Free beta access. 5 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › ILO Mod

NATO undermines the international liberal order and the credibility of the UN

Verma 22 Verma, Sudesh. “NATO Has Failed: UN Must Be Strengthened.” The Daily Guardian, 8 Mar. 2022, thedailyguardian.com/nato-has-failed-un-must-be-strengthened/. Accessed 4 July 2022. Sudesh Verma is a senior journalist and president of Debating India Foundation, a Delhi based think tank. //dre

NATO creates an unequal world and undermines the credibility of the UN. If other countries start emulating the example of NATO and create their own separate military alliances, this would be an end to the existence of the UN. This would also create a fertile ground for tension all across the globe. The Russian military intervention in Ukraine has exposed the world’s inability to control the situation if a powerful State decides to use its military power to set things right with its immediate neighbouring countries. The prime reason for this massive failure is the absence of a moral and righteous world body that has the mechanism to implement dharma-based order. NATO clearly does not fit the bill.The only organisation that could do this is the United Nations but it has got weakened due to shadow boxing by major world powers—the Big Five that includes the US, the UK, France, China and Russia. They trust their own military strength and have no reason to strengthen the UN. The veto enjoyed by them ensures that this body remains defunct to prevent any major crisis involving any of these players. All these five have developed sophisticated weaponry and are major suppliers of arms across the world. NATO cannot replace the UN since it is a group of countries having a vested interest to empower itself and maintain superiority vis-a-vis other countries. The world does not matter to NATO countries if they are not involved in acts of war with non-NATO countries. And if push comes to shove NATO can fight any country or grouping in the world based on its combined military strength and economic might. At least NATO would like to believe this.The fact that three permanent members of the UN Security with veto are members of the NATO—France, the UK and the US—makes it evident that the organisation seeks to be happy with its own enclave where they would enjoy liberty, freedom and democracy and will also have the wherewithal to fight others if these are hurt. Even in the vastly interdependent and integrated world, NATO believes that it can live peacefully even if other countries suffer. The UN has 193 members which means that 163 countries are outside the NATO framework. Becoming a member of NATO brings in security plus economic empowerment. Actually, the strategy of the British Empire where the military back-up by the Crown was used to further business interests has been emulated by NATO. NATO would intervene if its economic interest is hurt or if it concludes that certain actions of any country are hurting its core held principles. The massive airpower would ensure that NATO troops would not even need to be on the ground if it desires to punish a country. The control over English media by NATO countries both in terms of finance, governmental control and ideology would ensure that a larger legitimacy is provided to its actions. The US intervention in Afghanistan was justified as much as its withdrawal that happened after two decades. The US intervened in Iraq to destroy weapons of mass destruction but when it did not find any, it blamed intelligence failure. The UN has been relegated to providing legitimacy to the course of action decided by NATO. These NATO countries have enough clout because of their influence and are able to lobby successfully at the UN and get the support of smaller countries to add to their legitimacy. One wonders why was NATO not disbanded with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact—a military alliance of former communist countries with the erstwhile USSR as the fulcrum. Both the Warsaw Pact and the NATO were offshoots of the Cold war and hence when the Warsaw Pact was dissolved in 1991, NATO should have followed the same course. On the contrary, NATO expanded by inducting former Soviets into it. NATO creates an unequal world and undermines the credibility of the UN. If other countries start emulating the example of NATO and create their own separate military alliances, this would be an end to the existence of the UN. This would also create fertile ground for tension all across the globe. The world would be divided into exclusive economic and military blocs. Ukraine should serve as a lesson to NATO that it cannot do anything in a war-like situation with a powerful country. Some members of NATO are now realising that economic sanctions are going to hurt their own interests more than the interest of Russia. Had NATO not given false confidence to Ukraine and provoked it to seek NATO membership, the present crisis could have been avoided. You can appreciate the security concerns of other countries only when you understand the vulnerabilities. If you are strongly protected by the umbrella of a powerful security alliance you would not feel the pinch. Ukraine was the best as a buffer country between Russia and Western Europe. When Ukraine was forced to abandon its nuclear arsenals all the powers had ensured that it would stay safe and secure and the world would stand guarantee to its neutrality. Sending arms to that country and trying to influence it to become a member of the European Union and then NATO was a violation of that charter. Russian intervention in Ukraine cannot be justified in today’s world and any issue of provocation must be resolved through dialogues. But when unbiased history would be written about this crisis, one would not be able to ignore the fact that Russian overtures to talks were spurned by an overconfident NATO led by the US. Was it not provoked to use its military might to set things right from Russia’s perspective? NATO must ponder over this. The high-sounding words trying to bulldoze Russian President Vladimir Putin have proved to be hollow. NATO cannot get into direct war with Russia since the threat of nuclear weapons poses threat to the entire humanity. The need for a stronger UN was never felt more acutely than it is today. Panic gripped the world when on 4 March, the Russian military fired at the power units of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant—the largest nuclear facility in Europe. Energoatom which operates nuclear plants in Ukraine appealed to the world community saying that heavy shelling at the nuclear plants was “a severe violation of nuclear and radiation safety which can lead to hard and tragic consequences for the whole world!” The world had woken up to the warning that it could witness a tragedy worst than that of Chernobyl. Those who may have forgotten must know what Chernobyl disaster a nuclear accident that happened on 26 April 1984 during a routine checking at one of the nuclear plants at Chernobyl. This generated more radioactive radiation than the two bombs that were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Chernobyl and areas around it were evacuated and largescale relocation of the population took place in affected areas. The radiation led to people getting various diseases, particularly thyroid cancer. An area of 30 sq km around the plant is now made an exclusion zone where people cannot visit. Close to 150,000 Sq Kms of land area in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine were supposed to have been contaminated. Has the world evolved any mechanism to take care of such eventualities? You can blame one country or the other for the tragedy but who will be responsible for the largescale death and devastation resulting from this no gain blame game. Who is responsible for the death and destruction in Ukraine? The US, NATO or Russia? Or is it the entire world that failed to take corrective action in time? Whether a war or economic sanctions, the result is the same. The common people who have no role suffer the most. If we call ourselves civilised why can’t we evolve a strong mechanism for peaceful resolution of disputes? There are few hotspots of the world and immediate attention must be given to them so that rival territorial claims do not become a reason for military conquest. The UN is the only institution that promises hope. A larger role to the UN means that all military alliances or such pacts between countries must be dismantled. The UN must be strengthened to use force too if and when needed—not only for peacekeeping but also for bringing an errant country to sense. One factor that has made the UN almost non-functional in matters of such conflict is the power of the veto. Why should any country have a veto?

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › Turkey

Turkey is able to exercise control over NATO and other western countries to delegitimize the YPG

Reuters 22 “Sweden's Kurds fear they may pay price for NATO bid as Turkey fumes” June 28th, 2022 Accessed July 3rd, 2022

Turkey has opposed Sweden and Finland's membership of NATO, accusing them of harbouring individuals linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party militant group (PKK) and followers of a cleric Turkey accuses of orchestrating a coup attempt in 2016.

What are these groups?

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › Turkey

NATO agreed to what amounts to systemic violence against Kurds to sustain membership

Al Jazeera 22 “Why did Turkey lift its veto on Finland and Sweden joining NATO?” June 29th, 2022 Accessed July 3rd, 2022

Turkey has  over Finland and Sweden’s bid to join NATO, ending a weeks-long dispute that tested the unity of the alliance against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The breakthrough on Tuesday came after four hours of talks just before a NATO summit began in Madrid, and allows the gathering of 30 leaders in the Spanish capital to show a united front against Moscow, and start the process of Finland and Sweden’s inclusion in the alliance in earnest. The announcement of an agreement cements the biggest shift in European security in decades, as the Nordic countries abandon their decades-long neutrality to enter the military alliance. Here’s a look at why Turkey initially opposed Finland and Sweden’s NATO bid, and why it now backs their membership: Turkey surprised its NATO allies when it initially opposed Finland and Sweden’s bid to join the alliance. Ankara demanded that the Nordic countries stop supporting Kurdish armed groups, such as the PKK, and lift their bans on the sales of some arms to Turkey. Turkey raised concerns that Sweden had been harbouring , which Stockholm denied. NATO operates by consensus, which means that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan could have blocked the accession of Finland and Sweden to the 30-nation alliance unless his demands were met, which he had threatened to do. The PKK, a designated “terrorist” group in Turkey, the European Union, and the United States, took up arms against the Turkish state in 1984. Tens of thousands of people have died in Turkey as a result of the conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK, with the PKK and its offshoots carrying out numerous attacks on military, security forces and civilians, and Turkey conducting operations in southeastern parts of the country with the aim of forcing the PKK out. Turkey considers any support for the Syrian YPG, which it views as an offshoot of the PKK, akin to support for the PKK. The YPG has been backed by many Western nations in the fight against ISIL (ISIS). Turkey has conducted several military operations in both Syria and Iraq over the past few years, targeting the PKK and the YPG. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said the terms of the deal involved Sweden intensifying work on Turkish extradition requests of suspected fighters and amending Swedish and Finnish law to toughen their approach to them. Stoltenberg also said that Sweden and Finland would lift their restrictions on selling weapons to Turkey. Ankara hailed the agreement as a triumph. The Turkish president’s office said that Turkey had “got what it wanted” from the deal, and that it meant “full cooperation with Turkey in the fight against the PKK and its affiliates,” including the YPG. Finland and Sweden also agreed “not to impose embargo restrictions in the field of defence industry” on Turkey and to take “concrete steps on the extradition of terrorist criminals”.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › Turkey

NATO provides Turkey with a political cover to abuse the Kurdish ethnic minority.

Tugal 22 “Turkey shows what NATO really is” May 26th, 2022 Dr. Tugal is a professor of sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, who writes frequently on Turkey’s politics and society. Accessed July 3rd, 2022 T.T

In April, as the world was occupied with Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, a NATO member  on two of its neighboring territories. In a bombing campaign, Turkey targeted the camps of Kurdish militants in Iraq and Syria, inflicting damage on shelters, ammunition depots and bases. The irony went largely unnoticed. That’s hardly a surprise: For a long time, the Western world has turned a blind eye to Turkey’s heavy-handed treatment of the Kurds. Across decades, the Turkish state has persecuted the Kurdish minority — about 18 percent of the population — with devastating zeal. Thousands have perished and around a  in a campaign of severe internal repression. But Western nations, except for a brief spell when Kurdish resistance was holding back an ascendant Islamic State, have rarely seemed to care. Turkey’s treatment of the Kurds is now center stage — but not because allies have woken up to the injustice of Kurds’ systematic oppression. Instead, it’s because Turkey is effectively  the admittance of Finland and Sweden to NATO unless they agree to crack down on Kurdish militants. For President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, seeing an opportunity to further cement his nationalist agenda, it’s a bold gambit. The  from NATO allies so far suggests he might be successful. However the situation shakes out, it’s deeply revealing. For Turkey, it underlines once again the vigor with which Mr. Erdogan is keen to stamp out the Kurds while asserting the country as a regional power. For the alliance itself, the impasse brings to light facts currently obscured by its makeover as a purely defensive organization. NATO, which has long acquiesced in the persecution of the Kurds, is far from a force for peace. And Turkey, a member since 1952, proves it.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › Russia-China - Extension

Addition of Iran and Saudi Arabia fosters collapse of dollar heg

TOM O'CONNOR ON 7/1/22 AT 1:37 PM EDT As NATO Grows, China and Russia Seek to Bring Iran, Saudi Arabia Into Fold https://www.newsweek.com/nato-grows-china-russia-seek-bring-iran-saudi-arabia-fold-1720780

The energy problem plays into two key reasons having both Iran and Saudi Arabia on board for BRICS would be a "major gain" for the organization, according to Akhil Ramesh, a fellow at the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum. "For countries like China and to an extent India, import dependency for oil has been a major headache, both from an economic standpoint of trade deficits and from a geopolitical standpoint of having to make security and strategic sacrifices for the sake of oil imports," Ramesh said. "Having three large oil producers in the grouping [Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia] could possibly give these countries the option of securing oil at discounted rates or through alternative arrangements [barter]." Tehran and Riyadh's oil reserves would also lend BRICS a stronger hand in taking on the U.S. dollar's hegemony over the world financial system as Ramesh argued that, "in order to replace the USD as the global reserve currency you would need to have more commodity-exporting countries, especially oil exporting ones buying into the idea."

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › Russia-China - Extension

Russia-China alliance will bring in other players – including Iran and Saudi Arabia

TOM O'CONNOR ON 7/1/22 AT 1:37 PM EDT As NATO Grows, China and Russia Seek to Bring Iran, Saudi Arabia Into Fold https://www.newsweek.com/nato-grows-china-russia-seek-bring-iran-saudi-arabia-fold-1720780

Finland and Sweden's green light to join is set to bring about the U.S.-led Western military alliance's largest expansion in decades. Meanwhile, the G7, consisting of NATO states and fellow U.S. ally Japan, has adopted a tougher line against Russia and China. In the East, however, security and economy-focused blocs led by Beijing and Moscow are looking to take on new members of their own, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, two influential Middle Eastern rivals whose interest in shoring up cooperation on this new front could have a significant impact on global geopolitical balance. The two bodies in question are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. The former was established in 2001 as a six-member political, economic and military coalition including China, Russia and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan before recruiting South Asian nemeses India and Pakistan in 2017, while the latter is a grouping of emerging economic powers originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) upon its inception 2006, and including South Africa in 2010. "The BRICS and the SCO share one important ideological quality: they are both focused on multipolarity, and their summits have even been held back to back with one another at times," Matthew Neapole, an international affairs expert and contributor to the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Canada, told Newsweek. "Both are angling to act as force multipliers for this drive for multipolarity, to help along with alternatives [i.e, in currency or banking]," he added. "It could, in theory, facilitate economic linkages and step into gaps that U.S. institutions are not filling due to sanctions, such as those laid on Russia." Iran, already an SCO observer, began its formal amid the latest leaders' summit in September. On Monday, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced the Islamic Republic would also seek to join BRICS. Across the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia has also reportedly considered applying for BRICS membership, as revealed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during his visit to the kingdom in late May. The announcement followed Saudi Arabia joining Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Senegal, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates at China's invitation for a "BRICS+" discussion, after which Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin announced members had "reached consensus on the BRICS expansion process."

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › Russia-China Alliance Mod

Hegemony is empirically the most stable system and deters all conflict – decline causes transition wars

Robert Kagan, 17, 2-7-2017, Backing Into World War III, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/, Robert Kagan, Ph.D. in American History from American University, M.P.P. in Government from Harvard University, AVD

Think of two significant trend lines in the world today. One is the increasing ambition and activism of the two great revisionist powers, Russia and China. The other is the declining confidence, capacity, and will of the democratic world, and especially of the United States, to maintain the dominant position it has held in the international system since 1945. As those two lines move closer, as the declining will and capacity of the United States and its allies to maintain the present world order meet the increasing desire and capacity of the revisionist powers to change it, we will reach the moment at which the existing order collapses and the world descends into a phase of brutal anarchy, as it has three times in the past two centuries. The cost of that descent, in lives and treasure, in lost freedoms and lost hope, will be staggering. Americans tend to take the fundamental stability of the international order for granted, even while complaining about the burden the United States carries in preserving that stability. History shows that world orders do collapse, however, and when they do it is often unexpected, rapid, and violent. The late 18th century was the high point of the Enlightenment in Europe, before the continent fell suddenly into the abyss of the Napoleonic Wars. In the first decade of the 20th century, the world’s smartest minds predicted an end to great-power conflict as revolutions in communication and transportation knit economies and people closer together. The most devastating war in history came four years later. The apparent calm of the postwar 1920s became the crisis-ridden 1930s and then another world war. Where exactly we are in this classic scenario today, how close the trend lines are to that intersection point is, as always, impossible to know. Are we three years away from a global crisis, or 15? That we are somewhere on that path, however, is unmistakable. And while it is too soon to know what effect Donald Trump’s presidency will have on these trends, early signs suggest that the new administration is more likely to hasten us toward crisis than slow or reverse these trends. The further accommodation of Russia can only embolden Vladimir Putin, and the tough talk with China will likely lead Beijing to test the new administration’s resolve militarily. Whether the president is ready for such a confrontation is entirely unclear. For the moment, he seems not to have thought much about the future ramifications of his rhetoric and his actions. China and Russia are classic revisionist powers. Although both have never enjoyed greater security from foreign powers than they do today — Russia from its traditional enemies to the west, China from its traditional enemy in the east — they are dissatisfied with the current global configuration of power. Both seek to restore the hegemonic dominance they once enjoyed in their respective regions. For China, that means dominance of East Asia, with countries like Japan, South Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia both acquiescing to Beijing’s will and acting in conformity with China’s strategic, economic, and political preferences. That includes American influence withdrawn to the eastern Pacific, behind the Hawaiian Islands. For Russia, it means hegemonic influence in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which Moscow has traditionally regarded as either part of its empire or part of its sphere of influence. Both Beijing and Moscow seek to redress what they regard as an unfair distribution of power, influence, and honor in the U.S.-led postwar global order. As autocracies, both feel threatened by the dominant democratic powers in the international system and by the democracies on their borders. Both regard the United States as the principal obstacle to their ambitions, and therefore both seek to weaken the American-led international security order that stands in the way of their achieving what they regard as their rightful destinies. It was good while it lasted Until fairly recently, Russia and China have faced considerable, almost insuperable, obstacles in achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the international order itself and its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and, since the end of the Cold War, to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has checked their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. During the era of American primacy, China and Russia have participated in and for the most part been beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helps sustain; so long as that system functions, they have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The political and strategic aspects of the order, however, have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions — especially the geographical advance of liberal democracies close to their borders — as an existential threat. That’s for good reason: Autocratic powers since the days of Klemens von Metternich have always feared the contagion of liberalism. The mere existence of democracies on their borders, the global free flow of information they cannot control, the dangerous connection between free market capitalism and political freedom — all pose a threat to rulers who depend on keeping restive forces in their own countries in check. The continual challenge to the legitimacy of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported democratic order has therefore naturally made them hostile both to that order and to the United States. But, until recently, a preponderance of domestic and international forces has dissuaded them from confronting the order directly. Chinese rulers have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their legitimacy at home. Even Putin has pushed only against open doors, as in Syria, where the United States responded passively to his probes. He has been more cautious when confronted by even marginal U.S. and European opposition, as in Ukraine. The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions has been the military and economic power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful, has had to contemplate facing the combined military and economic strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest — including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these U.S.-led alliances present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on few allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, such as the military subjection of Taiwan or a naval battle in the South or East China Sea, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations and the likely cutoff of access to foreign markets on which their own economy depends. A weaker Russia, with its depleted population and oil- and gas-dependent economy, would face an even greater challenge. For decades, the strong global position enjoyed by the United States and its allies has discouraged any serious challenge. So long as the United States was perceived as a dependable ally, Chinese and Russian leaders feared that aggressive moves would backfire and possibly bring their regimes down. This is what the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order: As dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions. And it worked. The United States stepped up, and Russia and China largely backed down — or were preempted before acting at all. Faced with these obstacles, the best option for the two revisionist great powers has always been to hope for or, if possible, engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within, either by separating the United States from its allies or by raising doubts about the U.S. commitment and thereby encouraging would-be allies and partners to forgo the strategic protection of the liberal world order and seek accommodation with its challengers. The present system has therefore depended not only on American power but on coherence and unity at the heart of the democratic world. The United States has had to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm, but the order’s ideological and economic core — the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific — has also had to remain relatively healthy and confident.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › Russia-China Alliance Mod

Russia-China alliance will collapse the dollar – causes economic crisis and heg decline

Chris Hedges July 12 2022 NATO's endless expansion threatens endless war — and potential nuclear holocaust https://www.salon.com/2022/07/12/natos-endless-expansion-threatens-endless--and-potential-nuclear-holocaust/

If China, Russia, Iran, India and other nations free themselves from the tyranny of the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency and the international Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), a messaging network financial institutions use to send and receive information such as money transfer instructions, it will trigger a dramatic decline in the value of the dollar and a financial collapse in the U.S. The huge military expenditures, which have driven the U.S. debt to , $6 trillion more than the entire U.S. GDP, will become untenable. Servicing this debt costs $300 billion a year. We spent more on the military in 2021 — $801 billion, which amounted to 38 percent of total world expenditure on the military — than the next nine countries, including China and Russia, combined. The loss of the dollar as the world's reserve currency will force the U.S. to slash spending, shutter many of its 800 military bases overseas and cope with the inevitable social and political upheavals triggered by economic collapse. It is darkly ironic that NATO has accelerated this possibility.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › Russia-China Alliance Mod

US-NATO engagement spurs a Russia-China alliance

Chris Hedges July 12 2022 NATO's endless expansion threatens endless war — and potential nuclear holocaust https://www.salon.com/2022/07/12/natos-endless-expansion-threatens-endless--and-potential-nuclear-holocaust/

The alliance has spurned the Cold War strategy that made sure Washington was closer to Moscow and Beijing than Moscow and Beijing were to each other. U.S. and NATO antagonism have turned Russia and China into close allies. Russia, rich in natural resources, including energy, minerals and grains, and China, a manufacturing and technological behemoth, are a potent combination. NATO no longer distinguishes between the two, announcing in its most recent mission statement that the "deepening strategic partnership" between Russian and China has resulted in "mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order that run counter to our values and interests." On July 6, Christopher Wray, director of the FBI, and Ken McCallum, director general of Britain's MI5, held a joint news conference in London to announce that China was the "biggest long-term threat to our economic and national security." They accused China, like Russia, of interfering in U.S. and U.K. elections. Wray warned the business leaders they addressed that the Chinese government was "set on stealing your technology, whatever it is that makes your industry tick, and using it to undercut your business and dominate your market." This inflammatory rhetoric presages an ominous future.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › Arctic - Extension

NATO causes Russian militarization in the Arctic

Urban, Kathryn. 2022. “NATO’s Nordic Expansion Will Shake up the Arctic.” The National Interest. May 15, 2022. . /nfs

The language of the multilateral boycott of the Arctic Council the prospect of future re-engagement, “pending consideration of the necessary modalities that can allow us to continue the Council’s important work in view of the current circumstances.” However, there are no indications thus far of a return to normal operations. If Sweden and Finland are admitted to NATO, it is unlikely that Arctic governance will ever again effectively incorporate Russia. The border between Finland and Russia would likely become a militarized zone in the Arctic/sub-Arctic region, as Russian president Vladimir Putin has threatened to  heavy artillery to the border. It would also leave Russia as the sole Arctic state not part of NATO, eviscerating the balance of interests that has ensured stability in the region in recent decades.

If Russia perceives its fellow Arctic states to be united in an anti-Russian coalition, we should expect the future of Arctic geopolitics to be dominated by militarization. This trend is already being seen. Russia has been steadily expanding its military capabilities in the Arctic since 2014. This has included technological advances, such as strategic nuclear submarines in the North Sea or  the ZALA series of weather-resistant drones. Russia’s Arctic build-up has also prioritized human capital, with Moscow permanently  military forces along Russia’s northern coast and running specialized training exercises to improve force operations in the region. In addition to the promised militarization of the Russia-Finland border, the perception of a NATO threat in the region introduces an incentive for escalated Russian security measures.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › Arctic - Extension

NATO adventurism guarantees conflict – Arctic and Baltics

Scott Ritter, 05-14-2020, (Scott Ritter is a former US Marine Corps intelligence officer. He served in the Soviet Union as an inspector implementing the INF Treaty, in General Schwarzkopf’s staff during the Gulf War, and from 1991-1998 as a UN weapons inspector.), "US muscle-flexing threatens to open Arctic front in new Cold War with Russia," RT International, , Xoxo 7/28/2020

The US Navy is on the cusp of conducting confrontational freedom of navigation operations in the Arctic that threaten Russian economic and national security interests. The recent resumption by the US Navy of a Barents Sea Patrol represents muscle-flexing on the part of Washington and its NATO allies unseen since the end of the Cold War. Three American destroyers and a British frigate, accompanied by a supply ship, ventured into the Arctic body of water last week. The reestablishment of the patrol is part of a larger refocusing of attention by the US and NATO on the Arctic, where warming waters and melting ice have created the possibility of faster sea transits between Europe and Asia and access to natural resources which were previously viewed as cost-prohibitive due to heavy ice conditions. Russia, which views most of the Barents Sea as part of its territorial waters, has made it clear to the US and the international community that it will protect its core national economic and security interests using all means available. Given the stakes involved, the potential for conflict is real should the US seek to expand its military posture more aggressively in the Arctic. This is precisely what some in the US defense establishment are arguing for. In order to prevent what American defense hawks have called a potential maritime “Iron Curtain” from being pulled down over the Arctic by Russia, calls are being made for a more aggressive US naval posture in the region, expanding the Barents Sea Patrol to incorporate so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) as standard practice for US and NATO naval operations in the Arctic north. The US has regularly asserted its right to navigate international waters consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), despite not having signed the agreement (the US sidesteps this inconvenient fact by viewing the provisions of UNCLOS it finds acceptable to operate as common law.) Since 1983, the US Navy has conducted more than 400 FONOPs designed to challenge what it views as excessive maritime claims. The proponents of expanded FONOPs in the Arctic view such exercises as a prerequisite for countering perceived Russian domination of the Arctic region. One of the guiding principles of any US/NATO FONOPs conducted in the Arctic Sea will be to push back on what these nations view as excessively restrictive Russian national legislation based on UNCLOS’ Article 234 governing operations in Arctic waters. As things currently stand, Russia views the Northeast Passage (called the Northern Sea Route in Russia) as being exclusively within Russian territorial waters, and as such traditional freedom of navigation rights do not apply. Instead, Russia has implemented a series of laws which, by placing restrictions on building construction, ship navigation capabilities, and permit requirements, all but precludes freedom of navigation. It should be noted that Russian laws mirror in many respects those of Canada, which – like Russia – uses Article 234 as the basis of its restrictive domestic legislation governing the transit of ships in its territorial Arctic waters. Russian and Canadian interpretation of the rights afforded them under Article 234 are coming under legal challenge by nations such as the US, which want access to the economic potential of the Arctic which are emerging as the ice sheet is pushed back by the effects of global warming. Protecting Russian vested interests in the economic benefits that can be accrued (President Vladimir Putin has assessed the value of the mineral deposits in Russia’s Arctic region as approximately $30 trillion) by exploiting the reduced ice exposure of the Arctic region are a major reason behind Russia’s forward-leaning posture in the region. But there is another critical factor at play, which changes the dynamics of any FONOP-type operation. “Innocent passage” is a critical concept behind any viable FONOP exercise—military vessels must be engaged in non-hostile transit activity. However, US and NATO vessels that would conduct future FONOPs in the Arctic Sea are armed with Aegis surface-to-air missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles that would threaten Russian strategic rocket forces stationed in Siberia. The US is in the process of developing advanced SM-3 Block IIA surface-to-air missiles which can be launched from the Mark 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) employed on Aegis-capable ships. These new interceptors are capable of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and will be tested in this configuration in the third quarter of 2020. Given the fact that the vast majority of Russia’s strategic nuclear force—especially those elements of which are stationed in Siberia—are configured to fly over the Arctic Sea region before reaching their targets in the United States, any US naval deployment in the Arctic Sea armed with these weapons could not be seen as innocent. The Mark 41 VLS is also configured to launch sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). As part of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the US Navy is developing a new nuclear capable SLCM, known as the SLCM-N, which will be armed with a W-80-4 thermonuclear warhead with a variable yield of 5-150 kilotons. Any ship armed with SLCM-N weapons that is operating in the Arctic Sea region will possess an inherent first-strike interdiction capability against Russia’s strategic nuclear forces—again, a capability which makes the transit of such vessels anything but innocent. Russia currently has six military bases in the north, along with 10 airfields, numerous anti-aircraft missile system positions and military ports operating under the umbrella of the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command, better known simply as the Arctic forces. The anti-aircraft defenses include the Tor-M2DT, a modernized variant of the Soviet-era SA-15 system, and the newer Pantsir-SA system, both of which have been adapted to operating in the harsh environment of the Arctic north. These systems are designed to defend against cruise missile attacks, and are on 24-hour alert, 365 days per year. Seen in this light, the Russian militarization of the Arctic is more defensive than offensive and intended to protect the vital national security interests of Moscow from threats such as those that would be presented through any aggressive US/NATO FONOPs in the Arctic Sea. Moreover, Russia has a history, dating back to Soviet times, of aggressively defending its national security interests from what it believes to be the encroachment on its territorial waters by FONOPs which violate the requirement of innocent passage. Perhaps the most relevant example of this is found in the ramming incident that transpired off the coast of the Crimean Peninsula on February 12, 1988. The US Navy had dispatched a two-ship task force, consisting of the cruiser USS Yorktown and the destroyer USS Caron, to conduct FONOPs outside of traditional sea lanes. The US claimed it had every right to operate outside these sea lanes, citing innocent passage. The Soviets, however, viewed the presence of two modern warships, more heavily armed than any previous FONOP exercise, as anything but innocent, and dispatched two frigates to challenge the US naval presence. After warning both the Yorktown and Caron to depart, and having these warnings ignored, the Soviet ships proceeded to ram the US navy ships to compel their departure. There can be little doubt that the Russian navy would employ similar tactics—or more—to protect its interests in the Arctic Sea it felt threatened by US/NATO FONOPs that did not meet the criterion of innocent passage. If the US decides to beef up its naval presence in the Arctic region, expanding the current Barents Sea Patrol to incorporate more aggressive FONOPs along Russia’s Northern Sea Route, one can anticipate that Russia will respond in kind, creating the potential for a repeat of the Yorktown/Caron incident in the frigid waters of the Arctic north. In this day and age of renewed Cold War-like tensions between the US/NATO and Russia, the last thing either side needs is a new point of potential force-on-force friction.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › Arctic - Extension

NATO escalates tensions in the Artic

Urban, Kathryn. 2022. “NATO’s Nordic Expansion Will Shake up the Arctic.” The National Interest. May 15, 2022. . /nfs

One outstanding question is the degree to which devastating economic sanctions imposed on Russia will halt its military innovation projects. Nuclear-powered icebreakers currently under construction, for example, on India to deliver crucial supply chain components. However, Russia’s existing icebreaker fleet other Arctic competitors by orders of magnitude, and this trend holds true for most other Arctic military assets as well. Despite the impact of sanctions, NATO states—possibly including Finland and Sweden—will be left playing catch up to the capabilities of an increasingly militant Russia. Foreign policy is fundamentally a game of trade-offs—prioritizing certain threats and opportunities over others. Finland and Sweden’s desire to join NATO is driven by a self-interested of Russian aggression. The alliance’s enthusiasm to embrace these Nordic members, however, is seen as an opportunity to check Russia’s actions in Ukraine and deliver a message of trans-Atlantic solidarity. This may well be a beneficial move for NATO member states, but it is not without its consequences. Bringing Sweden and Finland into NATO will have knock-on effects beyond Ukraine. Altering the balance of power in the Arctic region will virtually eliminate the possibility of meaningful engagement with Russia on Arctic governance, bringing the region closer to military conflict than at any point since the nuclear buildup in the Cold War. The ripple effects of NATO expansion felt in the Arctic underscore the problem of responsive foreign policy decision-making. NATO’s calculated stand against Russian aggression in Ukraine may serve only to shift the locus of conflict further north.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Bad › Arctic Mod

NATO destabilizes Arctic – tensions cause nuclear war – extinction

Michael T. Klare, 02-11-2020, (Michael T. Klare, The Nation’s defense correspondent, is professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, DC. Also wrote a cool book about climate and the pentagon budget),"A World War Could Break Out in the Arctic," The Nation, , Xoxo 6/30/2020

In early March, an estimated 7,500 American combat troops will travel to Norway to join thousands of soldiers from other NATO countries in a massive mock battle with imagined invading forces from Russia. In this futuristic simulated engagement—it goes by the name of Exercise Cold Response 2020—allied forces will “conduct multinational joint exercises with a high-intensity combat scenario in demanding winter conditions,” or so claims the Norwegian military anyway. At first glance, this may look like any other NATO training exercise, but think again. There’s nothing ordinary about Cold Response 2020. As a start, it’s being staged above the Arctic Circle, far from any previous traditional NATO battlefield, and it raises to a new level the possibility of a great-power conflict that might end in a nuclear exchange and mutual annihilation. Welcome, in other words, to World War III’s newest battlefield. For the soldiers participating in the exercise, the potentially thermonuclear dimensions of Cold Response 2020 may not be obvious. At its start, Marines from the United States and the United Kingdom will practice massive amphibious landings along Norway’s coastline, much as they do in similar exercises elsewhere in the world. Once ashore, however, the scenario becomes ever more distinctive. After collecting tanks and other heavy weaponry “prepositioned” in caves in Norway’s interior, the Marines will proceed toward the country’s far-northern Finnmark region to help Norwegian forces stave off Russian forces supposedly pouring across the border. From then on, the two sides will engage in—to use current Pentagon terminology—high-intensity combat operations under Arctic conditions (a type of warfare not seen on such a scale since World War II). And that’s just the beginning. Unbeknownst to most Americans, the Finnmark region of Norway and adjacent Russian territory have become one of the most likely battlegrounds for the first use of nuclear weapons in any future NATO-Russian conflict. Because Moscow has concentrated a significant part of its nuclear retaliatory capability on the Kola Peninsula, a remote stretch of land abutting northern Norway—any US-NATO success in actual combat with Russian forces near that territory would endanger a significant part of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and so might precipitate the early use of such munitions. Even a simulated victory—the predictable result of Cold Response 2020—will undoubtedly set Russia’s nuclear controllers on edge. To appreciate just how risky any NATO-Russian clash in Norway’s far north would be, consider the region’s geography and the strategic factors that have led Russia to concentrate so much military power there. And all of this, by the way, will be playing out in the context of another existential danger: climate change. The melting of the Arctic ice cap and the accelerated exploitation of Arctic resources are lending this area ever greater strategic significance. ENERGY EXTRACTION IN THE FAR NORTH Look at any map of Europe and you’ll note that Scandinavia widens as it heads southward into the most heavily populated parts of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. As you head north, however, it narrows and becomes ever less populated. At its extreme northern reaches, only a thin band of Norway juts east to touch Russia’s Kola Peninsula. To the north, the Barents Sea, an offshoot of the Arctic Ocean, bounds them both. This remote region—approximately 800 miles from Oslo and 900 miles from Moscow—has, in recent years, become a vortex of economic and military activity. Once prized as a source of vital minerals, especially nickel, iron ore, and phosphates, this remote area is now the center of extensive oil and natural gas extraction. With temperatures rising in the Arctic twice as fast as anywhere else on the planet and sea ice retreating ever farther north every year, offshore fossil-fuel exploration has become increasingly viable. As a result, large reserves of oil and natural gas—the very fuels whose combustion is responsible for those rising temperatures—have been discovered beneath the Barents Sea and both countries are seeking to exploit those deposits. Norway has taken the lead, establishing at Hammerfest in Finnmark the world’s first plant above the Arctic Circle to export liquified natural gas. In a similar fashion, Russia has initiated efforts to exploit the mammoth Shtokman gas field in its sector of the Barents Sea, though it has yet to bring such plans to fruition. For Russia, even more significant oil and gas prospects lie further east in the Kara and Pechora Seas and on the Yamal Peninsula, a slender extension of Siberia. Its energy companies have, in fact, already begun producing oil at the Prirazlomnoye field in the Pechora Sea and the Novoportovskoye field on that peninsula (and natural gas there as well). Such fields hold great promise for Russia, which exhibits all the characteristics of a petro-state, but there’s one huge problem: The only practical way to get that output to market is via specially designed icebreaker-tankers sent through the Barents Sea past northern Norway. The exploitation of Arctic oil and gas resources and their transport to markets in Europe and Asia has become a major economic priority for Moscow as its hydrocarbon reserves below the Arctic Circle begin to dry up. Despite calls at home for greater economic diversity, President Vladimir Putin’s regime continues to insist on the centrality of hydrocarbon production to the country’s economic future. In that context, production in the Arctic has become an essential national objective, which, in turn, requires assured access to the Atlantic Ocean via the Barents Sea and Norway’s offshore waters. Think of that waterway as vital to Russia’s energy economy in the way the Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, is to the Saudis and other regional fossil-fuel producers. THE MILITARY DIMENSION No less than Russia’s giant energy firms, its navy must be able to enter the Atlantic via the Barents Sea and northern Norway. Aside from its Baltic and Black Sea ports, accessible to the Atlantic only via passageways easily obstructed by NATO, the sole Russian harbor with unfettered access to the Atlantic Ocean is at Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula. Not surprisingly then, that port is also the headquarters for Russia’s Northern Fleet—its most powerful—and the site of numerous air, infantry, missile, and radar bases along with naval shipyards and nuclear reactors. In other words, it’s among the most sensitive military regions in Russia today. Given all this, President Putin has substantially rebuilt that very fleet, which fell into disrepair after the collapse of the Soviet Union, equipping it with some of the country’s most advanced warships. In 2018, according to The Military Balance, a publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, it already possessed the largest number of modern cruisers and destroyers (10) of any Russian fleet, along with 22 attack submarines and numerous support vessels. Also in the Murmansk area are dozens of advanced MiG fighter planes and a wide assortment of anti-aircraft defense systems. Finally, as 2019 ended, Russian military officials indicated for the first time that they had deployed to the Arctic the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, a weapon capable of hypersonic velocities (more than five times the speed of sound), again presumably to a base in the Murmansk region just 125 miles from Norway’s Finnmark, the site of the upcoming NATO exercise. More significant yet is the way Moscow has been strengthening its nuclear forces in the region. Like the United States, Russia maintains a “triad” of nuclear delivery systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range “heavy” bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Under the terms of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed by the two countries in 2010, the Russians can deploy no more than 700 delivery systems capable of carrying no more than 1,550 warheads. (That pact will, however, expire in February 2021 unless the two sides agree to an extension, which appears increasingly unlikely in the age of Trump.) According to the Arms Control Association, the Russians are currently believed to be deploying the warheads they are allowed under New START on 66 heavy bombers, 286 ICBMs, and 12 submarines with 160 SLBMs. Eight of those nuclear-armed subs are, in fact, assigned to the Northern Fleet, which means about 110 missiles with as many as 500 warheads—the exact numbers remain shrouded in secrecy—are deployed in the Murmansk area. For Russian nuclear strategists, such nuclear-armed submarines are considered the most “survivable” of the country’s retaliatory systems. In the event of a nuclear exchange with the United States, the country’s heavy bombers and ICBMs could prove relatively vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes as their locations are known and can be targeted by American bombs and missiles with near-pinpoint accuracy. Those subs, however, can leave Murmansk and disappear into the wide Atlantic Ocean at the onset of any crisis and so presumably remain hidden from US spying eyes. To do so, however, requires that they pass through the Barents Sea, avoiding the NATO forces lurking nearby. For Moscow, in other words, the very possibility of deterring a US nuclear strike hinges on its ability to defend its naval stronghold in Murmansk, while maneuvering its submarines past Norway’s Finnmark region. No wonder, then, that this area has assumed enormous strategic importance for Russian military planners—and the upcoming Cold Response 2020 is sure to prove challenging to them. WASHINGTON’S ARCTIC BUILDUP During the Cold War era, Washington viewed the Arctic as a significant strategic arena and constructed a string of military bases across the region. Their main aim: to intercept Soviet bombers and missiles crossing the North Pole on their way to targets in North America. After the Soviet Union imploded in 1991, Washington abandoned many of those bases. Now, however, with the Pentagon once again identifying “great power competition” with Russia and China as the defining characteristic of the present strategic environment, many of those bases are being reoccupied and new ones established. Once again, the Arctic is being viewed as a potential site of conflict with Russia and, as a result, US forces are being readied for possible combat there. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was the first official to explain this new strategic outlook at the Arctic Forum in Finland last May. In his address, a kind of “Pompeo Doctrine,” he indicated that the United States was shifting from benign neglect of the region to aggressive involvement and militarization. “We’re entering a new age of strategic engagement in the Arctic,” he insisted, “complete with new threats to the Arctic and its real estate, and to all of our interests in that region.” To better protect those interests against Russia’s military buildup there, “we are fortifying America’s security and diplomatic presence in the area…hosting military exercises, strengthening our force presence, rebuilding our icebreaker fleet, expanding Coast Guard funding, and creating a new senior military post for Arctic Affairs inside of our own military.” The Pentagon has been unwilling to provide many details, but a close reading of the military press suggests that this activity has been particularly focused on northern Norway and adjacent waters. To begin with, the Marine Corps has established a permanent presence in that country, the first time foreign forces have been stationed there since German troops occupied it during World War II. A detachment of about 330 Marines were initially deployed near the port of Trondheim in 2017, presumably to help guard nearby caves that contain hundreds of US tanks and combat vehicles. Two years later, a similarly sized group was then dispatched to the Troms region above the Arctic Circle and far closer to the Russian border. From the Russian perspective, even more threatening is the construction of a US radar station on the Norwegian island of Vardø about 40 miles from the Kola Peninsula. To be operated in conjunction with the Norwegian intelligence service, the focus of the facility will evidently be to snoop on those Russian missile-carrying submarines, assumedly in order to target them and take them out in the earliest stages of any conflict. That Moscow fears just such an outcome is evident from the mock attack it staged on the Vardø facility in 2018, sending 11 Su-24 supersonic bombers on a direct path toward the island. (They turned aside at the last moment.) It has also moved a surface-to-surface missile battery to a spot just 40 miles from Vardø. In addition, in August 2018, the US Navy decided to reactivate the previously decommissioned Second Fleet in the North Atlantic. “A new Second Fleet increases our strategic flexibility to respond—from the Eastern Seaboard to the Barents Sea,” said Chief of Naval Operations John Richardson at the time. As last year ended, that fleet was declared fully operational. DECIPHERING COLD RESPONSE 2020 Exercise Cold Response 2020 must be viewed in the context of all these developments. Few details about the thinking behind the upcoming war games have been made public, but it’s not hard to imagine what at least part of the scenario might be like: a US-Russian clash of some sort leading to Russian attacks aimed at seizing that radar station at Vardø and Norway’s defense headquarters at Bodø on the country’s northwestern coast. The invading troops will be slowed but not stopped by Norwegian forces (and those US Marines stationed in the area), while thousands of reinforcements from NATO bases elsewhere in Europe begin to pour in. Eventually, of course, the tide will turn and the Russians will be forced back. No matter what the official scenario is like, however, for Pentagon planners the situation will go far beyond this. Any Russian assault on critical Norwegian military facilities would presumably be preceded by intense air and missile bombardment and the forward deployment of major naval vessels. This, in turn, would prompt comparable moves by the United States and NATO, probably resulting in violent encounters and the loss of major assets on all sides. In the process, Russia’s key nuclear retaliatory forces would be at risk and quickly placed on high alert with senior officers operating in hair-trigger mode. Any misstep might then lead to what humanity has feared since August 1945: a nuclear apocalypse on Planet Earth. There is no way to know to what degree such considerations are incorporated into the classified versions of the Cold Response 2020 scenario, but it’s unlikely that they’re missing. Indeed, a 2016 version of the exercise involved the participation of three B-52 nuclear bombers from the US Strategic Air Command, [SAC] indicating that the American military is keenly aware of the escalatory risks of any large-scale US-Russian encounter in the Arctic. In short, what might otherwise seem like a routine training exercise in a distant part of the world is actually part of an emerging US strategy to overpower Russia in a critical defensive zone, an approach that could easily result in nuclear war. The Russians are, of course, well aware of this and so will undoubtedly be watching Cold Response 2020 with genuine trepidation. Their fears are understandable—but we should all be concerned about a strategy that seemingly embodies such a high risk of future escalation. Ever since the Soviets acquired nuclear weapons of their own in 1949, strategists have wondered how and where an all-out nuclear war—World War III—would break out. At one time, that incendiary scenario was believed most likely to involve a clash over the divided city of Berlin or along the East-West border in Germany. After the Cold War, however, fears of such a deadly encounter evaporated and few gave much thought to such possibilities. Looking forward today, however, the prospect of a catastrophic World War III is again becoming all too imaginable and this time, it appears, an incident in the Arctic could prove the spark for Armageddon.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › A2 ILO

International law fails—it lacks properties required for a legitimate system

Steinberg 5 (Gerald M., Academic and political scientist, PhD in government from Cornell University, “The Myth of International Law” October 15, 2005, http://www.zionismontheweb.org/myth_of_international_law.htm)

In this reality, the principles that are said to constitute “international law” lack the two central properties required for any legitimate legal system: the consent of the governed, and uniform and unprejudiced application. International law and the claims made in its name fit neither criteria. In a democratic framework, the legal system gains legitimacy through the consent of the citizens, and accountable to democratic procedures. We accept the limitations placed on us by the system of laws and the role of the police in enforcing these laws as part of the requirements for justice and order in any functioning society. But we do not accept limitations imposed from the outside, without our consent. Thus, the claims of the UN, the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and campaigns run by obsessed extremists in Europe, lack any legitimate moral foundation or standing in democratic societies with their own legal system. Similarly, when judges sitting on the Israeli High Court base decisions on international law, they are attempting to impose an external framework which lacks the legitimacy provided by the consent of the governed. THE OTHER problem with the use of international law is the absence of equitable implementation. No legal system that focuses its attention selectively can be considered legitimate. Thus, the routine condemnations of Israeli or American policy by the UN, the ICJ, and accompanying NGOs have no moral or legal validity when the principles are not applied uniformly. In contrast to these destructive polemics, in order to promote a meaningful universal moral code, it is necessary to recognize the need for the consent of the governed and for consistent and universal enforcement. International law based on justice, and not ideology, remains a worthy objective. But the substitution of political rhetoric that invokes the myths and rhetoric for the real thing is entirely counterproductive.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › A2 ILO

No impact to the liberal order

G. John Ikenberry 18, professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive”, Carnegie Ethics and International Affairs,

In this essay I look at the evolving encounters between rising states and the post-war Western international order. My starting point is the classic “power transition” perspective. Power transition theories see a tight link between international order—its emergence, stability, and decline—and the rise and fall of great powers. It is a perspective that sees history as a sequence of cycles in which powerful or hegemonic states rise up and build order and dominate the global system until their power declines, leading to a new cycle of crisis and order building. In contrast, I offer a more evolutionary perspective, emphasizing the lineages and continuities in modern international order. More specifically, I argue that although America’s hegemonic position may be declining, the liberal international characteristics of order—openness, rules, multilateral cooperation—are deeply rooted and likely to persist. This is true even though the orientation and actions of the Trump administration have raised serious questions about the U.S. commitment to liberal internationalism. Just as importantly, rising states (led by China) are not engaged in a frontal attack on the American-led order. While struggles do exist over orientations, agendas, and leadership, the non-Western developing countries remain tied to the architecture and principles of a liberal-oriented global order. And even as China seeks in various ways to build rival regional institutions, there are stubborn limits on what it can do. Power Transitions and International Order There is wide agreement that the world is witnessing a long-term global power transition. Wealth and power is diffusing, spreading outward and away from Europe and the United States. The rapid growth that marked the non-Western rising states in the last decade may have ended, and even China’s rapid economic ascendency has slowed. But the overall pattern of change remains: the “rest” are gaining ground on the “West.” While there is wide agreement that the world is witnessing a global power transition, there is less agreement on the consequences of power shifts for international order. The classic view is advanced by realist scholars, such as E. H. Carr, Robert Gilpin, Paul Kennedy, and William Wohlforth, who make sweeping arguments about power and order. These hegemonic realists argue that international order is a by-product of the concentration of power. Order is created by a powerful state, and when that state declines and power diffuses, international order weakens or breaks apart. Out of these dynamic circumstances, a rising state emerges as the new dominant state, and it seeks to reorganize the international system to suit its own purposes. In this view, world politics from ancient times to the modern era can be seen as a series of repeated cycles of rise and decline. War, protectionism, depression, political upheaval—various sorts of crises and disruptions may push the cycle forward. This narrative of hegemonic rise and decline draws on the European and, more broadly, Western experience. Since the early modern era, Europe has been organized and reorganized by a succession of leading states and would-be hegemons: the Spanish Hapsburgs, France of Louis XIV and Napoleon, and post-Bismarck Germany. The logic of hegemonic order comes even more clearly into view with Pax Britannica, the nineteenth-century hegemonic order based on British naval and mercantile dominance. The decline of Britain was followed by decades of war and economic instability, which ended only with the rise of Pax Americana. For hegemonic realists, the debate today is about where the world is along this cyclical pathway of rise and decline. Has the United States finally lost the ability or willingness to underwrite and lead the post-war order? Are we in the midst of a hegemonic crisis and the breakdown of the old order? And are rising states, led by China, beginning to step forward in efforts to establish their own hegemonic dominance of their regions and the world? These are the lurking questions of the power transition perspective. But does this vision of power transition truly illuminate the struggles going on today over international order? Some might argue no—that the United States is still in a position, despite its travails, to provide hegemonic leadership. Here one would note that there is a durable infrastructure (or what Susan Strange has called “structural power”) that undergirds the existing American-led order. Far-flung security alliances, market relations, liberal democratic solidarity, deeply rooted geopolitical alignments—there are many possible sources of American hegemonic power that remain intact. But there may be even deeper sources of continuity in the existing system. This would be true if the existence of a liberal-oriented international order does not in fact require hegemonic domination. It might be that the power transition theory is wrong: the stability and persistence of the existing post-war international order does not depend on the concentration of American power. In fact, international order is not simply an artifact of concentrations of power. The rules and institutions that make up international order have a more complex and contingent relationship with the rise and fall of state power. This is true in two respects. First, international order itself is complex: multilayered, multifaceted, and not simply a political formation imposed by the leading state. International order is not “one thing” that states either join or resist. It is an aggregation of various sorts of ordering rules and institutions. There are the deep rules and norms of sovereignty. There are governing institutions, starting with the United Nations. There is a sprawling array of international institutions, regimes, treaties, agreements, protocols, and so forth. These governing arrangements cut across diverse realms, including security and arms control, the world economy, the environment and global commons, human rights, and political relations. Some of these domains of governance may have rules and institutions that narrowly reflect the interests of the hegemonic state, but most reflect negotiated outcomes based on a much broader set of interests. As rising states continue to rise, they do not simply confront an American-led order; they face a wider conglomeration of ordering rules, institutions, and arrangements; many of which they have long embraced. By separating “American hegemony” from “the existing international order,” we can see a more complex set of relationships. The United States does not embody the international order; it has a relationship with it, as do rising states. The United States embraces many of the core global rules and institutions, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization. But it also has resisted ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (it being the only country not to have ratified the latter) as well as various arms control and disarmament agreements. China also embraces many of the same global rules and institutions, and resists ratification of others. Generally speaking, the more fundamental or core the norms and institutions are—beginning with the Westphalian norms of sovereignty and the United Nations system—the more agreement there is between the United States and China as well as other states. Disagreements are most salient where human rights and political principles are in play, such as in the Responsibility to Protect. Second, there is also diversity in what rising states “want” from the international order. The struggles over international order take many different forms. In some instances, what rising states want is more influence and control of territory and geopolitical space beyond their borders. One can see this in China’s efforts to expand its maritime and political influence in the South China Sea and other neighboring areas. This is an age-old type of struggle captured in realist accounts of security competition and geopolitical rivalry. Another type of struggle is over the norms and values that are enshrined in global governance rules and institutions. These may be about how open and rule-based the system should be. They may also be about the way human rights and political principles are defined and brought to bear in relations among states. Finally, the struggles over international order may be focused on the distribution of authority. That is, rising states may seek a greater role in the governance of existing institutions. This is a struggle over the position of states within the global political hierarchy: voting shares, leadership rights, and authority relations. These observations cut against the realist hegemonic perspective and cyclical theories of power transition. Rising states do not confront a single, coherent, hegemonic order. The international order offers a buffet of options and choices. They can embrace some rules and institutions and not others. Moreover, stepping back, the international orders that rising states have faced in different historical eras have not all been the same order. The British-led order that Germany faced at the turn of the twentieth century is different from the international order that China faces today. The contemporary international order is much more complex and wide-ranging than past orders. It has a much denser array of rules, institutions, and governance realms. There are also both regional and global domains of governance. This makes it hard to imagine an epic moment when the international order goes into crisis and rising states step forward—either China alone or rising states as a bloc—to reorganize and reshape its rules and institutions. Rather than a cyclical dynamic of rise and decline, change in the existing American-led order might best be captured by terms such as continuity, evolution, adaptation, and negotiation. The struggles over international order today are growing, but it is not a drama best told in terms of the rise and decline of American hegemony.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › A2 Turkey

Turkey will be key to deterrence in the Black Sea theater

Tol 21 “Turkey-NATO ties are problematic, but there is one bright spot” Feb 16th, 2021 Gönül Tol is the founding director of the Middle East Institute’s  and a senior fellow for the . She is also an adjunct professor at George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies. After three years of field research in Germany and the Netherlands, she wrote her dissertation on the radicalization of the Turkish Islamist movement Milli Gorus in Western Europe. 

America’s presence in the Black Sea is important to check Russian expansionism, but a more effective strategy calls for a coordinated response from regional allies such as Turkey. Turkey’s relationship with NATO and the U.S. in particular has been rocky of late. Ignoring warnings from NATO and the threat of sanctions from the U..S, Turkey went ahead with its purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system, taking delivery of the first shipment in mid-2019. But despite its growing defense partnership with Moscow, Ankara is equally uneasy about the growing Russian military presence in a region where Turkey once had the edge. In a 2016 plea to Turkey’s NATO allies, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the Black Sea had become a “Russian lake” and called for a greater NATO presence, reversing a decades-old Turkish policy of keeping the alliance out. Turkey has developed a multi-pronged strategy to counter Russian influence in the Black Sea. One important leg of that strategy is on the home front, where Turkey is strengthening its navy. A project called MILGEM, a contraction of the Turkish for “national ship” (milli gemi), was launched to design and construct naval vessels in-country, including ADA class corvettes. In 2018, the  to acquire four of these ships from Turkey’s state-run defense contractor ASFAT, the first successful export of these vessels. Turkey has also been building up its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to counter Russia’s growing A2/AD assets in the Black Sea by ordering four new frigates, called both Istanbul and MILGEM II. The frigates are based on the ADA class corvette design but extended by 14 meters to enable the inclusion of a vertical launching system for surface to air missiles. The naval version of the army’s low-altitude air defense system, Gökdeniz, will be added to the inventory for the first time with the frigate. The national  anti-ship missile will also be integrated into the first unit of the class, TCG Istanbul, which is forecast for entry into service later this year. Turkey is taking steps on the foreign policy front as well, stepping up its cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Ankara views these countries as instrumental in its efforts to balance the Russian military presence in the Black Sea and South Caucasus. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Turkish-Ukrainian relations have expanded significantly. Last year, Erdoğan unveiled a $36 million military aid package for Ukraine. The two countries agreed to cooperate on the design and manufacture of aircraft engines, radar units, , and navigation systems and consider collaboration on advanced technology projects, such as ballistic missile systems. Turkey also plans to sell its ships to Ukraine as part of a much bigger defense deal, which, if it comes to fruition, could change the balance of power in the Black Sea. Besides cooperation in defense industries, the Ukrainian and Turkish navies also  joint training in the Black Sea to showcase their ability to operate "in accordance with NATO standards." Turkey has also invested in shoring up the defenses of Georgia, another Black Sea country threatened by Russia’s growing influence in the region. Turkey has  millions of dollars to the Georgian Ministry of Defense to reform the country’s military logistics and transfer defense capabilities to its northeastern neighbor while advocating for the extension of NATO membership to Georgia, a move Russia opposes. Turkey’s defense cooperation with Azerbaijan has been growing as well, which was on full display in the fighting in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh late last year, when Ankara threw its full military support behind Baku. Turkish drones provided Azerbaijan a huge advantage in the conflict, which ended with Azerbaijan capturing significant swathes of territory from Armenian forces. Turkey’s military exports to Azerbaijan rose six-fold in 2020, with Azerbaijan jumping to the top of the list of Turkish arms buyers in September. NATO and the Black Sea NATO should support these Turkish efforts. It should also establish a permanent “Black Sea Maritime Patrol” group modeled on the successful Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean. Operation Sea Guardian is a flexible effort that can potentially cover the full range of NATO’s maritime security needs. In accordance with NATO’s “framework nation” concept, Turkey can be assigned the leading nation role in the Black Sea and smaller members can integrate their own, more limited capabilities into an organizational structure provided by Ankara. Mirroring other NATO missions in the Baltic or Mediterranean, Turkey can play a coordinating role to bring in other NATO allies willing to participate and provide support. Such a force would require NATO’s coordination and political pressure among non-Black Sea members to commit in advance to a regular and rotational maritime presence in the Black Sea, in line with the 1936 Montreux Convention, which limits the presence of warships from non-littoral states to a maximum of 21 days. Although the development of such a multinational unit would require a sustained diplomatic effort, once active, it would boost NATO’s deterrence in a strategic region that has become a springboard for Russia to project power from Georgia all the way to Syria and Libya.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › A2 Turkey

Engagement with Turkey is the best chance to prevent human rights abuses

Ellehuus 19 “Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving” Dec 2nd, 2019 Rachel Ellehuus is the Secretary of Defense Representative in Europe (SECDEFREPEUR) and the Defense Advisor (DEFAD) for the U.S. Mission to NATO.

NATO leaders will gather this week in London to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the alliance; reflect on past accomplishments; implement the remaining deterrence and defense measures agreed at the 2014 Warsaw Summit; and lay the groundwork for future cooperation in new areas, such as emerging technologies and space. And while the military machinery that is the core of NATO continues to run smoothly—generating levels of interoperability, integrated operational planning, and force generation that are unmatched—NATO’s political cohesion is being challenged by both internal divisions among members and by external actors who seek to exploit these differences to their own advantage. Perhaps the most pronounced case of this fractured political cohesion is the Turkey-NATO relationship, where internal challenges and pressure from external actors uniquely intersect. Internally, allies are alarmed by President Erdogan’s walking back of democracy, press freedom, and civic society in Turkey; Turkey’s repeated unilateral incursions into northern Syria; and its willingness to hold the NATO agenda hostage to domestic concerns, for example, Turkey’s current hold on approving the Graduated Response Plan for the Baltic States and Poland pending NATO recognition of the threat posed to Turkey by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). Conversely, Turkey (and many other southern flank allies for that matter) believes that NATO does not fully recognize or address its legitimate security concerns, in particular migration and terrorism. Externally, Russia quickly capitalized on the fissures between Turkey and NATO, offering to assist Turkey in managing the YPG along the Turkey-Syria border and to sell it Russian equipment, such as the S-400 surface-to-air missile system, which would compromise NATO capabilities and has led to a halt in delivery of F-35 aircraft to Turkey. Turkey’s subsequent decisions to over Ankara and to fighter aircraft have reinforced concerns that Turkey has little interest in maintaining or rebuilding its relationship with NATO as instead plans to continue to test its boundaries. The EU-Turkey relationship is not faring much better, with accession negotiations (initiated in 2005) frozen since June 2018 due to Turkey’s backsliding on democracy, rule of law, and fundamental rights. The 2016 EU-Turkey refugee agreement, whereby Turkey receives EU financial assistance in exchange for continuing to host some 3 million refugees, is creating further tension, with both sides accusing the other of not living up to the terms of the agreement. What’s next? Presently, mutual mistrust is so high that many allies are questioning whether Turkey still shares NATO’s interests and values, and many in Turkey are struggling to see the benefits of NATO membership or a renewed EU accession process. Both sides seem to have forgotten in 1952, such as countering Russian (then Soviet) influence in Central Asia and the Middle East and maintaining stability in the Middle East. Yet these foundational factors remain valid: Turkey’s geopolitical position at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa still provides NATO with needed political and operational reach, and Turkey continues to benefit from the collective military power of NATO. With the relationship close to (if not at) its nadir, Turkey and NATO, with the support of the EU, need to take active measures to anchor it for the future, while avoiding steps that could destroy the relationship entirely. Active measures Assuming that Turkey is in fact interested in rebuilding the relationship with its NATO allies, there are several active measures NATO and Turkey can take now to create a foothold for the future. The key is to focus on areas of mutual interest where NATO involvement is critical to Turkish strategic interests and where Turkey has a unique role to play in N

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › A2 Arctic

No arctic war. Countries want stability.

SARAH CAMMARATA, 05/20/2020, [Sarah Cammarata is a digital producer for POLITICO Pro. She co-authors Afternoon Energy and contributes to Morning Defense, as well as defense policy coverage], “EU’s point man for the Arctic shrugs off Russia, China tension”, Politico, , Xoxo 5/31/2020

“Where the Arctic was [historically] reserved for the Arctic states, now it’s very much seen as an international area of interest, and I don't see that as being a problem as long as it’s well-handled,” said Mann, who took on his current role on April 1. A senior State Department official in a briefing late last month characterized this era as the “the return of geopolitics” in the Arctic, and warned “we can expect ... the rapidly changing Arctic system to create greater incentives for the Kremlin and the [People’s Republic of China] to pursue agendas that clash with the interests of the United States and our allies and partners.” Russia and the EU have their differences, which is “clear” to Mann, though it's historically been a place where the two entities have cooperated, he said. “I think one should avoid looking for flare-ups and tension where they don’t exist. That’s not to say that there won’t be in the future, but at the moment, things are running smoothly in my opinion.” The EU’s Arctic chief cited the Northern Dimension policy, a joint framework between EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland that promotes cooperation, economic competitiveness and sustainable development in Northern Europe as an example. Also, a new international fisheries agreement, ratified by Norway on Sunday, is an “absolutely amazing achievement” that’s a “sign that people are able to agree on things,” he said. Mann noted that Russia and the EU are both part of the Barents-Euro Arctic Council, a forum to discuss issues in the Barents region — the stretch of land that runs along the Barents Sea. Many non-Arctic countries in the EU, and elsewhere, are now shifting to design their own Arctic strategies, something he said is a welcome move. Arctic policy has normally been left solely to the Arctic nations to hash out. “New players are playing a very serious role in the Arctic now, well at least China. That wasn’t the case perhaps four years ago,” Mann explained. The concern about new Arctic activities “depends on the country,” but he did not point out a specific area of unrest. U.S. and British warships sailed to the Barents Sea this month for the first time since the 1980s, sparking buzz about what the operations meant in a militarized Arctic. However, a Navy spokesperson said in a statement the operations were routine and are “the latest in a series of ships operating in the Arctic Circle in recent years.” Mann stressed that “it’s worth underlining that the Arctic has been, and currently is, a place of peaceful cooperation ... [which] has been rather good. One of the EU’s main goals in Arctic policy is to promote multilateral cooperation and keeping it an area of peace.” New commercial opportunities that arise alongside the Arctic’s sea ice melting is a main driver of growing interest in the region, but the northern sea lanes and how much new traffic there is increasing are “being slightly overplayed,” he said. The apparent rise in tensions has led international officials to call for a body or forum for nations to discuss security issues, which Mann agrees may not be a bad idea. The Arctic Council, composed of the eight Arctic states, is a forum for discussion on cooperation in the Arctic, though it’s not required to discuss security matters and instead focuses on work in environmental and sustainable development, and support for indigenous communities. “Any forum that comes together where dialogue is possible, is going to be a good thing. I can’t tell you now what form that should be,” he said.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › A2 Arctic

NATO can deter Arctic conflict

Taha, Mahmoud. 2022. “Will the Arctic Become a New Battlefield between Russia and NATO? | Al-Estiklal Newspaper.” Al-Estiklal Newspaper. 2022. . /nfs

According to a report released in late 2021 by Reclaim Finance, a non-governmental organization, there are currently 599 oil and gas fields in production, under appraisal, field development, or in the discovery phase within the Arctic region. Gazprom, the largest Russian energy company, has 74% of its reserves in the Arctic and ranks first in the list of companies in the Arctic, which also includes many American, French, British and Norwegian companies. According to a US Geological Survey report, a fifth of the world's undiscovered oil and natural gas lie under the Arctic ice sheet, along with significant reserves of diamonds, gold, platinum, nickel, and lead. The report added, “there are up to 90 billion barrels of oil in that region, which is the amount that the American needs for 12 years, and is almost equal to the UAE's oil reserves.” The Arctic also has, according to the American report, more than fifty trillion cubic meters of natural gas, which has led to the growing interest of the great powers in the Arctic, despite international treaties that stipulate that no one owns this pole. However, each country extends its borders to claim new lands in the hope of benefiting from the wealth of the Arctic, which has a population of two million people. In turn, the researcher in international relations Mahmoud Alloush stressed in a statement to Al-Estiklal that “there is Russian concern about the increase in Western military activity in the Arctic, because of the importance of the Arctic in terms of energy resources, minerals and fish reserves, and the shorter shipping routes between Asia and Europe.” “The Arctic could be home to the largest undiscovered oil and gas reserves on Earth, storing billions of barrels of untapped energy resources, all while fuel shortages caused by sanctions against Russia,” he continued. “International interest in the wealth of the Arctic is likely to increase in the coming period in conjunction with climate change and melting ice, which will force Russia to play a more dominant role in the region,” he added. There are agreements concluded between Arctic countries on maritime law, environmental balance, and security needs, but the participation of most of these countries in arming Ukraine would jeopardize these agreements with Russia, according to Alloush. The researcher noted that “the militarization of the situation in the Arctic in recent years can clearly be observed, Russia is increasing its military presence on the Russian Kola Peninsula, bordering the Arctic, where the most powerful fleet in the Russian Navy is located, as Russia also has the largest share of strategic submarines and other important non-nuclear capabilities.” As for the motives for turning the Arctic into a battleground for influence between Moscow and the West, Alloush explained that “the Ukraine war changed the rules of the game in the Arctic, although Russia was generally cooperative with Western countries in the Arctic, NATO has become more concerned about its military expansion in this particular region.” Regarding the possibility of Sweden and Finland joining NATO, Alloush indicated that “if this happened, all Arctic countries except Russia would be part of NATO, which Russia views as a threat to encircle its activities in the Arctic.” However, he said, “Russia's military presence in this region is stronger than the presence of other countries,” adding: “At the moment, NATO is studying how to expand its activity in the Arctic to balance Russia.”

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › A2 Arctic

NATO deters Russia from Arctic conflict

Lawrence, Quil. 2022. Quals: New York-based correspondent for NPR News, covering veterans' issues nationwide. He won a Robert F. Kennedy Award for his coverage of American veterans and a Gracie Award for coverage of female combat veterans. In 2019 Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America honored Quil with its IAVA Salutes Award for Leadership in Journalism. https://www.npr.org/2022/04/15/1091492248/nato-arctic-war-game-had-a-cold-war-feel

"The US let some of that capability atrophy after the end of the cold war. Now we have, in the last few years, really paid more attention to the need to restore our icebreaker fleet, and also to be able to equip our forces to operate in colder weather and more dangerous conditions," said Sherri Goodman, former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense. Goodman says Russia still has a huge advantage in the Arctic though - about 50 ice-breaking vessels, compared to America's two coast guard ships. And she's worried that melting sea ice, new shipping routes, and a race for new mining and drilling in the Arctic present opportunities for crisis with Russia. Especially since Vladimir Putin is now a pariah. "We have entered an era in the Arctic of cold peace at best, where Russia is less tethered to the Arctic institutions that have provided stability for the last quarter century. While it doesn't mean we are heading into an armed conflict, we are heading into an area where deterrence and defense will play a larger role," said Goodman. At the same time that NATO practiced in Arctic Norway, the US ran a similar exercise with along the Bering Sea, where Russia has stepped up military activity in recent years.