. In my estimation, countering an imperial machine that operates in complex ways and at complex sites requires a political strategy as unwieldy and diffuse, linking constituencies that we may otherwise dismiss. That a tradition of realism regularly circulates through halls of power across the globe should be reason not to reject righteously but rather to leverage its authorized status. We can talk about imperialism, knowledge production, and race here, while they can talk about anarchy, power, and self-interest there—or we can theoretically work on the lines of thought that reverberate among us. To reiterate, building a countermachine is not driven to “pragmatic” reconciliation or consensus and, thus, remains distinct from the “eclecticism” of other plural approaches popular in IR today. While the combinatory logic of paradigmatic synthesis has its place, the connections between realist and postcolonial thought articulated here are made in a far more agonistic manner. Rather than produce something like a “postcolonial-realism,” this argument involves pushing contemporary realist scholarship toward new research agendas and new forms of critique that both capture a spirit internal to its own traditions while confronting the realities of contemporary global politics. It engages with minor positions along the realist canon to orient today’s realism away from the logic of great power politics operating under anarchy toward an understanding of how the logic of liberal order permits forms of imperial intervention. Needless to say, drawing together realist and postcolonial thought, as this essay has done, can be met with analytical skepticism and political hostility. A mode of argumentation that refuses comparisons of theoretical cores or non-truncated readings of select theorists strikes a note of analytical evasion. To this there is no defense—other than that already discussed at length. On the other hand, if the expressly political purpose of this work is accepted, the argument anticipates strong political reservations: why align the project of postcolonial theory with realism, an unethical tradition of militarism and realpolitik? To this I would respond that while a kind of strategic essentialism has its place, reducing “realists” to a coherent body of thought not only obscures the complexity of their thinking (see never-ending interpretations of Machiavelli as an example) but reproduces the narrative of transhistorical unity that some realists use to authorize unethical policy programs in the first place. More critically, however, in embodying an unproductive ahistoricism, it poses conventional realist categories of anarchy, selfinterest, and military power as the political problem to confront whereas the present historical context demands attunement to how some of these drives (militarism, national interest) connect with discrete problems of liberalism and imperial practices. In fact, there are good reasons to think that the dominance of (neo)realism in IR is overstated (Walker and Morton 2005; Maliniak et al. 2011) and that the ascension of liberal IR theory is sociologically tied up with the present hegemony of a US liberal world order (Sterling-Folker 2015). In other words, while realism may have been a productive foil in Cold War bipolarity, we must theorize from the present. In doing so, we may find that countering imperial formations may benefit from resonances established not just among postcolonial, feminist, poststructural, and other “critical” theorists but contemporary realists who identify links between liberalism and imperialism (Walt 2013). Indeed, if realism as a policy program defending the national interest is entangled with current militaristic and imperial interventions, we should push the premise of this statement, that difference should be defended, in anti-imperial and prudential directions. Doing so may allow new openings to emerge in the present sense of closure, new strategies to think and defend alternative politics. In this way, we may more fully embody postcoloniality by not being satisfied with either narrow critique or brash conversion but rather attentive translation.

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2AC – China War Securitization

No self-fulfilling prophesy---securitizing the danger of US-China war creates the caution and risk-aversion necessary to avoid it.

Wang 20, Professor of Political Science at Western Michigan University. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago. (Yuan-kang, 11/9/20, "Roundtable 12-2 on Thucydides’s Trap? Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry, and the Future of Sino-American Relations", H-Diplo | ISSF, https://issforum.org/roundtables/12-2-thucydides)

Throwing the Baby Out with the Bathwater? Chan warns that the discourse on Thucydides’s Trap and power transition can create a self-fulfilling prophecy. If leaders believe in Thucydides’s Trap and act accordingly, it may create the anticipated conditions that make war more likely. Talking and thinking in terms of Thucydides’s Trap will influence the state’s construction of its identity as well as its definition of interests and preferences. The discourse is harmful because it encourages ‘othering’ the opponent and contributes to confrontation. Should we, then, throw out the proposition that war is more likely when the system is undergoing a power transition? It might be worthwhile to go back to what Thucydides’s Trap refers to: “the severe structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one. In such conditions, not just extraordinary, unexpected events, but even ordinary flashpoints of foreign affairs, can trigger large-scale conflict.”[112] Instead of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, this statement should induce caution from leaders in Beijing and Washington. Understanding the danger of war is the first step to avoid being trapped in it. Like Chan, Allison seeks to offer “a set of principles and strategic options for those seeking to escape Thucydides’s Trap and avoid World War III.”[113] Obviously, historical analogies cannot completely capture an ongoing event. Allison himself cautions against “facile analogizing” and emphasizes that “the differences matter at least as much as the similarities.”[114] The purpose of analogizing Thucydides’s Trap is not to shoehorn China and the United States into the roles of Athens and Sparta respectively, as Chan suggests (17-18), but to underscore the enduring feature of international politics throughout the ages. The dynamics of conflict highlighted by Thucydides remain as relevant today as it was two thousand years ago. Many scholars accuse structural theory of determinism, as Chan does, (14, 34), even though structuralists do not adopt it. States can go to war for a variety of reasons. Attempting to isolate a single cause for all wars is impossible. The proposition that war tends to break out during a power transition is better understood as a probabilistic—not deterministic—statement. The structural tensions cause by power shifts can substantially increase the probabilities of war, much like dry leaves waiting for a spark, but it does not mean that war will inevitably break out. Properly understood, Thucydides’s Trap cautions us to be prepared for the danger of war during a power transition. Overall, Chan’s book provides a stronger critique of power transition theory than of Thucydides’s Trap. Students of power shifts should take his argument seriously and avoid the pitfalls he identifies. We should not, however, hastily dismiss the warnings of Thucydides’s Trap.

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2AC – China Threat Con

Empirically disproven.

Tenzin Dorjee 21. Senior researcher at Tibet Action Institute and a PhD candidate in the political science department at Columbia University. "Opinion: Anti-China is not anti-Asian". Washington Post. 4-6-2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/04/06/anti-china-is-not-anti-asian/

However, some commentators are arguing that the U.S. foreign policy establishment’s criticism of the Chinese government is to blame for the domestic problem of anti-Asian violence. This specious claim, which China’s state-run media quickly exploited, has been most prominently advanced in the mainstream Western media by distinguished novelist Viet Thanh Nguyen and political scientist Janelle Wong, who claim that “bipartisan political rhetoric about Asia” and successive administrations’ “critical takes” on China fuel anti-Asian violence. This narrative, which weaponizes Asian American vulnerability to shield Beijing from international criticism, is as dangerous as it is fraudulent.

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2AC – Heg Bad

Pursuit’s inevitable

Mearsheimer 11 John J. Mearsheimer, the “R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago” Jan/Feb 2011 “Imperial By Design” http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0059.pdf

The downward spiral the United States has taken was anything but inevitable. Washington has always had a choice in how to approach grand strategy. One popular option among some libertarians is isolationism. This approach is based on the assumption that there is no region outside the Western Hemisphere that is strategically important enough to justify expending American blood and treasure. Isolationists believe that the United States is remarkably secure because it is separated from all of the world’s great powers by two giant moats—the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans— and on top of that it has had nuclear weapons—the ultimate deterrent—since 1945. But in truth, there is really no chance that Washington will adopt this policy, though the United States had strong isolationist tendencies until World War II. For since then, an internationalist activism, fostered by the likes of the Rockefeller Foundation, has thoroughly delegitimized this approach. American policy makers have come to believe the country should be militarily involved on the world stage. Yet though no mainstream politician would dare advocate isolationism at this point, the rationale for this grand strategy shows just how safe the United States is. This means, among other things, that it will always be a challenge to motivate the U.S. public to want to run the world and especially to fight wars of choice in distant places. Offshore balancing, which was America’s traditional grand strategy for most of its history, is but another option. Predicated on the belief that there are three regions of the world that are strategically important to the United States—Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf—it sees the United States’ principle goal as making sure no country dominates any of these areas as it dominates the Western Hemisphere. This is to ensure that dangerous rivals in other regions are forced to concentrate their attention on great powers in their own backyards rather than be free to interfere in America’s. The best way to achieve that end is to rely on local powers to counter aspiring regional hegemons and otherwise keep U.S. military forces over the horizon. But if that proves impossible, American troops come from offshore to help do the job, and then leave once the potential hegemon is checked. Selective engagement also assumes that Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf are the only areas of the world where the United States should be willing to deploy its military might. It is a more ambitious strategy than offshore balancing in that it calls for permanently stationing U.S. troops in those regions to help maintain peace. For selective engagers, it is not enough just to thwart aspiring hegemons. It is also necessary to prevent war in those key regions, either because upheaval will damage our economy or because we will eventually get dragged into the fight in any case. An American presence is also said to be valuable for limiting nuclear proliferation. But none of these strategies call for Washington to spread democracy around the globe—especially through war. The root cause of America’s troubles is that it adopted a flawed grand strategy after the Cold War. From the Clinton administration on, the United States rejected all these other avenues, instead pursuing global dominance, or what might alternatively be called global hegemony, which was not just doomed to fail, but likely to backfire in dangerous ways if it relied too heavily on military force to achieve its ambitious agenda. Global dominance has two broad objectives: maintaining American primacy, which means making sure that the United States remains the most powerful state in the international system; and spreading democracy across the globe, in effect, making the world over in America’s image. The underlying belief is that new liberal democracies will be peacefully inclined and pro-American, so the more the better. Of course, this means that Washington must care a lot about every country’s politics. With global dominance, no serious attempt is made to prioritize U.S. interests, because they are virtually limitless. This grand strategy is “imperial” at its core; its proponents believe that the United States has the right as well as the responsibility to interfere in the politics of other countries. One would think that such arrogance might alienate other states, but most American policy makers of the early nineties and beyond were confident that would not happen, instead believing that other countries—save for so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea—would see the United States as a benign hegemon serving their own interests.

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2AC – Nation State

Analysis through nation-states and security is good.

Robin Luckham 17, an Emeritus fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, where he has been based since 1974. Following the publication of his book The Nigerian Military in 1971, he has researched and published extensively on civil-military relations, militarism, political violence, democratisation, security and development, security sector governance, security ‘from below’ and peacebuilding. Whose violence, whose security? Can violence reduction and security work for poor, excluded and vulnerable people? 2017.https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21647259.2016.1277009

6. The two faces of security – and of peace Security, especially state security, tends to be enacted in contexts of the violently contested political authority. Often it is enacted through violent power, rebranded as legitimate force. Small wonder that some in the development community, including those who drafted SDG 16, hesitate to use the word at all. But although security is a deeply disputed idea, it is also a highly necessary one. Security functions simultaneously as an analytical construct, as a frame for policy and as a moral narrative. It is distinct from the equally ambiguous if less contentious concept of peace. Yet, at the same time, it is often seen as essential to the preservation of peace. Most of the things that international decision-makers, political and security elites and development practitioners do in security’s name are supposed to protect the safety and welfare of people in a world of multiple challenges and threats. However, there is a tendency to slide from global, to national, to citizen and to human security and back again, without enough serious reflection on how they interconnect and on where tensions and contradictions lie hidden. Development agencies have too often plunged into security policies and programmes, without a clear understanding of where they might lead, who would benefit and how they might go wrong. The ambiguities stem in part from a deep-seated tension between two distinct visions of security (summarised in Table 3), which interconnect, yet are in deep tension with eachother. On the one hand, security can be seen as a process of political and social ordering, aiming to reduce violence and keep the peace. As such it is territorially organised and kept in place globally as well as nationally through the authoritative discourses and practices of power, including socially sanctioned violence. It connects to conceptions of what Galtung termed ‘negative peace’: the ending of overt violence, without necessarily transforming the conditions giving rise to this violence or attending to the quality of the subsequent peace. In this view security is a public good delivered in principle by states, much like official or donor-driven development.29 Yet in a world where states and indeed the international order face sustained challenges, security is often kept in place also through alternative nonstate or ‘hybrid’ networks of violence and protection.30 Moreover, security is far from being an unalloyed public good. In principle, it is equally shared and socially inclusive, even if in practice it is anything but, especially at the insurgent margins where insecurity is most acute. For in practice it protects socially embedded power, established property relations and social privilege – and reinforces global, national and local inequalities. On the other hand, security can be seen (in the vernacular) as an entitlement of citizens and more widely human beings to social peace and protection from violence, abuses of rights and social injustice, along with other existential risks such as famine or disease. It connects to the idea of ‘positive peace’, including transformations in the social conditions giving rise to violence and deepening the relationships between states and their citizens. The vernacular understandings, day-to-day experience, resilience and agency of the people and groups who are ‘secured’ and ‘developed’ are in this view the touchstone by which to evaluate security and violence reduction. Most people fall back upon their social identities – as women and men, members of families, clans, castes, ethnic groups, sects, religions and nationalities – to navigate their social worlds, to respond to insecurity and violence and (sometimes) to organise for violence. At the same time, these identities are written into the structures of power and inequality, being deployed to establish hierarchies of citizenship and patterns of exclusion. Ensuring that security is inclusive and not simply the security of particular groups or the property of the well-armed, powerful and wealthy, is fraught with difficulty and must be negotiated at multiple levels. ‘Security in the vernacular’ is the term used here rather than the interlinked but distinct concepts of ‘human security’ and of ‘citizen security’ popularised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank,31 which fit in the conceptual toolboxes of development practitioners, humanitarian agencies and intervention forces. Both human and citizen security have come under criticism for ‘securitising’ development by framing poverty, exclusion and vulnerability through security lenses, and thus paving the way for military interventions in the affairs of fragile states.32 ‘Security in the vernacular’ paves the way for more precise and detailed empirical scrutiny of how security and plays out in particular local and national contexts. It highlights the experience and social agency of those who are ‘secured’. And it underscores the transformative potential of security as an entitlement, which can be actively claimed by those who challenge the deeply rooted legacies of insecurity, exclusion and injustice. Both these faces of security have their underside, most obviously the first. ‘Seeing like a state’ even with the best of intentions can lead to the interests of citizens being sacrificed to an unbending vision of national security or of top-down development (as even in Nyerere’s Tanzania).33 It is also open to abuse – for instance, to prop up authoritarian regimes; to advance the interests of predatory elites; to impose exclusionary economic and social policies; to justify state secrecy and surveillance of citizens; or to justify the hegemonies and military adventurism of major world powers. And it tends to be closely if complexly related to ‘seeing like a corporation’, most obviously in enclave economies, where privatised security arrangements in protected enclaves may indeed destabilise or weaken the state.34 The deformations of security in the vernacular tend to be more hidden, but no less damaging – for instance, the submission of minorities and refugees to campaigns of exclusion and violence by populist majorities; forms of popular justice that violate the rights, dignity and safety of supposed perpetrators; or grass roots endorsement of ‘traditional’ or customary institutions, which perpetuate gender and other inequities. Moreover, local-level insecurities can persist or even worsen, when a state, like India or Brazil, is considered to be stable, or a region or locality is considered to be secure. Neither face of security can be considered without the other. The relationship between them is utterly crucial. The capacity of states to protect their citizens is at the basis of the social contract.35 That is, the rights and security of citizens and people are the bedrock of state and international security – or at least they should be. But these entitlements cannot be protected without some kind of social order, however achieved. And how and by whom social order is assured are both affairs of governance and vital concerns for everyone who lives under the leaky umbrella of political authority. Political stability, durable institutions, the rule of law, and effective and accountable security apparatuses are not just desirable attributes of states but are also in many respects conditions of the security of people. However, they come at a price, not just in taxes, but also because of the need for constant vigilance to ensure that those charged with delivering security do not ignore or still worse violate the entitlements of those they are supposed to protect.

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2AC –Grove

Grove is wrong about everything.

Christopher Mott 20, PhD in Political Science from St. Andrews, Master’s degree from London Metropolitan in IR, former Scholar in Residence @ Helmerich Center for American Research at the Gilcrease Museum, Trickster’s Guide to Geopolitics, “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World, A Book Review”, *note: the identity of the author isn’t immediately obvious but he links his book title in the comments, and you can look that up and it reveals his identity

Where I disagree with the author, however, is his very concept of the ‘Eurocene.’ If the present international state system wasn’t working for states across the globe it would be dying out, but it seems to strengthening. There is no way we are getting through what I will remain calling the anthropocene without some level of a command economy for resources and research direction for technologies. Many of these resources will be scare and will be competed over. The competitive nature of the state system means something Darwinistic is occurring, which is good as we do not yet have the answer for surviving our current era and so multiple approaches must be tried and the best will serve as models for others and the worst will die out. I also do not see anything particularly European about modernity anymore. While a new era did begin with the biological and demographic takeover of the western hemisphere and its forceable wedding to Europe-previously a minor and not particularly important subcontinental peninsula of Asia-any Eurasian actor could have potentially done the same thing. The bureaucratic state was first born in China and the agricultural state came from the Middle East, and those strike me as just as relevant to where we are now than the maritime-industrial states of post medieval Europe. Furthermore, as India and China move their way into full industrialization on their own terms and countries like Japan have long held that position dating back to the colonial era, I find little to argue for something called specifically ‘The Eurocene.’ That being said, the author is entirely correct that our currently unsustainable methods of development are a type of self-replicating virus imposed by force. But so too will any solutions have to follow that path. It may come as no surprise that I, a person very into geopolitics (and making speculative realist geopolitics in particular) also take a more neutral tone on the field than this author. I think geopolitics are as likely to get us out of this mess as they are to dig us deeper. Aside from general environmental goals, I see little universal in how we will escape from pollution and mass extinction and more a variety of paths which depend on the varying ecologies of different countries. As it is, some countries will benefit from climate change and their interests cannot be said to be comparable with those who will suffer. A stateless world is a de facto neoliberal world in practice and the author’s fear of political homogenization is not caused by realism or geopolitics but rather prevented by those same actors. Diversity can only thrive in the absence of grand universal projects. So our approaches are very clearly different as I see realist geopolitics as the guarantor of ideological, economic, and ecological diversity, not its foe. But Grove is an excellent writer so I enjoyed his take on it anyway.

2022 UTNIF Evidence

2AC – Eurocentric

IR’s not intrinsically Eurocentric – they need to indict our specific studies, or their vague theoretical cards just don’t apply

Audrey Alejandro 19, Assistant Professor at the Department of Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science, “Western Dominance in International Relations?”, Routledge Publishing, forthcoming

Since the 1970s, a ‘critical’ movement has been developing in the humanities and social sciences denouncing the existence of ‘Western dominance’ over the worldwide production and circulation of knowledge. However, thirty years after the emergence of this promising agenda in International Relations (IR), this discipline has not experienced a major shift. This volume offers a counter-intuitive and original contribution to the understanding of the global circulation of knowledge. In contrast to the literature, it argues that the internationalisation of social sciences in the designated ‘Global South’ is not conditioned by the existence of a presumably ‘Western dominance’. Indeed, although discriminative practices such as Eurocentrism and gatekeeping exist, their existence does not lead to a unipolar structuration of IR internationalisation around ‘the West’. Based on these empirical results, this book reflexively questions the role of critique in the (re)production of the social and political order. Paradoxically, the anti-Eurocentric critical discourses reproduce the very Eurocentrism they criticise. This book offers methodological support to address this paradox by demonstrating how one can use discourse analysis and reflexivity to produce innovative results and decentre oneself from the vision of the world one has been socialised into.

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2AC – IR Racist

IR isn't anti-black -- it's a minimalist theory to explain the occurrence of interstate war -- purity in scholastic exercises have zero concrete solvency.

Wæver & Buzan ’20 [Ole and Barry; May 15th; Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen; Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics; KU, “Racism and Responsibility -- The Critical Limits of Deep-Fake Methodology in Security Studies: A reply to Howell and Richter-Montpetit,” Racism and Responsibility -- The Critical Limits of Deep-Fake Methodology in Security Studies: A reply to Howell and Richter-Montpetit; GR]

Racism is a powerful, malignant force in world politics, and our discipline, IR, has deeply problematic entanglements with it. It is a serious matter both to come intellectually to grips with this and to find the most effective strategies to act on it. We worry that more serious problems and possibilities are marginalised by an ultimately very inward-looking and scholastic exercise where a particular definition of racism and a specific theoretical perspective makes it possible to deem the vast majority of scholarship in IR ‘racist’, ‘methodologically white’ and ‘antiblack’- every work that does not explicitly follow one exact version of anti-racist scholarship. Especially, the role played in H&RM’s argumentation by our sins of omission does ultimately seem to rest on the premise that only their distinct form of scholarship can be redeemed, because even post-colonial scholarship and critiques of euro-centrism are not enough; you are a racist if you do not follow exactly this particular route. It is not important whether your scholarship actually supports or hinders anti-racist analysis or political engagement; it is all about who you cite and what declarations you make. Here, a theory is not judged by what can be done with it, but by the question whether self-appointed anti-racists can find supposedly problematic sentences somewhere in its key texts. In this section, we will first point out that the H&RM article is a personal attack on us for racism, despite their reassurances about the opposite. Then, we discuss what an analysis of structural racism (systems of power) could amount to, given that they claim to do one but utterly fail to do so, resorting instead to a pretend examination of the foundations of ST. Next, we discuss what could be methodological guidelines for actually proving whether or not a theory like ST is racist.