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2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetic Supplement › 1NC – Extinction/Cybernetics Shell

The digital economy passifies the individual through tech and has established a “new complex form of authoritarianism in which the individual gives up democratic rights to engage in social relations—Leads to ontological death

Irmgard Emmelhainz 21, 11-1-2021, "Authoritarianism and the Cybernetic Episteme, or the Progressive Disappearance of Everything on Earth," No Publication, GJM

Under lockdown, internet-based technology became embedded in everyday life more than ever before. Zoom and other platforms became the matrix of a production model that exacerbates the power of technology over society. A new lockdown economy has emerged in this disembodied communication space, where knowledge is subsumed under the rules of capital accumulation. The pandemic has led to extreme alienation, to the point that privilege is defined as depending on invisible laborers to sustain forms of life. This means that a new “virtual working class” has emerged that can take basics like food, water, and electricity for granted, knowing that they do not have to risk their bodies to have these comforts. Until 2016, digital technology promised access to all human knowledge, unlimited exchange, self-expression, democratization, participation, opportunities to make money, the acceleration of bureaucratic processes, and the means for grassroots and popular power to challenge governments and corporations. The peak of this alluring cyber-utopia came around 2010–11, when social media played a crucial role in the Occupy and Arab Spring movements. But in 2016, when Cambridge Analytica was revealed to have intervened in the US elections that brought Donald Trump to power, the public’s belief in such technologies to change power structures began to shift. We witnessed the worldwide rise of right-wing governments and populist movements supported by wealth. Maurizzio Ferraris has called this the era of “post-truth,” when the deconstruction of a stable truth became an important political tool.5 In online public space, discourse has been shattered, truth has become indiscernible, and relativism has become the norm. The public sphere—the bastion of established and emerging democracies, bolstered by mass media—began to shatter. Leaders such as Benjamin Netanyahu, Donald Trump, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Jair Bolsonaro, and Narendra Modi have used digital communications to construct charismatic identities and disseminate populist messages, causing deep social and political polarization. Politics has profoundly mutated: while minorities and people at the margins have found ways to validate their speech by expressing their perspectives, individualized propaganda has become the order of the day. Algorithms feed users the information they search for, resulting in personalized information bubbles designed to engage preexisting biases. Much of the news media now functions by monetizing user engagement through this type of targeting, which has led to new forms of intensified racism and other types of prejudice. Author Andrey Mir has termed this “postjournalism.”6 He explains that, since mass media outlets have lost publicity revenue, they need to monetize engagement on the internet and do so by generating anger and hatred, usually directed at some specific group of people. For many, the news is the way to access the world, and rage has become currency: platforms drive and monetize anger as a mode of engagement. A complex form of authoritarianism is emerging, linked to digital platforms owned by the powerful CEOs who make up the notorious “Silicon Six.” Under the new authoritarianism, populations are no longer commanded: they are asked to participate, and in this simulation of involvement, the “ideology of connection” replaces the idea of social relations, neutralizing democratic demands from users to have control over their own lives, rights, and data. In this way, people are made passive.7 Cédric Durand explains the difference between the original conception of the World Wide Web and the subsequent development of closed platforms. The WWW began as a decentralized architecture in which a generic transaction protocol (http) and a uniform identification format (URI/URL) generated a space of flat content. In this space, human and nonhuman agents could have access to information without any third-party mediation. In contrast, closed platforms use application programming interfaces, or APIs, to mediate interaction, giving way to data loops in which interactions are more dense. The technical object that sustains this hierarchical architecture is the API, each of which is owned by a platform. On the one hand, big platforms, by way of APIs, offer apps that incorporate basic and indispensable data for users. On the other, platforms have access to the additional information generated by the API, such as user activity and buying habits. As the ecosystem grows in complexity, the platform is able to accumulate more and more data.8 We become more densely connected with each other and with the platforms every day, as our lives get more and more tied to the cloud.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetic Supplement › 1NC – Extinction/Cybernetics Shell

Fear of extinction is shaped by the cybernetic episteme. It molds our thoughts and mediates our cognition to prioritize supposed “existential risks” and diverts attention away from the monetization of the human

Irmgard Emmelhainz 21, 11-1-2021, "Authoritarianism and the Cybernetic Episteme, or the Progressive Disappearance of Everything on Earth," No Publication, GJM

Life and society worldwide have been transformed by digital technology, including the fabrics of emotional relationships. Many believed the internet would be the largest ungoverned space in the world with unlimited emancipatory potential, and trusted Big Tech to make the world a better place. Yet power and capitalism filled that space with surveillance systems, the production of private capital, the monetization of data, and the control of human lives. Social media now shape daily life and many have lost faith in the possibility of a shared consensus reality. We are living in a scenario similar to one imagined by Black Mirror: our belief in digital communication and social media creates narcissistic personalities, selves dissociated and dislocated from their reflections online. Digital communication offers an opaque mirror that delivers egos without bodies, eliding alterity. The collapse of reality, however, is not an unintended consequence of advancements in, for instance, artificial intelligence: it was the long-term objective of many technologists, who sought to create machines capable of transforming human consciousness (like drugs do). Communication has become a site for the extraction of surplus value, and images operate as both commodities and dispositives for this extraction. Moreover, data mediates our cognition, that is to say, the way in which we exist and perceive the world and others. The image—and the unlimited communication promised by constant imagery—have ceased to have emancipatory potential. Images place a veil over a world in which the isolated living dead, thirsty for stimulation and dopamine, give and collect likes on social media. Platform users exist according to the Silicon Valley utopian ideal of life’s complete virtualization. The internet, moreover, has radically changed the political communications game and must be considered a complex propaganda apparatus. Although a single Tweet can destroy someone’s career, and fake news can start a real news cycle, meaning is subordinate to the circulation of vacuous content. The capitalist capture of data for profit does not rely on policing content; the production of capital only relies on the constant exchange and circulation of information. We don’t yet know the full extent of the manipulation of companies such as Facebook, Google, and Amazon in the last two elections in the US or in other elections around the world. But it is undeniable that digital platforms are actively censoring content in the interests of particular political actors. For instance: in October 2020, Zoom canceled a meeting hosting Palestinian human rights activist Leila Khaled; a month before, Facebook and Twitter censored information detrimental to Joseph Biden’s presidential campaign. The same two companies intervened and shut down pro-Trump accounts in 2020, even Donald Trump’s own Facebook and Twitter accounts. After the attempted coup at the US capitol on January 6, 2020, Facebook’s recently instituted oversight board ruled that Trump had created “an environment where a serious risk of violence was possible.” In this light, it seems likely that he will continue to be banned from the platform. According to journalist Shoshana Zuboff, however, this is insufficient, given that the oversight board’s decision (whose work is supported by a $130 million endowment from Facebook) follows years of inaction by CEO Mark Zuckerberg, who indulged and appeased Trump while entrenching what Zuboff calls “surveillance capitalism.”1 A liberal might think that shutting up Trump and helping Biden is not bad, as they are actions that seemingly advance the interests of the Democratic Party. What is at stake here, however, is not whether the platforms take a “good” or “bad” stance on a particular issue; the problem is that they have immense unchecked power and can act as they please. Platforms are allowed to secretly extract behavioral data from users, whether or not users are aware, transforming the information into targeted ads, destroying privacy, changing human experience into data, altering elections, and reshaping human civilization. This structure can be termed the “cybernetic episteme,” and the new form of control, which goes beyond the previous regime of biopower, can be termed “neuropower.” According to its Greek etymology, an “episteme” is a system of understanding. In The Order of Things, Michel Foucault uses the term “épistemè” to mean the nontemporal or a priori knowledge that grounds what is taken as truth in a given moment. Several epistemes coexist at a given time, as they constitute parts of various systems of power and knowledge. The cybernetic episteme, as defined by the collective Tiqqun some twenty years ago, describes our relationship to technology and machines (which are inseparable from the workings of capitalism).2 The cybernetic episteme is based on the modern tenet of progress and human-led transcendence achieved through science and technology. Under neuropower, the sensible gives way to cognitive pathologies. These pathologies depend on the consumption of content rather than the sharing of meaning. As Thomas Metzinger explains, the internet has become an integral part of how we model ourselves, as we use it for external memory storage, as a cognitive prosthesis, and for emotional self-regulation. This has radically changed the structure of conscious experience, creating a new form of waking consciousness that resembles “a mixture of dreaming, dementia, intoxication, and infantilization.”3 Other effects of neuropower are humans’ growing invisibility to each other and a paroxysmal racism that infiltrates power, technology, culture, language, and work. For Franco “Bifo” Berardi, racism has become a “virus” that exacerbates fear—above all, the fear of extinction, which seems to have become one of the motors behind white supremacy in the world.4 Dissociated from our environment, alienated from each other, we are oblivious to the challenges that are being posed to humanity by the Capitalocene.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetic Supplement › 1NC – Cap/Cybernetics Shell

The new cybernetic societies are built in elitist foundations with a strong police state—turns the aff

Gabriel MéNdez HincapíE 17, Gabriel A. Méndez-Hincapíe is Lecturer in Political Science and International Relations, Universidad Autónoma de Manizales. Translation by Guillermo Calvo Mahe., 8-1-2017, "From the Cybernetic World War towards a Cybernetic Civil War," Critical Legal Thinking, , GJM

Up to now the world’s most developed cybernetic societies, Estonia, Singapore and Israel, have been: (1) demographically small and politically homogeneous; (2) possess very strong police states; and (3), view widespread elitist education as a state and societal priority. Interestingly, because these societies are incongruously distant from California, the idiotic myth that “everything is invented by Silicon Valley” is being discredited. However, a transition point seems to be approaching. In a new twist on the current Cybernetic World War (a digital reprint of the Cold War between East and West), during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in early June of 2017 Vladimir Putin announced a qualitatively new political program which, judging by the speeches, will involve the full “digitization” of Russian society and of the Russian economy which they plan to extract from their formidable schools of mathematicians and physicists. During that forum Putin and his ministers announced an alliance with Ethereum, a decentralized Internet services system based on Blockchain technology, the technology on which “cryptocoins” are grounded. The technology comprises interconnected nodes of encrypted information distributed throughout the world, functioning as both databases and security backup mechanisms. According to the Kremlin, President Putin met with the founder of Ethereum, Vitálik Buterin, a 23-year-old Canadian born programmer of Russian decent. Mr. Putin was enthusiastic about Mr. Buterin’s ideas and arranged for contacts with potential Russian partners. The press release on the meeting disclosed that: According to Russian [First Deputy] Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, Putin is “passionate” about the concept of digitization of the economy and new technologies. He said the president brought together a small group of administration and government officials to discuss these issues and only “permitted them to leave” after “one in the morning.” In St. Petersburg, Putin outlined the basics of the digitalization program the government has developed on its own. Among its goals is “general digital literacy” with “teaching curricula for people of all ages” and a “new and agile normative basis for introducing digital technologies in all fields”, taking into account “the informational security of the State, businesses and citizens.” Putin announced actions “to increase our intellectual, technological and professional superiority in the field of the digital economy”. In his opinion, “the groundbreaking schools in the fields of mathematics and theoretical physics” allow Russia “to achieve leadership in different sectors of the so-called new economy, especially the digital economy.” The digital economy is no longer a branch but rather, “the basis for creating new qualitative business, commerce, logistics and production models, which change education, health, state management and communication formats between people and which consequently create new development paradigms for the State, the economy and society as a whole”, argued Putin. Bonet in “El País”, (2017). Might not Putin’s strategy encompass the possibility that we find ourselves at the gates of what Alain Badiou has articulated as the “Event”: an intervention that cannot be accounted for in terms of its preexisting “objective conditions”? With Blockchain technology in play, societal wealth is being transformed, not only from an “immense accumulation of commodities” (Marx) towards an immense planetary synapse, but because of its revolutionary mathematical structure, it could also alter the traditional geometries of global power. Consider: What if in the near future Russia, China and India successfully duplicate Estonia, Singapore or Israel’s digitalization models? It will, of course, involve an escalation of the Cybernetic ​​World War with the principal Western Powers. Nonetheless, because they are all police and capitalist states with opaque, corrupt oligarchies entrenched in positions commanding both the economy and the administration, hacktivists, whether from the East or West, the North or South, will face the challenge of transforming the Cybernetic World War into a Cybernetic Civil War through the socialization of databases, i.e., decrypting Big Data and freeing all the potentia of its collective artificial intelligence from its current hijackers: both state (e.g., the United States, the European Union, Russia, China, etc.) and private (e.g., Google, Facebook, Netflix, Microsoft, Apple, etc.).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetic Supplement › 1NC – Cap/Cybernetics Shell

The impact is cybernetic civil war

Gabriel MéNdez HincapíE 17, Gabriel A. Méndez-Hincapíe is Lecturer in Political Science and International Relations, Universidad Autónoma de Manizales. Translation by Guillermo Calvo Mahe., 8-1-2017, "From the Cybernetic World War towards a Cybernetic Civil War," Critical Legal Thinking, , GJM

When such privatization reaches its final stages, capital will require very little living labor for its reproduction. By then, without state intervention, the risk will be that most workers will be hurled into the hell of unemployment and instability. However, in doing so, capital will have undermined its own foundation, “surplus value”, which can only be created by “living labor”. In Marx’s words: “Capital thus works in favor of its own dissolution as the dominant form of production.” (Marx 1980, 222) More recently, Stephen Hawking, the famous British astrophysicist, drew our attention to the same phenomenon: If machines produce everything we need, the outcome will depend on how things are distributed. Everyone can enjoy a life of luxurious leisure if the machine-produced wealth is shared, or else, most people can end up miserably poor if the machine-owners successfully lobby against wealth redistribution. So far, the trend seems to be toward the second option with technology driving ever-increasing inequality. [Emphasis added] (Hawking, 2015). If Hawking’s prediction comes true we will arrive at a situation where virtually every product will be machine made with little if any living labor involved. But, as pointed out by Bruno Milanovic (2015): “Isn’t this in some ways … very similar, to Marx’s process of increased “organic composition of capital” eventually leading to capitalism’s euthanasia (to use Keynes’ term in a Marxist framework)??” According to Milanovic, a former chief economist of the World Bank, Marx’s assumption is that the process of valorization implies intensification of capital relative to living labor. Thus, capitalists tend to accumulate more and more capital and to eliminate more and more living labor per unit of output. In a Marxist framework, this means a constant diminishing need for payed salary per hour which obviously generates consistently less surplus value. Such diminishing surplus value in inverse relation to increasing capital accumulation means a reduction in the rate of profit until it plummets to zero. How then will robotization affect capitalism? Karl Marx gives us some clues. As he wrote, each individual capitalist is constrained by the iron laws of the market to invest in increasingly capital-intensive processes to attain a competitive edge over other capitalists; however, when they all do the same, (ignoring counter-tendencies), the benefit rate diminishes for all of them. Thus, in the long term, when all is said and done, capitalists “withdraw from business” or, more precisely, move towards a zero rate of profit. In any case, living labor will be replaced by machines to such an extreme degree that the bulk of production will be carried out robotically. Employment will become insignificant. According to Marx, the ultimate political imbalance – or terminal crisis – would take place between a vast “reserve army of unemployed workers” and a thin layer of capitalists and successful wage earners. To visualize this imbalance, Milanovic (2015) invites us to … [I]magine thousands of robots working in a big factory with only one worker checking them out, and with the useful life of robots being one year so that you keep on replacing robots continuously and thus run enormous depreciation and reinvestment costs every year. The composition of GDP would be very interesting. If total GDP is 100, we could have consumption=5, net investment=5 and depreciation=90. You would live in a country with GDP per capita of $500,000 but $450,000 of that would be depreciation. Suppose now that following a Cybernetic ​​Civil War, -similar to the one recreated in the film V for Vendetta– and led by a global network of anti-system “hacktivists”, machines become the property of the unemployed and of the other disenfranchised of the system. The same enormous factories crowded with thousands of robots would be retained but their entire net product would be appropriated by the unemployed, who would use the income to facilitate a life of leisure with reduced working hours or perhaps none: gazing at screens and playing entertaining games on their laptops. Thus, cybernetic civil war would be a displaced class struggle. What, however, would be the “ideology” of the new cybernetic proletarians? Perhaps an invigorated “digitized fetishism” or perhaps, “the kingdom of freedom” as Marx hypothesized? In the words of Ricardo Sanín-Restrepo (2016): The wondrous machines of technology and communication are programmed in highly sophisticated languages and in extremely elitist environments that are instrumental for the domination of capital at its best. Even though we are connected irremediably in a network of ever-extending information, as a General Intellect, the cultural language of the machine remains encrypted: its flows and commands are still dependent on the hunger of the market, and its core intellect remains a highly scarce material. Hence, information can only become democratic when the machine—as a point of absorption of power-knowledge—is itself decrypted and politically liberated. “Wondrous machines” which, while embodying a great promise of human emancipation, still continue to replicate in their “flows and commands” the same moral baseness: racism, sexism, imperialism, capitalism, of the political matrix that bred life into them: Globalized Coloniality These are the great and disturbing challenges with which globalized coloniality and its encrypted reality confront us.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cybernetic Supplement › 1NC – Cap/Cybernetics Shell

Capital has infiltrated the general intellect and has muddled the distinction between the machine and the human knowledge production

Gabriel MéNdez HincapíE 17, Gabriel A. Méndez-Hincapíe is Lecturer in Political Science and International Relations, Universidad Autónoma de Manizales. Translation by Guillermo Calvo Mahe., 8-1-2017, "From the Cybernetic World War towards a Cybernetic Civil War," Critical Legal Thinking, , GJM

Energy is essential for the production and movement of “things”. Using an assemblage of machines the industrial revolution exponentially increased the energy available to human society; however, such machinery required human supervision and control to attain its objectives. There are basically three “ideal types” of machines: those that convert matter from one form of matter to another; those that convert energy from one form of energy to another; and, those that exchange information. Cybernetics deals with the latter. In that sense, the Internet may be conceived of as an immense machine encompassing the breadth and length of the planet that has the real-time capacity to interconnect and put in common all of human kind, an embryonic global civil society. The next evolutionary leap is now underway, the Internet of things (IoT) which, as inferred from its name, will permit the connection of “things” to each other as well as to human beings implying that, like today’s cybernetic machines, “things” will soon possess a degree of “intelligence”. In conjunction with certain functions (e.g., the capture, recording and transmission of information), such intelligence will equal or exceed that of humans. Based on the foregoing, what Karl Marx’s anticipated as a “social brain” is emerging before our own eyes. Since ancient times, humans and things have formed a single system (human society) comprised of a single socio-technical object in the sense defined in actor-network theory (ANT) by Michel Callon and Bruno Latour. In the latter, humans provided the desire and intelligence and “things” the energy and transformation of matter, even if ‘us” and “them”, humans and machines did not intercommunicate (converse). Now, however, a subtle disruption is occurring as “things” begin to acquire varying degrees of intelligence and thus conversation and a new kind of synergy appears plausible. Such disruption was anticipated by Marx in his famous Fragment on Machines (1857) where he wrote: “The accumulation of knowledge and skills of the general productive forces of the social brain is thus absorbed within capital.” (Marx, 1980, p.220). There (see Notebook VI-VII of the Grundrisse), in what he referred to as “general intellect” or the “social brain”, the German philosopher anticipated the process through which vampire like capital has imbibed knowledge and abilities from the productive forces of society, violently extracting it from its workers. According to Marx, such extraction in the form of the class struggle has shaped the history of that which is real, i.e., “the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated it into forms of thought”. Insofar, this conception of the human brain as a generic or social being, is precisely what is fundamental for the derivation of a theory of knowledge (epistemology) from the theory of value, which means one basic thing: that the brain “is” social. Today, such reality is referred to as “virtual reality” or “Big Data” although it would be more accurate to refer to it as “encrypted reality”. The privatization of Big Data (or the social brain) explains how Silicon Valley’s media stars now dominate the world. In the words of Slavoj Žižek: How did Bill Gates become the richest man in America? His wealth has nothing to do with Microsoft producing good software at lower prices than its competitors, or “exploiting” its workers more successfully (Microsoft pays its intellectual workers a relatively high salary). Millions of people still buy Microsoft software because Microsoft has imposed itself as an almost universal standard, practically monopolizing the field, as one embodiment of what Marx called the “general intellect”, by which he meant collective knowledge in all its forms, from science to practical knowhow. Gates effectively privatized part of the general intellect and became rich by appropriating the rent that followed. (Žižek 2012, 146).

2022 Michigan Negative
Negative › 1nc – russia AI fails

Russia lags behind in AI, means they aren’t a threat

Polyakova ’18 (Alina,  President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) as well as an adjunct professor of European studies at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), “Weapons of the weak: Russia and AI-driven asymmetric warfare, Accessed 7/9/2022, brookings.edu/research/weapons-of-the-weak-russia-and-ai-driven-asymmetric-warfare/)

Speaking to Russian students on the first day of the school year in September 2017, Putin squarely positioned Russia in the technological arms race for artificial intelligence (AI). Putin’s comment (see above) signaled that, like China and the United States, Russia sees itself engaged in direct geopolitical competition with the world’s great powers, and AI is the currency that Russia is betting on. But, unlike the United States and China, Russia lags behind in research and development on AI and other emerging technologies. Russia’s economy makes up less than 2 percent of global GDP compared to 24 percent for the United States and 15 percent for China, which puts Russia on par with a country like Spain. Despite Putin’s focus on AI, the Russian government has not released a strategy, like China has, on how the country plans to lead in this area. The Russian government’s future investment in AI research is unknown, but reports estimate that it spends approximately $12.5 million a year on AI research, putting it far behind China’s plan to invest $150 billion through 2030. The U.S. Department of Defense alone spends $7.4 billion annually on unclassified research and development on AI and related fields. Russia’s public corruption, decline in rule-of-law, and increasingly oppressive government regulations have produced a poor business environment. As a consequence, the country trails the United States and China in terms of private investment, scientific research, and the number of AI start-ups. In 2018, no Russian city entered the top 20 global regional hubs for the AI sector, despite the much-hyped opening of the “Skolkovo Innovation Center” in 2010, which was designed to be Russia’s answer to Silicon Valley. Unlike Silicon Valley, Skolkovo did not spur the kind of private investments and innovation that the Kremlin had hoped for and has since fizzled out. Russia’s new venture, a “technopolis” named Era, which is set to open in the fall of 2018, now promises to be the new hub for emerging technologies, but it too is unlikely to spur Silicon Valley like innovation. It is telling that despite high-level presidential and administrative support, there is scant Russian language academic research on AI. It is not likely that the country’s stagnant and hydrocarbon-dependent economy will do much to improve the government’s ability to ramp up investment in emerging technologies. In the longer term, Russia’s demographic crisis (Russia is projected to lose 8 percent of its population by 2050, according the UN) will likely lead to shortages in highly skilled workers, many of whom have already left Russia for better pay and opportunities elsewhere. Western sanctions on key sectors of the Russian financial sector and defense industry, which Europe and the United States imposed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the United States has continued to ramp up since then, put extra pressure on the Russian economy. Taken together, the economic and demographic trends signal that in the AI race, Russia will be unable to match China on government investment or compete with the United States on private sector innovation. The Kremlin is undoubtedly aware of the country’s unfavorable position in the global AI competition, even if such an admission is unlikely to ever be made publicly. Strategically, such a wide gap between ambition and capacity means that Russia will need to invest its limited resources carefully. Currently, Moscow is pursuing investments in at least two directions: select conventional military and defense technologies where the Kremlin believes it can still hold comparative advantage over the West and high-impact, low-cost asymmetric warfare to correct the imbalance between Russia and the West in the conventional domain. The former—Russia’s development and use of AI-driven military technologies and weapons—has received significant attention. The latter—the implications of AI for asymmetric political warfare—remains unexplored. Yet, such nonconventional tools—cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, political influence, and illicit finance—have become a central tenet of Russia’s strategy toward the West and one with which Russia has been able to project power and influence beyond its immediate neighborhood. In particular, AI has the potential to hyperpower Russia’s use of disinformation—the intentional spread of false and misleading information for the purpose of influencing politics and societies. And unlike in the conventional military space, the United States and Europe are ill-equipped to respond to AI-driven asymmetric warfare (ADAW) in the information space.

2022 Michigan Negative
Negative › 1nc – dod fails

DoD needs huge reforms before it could be effective

Konaev and Nurkin, 22 (Konaev Margarita and Tate Nurkin, Margarita Konaev is a nonresident senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Konaev’s research on international security, armed conflict, non-state actors and urban warfare in the Middle East, Russia, and Eurasia., Tate Nurkin is the founder of OTH Intelligence Group and a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.Substantively, Mr. Nurkin’s research and analysis has a particularly strong focus on US-China competition, defense technology, the future of military capabilities, and the global defense industry and its market issues., 5-25-2022, accessed on 7-13-2022, Atlantic Council, "Eye to eye in AI: Developing artificial intelligence for national security and defense", https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/eye-to-eye-in-ai/#accelerating-dod)

Currently, there are no shared technical standards for what constitutes ethical or trustworthy AI systems, which can make it difficult for nontraditional AI vendors to set expectations and navigate the bureaucracy. The DoD is not directly responsible for setting standards. Rather, the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expanded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) mission “to include advancing collaborative frameworks, standards, guidelines for AI, supporting the development of a risk mitigation framework for AI systems, and supporting the development of technical standards and guidelines to promote trustworthy AI systems.”7979. Pub. L. 116-283, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021), https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ283/PLAW-116publ283.pdf. In July 2021, the NIST issued a request for information from stakeholders as it develops its AI Risk Management Framework, meant to help organizations “incorporate trustworthiness considerations into the design, development, use, and evaluation of AI products, services, and systems.”8080. “Summary Analysis of Responses to the NIST Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF)—Request for Information (RFI),” National Institute of Standards and Technology, October 15, 2021, https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2021/10/15/AI%20RMF_RFI%20Summary%20.pdf. Related to standards are the challenges linked to testing, evaluation, verification, and validation (TEVV). Testing and verification processes are meant to “help decision-makers and operators understand and manage the risks of developing, producing, operating, and sustaining AI-enabling systems,” and are essential for building trust in AI.8181 Michele A. Flournoy, Avril Haines, and Gabrielle Chefitz, “Building Trust through Testing: Adapting DOD’s Test & Evaluation, Validation & Verification (TEVV) Enterprise for Machine Learning Systems, including Deep Learning Systems,” WestExec, October 2020, 3–4, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Building-Trust-Through-Testing.pdf. The DoD’s current TEVV protocols and infrastructure are meant primarily for major defense acquisition programs like ships, airplanes, or tanks; it is linear, sequential, and, ultimately, finite once the program transitions to production and deployment. With AI systems, however, “development is never really finished, so neither is testing.”8282. Flournoy, Haines, and Chefitz, “Building Trust through Testing,” 3. Adaptive, continuously learning emerging technologies like AI, therefore, require a more agile and iterative development-and-testing approach—one that, as the NSCAI recommended, “integrates testing as a continuous part of requirements specification, development, deployment, training, and maintenance and includes run-time monitoring of operational behavior.”8383. “Final ,” 384. The ethical code that guides the US military reflects a fundamental commitment to abiding with the laws of war at a time when authoritarian countries like China and Russia show little regard for human rights and humanitarian principles. Concurrently, the DoD’s rigorous approach to testing and assurance of new capabilities is designed to ensure that new weapons are used responsibly and appropriately, and to minimize the risk from accidents, misuse, and abuse of systems and capabilities that can have dangerous, or even catastrophic, effects. These values and principles that the United States shares with many of its allies and partners are a strategic asset in the competition against authoritarian countries as they field AI-enabled military systems. To cement the DoD’s advantage in this arena, we recommend the following steps. The DoD will not be able to fulfill its ambitions in AI and compete effectively with the Chinese model of sourcing technology innovation through military- civil fusion without close partnerships with a broad range of technology companies. This includes defense-industry leaders with long-standing ties to the Pentagon, technology giants at the forefront of global innovation, commercial technology players seeking to expand their government portfolio, and startups at the cutting edge of AI development. But, the DoD’s budget-planning, procurement, acquisition, contracting, and compliance processes will likely need to be fundamentally restructured to effectively engage with the entirety of this vibrant and diverse technology ecosystem. Systemic change is a slow, arduous process. But, delaying this transition risks the US military falling behind on exploiting the advantages AI promises to deliver, from operational speed to decision dominance. In the meantime, the following actions could help improve coordination with industry partners to accelerate the DoD’s AI adoption efforts. The DoD should implement the NSCAI’s recommendation to accelerate efforts to train acquisition professionals on the full range of available options for acquisition and contracting, and incentivize their use for AI and digital technologies.”88 Moreover, such acquisition- workforce training initiatives should ensure that acquisition professionals have a sufficient understanding of the DoD’s ethical principles for AI and the technical dimensions of trusted and responsible AI. The DIU’s ethical guidelines can serve as the foundation for this training. Rather than building entirely new AI-enabled systems, in the short to medium term, the DoD will be integrating AI into a range of existing software and hardware systems—from cyberdefense architectures to fighter jets to C2. Progress toward implementing AI will, therefore, also depend upon streamlining collaboration between the startups and nontraditional AI vendors that the DoD has been courting for their innovative and cutting-edge technologies and the defense primes responsible for integrating new capabilities into legacy systems.

2022 Michigan Negative
Negative › 1nc – regulations fail

It is impossible to fully and safely regulate complex AI

Gyulai and Ujlaki 21 (Attila, Centre for Social Sciences - Institute for Political Science / University of Public Service.  Anna, Centre for Social Sciences – Institute for Political Science / Corvinus University of Budapest, “The political AI: A realist’s account of AI regulation”, Információs Társadalom XXI, no. 2 (2021): 29–42,)

Recalling the realist viewpoint of the political sphere, it seems that the only attainable goal is a modus vivendi, which resonates with the idea that an inherent characteristic of the political world is balancing the possibilities of two extremes. History of politics supports this more pessimistic view: occasionally, eruptions of civil war and failed states still embody the brute reality of the Hobbesian state of nature, while the existence of authoritarian and totalitarian dictatures altogether with hybrid regimes are eternal reminders of the impossibility to limit power in a once-and-for-all manner. In light of this reality of the political world, new claims for the regulation of artificial intelligence, more specifically on weak AI, are less promising. Debates on the regulation of AI concentrate on the need to connect principles such as fairness, accountability, safety, sustainability, and social inclusion, among others, to AI governance (for a more exhaustive list, see Hagendorff 2020). Nevertheless, the most discussed issue is transparency, which is among the primary claims for several AI 38 ethics guidelines released by different institutions and companies in the past few years. The current boom in ethical guidelines for AI involves several criticisms concerning the effectiveness of such guidelines based on their potential to implement transparency and other claims effectively. This line of criticism can be divided into three types of argument. The first type challenges the AI guidelines on their extensive list of ethical claims based on their ineffectiveness. This type, which can be called ‘tick-box criticism,’ can be coupled with a proposal of some different approach, for example, virtue ethics (see Hagendorff 2020). The second type, which can be called ‘double standard criticism’, is more sceptical about the possibility of guiding AI and whether full transparency can be achieved at all. This criticism builds on the argument that it would be a double standard to call for higher transparency in AI compared to human decision tools and human reasoning (see Zerilli et al. 2019). The third type of criticism is more focused, what we call ‘specificity criticism’, and argues that current Artificial Intelligence Guidelines (AIGUs) are not specific to AI, but they are simply attempting to gain social control over technology. This criticism also demonstrates that transparency and explainability are claims that specifically concern AI because in such cases there is a possibility of the autonomy of AI. In that case, though, the double standard problem arises (see Héder 2020). These criticisms imply that there is a profoundly political characteristic of AI. On the one hand, there is a relative autonomy inherent in AI that can be understood in a broader sense. It is impossible to regulate in every detail, something that can develop by itself. On the other hand, concerning the expert systems of weak AI, the double standard criticism and specificity criticism correctly acknowledged that it would be an unfair expectation to regulate the decision-making of artificial intelligence in domains where human decision-making cannot be entirely regulated likewise. However, contrary to the double standard criticism, we do not base our argument on the similarity between the obscurity of artificial decision tools and human cognitive processes. Instead, we build our argument on the political characteristic of AI. Using AI as a tool is similar to political authorization: although accountability is the main virtue in politics, it would be unrealistic to expect legislative, executive, or judicial officials to act ‘perfectly’. We can only hope that they behave to the best of their knowledge, and while we usually hold them to account for significant breaches of their power, mostly, we authorize them because authorization is the only legitimate way to create order without slipping into a Hobbesian state of nature or a tyrannical regime.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **Cyber Scenarios** › 1ac NATO Cohesion Extension

NATO is key to avert all existential threats

Nicholas Burns 18, Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School; Director, American Secretaries of State Project, “Assessing the Value of the NATO Alliance.” Harvard’s Belfer Center. 9-5-2018. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/assessing-value-nato-alliance

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Menendez, you have asked for an assessment of NATO’s value to the United States. In my judgment, NATO continues to be of vital importance to American security interests in five principal ways. First, NATO is at the core of one of the most significant foreign policy accomplishments in American history—the creation of a long-term peace in Europe following the close of the Second World War. Because of NATO and the emergence of the European Union, Europe is united after centuries of division and war. NATO’s military strength has been a major reason for the absence of war with the Soviet Union and Russia since 1949. A recent Atlantic Council study reminds that America spent 14.1 percent of its GDP on defense during the First World War, 37.5 percent during the Second World War and 13.2 percent during the Korean Conflict. We spend nothing close to those levels now in large part due to the great power peace we have enjoyed for over seventy years. NATO has been a major factor in that peace. And due to the expansion of NATO and the European Union eastward after the fall of the Soviet Union, millions of East Europeans now live in free, democratic societies—a significant success for U.S. diplomacy. Second, NATO delivers additional benefits to U.S. military objectives and operations beyond our shores. NATO is at the heart of our defense of North America and Europe from nuclear and conventional threats. British and French nuclear weapons join ours in deterring aggression in the North Atlantic area. Since the late 1940s, every Administration has believed that the best way to defend our country is through American forces forward deployed in Europe with the NATO allies. This strategy remains right for today given Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014 and its current pressure on Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. NATO remains our primary vehicle for deterring Putin in Eastern Europe. The NATO allies host a great number of critical bases for U.S. forces—Ramstein in Germany, Aviano in Italy, Rota in Spain, Souda Bay in Greece and Incirlik in Turkey—that serve as a platform for our presence in Europe, as well as for U.S. force projection against terrorist groups in North Africa and the Middle East and for our continued military operations in Afghanistan. Europe is a critical link in the development of our Ballistic Missile Defense network focused on the Middle East with Turkey, Romania, Poland, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, the UK and other allies all hosting elements of this system. NATO allies continue to participate in the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State in the Middle East. Many of the allies play lead roles in other counter terror operations such as French forces in Mali supported by the U.S. In Afghanistan, the NATO allies remain with us in combat operations and in training the Afghan military. Over 1000 soldiers from European and other partner nations have died there during the last seventeen years. NATO continues to maintain the hard-earned peace in Kosovo with European troops bearing the large share of the burden. An EU-led force has taken on all of the peacekeeping responsibility in Bosnia, freeing up the U.S. for other activities. Third, the NATO allies are among our closest and most supportive global partners as we confront the great transnational challenges that define this century—the fight against terrorism, the entire complex of cyber threats, climate change, the risk of pandemics, mass migration and others. The NATO allies and our partners in the European Union act together with us on these and other issues. This is of incalculable benefit to the U.S. Neither Russia nor China have treaty allies. NATO is a significant advantage for the United States when it acts as a force multiplier for American interests.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **Cyber Scenarios** › 1ac Russian Cyberattacks Extension

Escalation is likely

Mathew J. Schwartz, executive editor, DataBreachToday and for European news coverage, 5-13-2022, "Russia-Ukraine War: Cyberattack Escalation Risk Continues," No Publication, https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/blogs/russia-ukraine-war-cyberattack-escalation-risk-continues-p-3231

While Ukraine remains at risk, of course, so too do any countries whose governments have been siding against Russia. Thankfully, however, so far the impact of online attacks has been much less than many analysts had feared, as Russia appears to remain much more focused on physical attacks. "Perhaps the concept of a 'cyber war' was over-hyped," Jeremy Fleming, director of the U.K.'s security, intelligence and cyber agency, GCHQ, said earlier this week with classic British understatement. "But there's plenty of cyber about, including a range of activity we and partners have attributed to Russia," Fleming said Tuesday at the CyberUK conference in Wales. "We've seen what looks like some spillover of activity affecting other countries. And we've seen indications that Russia's cyber operatives continue to look for targets in countries that oppose their actions." "What we were expecting was, of course, a massive cyber campaign with more spillovers," Juhan Lepassaar, executive director of the EU Agency of Cybersecurity, known as ENISA, said at the conference. Satellite Communications Disrupted Of course, there has been some notable Russian hacking, including the attack on Viasat's KA-SAT satellite communications terminals on Feb. 24 - the day Russia invaded Ukraine. This week, the EU, U.K., Ukraine and U.S. attributed that attack to Russia. "So yes, we've seen that, but we haven't seen a sustained effort," Lepassaar said (see: Russia-Ukraine War: 7 Cybersecurity Lessons Learned). Multiple strains of wiper malware have also been launched by Russia against Ukraine, experts say, including against energy facilities. But part of the challenge facing Moscow is that Ukraine has been devoting significant energy to shoring up its online defenses, backed by support from allies, as well as NATO. "The Ukrainians have been stress testing involuntarily since 2014," Lepassaar said of their online defenses. Likewise, Rob Joyce, the head of cybersecurity at the U.S. National Security Agency, has lauded the state of Ukraine's online defenses and told CyberUK attendees that Ukraine offers a model for others to emulate. "One of the things they've done is, they have emergency plans, having been under pressure for years," he said at the conference. "They have been able to practice and they understand what good incident response is." Even though so-called cyber war has failed to transpire, experts say the risk of inadvertent or intentional spillover remains high, especially for critical infrastructure sectors (see: 9 Essentials for Global CISOs During Russia's Ukraine War). "I'm still very worried about the threats emanating from around the Russia-Ukraine situation," Joyce told the BBC. This threat is being tracked at the highest levels of government. Joyce said the White House is continuing to closely monitoring the situation, not least given the ongoing risk that there would be "spillover of nation-state activity … continuing on to impact civil society." CISO Mandate: Stay Alert Hence while there's so far been no all-out cyber blitzkrieg, CISOs should - and must - continue to carefully track the conflict, given the risk that organizations might be affected by cyberattack spillover, if not directly targeted. Threat intelligence firm Flashpoint, for example, says it's been hearing this question regularly from the CISOs and other clients it continues to brief on the war: "How might decisions made by Western governments and commercial entities, such as economic sanctions, lead to an escalation in cyberspace and the physical world?" Another top concern, it says, remains which industries are most at risk and the types of attacks they should most beware. "When it comes to the cyber domain and the potential attacks on cyber infrastructure, it's something that we have to be very concerned about," said Max Bergmann, the Europe program director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in a Tuesday press briefing held by the Washington-based, bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization on Tuesday. Likely Targets Flashpoint says the most likely targets for Russia remain Ukrainian government and financial services sites and "military communication networks" but that any escalation would likely focus on other countries' financial services sectors and likely include distributed denial-of-service attacks, phishing campaigns and worse. "Russian state-backed activity has so far focused on Ukrainian banks - Privatbank and Oschadbank were targeted before the February invasion - likely with the purpose of diminishing trust in the Ukrainian financial sector both in the Ukrainian population and among Western partners," Flashpoint says. "The likeliest form of attacks include those that were used against the Ukrainian banks - DDoS attacks, self-propagating wiper attacks, or attacks leveraging banks' compromised email infrastructure - as well as attacks focusing on cyberespionage with the purpose of aiding sanctions evasion." But Russia faces "some real challenges" if it tries to escalate, said Bergmann at CSIS. "It's a very different environment than last year when … Russia-linked cyber actors attacked the Colonial Pipeline and took that down when the Biden administration was in the midst of trying to sort of establish a detente with Russia," he said. "That is not the environment now, and as Russia has bogged down in Ukraine, I don't think they're going to want sort of an escalatory cycle when it comes to sort of provoking us to get more involved in the conflict or to take direct action in the cyber domain against them."

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **Cyber Scenarios** › 2AC Cyberterror

Nuclear terror causes extinction

Irma Arguello and Emiliano Buis, 18 – *Irma, Founder and Chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation (Non-proliferation for Global Security), degree in Phyisics Science from the University of Buenos Aires, Master degree in Business Administration from IDEA/Wharton School, Defense and Security studies (Master level) at the Escuela de Defensa Nacional, Argentina; **Emiliano, lawyer and associate professor of public international law, international humanitarian law, international law of disarmament, and the origins of international law in antiquity (Irma Arguello & Emiliano J. Buis, “The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1436812)

But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **Cyber Scenarios** › 2AC Cyberterror

Emerging tech makes terrorist cyberattacks a viable option

Antonio Missiroli 19, the Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, a professional journalist, taught Boston University, Johns Hopkins, College of Europe (Bruges) and Sciences Po (Paris), 1-7-2019, “NATO and the South,”

Terrorists are also making an increasing use of modern technologies. While there have been no cases of ‘cyber-terrorism’ –ie, no proved terrorist act carried out through cyber means only– terrorist groups have indeed used cyberspace for recruitment and funding as well as operational purposes. This is an area where intelligence agencies are very busy and alert, although these activities are unlikely to reach the level of sophistication and disruption that only State-sponsored groups can achieve in this domain. There is, however, a growing concern about the possible use of unmanned vehicles for kinetic terrorist attacks –and not only on the battlefield (where they have already occurred) but also in civilian and especially urban environments–. What happened around Christmas 2018 at Gatwick airport in London was quite telling, especially in light of the commercial affordability and availability of such tools and their potential impact on civilian life. NATO has just launched a specific initiative to counter –on the battlefield but potentially also elsewhere– such a misuse of new technologies by terrorists.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **Cyber Scenarios** › 2AC NoKo Cyber

Cooperation is key to prevent US-North Korean nuclear war

Ikegami 17 Masako Ikegami is a professor in the Department of Innovation Science at the School of Technology and Environment at the Tokyo Institute of Technology. Previously, she was director of (and a professor at) the Center for Pacific Asia Studies at Stockholm University. Her research interests include Asian security; conflict prevention and confidence building; arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation; and science, technology, and society issues. She holds a doctorate in sociology from the University of Tokyo and a Ph.D. in peace and conflict research from Uppsala University in Sweden. Ikegami has been an active member in the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and was Abe Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington, D.C. and Honolulu in 2011–2012. By Masako Ikegami, June 15, 2017 Prevent nuclear catastrophe: Finally end the Korean War https://thebulletin.org/2017/06/prevent-nuclear-catastrophe-finally-end-the-korean-war/

The long-simmering confrontation between the United States and North Korea has reached a moment of unprecedented tension. The risk that unintended war will break out due to misjudgment is high. Indeed, as others have observed, East Asia is witnessing a “Cuban Missile Crisis in slow motion.”

According to Graham Allison, director of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, it is now time “to examine previously unthinkable options” on the Korean Peninsula—such as scaling back joint US-South Korean military exercises in exchange for a freeze on North Korean tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Considering these “unthinkable” options, Allison writes, would follow in a tradition established during the Cuban Missile Crisis by John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, who both “blinked,” and whose behavior ultimately amounted to cooperative crisis management. One of the most unthinkable options for the Korean Peninsula—but perhaps the most promising—is for the United States and China to finally pursue a formal end to the Korean War.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **Cyber Scenarios** › 2AC NoKo Cyber

North Korea is becoming increasingly capable at cyberattacks and will increase U.S. tensions and end any chance for US-North Korean coop

Benjamin R. Young 19, an assistant professor at the Wilder School of Government & Public Affairs at Virginia Commonwealth University, author of Guns, Guerillas, and the Great Leader: North Korea and the Third World, 2-4-2019, "North Korea Knows How Important Its Cyberattacks Are," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/09/north-korea-knows-how-important-its-cyberattacks-are/

North Korea’s cyberattacks became famous in 2014, when Pyongyang’s hackers targeted Sony Pictures, seemingly in retaliation for a satirical movie about North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. But the reclusive regime’s greatly improved cybercapabilities are not a joke. They’re a serious threat to the stability of the global economy and critical infrastructure systems. North Korean hackers have gone on to bigger and more financially profitable targets. Since 2014, North Korean hackers have attacked Bangladesh’s central bank, the U.K. National Health Service, and, more recently, cryptocurrency exchanges. And the odds are that many more major North Korean cyberattacks are to come in the near future. In internal regime discourse, Pyongyang proudly refers to its cyberoperations as its “all-purpose sword.” According to testimony from a South Korean intelligence chief, Kim reportedly stated: “Cyberwarfare, along with nuclear weapons and missiles, is an ‘all-purpose sword’ that guarantees our military’s capability to strike relentlessly.” Subversive, criminal operations are a style of asymmetric warfare long embraced by the North. The country’s founding leader, Kim Il Sung, earned his nationalist credentials by fighting Japanese colonialists in the 1930s. His guerrilla band later became the political elite of the North Korean state. During the Cold War era, Kim regularly deployed guerrillas to subvert and instigate the South Korean government. North Koreas hackers are the 21st-century version of guerrilla fighters, moving in the dark and striking at the most vulnerable points. Historically, guerrillas often depended on banditry and robbery to survive—and one reason for the recent amping up of cyberattacks is financial worries. While Kim Jong Un’s recent missile tests garner international condemnation and head-shaking in Washington and Seoul, Pyongyang’s cyberoperatives work in the shadows. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korean borders have been sealed shut for the past two years. North Korean trade with China has largely stalled, and many foreign diplomats have left the country, making the already reclusive state even more isolated. Nonetheless, North Korean hackers work diligently in an effort to bolster the depleted coffers of the party elite. Between 2011 and 2020, North Korea cybercriminals stole more than $1 billion worth of cryptocurrency. In 2021, North Korean hackers allegedly stole close to $400 million worth of crypto coins. The blockchain analysis company Chainalysis wrote in a recent report that “North Korean cybercriminals had a banner year in 2021.” The regime’s investment in its cyberoperations is likely providing a vital economic buffer for the isolated and paranoid leadership. According to an unclassified 2021 report from the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), North Korea’s cybercrime likely funds “government priorities, such as its nuclear and missile programs.” North Korea is also engaged in more conventional espionage. A cybersecurity firm recently uncovered that the North Korean hacking group Lazarus used two decoy Microsoft Word documents that resembled Lockheed Martin employment information in order to deliver payloads on unsuspecting users. Using spear-phishing attacks, the Lazarus group has increasingly targeted job-seekers in the U.S. defense and aerospace industries with fake documents that are infected with malware. Despite relatively good relations between Pyongyang and Moscow, North Korean hackers have even targeted Russia’s foreign ministry with malware. In what seems to be a counterstrike against the analysts who uncover their hacking operations, Pyongyang’s cyberagents are using fake social media profiles to infect the computers of cybersecurity researchers with custom backdoor malware. So, why have foreign-policy experts and policymakers themselves largely ignored North Korea’s increasingly sophisticated cyberoperations? Well, firstly, cyberattacks are less obvious than missile tests. Kim’s numerous missile tests are a frequent and unignorable reminder of his regime’s nuclear arsenal and military capabilities. Cyberattacks take place in the dark corners of the internet and are not always obvious to even the targets. Secondly, most policymakers struggle with understanding that North Korea is a technological peer nation in cybersecurity. Despite being a deeply impoverished country with a crumbling health care system and less than 10 percent of its non-highway roads paved, the North Korean leadership has attained significant expertise and development in its cybersector. As part of its militaristic worldview, North Korea prioritizes investment in regime stability and the defense industry over economic improvement for its citizens. North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities have allowed a nation with a GDP roughly equivalent to that of Mozambique to be able to compete with the world superpowers in cyberspace. The stereotype of North Korea’s Kim Jong Un as a buffoonish character on the international stage has impeded U.S. strategic thinking toward North Korea as a very real threat in cyberspace. And finally, fearing financial loss and public relations fiascos, companies and businesses are hesitant to release information to the public about North Korean cyberattacks. Since many CEOs solely prioritize their company’s bottom line, details of cyberattacks often get swept under the rug. In 2016, the FBI’s Internal Crime Complaint Center estimated that only 15 percent of cybertheft victims in the United States reported their crimes to law enforcement. So, what can be done to bolster defenses against North Korean hackers? Cyberattacks are part of North Korea’s historical commitment to asymmetric warfare, and it will not change course no matter how much we publicly condemn its actions. Rhetoric won’t work unless it has teeth. Guerrilla warfare, in cyberspace and the physical world, has long been embraced by the regime. The United States needs to address the role and complicity of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in North Korea’s cyberoperations. From hosting North Korean cyberunits in border cities such as Shenyang to training them at Chinese technology universities and research institutes, the CCP enables North Korea’s maliciousness in cyberspace. In 2016, a South Korean cybersecurity researcher estimated that around 600 to 1,000 North Korean cyberwarfare agents operate in China. In addition, most, if not all, of the internet traffic from North Korea runs through Chinese access providers. Many North Korean hackers get their education in China’s tech universities and then bring back their skills to their homeland. We need to cut off this supply of North Korean hackers and address the fact that the Chinese government knowingly enables North Korea’s malicious cyberoperations. In October 2020, John Demers, then the U.S. assistant attorney general for national security, mentioned at a think tank event that “there is support through Chinese cyberinfrastructure. There’s likely support in terms of sharing expertise and training from the Chinese side.” Since the U.S. national security apparatus seemingly acknowledges this Sino-North Korean cyberpartnership, the U.S. government should sanction the Chinese entities that enable and assist North Korean cybercrime, such as the Harbin Institute of Technology, which hosts North Korean computer science students. In 2019, China’s education minister signed an agreement with the North Korean government on the continuation of educational exchanges and partnerships from 2020 to 2030. The Chinese government will continue to see North Korean cybercapabilities as a useful proxy force to weaken and frustrate U.S. interests. Finally, U.S. companies and businesses need to share information about North Korean cyberattacks with the general public so that others can act to prepare themselves. As noted in the ODNI report, North Korea “probably possesses the expertise to cause temporary, limited disruptions of some critical infrastructure networks and disrupt business networks in the United States.” The last thing anyone needs during the pandemic is an already brittle critical infrastructure to be at the mercy of Kim Jong Un.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **Cyber Scenarios** › 2AC Iran Cyber

Goes nuclear

Kaveh L. Afrasiabi & Nader Entessar 19, Afrasiabi is an Iranian-American political scientist, Entessar is a professor of the department of political science and criminal justice at the University of South Alabama, 2-7-2019, “A nuclear war in the Persian Gulf?” https://thebulletin.org/2019/07/a-nuclear-war-in-the-persian-gulf/

Tensions between the United States and Iran are spiraling toward a military confrontation that carries a real possibility that the United States will use nuclear weapons. Iran’s assortment of asymmetrical capabilities—all constructed to be effective against the United States—nearly assures such a confrontation. The current US nuclear posture leaves the Trump administration at least open to the use of tactical nuclear weapons in conventional theaters. Some in the current administration may well think it to be in the best interest of the United States to seek a quick and decisive victory in the oil hub of the Persian Gulf—and to do so by using its nuclear arsenal. We believe there is a heightened possibility of a US-Iran war triggering a US nuclear strike for the following reasons: The sanction regime set against the Iranian economy is so brutal that it is likely to force Iran to take an action that will require a US military response. Unless the United States backs down from its present self-declared “economic warfare” against Iran, this will likely escalate to an open warfare between the two countries. In response to a White House request to draw up an Iran war plan, the Pentagon proposed sending 120,000 soldiers to the Persian Gulf. This force would augment the several thousands of troops already stationed in Iran’s vicinity. President Trump has also hinted that if need be, he will be sending “a lot more” troops. Defeating Iran through conventional military means would likely require a half million US forces and US preparedness for many casualties. The US nuclear posture review is worded in such a way that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in conventional theaters is envisaged, foreshadowing the concern that in a showdown with a menacing foe like Iran, the nuclear option is on the table. The United States could once again justify using nuclear force for the sake of a decisive victory and casualty-prevention, the logic used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Trump’s cavalier attitude toward nuclear weapons, trigger-happy penchant, and utter disdain for Iran, show that he would likely have no moral qualm about issuing an order to launch a limited nuclear strike, especially in a US-Iran showdown, one in which the oil transit from the Gulf would be imperiled, impacting the global economy and necessitating a speedy end to such a war.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **Cyber Scenarios** › 2AC Iran Cyber

Iran will escalate GPS attacks, causing escalation

Micah Halpern 19, former lecturer at Yale, political and foreign affairs commentator, 8-8-2019, “Iran Plays a Dangerous Hi-Tech Game,” https://www.newsmax.com/micahhalpern/strait-of-hormuz-jamming-centcom/2019/08/08/id/927875/

Iran is playing dirty tricks in and around the Strait of Hormuz. To begin with, they are jamming the GPS of tankers, causing ships to wander off course —and in to their waters. They are also spoofing andradioing the vessels, proporting to be friendly and even U.S. navy ships. Over the years the Iranian leadership has perfected the art of mixing and matching partial truths with outright lies in order to advance their agenda. They want to convince global observers that it is the Iranian leadership who are the innocent victims, innocent victims targeted by organized Western aggression. In this case Iranians are deliberately dogging, misleading and luring ships off course. Their actions have turned into a war of jamming. Like most everything else they engage in, for Iran this is serious business. Globally this is extremely dangerous. We are seeing signs all over the Mideast. The U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Division published a public warning to all ships and companies traveling in the region alerting them that Iran "spoofed bridge-to-bridge communications from unknown entities falsely claiming to be U.S. or coalition warships." U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said in a statement, "Due to the heightened regional tensions, the potential for miscalculation or misidentification could lead to aggressive actions against vessels belonging to US, allied and coalition partners operating in the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman . . . GPS interference, bridge-to-bridge communications spoofing, and/or other communications jamming with little to no warning." Bridge-to-bridge communication is when ships speak to one another. Iran has been become expert at jamming. That shouldn’t come as a big surprise given that as far back as 2012 the Iranian government has been jamming their own citizens. Back then, Iran replaced a series of short flagpoles scattered around their country with huge flagpoles – all the better to hide their jamming devices. The newer, taller, flagpoles sprouted up almost everywhere. The Iranian regime was attempting to stop all forms of social media and messaging. Their citizens were using satellites to communicate and find out the truth about what was happening in the world and that was not what Iranian leadership wanted. The Russians, too, have become very good at GPS jamming. Intelligence analysts report that Russia is jamming not waterways, but airspace, specifically the airspace around Syria. And that means that Russia is now capable of jamming communication for the new US stealth fighter jet, the F-35. This may be an exaggeration -I am skeptical that Russia is that sophisticated. Even more worrisome than all of this is a report that was issued this summer by the International Federation of Airline Pilots Association. The report details that pilots, landing in Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport in Israel, have lost GPS and that it is a recurring phenomenon. Thankfully, there are alternative tools that can be used to land and take off. Israel has said that they are dealing with the issue. But the mere presence of this issue demonstrates that we now live in a world hampered — dangerously so, by a significant threat of jamming. And this jamming can and is affecting more than ships at sea and military drones and jets in the sky, it is also targeting civilian aircraft with hundreds of civilian passengers aboard. When it comes to tech, Iran is highly skilled. They are developing their own tools and are using and adapting Russian and North Korean tech. Jamming and spoofing by Iran explains quite a lot of what has been happening in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran does not play games for fun. And this time, as always, the Iranians are playing by their own rules and they are playing to win.\

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **Cyber Scenarios** › 2AC Iran Cyber

The US’s cybersecurity sucks---Iran has been conducting successful OCOs and is more progressed than the US

Eric Rosenbaum, senior editor of CNBC.com, 11-18-2021, “Iran is ‘leapfrogging our defenses’ in a cyber war ‘my gut is we lose’: Hacking expert Kevin Mandia ,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/18/iran-leapfrogging-our-defenses-in-cyber-war-hacking-expert-mandia-.html

On Thursday, a federal grand jury indicted two Iranian hackers for election interference that included obtaining confidential voter information from at least one state’s election website for a cyber-based disinformation campaign targeting 100,000 Americans. Earlier this week, the U.S. government warned that Iranian hackers also have been on the ransomware offensive. To Kevin Mandia, the CEO of cybersecurity firm Mandiant, Iran’s success in the hacking realm is no surprise, as the nation has been upping its cyber-offensive capabilities for years to take advantage of U.S. weaknesses. Iran has progressed well beyond the first few stages of cyber evolution — defending its government in cyberspace and targeting its closest geographic foes, the immediate threats, which in Iran’s case would include the back and forth between itself and Israel in the cyber realm. “There was a time when we responded to Iran, their operators looked like they just got out of the classroom,” Mandia said during an interview with CNBC’s Eamon Javers at the CNBC Technology Executive Council Summit in New York City on Wednesday. “And we’re like god, you know ... they just compressed the C drive, why not just compress what you’re going to steal?” “But that was 14 years ago,” said Mandia, who has been monitoring cyber campaigns by Iran since 2008. “Come today, they’re operating with efficiency, they’re operating with malware that can be updated. They have a framework where they can update their malware super fast,” he said. “So they can be very efficient ... leapfrogging our defenses as they learn. And that’s kind of a frustration. I’ve seen most modern nations do have that capability ...a framework where they can update quickly. Iran does have that framework.” He said Iran also is part of a group of nation-state actors that have zero day capabilities — referring to a disclosed vulnerability for which no official patches or security updates yet exist even though exploitation by hackers can have severe consequences — the most frustrating of all types of cyberattacks. “Russia, Iran, Israel, China, they all have zero day components and zero day capability, whether they develop themselves or buy from someone, Iran’s gone through that rites of passage is well,” said Mandia, whose firm was the first to warn the U.S. government about the SolarWinds hack last year, the largest-ever attack on a software supply chain hitting both government agencies and private enterprise. The U.S. government alleges Russia was behind the hacking group that pulled off the cyberattack. Mandia, who served in the U.S. Air Force, said the nation’s physical military assets are ahead of its cyber assets, and there is no clear advantage in the real of cyber warfare. “In the cyber domain, we don’t have dominance,” he said. A U.S. workforce that is increasingly deployed on a global scale, as well as our early adoption of the internet economy and its evolution, all contribute to increased vulnerabilities as geopolitical rivals become more sophisticated in the cyber realm. Even if the U.S. has the best zero day capabilities, the nature of cyber warfare doesn’t favor a win for the U.S., he said. “My gut is we lose, because we’re in a glass house attacking mud huts. It’s just too asymmetric. And I don’t want to liken another country’s economy to a mud hut. But I’m saying in the cyber domain, the asymmetry, I think more people are taking advantage of the United States, and our openness. ... In my opinion, cyberattacks are also more effective against United States than against other nations.”

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **China** › 2AC China Add-On

China-Taiwan war goes nuclear. Deterrence is key. It’s fast and more probable than European war.

Pettyjohn and Wasser 5-20-2022, *senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security, **fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (Stacie and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs,

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **China** › 2AC China Add-On

US-NATO cooperation on Chinese cyberthreats key to deter Chinese invasion of Taiwan

Odgaard 22 Liselotte Odgaard- professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies . Her work focuses on US–China–Europe relations, including NATO–China relations; Chinese foreign, security and defense policy; Indo-Pacific security, and the geopolitics of the Arctic region. (2022) NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space, The Washington Quarterly, 45:1, 167-183, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059145

NATO’s vague recognition in 2021 that China constitutes a challenge to the transatlantic alliance reflects an institution that has failed to take on the security threats emanating from Beijing. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 highlights the reasons why this omission is problematic. The war in Ukraine has reignited transatlantic unity of purpose in addressing threats from Moscow toward European security. The existential shock that Europe is facing now that a Russian regime has shown itself willing to go to war against European countries carries with it the risk that China will be forgotten when NATO discusses its future priorities. During the war, China is walking a tightrope between maintaining its commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity and keeping up cooperation with Russia. The future strength of the Chinese-Russian partnership is likely to be determined by the continued usefulness of Moscow in China’s efforts to carve out more space for a Sinocentric international order based on authoritarian regimes. Meanwhile, China will continue to engender threats to the US and Europe in all domains and across geographical regions. With the summit statement of the North Atlantic Council released June 14, 2021, NATO extended a commitment to “engage China with a view to defending the security interests of the Alliance,” since “China’s stated ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security.”1 China’s coercive policies, nuclear arsenal, military modernization, military cooperation with Russia, lack of transparency, and use of disinformation are listed as main areas of concern for the alliance. NATO takes the China challenge seriously but has yet to devise a strategy to address it. NATO takes the China challenge seriously but has yet to devise a strategy to address it Compared to the United States, Europe took a long time to acknowledge its stake in managing security challenges from China. As Beijing pushed beyond its traditional zones of interest in East and Southeast Asia toward the Indian Ocean in the 2000s, US security policies began to focus more on China as Washington sought a new geopolitical equilibrium in Asia.2 Since 2014, France and the UK have spearheaded Europe’s naval diplomacy to counter the displays of force and increasing tensions in maritime Asia to which China contributes. This engagement has focused on regular exercises with the US and its Asian allies, operations in support of freedom of navigation, and base-sharing agreements.3 In 2021, the EU recognized that these geopolitical dynamics directly impact its security and announced the establishment of supportive mechanisms in its Indo-Pacific strategy.4 However, NATO has been conspicuously absent in these transatlantic endeavors designed to counter challenges to US and European security. Reflecting NATO’s absence from the main arena of US-China strategic competition, the alliance is hardly ever mentioned in off-the-record conversations on Indo-Pacific security between diplomats and think tank personnel. NATO’s reluctance to take on the China challenge is perhaps not surprising, given its inherent assumption that the European continent is the jewel in the crown of the US alliance system, which is thought to guarantee US assistance in the event of a military threat against Europe. This assumption was challenged during the Trump administration, which openly questioned the US commitment to Article Five’s collective defense obligation. The invasion of Ukraine has given NATO a new lease on life and put it at the frontlines of transatlantic cooperation on deterring Russia from further military action in future. However, NATO’s focus on its eastern frontline carries the risk that the alliance turns into a Russia-focused European institution and ignores that China is a global great power competitor which also constitutes a major challenge to the security of all NATO member states. Washington increasingly looks to the EU rather than NATO for guidance on Europe’s future security policy. One reason is that NATO’s toolbox is lagging in domains such as cyber and outer space, although cyber and outer space operations are key enablers of actions in all domains including air, sea, and land. One indication of this is the US-EU negotiations surrounding a common response to cyber threats which took place during the first US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) meeting in Pittsburgh in September 2021. In addition, during Trump’s presidency, longstanding US dissatisfaction with Europe’s modest defense spending threatened to put NATO on the backburner in transatlantic security debates.5 Since then, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has elicited a sea change in German defense policy with the announcement in February 2022 that defense spending will increase to more than 2 percent of its gross domestic output annually.6 While this may be a convincing signal that Europe will finally devote the resources required for its own defense and revive NATO’s central role in transatlantic security, there is also a risk that China will be moved to the periphery of the alliance’s agenda. On February 11, 2022, during the runup to the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Biden administration published its Indo-Pacific strategy as US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken was in the midst of a Pacific trip to Australia, Fiji, and Hawaii.7 This US prioritization signaled that despite Moscow’s war in Europe, Washington remains committed to strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific and competing with China. If the US drops the ball on the Indo-Pacific, Washington is concerned that China might use force against Taiwan.8 Consequently, the key question for the US is how many resources can be tied up in Europe without losing sight of the long-term goal: deterrence of China. As US strategic competition with China increases while NATO is sitting on the fence, failure to develop a transatlantic defense policy that addresses China will leave Europe vulnerable to China’s ability to exploit the weak links in European defense arrangements, which are newly fragmented by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.9 EU efforts to build an independent regional defense profile and nurture cooperation between Europe’s defense industry and national defense communities reflect a growing recognition that the region needs to become a self-reliant defense actor. However, Europe still needs to demonstrate that self-reliance does not imply merely focusing on Europe’s periphery. Otherwise, the industrial challenges from China may outcompete Europe’s defense industry. Shipbuilding is a case in point. By 2021, China built 50 percent of all existing ships in the world. Through design collaboration agreements, cyber espionage, and acquisitions, China has copied advanced innovative ship designs. Enormous financial resources from the state allow Chinese companies to enjoy economies of scale by building dual-use factories which not only outcompete Western companies in the commercial shipbuilding industry, but also threaten the production of navy vessels. If not taken seriously, Europe and the US may soon have no choice but to buy frigates from China.10 This example demonstrates the centrality of China for global economic and security developments and should encourage Europe to manifest a position of unified strength in defending NATO member states against Chinese security challenges. This realization will help convince the US and its adversaries that Europe continues to be a credible partner in countering common threats against transatlantic security, whether they appear in or beyond the European region. China’s challenges to US and European security constitute such common threats across a broad range of sectors. These include gradual reinterpretations of principles of international law, the subversion of universal liberal market economic practices, and cyber insurgencies targeting a wide range of civilian and military entities. These Chinese policies all have major military implications because they are related to developments in the operating principles, capabilities, and priorities of China’s armed forces. Only NATO can offer an integrated transatlantic response to the military aspects of Chinese policies that threaten those sectors across the globe, including European actors. NATO’s involvement is essential if the credibility of the alliance’s security guarantees is to be preserved and an effective response to China’s encroachments on a liberal rules-based order is to be established. NATO’s involvement is essential to establish an effective response to China The omnipresent character of the China threat demonstrates that it is long overdue for NATO to position itself as a significant player in addressing Beijing’s challenges to transatlantic security. NATO is key to keeping US and European security policies coordinated when applying mechanisms of deterrence and defense against Chinese challenges. If transatlantic unity of purpose is lost, both the US and Europe are far less likely to succeed in addressing China sufficiently.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff Addendum › **China** › 2AC China Add-On

China is using info-warfare tactics to make invading Taiwan easier- US counter-info warfare key to prevent invasion

Newsham 21 Newsham, G. (2021, October 23). Grant Newsham is a Senior Fellow with the Center for Security Policy. He also is a Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies focusing on Asia/Pacific defense, political and economic matters. Wake up: China is engaging in media warfare against Taiwan. The National Interest. Retrieved July 13, 2022, from https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/wake-china-engaging-media-warfare-against-taiwan-195477 //CS

Can the People’s Republic of China (PRC) invade and conquer Taiwan? Experts differ, but the current debate considers only the military balance—and whether the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has the weapons, hardware, and capabilities to get ashore, defeat Taiwan’s military, and force Taipei to surrender. The military match-up is important, but it misses half the picture—and half of the PRC’s strategy against Taiwan. Professor Kerry Gershaneck’s new book, Media Warfare: Taiwan’s Battle for the Cognitive Domain, details and explains a key portion of that “other half”: the PRC’s use of “media warfare” to psychologically fracture and demoralize Taiwan and make conquest easier or, even better, to have Taiwan surrender without a fight. Gershaneck knows the topic well. He has vast Asia experience and hands-on strategic communications experience at all levels of the U.S. government, as well as a particularly useful counterintelligence background. In 2020, he published a seminal work on PRC Political Warfare: Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China’s plan to “Win without Fighting” In this book, Gershaneck focuses on what China has done and is doing to Taiwan on the media warfare front. Importantly, he lays out how Beijing is waging the same type of insidious warfare worldwide—especially against Taiwan’s main “ally,” the United States. To Chinese strategists, media warfare and political warfare are just as important as building the PLA into a force able to defeat the U.S. military. Indeed, the kinetic and the “informational” are considered mutually reinforcing lines of attack. Media warfare, also known as Public Opinion Warfare, leverages all instruments that inform and influence an adversary’s public and government opinion. The objective is to weaken, divide, corrode, confuse, co-opt, and demoralize an opponent. What are the instruments? Beyond the old standards such as television, radio, and newspapers, there are also books, textbooks, and, over the past three decades, the Internet and social media. Indeed, the Chinese Communists make full use of all of these and are particularly aggressive on the internet/social media vectors. This makes sense. With TV, radio, and newspapers, a propagandist must somehow lure the intended target to receive the message. With social media and the Internet, it is possible to “jam” the message into the target non-stop. And given that 90 percent of Taiwan’s public is active on social media, that democracy presents a particularly target-rich environment. What does the PRC’s media warfare campaign against Taiwan look like? To deliver its messages, Chinese entities have bought Taiwanese broadcasting outlets and newspapers, and use the lure of advertising dollars against “independent” outlets. Another key part of the effort to influence the widest audience is the aggressive use of social media platforms to affect, confuse, and deceive, often through effective profiling of users to better target messaging. How successful has Beijing been? In 2018, the PRC deployed media warfare stratagems—including heavy use of social media—to engineer the election of an absolute “nobody”: Kuomintang Party (KMT) candidate Han Kuo-yu—as the mayor of Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s second-largest city. Many in the KMT support Communist China’s plans to annex Taiwan. The surprise election of Han to this powerful mayorship was no small feat and no minor issue: Kaohsiung has historically been a stronghold of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) that firmly opposes annexation by China. As part of the effort to elect Han, pro-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) media in Taiwan and the communist propaganda organs in China relentlessly attacked DPP leadership, including President Tsai Ing-wen, with disinformation and untrue allegations. That relentless campaign interference was enough to raise doubts with voters, especially because there were no effective means in Taiwan to detect and counter the media warfare attacks. Han ran for president two years later, once again with pro-CCP Taiwanese and Communist China-based “media warriors” hard at work on his behalf. Han had a fair shot at winning had not two things happened. First, Taiwan’s government woke up to the media warfare threat and cobbled together effective enough defenses to derail and expose Beijing’s strategy. Second, the Chinese Communist crushing of Hong Kong’s pro-freedom movement a few months before Taiwan’s election awakened a huge chunk of Taiwan’s public to the Chinese threat—and inoculated many to Chinese subversion. Gershaneck provides a concise, yet detailed introduction to media warfare in Taiwan, but with larger implications. He walks the reader through the confusing and redundant terminology and explains how media warfare fits into the larger Chinese political warfare strategy—intended to defeat an enemy via all measures short of outright kinetic warfare. While using Taiwan as the focus of his latest book, Gershaneck emphasizes that what the PRC is doing to Taiwan it is also doing to the United States and other free nations. Gershaneck wrote his most recent book to help Western nations “better detect, deter, counter, and defeat” Chinese media warfare—and political warfare writ large. And he provides a set of practical recommendations for Taiwan’s government that are applicable to any country under PRC media warfare attack. For example, Chinese state-controlled media (which is every media entity operating in China) has formed strategic alliances with western media. The New York Times, Washington Post, and even the “conservative” and “tough on China” Wall Street Journal carried China Daily media warfare inserts for several years. Gershaneck also describes how the Chinese government takes control of newspapers and broadcast media serving the Chinese “diaspora” in many, if not most, countries. At the same time, not only does the PRC flood the United States with “reporters” but it makes life miserable in China for the few foreign reporters still allowed to operate there. U.S. and other foreign outlets routinely self-censor to avoid angering Beijing. Gershaneck paints a grim picture of China’s massive, well-funded, and effective media warfare effort against Taiwan, and worldwide. Yet, many—if not most—people will say they are too smart, too well educated, and too discerning to be influenced by Chinese Communist Party media warfare. Maybe so. But if you’ve ever said or thought any of the following, you’ve been “influenced.” -Covid-19 couldn't possibly have come from a laboratory. -China wants to “reunify” with Taiwan. -The United States must have China’s help on climate change, North Korea, etc. -We simply have to be invested in the China market. -To make China an enemy, treat it like one. -China is no longer communist. It is capitalist. -China’s rise is “peaceful” and “inevitable.” -China has never attacked its neighbors. -China is not expansionist. -China is just doing what all great powers do. Gershaneck’s book is indeed alarming—though one grudgingly admires China’s industriousness and persistence on the “non-kinetic” media/public opinion/psychological fronts. But certainly, the U.S. Government has its own media warfare and political warfare effort to match and defeat whatever Beijing is doing? If only. Unlike previous administrations, the Trump administration understood the problem, and also understood China’s political warfare efforts. It had some limited success exposing and cracking down here and there—with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (to whom the book is dedicated) and Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger being particularly effective. But they ran out of time. The U.S. Government is once again back to doing nothing while China runs wild in the crucial “cognitive” battlefield that Gershaneck explains so well in this important book. This isn’t surprising, one supposes. The recent collapse of the Afghan government and military was as much a political warfare victory for the Taliban as a military victory. The U.S. military and civilian leadership didn’t seem to notice. One hopes they take China’s media and political warfare threat more seriously. And then do something about it.