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2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › A2 Arctic

NATO in the Artic deters conflict – only chance to prevent lashout

Taha, Mahmoud. 2022. “Will the Arctic Become a New Battlefield between Russia and NATO? | Al-Estiklal Newspaper.” Al-Estiklal Newspaper. 2022. . /nfs

‌ Little by little, the scope of the confrontation between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is expanding to reach the various spheres of influence and lines of contact between them in the world, even those remote and dormant, as is the case in the Arctic region, which does not seem to be immune from the fires of the Ukraine war. The resource-rich Arctic region is also a point of contact between Russia, a number of NATO members, and two of the alliance's most important friends, Finland and Sweden, which are now openly expressing their desire to join NATO, according to sources quoted by The Times a few days ago. On the other hand, the new Russian threats to resort to a policy of nuclear deterrence have raised the world's fears that Moscow might take a reckless step that seemed likely over the past weeks. At a time when tension is escalating between Russia and NATO against the backdrop of the Ukrainian-Russian war and the request of Sweden and Finland to join the alliance, Moscow is increasingly concerned about the latter's involvement of non-Arctic members in its military activities near Russia's borders. As a result, Russia has warned of the risks of an unintended clash between Russia and NATO in the Arctic and the impact on the European security system. In turn, the Ambassador for Special Missions in the Russian Foreign Ministry, Nikolay Korchunov, who chairs the Committee of Senior Officials of the Arctic Council, expressed in a statement to the Russian TASS Agency on April 17, 2022, Moscow's concern about NATO's involvement of its members from outside the Arctic region in its military activities there. “Another large-scale military exercise has recently taken place in northern Norway, which may lead to an increased risk of unintended accidents that would cause significant damage to the Arctic ecosystem, in addition to the security risks it brings,” he added. The Russian official explained that “if Sweden and Finland join NATO, this will harm security in the Arctic,” noting that “the long-term commitment of Stockholm and Helsinki during the past decades to the policy of non-alignment of military alliances was an important factor in stability and security in the northern European region and on the European continent as a whole.” Last March, Finland, and Sweden, both of which are considering joining the US-led Western military alliance, held joint military exercises with the alliance, as those exercises had been scheduled for a long time, but Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24 made them more important. ‘The Cold Response 2022 exercise’ is considered the largest exercise by NATO in the [Artic] region in the last thirty years. About 30,000 soldiers from 27 countries, including NATO partners Finland and Sweden, participated in it, in addition to about 220 aircraft and more than 50 warships. The stated goal was that NATO wants to make its soldiers more solid in fighting in the bitter cold on land, sea, and air, including in the Arctic. Russia's conflict against its counterparts in the Arctic was not a product of the moment, but rather has become a backyard for global conflicts, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said that NATO cannot allow a security vacuum to occur in the Arctic. “The lack of the alliance's presence in the Arctic fuels Russian ambitions, exposes NATO, and leads to miscalculation and misunderstanding,” he considered. It is noteworthy that the Arctic Council is an intergovernmental organization of the Arctic countries, namely Denmark, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Canada, Norway, the United States, Finland, Sweden, and Russia. In 2021, when the Council celebrated its 25th anniversary, its presidency passed to Russia for two years. Over the past weeks, all countries of the Arctic Council except for Russia issued a written statement refusing to participate in any Council meetings chaired by Russia or on Russian soil due to the Ukraine war.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › Climate Change Mod - Extension

Unilateral action is insufficient to solve pressing international threats

Joseph Bodnar, 20, (Joseph Bodnar, Joseph Bodnar is a graduate student at American University’s School of International Service. His writing has appeared in the Dallas Morning News and several national security publications, including the Atlantic Council’s New Atlanticist blog., 12-8-2020, National Interest, NATO Has a Role to Play in Fighting Climate Change, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/nato-has-role-play-fighting-climate-change-174051, 6-27-2022) SCade

Climate change can’t be deterred or defeated by military action, but militaries can be part of the solution. NATO’s new forward-looking report, NATO 2030: United for a New Era, recognizes the role that the transatlantic alliance can play in slowing ecological breakdown and offers a series of proposals to help address the crisis. The 138 recommendations that fill out this new strategic framework could bury its reaffirmation of climate change as a driver of the global security environment. But it shouldn’t. Against a backdrop of resurgent great power competition and technological disruption, the threat posed by the warming planet stands alone in scope and scale. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg—a former Deputy Environment Manager of Norway and UN Special Envoy on Climate Change—has repeatedly acknowledged that “climate change is one of the biggest challenges of our time.” Global warming has made extreme weather more intense and more frequent; displaced millions; aggrevated tensions around food, water and energy security; and added complexity and contention to geopolitics. For NATO, this means increased demands for humanitarian assistance and disaster response, more of the volatility that extremist ideologies depend upon, and a broader, messier threat landscape. Flooding, droughts, and wildfires have also impacted military readiness around the world. The NATO 2030 report recommends the creation of a Centre for Excellence on Climate and Security, which would monitor and assess the security implications of climate change. This enhanced situational awareness would enable NATO to anticipate, adapt, and act to meet the challenges posed by climate change. Collecting and sharing climate intelligence will be central to predicting future threats to safety and security. The report also highlights the strategic significance of the High North and the Arctic, where melting ice has made waters more accessible, more vulnerable to exploitation, and more contested. With geopolitical tensions filling the space left open by retreating cold and ice, the report stresses the need to develop a strategy of deterrence and defense in these waters to ensure freedom of navigation is upheld and aggressive moves by state actors are checked. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the report emphasizes the need to implement better green technology and smart energy. This is critical. The carbon footprints of NATO militaries are massive. The U.S. military alone releases more greenhouses gas than 140 countries, emitting more than 25,000 kilotons of carbon dioxide a year. The current push for increased military spending and burden-sharing must be coupled with a commitment to reduce dependency on fossil fuels. Purchasing military equipment for security that accelerates climate change is self-sabotage at an existential level. Stoltenberg has also noted that a shift to renewable energy, such as solar and wind, will increase NATO’s self-sufficiency and in turn its operational independence and flexibility. NATO’s success rests on its members’ credible commitments to act collectively against shared threats. Climate change cuts to the core of this mission. Flooding, fire, disease, famine, increased migrant flows, economic disruption, political and social instability, and new arenas of great power competition all stem from the same threat. NATO must adapt and do everything within its mandate to meet this reality.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › Cyber Deterrence Mod

Cyberattacks trigger tit-for-tat exchanges culminating in war---goes nuclear

Klare ’19 [Michael; November 19; Professor Emeritus of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College, Senior Visiting Fellow at the Arms Control Association; Arms Control Today, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation” /ceng

Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of cyberstrikes and counterstrikes against vital national infrastructure rather than on military targets. All major powers, along with Iran and North Korea, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key economic systems, such as power grids, financial systems, and transportation networks. As noted, Russia has infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia. The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack. The danger here is that economic attacks of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against ever more vital elements of an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing widespread chaos and harm and eventually leading one side to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets, risking the slippery slope to nuclear conflict. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.” These are by no means the only pathways to escalation resulting from the offensive use of cyberweapons. Others include efforts by third parties, such as proxy states or terrorist organizations, to provoke a global nuclear crisis by causing early-warning systems to generate false readings (“spoofing”) of missile launches. Yet, they do provide a clear indication of the severity of the threat. As states’ reliance on cyberspace grows and cyberweapons become more powerful, the dangers of unintended or accidental escalation can only grow more severe.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › Cyber Deterrence Mod

NATO cohesion solves cyber attacks

Stewart M. Patrick, 18, (Stewart M. Patrick is James H. Binger senior fellow in global governance and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance (IIGG) Program at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). His areas of expertise include multilateral cooperation on global issues; U.S. policy toward international institutions, including the United Nations; and the challenges posed by fragile and post–conflict states, 08-08-2018, Council on Foreign Relations, < https://www.cfr.org/blog/natos-deterrence-problem-analog-strategy-digital-age SCade

While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded on the idea of collective defense, the nature of security threats has changed since its inception. The Cold War-era alliance is struggling to adapt to evolving technology and the altered nature of warfare. Nowhere is this more true than in the cyber realm. NATO policymakers have acknowledged cyberwarfare as a distinct sphere of conflict, but they have not yet tailored nuclear-era concepts of deterrence and response to this new domain. As cyberattacks increase in destructive potential and remain difficult to attribute, the alliance face the dilemma of whether and how to adapt their policy of strategic ambiguity to a new era of cyberwarfare. At their annual summit last month, the twenty-nine allies cybersecurity plays in NATO, creating a Cyberspace Operations Center to supplement existing cyber defense facilities and reaffirming the need for an offensive capability “to deter, defend against, and to counter the full spectrum of cyber threats.” Missing from the communique, however, were any rules of engagement for the cyber sphere. This raises the question: How would NATO respond if a member state were to invoke following a cyberattack? The NATO alliance has long maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity when it comes to nuclear policy, leaving open the possibility that a conventional attack might be met with a nuclear response. (By contrast, China and India have adopted “no–first use” policy for nuclear weapons.) NATO’s nascent cyber policy exhibits a similar ambiguity, intentionally leaving unclear how the alliance would react to a cyberattack. Rather than responding in kind, NATO might instead conduct conventional attacks, such as missile strikes, allowing for rapid escalation. Early cyberattacks were largely seen as low-stakes events: an inconvenience for the financial sector and dangerous for personal data, but not a threat to national security or justification for a military response. This is no longer necessarily the case. A coordinated Russian cyberattack in Europe and the United States could have devastating consequences, were it to result in major radiation leaks. An , a softer target, could in theory cause hundreds of billions of dollars in damage and put lives at risk as traffic lights stop working, hospitals lose power, and unrest erupts. Given these stakes, NATO has an obvious incentive to strengthen its capacity to deter and punish cyberattacks, including through conventional retaliation. A U.S. published in early 2017 stated that at least for the next decade, offensive cyber capabilities are likely to outpace cyber defense, making deterrence the most viable option. Both the and also recognize that a devastating cyberattack could quickly escalate to violent conflict by triggering a conventional response. Unfortunately, the alliance’s policy of strategic ambiguity falls short. By failing to define the rules of engagement for retaliation, the alliance leaves open the potential for chaos in determining an appropriate response to cyberattacks. In doing so, it invites adversaries to test the waters. Cyber deterrence is inherently more challenging than nuclear or conventional deterrence because such attacks are difficult to definitively attribute to a particular actor. For example, it is easier to mask the source of a cyberattack on a power grid than it would have been for the Warsaw Pact to conceal a massive incursion into West Germany. This attribution problem could complicate NATO’s capacity to conclusively determine the source of a cyberattack and justify and conduct a timely conventional response, particularly if member states diverge in their perceptions. This dilemma could strain the foundations of collective defense and undermine any unified front against cyberattacks. For NATO to commit to military action, all of its members would need certainty, beyond a reasonable doubt, about the identity of the perpetrator. This is particularly true in the case of Russia—a known sponsor of cyberattacks. Without conclusive proof, it might be a challenge to convince a distant country like Portugal or a dangerously close one like Estonia to join in a counterattack. Complicating matters, such post-attack decisions would need to be made quickly, given Russia’s as a precursor to kinetic invasion. The need for speed leaves little room for philosophical debates over what constitutes an act of war. To be sure, NATO’s strategic ambiguity is not without its benefits. Uncertainty about the threshold for a military response could persuade an adversary not to push the envelope with an audacious attack. But that same ambiguity could lead an adversary to miscalculate. Moreover, the doctrine also leaves open the possibility of discord in the ranks of NATO member states regarding how to deal with any such attack. NATO’s policy of strategic ambiguity served it well during the long Cold War nuclear confrontation. But it may be less appropriate to the era of cyberwarfare, particularly given the problem of attribution and the potential for inter-allied disagreement on the appropriate response to any particular incident. NATO policymakers need to resolve this dilemma by formulating a more explicit cyberwarfare doctrine to which all of its member states can adhere. This should include updating their mutual understanding of what constitutes an act of aggression under NATO’s collective defense provisions, making explicit to potential adversaries just what its red lines are, and establishing clear procedures and channels for robust allied response to cyberattacks. Unless NATO clarifies current ambiguities, Russian aggression in the cyber realm could go unchecked.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › Terrorism Mod – Extension

NATO allows bases to be forwardly deployed. Preempts terror.

Burns 4/2/19 [Nicholas Burns, a U.S. ambassador to NATO from 2001-2005, is a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School. Douglas Lute, a U.S. ambassador to NATO from 2013-2017, is a senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center. NATO’s biggest problem is President Trump. April 2, 2019.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/natos-biggest-problem-is-president-trump/2019/04/02/6991bc9c-5570-11e9-9136-f8e636f1f6df_story.html]

NATO is still the world’s strongest military alliance. But its single greatest danger is the absence of strong, principled American presidential leadership for the first time in its history. Starting with NATO’s founding father, President Harry S. Truman, each of our presidents has considered NATO a vital American interest. President Trump has taken a dramatically different path.

As former U.S. ambassadors to NATO, we interviewed alliance leaders past and present for a new Harvard Belfer Center report: “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis.” Nearly all viewed Trump as NATO’s most urgent and difficult problem.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › Terrorism Mod

Extinction.

Marko M. Krstic 17. Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. Published in the Military Techinical Courier--Vol 65, Issue 2--a multidisciplinary scientific journal of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia. TENDENCY OF USING CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES. 2017. scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0042-8469/2017/0042-84691702481K.pdf

The studies of a few cases of earlier CBRN actions have led experts to identify the key characteristics of terrorist groups that could potentially have an interest to use these weapons. It is thought that conservatism is inherent in terrorist organizations, but it must not be forgotten that some terrorists are inclined to innovations in weapons and tactics, as well as to taking risks in actions or in the choice of weapons. Many experts agree that most terrorist organizations want to use proven methods to achieve desired effects. Innovations, especially in the field of CBRN weapons, often indicate terrorists are likely to be led by other factors rather than by pure curiosity and desire to experiment. For some individuals, repression and democratic and strong rule of law are positive determinants of the emergence of CBRN actions which points to a new and more complex global security environment with an increasing risk of terrorists trying to perform a CBRN attack. It is a frightening fact that a single terrorist or isolated terrorist group could improvise a biological weapon or use other ways to spread anthrax, smallpox or other biological agents and thereby cause mass casualties and destroy the health care system of a state. CBRN weapons are secretly shipped to terrorists or hostile governments and represent a significant and growing threat to many countries. Although the threat of CBRN attacks is widely recognized as the central issue of national security, most analysts assume that the primary danger is a threat of the military use of these weapons in conventional wars with tra-ditional military means while the threat of covert attacks, which include terrorism, is rashly and unfairly neglected. Covert attacks are difficult to deter or prevent and CBRN weapons suitable for this type of attack are available to a growing number of enemy states and groups. At the same time, restrictions on their use appear to be diminishing, and so-called new terrorists do not always escalate and become apparent only by using unconventional weapons. These weapons are easily spread or transmitted from person to person, have a high mortality rate and a potential impact on public health, causing mass casualties that can crush health systems and cause public panic and social disruption, thus requiring special efforts to suppress them. When assessing the threat of CBRN weapons, we should take into account the change in capacity to carry out terrorist attacks that are on the rise among countries and non-government elements. Analysts believe that the fear of chemical and biological terrorist attacks is excessive, they point out that, in the past, very few attacks involved these weapons, and even those few attempts that have occurred were mostly thwarted by the authorities. A relative ease with which biological weapons can be obtained, along with other current changes and turbulences in the world, sets the stage for another type of warfare in the 21st century. The potential for CBRN terrorism has widely grown since 11 September, when some of these materials were used. The danger of terrorist use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction represents a very serious threat for many countries; if a terrorist group could gain access to this weapon, it is highly likely it would use it, or threaten to use it. Although there is very little information on terrorists and their ability to come into possession of nuclear weapons or on their intentions to get them, the risk of CBRN weapons has certainly increased since the terrorists started to become more familiar with these agents and their harmful consequences. Discovering the nature of the threat of biological weapons, as well as the appropriate response to them requires an emphasis on the biological characteristics of these instruments of war and terror. Preparing for a terrorist attack may seem daunting and there are a small number of people with practical experience and a good knowledge of CBRN weapons, because until recently there was no need to own them. In the past, most of the planning regarding emergency response to terrorism concentrated on the concerns of open attacks (bombing). However, the threats of CBRN weapons are taken seriously, especially in the USA, where media, fascinated by new weapons of mass destruction, encourage a growing fear for public safety. Terrorists who have significant human and material resources are much more likely to realize their intentions than lone perpetrators or small terrorist groups. A CBRN terrorism threat is certainly a matter of concern; however, terrorists will face many obstacles in the implementation of an attack of this kind. This includes the acquisition of materials and preparation for spreading them as well as a selection and a survey of a chosen objective and a correct dose required to achieve a desired effect. The growing threat of CBRN terrorism Terrorism can be defined as a deliberate act of violence intended to cause damage, but also to create an appropriate political and ideological situation, so that the use of these non-traditional weapons of terror outside the context is obvious, and the goals will not be military, but civilian ones (Bioterrorism, chemical weapons, and radiation terrorism, nd). Toxic substances, regardless of whether they are of animal, vegetable or mineral origin, were used throughout the history for political assassinations and sabotage; despite the risk of severe penalties, the prospects for success favoured the use of toxic substances. Such use has always been reduced, however, since only a small number of people had access to substances and possessed the ability of learn how to use them (Pascal, 1999). CBRN weapons are rightly viewed with a special sense of horror, their effects can be devastating and indiscriminating, and they take the most stringent toll among the most vulnerable population, non-combatants (e.g. a biological attack cannot be detected sufficiently fast after the disease spreads through the population). Moreover, chemical and biological weapons are a particularly attractive alternative for groups that do not have the ability to produce nuclear weapons, and this risk raises complex but important ethical issues (London, 2003). The common name for CBRN terrorism which causes the death of a large number of people, large scale damage and a strong echo worldwide is post-industrial or hyper-terrorism. This means that non-state elements possess and dispose of assets that were previously held only by states, but unlike them, which often fear reprisals after WMD attacks, terrorists, having no geographical location, are ready to use WMD with much less scrupulousness and fear (Kurmnik, Ribnikar, 2003). Some authors have described the factors that make chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorist attacks in many ways unique and demanding, such as an element of surprise, invisible agents, ordnance, the risk of repetition and new types of risks (Ruggiero, Voss, 2015). In the past 30 years, the use of CBRN weapons has become a major concern for many nations around the world. The public has become insensitive to traditional terrorist attacks that seem to be a less efficient way for terrorist organizations to achieve their goals. What causes shock and fear is actually presenting the properties of weapons which can be used by terrorist organizations to enhance their efforts and the effectiveness of attacks. CBRN terrorism is often a synonym for weapons of mass destruction, although this form of terrorism and related incidents do not require attacks and inflicting harm to large numbers of people - they do not even require deadly attacks at all. The number of studies on this type of terrorism is limited due to the lack of available data on this terrorism type. There is a very small number of databases of CBRN incidents, and even the existing ones have relatively little to do with them and they are compared to conventional terrorism (Jesse, 2012). Some experts emphasize the factors that promote such attacks and these factors include the availability of information and expertise, increased frustration of terrorists, demonization of the target population, as well as a millennial, apocalyptic or messianic vision. Experts also differ in opinion when it comes to possible perpetrators of CBRN incidents, and include religious fundamentalists and cults1 as possible perpetrators of such attacks, especially when these groups address to ethereal audience, emphasizing the hatred of unbelievers (Ivanova, Sandler, 2007). Concerns about super terrorism which involves the use of CBRN weapons are mainly focused on what terrorists can do in the context of our social reality, with an emphasis on terrorist motivations, initiatives and limitations. When considering which terrorist groups may be inclined to commit CBRN terrorism, it is important to recognize the spectrum of these acts, as well as to analyze the following categorization: (a) massive casualty events produced by conventional weapons; (b) CBRN scams; (c) conventional attack on a nuclear facility; (d) limited-scale chemical or biological attack or a radiological dispersion; (e) large scale chemical or biological attack or a radiological dispersion; and (f) CBRN strikes (super terrorism) that can lead to thousands of victims. In addition to the motivation and willingness to inflict mass casualties in any way, terrorists must have technical and financial capabilities to come into possession of material and acquire skills for these types of weapons and materials and carry out a successful attack. Chemical and biological weapons can pose a risk to terrorists thus deterring them from using such weapons (Post, 2005, pp.148-151). The possibility that terrorists use chemical or biological substances may increase over the next decade, according to US intelligence agencies. According to CIA2 , an interest among non-state actors, including terrorists, for biological and chemical materials is real and growing, and the number of potential perpetrators is increasing. The agency also noted that many of these groups had developed an international network and did not need to rely on state sponsors for financial and technical support. However, it is believed that it is less likely that terrorists would choose chemical and biological weapons over conventional explosives, because these weapons are difficult to control and their results are unpredictable (Condesman, Burke, 2001). The risk of CBRN weapons is growing since terrorists are better acquainted with these agents and their potential for causing harm3 . These agents possess desirable characteristics as weapons of terror; they are biologically invisible to the naked eye, odorless and potentially lethal in the form of particles; natural organisms are so readily available, and can be "camouflaged" in natural disasters and used to spread fear and various diseases. Chemical agents quickly attack the critical physiological centers of the body, disabling or killing the victim. Biological and chemical weapons require the application of huge amounts of resources and result in different effects, causing fear and panic in the contaminated areas. Often referred to as "weapons of mass destruction", but, in medical terms, they are weapons of potential mass casualties because they can lead to massive death toll in the absence of preventive measures and timely response (Meyer, Spinella, 2014, pp.645-656). "Bioterrorism is the intentional use of microorganisms or toxins derived from living organisms used for hostile purposes intended to cause disease or death in man, animals and plants, on which they depend". The threat of bioterrorist attacks is real, and each individual is a potential terrorist, when terrorists are "invisible" prior to an attack which also can be "invisible" in the form of causing infectious disea-ses or epidemics. Citizens who are not aware they are infected are potential safety hazard and so-called dangerous bodies (Mijalković, 2011). In the last ten years, the issue of CBRN weapons has attracted the attention of experts, but a list of priorities by the heads of states has never been established. Biological weapons almost became forgotten after they had been banned by the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons. A significant attention was paid to them during the 90s of the last century. The important thing is that biological weapons attract much less attention than other similar weapons, but probably represent the greatest danger, and in addition to their use in war, they are available as instruments of terror in peace. Some countries showed willingness to use such weapons against defenseless populations to achieve strategic objectives, and in this regard, some analysts believe that those who attacked the World Trade Center in 1993 applied cyanide on their bombs (this was not confirmed, but a large amount of cyanide was found in possession of the perpetrators). Such a group will prove to be less inefficient, because if terrorists decide to shock and surprise the government by inflicting enormous damage, CBRN weapons will become more attractive and more accessible (Bettis, 1998). Motives and forms of behavior of individuals and groups who acquired or used CBRN weapons have existed since long ago and there is no doubt that modern society is vulnerable to such attacks (Tucker, 2000). Fear of biological terrorism is certainly greater than the fear of the conventional forms of terrorism; some of these fears are justified and some are often exaggerated. Some agents are really very contagious and deadly, and if used properly, have a potential to result in casualties similar to those in a nuclear attack. Perhaps the scariest aspect of biological weapons is that the body is attacked without warning, people are afraid of the threat as it is invisible, and cannot be heard or felt. The history of warfare, terrorism and crime involving biological agents in the last century is considerably less dangerous and more deadly than the history of conventional warfare (Parachini, 2001). Today, some states and some terrorist groups can more easily overcome technological barriers due to the increased flow of information and access to previously unavailable technologies. Along with nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are part of an unholy trinity of weapons of mass destruction (Davis, Johnson-Winegar, 2000, pp.15-28). The society is now faced with the threat of an apocalyptic and asymmetric war scenario in which kamikaze attackers are able to arm themselves with WMD4 without even having to have a "physical" weapon to create fear; they probably still prefer simple, proven methods: a stampede in an enclosed place, or just an explosive device, which will kill many people5 (Palmer, 2004, pp.3-9). Early detection and response to biological or chemical terrorism are crucial to solving this problem (U.S. Congress House, 2003, p.117).

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › Terrorism Mod

NATO prevents terrorism

Hajnalka Vincze 17. European foreign and security policy analyst, formerly in charge of European Union and transatlantic issues at the Hungarian Ministry of Defense’s Research Institute. “NATO: Assessing the Alliance’s Counter-Terrorism Efforts”.

At the heart of the second pillar, the development of capabilities, is NATO’s “defense against terrorism program of work” (NATO, April 9, 2015). Its aim is to develop innovative technologies to help prevent attacks and better protect troops and civilian infrastructure. Under three umbrellas — incident management, force protection and survivability, and network engagement — the program covers a wide variety of areas such as: protecting against man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs) or CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) attacks; countering improvised explosive devices (IED); biometric identification; protection of ports and harbors; and experimenting with non-lethal weapons. The program is run on the basis of common funding by all allies, and projects are led by individual NATO countries, with support and contributions from other member states. The third pillar of NATO’s counter-terrorism activities is intended to contribute to regional stability through capacity building in partner countries. As Secretary General Stoltenberg put it at the latest foreign ministerial meeting, “in the long run, it is much better to fight terrorism and project stability by training local forces, building local security institutions, instead of NATO deploying large numbers of our own combat troops in combat operations.” [2] It was in this spirit that in February 2017 the Alliance launched an in-country training program teaching Iraqi security forces to counter IEDs, while also continuing to train hundreds of Iraqi officers in Jordan (al-Arabiya, January 24). Furthermore, in 2016 mobile counter-terrorism training courses were provided to Egypt, and training in counter-insurgency was provided to Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. According to Secretary General Stoltenberg, “the possible use of NATO’s mobile training teams and special operation forces headquarters is one of the different options [NATO is] looking into [when it comes to deciding] what more we can do in general to fight terrorism” (NATO, March 31). Beyond the three main areas identified by the 2012 Policy Guidelines, NATO’s involvement in the fight against terrorism sometimes occurs in a more directly operational context. In fact, following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the Alliance invoked Article 5 — NATO’s collective defense clause — for the first time in its history.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › Europe Mod – Extension

NATO vital to European stability

Hal Brands | Bloomberg June 29, 2022 at 7:32 a.m. EDT The Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies The West Must Move East for NATO to Survive https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/the-west-must-move-east-for-nato-to-survive/2022/06/29/35087340-f779-11ec-81db-ac07a394a86b_story.html

The leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries are in Madrid for the alliance’s most consequential summit in a generation. NATO appears to have overcome Turkish diplomatic blackmail to bring in two new members, Sweden and Finland. It must approve a new concept for transatlantic security amid Russia’s ongoing assault on Ukraine.

Not least, the alliance — and the US — will confront an inconvenient reality: Even if the Ukraine war takes a heavy toll on Russia, NATO will need a stronger presence in Eastern Europe than it possessed before the conflict.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › Europe Mod – Extension

Even if European militarization succeeds, it ruins the U.S.-led liberal order---goes nuclear.

Berlinski 7-15-2018 – PhD in IR @ Oxford (Claire, “Europe’s Dependence on the U.S. Was All Part of the Plan: Postwar U.S. statesmen designed our world order as it is for a reason. They had lived through what happened without it.,” Politico, )

Trump’s NATO-bashing surprised no one. He has repeatedly suggested the United States’ postwar security architecture is a “bad deal,” one negotiated by weak and foolish “incompetents.” Foreign policy, in his view, is a zero-sum game; any benefit to another nation must of necessity be a loss for the United States. “NATO countries,” he declared on Twitter, “must pay MORE, the United States must pay LESS. Very Unfair!” Unfair? A world that revolves around American military, economic and cultural power, and uses the U.S. dollar as its reserve currency? What Trump fails to understand is that the disparity in spending, with the U.S. paying more than its allies, is not a bug of the system. It is a feature. This is how the great postwar statesmen designed it, and this immensely foresighted strategy has ensured the absence of great power conflict—and nuclear war—for three-quarters of a century. The open, liberal world order we know today was built in the wake of World War II and expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By design, it is led by the United States; by design, it ensures permanent U.S. military hegemony over Eurasia while uniting Europe under the U.S.’ protection. The goal of this American grand strategy is to prevent any single power from dominating the region and turning on the United States and its allies. American hegemony serves, too, to quell previously intractable regional rivalries, preventing further world wars. Dean Acheson, George Marshall and the other great statesmen of their generation pursued this strategy because they had learned, at unimaginable cost, that the eternal American fantasy of forever being free of Europe—isolationism, or America Firstism, in other words—was just that: a fantasy. Four hundred thousand American men lost their lives in the European theaters of the First and Second World Wars. (American fatalities in all of the other 20th-century conflicts—including Vietnam, Korea and the Persian Gulf—do not total one-quarter of that number.) Our postwar statesmen were neither weak nor incompetent. They were the architects of the greatest foreign policy triumph in U.S. history. So successful was this policy that Americans now—most of whom weren’t alive to witness the enormity of these wars—see peace, unity, prosperity and stability as Europe’s natural state. This is an illusion. For centuries, Europe was the fulcrum of global violence. With the age of global exploration, it became the globe’s primary exporter of violence, the tempo and horror of the carnage rising every century with improvements in technology for violence. The Scramble for Africa, the division and colonization of that continent by Europe, is a case in point. The 1884-85 Berlin West Africa Conference, which assembled the representatives of 13 European powers to settle their colonial claims to Africa by diplomacy in place of arms, did lead to peace in Europe for several years. Africans, however, would not recall these years for their exceptional comity. For example, the conference indulged King Léopold II’s claim that the Congo Free State was his private property. Ten million Congolese souls perished under his ministrations. In recognizing this history of blood, however, we must recognize something equally true: In the wake of World War II, liberal democracy saw its fullest realization in the West. This flourishing of peace and human rights cannot be explained by a sudden outbreak of European pacifism. (Consider the 1956 Suez expedition, crushed by an infuriated President Dwight Eisenhower; or the 1954-62 Franco-Algerian War.) It happened because during World War II, Europe destroyed itself, leaving the United States overwhelmingly powerful by comparison, its only rival the Soviet Union. Through the application of economic, diplomatic and military force majeure, the United States suppressed Europe’s internal security competition. This is why postwar Europe ceased to be the world’s leading exporter of violence and became, instead, the world’s leading exporter of luxury sedans. Only America, and massive power as the U.S. exercised it, could have pacified and unified Europe under its aegis. No other continental country possessed half the world’s GDP. No other country had enough distance from Europe to be trusted, to a large extent, by all parties and indifferent to its regional jealousies. No other country had a strategic, moral and economic vision for Europe that its inhabitants could be persuaded gladly to share. Indeed, Europeans cooperated with the U.S. program because it created conditions under which both the United States and Europe flourished. The United States assisted Europe’s postwar economic recovery with $13 billion of aid in the form of the Marshall Plan. (In today’s dollars, roughly $113 billion.) It midwifed the groupings and treaties that would become the European Union. It brought Europe under the U.S. security umbrella with the NATO treaty. Article V of the treaty, its most important element, declares that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all members. These policies were intended not only to counter the Soviet Union, but to condition Europe’s prosperity upon its integration into a single market, with free movement of goods, capital and labor. The founders of these institutions fully intended them to be the foundations of a United States of Europe, much like the United States of America. Profound economic interdependence, they believed, would make further European wars impossible. At the same time, the United States built an open, global order upon an architecture of specific institutions: the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the International Court of Justice. This order is in many respects an empire—a Pax Americana—but it is more humane than any empire that preceded it, with institutions that are intended to benefit all parties. Postwar U.S. statesmen believed that prosperous, liberal democracies that traded freely with each other would neither go to war with each other nor the United States. They ascribed, in other words, to the so-called Democratic Peace theory—a theory with overwhelming empirical support. The U.S. military was always an integral part of the plan to unite and rebuild Europe from the rubble. Since World War II, U.S. troops have been deployed in Eurasia to ensure the continent cannot be dominated by a single power capable of monopolizing its resources and turning them against the U.S. The United States has built overwhelmingly massive military assets there to deter local arms races before they begin, and it has simultaneously assured those under U.S. protection that there is no need to begin local arms races, for their safety is guaranteed. American grand strategy rests upon the credibility of its promise to protect American allies; this credibility rests, in turn, upon U.S. willingness to display its commitment. (The Berlin Airlift, when U.S. troops airlifted supplies to Berlin during a Soviet blockade, was precisely such a display.) In return for the United States’ commitment, U.S. allies have accepted America’s dominant role in the international system. In the postwar era, just as now, the enemies of liberal democracy sought to undermine the order the U.S. was building. Precisely because the Marshall Plan would strengthen and unite the West under the United States’ protection, the Soviet Union’s propaganda organs cranked into overdrive to denounce it. A cartoon, for example, published in Isvestia in 1949, depicted the Marshall Plan’s administrator, Paul Hoffman, as a fat capitalist bent on destroying the sovereignty of European nations. The French paper L'Humanité, which reliably parroted Moscow’s line, wrote, “After disorganizing the national economies of the countries which are under the American yoke, American leaders now intend conclusively to subjugate the economy of these countries to their own interests.” The Soviet Union’s criticism of the Marshall Plan and other American involvement in Europe was eerily similar to the language Russia’s now uses in its campaign to undermine NATO and the EU. The vocabulary and tropes of Russian propaganda are widely echoed, wittingly or unwittingly, by far-right, far-left and other antiliberal politicians, parties and movements throughout the West. With the men who built the postwar world order now in their graves, and the memory of carnage and horror buried with them, a very sizable constituency of Americans has forgotten that their country built this system for a reason—that the United States does not maintain its alliances as an act of foolish largesse. The loudest exponent of the idea that the U.S. is getting rolled, that the European Union was “created to destroy us,” and that multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization assault the “sovereignty” of the nations concerned is, unfortunately, the president of the United States. It’s hard to understate how foolish and reckless these notions are. History can be shoved down the memory hole, for a time, but reality is never so cooperative. Global free trade sustains modern economic life. An interruption to this trade—carried out chiefly on global shipping lanes safeguarded by the U.S. military—would bring modern life to an end. The Second World War proved not only that isolationism and American-Firstism were fantasies, but exceptionally childish and dangerous ones, at that. In the age of hyperglobalized trade, international air travel, the internet, nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, these fantasies are even more childish and dangerous. The U.S. may be on another continent, but it is not on another planet. It is true that the U.S. spends more on its military, in absolute dollars and as a percentage of GDP, than any European country. That was always part of the deal. The U.S. is a global superpower. It can fight a war anywhere in the world, invade any country at will, and (at least in theory) fight multiple simultaneous major wars—even in space. Of course this costs more. It is in America’s advantage to be the only power on the planet that can do this. Conversely, it is not remotely in America’s advantage for other countries to spend as much money on their militaries as we do. Europe is America’s biggest export market, as designed. We want Europeans to spend their money enjoying U.S. goods and services, not razing Flanders to the ground yet again. Yet Trump’s refusal to deter our shared enemies and protect our allies risks provoking a regional European arms race—exactly what the U.S. has sought to avoid for 74 years. It is an invitation to adventurism from Putin. Trump’s refusal to adopt the encouraging language of past presidents toward European integration, language that until now has been transformed into policy by professional and experienced State Department employees, puts further strain on an already-weakened Europe. Above all, Trump’s overt support for sordid, Kremlin-backed actors who seek to undermine Europe’s unity is unfathomable: How could it be in Europe’s interest, or in ours, for the American president to lend the United States’ prestige and support to Europe’s Nazis, neo-Nazis, doctrinal Marxists, populists, authoritarians, and ethnic supremacists, particularly since all of them are ideologically hostile to the United States? The damage Trump has deliberately inflicted on Europe’s stability comes at a uniquely dangerous time. Democracy’s so-called third wave—the global blossoming of open political systems after the Cold War—has long since receded. A threat to liberal democracy, in the form of a distinct, rival ideology—illiberal democracy—is ascendant. We see it today in Russia and Turkey—a corrupt, oligarchic, kleptocratic and hollow form of democracy that spreads and consolidates itself through the new technologies of the 21st century. The global order the U.S. built was based on the principle that only a world of liberal democracies can be peaceful and prosperous. That principle is correct. Should the unraveling of the order the U.S. built proceed at this pace, the world will soon be neither peaceful nor prosperous. Nor will the effects be confined to regions distant from the United States. America will feel them gradually, and then, probably, overnight—in the form of a devastating, sudden shock. Charles de Gaulle believed the Anglophone world could not, in the long term, be trusted with French security. It led him to withdraw France from NATO’s military integrated command and launch an independent nuclear development program. The independent nuclear program was real, but the withdrawal from NATO wasn’t—a secret agreement kept France in NATO anyway. But, today, with other NATO members obliged to consider the costs and benefits of an independent accommodation with Russia and the risks and rewards of acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent, de Gaulle is saying from the grave, I told you so. The American-led world order, undergirded by the ideal of liberal democracy, has been highly imperfect. But it has been the closest thing to Utopia our fallen and benighted species has ever seen. Its benefits are not just economic, although those benefits are immense. Its benefits must be measured in wars not fought, lives not squandered. Yet many Americans have turned their backs on history and reality alike. Let us hope pride does not prevent them from realizing this mistake before it’s far too late

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › Europe Mod – Extension

NATO collapse causes European countries to turn inward and re-invest into domestic arms

Trofimov 19 - Columnist and Senior Correspondent, The Wall Street Journal [Yaroslav, Jan 4th, Wall Street Journal, “Is Europe Ready to Defend Itself?”, ]

The new Republican administration in Washington issued a blunt warning: Unless Europe quickly set up its own unified army, the U.S. would be compelled to undertake an “agonizing reappraisal” of its commitment to defend its European allies.

The year was 1953, and the main target of American ire was France, whose delay in ratifying the European Defense Community treaty, signed the previous year, meant that preparations for a federal European army had to be paused. But the pressure applied by the Eisenhower administration backfired spectacularly: A joyous choir of French lawmakers broke into the “Marseillaise” when France’s parliament finally rejected the treaty in August 1954. The idea of a joint European defense policy was shelved for decades.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › Europe Mod

Europe war escalates

Charles Glaser, Assistant Professor in the Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the U of Chicago, Summer 1993 International Security

However, although the lack of an imminent Soviet threat eliminates the most obvious danger, U.S. security has not been entirely separated from the future of Western Europe. The ending of the Cold War has brought many benefits, but has not eliminated the possibility of a major power war, especially since such a war could grow out of a smaller conflict in the East. And, although nuclear weapons have greatly reduced the threat that a European hegemon would pose to U.S. security, a sound case nevertheless remains that a major European war could threaten U.S. security. The United States could be drawn into such a war, even if strict security considerations suggest it should stay out. A major power war could escalate to a nuclear war that, especially if the United States joins, could include attacks against the American homeland. Thus, the United States should not be unconcerned about Europe’s future.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › Europe Mod

NATO prevents intra-European wars

Katz 15 [Mark N. Katz, Professor of Govt & Politics at GMU, “Why Russia Shouldn't Fear NATO,” The National Interest, 2015, ]

The corollary of Moscow belief that the expansion of NATO is a threat to Russia is that the retraction, incapacitation, or dissolution of NATO would make Russia safer. Indeed, Putin’s support for anti-NATO and anti–EU political parties throughout Europe indicates that he does indeed aim at undermining these two institutions. Nor does Putin necessarily need to bring about their dissolution in order to undermine them. Since NATO and the EU both tend to operate on the basis of consensus, the fact that the current political leaders of Hungary and Greece are hostile to the existing European order and are quite friendly with Moscow may go a long way toward furthering Putin’s goal of rendering NATO inoperable. And if any more such leaders are elected to power, NATO might indeed become unable to respond effectively to actions taken by Putin to “protect” Russian speakers elsewhere in Ukraine or even in the Baltic states. This clearly would not benefit the West. But it would not benefit Russia either. For the decline of NATO is less likely to lead to the unopposed rise of Russian influence than to the re-emergence of conflicts that common membership in NATO has suppressed or (in the case of Greece and Turkey) kept under control. Putin has had relatively cooperative relations with the often anti-Western Erdogan government in Turkey. He also has good relations with Greece’s new leftist leadership that is at odds with the EU. But if (whether as a result of Putin’s actions or not) NATO becomes inoperable, the Greek-Turkish animosity that NATO helped keep from escalating after Turkey’s 1974 intervention in Cyprus might soon re-emerge. And if it does, it is highly doubtful that Russia will be able to calm it down. Moscow may then be faced with the choice of alienating one party because it sides with the other, or alienating both because it sides with neither or (as Putin has attempted elsewhere) tries to side with both simultaneously. Despite Turkey’s troubled relations with the West recently, Turkey may regard Russian support for Greece against it as an existential threat and thus go all out to support Chechen and other Muslim opponents of Moscow’s rule in the North Caucasus and other Muslim regions of Russia. The decline of NATO might also embolden an increasingly nationalist and pro-Russian Hungary to revive its claim to “lost territories.” Moscow might not mind if Budapest does this with pro-Western Ukraine or Romania (with which Russia also has difficult relations), but would not be pleased if Hungary sought the return of territory that is now part of pro-Russian Serbia or Slovakia (where Moscow has also sought to cultivate illiberal tendencies). Another problem for Moscow is that for every anti-Western government elected to office anywhere in Europe, one or more of its neighbors are likely to feel threatened by it and so turn to America for support. Further, while German public opinion may care little about what Russia is doing in faraway Crimea or Eastern Ukraine, Berlin is likely to take more active measures to thwart Moscow’s efforts to expand Russian influence in countries closer to it. Finally, the more that Western states see Russian actions as directly harming their security, the more incentive they will have to respond by arming Ukraine or others actively resisting Russia. In other words, the decline of the pax Americana in Europe resulting from a weakened NATO is less likely to be replaced by a pax Russica there, but by a chaotic situation in Europe that Russia will be unable to control or prevent from negatively impacting not just Russia’s external ambitions, but its internal security as well. Ironically, Russia could avoid all this if NATO remained strong and intact. Far from threatening Russia, a strong NATO has a much greater incentive to act with self-restraint toward Russia than individual countries (both members and non-members) being undermined by Russian actions. Indeed, offering NATO membership to what remains of Ukraine may be the surest means of inducing Kiev and the West as a whole to acquiesce to (though not formally accept) the loss of Crimea and eastern Ukraine to Russia. In other words, Moscow is better off with a strong NATO that keeps America in, Europe peaceful, and Russia by itself (if that’s what it wants) than a weak NATO (or no NATO at all) that keeps America, Europe, and Russia all embroiled in needless conflict and tension

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › China Mod – Extension

NATO is taking steps toward combating Chinese aggression

AL JAZEERA (al jazeera is an international news agency). “NATO declares China a security challenge for the first time” 30 June 2022

“One of the things that [China’s] doing is seeking to undermine the rules-based international order that we adhere to, that we believe in, that we helped build,” said US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. “And if China’s challenging it in one way or another, we will stand up to that.” Western leaders are concerned that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, which China is yet to condemn, could embolden Beijing to be more assertive over Taiwan. China considers Taiwan a part of its territory with no right to independent recognition as a state or representation on the world stage. Speaking at an event in Madrid that was not part of the NATO summit, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said that unless China is checked “there is a real risk that they draw the wrong idea which results in a catastrophic miscalculation such as invading Taiwan,” referring to the self-governing island that China claims as a province. Marcin Jerzewski, head of the Taiwan office of the European Values Center for Security Policy, told Al Jazeera that NATO members may also be concerned about Chinese-Russian military cooperation on Russia’s oft-forgotten Pacific coast. Before the war in Ukraine, Putin began pursuing his own “pivot to the east” by ramping up economic development and his military presence on the Pacific Coast. “This is an important step for NATO and in a way a sign that NATO is waking up to a new geopolitical reality, which is largely defined by the growing confluence of Russian and Chinese strategic interests,” Jerzewski said. “Russia has been viewed mainly as a source of threats in the European theatre, but that view ignores Russia’s physical presence on the shores of the Pacific.” Highlighting NATO’s new focus on China, the gathering of world leaders in Madrid, both inside the bloc’s summit and on its sidelines, included many from Asian nations. It was the first time that the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand were invited to a NATO summit. They participated in a NATO session on new global challenges after holding a side meeting outside of the summit.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › China Mod – Extension

War over the South China Seas goes nuclear:

Polina Tikhonova, 11/28/2015 (Master's Degree in English Philology from the University of Oxford, “US Faces Nuclear War Threat Over South China Sea – Chinese Professor,” http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/11/us-nuclear-war-south-china-sea/, Acccessed 2/7/2017, rwg)

U.S. could provoke nuclear war with China And while the U.S. does not have its core interests in the South China Sea, the disputed islands present China’s strategic interests, which is why this kind of asymmetry in stakes would certainly give Beijing an advantage in “the balance of resolve” over Washington, according to the professor. And if the South China Sea situation escalates and starts spiraling into a nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and China, Washington will face a choice of either backing down first or fighting a nuclear-armed power and the world’s largest military force with a strength of approximately 2.285 million personnel. “Neither option is attractive and both exact high costs, either in reputation or human lives, for the U.S.,” Baohui wrote. So it would be unwise for the U.S. to further provoke China in the disputed area, since China’s willingness to defend its interests, reputation and deterrence credibility could easily escalate the conflict into a military confrontation that would ultimately harm U.S. interests, according to the professor.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › China Mod – Extension

Weakening NATO means Asian allies bandwagon to China – takes SCS/Taiwan

Hans Binnendijk, 3-19-2019, distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as senior director for defense policy on the Clinton administration’s National Security Council. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/19/5-consequences-of-a-life-without-nato/, "5 consequences of a life without NATO," Defense News, Acc:7-1-2020 (ermo/sms)

The fourth consequences of life without NATO would be global. American bilateral alliances in Asia would each be shaken to their core should NATO fail. America’s defense commitments there would become worthless. With China determined to claim a dominant position in Asia, the collapse of NATO would cause America’s Asian partners to seek accommodation with China, much as the Philippines is in the process of doing.

Trump’s decision to abandon the economic Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement has already given China new advantages in the region. Without credible American security commitments, there would be little to stop China from controlling the South China Sea and probably occupying Taiwan as well. Add to this equation the new footholds that China is building in central Asia, Africa and Europe: Abandoning NATO would help assure China’s competitive success.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › China Mod

SCS war escalates to extinction.

Klare 17 – Michael Klare, Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College, “Escalation Watch: Four Global Hotspots for Trump”, Asia Times, 1-20, http://www.atimes.com/article/escalation-watch-four-global-hotspots-trump/

Within months of taking office, President Donald Trump is likely to face one or more major international crises, possibly entailing a risk of nuclear escalation. Not since the end of the Cold War has a new chief executive been confronted with as many potential flashpoints involving such a potential for explosive conflict.

This proliferation of crises has been brewing for some time, but the situation appears especially ominous now given Trump’s pledge to bring American military force swiftly to bear on any threats of foreign transgression. With so much at risk, it’s none too soon to go on a permanent escalation watch, monitoring the major global hotspots for any sign of imminent flare-ups, hoping that early warnings (and the outcry that goes with them) might help avert catastrophe.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › China Mod

NATO key to countering China in SCS and ECS

Brzezinski 6/1 - Ian Brzezinski is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council focusing on the Transatlantic Security Initiative and the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is the Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy, 2020 (“NATO’s role in a transatlantic strategy on China”, available online at , The Atlantic Council)

On the eve of the NATO Summit in London last December, the Alliance’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg addressed the need for a collective response to China’s emergence as a global power. “This is not about moving NATO into the South China Sea,” he stated, “but it’s about taking into account that China is coming closer to us—in the Arctic, in Africa, investing heavily in our infrastructure in Europe, in cyberspace.” At the summit, NATO heads of state diplomatically declared that China has become a concern: “we recognize that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.”

Indeed, it is hard, if not impossible, for NATO to avoid China. Beijing presents a full spectrum challenge to the transatlantic community—a challenge whose potential mirrors, if not surpasses, that once posed by the former Soviet Union. China’s $14 trillion economy is expected to soon surpass that of the United States, and Beijing exercises that might in a predatory fashion around the globe, including in the United States and Europe. China threatens to boycott companies and countries that criticize its policies, leverages its debt instruments against poor nations, and is buying up critical infrastructure around the world. Its acquisition of European ports has raised concerns of top NATO commanders who warn that such ownership could adversely affect the Alliance’s ability to use those facilities in times of crisis.

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › Laundry List

NATO cohesion solves a litany of impacts while ensuring increased EU capabilities

Ben Hodges, 18, (Ben Hodges, 12-7-2018, GMFUS, Why the United States Needs a Cohesive NATO, https://www.gmfus.org/news/why-united-states-needs-cohesive-nato, 6-26-2022) SCade

If a conflict with China arises, the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond. The United States remains committed to Europe’s security and stability. But it also expects its European allies to pick up their share of the burden for collective security so as to help maintain order in the continent and around the globe. It is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges. Several things remain to be achieved if Europe and the United States in this regard. First, they must build a common approach not only in defense, but across economic, information, and political domains. Second, they must solve the continued inequity in burden sharing that hinders a stronger relationship between them and erodes the confidence of many Americans in the efficacy of NATO. Third, it is necessary to achieve greater coherence on NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in the Black Sea region. Fourth, NATO must continue its efforts to improve its deterrence capability against Russia’s aggressive behavior. The interests and responsibilities of the United States are global, with freedom of navigation on the seas and preservation of the global commons being prime examples. Its allies and partners benefit from these freedoms as well, but these have now come under threat, most notably in the South China Sea and with China’s growing control over much of the infrastructure of the world, particularly in Europe and Africa. The threat from China is real and growing, and if it materializes the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond, while the majority of its forces and capabilities, particularly air and naval ones, are operating in the Pacific theater. The stability, security, and economic prosperity of the United States are directly linked to that of Europe. The bulk of its global economic relationships are in North America and the European Union, and the majority of its most reliable allies and partners are in Europe. To give but one example, the shared intelligence obtained from Europe is essential to the implementation of the recently published U.S. National Defense Strategy. In this context, it is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges. The U.S. Priority: China A war between China and the United States is not inevitable, but the next 15 years could see the eruption of such a conflict. While this may not reach the threshold of full-scale war or a nuclear conflict, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have set their country on a trajectory that will lead to a strategic situation that may result in sustained armed conflict, potentially stretching across the Pacific region, in all domains. Furthermore, the combination of China’s huge population, export-oriented economy, and lack of natural resources could generate an inexorable push towards conflict. The CCP leadership has emphasized the development of military capabilities that could deny the U.S. Navy access to the South China Sea, including long-range air and missile defense and anti-ship capabilities. This anti-access area denial (A2AD) capability does not depend on a large Chinese navy but instead uses well-protected, land-based systems. The creation of artificial islands in the region, most of which are already being armed and garrisoned with A2AD capabilities, are violations of international law and agreements that clearly demonstrate the CCP’s strategy and intentions. Enforcement of freedom of the seas and recognized international waters by the United States and others is necessary to counter these policies. In one recent demonstration of CCP intent, there was a near-collision incident between Chinese and U.S. Navy ships, caused by unsafe and unprofessional behavior by the Chinese one. Statements by the China’s minister of defense during his recent visit to the Pentagon, including demands that the U.S. forces stay away from the articifial islands, indicate that his country will continue to push aggressively its territorial claims. Meanwhile, in Europe China has become an increasingly significant and potentially divisive influence in a variety of aspects; especially in infrastructure, technology transfer, and trade. The Belt and Road Initiative has resulted in dramatic increases in Chinese investment in Europe, control of hundreds of European companies, and ownership or control of more than 10 percent of Europe’s ports. These developments, and the CCP’s strategy and behavior, are cause for concern about the potential for conflict with China within the next 15 years. They also show why the United States must prepare for this eventuality. During the Cold War, the United States used a “two and a half wars” framework for force structure. This was not a strategy, but rather a mechanism meant to assess how much capability and capacity its armed forces needed to deter effectively and, if necessary, win simultaneous conflicts in two different operational theaters and “hold” in a third, minor theater at the same time, for as long as necessary. Today, and for the foreseeable future, the United States can no longer exercise this capability and capacity. Therefore, in the event of conflict with China, it will need a strong, cohesive NATO as well as partnerships around the world in order to continue deterring a revanchist Russia and to carry on counter-terrorism operations in the Middle East while the majority of U.S. forces and capabilities are operating in the Pacific. The U.S. Commitment to Europe Many European leaders have expressed uncertainty about the United States’ commitment to Europe, based on President Barack Obama’s “pivot to the Pacific” and, more recently, President Donald Trump’s questioning of the relevance and value of NATO and the EU. The facts on the ground, however, demonstrate that the United States, including the current administration, is fully committed to its long-time allies and partners in Europe. Everything promised by the Obama administration at the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw is being delivered by the Trump administration: a rotational armored brigade combat team, pre-positioned equipment for an army armored division, and the Enhanced Forward Presence battle group in Poland. The administration just announced an additional 1,500 soldiers in an artillery brigade and short-range air defense battalion that will be assigned to Europe. The operational contingency fund, known as the European Reassurance Initiative, which started during the Obama administration, has increased steadily over the last three years and is now known as the European Deterrence Initiative, reflecting U.S. backing for Europe and deterrence of Russia. Also telling was the Senate vote just prior to this year’s NATO’s summit in Brussels, which affirmed by a 98:2 margin U.S. support for Article 5. The United States’ commitment to European partners like Ukraine and Georgia also remains very strong, as evidenced by provision of the Javelin anti-tank weapon system, other equipment, and training, as well as continued support for these countries’ eventual membership in NATO and the return of their territories from Russia. U.S. Perspectives on European Military Capabilities and Strategic Autonomy Europe is responding to these U.S. initiatives with increased investments, adaptation of NATO’s command structures, increased training and readiness, and renewed efforts within European frameworks to improve security and defense capabilities. The United States will continue to welcome any increases in the capability of its European allies and partners to contribute to collective security and defense, and to take on more responsibility for the burdens of global security and stability. The creation of the Permanent Structure for Cooperation framework is particularly encouraging in that it is legally binding and is already showing promise, with key projects such as the one on military mobility. Efforts to create a larger EU military structure, however, might be met with less enthusiasm. Parallel to NATO, such a structure would create redundant and unnecessary capabilities, and draw away the officers needed to fill existing European commitments to the alliance. Some European leaders have called for European security autonomy. However, the notion of autonomy is confusing and poorly understood, even in Europe, let alone in the United States Even the latter does not have unlimited autonomy: it seeks allies and builds coalitions for everything it does. Furthermore, the United States does not have the capacity nor the desire to carry out missions alone, as, for example, in Afghanistan, Libya, or Syria. However, if a more independent European security policy was to move forward in a spirit of transparency while consciously avoiding redundancy, the United States would likely be supportive. Having European troops on counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, and peacekeeping missions in Africa is a welcome form of burden sharing. Undoubtedly, the United States depends on European countries to lead in solving European problems, and to take on a greater share of collective security in Europe; for example, with air and missile defense, intelligence, and logistics. European help in the Middle East and even in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific further contributes to burden sharing. What Needs to Be Done Several things still remain to be achieved if Europe and the United States are to get to the point where they need to be. First, they must build a common approach not only in defense, but across economic, information, and political domains as well. Inconsistencies in the behavior of some European countries that pursue political and economic policies that are counter to transatlantic security efforts are unhelpful, particularly with respect to the deterrence of Russia and countering the growing threat from China. As Assistant Secretary of State Wess Mitchell recently stated, “We expect those whom America helps to not abet our rivals. Western Europeans cannot continue to deepen energy dependence on the same Russia that America defends it against. Or enrich themselves on the same Iran that is building ballistic missiles which threaten Europe.”1 The United States supports the the Three Seas Initiative as a way to build energy independence for Central and Eastern Europe as well as improving infrastructure connection between Northern and Southern Europe – all of which will enhance Europe’s stability, security, and prosperity. Additional investment by the United States and Western European countries into Central and Eastern Europe would be an effective way to counter attempts by Russia and by China to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe, and between European countries. Second, continued inequity in burden sharing hinders a stronger relationship between the United States and Europe, and it erodes the confidence of many Americans in the efficacy of NATO. Addressing the realities and the perceptions of this inequity is important to address a sense of unfairness and unmet expectations in the United States. The 2 percent defense spending pledge of all NATO members at the Wales Summit in 2014, notably including using 20 percent of their spending to invest in major new equipment and related research and development, is an important step forward as well as a strategic message to Russia that the alliance is prepared to address the changed security environment. These investments are the necessary underpinning for all that must be done for deterrence, defense, and projecting stability. To paraphrase NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, it was acceptable to reduce defense investment when tensions were low but it is also important and necessary to be willing to increase them when tensions rise. The need for European countries to increase defense spending is nothing new. Every president since Dwight Eisenhower has challenged the United States’ European allies to do more. Even President Obama called some European countries “free riders”. Thanks to the efforts of Stoltenberg and many national leaders, including President Trump, the alliance has made meaningful progress with most members at or on a path to achieve the 2 percent obligation by 2024. Nearly every one of them has increased their defense spending or at least halted falls in it. In reaching the necessary spending threshold, a more sophisticated definition of burden sharing and the 2 percent goal is required. Investments must be oriented towards collective security, and to do so the focus must shift from inputs to outcomes. Stoltenberg has referred to the “Three Cs”: cash, capabilities, and contributions. The transatlantic allies must invest today what is required to develop capabilities tomorrow to make operational contributions the day after tomorrow. Many of these required capabilities are not purely military, nor are they financed by the budgets of the various Ministries of Defense. Transportation infrastructure is well below what is needed for fully effective deterrence or, if deterrence fails, operational requirements. Cyber protection is necessary for all the airports and seaports the alliance needs for rapid reinforcement and sustainment. Fuel pipelines that reach into potential operational fields are necessary. Protected fiber communications networks need to be in place ahead of a crisis for moving rapidly forces from across the alliance. NATO member states need to improve or build highways, bridges, and tunnels that can accommodate larger vehicles. This is particularly the case in Central and Eastern Europe because modern military vehicles, such as German Leopard tanks or U.S. Abrams tanks, are much heavier and larger than those that were typically used in former Warsaw Pact countries. These are not military-specific capabilities but they are essential for everything NATO does or will need to do. National defense investment could be incentivized by counting spending on these essential capabilities if they have demonstrable, dual-use military value. Third, it is necessary to achieve greater coherence on NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in the Black Sea region. A new sort of Iron Curtain has developed with Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey on one side and Russia on the other, along with NATO’s partners Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Russia has almost 10,000 soldiers occupying Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. It has over 25,000 soldiers in the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula and thousands of soldiers aiding separatists in Luhansk and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine. In the Sea of Azov, Russia has built a bridge across the Kerch strait, connecting its mainland to Crimea. This effectively blockades Ukrainian ports because the bridge is too low to allow the passage of many commercial vessels that would normally carry Ukrainian steel from Mariupol to different markets. This was intentionally done to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and stop its efforts to join the West. It can also lead to a dangerous military escalation, as illustrated by the recent seizing of Ukrainian naval vessels by Russia. All of these activities are part of Russia’s overall effort to extend its control and influence in the Black Sea region, which is vital to its operations in Syria, the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Europe needs to maintain its sanctions until Russia lives up to the Minsk Agreement and returns Ukraine’s occupied territories. It should also continue to support eventual membership in the EU and NATO by Georgia and Ukraine. Georgia should be invited to join NATO immediately. Fourth, NATO must continue its efforts to improve its deterrence capability against Russia’s aggressive behavior. Deterrence requires having the real capability to compel a potential adversary. This is not simply a matter of equipment or formations, but rather recognizing Russia’s new approach to conflict, which seeks to blur the distinction between peacetime and wartime, to use cyber and misinformation to prevent political and military leaders from realizing what is happening, and then to intimidate and coerce using the threats or even force necessary to achieve its objectives. Underpinning this capability are three different “speeds”. First, speed of recognition. This means using all means necessary to identify rapidly a situation before it becomes a true crisis. This requires that the EU and NATO improve intelligence sharing and communications, networks that will certainly be under stress and likely targeted by cyber-attacks. Second, speed of decision. Political leaders will need to make decisions quickly in order to allow military commanders to start the movement of equipment, units, and materiel when necessary. At the same time, they will want to avoid doing anything that looks provocative or escalatory. This means, for example, that planners cannot assume that governments will automatically waive normal EU road restrictions, prioritize military convoys over civilian commercial traffic on highways, or give priority to military equipment on rail over previously scheduled commercial shipments. Thus, most if not all initial reactions will happen in peacetime conditions. Third, speed of assembly. This is key in order to give political leaders options other than a liberation campaign. The transatlantic allies must be able to move quickly to demonstrate to Russia that NATO is prepared, determined, and positioned to protect its members and key interests. This is why military mobility, essential for effective deterrence, is already identified and supported as a priority by NATO and the EU. This is the perfect nexus for their cooperation, one that was emphasized at the NATO summits in Warsaw and Brussels. As they transition from expeditionary operations to a deterrence posture, European members and partners of the transatlantic alliance must regain a culture of readiness where equipment, formations, and headquarters are all able to perform their assigned missions. Having units that are not fully manned or trained, or expensive vehicles or aircraft or ships that are not properly maintained are clear signals that the alliance is not prepared to defend its members – and thus increases the risk of miscalculation by Russia. Conclusion The United States is committed to the stability and security of Europe, as it has been for over 100 years ever since the first U.S. soldiers arrived in France during World War I. This has been demonstrated regardless of who has been in the White House and which party-controlled Congress. The American people have a special affinity for Europe, and the economic prosperity of the United States depends on the continent’s security and stability. But they also expect that their European friends and allies will pick up their share of the burden for collective security so as to help maintain order around the globe and ensure that Europe remains whole, free, and at peace.

inspire

2022 SDI Evidence
MSDI NATO Good-Bad › NATO Good › Laundry List

A strong NATO solves a laundry list of conflicts and impacts

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22, (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3-21-2022, Government of the Netherlands, What does NATO do? Foreign Affairs in plain language, https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2022/03/21/what-does-nato-do-netherlands-safety, 6-25-2022) SCade

Safety and security in the Netherlands A safer world also means a safer Netherlands. Why? Take for instance terrorism, nuclear weapons or cyberattacks. These threats have one thing in common: they don’t stop at borders. So our own safety and security often starts abroad. That’s why it’s important to have good relations with other countries. And to protect stability in the world together. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs works hard to do this. NATO also plays an important role. But what exactly is NATO? What is NATO? NATO stands for ‘North Atlantic Treaty Organization’. It is a military alliance of 30 countries in Europe and North America. Its headquarters is in Brussels. The Netherlands is a member of NATO. NATO was set up in 1949, not long after the end of the Second World War. Its aim: to protect the security and freedom of all the countries that are members (the Allies). And right now, that Alliance is perhaps more important than ever. Worldwide security challenges The world is a less safe place than before. Even in areas near the Netherlands. Take for instance the war in Ukraine started by President Putin. Or China: a growing global economic and military power that is flexing its muscles more and more often. Technological developments also lead to new threats, like cyberattacks. Or the use of modern weapons, like drones, that can attack targets without humans having to risk their lives. And climate change can also lead to more conflicts, or make conflicts worse. Countries need each other so they can prevent and combat these global threats. NATO and diplomacy NATO is a defensive military alliance. You might think NATO is all about military action. But there is another very important step that comes first. NATO’s main priority is diplomacy. By talking to each other and with other countries, we try to solve conflicts without using force. Within NATO, the Allies work together and make agreements. For instance on protecting democratic values. Examples are: being able to hold free and fair elections, equal rights for everyone, and freedom of expression. Within NATO, military and non-military experts meet to exchange information about what is happening in the world. In this way, NATO prepares itself for the challenges and threats of today and of the future. With military and diplomatic action. NATO in the world NATO also helps other countries – that aren’t members of NATO – with their security. For instance by helping them train their soldiers. NATO soldiers can also be sent to deal with a crisis. This is important for the Netherlands too. Because the world is becoming more and more closely connected. And our safety and security is also connected to that of other countries. Article 5: what happens if a NATO country is attacked? An attack one of NATO’s member countries is an attack on all of them. Article 5 is the most important part of the North Atlantic Treaty, the treaty on which NATO is based. If one NATO member country is attacked, all members will provide it with military support. This way, the country that has been attacked doesn't stand alone. The attack doesn't have to be with tanks and guns; it could also be a cyberattack, for instance. So basically, NATO make us safer together. But how does a country become a member of NATO? When can a country join NATO? A country can’t just simply join NATO. There are certain requirements and steps that the country has to take. Step 1: the country must meet NATO’s three basic requirements. Only European countries and countries in North America can join NATO. That was decided when NATO was first set up. The country must be democratic. And the country must contribute to security in the European-Atlantic region. Step 2: the country must take part in the Membership Action Plan. This means the country is assessed and given help with meeting NATO’s other requirements. Those requirements have to do with freedom, human rights, democracy and the legal system. Sometimes it means that reforms are needed in the country that wants to be a member. Step 3: the country must agree to NATO’s aims, rights and obligations. The country makes these agreements in talks with NATO members. Step 4: all NATO member countries must agree to the country’s membership. All NATO members sign a document called the accession protocol. Step 5: the country’s own people must agree to NATO membership. This can be decided by parliament, or by holding a referendum. Every country is different. So some countries may take longer to become a member than others. NATO and the Netherlands To protect our way of life, the Netherlands works to build a strong Europe and a strong NATO. By working together with other countries and making agreements with them, we stand stronger in the world.

2022 SDI Kritik
MSDI Security K › Affirmative Answers › Securitization Good / Alt fails

Our impact is epistemologically sound – it’s based on readings of history and statistically strong modelling – empirics are the best way to make predictions – the alt causes extinction

Scott D. Sagan 95. Assistant professor of political science at Stanford University. 1995. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate.” p.115-116.

There are two basic kinds of errors that one can make in assessing nations other than one's own. The first error is rooted in ethnocentrism. This is a common mistake Americans make when looking at others: we too often assume that other nations are less competent, less intelligent, and less rational than the United States. Kenneth Waltz has performed an important service in this regard: his analysis of nuclear proliferation is a valuable corrective against such ethnocentrism and the blind spots it can create among both scholars and government officials. He is absolutely correct, in my view, to criticize a number of proliferation pessimists who argue, in effect, that the United States has been perfect in handling nuclear weapons (but others will not be), that the United States can control these awesome weapons forever (but no one else can), or that the United States has utterly unproblematic civil-military relations (but no one else does). Waltz's analysis should serve as a constant reminder of how dangerous it is in international affairs to assume, to put it crudely, that the United States is smart, but that other nuclear states are or will be stupid. The second basic error, however, is the opposite: to assume that others are better than we are. This is, I believe, the central problem with Kenneth Waltz's arguments about the consequences of proliferation. He now appears to accept many of the arguments made by scholars who have studied the operational accidents and near-accidents, conflicts in civil-military relations, and other organizational problems experienced by the United States during the Cold War. Yet he maintains that other states will do better, will be smarter, will learn more quickly, will, in short, avoid the kinds of errors that we have suffered in the past. I believe, in contrast, that there are both strong theoretical reasons and emerging empirical evidence to expect that new states will not avoid such problems. New nuclear powers may not make exactly the same mistakes as their predecessors; but they are likely to make their own serious errors, and some will be deadly.