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In the same way that crypto-proponents are buying up beachfront property in Puerto Rico, contributing to rising real estate prices and threatening to push existing residents out, the financialization of housing and land has “colonized cities by provoking dispossession and homelessness” (Rolnik, 2019). More broadly, private property ownership has been conceptualized as a white settler colonial construct tied to violence and dispossession of land from Indigenous populations (King, 2019). Bhandar has established how private property and racial subjects are co-produced in ongoing “racial regimes of property” (2018). Dorries (2022) further argues that racial property regimes are reinforced in mainstream planning logics and poses a critical provocation – what is planning without property? Engaging this trajectory of thought, I raise the reverse question – via DLTs and other digital tools – what is property without planning? I suggest that certain digital technologies are used to encode or perpetuate the private property regime outside of mainstream planning structures, and yet DLTs are being used in fewer cases to experiment and imagine more equitable modes of living. More research on land based distributed ledger projects and digital real estate experiments (along with their racial/gendered implications) is needed.

Even for projects that claim to seek justice and emancipation via blockchains, a form of “settler normalcy” (Tuck and Yang, 2012) makes it hard to envision actionable alternatives outside of the capitalist status quo. While distributed ledgers may open up experimentation with land and property to those outside of mainstream planning discipline, this does not mean such experimentation will inherently be more just or decolonial. Decolonial design strategies necessarily rethink the concept of private ownership and might explore commoning and cooperative practices, collectivism, and multi-species land stewardship (TallBear, 2017; Bresnihan, 2016; Tsing, 2015; Sundberg, 2014). If distributed ledgers are to support the interests of justice, one might first question, as Dorries (2022) poses, “what forms of praxis and modes of relationality […] will best support the ethical flourishing of life?” – and are certain technological configurations compatible?

This article argues that blockchain represents a form of ‘platform imperialism’ (Jin, 2015) that extends both the cultural and economic power of Silicon Valley and American geopolitical interests. Blockchain has emerged as one of the central technologies of the ICT4D paradigm drawing together foreign governments, NGOs, platform developers and corporations in shaping developing world economic policy and governance practices. The US State Department has played a crucial role in coalescing these networks through initiatives such as Civil Society 2.0 which cast Silicon Valley platforms and a culture of techno-solutionism (Morozov, 2014) as universal. What is distinct about blockchain platform imperialism are its claims to algorithmic governance and powers of cartography. As part of ‘Data’s Empire’ (Isin and Ruppert, 2019), blockchain undermines the developing world state’s ability to control its own resources, while mapping new ‘territory as an object of power’ (208). Blockchain complements techno-colonial processes of data extraction and computational capitalism (Beller, 2018) by using code to lock in proprietary relations.

Opening new terrains of data and expanding network technologies does not depend upon imperial coercion but an assemblage of development agencies, foreign governments and platforms all ‘celebrat[ing] the transformative nature of ICTs’ (Ndemo, 2019: 27). Within these contours, there are rival cyber-powers and platforms as well as indeterminacies of connectivity which diffuse the exercise of imperial power. However the ‘spiritual hegemony of American-based entrepreneurship’ (Jin, 2015: 16) pervades these networks. The US has relied on the soaring rhetoric of freedom, democracy and empowerment through connectivity in shaping global communication systems. American hegemony in ICT4D can be explained in political-economic terms as the support of domestic capital and platforms, the leadership of governing bodies such as ICANN and the US State Department’s long-standing interest in tech-centric soft power initiatives. This continuity of soft power and cultural imperialism spans the ‘free flow of information doctrine’ (Schiller, 1975) during the Cold War to the ‘freedom to connect agenda’ (Powers and Jablonski, 2015: 74) in the era of network computing. As articulated by former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, connectivity is the ‘great leveller’ creating ‘a common body of knowledge that benefits and unites us all’ (US Department of State, 2010).

In a very short space of time, arguably the last three to five years, blockchain has risen to capture the feverish imagination of capitalists and entrepreneurs alike across the globe. There is now a morass of such players scrambling over one another in ferce competition to be the winners in this latest round of onanistic technological innovation. Fuelled almost exclusively by hyperbole and, contrary to the nature of the technology itself, a gradual centralization and aggregation of peripheral technological practices that is a direct result of the infuence of capitalist logic, blockchain is rapidly emerging as a proftable mainstream means for generating the surplus interventions, accumulations, exploitations and reproductions demanded by the capitalist imagination. Under the duel banners of ‘innovation’ and ‘progress’ blockchain has become the means du jour for the reproduction of capitalist class power through ‘world changing’ technology in the so-called fourth-industrial age in which advanced Western capitalist societies now imagine themselves.3 And the forward thrust of blockchain innovation is furious, with record levels of investment as of 2016/17 measured in billions of dollars of venture capital.

Capital and ‘Disruptive’ Innovation: An Entrepreneurial Love Afair The issue of blockchain as a means of reproducing capitalist class power does not begin (or end for that matter) with the technology itself but with people. Those who engineer and build the technology might care about blockchain solely as an intellectual challenge. The extent to which it is possible to separate those who, for instance, engineer a piece of software or build a platform from those who seek to exploit the technology (for the purposes of not simply generating personal fortunes in the short to medium term but also for the sheer thrill of the process of being an active economic subject) becomes less clear when they are one and the same person, namely a so-called tech entrepreneur. For this cabal of tech-minded libertarians and anarchocapitalists blockchain technology ofers an opportunity to leverage new markets and enable, as David Golumbia argues, ‘a wide range of extractive and exploitative business practices’ that ultimately ‘increase the power of corporations and capital outside the scope of any attempts by democratic polities to constrain them’.5 When discussing technology it is easy to forget the people behind it. Likewise, it is easy for those selfsame people to hide behind the technology and ultimately use it to both facilitate and conceal their desires and motivations. Desires that can be markedly diferent from those to which the technology appears to be aimed — or, at least, towards which they tell the world the technology is aimed. A single basic technological form with many diferent uses is the Holy Grail of technological innovation in engineering terms. Just as Stiglitz suggests in the quote earlier. But the economics of these innovations make happy reading for many as well. The reason is simple. If you don’t need to spend time or money changing technology to make it ft multiple applications then you are likely to have the gift of a technological ‘organizational form’ that is highly cost-efective and organizationally efcient.6 It is trite these days to highlight capital’s insistence on superseding the old with the new, whether via material obsolescence or some other form of cynical immaterial manipulation of one’s personal and subjective desires (advertising, marketing etc.). We must recognise what the process of making way for (or forcing) the new represents in this context however: a deeply ideological and often highly cynical process that determines the accrual of benefts into only a few sets of hands, and the onward march of capitalist class power through the creation of a constant tension between (supposed) problems and (necessary) solutions. Much like the comic plotlines of the hit HBO comedy Silicon Valley, entrepreneurial narratives of progress and innovation are fraught with fanciful thinking and dreamlike logic that see problems as always already indexed to solutions and vice versa, ad infnitum. Central to the reproduction of capitalist class power on this score is the necessity of a call to duty of individuals willing to play the game of problem versus solution. Akin to Louis Althusser’s interpellated economic subjects, entrepreneurs don’t just answer this call (the hail) made by capitalism, however; they locate their object of desire in the internal reason and (il)logic of capital. Entrepreneurs fall in love with innovation, they enjoy the promise of it, and it becomes their ‘passion’.7 As such they tell themselves that ideas not income are important, whilst searching, via a cycle of success and failure, for the one big idea that will secure their fortune.8 For entrepreneurs and capitalists alike the aim is always to unearth innovations and technologies that ‘disrupt’, which are capable of creating more competition and markets. Blockchain is a prime example of just such a ‘disruptive’ technology, hence why it forms the latest chapter in the enduring love story between capital and innovation. But it is important not to confuse technology with innovation. The latter ‘is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in’.9 Innovation, like progress, is rooted in historical contingency and narratives of power. ‘The idea of innovation is the idea of progress stripped of the aspirations of the Enlightenment, scrubbed clean of the horrors of the twentieth century, and relieved of its critics’, says Jill Lepore, ‘[d]isruptive innovation goes further, holding out the hope of salvation against the very damnation it describes: disrupt, and you will be saved’.10

The US government—reflecting rare bipartisan consensus—has, of late, undertaken increasingly expansive and intrusive actions to stem the illicit flow of proprietary secrets and intellectual property to China. These actions also aim to reduce the benefits that accrue to China from expertise acquired by Chinese scholars and students during visits or extended stays in the United States. Underlying this consensus is evidence that China is stealing valuable proprietary information from the United States, characterized by FBI Director Christopher Wray as “a whole of society effort to steal from the United States” (1).

Although these government actions are well-intentioned, significant harm has resulted. The benefits to the United States from the influx of talented Chinese students, immigrant scientists, and visiting scholars to our universities have largely been ignored or poorly understood by policymakers. Numerous examples highlight the importance for the United States of welcoming talent from around the world, but most particularly from China. Understanding the implications of these examples underscores just how much we lose by enacting Draconian measures to stop Chinese scientists from coming to the United States.

The crypto industry has never made it this far in its quest for a new system of U.S. oversight for digital assets, but the recent flurry of legislative progress may still be too contentious for it to become law.

Three major fronts have emerged in digital assets legislation. One effort would finally set up wide-ranging rules for the industry, another would address stablecoins and a third would tackle the dangers of money laundering in crypto. They all saw a surge forward last week, but each of them also faces a minefield that may be insurmountable in the short term.

Ratings agency S&P Global on Tuesday took note of cryptocurrencies' appeal as assets that protect investors from the effects of inflation, while also stressing the lack of data to support the popular narrative.

"Crypto assets could theoretically be a hedge against inflation," the New York-based agency said in a press release shared with CoinDesk, noting adoption in some emerging markets battling high inflation.

Implementing blockchain technology often comes with a hefty price tag. This is not just about the initial setup but also encompasses various aspects like developing the necessary infrastructure and continuous maintenance.

For instance, a company looking to adopt blockchain must invest in robust hardware and software, hire skilled blockchain developers, and possibly train existing staff. Additionally, finding the right expertise can be costly since blockchain is a relatively new technology.

Disadvantages of Blockchain Technology for Small Businesses and Enterprises

Every coin has two sides, so now let’s look in detail at the top 5 drawbacks of blockchain technology you may meet while implementing it for your business needs.

Bitcoin's (BTC) bull run could add to inflation in the U.S. economy, making it harder for the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates this year.

The leading cryptocurrency by market value has gained over 50% in 2024 already, extending last year's 155% surge to trade within striking distance of record highs near $69,000. Ether (ETH) has also surged, and the CoinDesk 20 Index, a broader market gauge, has jumped 57% this year. The total crypto market capitalization has added 53% to $2.64 trillion.

An asset bubble is defined as the difference between the asset's price and its fundamental (or intrinsic) value. The fundamental value is the present value of future cash flows from the asset’s ownership (dividends for stocks, coupons for bonds, rents for rental property, imputed rents when the property is owner-occupied...). To answer the question of viability, a cryptocurrency is what economists call a pure bubble, an asset with no intrinsic value - its price will fall to zero if market confidence in it disappears - in other words, its fundamental is zero. More generally, whether its fundamental is zero or positive, the price of any asset available in limited quantities can reach very high values, well beyond this fundamental, thanks to self-fulfilling beliefs: I'm prepared to pay a high price for an asset if I think someone will buy it back from me tomorrow at an even higher price on average; and this next buyer will hold the same reasoning, ad infinitum. Technically, one must correct for the interest rate on other available assets and for any risk aversion, especially as these bubbles are so volatile. [For the exact conditions under which an asset can become the subject of a bubble, see my two Econometrica articles (1982 and 1985), as well as my article with Emmanuel Farhi in the Review of Economic Studies (2012) on the potential use of bubbles as a store of value by financial intermediaries, generating booms and then crashes in economic activity. The 1985 article also discusses the complex link between the value of an asset as a medium of exchange and the existence of a bubble; even if a pure bubble such as bitcoin can a priori serve as a medium of exchange, the fact remains that its value falls to 0 when confidence disappears].

The risks

Another approach is defensive publication. It can be considered when the invention does not qualify for secrecy, for example: if the invention is self-evident and can easily be reverse engineered, and if the costs of patenting outweigh the benefits. Another reason can be identified in the risks associated with trade secrecy, such as involuntary leaks (Mansfield (1985)). As the name suggests, the strategy consists of disclosing the details of an invention, effectively making it publicly available. One of the main requirements for a patent grant on an invention is that the invention must be new since the objective of the patent system is to promote progress. To verify if an invention is new, it is measured against the prior art publicly available. The prior art contains all information which was made public at anytime, anywhere and in any way before the patent application. Defensive publications hence qualify as prior art and render it impossible for competitors (as well as the original owner of the intellectual property) to get a patent on the published invention. Here again, timeliness plays a central role: for example, legislations in individual countries such as USA, Australia, South Korea, Canada and a few others specify a year-long grace period. In effect, a publication only counts as prior art if it was published 12 months before the invention. It can prove to be a serious challenge to ascertain whether a disclosure has been available for more than a year. The capability to undoubtedly prove the exact time of publication can be the decisive element settling a lawsuit – or invalidating a patent. Theoretically, defensive publications bear massive potential: for the inventor, it guarantees freedom to operate, identified as “the fundamental precondition for appropriation [of value from inventive activity]” by Henkel et al. (2008). Furthermore, the entire society benefits as the invention becomes public, remains unprotected and can thus be used and improved by everyone.

In exploring the likelihood of Western corporations’ receipt of compensation for the infringement of their IP rights, some attorneys have recommended implementing a private sector-based strategy.130 Foreign businesses can adopt a proactive approach aimed at protecting and enforcing their IP rights or receiving compensation for IP infringement by pursuing litigation in Russian courts and settling with Russian subsidiaries.131

In stark contrast to the Russian executive and legislative branches, which are in favor of weakening Western IP rights, the Russian judiciary has voiced its reservations and scrutinized the targeted policies.132 After seeking protection of its trademark “L.O.L. Surprise!” toys, U.S. corporation MGA Entertainment, Inc. received a favorable judgment from the Russian Arbitration Court of the Tomsk Region.133 The Arbitration Court held that Russia must adhere to its international legal obligations as stipulated in Article V(I) of the Berne Convention: to guarantee the same level of IP protection to companies within the country of origin and within other states who are parties to the Convention.134 Since the ruling, legal commentators have speculated on whether Russian courts will resist Putin’s efforts to turn non-enforcement of IP rights into a countermeasure against the West.135

For this reason, it's incumbent on brands to protect their products and their image from theft and fraud. Luckily, there are several tools and strategies at their disposal to protect their business and maintain trust with their consumers.

1. Track And Trace Networks

– Employee Education and Awareness: Providing comprehensive cybersecurity training to employees, focusing on the importance of IP protection, social engineering threats, and best practices for data handling, is becoming a proactive industry standard. Conducting regular awareness campaigns to reinforce security protocols and encourage reporting of suspicious activities is a common approach adopted by businesses of all sizes.

Beyond the status quo, the federal government could provide cybersecurity grants. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) announced it will grant $3 million to strengthen the cybersecurity infrastructure of new small businesses (SBA, 2022). A similar program for smaller businesses with promising IP might help small businesses avoid theft that might put them out of business. In 2018, small businesses accounted for 43.5% of U.S. gross domestic product (Kobe & Schwinn, 2018). Meanwhile, according to The Small Business Guide to Cybersecurity (SCORE, 2020), up to 71% of cyberattacks occur at businesses under 100 employees. There is a lot of variability in these estimates from different sources and years—CPO magazine estimates that 50% of all cyberattacks (Powell, 2019). Regardless, most estimates indicate malicious cyber activity aimed at small businesses outstrips the businesses’ contribution to the GDP. Alarming statistics abound when studying the behavior of our adversaries versus small businesses. According to Barracuda Networks (2022), the average employee of a small business with fewer than 100 employees fields 350% more social engineering attempts than an employee of a larger enterprise. Although it is impossible to prove, available data suggests that small businesses underinvest in cybersecurity. Juniper Research (2018) found that small businesses make up only 13% of the overall cybersecurity market. Meanwhile, small businesses make up 99% of all U.S. businesses (SBA, 2020). It seems that adding a grant program specifically for companies with promising IP to the U.S. government’s existing efforts could be a step in the right direction. Although Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAO) are not government organizations, the formation of an ISAO focused on the protection of intellectual property would be beneficial. These organizations can help spread threat-specific information and best practices to innovators across the country.

In order to have a baseline defense against Chinese IP theft, the following must happen: create a sense of urgency, educate individuals, expand insider threat protocols, invest more in cyber defense, and issue harsher sentences for those that participate in intellectual property theft.

First and foremost, a sense of urgency within the U.S. populous needs to exist in order for change to occur. While the conducted survey data indicates that the average American citizen has a somewhat decent grasp on espionage efforts in the U.S., and who presents the largest threat in this realm, there is no immediate sense of urgency in regards to preparing for cyberattacks. When it comes to cyber threats, individuals tend to brush them off as the attack feels less personal, and the impacts are less explicit than a kinetic attack. This reality is amplified by how hard catching cyberattacks can be, especially for an employee working outside of cyber security. One might say that until a cyberattack financially hurts an individual, they will not care about cyber threats, or think that they could become the victim of such threats. Even though the survey data states that 59% of Americans believe cyber is the biggest national security risk, the average citizen brushes off their pertinence because their impacts are not imminent or grotesque. In reality, all Americans face cyber threats routinely, and this lackadaisical approach only emboldens China’s IP theft endeavors.

The third pillar of a unified grand strategy is military policy. If economic and diplomatic policy fail to deter China from seizing Taiwan, then US military policy must be robust. The US is pivoting to the Pacific, but not fast enough. There are two main policy options, and they are not mutually exclusive. The first policy alternative is to reshuffle force deployment in the Pacific theater. Currently the US uses a half-dozen major military bases within the first and second island chains. This is problematic because China has an extremely deadly and accurate ballistic missile force that would destroy 90% of the US Pacific forces within the first few days due to densely grouped assets.40 The policy alternative is the concept of Agile Combat Employment (ACE). ACE takes the WWII concept of island hopping and expands it.41 The goal would be to construct hundreds of small forward arming and refueling points within the first island chain to allow US forces to disperse and rearm and refuel before they are targeted by China’s ballistic missiles. 42 This would be coupled with obtaining increased basing rights in Southeast Asia and the Philippines, and greatly enhancing ballistic missile defenses in the Pacific. The goal would be to complicate China’s targeting, and to reduce the size of the salvos launched against US forces to allow a higher probability of interception by US forces.43

The other key policy alternative is to greatly enhance the US manufacturing capability of long-range, precision guided munitions (PGMs) and to expand the US network of multilateral alliances in the Indo-Pacific. The US is woefully understocked for a hot war with a major power. Taiwan invasion wargames have shown the US running out of PGMs within the first few weeks, leading to costly engagements and huge US losses. The US must greatly enhance its defense industrial base to build more PGMs and enlist allied nations to do so as well. Multilateral partnerships will help in this regard too. More security partners in the Indo-Pacific will mean more basing opportunities and angles to project US forces, complicating China’s invasion plans. The US may not have the full capability to defend Taiwan at such great distance, but Xi Jinping must doubt China’s ability to take Taiwan at minimal cost.

Economic Decoupling and IP Protection The “CHIPS Act” has been a very strong move in the right direction to economically decouple from China and Taiwan on the most critical semiconductor manufacturing. However, more must be done, both to reduce China’s theft of US and allied IP, and increase the security posture in the Indo-Pacific to reassure Taiwan and other regional allies such as Japan and South Korea.34 On China’s IP theft there are several potential policy options. Bills like H.R. 1016, the “Stop China’s IP Theft Act,” would sanction CCP members and prevent most CCP officials from doing business with the US or entering the US until China stops stealing US IP.35 Bills like this are mostly symbolic and have a small chance of becoming law. However, the larger point remains that there needs to be additional pressure placed on China and the CCP to dissuade continued theft. The biggest policy alternative that provides the US with leverage is the concept of reciprocity. China unfairly targets US corporations and pressures companies to share trade secrets or submit blueprints for scrutiny.36 The US does not do that to Chinese firms. There are two playing fields, and one is rules based, the other is heavily tilted in the CCP’s favor. China knows this and actively exploits the US laws to its own advantage. The US can further place trade limitations on Chinese firms when China targets US firms, and it can place even more restrictive export controls on technology, not just sensitive dual use technology.37

One of the fruits of bringing the Chinese economy more completely into international trade relations is that membership requires commitments to formal agreements of one kind or another. Should any nation violate those contracts, there are due-process mechanisms that allow for the case to be arbitrated. The World Trade Organization (WTO) carries one such provision related to IP, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement. The United States alleges that China has routinely violated the specifics of that binding arrangement. In 2018, the United States brought suit at the WTO, alleging that Chinese joint-venture agreements routinely permitting use of American technology after the expiration of the contract represented a violation of WTO trade law. Shortly thereafter, the European Union filed a parallel inquiry expressing a similar grievance.

The response was swift, occurring prior to the case being heard. In March 2019, China peremptorily outlawed the compulsory transfer of technology requirements, which were the targets of the U.S. WTO case (Zuijdwijk, 2019). That law went into effect on January 1, 2020, but does not represent the end of the story, as the persistence of claims of IP abuse continue to attest. The Chinese government quickly declared a workaround that brought allegations of malfeasance under the purview of its court system. Here Chinese authorities exercise a decided advantage when evaluating claims brought by foreign parties. For example:

There are two means through which this transfer of technology is facilitated. The first involves coercion applied to American companies wishing to establish business ties with Chinese companies. Two experts affiliated with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace outline a typical arrangement that allows for pressure to be applied to foreign firms:

[I]n some sectors China is accused to demanding technology transfers in exchange for market access by requiring foreign investors to form joint ventures with Chinese firms. Although China denies any coercion (after all, foreign firms can simply walk away), many foreign firms feel that the sheer size and attractiveness of the Chinese market give domestic firms excessive bargaining power [Huang & Smith, 2019].