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2024 Michigan Kritik
Links › Impact/Advantage Links › Journalism

Online platforms are an unstoppable force that tracks our every move to give us new signals in the form of advertisements to get us to consume more.

Cohen 23, Julie Georgetown University Law Center, December 17, 2023, “Informational Capitalism as Phase Shift: Challenges for Digital Constitutionalism”, Oxford University Presss, forthcoming 2024, Accessed July 5, 2024, PW

The phase shift to informational capitalism also entails a new organizational logic for economic exchange, which revolves around platformization. Unlike the fictional construct of a market, which is dematerialized and universal, platformization entails more concrete and specific computational and sociotechnical arrangements. Generally speaking, platforms are information intermediaries that use data-driven, algorithmic methods and standardized, modular interconnection protocols to facilitate digitally networked interactions and transactions among their users. The platformized arrangements that have emerged within the political economy of informational capitalism also exploit those structures in additional, more specific ways. The early decades of the twenty-first century have witnessed the emergence of dominant platform firms with seemingly limitless power to configure new, public-facing information-based services on a global scale. They facilitate, intermediate, and control a blend of old and new activities that together define the user experience of the information economy, including but not limited to ecommerce, access to software and digital tools, access to information and entertainment, search, social media, and cloud storage of digital resources. The platform business model represents a distinctive strategy for harnessing legibility to provide access to multiple user constituencies.19 Generally speaking, the dominant platforms (along with a host of smaller platforms) rank order content (including advertising) for presentation to users. They use highly granular data collected from and about users and user populations to optimize the rank ordering process for engagement, which, in turn, maximizes the platform’s ability to extract surplus value in the form of digital advertising revenues, and they design digital devices and interfaces in ways that encourage automatic, habitual use and acquiescence to data collection.20 Scholars and regulators alike have puzzled over the seeming mismatches between platformized arrangements and preexisting legal frameworks. For the most part, such work has focused on the effects produced by dominant platforms in their capacities as self-interested economic actors. Work in antitrust and competition law has explored the way that so-called multi- sided platform businesses disrupt conventional predictions about competitive discipline within markets.21 Work in organizational anthropology and in labor and employment law has probed the ways that dominant platform businesses are reshaping the landscape of work, replacing formal employment structures with outsourced and gig labor arrangements and permeating both old and new work arrangements with continual, invasive worker surveillance.22 Viewing the effects of platformization through the lens of competition law or labor law, however, tends to overshadow other important questions about the computational and sociotechnical logics underlying the political economy of informational capitalism. Platformization represents both a privatized extraction strategy and a core organizational logic, and the latter does not depend (entirely) on the former. Most basically, platforms represent “strategies for introducing friction into networks.”23 They exploit principles of network organization, within which hubs and nodes structure flows of interaction and participants reap benefits as the networks grow in size and scale, as well as the affordances of digital information and communications networks, which are structures for the exchange of modularized packets of information. Atop open networks, platforms use other technical protocols to define networked spaces in which their users can conduct particular activities and to structure those spaces for ease of use. The giant platforms that now dominate the emergent global political economy of informational capitalism have attained that status by leveraging the power of network-and- standard-based architectures and modular communication protocols in a particular way. More specifically, they have pursued so-called “ecosystem” strategies for layering proprietary data collection and exchange protocols systematically across the underlying infrastructure of the open internet. Those strategies rely on software developer kits (SDKs), which are off-the-shelf utilities prepared and distributed by platform proprietors to website and mobile app developers, and which function as “boundary resources” that enable critical kinds of system extension and control.24 Developers use the SDKs to enable a wide range of platform functions—for example, location mapping, ad placement, and universal login. Platforms use them to harvest data from website and mobile app users, transmit it to platform data centers to augment already-existing user profiles, and push profile-driven functionality and content back to users via websites and mobile apps.25 The resulting disaggregated, modular architectures have reached levels of penetration that are self-reinforcing and that inhere in their capabilities for tracking, targeting, and tailoring at scale. For individual and organizational users, they foster experienced personalization and seamless convenience. For developers, they facilitate relatively effortless development and deployment of compatible apps and utilities. For publishers and advertisers, they promise targeted messaging calibrated to user engagement. Every incremental expansion further embeds the data-driven business models into which app developers, website partners, advertisers, and users are recruited, supplying the continual streams of data that drive personalization and enable algorithmic tuning of recommender systems to optimize for engagement and ad targeting. Heterogenous webs of actors are united by dispersed, algorithmic supply chains that cross conventional organizational boundaries—and that frequently resist conventional approaches to accountability.26 Platformization, however, does not simply represent a new way of organizing transactions and interactions among members of the public at scale. It also represents a more widely subscribed organizational logic that involves harnessing algorithmic management and standardized, modular interconnection protocols for seamless access to and exploitation of economic resources within enterprises of all kinds.27 Examples include credit reporting agencies, payment processing intermediaries, specialized services for employee recruitment and human resource management, portals for licensing rights to access and use copyrighted content, dashboards for financial trading, and many more. Preeminence in a particular field may flow from control of a defined resource— as, for example, with trading platforms for the major financial exchanges or platforms for licensing musical performance rights. Conversely, a platformized service can be vulnerable to disintermediation if a rival service manages to position itself as the intermediary of choice—and, for that reason, platforms of all sizes use contracts and technical protocols to define both collected data and algorithmic logics as zones of exclusivity.28 Both old and new platformization strategies now coevolve with the disaggregated, modular data architectures developed and operated by the dominant platforms. So, for example, a wide range of third parties with business models based on multi-dimensional commodification routinely seek and receive permission to embed their own SDKs in popular websites and apps.29 Others rely on platformized advertising dashboards to supply them with targeted pools of potential customers, and still others scrape publicly available data from the social web. Of special importance for the coming decades, both dominant platforms and new entrants now rely on both platformized data architectures and the computing power amassed by a few dominant platform entities to power ventures in neuromarketing, biometric surveillance and generative AI.30 Platformization accelerates the phase shift to informational capitalism in two ways that complement and reinforce the processes of multi-dimensional commodification described in Part 3, and that work to embed economic power structurally and epistemically. First, it offers users (what appear to be) powerful new kinds of transactional flexibility, which, in turn, is both enabled and configured by underlying modular protocols for data exchange. That result parallels what Gillespie described in the context of social media as a “raised, level service” affording limitless freedom for self-presentation, which, in turn elides the necessary work of policing the platform’s protocological edges.31 The apparent freedom with which this chapter is concerned, however, is the freedom to configure and reconfigure datafied resources in new and profitable ways that facilitate both their use and their multi-dimensional exploitation—while, at the same time, tethering the conditions of resource access and use to the platform and its imposed constraints.32 Second, platformization facilitates and perfects a type of nonmarket ordering that inheres in the ability to command fine-grained, data-driven, algorithmic intermediation of information exchange. The most dominant digital platforms now function as fundamentally nonmarket mechanisms for tuning access to information and allocating goods and services.33 The disaggregated, modularized datastructures resulting from platformization also embody distinct kinds of functionality and flexibility. They can be made to extend vertically, in stacks that superimpose data-driven logics over a wide variety of underlying inputs, and/or laterally, in webs that extend tendrils of linkage and control into domains that formerly were more distinct.34

2024 Michigan Kritik
Links › Impact/Advantage Links › Competition

The logic of competition and innovation constructs systems of non-stop anxiety and overstimulation, transforming human attention into another resource to be extracted

Szilvia 22, (Ruszev Szilvia, 2-16-2022, "Mental and Material Images of Contemporary Capitalism," Bournemouth University Research Online, http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/38043/) #GayFrog

There is common knowledge about the fundamental traits of capitalism such as the accumulation of profit, upholding private ownership and the freedom of the individual in a competitive market, based on wage labor. Capitalism’s main critique is that this setup, seemingly geared toward a free market and economic growth, causes exploitative and oppressive structures for a large group of people. What this essay is focusing on is the way in which capitalism developed in the 21st century, enmeshed with the exponential advancement of networked digital technologies in a globalized world. Currently, the product in which capitalism is interested is knowledge and affect, both invisible and inseparable from the person who “produces” them. The contemporary state of capitalism has been labeled in different ways, such as cognitive, neuro, mental, emotional, affective, platform or surveillance capitalism depending on the perspective of the author. Nevertheless, all these adjectives converge around the shifting interest of capitalism from material production to the colonization of the mind by utilizing the power of networked, digital media technologies. As Yann Moulier Boutang asserts “material labour does not disappear, but it loses its central role as a strategic asset”7. Historically, the perspective on contemporary capitalism that concentrates on the ways power structures target cognitive production connects to the Italian Marxist movement of operaismo. Giorgio Grizziotto writes about a shift from the industrial to a biocognitive stage in which technological transformation exerts its power through devices such as mobile phones that became inseparable from our lives as thinking, feeling and material bodies. Tiziana Terranova summarizes it as follows: This transition is expressed not only in technological transformation and innovation, but also in the way in which technological mediation invests the social body, from allergies and autoimmune diseases to burn-out syndromes caused by hyper-competition between precarity, anxiety and stress caused by the fact that attention becomes the central and integral part of work to the materialization of the mobile phone as a biopolitical device in the mobile phone.8 Attention is the central parameter through which the body-mind gets hooked up to the invisible force of technological transformation and normalization. The individual body is added to the social body through its attention, a channel for mediation, which narrows down the human biocognitive existence to competition and other anxiety-driven, negative parameters. In his article “The Economy of Attention”, Georg Franck connects the influences of social and mass media in constituting a so-called “attention capital.” He uses the term “mental capitalism” in which, he observes, “we seem to have a nearly perfect reflection of the material base in our mental superstructure”9. Yves Citton talks rather about an “ecology of attention” and focuses on the synchronicity and communality by which media content is consumed. In his words: And so the general function of this entire mediasphere, of which we had difficulty deciding whether it related to the necessities of production or to the puzzling pleasures of entertainment, comes into view. The very fact of watching the same things together at the same time, even if in apparent isolation from each other, produces effects of communal valorization which are indispensable to the constant renewal of the system of production.10 The term “ecology of attention” points to the inseparability of the natural, media and technological environment, on the one hand, and the underlying hegemonic structures, on the other. The pervasiveness of power exerted through networked digital technologies is expressed through the vanishing of the demarcation between being on and offline, work and leisure, public and private spaces. The vision of a coming metaverse11, or the web 3.0, brings in yet another kind of immaterial ecology: the ecology of the hyperreal. The hyperreality of the metaverse assimilates and commodifies not only cognitive aspects of the human life. Emotion and affect are tools in achieving the desired attention, but they can also be seen as products, constructed and utilized by capitalism. Eva Illouz defines emotional capitalism as follows: Emotional capitalism is a culture in which emotional and economic discourses and practices mutually shape each other, thus producing what I view as a broad, sweeping movement in which affect is made an essential aspect of economic behavior and in which emotional life – especially that of the middle classes – follows the logic of economic relations and exchange.12 The term “affective capitalism” goes in tandem with “emotional capitalism”, emphasizing the body, its feelings, longings, and desires. Brian Massumi describes how affect becomes an intrinsic commodity of capitalism: “The ability of affect to produce an economic effect more swiftly and surely than economics itself means that affect is itself a real condition, an intrinsic variable of the late-capitalist system, as infrastructural as a factory”13. Affect is not only a variable as a means of control but also as a means of production. Thus, attention and affect are closely intertwined in a vicious spiral in the contemporary mediasphere. In turn, the terms “platform capitalism” and “surveillance capitalism” focus on technologies and digital networks that commodify, produce and control fundamental aspects of our human existence such as knowledge, memories, decisions, emotions and affects. In his book Platform Capitalism, Nick Srnicek places data at the epicenter of the production of contemporary capitalism. He looks at various digital platforms that are specialized in extracting, interpreting, and using data as the main asset to achieve growth in a knowledge economy14. Shoshana Zuboff’s book The Age of Surveillance Capitalism focuses on data as a commodity as well. She asserts that “surveillance capitalism unilaterally claims human experience as free raw material for translation into behavioral data”15. Behavioral data, and specifically the so-called “behavioral surplus”, has been used to create predictions and profiling with detrimental consequences for the future of democratic societies. In that sense, digital technologies and contemporary capitalism are perfectly entangled. To summarize, the interdependence between contemporary capitalism and networked digital technologies results in a pervasive power structure that aims to colonize cognitive and affective aspects of human life by subjugating them to the logic of the binary computation. In other words, everything that is computable is commodifiable and controllable at the same time.

2024 Michigan Kritik
Links › Impact/Advantage Links › AI

Artificial Intelligence maps the human brain as a computational device to be exploited and influenced

Szilvia 22, (Ruszev Szilvia, 2-16-2022, "Mental and Material Images of Contemporary Capitalism," Bournemouth University Research Online, http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/38043/) #GayFrog

Contemporary capitalism and neuroscience have found interdependency in their shared goal of understanding and eventually manipulating human behavior based on the positivistic belief that mapping the brain as a distinct and biological entity is possible. In other words, conceptualizing the brain as a computational machine can eventually lead to an optimization and commodification of the human mind. On the one hand, already the term “optimization” is problematic as it is tainted by capitalism’s profit-oriented goals and the idea of the exclusivity of the optimal, which moves close to eugenics. A more appropriate term could be normalization, which lacks the seemingly positive goal setting, yet expresses an external force willing to smoothen the curve of differences. Another consequence of the convergence between capitalism and neuroscience is the development of machine learning algorithms toward a general artificial intelligence (AGI) as a problem solving technological tool in a framework that does not consider ethical questions in the first place. The goal of developing artificial intelligence is to mimic and eventually surpass human perception, cognition and behavior, which reiterates the idea of the human brain as a computational machine. This approach has far reaching consequences for questions such as: what kind of artificial intelligence is being built; what kind of relationship is being cultivated to it; and lastly, how we situate ourselves as a human species in a post-Anthropocene world. Contemporary capitalism is neurocentric, with neuroscientific results offering the necessary knowledge and tools that feed into capitalism’s main goals – profit through commodification, and control through surveillance and normalization. Currently, the prefix neuro- is on the rise. Neuroscience has been at the scientific forefront in the 21st century, enabled by the rapid development of brain imaging technologies, artificial intelligence, and specifically machine learning. In the quest to better understand human consciousness, perception and action, empirical, speculative, and executive approaches favor implementing outcomes of neuroscientific research. Neuroaesthetics, neuroarchitecture or neuroeconomics are just a few of the emerging sub and cross fields claiming ties to recent research outcomes in neurosciences. The brain as a biological entity has been targeted by pharmaceutical, media and neurotechnologies in order to map, control, surveil, and manipulate, yet covering these actions as news, entertainment, or medicaments. In this sense, capitalism, positivist neuroscience and technology result in an intricate entanglement whose main focus is the commodification and colonization of the mind. The term “neuroculture” mirrors the contemporary phenomena of neurocentrism that expands into the cultural, social, political, and economic life16. The interest in the brain as a biological entity is not new as the brain has been seen as the key in understanding human consciousness in all its facets. Nevertheless, what is manifested in the term neuroculture is the positivist belief that the brain as a biological organ can be completely mapped and connected to thought, emotions, and behavior. On the one hand, neuroculture is a product of the contemporary form of capitalism, fueled by the networked capacity of digital technology. But on the other, neuroculture also produces its own critique in various forms of theory and practice. A common denominator in the countercurrents is the refusal or destabilization of a positivist and mechanistic view of the brain and cognition. In this context, cognition is embedded, embodied, enactive, and extended, referred to as 4E cognition17. The brain’s boundaries as a biological entity are questioned. British author Tony D. Sampson talks about the brain as an assemblage which is in constant becoming18. Feminist neuroscientists aim to reframe neuro-epistemologies by uncovering social influences on the gendered development of the brain19. The idea of “neuroplasticity” is key in this regard as it sees the brain as a dynamic system that is not only biological (shaped by evolution) but also social and cultural (shaped by socio-cultural environments). Neuroplasticity is a key term in the critique of contemporary capitalism and especially cognitive capitalism as it is the targeted field of exerting neuropower

2024 Michigan Kritik
Links › Impact/Advantage Links › AI

AI exacerbates resource and capital extraction --- becomes the foundation for the birth of the Capitalocene – causes environmental collapse

Caballero and Monje 24 (Francisco Sierra Caballero is a senior researcher and professor of com-munication theory in the Department of Journalism at the University of Seville, Spain.. Daniela Inés Monje is a professor in communication theories and communication and culture policies at the National University of Córdoba, “Political Economy of Media and Communication”, Routledge, 31 January 2024, ) //LF

That technology is disruptive is something that materialist critical theory has always understood as a break or breach inherent to the modern order. Historically, the school of the PEICC has tended to analyze the transfor-mations and reversals that the development of productive forces generates in the communication and culture industries and how this affects the capitalist mode of production. Nowadays, the so-called “Fourth Industrial Revolution” has given rise to a new information regime focusing on the organization of algorithms and AI which strategically determines all social, economic, and political processes and, therefore, the logic of reproduction of culture that has such a huge impact on the natural en-vironment. But beyond the environmental impact of the energy con-sumption of AI and current expert systems – 1,500 times higher than that of analogue media – one of the strategic conceptual problems in this respect is to define the nature of the information and knowledge generated by the digital revolution and its effect on the habitat. One of the initial hypotheses is that AI only exacerbates the energy ex-traction process, optimizing the capitalist mode of production with the subsequent environmental impact. The colonization of the cloud by the FAANG (Meta [formerly Facebook], Apple, Amazon, Netflix, and Alphabet [formerly Google]) has actually contributed to environmental degradation through the establishment of a dirty economy, exemplified by the growth of Big Oil and the consequent perpetuation of the practices of the fossil-fuel economy, to which reference is made in media studies in relation to pro-posals for a new materialism. In other words, automation, predictability, and planning in the cloud are the conditions of capitalism for progressing in the so-called “digital transition” to a green economy that, contrary to institutional advertising, ends up undermining the commons. Having come this far, nobody can deny that the artifice of our digital existence also conceals an energy demand that will account for 21 per cent of the global demand for electricity by 2030 and which will eclipse half of the greenhouse gas emissions from transport by 2040. (Cancela, 2023, p. 121) In this vein, it is necessary to question the “Capitalocene” by exploring the dilemmas that AI systems pose for communication and culture, and to define the theoretical and analytical categories of info-communication policymaking on GPGs, with special emphasis on the ethical and regula-tory debates on their treatment as contested commodities. As has been noted in previous studies (Monje, 2018; Monje et al., 2021), public goods constitute the doctrinal corpus of the economy. It is generally accepted that they possess elements that simultaneously display characteristics of non-rivalry in consumption and the inapplicability of the principle of exclusion. The advent of a new theory of GPGs is linked to the process of globalization that, together with other factors, has led to a transformation in the capacity for action of the public sector in the market economy. In the context of the PEICC, considering the evolution of the Internet there is “the need for supranational public intervention in most of the GPGs so as to guarantee their efficient provision” (García-Arias, 2004, p. 187). Indeed, in the AI era, it is evidently imperative to construct and protect the commons by creating “public platforms – platforms owned and con-trolled by the people. (And, importantly, independent of the surveillance state apparatus.) This would mean investing the state’s vast resources into the technology necessary to support these platforms and offering them as public utilities” (Srnicek, 2017, p. 70). Even more so considering that the management of data on social behavior facilitated by AI is unparalleled in human history and undoubtedly poses new threats, like the opacity of certain reproduction processes and the subsequent erosion of safeguards, mechanisms for redress, and the guarantee of rights.

2024 Michigan Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Trademarks

The legal system of trademarks is not just a tool of a market economy—but a semiotic economy as well. Trademarks are signs that work with industrial efficiency to commodify every aspect of reality—seeking to make everything perfectly transparent in order to produce differentiation.

Beebe 08 [Barton Beebe, John M. Desmarais Professor of Intellectual Property Law at NYU School of Law, Co-Director of the Engelberg Center on Innovation Law & Policy, Co-Director of the Competition, Innovation, and Information Law LLM Program, received a Podell Distinguished Teaching Award from NYU School of Law, James S. Carpentier Visiting Professor of Law, Columbia Law School in 2020, Anne Urowsky Visiting Professor of Law at Yale University in 2011, Visiting Professor of Law at Stanford University in 2009, Law Clerk for Hon. Denise Cote, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in 2002, J.D. from Yale Law School, PhD in English from Princeton University, B.A. with honors from University of Chicago, Trademark Law and Theory, 2008, “The semiotic account of trademark doctrine and trademark culture”, //zrubin]

In a modern industrialized mass society, particularly a wealthy one, perhaps the most pressing scarcity that the individual faces is the scarcity of distinction—distinction not in the sense of prestige, but in the sense simply of difference that conduces to identity. Trademarks provide this difference and they do so through their sign value. It has long been a cliché, of social theory as much as of advertising practice, that consumers communicate with each other by the objects they consume. Of late, however, commodity culture has begun to unburden itself of the object language of material commodities. The trademark system has developed as an alternative language of consumption, and its development has been rapid indeed. No other language in history, and certainly no other language of distinction, has experienced such explosive growth, both extensively and intensively, in so short a time. The trademark system’s classificatory scheme now orders culture as much as the market—and, in doing so, evidences the degree to which the two fields have merged. To be sure, it is not the only such classificatory system, but none exercises its classifying function so exoterically, in terms so easily and widely understood. Where other systems of distinction are opaque, even unknowable except to those whom they privilege, the power of the trademark scheme resides in its emphatic transparency. While the semiotic analysis—or the economic analysis, for that matter—may go far towards explaining how the trademark system has evolved as it has, it will not ultimately explain why. Underlying the semiotic logic of the trademark system and of trademark law is a more profound logic, what Baudrillard has termed the “social logic of differentiation.”85 This logic meets “an objective social demand for signs and differences,”86 for “the distinguishing processes of class or caste which are fundamental to the social structure and are given free rein in ‘democratic’ society.”87 The trademark system is ultimately both an agent and an object of “classification struggle”:88 an agent in its own struggle to establish itself as the preeminent system of classification, and an object in the struggle by producers and consumers within the trademark system to bend its classificatory scheme to their own economic or cultural ends. The culture industries—and what industries aren’t?—have long sold trademarks as commodities in their own right. Entire areas of trademark doctrine cannot be understood except as systems of rules designed to facilitate the commodification—indeed, the “industrial production”89—of social distinction.

2024 Michigan Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Trademarks

We cannot escape the surveillance of trademarks whose influence has roboticized us into loyal capital subjects. The oversaturation with the commercialization of trademarks invades our minds so that we never forget to obey the capitalist regime

Zakharov 09, Katya Assaf is from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law, 28 July 2009, “Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 643”, “Protection of trade marks against dilution: a semiotic perspective”, Oxford University Press Journals, Accessed July 3, 2024, PW

The influence of marketing techniques on Western culture is not limited to the messages they convey directly. Today advertising and sponsorship are the central source of income for the main media: television, radio, and the printed press. This allows the advertisers to exercise considerable control over the content of these media.22 Over time, commercial conglomerates increasingly discover ways to use media to convey their promotional messages. A good example of this tendency is product placement. Relatively uncommon in the mid-1990s it is found today in nearly every movie, reality show, game show, and sitcom. Media previously thought to be inappropriate for commercial marketing, such as novels and songs, are now losing their immunity.23 Product placement expands gradually into new types of media, such as video games, internet magazines, and even blogs.24 This trend illustrates a more general tendency. As soon as corporations discover the potential of a certain medium to attract an audience, they attempt to attach their marketing messages to it. If the medium is especially successful, it is often purchased altogether. Thus, for example, in 1982 the Coca-Cola Company purchased Columbia Pictures and in 2006 Google Inc. purchased YouTube. No medium of mass communication is immune to marketing. In the world of capitalism and free market competition, every product ultimately reaches the one who values it the most, that is, is willing to pay the highest price for it.25 Audience is a precious product for corporations, which seek to expose potential consumers to their marketing. Thus, every communication medium that attracts an audience is almost inevitably destined to convey marketing messages. As soon as a communication medium is sponsored or owned by advertisers, commercial interest gradually gains control over its content. Thus, for example, Coca-Cola banned the use of 7-Up and Pepsi products in movies produced by Columbia Pictures shortly after purchasing the company. There has been at least one instance when a movie director was compelled to change its final scene to suit the visions of a commercial sponsor (Reebok) which placed its products in the movie.26 At times, corporations wishing to promote their products even initiate the creation of artistic projects. Thus, in 2005, McDonald’s began offering rewards to hip-hop artists who mentioned the Big Mac in their songs. Nike produced a boxing film to market its shoes. Since advertisers are almost always willing to pay more than the audience to the owner of a given medium, they eventually have decisive influence over its content. Since a principal goal of almost every marketing message is the creation of a strong and meaningful trade mark, it can be said that the process of creating meaningful trade marks has a deep influence on our cultural environment. But what is the nature of that influence? Commercial corporations promote a certain ideology. Consider two following examples. In 1971 Janis Joplin wrote the song, ‘Mercedes Benz’. In the song she asks the Lord to buy her a Mercedes Benz, a colour TV, and a night on the town. The song was written as a social commentary on the fact that people relate happiness to consumption and material possessions. Ironically, in 1995, Mercedes Benz obtained a licence from Janis Joplin’s step-sister, who owned the rights to the song, to use it in its own commercial. The second example is the vagrant style created by hippies in the 1960s. This style was meant to convey the anti-establishment beliefs of this counterculture group, but was immediately adopted by clothing manufacturers and presented in advertising as a novelty in dressing style. By the early 1970s, much of the hippie style had been already integrated into mainstream American culture.27 These two examples demonstrate how commercial interest can distort the meaning of a cultural sign, when this meaning clashes with the commercial ideology. The strongest message of their ideology is the endorsement of the values of capitalism in general and consumer culture in particular. Several big media sponsors have even formulated in explicit rules that the media content must not bear any kind of critique on advertising, on the consumer culture, and, more generally, any negative claims concerning the capitalist world order.28 The ideology promoted by commercial corporations has already acquired a dominant position in Western society; it is usually taken for granted and very rarely questioned. The more media falls into the hands of advertisers, the deeper these values will be ingrained into Western culture, making it increasingly materialistic and consumption-oriented. Over time, marketing techniques increasingly capture public space. Sidewalks, buildings, beaches, and every place our eye naturally falls on bear messages designed to make us remember certain trade marks. Marketing messages saturate public space and constantly invade the private sphere. Some scholars equate, quite properly, commercial overload with air pollution.29 The legal system provides no protection against the downpour of commercial messages. Quite the contrary, since the commercial messages are regarded as ‘neutral’, they can reach people in places where political messages cannot, for example, in situations of ‘captive audience’.30 The very omnipresence of promotional messages further endorses the commercial ideology. The more we are used to these messages, the more they seem as a natural and indispensable part of our life. Our environment, saturated with marketing, tells us implicitly that commercial messages have the legitimacy to reach us everywhere, to appear in every possible medium. People become conditioned with the idea that consumption and marketing have the right to occupy a central place in their lives. Thus, although commercial speech is not regarded as a primary subject of the First Amendment, for all intents and purposes it is commercial speech that dominates our social and cultural discourse. This process is made possible by the logic of capitalism and free market economy: the divine right of capital31 has no limits. Capital can control or purchase whatever it wishes. When it wishes to enter the cultural scene, hardly any structure will stay immune to its power. Under these circumstances, there is hardly anything that can hamper the dominance of the commercial ideology

2024 Michigan Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Trademarks

Trademarks produce a parasocial relationship between the brand and the consumer relying on the capital slave perpetuating and venerating these brands leading to the fetishization and submission to the trademark.

Manning 10, Paul Manning is an Associate Professor of Anthropology at Trent University, Canada, June 14, 2010, “ANNUAL REVIEW OF ANTHROPOLOGY”, “The Semiotics of Brand”, Annual Reviews, Accessed July 3, 2024, PW

THE DEMATERIALIZATION OF BRAND Because brand is thus everywhere, and yet nowhere, the phenomenon comes to be represented as an essentially immaterial form of mediation, a kind of globalized interdiscursivity, an indexical icon of the virtual nature of the global capitalist economy itself, which is often compared with virtual worlds on the Internet (Lury 2004, Arvidsson 2006). This virtualized brand starkly contrasts the messy materiality of “messages on bottles” as they are often encountered on the individual token level, illustrating a tendency toward what Robert Moore has dubbed the “dematerialization of brand” (R. Moore, personal communication). This tendency erases the “semiotic vulnerabilities” of brand, Moore argues, that come into view when the semiotic ideology of brand is confronted with the contingent world of its materializations (Moore 2003, p. 336). Because of the metaphysical expansiveness of brand discourse and its tendency toward dematerialization, it becomes difficult to decide where brand lives as a semiotic phenomenon: How should a semiotic analysis of branding take account of the seemingly quite different ontological statuses of brands as such, versus branded products (as types), versus individual instances (tokens) of branded products, these last being what actual people engage with in activities of consumption, use, enjoyment, display, and so on? How can the concrete sensuous reality (e.g., color) of such tokens in use act as a relay for the more abstract associations (Young! Fresh! Edgy!) that branding professionals try to “encode” in consumer experience. (Moore 2003, p. 332) The tendency for brand to be conceived as an immaterial form of mediation essentially identical to semiosis as such is partially due to the way that brand is defined in opposition to the product. “The product and the brand” (Gardner & Levy 1955) form a privileged doublet, expressed in popular marketing mantras such as “a product is made in a factory: a brand is bought by a consumer” (Wang 2007, p. 23; Lury 2004, pp. 31, 72). As mantras such as this show, the definition of brand develops over time by a kind of mystical via negativa, defining itself not so much by saying what brand is as what it is not: the product. By degrees, brand moves from being a “symbolic extension” of a product (Arvidsson 2006, p. 95; Askegard 2006, p. 100), as brand guru David Ogilvy put it in 1955, the “intangible sum of a product's attributes, its name, packaging, and price, its history, reputation, and the way it is advertised” (cited in Wang 2007, pp. 23–24), to leaving behind the dull, passive, generic, inert utility and materiality of the product entirely, taking on an “enchanting, sometimes religious character,” adding a “spiritual dimension to what used to be ‘merely a product’” (Askegard 2006, p. 96). The opposition brand/product condenses a folk-ontological opposition between immaterial/material, form/function, distinctive/descriptive, decorative/functional, symbolic/technical, properties of subjects/properties of objects; the pervasive dematerialization of brand recapitulating in broad outlines the dematerialization of meaning itself in western secular and religious discourse (Irvine 1989, Pfaffenberger 1992, Masuzawa 2000, Keane 2003, Manning & Meneley 2008). In addition to the complementary schizmogenesis in which brand drifts away from the product, leading to a dematerialization of brand, brand undergoes several other parallel semiotic shifts. Earlier, primarily legal, discourses tend to treat brand as an arbitrary and distinctive trademark indexing a producer, whereas more recent marketing discourses tend to treat the essence of brand as a set of associations held in the minds of consumers (Hanby 1999, Moore 2003). This treatment is sometimes linked to an opposition between an earlier “positivistic,” “mechanistic” view of brands as “lifeless manipulable artefacts,” “inert physical objects,” which serve primarily as differentiating marks for products and which are “owner-oriented, reductionistic and grounded in economics” (Hanby 1999, p. 9; Csaba & Bengsston 2006, p. 121), and more recent quasi-animistic discourses that treat brand as a “person” (Lury 2004, p. 75) in which the pervasive associations based on the role brands play in consumers' lives are transformed into actual anthropomorphic characteristics imputed to brands understood as holistic, organic, living, growing entities with which consumers can form actual social relationships directly (Hanby 1999, Csaba & Bengsston 2006). We also see historical changes in which trademarks and brands move from being a category of communication to objects of property (Lury 2004, Bently 2008a). The discourse of brand is much addicted to epochalism so that in the 1960s we move from the “product era” to the “image era,” and in the 1980s the “brand image” gives way to a financially quantifiable “brand equity” (Arvidsson 2006, pp. 41–65; Wang 2007, pp. 23–25). All these shifts broadly recapitulate moves away from earlier Saussurean structuralist semiotic theories privileging the arbitrariness and distinctiveness of the sign to later poststructuralist accounts in which the omnivorous associationism of brand (for homologies between semiotic theories and trademark law, see Beebe 2004), not to mention rampant anthropomorphism, comes to approximate the fetish (Beebe 2004, p. 681; 2008, p. 52; Hearn 2008). However, the brand fetish is not easily assimilated to the Marxian “commodity fetish” to which it is frequently compared (Manning 2009, p. 926n6). Rather, I am taking the fetish here as a general semiotic figure “standing for an amorphous collection of ‘hybrid’ semiotic phenomena united only in their inability to be assimilated to the Saussurean ‘purification’ of the sign” (Manning & Meneley 2008, p. 292; on the semiotic polysemy of the fetish, see also Pietz 1985, Masuzawa 2000). Whereas these different views of brand are often presented in epochal shifts globally affecting the imagination of brand, mechanistic views of brands as lifeless signs and organic views of brands as living persons are often mixed in contemporary marketing discourse (Hanby 1999, Csaba & Bengtsson 2006). As with other dichotomies such as nature/culture (Latour 1993 [1991]), if brand discourse seems preoccupied with ontological purification of brand from its connection, inter alia, to products, brand practice confronts us with a phenomenal proliferation of semiotic hybrids. Given these difficulties of analytic specification, I follow Moore (2003) by presenting the various semiotic moments of brand on the model of the communicative act itself, replacing speakers with producers, consumers with addressees, referents with products, and messages with the brand itself.

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Links › Topic Links › Trademarks

Trademarks have overridden our subconscious through semantic imagery that dilutes our emotions forcing us to be capital slaves to the state of consumption

Zakharov 09, Katya Assaf is from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law, 28 July 2009, “Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 643”, “Protection of trade marks against dilution: a semiotic perspective”, Oxford University Press Journals, Accessed July 3, 2024, PW

The influence of trade marks is not limited to cases in which an existing cultural sign is chosen to serve as a mark. A culturally meaningful trade mark must incorporate certain ideas and values. In order to reach this goal, the trade mark should be linked to cultural signs that denote these ideas and values. For example, to invest a trade mark with the spirit of romantic love, advertising can, among other things, display it together with the word ‘love’, flowery hearts, a diamond ring, or a romantic couple walking on a beach. All of our society’s ideals—happiness, freedom, love, and professional success—are eventually exploited by advertising which attempts to link them to commercial trade marks. This process strengthens the cultural significance of promoted trade marks and of consumption in general. However, the significance of the social ideals exploited by advertising is also affected. Although each advertisement pulls a given sign towards another product or service, all have a common message: the way to happiness, freedom, love, professional success, etc. lies through the consumption of commercial goods and services. Even if not every single advertisement succeeds in fastening the promoted trade mark to the desired cultural ideal, their cumulative effect successfully links consumption to important social values, giving it a central place in modern society. People attribute great importance to consumption and associate it with happiness, pleasure, freedom, and self-reward.14 However, because of the existence of reciprocal forces in the semantic field, this process has a flip-side, since cultural ideals to which consumption has been linked start incorporating materialistic values. If consumption denotes happiness then, necessarily, happiness also denotes consumption to a certain extent. If a luxury cruise, dinner in a restaurant, or an expensive piece of jewellery symbolize true love, then the notion of true love also includes these consuming practices to some extent. Constantly linking cultural ideals to the banal context of consumption dilutes and hollows their distinct meaning. As Andrew Wernick notes, even in church, it is hard to hear the word ‘paradise’ without thinking on the multitude of goods to which this idea has been promotionally linked.15 Frequently, cultural signs with a strong and distinctive significance, cultural icons, are chosen to serve as rhetorical figures in advertising.

2024 Michigan Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Patents

The proliferation of patents is a tool of cognitive capitalism that necessitates the privatization of social services, resulting in the subjugation of those in the Global South

Asimakopoulos and Gilman-Opalsky 18 (John Asimakopoulos  is Full Professor of Sociology at the City University of New York and executive director of the Transformative Studies Institute (TSI), an educational think tank. Richard Gilman-Opalsky is Associate Professor of Political Philosophy in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois. “Against Capital in the Twenty-First Century”, Temple University Press, February 23 2018, //LF

Enclosures makes reference to a decisive moment in the social and economic history of England: the final eradication in the eighteenth century of customary rights that bore on the use of communal land, the “commons.” These lands were “enclosed”—that is to say, appropriated in an exclusive manner by their legal owners—and that with tragic consequences, because use of the commons was essential to the life of peasant communities. A frightening number of people were stripped of all means of subsistence. “The Tragedy of the Commons” is, moreover, the title of a widely read essay that was published in 1968, but its author, Garrett Hardin, misappropriates the association between the destruction of the commons and tragedy. The tragedy is in fact supposed to be the overexploitation (postulated by Harding) of the communal lands themselves, linked to the fact that each user pursued his self-interest without taking into account the fact that the outcome of this self-interest would be the impoverishment of everyone. This fable evidently met with great success, as it allowed not only the enclosures to be legitimated as “unfortunately necessary” but with them the ensemble of privatizations of what had been of the order of collective management: the interest of private property owners is also selfish but it pushes them to turn a profit on their capital, to improve their returns, the increase productivity. Another classic narrative—that of [Karl] Marx—associates the expropriation of the commons with what he calls the “primitive accumulation” of capital.3 The great mass of the poor, now stripped of any attachment, will be mercilessly exploited by the nascent industries, because there is no need to take into account the reproduction of labor power: the poor can collapse on the job as there will always be others. In this sense, the enclosures prepare the capitalist appropriation of the labor of those who, deprived of their means of life, will be reduced to being nothing but their labor power. However, Marx did not celebrate this expropriation in the manner in which he celebrates the destruction of the guilds and of the ensemble of what attaches humans to traditions and ways of life: like the elimination of an old order, an elimination which the future socialism will be indebted to capitalism for. Perhaps it is because of the pitiless brutality of the operation, or because what was destroyed was a form of “primitive communism,” bringing resources and means into common use, the fact remains that he saw in it a “theft,” or the destruction of the right of the poor to ensure their subsistence. If, today, the reference to enclosures matters, it is because the contemporary mode of extension of capitalism has given it all its actuality. The privatization of resources that are simply essential to survival, such as water, is the order of the day, as well as that of those institutions which, in our countries, had been considered as ensuring a human right, like education. Not that the management of water has not been a source of profit, and that capitalism hasn’t largely profited from the production of well-trained and disciplined workers. What has changed is that henceforth it is a matter of direct appropriation, under the sign of the privatization of what were public services. And privatization doesn’t stop there. The reference to enclosures is very directly activated by this “knowledge economy” to which I have already alluded, because what the latter promotes is nothing other than the disappearance of the line separating public and private research and the direct appropriation of what had, until now, benefited from a (relative) autonomy. The production of knowledge today is considered as a stake that is too important to allow this minimal autonomy to researchers, who are now subjected to the imperative to establish partnerships with industry, to define acquiring a patent as the desirable success par excellent, and the creation of “spin-offs” as the glorious dream. All that with public money, which gets sucked up into multiple spin-offs that fail, while those that succeed will be purchased, without too much risk, together with their patents, by one or another consortium. In short, the distribution between what the state lets capitalism do and what capitalism gets the state to do has changed. The state lets capitalism appropriate what was defined as falling within from the public domain, and capitalism gets the state to endorse the sacred task of having to hunt down those who infringe the now sacrosanct right to intellectual property—a right that extends over practically everything, from the living thing to knowledges previously defined as freely accessible to all their users. A right to which WTO [World Trade Organization] intends to subject the entire planet, in the name of the defense of innovation. From the conceptual point of view, the fact that in the name of competition workers are exploited today with a rare intensity, without even talking about the sweatshops reserved for poor countries, or about the appearance in our countries of “poor workers” who aren’t capable of making ends meet on their salaries, doesn’t count for much. But above all, as in every theater of concepts, we are functioning here in the long, even the indefinite, term.

2024 Michigan Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Patents

The 1AC’s understanding of patents serves not only as a technique of commodification but is the capital used in the international network of information. The 1AC is zeroed by the technologies structured by the World Computer which uses patents as data to fuel the systems proliferation and the endless digitization ideas through the databases of digital networks that patent law relies on.

Kang 23(Hyo Yoon, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Warwick. She studies legal forms and techniques in their political, cultural and social contexts by drawing on scholarship in social and literary theories, historical epistemology, political economy, and science and technology studies. “Patents as Capitalist Aesthetic Forms”, Law and Critique, 6/1/2023. Accessed 7/1/2024)//jliu

There are incongruous representations of patents circulating today, both in the medium of text and of a pictorial image.1 On the one hand, there is an increase in the popular aestheticization of patent drawings. A patent drawing decontextualizes and simplifies an abstract legal monopoly right into a pictorial representation of an inventio-n. But an isolated patent drawing removed from its original document context has no legal meaning or force in the sense of ascertaining, codifying or even understanding the contours of a patent as an intellectual property right. Patent drawings seem to be valued mainly for the aesthetic pleasure or familiar ‘novelty’ factor that they may generate (as seen in Fig. 3). On the other hand, in contrast to patent drawings’ popularity, efforts towards the full digitization of patent bureaucracy are continuing with networked distribution of patent documentation and examination practice (Kang 2019). Patent law drives and relies upon databases of digital documentation and networks. These have also engendered a tertiary service of information provision. These comprise private providers such as Clarivate, which merged  the leading private IP ‘intelligence’ services, such as Derwent and CompuMark, as well as the free, publicly available databases of the World Intellectual Property Organization, European Patent Office, or the US Patents and Trademark Office.2 Such an international network of digital patent ‘information’ is the possibly the largest legal networked bureaucratic information infrastructure, and it remains below the public radar. In contrast to public imagination of patent with geeky inventions depicted in technical drawings, the legal system is not particularly concerned with patent drawings. Its primary mode of representation of an invention is that of a text. The main genre of a patent’s representation is that of a document. The document in turn serves as a medium in the form of an identical file in the overall system of patents as data management (Kang 2012). Such a wide gap between the cultural representation of patents and their legal form remains underdiagnosed and underexplained. Analyzing IP’s effects on cultural significance and practices, Rosemary Coombe wrote her influential book, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship, Appropriation, and the Law in the 1990s. The book’s analytical gaze was socio-legal by foregrounding the inquiry on law’s effect on society and culture, and not so much the other way around. The proliferation and adoption of patent drawings as cultural artifacts, however, indicates novel cultural imaginaries of patents, which shape the ways in which patent law is understood and legitimized. Furthermore, the realm of science, associated with patents in modern IP law’s subject matter division between arts and sciences, remained underexamined in Coombe’s treatment, perhaps because it was seen as being separate and/or extraneous to the cultural realm. The stipulated division between arts and sciences in modern intellectual property law runs along the legal divisions of copyright and patent laws. They conceal how sciences occupy a central role in contemporary cultural imaginaries of development and progress (Kim 2017). Sciences are not outside their cultural and social environments.3 University and industrial sciences, financial capitalism, and economic nationalism are closely intertwined with the privatization of sciences (Mirowski 2011). Close links between university technoscience, understood as interrelated scientific, business and cultural practices, and financial speculation underpin the Silicon Valley culture of venture capitalism and its adoption at a national(ist) scale by authorities through their ‘high tech’ and ‘start-up nation’ agendas (Daub 2020; see Stadler, Steuwer, Wulz 2021, for a historical contextualization of university policies and right-wing knowledge politics).4 In such a context of speculative, finance-driven capitalism, patent law has not only acted as techniques of commodification, but also of financial assetization: patents are not only used for raising capital, but also act as capital themselves (Kang 2015, 2020).

2024 Michigan Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Copyright

Copyright is no longer a means for creative structure but to reproduce content that’s only seen as mainstream, which incentives us to relinquish culture in the name of profit. These copyright holders then sell our senses through semiotic advertisements geared to force us to gorge on capitalistic pleasures of consumption

PESSACH 16, GUY Associate Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Affiliate Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School. A prior draft of this essay was presented at the McGill University Centre for Intellectual Property Policy (CIPP). I am indebted to Professor Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse the director of the CIPP for hosting me and for excellent insights on the topic of this paper, Fall, 2016 “Beyond IP--The Cost of Free: Informational Capitalism in a Post-IP Era”, Osgoode Hall, Accessed July 3, 2024, PW

Critical copyright scholarship also emphasizes the copyright's role in shaping the political economy of corporate media. 4 Control over the means of production and distribution is gained through a mixture of government-issued entitlements in creative resources (e.g., copyright) and distribution platforms (e.g., telecommunications licenses). 5 Within this framework, the traditional corporate media model is based on producer-consumer relationships and the copyrighting of culture--that is, the commodification of content through proprietary protection. 6 This economic model pivots around the extraction of revenue from the distribution of and provision of access to content. 7 At the same time, a market-oriented media system fails to provide the public with the whole array of media products that the society desires. 8 Media markets tend to produce a wasteful abundance of content that responds to mainstream tastes while neglecting civically, educationally, and culturally pluralistic content. 9 Additionally, [*228] the nature of corporate media as advertising-supported favours media products that have a wide appeal and are suitable for selling the advertised products over media that attends to the diversity of people's actual needs and interests. 10 The emergence of the Internet is perceived by critical copyright scholars as a unique opportunity to significantly improve society's informational and cultural ecology, if only the right regulatory and legal choices are made. 11 In broad strokes, the argument is that new information technologies make it easier for individuals, groups and communities to collaborate in producing and exchanging cultural content, knowledge, and other information goods without requiring the involvement of commercial, profit-motivated media entities. 12 New, cheaper methods of producing, storing, and distributing content provide fertile ground [*229] for the emergence--and constant demonstration of the existence--of enhanced schemes for sustaining culture and knowledge beyond IP. 13 From this perspective, the traditional distributor-centric, proprietary-based cultural and informational industries appear both unjustified and counterproductive in terms of the public interest in cultural diversity, decentralization of media spheres, and individuals' self-fulfillment. It seems only natural that a shift from producer-consumer cultural industries to civically engaged cultural spheres would be feasible, if one could only dissolve the strong attachment of cultural production to intellectual property protection as a governing institution. 14 Critical copyright scholarship does not stop at criticizing the traditional corporate media model, it also offers an alternative model of creative activities that rests upon concepts of free content, free access, and openness. 15 This scholarship shows that there is much to be looked for beyond intellectual property, particularly in light of persuasive evidence and arguments that authors' [*230] and creators' incentives are far more diverse than intellectual property's direct economic incentive. 16 The purpose of this article is to untie the seemingly Gordian knot between proprietary intellectual property protection and capitalist structures of corporate media. I argue that media environments based on free distribution of content are no less vulnerable to corporate market powers. 17 Free content and departure from traditional proprietary intellectual property regimes do not necessarily lead to true, effective freedom for individuals. Recent scholarship in the areas of communications studies and critical Internet studies examines the emergence of a new political economy in which networked information industries are built upon free flow of information and content. 18 This literature describes what many of us experience on a daily basis: a highly concentrated industry in which revenues are extracted mostly from selling advertisements and users' personal data. 19 The scholarship focuses on informational capitalism, which uses data, information and content as means of production and circulation to make profit and accumulate wealth. 20 [*231] The key features of this networked environment include a strong tendency towards selling "eyeballs" (audience attention) to advertisers; utilization of big data; and the use of information flows about consumer behaviour to target advertisements, search results, and other content. 23 Similar such features include stealth advertisement; sophisticated systems of predictive analytics; 24 commodification of consumers' data; 25 and free utilization of content. 26 These features represent a brave new world that is the opposite of what one anticipates when looking beyond intellectual property protection. In such "beyond IP" realms, industrialized corporate structures, media concentration, content biases, abridged creative diversity, and deflated authorial welfare may outweigh the drawbacks of traditional corporate media. 27 A second, related aspect of informational capitalism is its growing dependence on free content and information as elementary means of production. In a political economy that does not extract revenues through the direct commercialization and sale of content, but rather from the commercialization of personal information and users' attention, free content and free information are the main bait for obtaining and monetizing both audience attention and users' personal information. [*232] Spheres beyond intellectual property thus represent a social contradiction between their empowering functions and their vulnerability to exploitation and commodification. Free flow and distribution of content undoubtedly stimulate social conditions that empower individuals, promote innovation, and advance cultural democracy. Yet, at the same time, they provide no safeguards against patterns that imitate the logic and drivers of proprietary cultural industries. In fact, they simultaneously create new opportunities to make profits and accumulate property through the commodification and commercialization of users' attention and personal information. Although the emergence of networked informational capitalism is well addressed in the academic literature, there is hardly any reference to the linkage between networked informational capitalism and components, both legal and ideological, that are derived from and associated with free distribution of content in cultural and informational zones in which intellectual property's governance is less salient. I argue that informational capitalism is linked not only to elements of proprietary control, but also to elements of free flow and non-proprietary modes of content circulation. This argument questions the conventional wisdom of critical copyright scholarship, which tends to pair proprietary protection with informational capitalism and the commodification of culture.

2024 Michigan Kritik
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Copyright and other industries capture our data to sell which produces a harmful competition over our attention. This attention economy creates new profit possibilities for industry conglomerates.

Cohen 23, Julie Georgetown University Law Center, December 17, 2023, “Informational Capitalism as Phase Shift: Challenges for Digital Constitutionalism”, Oxford University Presss, forthcoming 2024, Accessed July 5, 2024, PW

A final set of strategies for multi-dimensional commodification involves skimming, or appropriating the data traces generated by an underlying resource, by natural phenomena, or by commercial or social activity. Once converted into streams of data, the information can be combined and processed to identify underlying patterns and devise services that exploit the patterns to generate profits. As noted in Part 2, one type of skimming strategy that features prominently in the political economy of informational capitalism involves data harvested from people and populations. A related strategy, pioneered by social media companies, appropriates the data traces from user generated content posted online. Notably, this model leveraged widespread resistance to early enforcement efforts by the major copyright industries, which sought to transpose their own slicing-based strategies for clearing rights at scale to public-facing online environments.15 As an alternative, online intermediaries developed a different model that leverages large amounts of highly granular viewing and listening data collected from the very same users who sought open access to online content.16 That model, however, looks very different than the one that the original open-access activists envisioned. In its mature form, it combines advertising revenues with slicing and tethering strategies targeting different user and right holder populations. Multi-dimensional commodification strategies merit careful attention from scholars of constitutionalism for two reasons, both involving the ways that such strategies redistribute economic power. First, multi-dimensional commodification arrangements bite with special force on fictitious commodity resources—the resources whose status within a system of political economy has such profound implications for human and social wellbeing. Land, labor, money, natural resources, and people may not have been created by or for the market, but data about them appears to suffer from no such deficiency. When generated and extracted in an environment offering sufficient flexibility and processing power, it can be manipulated to generate seemingly infinite new profit possibilities.17 Multi-dimensional commodification strategies enable the isolation and perfection of interests in old and new fictitious commodities that are more neatly amenable to economic exploitation than the underlying resources would be. Often, the new ventures can be designed to operate in ways largely unconstrained by preexisting protective regulation—for example, by substituting gig work arrangements for formal employment arrangements that would be subject to protective labor regulation, by devising new instruments for extracting rents from land and those living on it, or by concocting complex mechanisms for profiting from underlying financial dealings without engaging the various forms of banking, investor protection, and consumer protection regulation to which those dealings are subject.18 Such ventures can appear to be appealing investments for a variety of reasons. As capital flows into arrangements for layering, slicing, tethering, and skimming, however, the apparent economic imperatives surrounding configuration and exploitation of such arrangements grow commensurately, creating powerful new pressures on distribution and control of the underlying resources—and on the human beings and human societies that they affect. Second, multi-dimensional commodification strategies, and the scaled-up information processing and service delivery operations upon which they increasingly rely, tend to engender specialized intermediation arrangements—and those arrangements, in turn, can come to embody large concentrations of economic power. (The exceptions tend to involve multi-dimensional commodification ventures operated by large, sophisticated entities that can provide scaled-up information processing and service delivery for themselves.) For these reasons, moreover, multi- dimensional commodification strategies tend to elicit and thrive within a particular set of structural and organizational logics, to which I turn next.

2024 Michigan Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Intellectual Property

To manage intellectual property is the distinction between the original and a copy. The legal institutions of IP are built on an intellectual quicksand of semiotic value where there is neither an original nor a copy.

Ted Striphas 9, Associate Professor in the Department of Media Studies at the University of Colorado-Boulder. I am also Editor-in-Chief of the journal Cultural Studies. "Harry Potter and the Simulacrum: Contested Copies in an Age of Intellectual Property", P. 295-311, Published 12 Oct 2009. Critical Studies in Media Communication, Volume 26, Issue 4. ,JDiang

But this is only half of the story. The magic of Harry Potter also resides in how competing claims about the young wizard's authenticity open up and help to answer the question: what happens when the boundary line dividing originals from copies becomes indeterminate, so much so that it becomes untenable to speak of originals and copies at all? This question, it should be pointed out, poses a significant quandary from a legal standpoint. Because courts of law are in the business of adjudication, they cannot resolve it by celebrating the play of difference. From the vantage point of intellectual property law, cultural artifacts cannot be permitted too much semiotic leeway, especially in cases where competing claims about their priority cannot be definitively reconciled. The litigious life of Harry Potter-related doubles thus lends insight, I want to argue, into how courts of law manage the critique of representation (i.e., the growing diffuseness of the categories “original” and “copy”) within the context of increasingly recombinant media and cultural production (Hebdige, ; Jenkins, ; McLeod ,; Vaidhyanathan, ). Lurking behind all this sorcery is a disquieting figure, the simulacrum. It emerges first in Plato's meticulously gradated universe, where it occupies the lowest rung in the hierarchy of the arts of making (poiesis). Plato's simulacrum is neither model nor exact replica, but rather a distant semblance of whatever it doubles—the figure of the same, only different, and thus of fidelity corrupted. It is also a term he associates with the Sophists, that itinerant group of orator-pedagogues whom he likens to “conjurers” for having despoiled rhetoric with their falsely imitative arts (Plato, , pp. II.64–II.68, II.26). More recently, Jean Baudrillard (1983, ) and Gilles Deleuze (, , ) each has reimagined the simulacrum, in his own way, as that which causes bright-line distinctions between originals and copies to blur. However conceived, the simulacrum would seem to wield a certain, unsettling power. But what happens when theory interfaces with law? That is, what happens when the simulacrum enters into determinate legal contexts? I contend the litigation involving Harry Potter-related doubles stages these questions; it throws into relief the simulacrum's theoretical and political limits for scholars in and beyond media studies; and it sheds light on the legal thaumaturgy by which those limits get imposed. Analogy: My Fetish is to Your Aura … I am hardly the first to speak of the magical character of cultural goods. More than a century ago, Karl Marx () referred to a “fetish” character that commodities assume under capitalism, while in 1936, Walter Benjamin () explored the mysterious “aura” surrounding “original” artwork. These qualities, which are immanent to and a product of the realm of people and things, nevertheless mystify cultural goods, imbuing them with other-worldly characteristics. Both Marx and Benjamin took magic seriously, perhaps even literally, seeing it, albeit in somewhat different ways, as intrinsic to modern social life. Marx's Das kapital is an exemplary work of modern political economy. Yet, inasmuch as Marx provides a “scientific” account of social and productive relations under capitalism, his methods nonetheless reveal a society deeply enchanted in its own right. To read Das kapital is to enter into a world not unlike the one readers will find in Harry Potter. Charmed objects, deadly magical creatures, and ghosts populate Potter's world just as they do in Marx's magnum opus, which is replete with dancing tables, thirsty vampires, and phantom orchestras. (So, too, is Marx and Engels’ [1848/] The communist manifesto, in which the authors liken the bourgeoisie to “a sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells” [p. 14].) Perhaps it is no surprise, then, to hear Marx (1867/1976) speak of commodities in Das kapital as “abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties” (p. 163). The commodity fetish takes center stage in this drama precisely because of magic's centrality to the world Marx describes. The fetish character of commodities arises, according to Marx, from the peculiar form these objects assume under capitalism. Here, commodities come to be valued not only, or even primarily, for the uses to which they can be put, but perhaps more importantly for their capacity to be exchanged for other commodities. This privileging of exchange- over use-value obscures the vast stores of human labor power embodied in any thing, with two principal results. First, whether mediated by money, the universal (abstract) form of equivalence, or not, commodity exchange comes to stand in for more direct forms of human relation. “It is nothing but the definite social relation between men and women themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things,” writes Marx (1867/1976, p. 165). Second, to the extent that commodities appear to be severed from the realm of human affairs, they would seem to be produced autochthonously and solely for the sake of exchange. Marx again: “the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race” (p. 165). The strange magic of the commodity fetish thus is both cause and effect of inanimate objects assuming a “life of their own,” seemingly independent of human praxis. If the commodity fetish is a multifarious form of epistemological magic, which disguises human labor power, then what of Benjamin's (1968) notion of the aura? I pose this question with some trepidation, given the almost compulsive ality that surrounds the essay from which the term is drawn, “The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction.” To say this is not to reduce its import, but rather to point out that Benjamin's essay and its attendant concept, aura, have spawned something of an industry when it comes to engaging industrially reproduced cultural goods. As Udi E. Greenberg () observes: Walter Benjamin claimed that the democratization of art, brought about by mechanical mass production, would sharpen the critical faculties of the masses. The popularization process to which Benjamin himself was subjected, however … reveals that the dynamics encompassed in it are far more complex, and are at times paradoxically based on a structural tradition that contradicts the goals of the Benjamin industry's agents themselves. (pp. 67–68) Indeed, despite Benjamin's (1968) argument about forms of reproduction undermining the aura, or the sense of authenticity specific to a given artifact after which reproductions are fashioned (p. 223), the social life of his essay belies a different story. In publication after publication, in conference after conference, in classroom after classroom, both the main argument and the text of Benjamin's essay are extensively reproduced. The result is that the piece accrues ever more social, theoretical, and intellectual capital. Ironically, then, the essay's mass reproduction would seem to be what is imbuing it with authority and authenticity—with luminescent aura—despite Benjamin's claim about the waning of the aura in the age of mass reproduction. So what story can the social life of Benjamin's essay tell about the nature of mass reproduction and the magical work of aura, beyond what the essay explicitly says? In the preceding example, doubles do not degrade the original's aura. To the contrary, they are a necessary condition of the aura of originality, the magic of authenticity. Or, to say it even less equivocally, copies produce originals as such, not the other way around (c.f. Chang, , p. 188; Deleuze, 1994, p. 289; Sterne, , pp. 217–221). Tucked away in the hinterlands of “The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction” is a footnote in which Benjamin (1968) suggests as much: Precisely because authenticity is not reproducible, the intensive penetration of certain (mechanical) processes of reproduction was instrumental in differentiating and grading authenticity.… To be sure, at the time of its origin a medieval picture of the Madonna could not yet be said to be “authentic.” It became “authentic” only during succeeding centuries and perhaps most striking during the last one [i.e., the 19th century]. (p. 245 n. 2) Some people undoubtedly perceived the Madonna to be a unique artifact prior to the advent of new technologies of mass reproduction in the 19th century. The possibility of seeing it as authentic or original only arises, however, within the context of reproducing the image on a mass scale.2 The magic of the aura is precisely this, then: the concept's spellbinding capacity to conjoin original and copy and to invert their priority, so that “derivative” works appear to be a function of a putative “original.” Indeed, the derivative or copy would seem to be the most original, perhaps the only original, assuming we still feel compelled to hold on to that terminology at all. Gilles Deleuze (1994) affirms this point when he speaks of “a perfect independence on the part of each presentation” or instance of a mass-produced object (p. 70). Deleuze's project in Difference and repetition and elsewhere is to overturn Platonic mysticism, and more specifically to undo its most enduring set of distinctions: between essence and appearance; original and copy; the thing-in-itself and its simulacrum. Plato and his followers erred, Deleuze argues, in their claim that a repeated thing always must refer to some “concept” outside of itself, which is to say, to a set of epistemological conditions that posit (to the point of demand) an existential link between the repeated thing and that which it doubles (p. 13). This collapse of the ontological into the epistemological mobilizes Platonism's moral claims about the primacy, even sanctity, of essence over appearance, such that the repeated thing or “copy” comes to represent an existentially degraded version of the vaunted “original.” But what would happen, Deleuze asks, were we to think repetition ontologically, that is, in itself? The result, Deleuze argues, would be a renewal of our ability to appreciate difference in repetition, which is tantamount to our not conflating the repeated with the Same, or even the Similar. “It seems … that, with Plato, a philosophical decision of the utmost importance was taken, that of subordinating difference to the supposedly initial powers of the Same and the Similar, that of declaring difference unthinkable in itself and sending it, along with the simulacra, back to the bottomless ocean” (p. 127). Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that simulacra take on a renewed importance for Deleuze. In contrast to those of Jean Baudrillard (1983, 1994), Deleuze's simulacra refer not to phantasmic copies of copies, each of whose appearance bears a recursively diminishing degree of resemblance to a furtive original. They refer, rather, to “the act by which the very idea of a model or privileged position is challenged and overturned” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 69; see also Deleuze, 1990, p. 262; Massumi, ). In this reading, which is at once more and less faithful to Plato, simulacra unravel the ontologically moribund original-copy distinction. They do so by compelling people to acknowledge the singularity of every repeated thing. In more concrete terms, simulacra challenge normative juridical and political-economic understandings of repeated things as they arise within capitalist relations of production, given the doubt they cast on the rubrics by which the art-law-culture nexus sustains itself: “In every respect, repetition is a transgression. It puts law into question, it denounces its nominal or general character in favour of a more profound and more artistic reality” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 3). The point of all this looking up the magician's sleeve is to identify some of the ways in which capitalism works its epistemological magic. It is also to think through some philosophical conditions by which to articulate a more deeply politicized aesthetics of daily life, given the peculiar prestidigitations by which two or more social artifacts become existentially linked, temporally prioritized, and thus morally hierarchized. Hence the simulacrum—outlaw art, which in Deleuze's account would seem poised to break the spell. But to what extent can it be counted on to do that? The Muggle Struggle The struggle over commodities, copies, and the magic of capitalist production comes to a head in the intellectual property dispute, Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer. The suit's foundations were laid in August 1999, when Stouffer and her attorneys initiated talks with Scholastic, Inc., Potter's U.S. publisher, over ownership rights to specific copyrighted and trademarked materials associated with J. K. Rowling's by then wildly popular book series. In addition to the aforementioned physical similarities between the Potters Larry and Harry, and among other allegations, Stouffer contended that Rowling willfully had borrowed from her, with neither permission nor compensation, the word “Muggle.” In Harry Potter's universe, Muggle refers, in its noun form, to persons without magic and, adjectivally, to things associated with those persons. Stouffer alleged she had introduced Muggle to the literary community in 1984 at a New York City toy fair with the debut of her children's book, The legend of Rah and the Muggles—that is, more than a decade prior to the first Harry Potter volume's publication in 1997. Stouffer also claimed to have copyrighted and trademarked Muggle around that time. As such, she insisted that only she—not Scholastic, not Rowling, not Warner Bros., nor any party connected with the Harry Potter series—could assert ownership rights over and thus license the lucrative word (Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer, 2000). All that might seem straightforward enough, but the story only grows odder as we venture down the rabbit hole and enter the enchanted realm of the “legal real” (Gaines, , p. 90). There, doubles, copies, frauds, and unexpected reversals rule the day. After talks between the parties stalled, the Muggle struggle came to a head in November 1999 with the filing of the complaint that resulted in the aforementioned legal action. Now, given Stouffer's contentions, one might reasonably expect her and her attorneys to have filed suit against Scholastic and its associates. In fact, it happened the other way around; Scholastic and company filed suit against Stouffer, seeking “a declaratory judgment that they have not infringed and are not infringing any of … Nancy Stouffer's copyrights or trademarks” (Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer, 2000). Stouffer thus became the defendant in a case in which others were alleged to have violated her intellectual property rights. Preemption such as this is not uncommon in the realm of the legal real, however, especially in contests over high-stakes financial concerns. Compelled to mount a formal legal defense, Stouffer submitted six key pieces of evidence to prove she was the legitimate rights-holder of the word, Muggle. She also hoped to show, in the process, that Rowling might have had access to, and thus opportunity to pilfer, her words and ideas in the process of conceiving of Harry Potter. The evidence Stouffer submitted to the Court included:

Stouffer's 2000 countercomplaint detailed a series of further coincidences that, taken together, led her to suspect Rowling had unlawfully taken additional proprietary material from her. Despite these coincidences, Stouffer still lacked a smoking gun by which to prove Rowling had willfully lifted her intellectual properties. Her insinuation, that Rowling may have stumbled across her work while visiting briefly in the U.S. and living in Europe, was thin at best (Stouffer v. Scholastic et al., ). Nevertheless, the long list of apparent similarities probably would have given any reasonable person pause to consider whether Rowling had represented her much-heralded work fraudulently, thereby violating the intellectual property interests that Stouffer insisted were her own. That Rowling reportedly could produce few documents attesting to the originality of her work, most notably manuscript drafts of Harry Potter and the philosopher's stone (Stouffer, ), added further cause for speculation. Presiding Judge Allen G. Schwartz effectively concurred (Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer, 2000). Stouffer's contentions about Rowling's fraudulence and illicit copying doubled back on her, however, when Scholastic et al.'s team of expert witnesses showed that the bulk of Stouffer's evidence must have resulted from, of all things, fraudulence and illicit copying. Take the booklet, The legend of Rah and the Muggles, for instance. In a virtuoso feat of reverse-engineering, Scholastic et al. demonstrated that the words “The legend of” and “and the Muggles,” which appeared on the volume's title page, must have been printed in 1991 or later. The volume couldn't have been an original Andé edition, or if it were, the all-important Muggles must have been added retroactively. Stouffer's 1984 copyright registration supported the plaintiff's contention, given that it listed the title of the work merely as, Rah. The Playthings advertisement? Scholastic et al.'s attorneys tracked down the magazine, and although the ad copy indeed referred to Muggles, the ad they found lacked the boldly declarative “Muggles™ from RAH™” logo that figured so prominently in the version Stouffer had provided to the Court. Larry Potter fared about as well. The lone paragraph mentioning the youngster's last name, Scholastic et al.'s experts testified, was rendered in a font different from that of the remaining text. It wasn't even clear, by the time the dust settled, whether original B.C.I. editions of The legend of Rah and the Muggles and Larry Potter and his best friend Lilly ever existed at all. Former employees of the short-lived publishing house testified to never having produced a book whose title referred to Muggles. And although Stouffer claimed that the color photocopies of Larry she had provided to the Court came from originals published in 1988, the plaintiffs countered by showing that the technology used to produce the supposed originals didn't exist until 1993. Finally, with regard to the invoices Stouffer hoped would document the market strength of her work: neither B.C.I. salesperson Joan Korban Wright, nor Great Northern president Randolph Slaff, whose names appeared on the documents, recalled ever having brokered a deal to distribute B.C.I. books. Slaff, for his part, testified that the signatures bearing his name were not his own, while Wright went a step further to assert that Slaff's signature must have been forged by Stouffer, whose handwriting she knew well (Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer, 2002). The Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer decision was devastating to the defendant. Given Stouffer's scant sales (she never sold more than 6,000 copies of any of her books, compared to the 400-million-and-counting Harry Potter volumes sold [Flood, , n.p.]) and what the Court described as her “pattern of intentional bad faith conduct,” it concluded: Plaintiffs’ publication, distribution, and exploitation of the Harry Potter books does not violate any of Stouffer's intellectual property rights. Stouffer is permanently enjoined from making false representations to third parties indicating that she owns all rights in the “Muggle” and “Muggles” trademark and copyrights, or indicating that plaintiffs have violated her intellectual property rights. (Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer, ) The Court proceeded even further, granting Scholastic et al.'s motion to sanction Stouffer for her “perpetration of a fraud upon the Court.” In addition to fining Stouffer US$50,000, the Court ordered her to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs, which they claimed totaled nearly US$1.65 million. Judge Schwartz reduced that amount by about two-thirds, however, citing “discrepancies” in the law firms’ billing procedures and “a large volume of duplicative work” that had run up the plaintiffs’ tab unnecessarily (Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer, ; see also Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer,). A Precession of Simulacra It may be tempting to read the Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer decision as a kind of karmic outcome, the product of a get-rich-quick scheme gone bad. Given Stouffer's questionable maneuverings and the expert testimony presented in court, there is good reason to suggest, on one level, it probably was. On another level, though, the case shows just how strangely enchanted this world of ours is, given the peculiar but still completely routine twists and turns that occurred during the litigants’ dizzying dance of claim and counterclaim. The genius of this case lay, really, in Scholastic et al.'s decision to file a preemptive suit against Stouffer, who was compelled then to defend the originality of her work to an extent that J. K. Rowling was not. In fact, the plaintiffs had to prove very little to secure their trademark and copyright interests, other than to show the false—and falsely derivative—nature of the evidence that Stouffer had presented to the Court. Schwartz (1996) is right on the mark, then, when he states: “It is within the exuberant world of copies that we arrive at our experience of originality” (p. 212). Rather than copies and frauds affirming the substance or plenitude of purported originals, the case shows how the latter arise, empty and ghostlike, in the negative outline of the former. And what of the evidence? Surely there is compelling proof of wrongdoing on Stouffer's part. What is also compelling, however, is the more legitimate evidence that, owing to the dazzling display of dupes and doppelgängers, the Court downplayed in deciding the case. Among the most persuasive facts is Stouffer's having successfully contested trademark registration of the word Muggle in 1992. Here, the offending party was a mouse named Muggle, who, assisted by the voice talents of comedian Bobcat Goldthwait, starred in the American Broadcasting Company's short-lived, animated primetime television series, Capitol Critters. While it is not clear whether producer Steven Bochco withdrew his application from the federal trademark office because of Stouffer's claim, the series’ cancellation, or both, the fact remains that Stouffer asserted trademark rights publicly, and with a federal agency, five years prior to the first Harry Potter volume's debut (“‘Harry Potter’ book lawsuit,” 2000; Stouffer v. Scholastic et al., 2000; Stouffer, ). Stouffer officially copyrighted an illustration of the Muggle characters in September 1986, moreover, referring to them as such on the application, and in June 1987, she copyrighted a song she had penned called “Muggle-bye.” The former was linked explicitly to the Rah book, whose copyright she had registered with the U.S. Library of Congress in 1984 (Stouffer, ,). Despite holding these copyrights and having taken action against Bochco's mischievous mouse, Stouffer's Muggles still were not what the law would consider to be a “strong mark,” given her languid book and merchandise sales. The situation was compounded by the fact that she had failed to register the word Muggle with the federal trademark office until February 2000, asserting until then a less weighty, common-law trademark (Stouffer, ). The Court's ruling in Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer meant that, in an ironic twist of fate, her Muggles no longer would be entitled to the very intellectual property protections she had pursued and defended for years. In political-economic terms, the meager economic capital Stouffer's Muggles had generated resulted in the diminishment of the legal capital conferred on her by intellectual property law. Here, then, is an operant tautology at work in the Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer decision: Stouffer's Muggles were not a strong mark, nor were they entitled to become one, because they were not, after all, a strong mark. Odder still is how the contested copies at the heart of this case compelled the Court to evacuate the word Muggle of any sense of originality or distinctive meaning for purposes of preserving Scholastic et al.'s trade rights. Rowling claims to have drawn her inspiration for the word Muggle from “mug,” a British colloquialism meaning “easily fooled” (Bone, ). Stouffer, for her part, maintains that Muggle was a nickname she had used for her son when he was growing up (Stouffer v. Scholastic et al., 2000; “‘Harry Potter’ book lawsuit,” ). As the Court observed in its decision, however, there was “no indication that ‘Muggle’ or ‘Muggles’ could be viewed as ‘truly distinctive,’ especially given the fact that these words have been used in commerce by third parties long before Stouffer [or Rowling, presumably] created any of her works” (Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer, 2002, n. 8). The Court then presented an inventory of artistic works, supplied to it by the plaintiffs, that refer at one point or another to the word Muggle. The list included two children's books: Johnny Gruelle's Raggedy Ann in the snow white castle (1946) and Carol Kendall's The gammage cup (1959), both of which feature a character named Muggle. The list also referred to a 1928 Louis Armstrong song called “Muggles,” in which, according to the Oxford English dictionary, the Muggle in question referred not to characters but to cannabis—that is, to marijuana cigarettes. Still, the list of Muggle-doubles does not stop there. Both the plaintiffs and the Court overlooked Lewis Carroll's 1867 short story “Wilhelm von Schmitz,” in which “the euphonious title of Muggle” is conferred on one of the characters (Thomas, ). Surely there are other Muggles lurking about the cultural realm. In any case, lost amid the Muggles’ rampant proliferation is the claim that any one Muggle reference might be said to be originary; however, what must vanish then, too, is an abiding, existential link that would conjoin some or all of these Muggle references as copies. Absent an origin, that is to say, their status as copies grows more and more diffuse. What remains is a series of Muggles that are the same … only different. The Scholastic decision begins by summoning a fairly clear-cut sense of originals and copies, therefore, only to muddy that distinction later on. This is not altogether uncharted territory, however. As Jane Gaines (1991) observes about the case Onassis v. Dior, which revolved around the legitimacy of using celebrity look-alikes in advertising: “Copyright law, having seen so much of similarity, is unimpressed with it.” She adds that because similitude is such a potentially pliant state of affairs, “copyright law … cannot be based on the commonsense notion of absolute uniqueness or a one-of-a-kind ideal. It recognizes claims based on firstness in order to break ties when two objects of culture appear to be identical or, in legal terms, ‘substantially similar’” (pp. 96–97). Intellectual property cases need not be adjudicated on the basis of unqualified originality claims, in other words, an insight Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer reinforces only too well. But in this respect the Onassis and Scholastic cases also part company. In Scholastic, the Court determined that the Muggles in question were so substantially different from one another that the criterion of firstness would not—indeed, could not—apply. Thus, the Court was forced into what could have been—or, theoretically, what should have been—a precarious position. It admitted that there were no originals or copies, at least, where Muggles were concerned; there were only simulacra. The Court thereby embraced those nettlesome bits of outlaw art whose purpose is to exorcise the world of its Platonic inheritances, beginning with originals and copies. To put this even more pointedly: simulacra conceivably should have no business in the realm of intellectual property law, except maybe to cause trouble. After all, intellectual property law historically has been spellbound by matters of duplication and derivativeness. As such, simulacra would seem to be nothing if not threatening to the foundations of its jurisprudence. Copyright, in particular, is “an institution built on intellectual quicksand: the essentially religious concept of originality, the notion that certain extraordinary beings called authors conjure works out of thin air” (Rose, , p. 142). Nevertheless, in Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer, simulacra ran rampant. Not only that, they propped up rather than undermined the plaintiff's claims to intellectual property rights! What this suggests is that simulacra may not only operate outside of or against the law to trouble intellectual property (both the legal right and the broader concept); they may operate inside the law as instruments to secure exclusive proprietary claims as well. Conclusion In an age in which corporate media giants like Scholastic, Warner Bros., and others increasingly define the parameters of human creativity and expression through aggressive assertions of intellectual property rights (Borah, ; Jenkins, , pp. 185–198), Stouffer's challenge, whatever her intentions, deserves a certain modicum of respect. What was once a “culture industry” is fast becoming a “copyright industry” (Horkheimer & Adorno,1944/1997, pp. 120–167; Lessig, , p. 252). This shift threatens not only to restrict legitimate cultural production to an already enfranchised (and well-attorneyed) few, but also, in the longer term, to create unreasonable terms of access to the cultural commons—the publicly accessible resources by which culture is constantly made over again, anew. This essay thus complements and extends the recent work of Jarrod Waetjen and Timothy A. Gibson (). They have shown how corporations such as Time Warner, which are involved in the production and distribution of Harry Potter, “activate” specific aspects of the Potter texts in advertising and other promotional venues, hoping to eclipse their potentially progressive political messages (e.g., anti-consumerism). The struggle over trade rights to “Muggle” and related Potter indicia show how media institutions can marshal the law and legal categories so as to further consolidate the terms of media reception and use. Still, Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer is about more than individual and corporate greed in an age of ascendant intellectual property. Implicit in the case are additional theoretical lessons that bear directly on how one might imagine intervening in this emergent articulation of art, law, and culture. First, while it is true that simulacra might go a long way toward dispelling the bedazzling aura of originality, it is also the case that the politics of their doing so are not guaranteed. When Deleuze (1990) describes simulacra as “the edge of critical modernity” (p. 265), one might surmise that they stand opposed to institutions such as intellectual property law. After all, the idea of intellectual property has roots deep in modernity, with the advent of printing and other technologies of mass reproduction, along with the subsequent exaltation of the author as lone, creative genius (Foucault, ; Johns, ; Rose, ; Woodmansee, , pp. 35–56). Scholastic et al. v. Stouffer shows how the law does not always shrink from simulacra, however, and how it can in fact summon their critical capacities at decisive moments to achieve specific ends. In this case, the simulacra in question, Muggles, became instruments whereby the plaintiffs and the Court attenuated a vexed matter of creative priority (i.e., of originals and copies) by displacing it into a more clear-cut matter of political-economic power. Legal entities therefore are capable of wielding simulacra in ways that may break the spell of representation, only then to cast an even stronger one in which capital comes to express itself more immediately than ever through the law. Second, the case suggests how the experience of culture is mediated increasingly by law and legal categories. Beyond the book world, this phenomenon is dramatized by the music and movie industries’ penchant for suing enthusiasts who trade copyrighted materials online. These and other examples point to the diminishment of culture's “relative autonomy” from matters of law, economics, and so forth at the turn of the 21st century (Althusser & Balibar, ), and perhaps, then, to a sense in which cultural politics on its own is becoming less viable or efficacious today. “Culture is not where change is being organized and experienced, and it is not where resistance is being viably organized,” Lawrence Grossberg () asserts. “This need not be taken to mean that culture does not matter but that the ways in which it matters—and hence, its effects—have changed in ways we have not yet begun to contextualize or theorize” (p. 17). This essay constitutes an effort to begin this work of resituating culture, theoretically, in addition to a plea to take an even more active interest in the ways in which law and jurisprudence bear on what otherwise might be mistaken for straightforwardly cultural concerns. What might critical media scholars do, exactly, to further this project? Our touchstone ought to be this observation, put forth by the Soviet legal scholar Evgeny Pashukanis (): “commodity fetishism is complemented by legal fetishism” (p. 79). Pashukanis suggests here that we investigate not only how specific legal codes, decisions, and authorities prop up capitalist relations of production, and vice-versa, but also how the law, like commodities, can assume an almost mystical character. Apropos, legal fetishism results when one approaches the law as a sacrosanct body of rules and regulations, transcendent to human affairs, as in a natural rights tradition. Hence, it is incumbent upon us to resist such a narrow conception. Instead, we should treat the law as an affirmative expression of a particular community's norms, and more importantly, as “an invitation to consider whether, in fact, things ought to be different” (Lessig, , p. ix). Legal fetishism also results when one assumes this invitation is meant exclusively for jurists. Matters of law do indeed belong in their hands, but not strictly so. As media scholars, we should apprentice ourselves to the arcana of legal argumentation, so that we may in turn participate more effectively in a domain where, today, the politics of culture are getting worked out despite us. Finally, legal fetishism crops up in the absence of relays that would connect juridical institutions with agents whose bailiwick historically has been the politics of culture, more narrowly construed. Nurturing these types of relays thus will be essential if critical media studies wishes to have uptake well into the 21st century.

2024 Michigan Kritik
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The expansion of intellectual property rights as a vehicle of capital locks in the rise of the vectoralist class – ensures the commodification of information

Wark 4 (McKenzie Wark is is known for her writings on media theory, critical theory, new media, and the Situationist International, “A Hacker Manifesto”, Harvard University Press, October 4, 2004, ) //LF

Capital is the secondary form of property. The privatization of productive assets in the form of tools and machines and also of working materials gives rise to a class of interest among its owners, the capitalist class. Dispossessed peasants, with nothing to sell but their capacity to work, create this vast stock of capital as private property for the capitalist class, and in so doing create a power over and against themselves. They are paid in wages, but the return that accrues to the owners of capital as property is called profit. The instrument of profit puts capital into play as a form of property that has a greater degree of abstraction inherent in it than that of land. All physical resources now become comparable on the basis of this abstract plane of property. However, capital, unlike land, is not in fixed supply or disposition. It can be made and remade, moved, aggregated, dispersed. A much greater degree of potential can be released from the world as a productive resource once the abstract plane of property includes both land and capital. Where the value of land arises in part out of natural scarcity, the scarcity of things made by productive industry requires the abstraction of property as an artifice to maintain and reproduce scarcity. The possibility of revolt against scarcity arises for the first time at this point in the abstraction of property Capital as property also gives rise to a class interest among its owners, sometimes opposed, sometimes allied, to that of pro p erty [186] [187] [188] pastoralists. Capital threw its political energies into the overthrow of the patchwork feudal class relations, but also found itself sometimes opposed to the pastoralist class that consolidated the feudal property system into the abstraction of land. What capital opposed was the pastoralist ability to exploit its monopoly over land rent to secure the lion’s share of the surplus. Capitalist and pastoralist interests struggle over the partition of the surplus between rent and profit. The pastoralist has the natural monopoly of land, but capital usually prevails, as it has a greater capacity for abstraction. History makes a qualitative leap when the capitalist class liberates itself from the fetter of the pastoralist interest. The capitalist class recognizes the value of the hack in the abstract, whereas the pastoralists were slow to appreciate the productivity that can flow from the application of abstraction to the production process. Under the influence of capital, the state sanctions nascent forms of intellectual property, such as patents and copyrights, that secure an independent existence for hackers as a class, and a flow of innovations in culture and science from which history issues. Capital represents private property to itself as if it is natural, but comes to appreciate the artificial extension of property into new, productive forms under the impact of the hack. Information, once it becomes a form of property, develops beyond a mere support for capital and for a pastoralist class belatedly aware of the value of increased productivity for its rent rolls. It becomes the basis of a form of accumulation in its own right. Just as farmers and workers find themselves confronting a class owning the means of production, so too hackers find themselves confronting a new class of owners, in this case of the means of producing, storing and distributing information—the vectoralist class. The vectoralist class struggles first to establish its monopoly over information—a far more abstract form of property than land or capital— and then to establish its power over the other ruling classes. It secures as much of the surplus as it can as margin—the return on ownership of information—at the expense of profit and rent. Viewed from the current stage of historical development, each of these ruling classes appears to develop out of the productivity of the hack. The pastoralist class develops out of the productivity of private land ownership, a legal hack. The capitalist class develops out of the productivity, not just of private property, but of technical innovations in power and machinery. The vectoralist class develops out of further technical innovations in communication and control. Each in turn competes with its predecessor. Each competes for the capacity to extract as much of the surplus of total productivity as possible for its own accumulation. Each struggles with the productive classes over the disposition of the surplus. But that there is an ever-expanding surplus to struggle over is the product of the application of the hacker’s abstraction to the invention of new forms of production, or new desires for consumption, all within the framework of property. Those dispossessed by the capture of a resource by property come to conceive of their interests in terms of property. They may struggle individually to become owners of it, or they may struggle collectively to reappropriate a portion of it. Either way, property becomes the stake in the struggle for the producing classes as much as for the property owning classes. Land, capital and information all appear as domains of struggle between possessors defending or extending the claim of private property, and the dispossessed, who struggle to extend or defend public property. Farmers struggle against their landlessness. Workers struggle against their dispossession, to claim a social wage. Hackers struggle to socialize a portion of the information stocks, flows and vectors on which the hack depends. The hacker class, which has some sliver of ownership conferred on it by the instrument of intellectual property, finds its rights challenged again and again by vectoralist interests. Hackers, like farmers and workers before them, find that their ownership of the immediate tools of production is compromised both by the market power of the possessing class confronting them, but also by the influence that class can have over the state’s definition of the representations of property. Thus hackers as individuals are obliged to sell out their interests, and hackers as a class find their property rights diminished.

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Intellectual property regimes controls the development of subjectivities through accumulation by erudition – makes neoliberal exploitation and sacrificial logics inevitable

Solomon 14 (Jon Solomon is a professor at the Université Jean-Moulin in Lyon, France who has been working on a project on the biopolitics of translation based on the theory of translation elaborated by Naoki Sakai, “The Postimperial Etiquette and the Affective Structure of Areas”, A Transdisciplinary Journal, Spring 2014, https://www.academia.edu/10219075/The_Postimperial_Etiquette_and_the_Affective_Structure_of_Area)//LF

The third element in the affective structure of area to which I would like to draw attention is erudition. In the meaning to which I would like to ascribe to this term, it refers not just to the problems of access and class mobility, but also more generally to the socially meaningful qualification of “knowledge” and the distribution of it among bodily bearers. Erudition operates through division—the division of labor, to begin with, but also the disciplinary divisions of knowledge, the economic divisions of affect, and finally the individuating divisions of the body. Translation and address play an important role here, too, as erudition excludes or devalorizes certain kinds of knowledge that cannot be “translated” into the quantitative forms and standardized denominations to which the definition of “knowledge” is limited. In today’s neoliberal regime, such exclusion is exercised through the standards set by financially motivated evaluation bureaucracies. In today’s neoliberal regime, such exclusion is exercised through the standards set by financially motivated evaluation/surveillance bureaucracies, intellectual property regimes, and disciplinary boundaries. Erudition is time-consuming. It signals both an unprecedented expropriation of the intellectual worker’s time, such that one is never fully off work, as well as a consumption of time by making affective experience a direct source of value (“consumers hungry for new experience”). Working-too-much, often under precarious conditions, is fast becoming the main way in which subjective disavowal, a fetishism of the object under the sign of erudition, is instituted, even among those of us who would otherwise like to be alert to the problem of disavowal. The technical term that Marx uses for “working-too-much” is absolute surplus value, typically produced by extending the worker’s labor time. Several decades ago, Gayatri Spivak used Marx’s technical term globally to characterize relations between the West and the non-West in the postcolonial era (Spivak 2009b, 123). Today, it would appear that the extraction of absolute surplus value through excessive labor time is fast becoming one of the principal ways to assure not just a hierarchy of relations but the unquestioned acceptance of the field of oppositional terms through which hierarchies are constructed and reversed. What is being forgotten is that the terms of specific difference, such as the West and the non-West, always contain a core component of negativity, freedom, indeterminacy, and antagonism, and are never simply given. Due to a Cartesian habit, we might not think of erudition in terms of affect, but under the definition that I would ascribe to it, affect “sneaks” into erudition through the particular way it individuates the body. Erudition constitutes a singular appropriation of the relation between body and knowledge by granting exclusive legitimacy to the abstract, accumulational form that we call, in English, the body of knowledge. The affective form that is closely related to this appropriation of the multiplicity of the body is the sense of knowing. Nationalism is precisely the modern political form that turns knowing into affect. While foreigners can know about the other nation, they cannot understand it in the same way as nationals; they cannot, in other words, partake in knowledge as an affective structure of feeling that is based in “experience” and shared among members of an imaginary community. Yet the category of experience-that-can-be-shared-sympathetically is determined in advance by the arena that capitalism, in the process of appropriating the state, establishes for the process of valorization. This is the arena of exchange value. Sympathetic knowledge, or national knowledge, is the form of exchange value that is being applied to the act of knowing understood in terms of fantasy—the fantasy of shared experience reflected in knowledge. As an apparatus of fantasy, erudition’s most important role is found in recoding the body. It is not simply that distantiation, based on the Cartesian stance of objectivity, becomes the principle mode of relation, with all of its known symptoms. Erudition is also a means of maintaining an attitude of indifference or disavowal. The most common form of this attitude of indifference with regard to knowledge in the postimperial configuration can be seen in the institutionally sanctioned assumption that issues related to anthropological difference fall under the purview of specific disciplines or fields within the human sciences—what are commonly termed “area studies” in North America. The matrix of anthropological difference per se as an organizing principle for the human sciences must never be brought into question at an organizational level. The organization must be naturalized so that participants never see their own disciplinary commitments, including language and object choice, in terms of the history of social relations under conditions of colonial population management. It is not simply that objects reflect the desires and tastes of certain kinds of subjectivity (forming in effect a socially instituted form of prejudgment or simply prejudice), but rather that objects become means of disavowal by which people can ignore and forget the mediations and negations that constitute subjectivity as a social practice. As an affective form, erudition is thus characterized by object-obsession and subjective disavowal. It is globally institutionalized and legitimized through the supposedly “natural” correspondence between disciplinary divisions in the order of knowledge and various social divisions in the order of political organization. And while it may look as if the university institutions in North America, in which greater anxiety about the status of objects is often seen (accompanied by all kinds of institutional innovations to accommodate interdisciplinary approaches), has an advantage in this respect, the truth is rather that an imperial nationalism, such as seen today in the United States, invariably calls forth performative gestures, such as transdisciplinary object-anxiety, in order to garner the sacrifice of minority populations for the benefit of the capital-state nexus. Disciplinary rigidity and obsession with the legitimacy of “pure” objects as seen in the other nations today outside North American high academia is not a sign of their “backwardness,” but simply the function of cultural nationalism formed in relation to imperial nationalism. In short, the regime of erudition oversees the silent articulation of the reproduction of cleavages (reason vs. myth, speech vs. writing) and identities inherited from the imperial/colonial modernity to the neoliberal production of value through affect. The bearer of various forms (racial, ethnic, national, gendered, sexual, linguistic, et cetera) of social domination and exploitation that have accompanied modernity, erudition is above all concerned with bodies of accumulation. Whereas capitalist accumulation produces the bodies coded by political economy and translational accumulation produces bodies coded by civilizational and anthropological difference, erudite accumulation produces normalized bodies of knowledge as well as bodies normalized by knowledge.

2024 Michigan Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Intellectual Property

Intellectual Property Law facilitates the creation of an immaterial surplus of labor through unconscious generation of desires that lead to endless cycles of exploitation and semiotic exchange

Douglas 19, (Dillon Douglas, 6-6-2019, “A Geology of the General Intellect”, The University of Western Ontario, https://www.proquest.com/openview/ef0e1fcc83b32a21ff5914b87f8f125a/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y) #GayFrog

So, what then is a parasite, the creature who siphons off the surplus? Serres describes the parasite in terms of an unequal exchange of energy, the way in which one organism extracts more energy, labour or time from another organism than it gives back in return, the way one stratum extracts more from layers beneath or beside. Serres explains how organisms are always stealing energy from each other. From this simple thesis, Serres develops a “universal economy of unequal exchange”: The parasitic relation is intersubjective. It is the atomic form of our relations.136 Man is a louse for other men. Thus man is a host for other men. The flow goes one way, never the other. I call this semiconduction, this valve, this single arrow, this relation without a reversal of direction, “parasitic.”137 To parasite means to eat next to...The country rat is invited by his colleague from town, who offers him supper. One would think that what is essential is their relation of resemblance or difference. But that is not enough; it never was. The relation of the guest is no longer simple...There is no exchange, nor will there be one. Abuse appears before use.138 We parasite each other and live amidst parasites. Which is more or less a way of saying that they constitute our environment.139 Pasquinelli gives the parasite a Marxian inflection and picks up on the aprioristic feature of “abuse” and “exploitation.” Before there is use-value or exchange-value there is abuse-value (i.e. primitive accumulation, enclosure and proletarianization). Capital requires a surplus in order to reproduce itself - living labour, ecosystems, and “externalities” of all sorts. In terms of tracking asymmetrical tensions and arrows cutting across, dividing and splitting the semiotic-libidinal domain of the mediasphere, we have to constantly throw ourselves into the energetic surplus of the offline in order to account for exploitative absorptions that pass through a continuum of organisms, strata and workers. The mediasphere is an energy system constituted by a complex of non-mediatic “outsides.” As a kind of caveat, Pasquinelli will also make clear that the “parasite” is not one- dimensional. The parasite does not want its host to die but generates a symbiotic relationship with it and is not simply an insidious leech (although, keeping the host alive can, at times, be all the more sinister); there are moments of alliance and non-hostility immanent to the parasitic relation that exceed direct exploitation and extortion.140 Parasitism is not a moralism. Rather, it flickers between two determinations or poles¾cruel exploiter and friendly symbiont. What the “libidinal parasite” opens up in terms of an “uneven ontology of desire,” then, rather than regarding desire as “a boundless positive energy” or a force that can “endlessly erode all structures of control” (as the relentless Spinozisms of Deleuze and Negri do), is a more radical understanding of how semiocapitalism and neoliberalism divide, cut up, structure, accumulate and siphon flows of desire.141 With the parasite, we supplement the “enchanted universe of production” (Spinoza, Negri, Deleuze, Virno) for the “dark universe of consumption” (Serres, Bataille, Pasquinelli, Parrika). Pasquinelli uses mediatic phenomena such as Internet porn videos, the simulacra of pop icons and other spectacular machines to explain the function of libidinal parasites as seductive gravitational attractors that “channel and accumulate our libido in a highly physical way. Media parasites absorb our libidinal energies as a surplus and condense it in the form of attention and fetishism towards brands, technology, material and immaterial commodities.”142 But there are other, more complicated forms of libidinal surplus value at work within the geology of media and the planetary divides of global labour that subtract our libidinal bandwidth away from secluded processes of how “desire” is manufactured in the first place. Take, for instance, “the residue products from the processes of fabrication, like the minuscule aluminum dust residue released from polishing iPad cases to be desirably shiny for the consumer market.”143 Or, even, how immaterial labour functions on the international stage: “in Vietnam or Thailand a famous designer buys for three dollars a shirt conceived in Paris or Zurich. The shirt will be sold in the West for forty-five dollars in the name of the ‘immaterial designer’” and thanks “to patents, trademarks and intellectual property - that is, to the much higher remuneration commanded by knowledge with respect to material-applied labor - wealth is in fact redistributed to the North.”144 Creativity is ontologically, fetishistically and economically restricted to the commons of the global North. It belongs (legally) to the intellectual and aesthetic consciousness of the cognitariat. We do not often talk of desire in strictly material or “corporate” terms (businesses desire profit and deterritorialize enormous parts of the earth in order to make commodities¾from computers to Ikea furniture¾so they can realize that desire). Desire typically has a phantasmagoric texture, egocentric connotation and anthropogenic locus. It seems to be an immensely polished, exfoliated and diaphanous subjective revelation, intersubjective relation or even machinic relationality¾a cupidinous arrow, machinic coupling or personal inner movement exorcised from all molecular negativity, grit or material support.145 We forget that desire has to traverse supply chains before it gets to the consumer or enters the “psychosphere” in the form of an “abstract” object of enjoyment. When speaking about “desiring-machines,” it is better move away from the “residual consumer” or “larval subject” (and its nomadic and ephemeral identity) found in Anti-Oedipus and emphasize the machine in “desiring-machines,” insofar as it enables us (without denying the “dynamic composition of heterogenous elements” or “transversal relationality”) to think about how corporate technicity (i.e. factories, data centers, fixed capital, financial computation) operates as a major force of geological exhaustion, extortion and destruction. Even beyond the desire to produce surplus value, in so far as a desiring flow functions to disrupt a molar or arborescent configuration of the socius (e.g. centralized financial systems) but plugs into a technological infrastructure that gives it a cyborg dimension it becomes problematic: the “cryptocurrency Bitcoin, which is intended to disrupt hierarchical and centralised financial systems, requires the energy of nine US homes to perform a single transaction; and if its growth continues, by 2019 it will require the annual power output of the entire United states to sustain itself.”146 As Cubitt viciously demystifies for us, the “[f]antasy cyborgs look like human beings with technological implants,” whereas “[a]ctually existing cyborgs are huge agglomerations of technologies with human implants. Corporations like Enron and FirstEnergy are such cyborgs, composed of non-human actors with human biochips embedded to carry out specialist tasks” (like public relations and human resource management), and whose sprawling machinic agency has at is disposable “electrical grids connecting aggressively active users (who can scarcely be caught in the term consumers), the unmanaged turbulence of deregulated and automated markets, and the inhuman drive for corporate profit.”147 Again, it seems necessary to turn to the provocative formula of Anti-Oedipus and read it in geological and corporate terms: “we always make love with worlds.” How does capitalism produce desire, insofar as the desire for surplus profit demands immense material consumption, a 145 Even for Lacan and Žiźek, desire is animated by a primordial “lack” (loss or void in Being) that is then determined and constituted by the signifiers of the “Other” or symbolic order, that is, through the “immaterial” organization of signs and never contaminated by the heterogeneous flows that condition its possibility or production. Desire is, in some degree, an auto-animating force beyond the realm of patriarchal code but, nevertheless, the constellation of objects around which desire is organized are always these phantasmal or “imaginary” objects. Psychoanalysis does not understand production but only structures. consumption that has nothing to do with the “individual”? What material elements does it use, abuse and discard of in the process of “desiring-production”? Desire has a constellation of material traces, minerals and chemicals (from psychopharmaceutic SSRIs to aluminum dust used for polishing Ipads, from serotonin to silicon) grafted onto its quasi-spiritual stomach lining: “plagued by worker suicides, and indexical of the wider health issues having to do with aluminum dust that is a side product of ensuring our iPads are shiny and properly polished, such places are the murky unconscious of gadget culture.”148 Parikka continues the link between desire and materiality: aluminum “itself is one of the primary chemical and metals of technological modernity: its fetishlike shininess defines Italian futurism as much as post-World War II automobile culture” and exposes a paradox in that “the residue of the utopian promise is registered in the soft tissue of a globally distributed cheap labor force.”149 This is an “entanglement” between structured regimes of desire and the materiality of technology that new materialists and cyborgs brutally shy away from. Desire is a complicated parasite that is forever predicated on unequal exchanges. It passes through objects (relations, machines, parts and people) in order to realize and express itself¾at the same time things pass through it, supporting or sabotaging it to varying proportions. The extent to which this relationship is extortive or enrichening, of course, depends on the material honesty of our social relations.

2024 Michigan Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Intellectual Property

Intellectual property rights act as a regime of enclosure under cognitive capitalism, ensuring the re-assertion of hegemonic communication

Karakilic 19 (Emrah Karakilic holds a PhD in sociology from Goldsmiths, University of London and 20. His research revolves around work, employment and society and cognitive capitalism. “Rethinking intellectual property rights in the cognitive and digital age of capitalism: An autonomist Marxist reading”, Elsevier Inc, October 2019, )//LF

The “distinctive quality” of the Marxian limit which is tried to be overcome by capital through the strategies of ex-novo separation pertains to the tendency of workers’ open-direct access to social wealth that is not mediated by the natural laws of capitalist mode of production. When capital’s eternal desire to colonise and accumulate is constrained or threatened by the workers, capital encounters with an alarming situation. In cognitive capitalism, the becoming-centrality of the common provides a political opportunity for workers to invert the essential separation and claim their autonomy in relation to capital. In this context, capital strives to separate people ex-novo from the growing common forms of wealth by mobilising aggressive commodification strategies such as intellectual property rights. A Structural Contradiction: The Enclosure of the Common through Intellectual Property Rights From the standpoint of classical economics and property law, the system of private property (be it real estate or intellectual property) rights is based on two levels of provisions. The first level concerns the rules, norms, conventions, laws, etc. (these are the forms of obligations in differing intensity) that establish the usus (the delimitation of uses), fructus (the exclusive right to enjoy), and abusus(the alienability; the ability to exchange at mutually agreeable terms) of goods, where good is understood to be anything that is recognised as an object of economic, symbolic or social value (Alchian, 2019). The second level concerns the institutional arrangements, that is, the 18 conditions for the enforcement of those laws, rules, and so forth. These two levels are interrelated inasmuch as if the forms of obligation are ignored, they fall into disuse and the character of enforcement is rendered obsolete. In industrial capitalism, on the whole, the jurisdictional and institutional arrangements which inform the nature and execution of private property rights in general, and intellectual property rights in particular were not a subject of major debate for two reasons. First, in industrial capitalism ‘the production of wealth and value is [largely] based on material production and manual labour’ (Morini and Fumagalli, 2010: 235) and, accordingly, the volume of “intellectual” products such as knowledge(s), designs, ideas, codes, images along with the artefacts which are innately not separable (divisible), rival, and excludible was quite limited. Second, the formation of monopoly with regard to the trade of intellectual products was firmly established and regulated by the system of i) patents, ii) trademarks/branding, and iii) copyrights. These mechanisms secured the unity of usus, abusus and fructus of intellectual goods and enabled the transformation of them into scarce goods on the market, thusly providing the tenant of IPR legal right to have monopoly. The evolving technical means of reproduction surely challenged the IPR enforcement by overstepping the legal apparatuses, which was followed by a new writing of the law(s). In cognitive capitalism, the issue of IPR, has become a central topic. The legal proceedings and the increasing court cases over the conflicts of IPR are indeed everywhere (Reuters, 2014). It is not a coincidence that in 1996, a journal was launched which was dedicated to this subject (i.e. Journal of Intellectual Property Rights). Here, we may underline two main interrelated reasons. Firstly, as discussed in the previous sections, the value and wealth have increasingly come to rest on immaterial production (and its intellectual products) which is increasingly conducted within and through the common. This corresponds to the tendency of workers’ re-appropriation of intellectual powers of production, reversal of workers’ separation from the means of production, 19 and hence their increasing autonomy in terms of production relations; a tendency which creates a distressing situation from the perspective of capital. This “distressing” situation, secondly, was raised to an “alarming” situation with the tendential breakdown of the strong links between usus, fructus, and abusus, which was engendered by the force of digital revolution. The new information and communication technologies transformed the results of immaterial production (i.e. intellectual products) into a sequence of binary digits via, for instance, software compression and encryption. In the digital world, the reproduction which is based on meta-data is virtually identical with the original, whereas in the analogical world the latter is always distinguishable, for it is necessary to utilise a physical medium (e.g. tape recorder) for the process of its reproduction. Since the digital data could be coded in the digital media, reproduced, and delivered virtually at zero marginal cost, the inversion of scarcity of creative, social, knowledge commons in relation to intellectual goods has come to the forefront. The rise of ‘digital multitudes’, the elimination of the limits to reproduction, the inversion of scarcity of commons, the developments in the capacity for the repository of intellectual goods have culminated in the ‘limited user rights, conditional fructus, and non-alienability’ (Boutang, 2011: 106) of intellectual goods. As a response to this “alarming” situation, we have witnessed an aggressive plan directed towards enclosing the commonality of immaterial production through IPR. To mention a few, some strict measures [i.e. laws and treaties] were set out, via the World Trade Organisation (WTA), in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), as finalised at the Marrakesh Agreement in 1994. The measures were then strengthened in Doha Development Rounds. In 1998, Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) passed in the United States, followed by the European Union Copyright Directive in 2001. The final version of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market by EU was approved on 26 March 2019. According to the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), there are currently twentysix international intellectual laws, treaties and conventions, binding 191 member-states legally . In cognitive capitalism, nevertheless, the process of enclosure through enforcement of IPR manifests a paradox or, using Marxian terminology, a structural contradiction in two ways. First, capital’s attempts to enclose the commons through IPR in order to (re)establish hegemony over intellectual powers of production actually inhibits the development of productive forces, and thereby capital prepares its own social crisis in terms of established relations of production. Second, the enclosure through IPR curtails the business opportunities in terms of innovation, profit-making, and growth. In what follows, I will discuss these two critical points.

2024 Michigan Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Intellectual Property

Digital information from capital subjects is being used on platforms to dictate our social, political, and economic activities

Cohen 23, Julie Georgetown University Law Center, December 17, 2023, “Informational Capitalism as Phase Shift: Challenges for Digital Constitutionalism”, Oxford University Presss, forthcoming 2024, Accessed July 5, 2024, PW

Intangible resources—defined, extracted, and exploited at scale—play central roles in informational capitalism’s logics and production processes. Such resources include the patents, copyrights, and trademarks upon which industrial-economy actors relied, now routinely assembled into portfolios and leveraged in combination with each other. Also, and notably, they include other categories of intangible informational and economic constructs, such as datasets and algorithms, that are more fluid. Datasets, algorithms, and data-driven algorithmic processes both work to produce and are themselves produced by emergent economic arrangements. In particular, as we will see in Part 3, they have emerged as powerful strategies for extracting rents in ways that underlying physical constraints did not permit. Not coincidentally, another signal aspect of the political economy of informational capitalism is the increasingly pervasive datafication of categories of resources that have long been thought both essential to capitalist production and resistant to full commodification. As conceptualized by Polanyi, resources such as land, labor, and money are fictitious commodities because they are not produced by or for markets, and attempting to subject their supply and demand to market governance produces profound disruptive effects—including human suffering, social dislocation, and consequent social and political unrest—that reverberate far beyond markets.3 Datafication of fictitious commodity resources has begun to produce comparably far- reaching consequences.4 In the era of informational capitalism, moreover, a new basic factor of production with fictitious commodity attributes has emerged. A particularly significant new resource category has become people themselves, as new data-extractive strategies and practices targeting populations underwrite surveillance-based business models.5 A third signal aspect of the the political economy of informational capitalism is an organizational logic based on platformization. Platformization is a form of nonmarket ordering that relies on intermediation of information flows configured for scaled-up interconnection using modular protocols. Whereas the market was “an idealized site of encounter between buyers and sellers within which the characteristics, quantities, and prices of goods and services were regulated autonomically by the laws of supply and demand,” the platform is “a site of encounter where interactions are materially and algorithmically intermediated.”6 Platformization has pervasively reshaped patterns of resource appropriation and extraction and, in so doing, has also pervasively reshaped a wide range of other economic, social, and civic activities, including information transmission, social interaction, political discourse, entertainment, and the consumption of goods and services. Much as a thermodynamic phase shift acts on the nature and structure of molecular interactions, producing large-scale change in the behavior of chemical substances, so the three constitutive transformations of information capitalism have acted on the nature and structure of transactions and interactions, producing large-scale change in the behavior of economic, social, and political systems. Parts 3 and 4 explore two systemic changes that have particularly significant implications for digital constitutionalism movements.

2024 Michigan Kritik
Framework › FW offense › Reps shape reality

Discourse shapes reality --- only through the development of a new collective logos based on deeper social-ontology can we actualize new realities.

Mensch 23 (Ivo J. Mensch is London based expert generalist without titles but many practices. He’s currently working with Rebel Wisdom, Emerge and Perspectiva in various roles. “The Solipsistic Society: from stuckness to collective unfolding”, Perspectiva, 3/31/23, //LF

Another big task in sourcing our new subjectmatter and to let it take new shape, I believe, requires the capacity of practising a new logos into being as a community. As consciously as possible, so we can weave the web Bourgeault speaks of. Historically, a logos formed around a charismatic figure, like a Jesus or Buddha, who could breach their imaginaries and give people the teaching based on a new logos to rework its subjectmatter. But I believe a practice of ‘Logoics’ should primarily be a collective effort from the start this time, given the context, complexity, geography and temporal nature of our challenges. One observation, having practiced deeply in two wisdom traditions, is that the way reality shows up in our experience, depends on the logos and transmission of that teaching, not just the surface concepts our mind rejects or entertains. As a Buddhist I had spot-on Buddhist experiences; while practicing in the Diamond Approach (the same?) reality manifested in ways that would never arise in a Buddhist context. The teachings, concepts and practices we engage in at various depths of reality determine how it unfolds and is what I term dispositional realism – how we engage reality determines how it shows up. That’s why we must take great care when using and developing our psychoactive theories, models, methods, images, metaphors and other concepts. That mastery is where I believe true agency can be developed, in dialogue with the Real and its constraints. We may find that we’re not passive subjects to any bottom-up emergence, but that the influence of our sincere inquiry actually shows that reality is responsive. A.H. Almaas: ‘The logos is responsive to situations and actual needs of real people, and these are determined by historical epochs, culture, language, forms of logic and psychology, major events, and so on. Therefore, how it unfolds its wisdom as a teaching will have to take into consideration all these factors, and many others. This is an expression of its optimising and loving intelligence, and its total freedom. This amounts to recognising that the logos can unfold experience through different and varying logoi.’[xlv] We can learn to become logos-aware, exploring how the attitudes, dispositions and questions we bring to reality yield certain responses and different kinds of knowing and afford us new perceptual capacities not available to the modern enculturated humans of today. Just as reason made itself available to humanity at a moment in history and was spun into the collective atmosphere, so can other qualities of being and guidance be discovered. Much can be learned by moving in and out of the existing logoi of wisdom traditions or indigenous ones while not forgetting the logos of technology and its imagination that now increasingly shapes our lives. Each of these logoi offers a view on reality’s deep continuity, a participatory potential to work the subjectmatter and an expressive potential that holds a piece of the puzzle, but when taken alone leads to more solipsisms. Collective unfolding requires drawing energy and information from many sources, consciously cultivating openness, working with constraints, permeability and diversity. The latter may serve to be a good preventative of dogma and partial views of reality that risk being mistaken as the only truth, turning into another version of capitalist realism. The logoi that animate all wisdom traditions originate from the deep continuity of Origin and are an expression of the intelligence in the dynamic unfolding of reality itself. A sympoietic society is always participating in this creative dynamism. A journey of discovery is not about doing and controlling things according to an outcome-focused strategy or an ideology, but about cultivating our inner states, developing perceptual potential and getting out of our own way – working the evolutionary potential of the present moment. This is implicitly building with the subjectmatter of trust and courage, living into new imaginaries that are in harmony with all life and in support of our collective unfolding through the mystery that we share.

2024 Michigan Kritik
Framework › FW offense › Fiat bad

Identifying and rejecting the illusions of the Imaginary is necessary for the creation of a psycho-political subject capable of transcending the biopolitical.

Mensch 23 (Ivo J. Mensch is London based expert generalist without titles but many practices. He’s currently working with Rebel Wisdom, Emerge and Perspectiva in various roles. “The Solipsistic Society: from stuckness to collective unfolding”, Perspectiva, 3/31/23, //LF

The tech world uses the term ‘technical debt’, which means that a legacy system has grown so large and dysfunctional over time that it no longer pays to keep patching it up. At some point it is better to build something completely new. The same principle applies to our imaginary and structure of consciousness as its operating system. We don’t need another quick fix upgrade, or ‘a new story’ as many insist, but a new architecture that is built out of a different matter altogether. Julian Reid is onto this: ‘How to navigate the relation between the imaginary and the real? A politics of resistance to liberalism, today, requires more than ever a psychopolitical subject capable of transcending the biopolitical horizons of liberal modernity; one that will free us from its biologisms, and enable us to dream and imagine in ways that are proper to the human psyche. But in order for an imaginary to continue with enough persistence such that it produces a revolutionary manifesto with a new literary constitution, for it to be more than the vacuous pastime of poets, the imaginary must find its matter, its reality. A material element must give the imaginary its own substance. Note it is not the question of which material precedes the imaginary, but how the imaginary finds its material, such that it is able to realise itself.’[xliii] I think his insight is profound and is pointing in the direction we need to be headed. We are still largely living in a materialist imaginary – yet to culturally integrate the insights of quantum sciences and what it tells us about the reality of matter. There is the obvious kind of physical matter, whose depleting resources and resulting constraints will play a leading role in shaping our new subjectivity.[xliv] Then there’s our quest to discover new matter from which to crystallise our new imaginaries. To avoid falling back into the solipsism that arises from our sense of separation from the real, whatever its qualities or symbolic interface we use, I propose to call the material Reid speaks of ‘Subjectmatter’. I see it as a pragmatic imaginal move in service of deepening care for our inner states, heeding the truths of entanglement and co-enactment of reality we engage in as conscious agents. Enacting new imaginaries can’t be limited to work on ‘ourselves’ as we saw. We’ll need to expand our focus; not just go ‘in’ to work on our personalities, but get real and look ‘out’ at our entanglements with matter, beyond the surface and include the ‘in-between’ of our interpersonal relations, including interspecies ones. Then identify which constructions turn out to be mere Demi-real illusions (such as colonialist white supremacy, patriarchy, anthropocentrism etc.), rid ourselves of them and finally perform the alchemy on the material of our social structures. Practicing in this reflexive way means forging a bodymind capable of accessing the deeper processes of reality, all the way from the surface of our fixed egoic, mental-rational perspective to Origin, including different kinds of nonduality. Only from deeper places, like the imaginal, will you be able to participate in its unfolding so it can manifest in new ways. In my opinion, it is the only way we can be truly novel and start from scratch to build , a , or a new system that replaces the old, as Buckminster Fuller instructed. Cynthia Bourgeault points to the attitude it requires to enter into the liminal and not immediately run the familiar modern malware of control when things feel a little uncertain and shaky: ‘The first step is the hardest. Lean into the emptiness! Don’t immediately rush to fill up all the available space. Lean into the darkness and let your eyes adjust. Little by little you’ll discover that you’re actually seeing a new landscape, seeing in a slightly different way. The deeper clues of connectedness begin to fill in for you, announcing their presence in small and often surprising ways. As your imaginal vision gains strength, that strength flows back into the web, and the web itself gains strength and presence enough, eventually, to begin to hold healing and even prophetic force within its collective atmosphere.’