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Cyber › Norms › 2NC --- Perm do Both
Raymond 20 [Dr. Mark Raymond, Dr. Mark Raymond is the director of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center at the University of Oklahoma. "Confronting the Ubiquity of Norms in Cyberspace and Cyber Governance," Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/confronting-ubiquity-norms-cyberspace-and-cyber-governance] Blitz
The Cyberspace Solarium Commission was tasked with applying social science insights to American cybersecurity strategy. Organization of the commission into three task forces on deterrence, active disruption of adversary attacks through persistent engagement, and norms-based regimes reflects an important truth. Norms, or , are a ubiquitous and unavoidable dimension of global cyber policy. Distinguishing a norms-based approach, however, carries the risk of suggesting that a deterrence or persistent engagement strategy could be undertaken without relying on norms. In fact, norms are essential to both strategies and to any other possible cyber strategy. The only choices facing the United States (or any other actor) are about the content of the norms it promotes, and about how it will convince others to adopt, interpret, comply with and uphold them. Below, I introduce several vital but sometimes misunderstood features of how norms work and discuss their implications for American cybersecurity strategy. In the past 30 years, international relations scholars have learned a great deal about norms. First, norms often generate high rates of compliance without centralized enforcement; are a key example. Second, it is a for analysts to treat something that violates their own set of norms as something that is necessarily anti-normative. Individuals and groups across space and time have held vastly different notions about what constitutes appropriate behavior. Care should be taken not to conflate norms in general with a specific set of Western liberal norms that underpin contemporary rule-based global order. Third, norms are . Some norms (like U.N. Charter Article 51) explicitly authorize violence, at least under certain conditions. Thus, it is completely consistent with the standard definition of norms to envision an extremely conflictual world in which regular, high-consequence cyberattacks are regarded as appropriate behavior for major powers, states in general or even various nonstate actors. While such a world would not align with American interests or values, to the extent actors saw it as legitimate, it would reflect the influence of norms. Fourth, norms are not outcomes that remain static until they suddenly change. Rather, they are that exist not as individual things in isolation but as parts of complex normative systems that can (and often do) place actors in difficult positions requiring them to make determinations about appropriate behavior in light of multiple applicable norms that may be in conflict. Fifth, this means that consensus and completeness for thinking about whether norms exist or can be useful in a given issue area. Finally, norms are important even when compliance is imperfect. They have a crucial role to play in responding to violations. The process of highlights the fact that the international community relies on norms to provide a basis for criticizing or justifying behavior. It is the very existence of such behavioral standards that makes it possible to actions that fall outside expectations as with, for example, “rogue states.” In this way, norms are essential in justifying responses to norm-violating behavior, whether in the form of criminal indictments, economic sanctions or even the use of force. Other related norms tell us how to determine whether a prior norm has been broken, and how to respond if it has been What does this all mean for American cyber policy? A great deal. No single actor, however powerful, can unilaterally shape norms for cybersecurity. Doing so requires skillful, consistent engagement in global processes of rule-making, interpretation and application. Shaping cyber norms thus requires “persistent engagement” but of a very different kind than envisioned by most uses of the term. Specifically, norms development requires a coordinated whole-of-government approach led by the State Department. The United States must articulate and justify its positions in convincing, legitimate ways to a broad audience that includes industrial democracies, emerging economies, foreign and domestic firms, and civil society organizations. Since these stakeholders have for what makes an argument convincing, this presents an extremely challenging diplomatic task.
2022
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Cyber › Norms › 1NC --- Norms
Mazarr et al. 22 [Michael J Mazarr, Michael J. Mazarr is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Previously he worked at the U.S. National War College, where he was professor and associate dean of academics; as president of the Henry L. Stimson Center; senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; senior defense aide on Capitol Hill; and as a special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His primary interests are U.S. defense policy and force structure, disinformation and information manipulation, East Asian security, nuclear weapons and deterrence, and judgment and decisionmaking under uncertainty. Mazarr holds a Ph.D. in public policy from the University of Maryland.; Brian Frederick, Bryan Frederick (he/him) is the associate director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program within RAND Project AIR FORCE, and a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. His research interests include strategic competition, interstate deterrence and escalation, conflict forecasting, military interventions, territorial disputes, international norms, the law of armed conflict, and regional security issues in Europe, East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. He has previously worked at the International Crisis Group, and the Issue Correlates of War Project. He completed his Ph.D. in International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in 2012, his M.A. from Johns Hopkins SAIS in 2002, and his B.A. in Philosophy from Williams College in 1998.; Emily Ellinger, Emily Ellinger is a policy analyst at RAND Corporation, based in the Pittsburgh office. Her research interests include strategic competition, alliance formation and politics, the security clearance process, extreamism, and security cooperation, geographically focused on Europe and East Asia. Ellinger holds a M.S. in international relations from the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. Her master’s thesis comprised a comparative analysis of US alliances as they related to intelligence sharing in a post-9/11 world. Her B.A. from Northwestern University is in Physics with concentrations in theoretical physics and astrophysics. During her undergraduate studies she spent three years researching protoplanetary disks with NASA, culminating in two publications including “Connection historical disk interactions with current planetary system architectures”. Prior to joining RAND, Ellinger was a threat analyst at Prescient LLC, a private firm that provided open-source analysis for on-the-ground threats and potential risks in remote locations around the world. During her undergraduate career, Ellinger spent a quarter in China studying at Peking University and Hangzhou Wanxiang Polytechnic. There she investigated public health and renewable energy technology and policy in a fellowship for the Wanxiang Corporation., Benjamin Boudreaux, Ben Boudreaux (he/him) is a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and a policy researcher at RAND working in the intersection of ethics, emerging technology, and human security. His current research focuses on the ethics of artificial intelligence (including on algorithmic equity, biometric surveillance, and military AI) and on social media policy issues (such as misinformation). He leads the Pardee RAND Graduate School's ethics program, and teaches Ethics in Theory, Policy, and Practice and a course on complex systems policy design. Prior to joining RAND, Boudreaux was a diplomat in the State Department's Cyber Policy office, where he worked to promote security, stability, and human rights in cyberspace, and led State's cyber operations portfolio. He also has research interests in conflict prevention, Middle Eastern and South Asian regional issues, and international migration. Boudreaux holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of California, Berkeley where he focused on ethical theory and political philosophy, a M.S. in foreign service from Georgetown University, and a B.A. in economics and philosophy from NYU. "Competition and Restraint in Cyberspace," RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1180-1.html] Blitz
Our analysis of the interests and perspectives of the major cyber actors, the character of norms and the cycle of norm emergence, and the history of cyber norm development highlighted two leading principles of a U.S. cyber norm strategy. First, it should be catalytic , seeking to encourage the gradual, sometimes messy process of political and social norm emergence rather than trying to put into place a singular treaty or agreement. Second, it should be multistakeholder, working with many public and private actors simultaneously to advance normative consen - sus on a broad front, and lending support to norm entrepreneurs. As discussed in Chapter Three, these principles—and many of the specific elements of this strategic approach described below— have characterized elements of U.S. policy on cyber stability and cyber norms since about 2011. Our argument is not that this general approach is entirely new, but that the emphasis in U.S. efforts should shift away from international expert negotiation and toward broader political engagement, as well as toward defining a small handful of normative limits with U.S. competitors and ensuring greater harmony between U.S. norm-promotion efforts and other U.S. activities in cyberspace.
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Cyber › NATO › 1NC --- EU Hybrid Warfare
Chivvis 17 [Christopher S. Chivvis, a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and teaches at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, March 22, 2017, “Understanding Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’”, RAND Corporation, , JMH]
Developing Strategies to Counter Hybrid Warfare Meeting the challenge posed by Russian hybrid warfare will take time and effort. It must also be developed in conjunction with efforts to strengthen conventional deterrence. An effective strategy to defend U.S. interests against hybrid Russian strategies will include, at a minimum, the following. Support for transparency and anticorruption efforts. Tolerance of corruption greatly facilitates Russian influence strategies. Some countries in Europe—for example, many states in the Balkans—suffer from weak anticorruption legal frameworks and limited political will for change. In other countries, political will may be strong, but individual privacy concerns can limit the remit of transparency laws. In these areas, the EU is an important partner for both the United States and for NATO. The United States should support European anticorruption efforts wholeheartedly, with appropriate funding for related State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development programs. Support for internal security reform and defense institution building in targeted states such as the Balkans and Ukraine. Although some Balkan militaries already meet NATO standards of professionalization, others need additional support. Institution-building in these countries needs to be focused on weakening any lingering ties with Russian security services. In addition, strengthening capabilities in such countries, as well as in the Baltic states, will enable greater detection and resistance to covert Russian operations. In general, U.S. assistance targeted at strengthening the rule of law will complicate Moscow’s hybrid efforts.15 Strategies to push back against Russian influence operations. More work needs to be done in this difficult area, but initial research suggests that it may be better to focus on discrediting sources such as Russia Today and generally raising awareness of misinformation rather than attempting to fight each and every story on a tit-for-tat basis. Civil society must also be encouraged to play a larger role in combatting Russian disinformation. Increasing the flow of positive information will also help. In extreme cases, such as wartime, it may be necessary to temporarily close off access to Russian media outlets.16 Effective use of U.S. special operations forces in the U.S. European Command area of operations. U.S. special operations forces have an important role to play in combating Russian hybrid strategies in Europe. Both the mission and operating environment in Europe, however, is different from that in countries like Iraq and Syria. This requires some adaptation. For example, one challenge is ensuring that U.S. diplomats are attuned to the needs of U.S. special operations forces conducting training and other activities in the region. Conversely, U.S. forces must also be fully aware of the delicate nature of some U.S. diplomatic activities underway in these same countries. The United States must also operate in support of individual European countries’ plans, filling their gaps and bolstering their programs. Support for European efforts to combat Russian hybrid warfare. The United States, after all, is not the first line of defense against most forms of Russian hybrid warfare in Europe. Instead, the first line of defense is the EU and European countries themselves. The United States can support specific efforts, such as Finland’s Hybrid War Center of Excellence, Latvia’s Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, and Estonia’s Cyber Center of Excellence, while encouraging other best practices, such as closer public-private partnerships in Europe, to strengthen Europe’s own defenses against cyber attacks.
2022
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Cyber › NATO › 1NC --- Cyber Task force
Quested ‘22 - [Tony Quested, 6/15/22, "Darktrace CEO calls for ‘tech NATO’ to police cybercrime," business weekly, ] //MLee
The CEO of Killer50 superstar Darktrace says there is “a shocking tolerance” to cyber attacks and urges additional vigilance. Poppy Gustafsson spoke at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on the evolving cyber threat landscape in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. She was in conversation with Professor Madeline Carr, Senior RUSI Associate Fellow and Professor of Global Politics and Cybersecurity at University College London. Commenting on the challenge of policing both cyber warfare and international cyber crime, Gustafsson said “There remains a persistent lack of clarity around how we define an act of war in the cyber-sphere.” She called for the creation of a dedicated international cyber task force, or ‘tech NATO’, to deliver international collaboration in agreeing and ratifying a set of cyber-norms and accountability. Gustafsson noted that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the first time an active invasion has been supported by the tactical dismantling of national infrastructure using cyber-attacks. “The attack on the Viasat satellite that disabled Ukrainian military communications one hour before the invasion was a key component of the beginning of this war,” argued Gustafsson. She added: “We have seen UK, US and EU officials jointly attribute this attack to Russia, an immensely political act. That is unprecedented.” Asked by Prof. Carr whether Darktrace had seen the level of collateral cyber disruption it expected, Gustafsson shared that Darktrace data showed a global increase in attacks on critical national infrastructure bodies across its customer base, including a 90 per cent increase in high priority security incidents on the networks of energy companies in Europe during the week of the invasion, from February 24. At the domestic level, Gustafsson called for cooperation and accountability between the public and private sectors as well as lower tolerance for cyber attacks. She emphasised the importance of a “whole of society approach” to cyber security adding: “There is a shocking tolerance for cyber attacks, and that has to change. “Organizations that are custodians of valuable, private data cannot be allowed to let that data fall into criminal hands through negligence and face no consequences.” Professor Carr commented: “Issues that we had thought about speculatively have now become our reality. We are facing war in Europe and there is an essential cyber component both to the way it is being fought and to its international ramifications. What is needed is clarity, consensus and cooperation.” The Royal United Services Institute is the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think tank. Darktrace has been a member since 2020.
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Cyber › 5-G › 2NC --- Solves China
Peterson 18 - [Erik R. Peterson, 2018, "5G is the key to future American competitiveness," Germany, ]//MLee
The telecom industry’s race for 5G is one of the most intense and consequential technological contests of our time. What will it take to win? As the global race to develop and deploy 5G telecommunications networks heats up, the urgency for American investment in its digital infrastructure is rising in tandem. Rapid and large-scale deployment of 5G would not only help the United States maintain its economic and technological edge globally, but it would also offer an opportunity to realize three other national objectives. First, it would support the transition of the economy to the Fourth Industrial Revolution ushered in by dramatic technology innovations. Second, it would promote a stronger, more innovative, and more competitive business landscape, which in turn would support sustainable and high-paying jobs. Finally, it would provide increased access, benefiting both local communities and the private sector in under-served areas. The stakes are extraordinarily high. The first country to achieve large-scale, reliable 5G coverage stands to reap significant economic gains—starting with higher technological innovation, elevated economic growth, and strengthened national competitiveness. The returns will be far larger than upfront investments. 5G: a world of change A new era of the digital economy was unleashed as wireless networks evolved from voice-only 2G, to voice and text, and then to the latest Internet-enabled 4G LTE technology. Once fully deployed, 5G will be similarly transformative, given its ability to support massive Machine to Machine (M2M) communications through greater bandwidth, such as between cellphones, sensors, “smart” machinery and appliances, and other Internet of Things (IoT) devices. In addition to IoT, 5G will support a range of new and future applications in each of the other next-generation technologies at the core of the —artificial intelligence, robotics, additive manufacturing, and augmented and virtual reality (AR/VR). There is no doubt that 5G will have a significant impact on American consumers. One obvious way will be from performance improvement, such as faster video streaming and real-time gaming thanks to the reduced latency provided by 5G networks. Kearney’s recent report highlighted how mobile health solutions from wearables, IoT devices, and related technologies will take advantage of 5G for improved data collection and real-time monitoring, while other advances such as remote surgery will also become possible. The power and convenience of 5G may even contribute to the next wave of “cord cutting” in fixed services—particularly given 5G's potential as a way to provide high-speed connectivity to customers currently underserved by existing fixed broadband infrastructure. Process innovation: an essential ingredient of competitive advantage Companies and their R&D arms are rethinking the way they manufacture both old and new products. In today’s hyper-competitive world, are you exploring every opportunity to innovate? 5G will also have a significant impact on the B2B market. The entire ICT industry—from chipmakers to telecom companies to hardware and software manufacturers—is building out this technology with B2B customers and “things” top of mind. Businesses will have countless devices talking to one another as well as to the cloud, streaming massive amounts of data. While IoT devices are already proliferating rapidly due to the connectivity offered by today’s LTE networks, 5G will further enhance connectivity for these devices due to network slicing, improved spectrum efficiency, and better power management. As a result, businesses will be able to better manage fields and factories with much lower latency than is possible with current WLAN networks, track goods in real time along their supply chains, and follow products from the retail shelf into the home. Data sharing will also be multidirectional. For instance, a truck tire will simultaneously collect data on wear and tear, road conditions, temperature, and air pressure for both the vehicle owner and the tire manufacturer, providing crucial inputs for maintenance schedules and future product development. Finally, take “,” which promise better traffic management, improved car safety, and route optimization. What makes them “smart” is the ability of their systems to share large amounts of data instantly between other cars, road sensors, traffic lights, and other devices. And while there is always a trade-off between supporting M2M and latency in any network, 5G will see improvements in both, leading to significantly improved performance across the spectrum of 5G use cases. According to Rob Thies, general partner at World Innovation Lab Ventures, “5G is as big as the transition from dial-up to DSL, and will change the world just as much.” that the global 5G value chain will be $3.5 trillion by 2035, which is larger than the entire mobile value chain today. Add to that another $12.3 trillion in “5G-enabled” growth. For the United States, the projected economic impact is no less staggering. The telecommunications industry association CTIA estimates that 5G will create three million new jobs, on top of a wireless industry that already supports 4.7 million workers. It will also generate an estimated $500 billion in economic growth—including 5G-enabled innovation by startups and major companies alike that will add new economic value. The efficiency and speed with which 5G delivers these economic and social benefits, however, will depend on the scale, timeline, and geographic scope of the investments made by the mobile operators, as well as how friendly government policies are to 5G adoption, including wireless spectrum auction processes. Importantly, 5G opens up enormous new blocks of spectrum, making it most cost-effective to serve the relentless rise in traffic on networks. What are the incentives for 5G? A key incentive for making such an investment is the potential for new revenue streams, accomplished in part by working more closely with B2B companies. For example, given the significant B2B market for 5G capabilities, it is likely that changes will occur in the cost structures for what are known as “over-the-top,” or OTT, services such as current video content providers and future AR/VR services and autonomous vehicle operators, as well as their relationships with telecom companies. For example, Tesla is to bring 5G connectivity to its vehicles. Further, Ericsson estimates the potential market size for industry digitalization that telecoms could tap into will be nearly $620 billion by 2026. We therefore expect to see considerable experimentation and innovation in this space in the coming years. B2C will also provide incentives for investment in 5G, particularly as mobile use continues to rise globally. As reinforced by the Mary Meeker’s , mobile Internet usage remains the key driver of digital media consumption. Global average smartphone costs continue to decline, mobile payments are increasingly standard, and the mobile experience is becoming further ingrained in people’s daily lives. With 5G, more services can be brought to mobile, further amplifying the scope for innovation. The global 5G race Major economies around the world—particularly those in Asia—are working aggressively to develop 5G networks. The Chinese government, for example, is for 5G amid a broader effort to strengthen its digital economy, including through its “Made in China 2025” initiative. South Korea used the occasion of the 2018 Olympics to demonstrate its 5G prowess. A even carried the Olympic torch. And Japan is expected to use the 2020 Olympic Games to do the same. Australia, the United Kingdom, and others will also test 5G networks in the coming months and years. CTIA forecasts that US telecoms will invest $275 billion in 5G technology, including fiber-optic cables, small cells, and other 5G network infrastructure. All the major US telecoms are planning 5G trials in 2018 and 2019 across dozens of cities—with 2020 as the consensus tipping point for 5G across major urban centers—fostered by strong competition among them to be the first to deliver 5G to customers. Indeed, a key stated goal of the is to utilize their combined assets to become the first nationwide 5G carrier. Such a development would push other telecoms to accelerate their 5G rollouts in order to compete in the marketplace, improving mobile access for consumers and businesses throughout the country. For their part, and have both discussed how 5G is creating new opportunities for all the top US telecoms, with each one implementing a different strategy to develop and deploy its capabilities. At the same time, the rollout of 5G will allow telecoms to retire some of the capacity dedicated to 2G and 3G networks, enabling important cost savings and reinvestment of resources, as well. US telecoms may also use the deployment of 5G to capture a previously untapped and underserved customer base—rural America. In this effort, public and private sector interests would be aligned. The US Federal Communications Commission has identified 5G investment as integral to that still persists today. Opportunities may therefore emerge for public-private partnerships between telecoms and governments at the local, state, and federal levels to roll out 5G coverage, particularly to underserved areas. This is important, as concerns regarding the social impact of technology are growing, including whether the 4IR will reduce or exacerbate inequality. Such questions will in large part determine the long-term outlook for the United States, as explored in our effort to assess the outlook for the country our to its 250th anniversary in 2026 and beyond. What will it take to win the 5G race? The future center of global technological change will shift as a result of who wins the 5G race. To be sure, not every country is a perfect candidate for aggressive 5G investments given variations in market size, level of technological penetration, the size of the rural market, and other factors. Additionally, questions remain regarding the business case for large-scale 5G investments, as the average consumer . But national competitiveness, particularly for the world’s major economies, will increasingly be determined by the level of 4IR technological adoption and innovation, which in turn will depend on the quality of national 5G wireless networks. Winning the 5G race requires ensuring that coverage is both broad and deep across a given market. Only then will the impacts of massive infrastructure investments, job creation, and broader economic growth be realized. To upgrade its digital infrastructure quickly and efficiently, the United States must ensure that the proper incentives are in place to foster massive investments by—and healthy competition among—the country’s telecom companies. These companies also need the space to innovate and experiment with new business models in collaboration with the wide variety of industries expected to leverage 5G. America’s future competitiveness depends on it.
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Cyber › 5-G › 1NC --- 5-G
Brake and Bauer 20 [Doug Brake – Former Director, Broadband and Spectrum Policy, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, and Alexandra Bauer, Policy Analyst, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation" The Great 5G Race: Is China Really Beating the United States?" ITIF, https://itif.org/publications/2020/11/30/great-5g-race-china-really-beating-united-states/] Blitz
INTRODUCTION 5G is expected to provide the connective tissue for many emerging technologies critical to productivity, innovation, and national competitiveness. Some commentators have panicked over the so-called “race” for 5G, pointing in fear at China’s hundreds of thousands of new base stations, and projections of hundreds of millions of 5G subscribers this year alone. But if we are going to base policy decisions on this race (and it is questionable that we should), understanding how infrastructure and subscription numbers are actually counted matters. A closer look reveals that China’s wireless infrastructure and subscriber numbers are not as impressive as they may first appear: By counting anyone on a 5G plan—even if they only have a 4G device connecting to 4G infrastructure—as a 5G subscriber, and measuring individual base stations instead of cell sites, China’s 5G stats can paint a misleading picture. This misleading picture leads to the interpretation that the sky is falling. THE SKY IS FALLING: CLAIMS THAT CHINA IS BEATING THE UNITED STATES AT 5G One can barely scan a technology news site without reading that the United States is losing to China in 5G, and that this will mean economic catastrophe. Headlines such as “China’s Dominance Of 5G Networks Puts U.S. Economic Future At Stake” and “China’s growing 5G dominance is a disaster for US security” keep policymakers on edge when considering how the United States should move forward with the next generation of wireless.1 The fear is that the first country to build 5G networks will have a head start in developing the emerging technologies that depend on 5G’s low-latency, high-throughput wireless connectivity. As Attorney General William Barr put it, “China’s success in 5G infrastructure is also translating into advantages in a range of new technologies associated with 5G.”2 He claimed, “Within the next five years, 5G global territory and application dominance will be determined,” and “the stakes for the United States could not be higher.”3 Are these Chicken Littles to be believed? Certainly, China has advantages in deploying 5G infrastructure, with state-directed companies making investments that market actors might not. But it is important we have a strong understanding of the metrics of Chinese 5G deployment, and the methodology for counting before calling the 5G race. 5G USERS VERSUS SUBSCRIBERS Many reports likely overstate the extent of Chinese 5G deployment for several reasons. Part of this is likely due to intentional inflation of statistics reported by operators under pressure from Chinese authorities. This is a long-standing practice in China, going back at least as far as Mao and agricultural communes reporting fake crop yields so as not to displease leadership.4 And today they are not unique to the telecom sector, as organizations of all kinds inflate numbers in order to meet Beijing’s expectations. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) put out a statement encouraging telecommunications providers to “accelerate user migration to 5G through measures such as package upgrade offer, and credit purchases, etc.”5 Providers then started encouraging or even forcing customers to upgrade to 5G subscriptions regardless of their actual need, use, or device.6 Some companies reduced 5G subscription prices so much they are even cheaper than staying on a 4G plan.7 As one reporter put it, “[W]ith all of China’s big telcos slashing 5G package prices in the past few months, it could well be that customers are being drawn in more by attractive tariffs than by a desire to get their hands on the latest hardware and its related capabilities.”8 The push for 5G subscribers was evident before 5G was even activated: Although 5G service was not turned on in China until November of 2019, Chinese telecom providers listed 9 million 5G users in October 2019, a month prior to its actual activation.9 By counting anyone on a 5G plan—even if they only have a 4G device connecting to 4G infrastructure—as a 5G subscriber, and measuring individual base stations instead of cell sites, China’s 5G stats paint a misleading picture. Apparently, the numbers game went too far, as the MIIT later called upon providers to “clean up” reporting and end aggressive sales practices after news of subscriber inflation spread.10 But current numbers are still plagued with confusion. Consider that China Telecom and China Mobile (the two largest operators in China) reported 150 million “5G package customers” as of September 2020. But according to China’s Academy for Information and Communications Technology, only 94 million 5G devices had been shipped for all of China during the same time frame, indicating a sizable gap between the number of “subscribers” and actual 5G users.11 The discrepancy may be due largely to terminology: “5G package customers” is a blanket term often used by Chinese carriers to refer to anyone on a 5G subscription, regardless of whether they actually have a 5G device or access to a 5G network.12 China Mobile acknowledges that they count anyone “who has subscribed to 5G tariff plans” as a 5G customer.13 The number of 5G-capable devices alone is impressive, and the competitive threat from China justifies a thoughtful policy response, but no one should be worked into a panic by goosed stats. NETWORK DEPLOYMENT: BASE STATIONS VERSUS CELL SITES Subscriptions are not the only potentially misunderstood stat. Chinese operators tend to count mobile infrastructure differently from how Western operators generally do. The key difference is between cell sites (how U.S. telecommunications operators typically measure deployment) and base stations (how Chinese telecommunications operators typically measure deployment). A cell site usually refers to the entire area of a given tower, which includes potentially multiple base stations and antennas using different spectrum. The term “base station” generally refers to the equipment each carrier uses to send signals over multiple antennas at the cell site. Often one cell site will have multiple base stations, sometimes it will host only one. But generally, it is not a one-to-one conversion between base stations and cell sites or towers; It is important that these numbers are not conflated to mean the same thing. Deployment figures are often further mischaracterized because of the way Chinese operators sometimes count each spectrum band as a separate “logical” base station instead of actual pieces of equipment.14 Just like how a Wi-Fi router can work on different spectrum (generally 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz), a mobile base station can operate on multiple spectrum bands. American carriers would generally count a multi-spectrum base station as at most one piece of equipment. But some Chinese reporting apparently treats each individual spectrum band a base station supports as a different “logical site.”15 A representative from Huawei explained that “a China Unicom base station supports GSM 900, GSM 1800, WCDMA 2100 and LTE. Most of the equipment is deployed in the same room at one physical site, but there are four bands, so there are four logical sites.”16 As a result, Chinese numbers could easily be misrepresented as three to four times higher compared with how Western operators tend to count equipment.17 Policymakers and the media should take care not to conflate estimates of base stations for logical sites with actual, physical cell sites—these are two totally different measurements. For a rough comparison, it seems fair to assume two or three base stations per cell site, but the number of logical sites—meaning each spectrum band used—could be many more. ACTUAL PERFORMANCE The raw number of base stations is not always a good measure of a network’s performance. What we really care about is a network’s performance for the population it covers. Measuring performance becomes increasingly complicated with 5G’s diverse spectrum assets, some of which do not use the traditional cellular architecture. The utilization of different spectrum resources or amounts of bandwidth results in varying levels of performance even with equal levels of infrastructure. This is relevant when comparing China, which so far uses exclusively mid-band spectrum for 5G, with the United States, which has made a large push to focus on high-band coverage. High-band 5G offers the highest performance leap over existing networks, at least where it is available. But that being said, let’s try a rough comparison, assuming the similar spectrum assets and using China’s announcement that it anticipates 600,000 5G base stations by the end of 2020.18 Assume three base stations per Chinese cell site—one for each of the major operators—and we get about 200,000 sites. This could be several times lower if we’re talking logical sites, but it is hard to say—let’s keep the estimate conservative and set that issue aside. The population served also plays a big role in the performance of a given network. China’s population is about 1.39 billion. This is about 4.5 times larger than that of the United States, indicating Chinese operators will need roughly 4.5 times as many base stations as their U.S. counterparts to get a similar level of performance for each user (all else being equal). So, those 200,000 sites work out to about 1 site per 7,000 people. In 2019 alone, U.S. operators invested in 5G-ready cell sites and added 46,000 new cell sites—roughly 1 site per 7,134 people.19 To the uninformed, 600,000 base stations might sound alarming, but understanding what those numbers mean, we’re about neck-and-neck. If we assume that the Chinese sites include logical sites, and the spectral efficiency of their base stations is less, then it appears the United States is clearly in the lead. Slow and steady may win the race. Whereas the United States is pursuing a gradual, economical deployment of 5G, the problems with China’s rushed 5G deployments are already starting to show. One of Huawei’s own executives went so far as to call China’s 5G “fake, dumb and poor,” mostly due to poor integration with the 4G network.21 Another former official warned in a recent speech that China’s 5G push could become a failed investment.22 While China is no doubt investing substantially in the expansion of its 5G network, including by pressuring its state-owned carriers to invest faster than the market demands, Chinese figures must be properly scrutinized when using them to make U.S. policy decisions.
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AI › Misc › 2NC --- SpaceX solves AI
Neel V. Patel, 7-3-2020, "Are we making spacecraft too autonomous?," MIT Technology Review, https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/07/03/1004788/spacecraft-spacefight-autonomous-software-ai/
When SpaceX’s Crew Dragon took NASA astronauts to the ISS near the end of May, the launch brought back a familiar sight. For the first time since the space shuttle was retired, American rockets were launching from American soil to take Americans into space.
Inside the vehicle, however, things couldn’t have looked more different. Gone was the sprawling dashboard of lights and switches and knobs that once dominated the space shuttle’s interior. All of it was replaced with a futuristic console of multiple large touch screens that cycle through a variety of displays. Behind those screens, the vehicle is run by software that’s designed to get into space and navigate to the space station completely autonomously.
2022
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Counterplan
AI › Misc › 2NC --- No Solvency AI
McCord 21 (Mark, “China Already Outflanks US in AI, Says Ex-Pentagon Tech Chief,” Asia Financial, https://www.asiafinancial.com/china-already-outflanks-us-in-ai-says-ex-pentagon-tech-chief)
China is set for global dominance of the artificial intelligence space, the Pentagon’s recently resigned first chief of software officer has said, adding that he stepped down because the US had been too slow to develop the technology. Nicolas Chaillan, a technology entrepreneur, left the Department of Defence in October 2021 after spending three years trying to develop cyber security systems with the US Air Force. But he told the Financial Times that he resigned because he couldn’t bear to watch the US flounder on AI. “We have no competing fighting chance against China in 15 to 20 years,” he was quoted as telling the UK-based newspaper. “Right now, it’s already a done deal; it is already over in my opinion.” The 37-year old said he was “angry” at the pace of development in the US, arguing that AI was more vital to US interests than military hardware. A congressionally mandated national security commission offered similar warnings of China’s imminent AI supremacy earlier this year. Part of the problem, Chaillan told the FT, was that Google had been reluctant to work with the Defence department on the technology. And in his resignation letter, Chaillan said military personnel had been put in charge of cyber security when they had none of the skills required to tackle it. “[W]e are setting up critical infrastructure to fail,” he wrote. “We would not put a pilot in the cockpit without extensive flight training; why would we expect someone with no IT experience to be close to successful? While we wasted time in bureaucracy, our adversaries moved further ahead.” Consequently, cyber defences in some government departments were at “kindergarten levels”, he was quoted as saying.
2022
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Counterplan
AI › TEVV › 2NC --- DOD fails
Flournoy, Haines et al 2020 - former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Director of National Intelligence [Michèle and Avril, Gabrielle Cheftiz Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy October, “Building Trust through Testing Adapting DOD’s Test & Evaluation, Validation & Verification (TEVV) Enterprise for Machine Learning Systems, including Deep Learning Systems” https://cset. georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Building-Trust-Through-Testing.pdf Acc 6/23/22 JZ]
The Defense Department needs to reform its existing testing and verification system—its methods, processes, infrastructure, and workforce—in order to help decision-makers and operators understand and manage the risks of developing, producing, operating, and sustaining AI-enabled systems. Several DOD reports and policy documents identify TEVV as a barrier to AI adoption and call for increased research into new methodologies, including the Pentagon’s AI Ethics Principles1 and AI Strategy,2 which states, “we will invest in the research and development of AI systems that are resilient, robust, reliable, and secure; we will continue to fund research into techniques that produce more explainable AI; and we will pioneer approaches for AI test, evaluation, verification, and validation.” However, DOD has yet to translate this stated goal into a real plan of action. Advancing the Defense Department’s TEVV enterprise for ML/DL systems is critical for several reasons. First, developing an effective TEVV approach that is sufficiently predictive of performance is critical to building the trust in these systems necessary to deploy and leverage these capabilities at scale. The United States has already seen this dynamic with nuclear power, for example, where lost trust in the technology has prevented policymakers from harnessing nuclear power for clean energy
Alternate Causality - Limited DOD data prevent testing and verification of AI
2022
MNDI
Counterplan
AI › TEVV › 2NC --- TEVV Solves
Flournoy, Haines et al 2020 - former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Director of National Intelligence [Michèle and Avril, Gabrielle Cheftiz Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy October, “Building Trust through Testing Adapting DOD’s Test & Evaluation, Validation & Verification (TEVV) Enterprise for Machine Learning Systems, including Deep Learning Systems” https://cset. georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Building-Trust-Through-Testing.pdf Acc 6/23/22 JZ]
Second, the context in which DOD operates means these technologies are prone to adversary attack and system failure, with very real consequences. Machine learning systems have an increased potential for failure modes relative to other systems, such as bias due to a distribution shift in data, as well as novel vulnerabilities to attacks ranging from data poisoning to adversarial attacks. One could easily imagine an image classifier that accidentally classifies a civilian school bus as a tank or an adversary exfiltrating a model processing sensitive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or communications data. Image classification algorithms developed for one environment (e.g., the desert) could turn out to work incorrectly in another environment (e.g., cities).
Third, with an effective TEVV system, the United States can reduce barriers to innovation and facilitate U.S. leadership in ML/DL technologies. As most of the innovation in ML/DL will come from the private sector, unless the U.S. government is able to effectively draw on private sector work in this arena, it will not be able to leverage the best cutting-edge technology. Research on new TEVV methods and organizational reforms to adapt the current system is simply not keeping pace with private sector development. Without urgent reforms and prioritized investment in new research and infrastructure, the Defense Department will lose its chance to shape industry’s approach to ML/DL development in a manner consistent with DOD standards for safety, reliability, and accountability. It will lose the opportunity to take advantage of new private sector developments, while allowing other nations without such standards to adopt the latest innovations. It is critical that the U.S. government not only shape its own U.S. industry standards but also promote compatible global standards and norms.
2022
MNDI
Counterplan
AI › TEVV › 2NC --- TEVV Solves
Flournoy, Haines et al 2020 - former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Director of National Intelligence [Michèle and Avril, Gabrielle Cheftiz Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy October, “Building Trust through Testing Adapting DOD’s Test & Evaluation, Validation & Verification (TEVV) Enterprise for Machine Learning Systems, including Deep Learning Systems” https://cset. georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Building-Trust-Through-Testing.pdf Acc 6/23/22 JZ]
The Pentagon cannot let TEVV become a barrier to fielding AI-enabled systems in an operationally relevant time frame, but must do so in a manner that engenders trust in such systems and is consistent with U.S. values and principles. The ultimate goal of any TEVV system 4 should be to build trust—with a commander who is responsible for deploying a system and an operator who will decide whether to delegate a task to such system—by providing relevant, easily understandable data to inform decision-making. Fielding AI systems before our competitors may not matter if DOD systems are brittle and break in an operational environment, are easily manipulated, or operators consequently lose faith in them. Military operations present a challenging environment. The Defense Department needs ML/DL systems that are robust and secure. They need to be able to function in a range of environmental conditions, against adversaries who are adaptive and clever, and in a manner that engenders trust by the warfighter.
2022
MNDI
Counterplan
AI › TEVV › 1NC --- TEVV
Flournoy, Haines et al 2020 - former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Director of National Intelligence [Michèle and Avril, Gabrielle Cheftiz Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy October, “Building Trust through Testing Adapting DOD’s Test & Evaluation, Validation & Verification (TEVV) Enterprise for Machine Learning Systems, including Deep Learning Systems” https://cset. georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Building-Trust-Through-Testing.pdf Acc 6/23/22 JZ]
Third, with an effective TEVV system, the United States can reduce barriers to innovation and facilitate U.S. leadership in ML/DL technologies. As most of the innovation in ML/DL will come from the private sector, unless the U.S. government is able to effectively draw on private sector work in this arena, it will not be able to leverage the best cutting-edge technology. Research on new TEVV methods and organizational reforms to adapt the current system is simply not keeping pace with private sector development. Without urgent reforms and prioritized investment in new research and infrastructure, the Defense Department will lose its chance to shape industry’s approach to ML/DL development in a manner consistent with DOD standards for safety, reliability, and accountability. It will lose the opportunity to take advantage of new private sector developments, while allowing other nations without such standards to adopt the latest innovations. It is critical that the U.S. government not only shape its own U.S. industry standards but also promote compatible global standards and norms.
2022
MNDI
Counterplan
AI › EU › BIPARTISAN AI POLICY
Rao & Greenstein 22 [Ananad Rao & Brey, Global AI Lead; US & Data and Analytics Partner, 2022, PwC 2022 AI Business Survey, PWC,, 6/24/2022, MA]
Companies that take a more holistic approach to AI, focusing on achieving three business goals, see greater success than those that take a singular approach. Bar chart titled Compared to companies that approach AI in a piecemeal manner, these leaders (just over a third in our survey) are far more likely (36% versus 20%) to report widespread AI adoption. They’re roughly twice as likely to rep9ort substantial value from AI initiatives to improve productivity, decision-making, customer experience, product and service innovation, employee experience and more. By bringing so many leaders together from across the organization, a holistic approach facilitates scale and data sharing. It brings together AI specialists with analytics teams, software engineers and data scientists. By including business experience, it helps align outcomes with business priorities, leading to organizational buy-in and to projects that deliver a real impact at a reasonable cost. This holistic approach supports a critical ingredient of AI success: investing in and managing data, AI and cloud as a unified whole. AI can deliver more value at scale when it’s embedded in application systems that work nonstop, analyzing and acting on data from inside and outside the organization. These systems, in turn, need cloud-based computing power that can scale up and down to help meet demands. An approach to AI initiatives that encompasses business, technology and decision-making priorities helps data, AI and cloud work together smoothly, end-to-end. This unified approach to AI aligns well with a unified approach to data: making a person (such as a chief data officer) or a centralized team responsible for data sharing and data governance. That can help connect data to AI in ways that benefit as many lines of business as possible. Thirty-six percent of companies with a holistic approach to AI are planning to use AI this year to help create a data fabric: an action-ready, 360-degree view of all data that touches their organizations. Within this framework, many AI leaders plan to focus on five key priorities, all related to one theme: delivering valuable, real-world business outcomes. AI-supported decision-making is so powerful for a simple reason: it can enable you to incorporate and analyze far more information than you (or any human being) could do on their own. To help optimize pricing, for example, AI can input reams of historical data on product sales, margins, supplier costs and customer satisfaction, then produce rigorous estimates of possible future scenarios. It can project how competitors and suppliers might change their prices in response to your decisions. AI combined with Internet of Things (IoT) sensors can forecast machines’ performance and maintenance needs, enabling better operational decisions. With the rise in “AI at the edge” — AI combined with edge computing, so AI algorithms are executed at or near the device level — these decisions can be lightning fast, too. Start with outcomes. As you consider new AI models in decision-making, don’t start with the data you have. Instead, start with the business outcome you seek, then look for the data and analytics to back it up. Consider which decision-makers will use the model to achieve this outcome, where the model will fit within the decision-making process, how it will integrate with the cloud, and how you will monitor, scale, improve and eventually retire it. Let AI make your data actionable. Once you’ve identified the data you need, let AI help you find and use it. Many companies are drowning in unstructured, “messy” data. Whether with, images or video, AI can wade through this ocean of data, extract exactly what decision-makers need and put this data — and only this data — in front of the right people at the right time. Focus, then scale. A holistic approach doesn’t mean “everything at the same time.” An effective way to use AI in highly complex decisions, such as ESG, is to start with a specific element, such as a single facility’s carbon footprint. You can then scale up to other facilities and ESG factors.What companies can do Create synthetic data. Machine learning models require huge amounts of data — which simulation models can create. For facial recognition, for example, instead of acquiring images of faces from multiple angles, contrast levels and brightness, simulations can generate them to train machine learning models. Synthetic data, which AI simulations can provide, can turbocharge other AI and analytics initiatives. Make digital twins a platform too. To effectively use AI’s power to create business-relevant simulations, consider (as part of AI’s integration with and) making digital twins a platform capability — to help make sense of your various data sets in the context of your business, your customers and your products. Align your specialists. Your simulation specialists very likely have an engineering background, while your data scientists will typically be more experimental scientists. Bringing these specialists together with each other and with business leaders is key to solving simulation problems. Companies are now increasingly able to answer these and other questions, thanks to new assessment methods. These can capture not just “hard” returns, such as increased productivity, and “hard” costs, such as new hardware spending. They can also capture “soft” returns, such as an improved employee experience, and “soft” costs, such as increased demands on subject matter specialists’ time. The holistic approach to AI, by fostering scale, shared insights and shared leading practices, also makes it easier to predict the ROI of new initiatives. As you work to measure and increase AI’s ROI, you may also be able to take advantage of AI itself: its simulations can model the uncertainties that surround other AI initiatives, helping to better allocate resources. What companies can do Be complete. As you use the to assess and predict AI’s ROI, be sure to factor in uncertainties (such as AI models’ exact error rate), changes in model performance and maintenance needs over time, and how different AI initiatives could impact each other’s results. Build a portfolio. To help avoid ROI surprises, consider a: as you might do with financial investments or product innovation, create and assess a mix of initiatives that will raise the likelihood of delivering the overall results you need. Manage the life cycle. To further predict and boost AI’s ROI, aim to manage not individual AI projects, but an integrated data-AI-cloud (DAC) life cycle. That can help you continually evolve strategy, fine-tune execution and find new use cases for data — both avoiding downside surprises and identifying new value. Given the widespread understanding of, the lack of action likely reflects the challenges. Responsible AI requires both technology and business experience. AI professionals may, for example, miss the impact on compliance or the brand when AI makes decisions based on historical data sets, which may be rife with historically common biases. Business and risk experts may lack the technical skills to forecast how highly complex algorithms may perform as circumstances change. And since AI continuously evolves its own decision-making based on new data, it requires governance and protection that evolve too. What companies can do Govern the life cycle. To keep up with fast-changing AI models, deploy of the DAC life cycle.. This governance should integrate risk, AI and business leaders, with new procedures, roles and responsibilities for each of your three lines of defense. You often can employ and enhance much of existing IT governance and controls, but many business and risk leaders may need to learn some AI and data science basics. Assess the impact. To facilitate the work of integrated teams and life-cycle governance, consider. By evaluating the end-to-end AI life cycle, they can capture risk, identify governance needs, increase accountability and facilitate go/no-go decisions. Minimize bias. Many companies today are understandably focusing on responsible AI basics: making sure that AI is safe and does what it’s supposed to. But as AI supports ever more business-critical decision making, it will likely become increasingly important to, so that your AI models treat all of your stakeholders fairly approach to be continuing full speed ahead with AI initiatives despite the AI talent shortage (23% versus 14%). That may be because they’re far more likely to be pursuing leading practices such as retraining in-house talent to work with AI (43% versus 33%), and reorganizing teams to make better use of scarce AI experience (41% versus 32%). Perhaps because successful AI initiatives are providing the money (through either cost savings or enhanced revenue) for a bigger hiring budget, they’re also more likely to be actively recruiting more AI specific talent (42% versus 32%). Finally, they’re also nearly one and a half times more likely than others (44% versus 30%) to plan on leveraging more third-party vendors, such as with their scalable and multifaceted AI workforce, for experience. What companies can do Do more with less with AI. The highest-value use of AI in the labor market today is to help people to do better work, reducing the pressure to fill hard-to-fill positions. That’s true both for routine tasks, which AI-backed automation can perform to save employees’ time, and for advanced, AI-specific roles. AI can, for example, often conduct even sophisticated data science tasks, helping compensate for the shortage of data scientists. Make employees happier. By reducing the need for rote work, AI can make employees’ work life easier and more engaging. By giving them the opportunity and training to work with cutting edge AI, you can help increase the value you’re providing them — as well as the value they can give you. AI can even help in the workplace, fighting productivity loss and burnout. Invest in data-driven people. The fastest way to address the AI talent shortage is most often to take specialists who have some of the skills you need, then provide the rest. Consider teaching computer scientists data science, data scientists software engineering, statisticians AI-relevant data science, and business leaders a little of all of these fields. Besides filling talent gaps, this approach can enhance cooperation among the groups that AI requires.
2022
MNDI
Counterplan
AI › EU › OECD Cards (NATO SAYS NO)
Carayannis & Draper 22 [E.G. Carayannis & J. Draper, American Scientist & Austhor, 11 January 2022, Optimising peace through a Universal Global Peace Treaty to constrain the risk of war from a militarised artificial superintelligence, AI & Soc,, 6/19/2022 MA]
While the United States under President Donald Trump has been pulling away from international agreements and institutions such as the Paris climate accord, NATO, and the UN, U.S. government officials participated in the drafting of the principles which the country later agreed to adopt. U.S. President Donald Trump himself had called for in February. The executive order also aimed to promote cooperation with foreign powers. An official at the OECD also said the United States adopted the principles because they wanted to keep some control over international agreements on technology and were worried that Europeans were becoming the global rule-setters since the General Data Protection Regulation. “During the whole process of negotiation, the US have been making compromises with the other countries and stakeholders,” said Anne Carblanc, head of the OECD's digital economic policy division. The United States is home to some of the world’s biggest technology companies such as Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple. China is its main competition with the. The country, which is not a member of the OECD, sees AI through different eyes. The country has used, among other uses. Gurría, the OECD's secretary-general, confirmed more general fears around the development of AI. "There are questions around the trustworthiness, the robustness of AI systems including the dangers of codifying or reinforcing existing biases related to gender, race, or infringing on human rights of important values like privacy," he said during his opening address. The United States was among signatories keen for the document to reinforce democratic values centred on human rights, officials said. “With [their participation], the US was keen on establishing a certain path that was more in line with the OECD and our values,” said Wyckoff. Artificial intelligence has been a focus of international discussions this year, and the OECD AI principles will be discussed at a G20 summit in Japan on June 28 and 29. OECD officials and experts are developing a more practical document for the implementation of the principles. Artificial intelligence has also been the focus of the G7 hosted by France. The country’s president Emmanuel Macron has partnered with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government to push for strong cooperation. In late 2018, both countries announced the creation of a group of international experts on AI, which would be modeled after the International Panel on Climate Change. During a G7 meeting of ministers of digital affairs in May, Canada and France unveiled about future international group IPAI (International Panel on Artificial Intelligence). The European Union unveiled its in April. The document, which establishes consensus among EU members, mentions the importance of human agency and oversight of AI systems and the need to ensure respect for privacy and data protection. The document represents a first step toward practical guidelines and potential regulation in the future.
2022
MNDI
Counterplan
AI › EU › OECD Cards (NATO SAYS NO)
Carayannis & Draper 22 [E.G. Carayannis & J. Draper, American Scientist & Austhor, 11 January 2022, Optimising peace through a Universal Global Peace Treaty to constrain the risk of war from a militarised artificial superintelligence, AI & Soc,, 6/19/2022 MA]
Artificial intelligence has been a focus of international discussions this year, and the OECD AI principles will be discussed at a G20 summit in Japan on June 28 and 29. OECD officials and experts are developing a more practical document for the implementation of the principles. Artificial intelligence has also been the focus of the G7 hosted by France. The country’s president Emmanuel Macron has partnered with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government to push for strong cooperation. In late 2018, both countries announced the creation of a group of international experts on AI, which would be modeled after the International Panel on Climate Change. During a G7 meeting of ministers of digital affairs in May, Canada and France unveiled about future international group IPAI (International Panel on Artificial Intelligence). The European Union unveiled its in April. The document, which establishes consensus among EU members, mentions the importance of human agency and oversight of AI systems and the need to ensure respect for privacy and data protection. The document represents a first step toward practical guidelines and potential regulation in the future.
2022
MNDI
Counterplan
AI › EU › OECD Cards (NATO SAYS NO)
Carayannis & Draper 22 [E.G. Carayannis & J. Draper, American Scientist & Austhor, 11 January 2022, Optimising peace through a Universal Global Peace Treaty to constrain the risk of war from a militarised artificial superintelligence, AI & Soc,, 6/19/2022 MA]
While the United States under President Donald Trump has been pulling away from international agreements and institutions such as the Paris climate accord, NATO, and the UN, U.S. government officials participated in the drafting of the principles which the country later agreed to adopt. U.S. President Donald Trump himself had called for in February. The executive order also aimed to promote cooperation with foreign powers. An official at the OECD also said the United States adopted the principles because they wanted to keep some control over international agreements on technology and were worried that Europeans were becoming the global rule-setters since the General Data Protection Regulation. “During the whole process of negotiation, the US have been making compromises with the other countries and stakeholders,” said Anne Carblanc, head of the OECD's digital economic policy division. The United States is home to some of the world’s biggest technology companies such as Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple. China is its main competition with the. The country, which is not a member of the OECD, sees AI through different eyes. The country has used, among other uses. Gurría, the OECD's secretary-general, confirmed more general fears around the development of AI. "There are questions around the trustworthiness, the robustness of AI systems including the dangers of codifying or reinforcing existing biases related to gender, race, or infringing on human rights of important values like privacy," he said during his opening address. The United States was among signatories keen for the document to reinforce democratic values centred on human rights, officials said. “With [their participation], the US was keen on establishing a certain path that was more in line with the OECD and our values,” said Wyckoff.
2022
MNDI
Counterplan
AI › EU › OECD Cards (NATO SAYS NO)
Carayannis & Draper 22 [E.G. Carayannis & J. Draper, American Scientist & Austhor, 11 January 2022, Optimising peace through a Universal Global Peace Treaty to constrain the risk of war from a militarised artificial superintelligence, AI & Soc,, 6/19/2022 MA]
Canada and the United States joined forty other countries in adopting the first ever set of intergovernmental rules on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) at a conference in Paris on Wednesday, as the technology promises potential benefit and fuels ethical and other concerns. The the nations' representatives put their signatures to stresses AI should be developed and implemented fairly and safely, urging governments to create policies for “responsible stewardship of trustworthy AI.” The guidelines were drafted through an initiative led by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which brought together more than 50 experts from industry, 20 governments, civil society and tech companies. They aim to provide a stable environment for the development and implementation of AI through shared fundamental values. “AI technology is still in its infancy and its potential remains to be realized," OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría said at the official adoption of the principles on 22 May. "And while AI is driving optimism, it is also fueling anxiety and ethical concerns,” he added. The principles include five value-based principles for the development of AI and five recommendations for public policy. The document states that AI should benefit people and planet and be designed in a way that respects the rule of law, human rights, democratic values and diversity. AI systems should be transparent and safe. Their risks should continually be assessed and managed. And those developing, deploying or operating AI systems should be held accountable for their use of the technology, it reads. The OECD experts also recommend that governments facilitate investment in research and development, foster accessibility to AI systems by sharing data and knowledge, create policy to ensure citizens trust in AI systems, train displaced people with skills to help with smoother economic transition, cooperate with other governments to share best practices. Artificial intelligence is already displacing some human employment, and unease about how far that trend will go will need to be dealt with as its application to more problems grows. As a general purpose technology it will affect all fields, and so the principles deal with all the potential consequences and benefits of AI from the economic impact for workers to how data gathered will be used for healthcare, traffic management, advertising or any other purposes. The principles are not legally binding but it will allow the OECD to monitor and compare the progress of the 42 signatories in their development and use of AI. The OECD also has a history of producing policy documents that contribute to later national and international legislation. Their, which highlighted the need to set limits on the collection and use of personal data, was the groundwork policy which the European Union considered for its General Data Protection Regulation law. The OECD is a 36-member club of developed countries that describe themselves as committed to democracy and the market economy. All members signed the AI document, as did Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Romania. OECD officials in charge of the initiative said they were satisfied that many countries worked together to develop and agree to the principles and they hoped more countries will adopt them. “Our ambition goes far beyond our membership,” said Andrew Wyckoff, director for science, technology and innovation at the OECD.
2022
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Counterplan
AI › EU › AI Act
Townsend 21 [Bev Townsend, Postdoctoral Researcher at University of York, “Decoding the Proposed European Union Artificial Intelligence Act”, Insights, , JMH]
The Proposed Regulation Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence On April 21, 2021, the European Commission published the highly anticipated proposal for a Regulation Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (AI Act or the Act).11 This followed the Commission’s ongoing commitment to establish “legislation for a coordinated European approach on the human and ethical implications of AI.”12 At the outset it is worth noting that, rather than focusing on the properties or outcomes of AI, the Act defines an “AI system” as software that is developed using certain techniques and approaches (detailed in an annex) that can, for a given set of human-defined objectives, generate outputs such as content, predictions, recommendations, or decisions influencing the environments they interact with.13 Any AI system developed not using one of the enumerated techniques or approaches falls outside of the definition—a definition that, because of its imprecision, creates the opportunity to skilfully circumvent the Act. The intention is for the new legal framework to provide a set of harmonised rules that align (and are consistent with) existing EU human rights instruments and EU law regulating data protection, data governance, consumer protection, non-discrimination, and gender equality. Accordingly, a cautious yet balanced and proportionate regulatory approach is proposed, one that is primarily risk-based. It sets out the minimum necessary requirements to address risks to values, fundamental rights, and principles associated with AI development and deployment without unnecessarily constraining technological development or trade.14 What the Act does—and does well—is to differentiate requirements by risk level and to prohibit more objectionable AI systems that carry what is considered “undesirable risk” of fundamental rights infringement. The Act also introduces new legal obligations (such as monitoring, reporting, and transparency obligations) to manage those systems that, although not prohibited, are considered high risk. Amongst others, the Act establishes a robust governance, monitoring, and enforcement regime, sets up a European Artificial Intelligence Board, and seeks to impose sanctions and penalties for non-compliance. Adopting a Risk-Based Approach: The Level of Risk Determines the Applicable Rules. The central tenet of the AI Act is to introduce a set of binding rules based upon the intensity and scope of the risk generated by the AI system. The impetus for such a riskdriven approach is that persons at risk and vulnerable to health, safety, and rights infringement by new AI technologies require a higher level of protection. This is premised on the understanding that AI systems have certain characteristics (inter alia, an opacity, complexity, dependency on data, and capacity for autonomous behaviour) that can adversely and significantly affect fundamental human rights—rights to data privacy, transparency, autonomy, and the like.15 The Act addresses three categories of risk: 1. Prohibited Systems. Prohibited systems include AI systems that manipulate human behavior and/or exploit persons’ vulnerabilities; social scoring systems; and, save for certain exceptions, “real-time” and “remote” biometric identification (or facial recognition) systems. 2. High-Risk Systems. While not clearly defined, a “high-risk” system is understood to be one that poses significant risk to health, safety, and fundamental rights. Although the AI Act applies generally to all AI systems, certain provisions contained within the Act (and provided for in Title III) apply specifically to those considered high-risk. High-risk systems are either those products (or safety components of products) already covered by EU health and safety harmonisation legislation (such as medical devices, toys, and machinery, for instance) or those AI systems used in specified areas and contained in an annex to the Act (such as educational training, employment, and law enforcement).16 Rather than relying on certain criteria to position a system as high-risk, the Act designates as high-risk all AI systems used within a specified enlisted and pre-determined domain. There are also no gradations of high-risk systems—either a system is high-risk, in which case compliance with a comprehensive list of requirements and obligations is prescribed, or it is not. Once it has been established that an AI system is high-risk, it is mandated that the system’s provider (the person, agency, or body that develops an AI system or that has an AI system developed with a view to placing it on the market or putting it into service under its own name or trademark17) must fulfill certain requirements and obligations. These requirements include that quality and risk management systems be implemented; that training, validation, and testing datasets be subject to appropriate data governance and management practices and meet data quality criteria; that technical documentation be drawn up and proper records be kept; and that transparency obligations be fulfilled.18 These obligations are set out in detail within the Act. An important further requirement is that high-risk AI systems be designed and developed to allow for human oversight so that natural persons can oversee their functioning. Providers are required to introduce “human-machine interface tools” and measures to guarantee that a system is subject to built-in operational constraints that cannot be overridden by the system itself and is responsive only to a human operator. 3. Low- or Minimal-Risk Systems. All other AI systems that are without risk, or are of low or minimal risk, can be developed, sold, and deployed without additional legal obligations subject, of course, to compliance with any existing relevant legislation (including data protection legislation, such as the GDPR). Moreover, those that design and deploy low- or minimal-risk systems are encouraged to adhere to voluntary codes of conduct. Disclosing Bots, Detecting Emotions, and Deep Fakes Although there are no special requirements for low-risk systems, transparency obligations apply to all risk-levels, and three categories of disclosable activities are distinguished. First, providers of AI systems must design systems so that natural persons are informed that they are interacting with an AI system (so-called robot or “bot” disclosures). This disclosure is to avoid any potential confusion by a natural person when interacting with an AI system. It is not necessary to make such a disclosure in instances where it is contextually obvious that persons are interacting with an AI system. Second, users of systems that detect emotions or determine association with (social) categories based on biometric data must be informed of the operation of the system except in instances permitted by law or in crime prevention. And lastly, although certain exemptions apply, it is required that creators of artificial images, video, or audio content disclose that they have been generated synthetically or manipulated, such as in the case of “deep fakes.”19 Extraterritorial Reach Crucially, if adopted in its proposed form, the AI Act, much like the GDPR, will be farreaching and have significant consequences beyond the EU. The Act has extraterritorial effect and, subject to certain specific exceptions, applies to: (i) providers that place on the market or deploy AI systems in the EU, regardless of where such providers are located; (ii) users of AI systems located within the EU; and (iii) providers and users of AI systems that are located outside the EU to the extent that the output produced by the system is used within the EU. Conclusion: A Step in the Right Direction If the AI Act is strikingly similar to the GDPR, it is perhaps no coincidence. Is the AI Act likely to become the new global “gold standard” for the adoption of AI regulation? Will the EU be the sole and dominant crafters of the laws governing technology? Certainly, many low- and medium-resource countries look to regulations such as those promulgated by the EU to guide and inform their new regulatory policy development. To this end, and despite various shortcomings, the Act is a valuable start in helping to shape global norms and standards and promote trustworthy AI—AI systems that are, at least to some degree, more consistent with human values and interests. The Act also promotes innovation, including regulatory sandboxes and specific measures to support small-scale users and providers. Some may say that in preserving rights it does not go far enough, while innovators and developers may argue that it goes too far. But promoting ethical innovation and fair competition while balancing rights is not easily done— compromise is often needed—and the right regulatory framework should (prudently) do both. But by covering too much ground—fundamental rights, health and safety, data protection, and consumer law—there is a risk that the practical operationalisation and implementation of the law may be untenable. Further, a plausible framework should also be nuanced and flexible enough to adapt to, and keep abreast of, the rapidly evolving landscape that is AI development and deployment. Whether the AI Act does this sufficiently in its present form remains to be seen.
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AI › Norms › 2NC --- NATO follow on
Parker 20 [Lynne Parker, Dr. Lynne Parker is Director of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Office, Deputy United States Chief Technology Officer, and Assistant Director of Artificial Intelligence at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). She is detailing to OSTP from her position as Professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK). She previously served as Interim Dean of the Tickle College of Engineering (TCE) at UTK, and before that was the Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs and Engagement in TCE. She also previously served at NSF as Division Director of Information and Intelligent Systems. She spent several years at Oak Ridge National Laboratory as a Distinguished Research and Development Staff Member. She received her PhD in Computer Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "The American AI Initiative: The U.S. strategy for leadership in artificial intelligence," No Publication, https://oecd.ai/en/wonk/the-american-ai-initiative-the-u-s-strategy-for-leadership-in-rtificial-intelligence] Blitz
On February 11, 2019, President Donald J. Trump launched the the United States’ national strategy for maintaining American leadership in AI, by signing This blog post details how that initiative recognizes the importance of American leadership in AI to maintain the economic and national security of the United States and to shape the global evolution of AI in a manner consistent with our Nation’s values, policies, and priorities. United States policies and practices to promote trustworthy AI innovation The American AI Initiative focuses the resources of the Federal Government in support of AI innovation that will increase prosperity, enhance national security, and improve quality of life. In the past year since the signing of the Executive Order, the United States has made significant progress on achieving the national strategy‘s objectives. This national strategy is well-aligned with the OECD AI Principles and takes important action to support the development of trustworthy AI. The Initiative emphasizes the following key policies and practices: Invest in AI research and development: The United States must promote Federal investment in AI R&D in collaboration with industry, academia, international partners and allies, and other non-Federal entities to generate technological breakthroughs in AI. President Trump called for a two-year and in 2019 the Administration developed the first and published the first-ever reporting of government-wide non-defense AI R&D spending. Unleash AI resources: The United States must enhance access to high-quality Federal data, models, and computing resources to increase their value for AI R&D, while maintaining and extending safety, security, privacy, and confidentiality protections. The American AI Initiative directs Federal agencies to to increase access to and use of Federal data and models. In 2019, the White House Office of Management and Budget established the as a framework for operational principles and best practices for Federal agencies and how they use and manage data. Remove barriers to AI innovation: The United States reduces barriers to the safe development, testing, deployment, and adoption of AI technologies by providing guidance for the governance of AI consistent with our Nation’s values and by driving the development of appropriate AI technical standards. As part of the American AI Initiative, The White House proposed the a first-of-its-kind national AI regulatory policy that advances innovation underpinned by American values. In addition, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) issued the first-ever Promote an international environment supportive of American AI innovation: The United States engages internationally to promote a global environment that supports American AI research and innovation and opens markets for American AI industries while ensuring that AI is developed in a matter consistent with our Nation’s values, including protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Last year, the United States joined with allies in historic efforts at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to develop the first The United States supports OECD’s ongoing work to implement these principles through the AI Policy Observatory and related activities. Embrace trustworthy AI for government services and missions: The United States embraces technology such as artificial intelligence to improve the provision and efficiency of government services to the American people and ensure its application upholds our Nation’s values, including protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. The General Services Administration established an to enable Federal agencies to determine best practices for incorporating AI into their organizations. Train an AI-ready workforce: The United States empowers current and future generations of American workers through apprenticeships; skills programs; and education in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), with an emphasis on computer science, to ensure that American workers are capable of taking full advantage of the opportunities of AI. President Trump directed all Federal agencies to prioritize AI-related apprenticeship and job training programs and opportunities. In addition to its R&D focus, the National Science Foundation’s new program will also contribute to workforce development, particularly of AI researchers. America’s strong innovation ecosystem, fuelled by strategic Federal investments, visionary scientists and entrepreneurs, and renowned research institutions, has propelled the United States to global leadership in AI. However, continued leadership is not predetermined. Maintaining America’s preeminent role in AI can only be realized by continually building upon our progress and pursuing a strategic, forward-looking approach in partnership with industry, academia, non-profit organizations, other non-Federal entities, and like-minded international allies. Together, we will shape the trajectory of AI development for good — enriching our lives, promoting innovation, fostering trust and understanding, and ensuring our national defense and security. NATO slows down solvency and causes cohesion – only a unilateral plan avoids Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman 21 [Lena -- Lena is a CSER Research Affiliate whose research examines the intersection of international security, international law, and emerging military technologies. and Zoe, Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. Her research interests are in the areas of defence innovation, emerging technologies, defence industries, and military capability development. Previously she worked as a defence analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris and Brussels. She holds a Master's degree from Sciences Po Paris and a Bachelor's degree from Johns Hopkins University. Throughout her studies, her practical experience included working on dual-use export controls with the U.S. government and consulting for U.S. government systems integrators. Her participation in the Warring with Machines project will include framing machine learning in a socio-technical context that takes into account the unique aspects of defence economics, management, and operational environments, as well as applying lessons across alliances and like-minded countries. The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance inMilitary Affairs”-9780197579329-e-69] Blitz Externally, as AI-enabled autonomous systems enter the arsenals of more technologically advanced countries, uncoordinated ethical frameworks between Allies could pose operational risks. Without wider alignment, AI systems will have “varying technical specifications based on the legal and policy decisions made by individual governments when answering the key questions.” Further, although one motivation of autonomous systems is the increased safety of military personnel by removing them from dangerous situations, the lack of alignment could lead some Allies to perceive other capitals’ deployments of unmanned forces as a lack of commitment to put lives on the line, therein posing credibility risks for Allies to assure one another. These credibility risks can be mitigated by accountability and verification standards and procedures that NATO can implement for multinational operations, and efforts to institutionalize these procedures for AI are underway. While the NATO AI Strategy is expected to create a common foundation for the Alliance’s pursuit of AI, it is the implementation of principles for safe, ethical, legal, and interoperable AI that will reveal how coherent different national perspectives are. As of August 2021, only the United States and France have publicly issued their military AI strategies. Other allies, including Canada and the United Kingdom, have emerging views on responsible military AI, but little official information about how they implement their ethical risk assessments is publicly available.
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AI › Norms › 2NC --- Modelling
Ethics of AI: Values and Principles
The document defines the scope and provides a universal framework of values and principles of the ethics of AI within its scope. The definition of AI within the document includes and is not limited to machine learning, machine reasoning, cyber-physical systems, IoT, and all stages of AI systems life cycle (process, person, enterprise).
The objective of the document is to guide the actions of the stakeholders in embedding the ethics of the AI, promote human rights and fundamental freedom in all stages of the AI life cycle, and promote equitable access to development and knowledge in the field of AI between the global north and south nations. The recommendations explicitly ban the use of AI social scoring and mass surveillance and advocate stronger data protection.