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Catherine Shu, “Can the law be copyrighted?,” TechCrunch, 04-09-2019, https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/09/can-the-law-be-copyrighted/

ICC’s stance is that it is already making its code more accessible by putting it online.

Raymond Mosley and Robert Tapella, “Amicus brief- Former Government Publishing Officials Raymond Mosley and Robert Tapella,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, https://www.eff.org/ar/document/amicus-brief-former-government-publishing-officials-raymond-mosley-and-robert-tapella

Cochran’s objections to the Federal Register are notable because they introduced thematic arguments against public access to the law that would reappear for years to come. First, he argued that government publication of the regulations was unnecessary because the only potential readers were industry lawyers and professionals, who could get copies of relevant regulations simply by asking legislators or agencies for copies.²¹ “[T]he attorneys in St. Louis and the business houses in St. Louis,” Cochran’s home district, “who are interested in Government regulations and Executive orders secure them if they need or want them.”²²

National Fire Protection Association, “Benefits of Standards Development Organizations,” NFPA, 04-18-2024, https://www.nfpa.org/for-professionals/codes-and-standards/standards-development/the-value-of-standards-development-organizations/benefits-of-sdos#

*Date obtained with carbon dating the internet

Vanessa Williamson, “Understanding democratic decline in the United States,” Brookings Institute, 10-17-2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-democratic-decline-in-the-united-states/

The United States is experiencing two major forms of democratic erosion in its governing institutions:6

Vanessa Williamson, “Understanding democratic decline in the United States,” Brookings Institute, 10-17-2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-democratic-decline-in-the-united-states/

Experts agree that the health of U.S. democracy has declined in recent years—but what does that mean? The United States is experiencing two major forms of democratic erosion in its governing institutions: election manipulation and executive overreach.

Vanessa Williamson, “Understanding democratic decline in the United States,” Brookings Institute, 10-17-2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-democratic-decline-in-the-united-states/

Experts downgrade U.S. democracy

American Bar Association, “ABA survey: U.S. democracy is weaker today — and disinformation is to blame,” American Bar Association, 04-23-2024, https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2024/04/survey-us-democracy-weaker-disinformation-to-blame/

WASHINGTON, April 23, 2024 — Democracy in the United States is weaker today than it was five years ago, and most people blame misinformation, disinformation and the political parties, according to a new national survey conducted for the American Bar Association.

The Economist, “Why America is a “flawed democracy”,” The Economist, 03-21-2024, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2024/03/21/why-america-is-a-flawed-democracy

Instead, it is America’s political culture and the functioning of its government that pose the biggest problems. Within the culture category, America scores poorly on political polarisation and general support for democracy. A recent survey by Pew, a pollster, found that more than a quarter of Americans think that an autocracy—in which a leader can bypass Congress and the courts—would be a somewhat or very good form of government.

Daniel F Spulber, “Public Prizes versus Market Prices: Should Contests Replace Patents?,” Northwestern University, https://www.scholars.northwestern.edu/en/publications/public-prizes-versus-market-prices-should-contests-replace-patent

I consider whether government prizes should replace market prices for inventions. The America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 establishes a framework for government prizes I examine how antitrust and public policy towards patents should take into account the economic benefits of the market for inventions. I compare the market price system with government prize systems in terms of economic efficiency. I find that the deadweight welfare loss argument for replacing market prices with government prizes is flawed. I show how prices in the market for inventions provide state-contingent signals that guide invention, commercialization, innovation, financing, and complementary inventions. I examine how prices in the market for inventions provide indicators of technological change. I conclude that replacing market prices with government prizes would harm invention, innovation and economic growth.

Joe Lancaster, “The Government Is Better at Picking Losers Than Winners,” Reason, 02-xx-2024, https://reason.com/2024/01/25/picking-winners-and-losers/

All investment is risky. What better way to avoid that risk than to use other people's money? Federal, state, and local governments dispense gifts, grants, and loans to private companies, generously funded by taxpayers and usually with vague promises of economic development in return. While politicians say they don't like to pick winners and losers, even the "winners" sometimes turn out to be losers for taxpayers.

Andrei Iancu and David Kappos, “Replacing Patents with Prizes Bad for Innovation,” Boston Hearld, 08-20-2023, https://www.bostonherald.com/2023/08/20/iancu-kappos-replacing-patents-with-prizes-bad-for-patients/

A major problem with prize systems is that they undervalue new medicines. While a drug is being developed, it’s very difficult to estimate how much it could eventually be worth — and government prizes rarely fall on the “large” side of the spectrum. As soon as drug developers see that the available award is unlikely to match the market value of a new drug — or even cover costs — the prize system will have no motivating effect.

Andrei Iancu and David Kappos, “Replacing Patents with Prizes Bad for Innovation,” Boston Hearld, 08-20-2023, https://www.bostonherald.com/2023/08/20/iancu-kappos-replacing-patents-with-prizes-bad-for-patients/

Prizes were a fad hundreds of years ago. They did not work. All serious scholarship has demonstrated that prizes fail badly at incentivizing innovation, as compared to our tried-and-true patent system.

Andrei Iancu and David Kappos, “Replacing Patents with Prizes Bad for Innovation,” Boston Hearld, 08-20-2023, https://www.bostonherald.com/2023/08/20/iancu-kappos-replacing-patents-with-prizes-bad-for-patients/

Instead of using patents to reward and encourage invention — as the U.S. has done with stunning success for over 200 years — Sanders wants the government to offer prize money.

“Delinkage Debunked: Why Replacing Patents With Prizes for Drug Development Won’t Work,” 02/03/2020, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, https://itif.org/publications/2020/02/03/delinkage-debunked-why-replacing-patents-prizes-drug-development-wont-work

WEAKNESSES OF THE DELINKAGE APPROACH

Henry G. Grabowski, Joseph A. DiMasi, Genia Long, “The Roles Of Patents And Research And Development Incentives In Biopharmaceutical Innovation,” Health Affairs, February 2015

Alternatives To The Patent-Based System

Jose Luis Valverdea, and Eduardo Pisanib, “The Globalisation of the Pharmaceutical Industry,” Pharmaceuticals Policy and Law, Volume 18, 2016, https://www.ifpma.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/The-Globalisation-of-the-Pharmaceutical-Industry-Monograph.pdf#page=51

While some proposed measures have their theoretical and/or practical merits, and can complement the current privately funded R&D model, they cannot replace it. From a pragmatic point of view, charitable R&D initiatives, state-directed R&D, and/or public-private partnerships could not sufficiently finance the development of needed innovative medicines in an efficient and sustainable way as through the current capital-market based R&D model (Fig. 1). No alternative R&D models could replace the private pharmaceutical R&D model with its functioning patent system, without severely affecting the development of new life-saving medicines. The often discussed “de-linkage” of the price for a medicine and R&D costs remains academic as none of the suggested models could provide the continued supply of resources for research as the financial markets do. Especially with regard to NTDs, where market incentives are not available, the further fostering of collaboration between WHO, industry, national authorities and other stakeholders – complementing rather than replacing private-sector funded research – can be expected to continue to produce encouraging results in the future. New models should therefore be seen as complementary, as add-ons to current collaborations, rather than as radical changes to the current innovation ecosystem.

Cecilia Cheng and Theodore T. Lee, “When Patents are Sovereigns: The Competitive Harms of Leasing Tribal Immunity,” The Yale Law Journal, 03-02-2018, https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/when-patents-are-sovereigns

Moreover, if this practice becomes commonplace, generic companies may be less likely to compete ex ante, because the litigation costs for challenging even weak patents would significantly increase. Even if tribal immunity is only successfully exercised in PTAB proceedings, generic companies whose expected benefit of challenging the IP falls between the costs of PTAB proceedings and full litigation would no longer have an incentive to dispute the patents. This outcome would undermine the specific incentives that the AIA IPR process is meant to create: a more streamlined, easier way of challenging patents without going through full litigation.

Cecilia Cheng and Theodore T. Lee, “When Patents are Sovereigns: The Competitive Harms of Leasing Tribal Immunity,” The Yale Law Journal, 03-02-2018, https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/when-patents-are-sovereigns

The interaction between tribal sovereign immunity and patent law can lead to anticompetitive harms. In this Section, we start by canvassing the implications of sovereign immunity and the problems potential plaintiffs face when attempting to join a sovereign tribe in the patent context. The Section concludes by discussing the implications of pharmaceutical companies using tribal sovereign immunity to avoid the Hatch-Waxman and IPR processes.

Emily S. Bremer, “On the Cost of Private Standards in Public Law,” Kansas Law Review, https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/20310/5-Bremer_FinalPDFSheridan.pdf?sequence=1

A. The Benefits and Costs of Mandating Free Access

Jeffrey A. Rosen, “Report to the House of Delegates,” American Bar Association, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/ebook-of-resolutions-with-reports/2016_hod_annual_meeting_electronic_report_book1.pdf#page=403

On the other hand, many SDOs reportedly rely heavily upon the revenue derived from the sale of their copyrighted standards in order to conduct their operations. They maintain that unconstrained public access to such material would leave them unable to continue to develop and produce the standards themselves unless an alternative revenue stream were made available. At the same time, many agencies would be unable, unwilling, or without sufficient resources to replicate what the SDOs currently do. Indeed, as discussed above, agencies often find that they greatly benefit from their ability to make use of these standards. Consequently, any legislation in this area should avoid creating a situation in which access to IBR material in regulations would be provided without charge, but the standards themselves would cease to be developed by the SDOs due to inadequate funding.