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Encouraging e-waste recycling could be achieved with new and sustainable techniques. Agromining can be a sustainable solution for old household electronics (mobile phones, laptops, and TVs) with high REE concentration. The agromining processes employ plant species with high hyperaccumulation attributes like fast-growing on REE-rich soils and accumulating a high amount of REEs. After REEs have been concentrated in the body of a plant or multi-cellular fungi like mushrooms, REE extraction into individual elements can be achieved through several hydrometallurgical or pyrometallurgical processes. Utilization of the hyperaccumulating characteristics of plants for agromining makes it an environmentally friendly and low-cost approach. But, it requires a lot of land and constant plant care. REEs supply from recycling e-wastes via agromining can be a good policy recommendation for President Biden’s executive order on U.S. supply chains of critical materials. Agromining can address several national priorities like enhancing domestic job creation and manufacturing capacity, as well as mitigating supply chain risks and environmental impacts. Besides, agromining can help small to medium-sized companies and municipal landfills in the U.S. and developing countries to participate in REE extraction at a fraction of REEs mining from finite ore sources.

Researchers report they achieved on-demand storage of photonic qubits at telecom wavelengths using a laser-written waveguide fabricated in an erbium-doped crystal. The work could lead to the construction of large-scale quantum networks based on existing fiber networks. The research team was based at the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). A research team from the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) report they achieved on-demand storage of photonic qubits at telecom wavelengths using a laser-written waveguide fabricated in an erbium-doped crystal. The team, led by Prof. GUO Guangcan, said work demonstrates an essential request for fiber-based quantum networking applications, and is a leap in the construction of large-scale quantum networks based on existing fiber networks. The researchers published their findings in Physical Review Letters. According to the team, quantum memories are crucial devices in quantum networks. In order to construct quantum networks using current optical fiber networks, such devices ought to function at telecom wavelengths. However, due to their fixed read-out time, preexisting quantum memory systems at telecom wavelengths were unable to realize on-demand storage. In this study, researchers processed a fiber-integrated quantum memory at telecom wavelengths based on a laser-written waveguide fabricated in an erbium-doped yttrium silicate (167Er3+:Y2SiO5) crystal. In order to realize on-demand storage and retrieval, the researchers glued and integrated ordinary single-mode fibers at both ends of the waveguide. They used electronic evaporation technology to fabricate on-chip electrodes on both sides of the waveguide. To further increase storage efficiency, they polarized the electron spin of the erbium ion and initialized its nuclear spin state. Such methods resulted in a fivefold increase (up to 10.9%) in the photon storage efficiency, compared with previously reported results. Besides, the fidelity of on-demand quantum storage reached 98.3%, reducing the loss in long-distance optical fiber transmission by a significant extent.

Quantum computing, a field that relies on the principles of quantum mechanics to calculate outcomes, has the potential to perform tasks too complex forxz traditional computers and to do so at high speeds, making it in some ways the new frontier for science and engineering. To get to the point where quantum computers can meet their expected performance potential, the development of large-scale quantum processors and quantum memories is needed. Precise control of qubits—or quantum bits, the basic building blocks of quantum computers—is critical to do this, but methods of controlling qubits have limitations for massive high-density wiring with high precision.

Now, researchers from Yokohama National University in Japan have found a way to precisely control qubits without the previous limitations. Their results were published in Nature Photonics on July 26, 2022.

Quantum computing offers a range of powerful applications in financial crime detection and prevention. QML models, such as Quantum Neural Network (QNN) and Quantum Support Vector Machine (QSVM), have the potential to analyse massive financial transaction datasets much faster than classical AI methods []. They can identify complex money laundering or fraud schemes that might go unnoticed by conventional approaches. Quantum Natural Language Processing (QNLP) can swiftly sift through various texts, including reports and calls, to detect signs of economic crimes by better understanding semantics and contextual concepts [, ]. Quantum Reinforcement Learning (QRL) agents can interact with synthetic environments that simulate financial systems at scale [, ]. It enables them to identify new vulnerabilities exploited by criminals, providing valuable insights for strengthening security measures. Quantum recommendation systems can learn customer behaviours and promptly detect anomalous activities [], allowing for immediate flagging and investigation before significant losses occur. Furthermore, quantum dimensionality reduction techniques extract meaningful features from high-dimensional time series and other real-world financial data. It enhances the ability to accurately detect anomalies and suspicious patterns []. Quantum clustering algorithms also play a significant role by grouping related criminal activities or entities that transcend borders or employ dissimilar techniques [], providing a more comprehensive understanding of interconnected criminal networks. Quantum simulations of markets and investment strategies offer insights into systemic risks and allow for testing interventions at a speed and scale that classical computers cannot match []. Finally, combining the advantages of both paradigms, hybrid quantum-classical models can potentially transform how financial intelligence agencies and banks leverage data to prevent financial harm. By harnessing the power of quantum computing alongside classical methods [], these hybrid models can revolutionise the approach to combating financial crimes. In summary, the applications of quantum computing in financial crime detection and prevention are vast and promising. From analysing large datasets to understanding complex semantics and detecting anomalies in real-time, quantum computing is poised to reshape the context of safeguarding financial systems and preventing illicit activities. As mentioned before, QML algorithms, such as QSVM, can revolutionise the analysis of large transaction datasets by detecting patterns that indicate money laundering, fraud, and other illicit activities [, ]. The quantum version of these algorithms can perform the classification task exponentially faster. In addition, quantum annealing and Variational Quantum Eigensolver (VQE) algorithms offer the opportunity to optimise risk models for extensive portfolios, enabling the detection of abnormal financial activities associated with economic crimes like insider trading. Quantum Principal Component Analysis (QPCA) and other dimension reduction techniques can extract meaningful features from multidimensional financial time series, aiding in identifying anomalies and suspicious transactions related to theft and embezzlement. Furthermore, quantum order finding algorithms, such as Shor’s algorithm [], can analyze periodic patterns in financial market indicators and transactions, uncovering cyclical behaviour exploited by perpetrators of economic crimes such as pump-and-dump schemes. By leveraging quantum graph algorithms, particularly quantum walk-based algorithms applied to transaction networks, hidden connections between entities involved in economic crimes can be detected faster than with classical methods []. Quantum simulations of financial processes and models have the potential to accelerate stress testing of controls and risk analysis, facilitating the identification of new vulnerabilities exploited by economic criminals []. Moreover, quantum sampling abilities can generate realistic synthetic economic crime datasets, which can be used to train machine learning models for detection and prevention. Finally, combining hybrid quantum-classical algorithms with investigative techniques and domain expertise holds the promise of revolutionising economic crime fighting. By harnessing the power of quantum computing alongside classical approaches, we can potentially enhance our ability to combat and prevent economic crimes more effectively. Financial crimes such as money laundering, terrorist financing, fraud, and tax evasion have significant financial implications for society, costing billions of dollars each year. These illicit activities erode trust in the financial system and facilitate more severe criminal behaviours. In the past, financial institutions primarily relied on human analysts to monitor transactions and report suspicious activities. However, modern financial systems’ scale, complexity, and speed have surpassed human capabilities. Enormous volumes of data are generated daily, holding the potential to reveal criminal patterns. Advanced analytics and AI offer promising solutions to this challenge. By processing vast amounts of unstructured data, including transactions, documents, and communications, AI technologies can augment human analysts and identify intricate patterns and anomalies that might go unnoticed. Equipped with the right tools and access to aggregated transaction data, regulators and law enforcement agencies can more effectively detect criminal networks, track illicit financial flows, and prevent unlawful funds from infiltrating the financial system. From a business perspective, financial firms aim to fortify their platforms against criminal exploitation, minimise fines and reputational risks, and assure customers that their assets are secure. Advanced monitoring and AI-based systems safeguard the interests of all stakeholders involved. Moreover, the application of these new technologies holds great promise in enabling authorities to swiftly and efficiently identify threats to public safety, such as terrorism, human trafficking, corruption, and other forms of organised criminal schemes that undermine society as a whole. QML models, such as QNN and QSVM, offer the ability to analyse massive financial transaction datasets at a much faster pace than classical AI methods. These models excel in identifying complex money laundering or fraud schemes that may elude traditional approaches. Quantum natural language processing enables quick sifting through texts like reports and calls, leveraging a better understanding of semantics and contextual concepts to detect signs of economic crimes more effectively [, ]. Furthermore, quantum reinforcement learning agents can interact with synthetic environments that simulate financial systems on a large scale. It allows them to identify new vulnerabilities exploited by criminals, providing valuable insights for enhancing security measures. Quantum recommendation systems learn customer behaviours and promptly detect anomalous activities, enabling immediate flagging for investigation, thus mitigating potential significant losses. Quantum dimensionality reduction techniques extract meaningful features from high-dimensional time series and other real-world financial data, improving anomaly detection capabilities. Quantum clustering algorithms comprehensively group related criminal activities or entities that transcend borders or employ dissimilar techniques, enhancing the understanding of interconnected criminal networks. Moreover, quantum simulations of markets and investment strategies contribute to a deeper comprehension of systemic risks and enable testing interventions at a speed and scale not achievable with classical computers. Finally, hybrid quantum-classical models, harnessing both paradigms’ advantages, can fundamentally transform how financial intelligence agencies and banks leverage data to prevent financial harm. In summary, quantum computing applications in financial crime detection and prevention encompass many capabilities. From analysing massive datasets and understanding complex semantics to identifying vulnerabilities and mitigating risks, quantum computing has the potential to revolutionise the way we safeguard financial systems and combat illicit activities.

Given Vladimir Putin’s reckless talk about his potential use of Russian nuclear weapons, the United States must ensure its own nuclear stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. Yet, for decades, the stewards of the country’s nuclear complex — the Departments of Defense and Energy — failed to assess and remediate the cyber vulnerabilities of America’s strategic forces. An effort to reverse that neglect has been building momentum over the past five years. Both Congress and the executive branch must accelerate the pace. On October 18, the Kremlin announced that the four Ukrainian regions recently “annexed” by Russia are now under the protection of the Russian nuclear umbrella. In plain speak, Putin suggested that attempts to aid Ukraine in the rescue of its sovereign territory could be met by a nuclear response. To deter additional aggression and dangerous escalation, Washington should ensure the U.S. nuclear triad stands ready and able, as the Pentagon says, to “deliver a decisive response anywhere, anytime.” But deterrence is only as good as it is credible. Two years before the February invasion of Ukraine, the congressionally mandated Cyberspace Solarium Commission called for a Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment across the U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications, or NC3, system. The Commission’s rationale was simple: an adversary could breach any military system, including the NC3, reliant on computer networks built upon software and hardware of sometimes unknown provenance. A potential compromise could create a false warning of attack or prevent warning of an actual attack. A breach could render the U.S. launch capability inoperable or allow unauthorized use of weapons. Given Moscow’s proclivity to use false flag operations to justify the use of force, America’s nuclear arsenal must be protected from manipulation by an adversary. Buried in both the Senate and House versions of the massive 2023 National Defense Authorization Act are short provisions augmenting the cybersecurity of the NC3. This step forward builds on important work over the last few years by both Congress and the executive branch. The Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review in 2018 first underscored the risk to the NC3, noting, “The emergence of offensive cyber warfare capabilities has created new challenges and potential vulnerabilities for the NC3 system.” A Government Accountability Office report later that year warned that “until recently, DOD did not prioritize weapon systems cybersecurity.” Against that backdrop, the Solarium Commission urged Congress to direct the Pentagon to “continuously assess weapon system cyber vulnerabilities” and “routinely assess every segment of the NC3.” Congress has passed multiple pieces of legislation into law in recent years to harden the weapons complex. In the FY21 NDAA, Section 1712 requires periodic reviews of the vulnerabilities of major weapons systems and the critical infrastructure on which those systems rely. Section 1747 requires the DoD to establish a concept for operations needed to defend the NC3 from cyberattacks. In last year’s NDAA, Congress again addressed this issue, this time in three places: Section 1525 requires the DoD to issue regular reports on the progress of the Strategic Cybersecurity Program, an effort that evaluates the cybersecurity of offensive cyber systems, long-range strike systems, nuclear deterrent systems, national security systems, and DoD critical infrastructure; Section 1534 puts a deadline on an existing mandate for assessments of the cyber resilience of nuclear command and control systems; and Section 1644 calls for an “independent review of the safety, security, and reliability of covered nuclear systems,” which includes, but is not limited to, cybersecurity. The Biden administration complemented these statutory requirements in May 2021 with a new executive order on “Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity,” requiring, among other things, that the secretary of defense provide further details on cybersecurity practices for national security systems. Adm. Charles Richard, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, meanwhile, affirmed in April that programs to upgrade the NC3 are “harden[ing] NC3 systems against cyber threats.” As a result, NC3′s cybersecurity protections will exceed “the DoD baseline standard” including persistent monitoring to detect and mitigate threats. Congress now aims to build on this momentum. The Senate version of the FY23 NDAA has a provision that specifically extends the requirement for annual NC3 assessments another five years. The House version clarifies how Congress will receive briefings on vulnerabilities and remediation efforts and conduct oversight of the improvements made to the NC3 system. The last three years of direction and funding from Congress could not be clearer: the Department of Defense must maintain a laser focus on hardening the country’s strategic forces against cyber threats. The security of these systems provides the bedrock of credible deterrence that prevents Putin from launching a nuclear war.

In China’s Standards 2035 plan, unveiled last year, the country outlined its intentions to dominate the next generation of technologies by taking a pivotal role in setting technical standards. According to Beijing, “third tier” companies make products; “first tier” companies set standards. It wants to be a champion of the latter. 

The plan is seen as intrinsic to China’s ambitions for supremacy in emerging fields such as AI, quantum, the internet of things, 5G and 6G. Those ambitions reflect the commonly held belief that we are on the precipice of a fourth industrial revolution, says Richard Ghiasy, senior fellow at the Leiden Asia Centre in The Netherlands. “What we’ve seen in the previous three iterations, is that the nation or nations that lead that revolution generally tend to lead the world and the world economy,” he says.

As companies from around the world develop the technology and standards for 5G mobile devices and networks, American companies are under threat by aggressive antitrust enforcement that ultimately redounds to the benefit of these foreign companies, which are economic competitors in countries that are also military competitors of the U.S. Over the past five years, foreign governments, particularly in Asia, have subjected U.S. companies to antitrust investigations that failed to follow basic norms of the rule of law, such as providing basic due process protections.14 These antitrust investigations were a thinly-disguised effort by these countries to force the transfer of U.S. patented technology to their own domestic companies, or to insulate their domestic companies from American competition. In recent years, Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese antitrust authorities have brought nearly 30 investigations against 60 foreign companies across a range of industries, including manufacturing, life sciences, and technology.15 Antitrust challenges undermine intellectual property rights by forcing companies to license their products on non-market-based terms. One prominent example in U.S. history is when the Department of Justice wrung a concession from AT&T to license royalty-free the entire portfolio of 8,600 patents held by Bell Labs in a 1956 antitrust consent decree with the company.16 Today, the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy has observed that “China uses the Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China not just to foster competition but also to force foreign companies to make concessions such as reduced prices and below-market royalty rates for licensed technology.”17 Companies have also complained about poor policy guidance and procedural protections under China’s competition laws.18 Others have complained about China’s use of its competition laws to promote policy objectives rather than protect competition and advance consumer welfare.19 In one example, companies raised concerns with Article 7 of China’s State Administration of Industry Commerce (SAIC) 2015 Rules on the Prohibition of Conduct Eliminating or Restricting Competition by Abusing Intellectual Property Rights.20 Under this provision, intellectual property constitutes an “essential facility,” which could allow parties to raise abuse of intellectual property rights claims against patent owners for a unilateral refusal to license their patents.21 Predatory antitrust enforcement actions threaten the ability of U.S. companies to continue to be leaders in 5G technological development. China and other nations with similarly restrictive regulatory frameworks can weaken the ability of the United States to compete in global markets by exacting high monetary penalties from U.S. intellectual property owners or forcing the transfer of their intellectual property to domestic commercial rivals. As a penalty for violations of its competition laws, China can impose exorbitant fines that range up to 10% of a foreign company’s entire revenue in the prior year.22 This is not a legal rule observed in the breach; it has already resulted in fines just shy of $1 billion.23 Another way in which courts in China and other foreign countries are harming U.S. companies is through the use of anti-suit injunctions. One example of this is in the recent patent infringement lawsuit brought by InterDigital, an American high-tech company that has developed key technologies in wireless telecommunication, against Chinese company Xiaomi. In June 2020, Xiaomi filed a lawsuit in the Wuhan Intermediate Court in China requesting that the court set global licensing rates for InterDigital’s patents on standardized technologies. In July 2020, InterDigital sued Xiaomi in India for infringement of InterDigital’s Indian patents. The Wuhan Intermediate Court then ordered InterDigital to stop its lawsuit with its request for an injunction in India. The Chinese court further prohibited InterDigital from suing Xiaomi and requesting an injunction or damages in the form of reasonable licensing rates, or even to enforce a previously-issued injunction, in any other country. If InterDigital does not comply with this worldwide injunction against pursuing legal relief for the violation of its patents in any other country, the company faces a significant fine in China. The type of judicial order issued by the Wuhan court is known as an anti-suit injunction and its purpose is to force an intellectual property dispute to play out solely in a Chinese court at the behest of the Chinese government. These court orders demonstrate China’s desire to become the source of 5G innovation and to dictate the licensing terms of the technology, and the anti-suit injunctions hamstring U.S. companies like InterDigital from enforcing their intellectual property rights anywhere in the world. The unfair use of antitrust enforcement and related legal actions like anti-suit injunctions to weaken U.S. intellectual property rights around the world risks diminishing U.S. global competitiveness in critical technologies like 5G, and further empowers China and others to expand their influence over the evolving 5G technological ecosystem. To the extent the U.S. cedes its dominance in 5G standards development, China will continue its focused efforts to fill that void. Huawei, a China-based company, has increased its R&D spending while growing its share of patents on the standardized technologies comprising 5G.24 The President’s Council on Science and Technology issued a report concluding that Chinese actions in the semiconductor industry, which include a range of policies backed by over $100 billion in government funds, threaten U.S. leadership in the industry and present risks to U.S. national security.25 China’s “Made in China 2025” plan called for China to become a leader in 5G technology, including in the development of the standards for the technology, by 2020.26 The plan expressly favors Chinese domestic producers, calling for raising the domestic content of core components in high-tech industries like 5G to 70% by 2025.27 This issue, however, extends far beyond simply the ability and willingness of U.S. companies to engage in the requisite R&D to participate in the 5G race. Reduced U.S. influence on 5G standard-setting would force the U.S. government to rely on untrusted foreign companies for its 5G product supply. The Department of the Treasury has expressed concern about the “well-known” U.S. national security risks posed by Huawei and other Chinese telecommunications companies.28

In his speech on 9 October 2021, celebrating the 1911 Xinhai Revolution which ended China’s last imperial dynasty, Chinese President Xi Jinping vowed to reach “peaceful unification” with Taiwan under a “one country, two systems” arrangement.[1]

Still, Xi has also repeatedly warned against “Taiwan independence”, arguing that the current Taiwanese government is the strongest enemy of Chinese unification and the biggest hurdle in the way of a “great rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation”.[2] These kinds of statements reaffirm Xi’s clear understanding that as long as Taiwan remains independent, and unconquered, China’s dream of national greatness can never be realised.

In his speech on 9 October 2021, celebrating the 1911 Xinhai Revolution which ended China’s last imperial dynasty, Chinese President Xi Jinping vowed to reach “peaceful unification” with Taiwan under a “one country, two systems” arrangement.[1]

Still, Xi has also repeatedly warned against “Taiwan independence”, arguing that the current Taiwanese government is the strongest enemy of Chinese unification and the biggest hurdle in the way of a “great rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation”.[2] These kinds of statements reaffirm Xi’s clear understanding that as long as Taiwan remains independent, and unconquered, China’s dream of national greatness can never be realised.

Though these questions may seem silly and nonsensical, their answers have taken on new importance. These questions are part of a larger inquiry as to what inventions should be considered patent eligible. Because United States patents are worth $3 trillion, determining what is eligible for a patent has a major effect on the United States economy.5 However, patent eligibility is mired in a state of uncertainty, as this Note will explore in detail. Many of those who follow patent jurisprudence closely hoped that the Supreme Court would resolve the lingering uncertainty by ruling on American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 6 but the Court denied certiorari in June 2022,7 thus ending the Court’s entrance into the patent-eligibility waters for the foreseeable future.8

Among the many changes in the patent system wrought by the Supreme Court in the past decade were four decisions between 2010 and 2014 on patent eligibility doctrine under § 101.13 These four decisions culminated in the “Alice-Mayo framework”—a new two-factor inquiry that courts and the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) have applied since 2014 in assessing whether an invention or discovery qualifies under § 101 as an invention or discovery that is patentable under the Patent Act even if it is new, useful, and fully disclosed in the patent.14

The Alice-Mayo framework does not apply the statutory text of § 101, but rather the judicially created exclusionary rule prohibiting patents issuing on abstract ideas, laws of nature, or physical phenomena. The two-factor inquiry is: (1) determine whether the patent claims an abstract idea, natural phenomenon, or law of nature that are ineligible for patent protection, and, if so, (2) determine if the patent claims something more that transforms it into a patent-eligible application (an “inventive concept”) of one of these ineligible categories or is this additional activity in the claim merely well-understood, routine, and conventional activity in the art.

Among the many changes in the patent system wrought by the Supreme Court in the past decade were four decisions between 2010 and 2014 on patent eligibility doctrine under § 101.13 These four decisions culminated in the “Alice-Mayo framework”—a new two-factor inquiry that courts and the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) have applied since 2014 in assessing whether an invention or discovery qualifies under § 101 as an invention or discovery that is patentable under the Patent Act even if it is new, useful, and fully disclosed in the patent.14

The Alice-Mayo framework does not apply the statutory text of § 101, but rather the judicially created exclusionary rule prohibiting patents issuing on abstract ideas, laws of nature, or physical phenomena. The two-factor inquiry is: (1) determine whether the patent claims an abstract idea, natural phenomenon, or law of nature that are ineligible for patent protection, and, if so, (2) determine if the patent claims something more that transforms it into a patent-eligible application (an “inventive concept”) of one of these ineligible categories or is this additional activity in the claim merely well-understood, routine, and conventional activity in the art.

Over the past decade, though, the U.S. patent system has been put under an extensive amount of stress from all branches of the federal government. For its part, the Supreme Court is now deciding patent cases at a rate not seen for almost 100 years,8 changing the law in all aspects of the patent system. This has sown extensive uncertainty for innovators, which has undermined the reliability of patents as a guaranty that an inventor or creator will be able to rely on them to reap the fruits of their labors.

But it is far worse. The Supreme Court is now closing off the patent system to the innovations that it has long recognized as worthy of securing with patent protection. This has had a tremendously negative impact on the inventors and the companies working in the innovation industries that invest millions of dollars in creating the new products and services that drive economic growth, job creation, and higher standards of living. The Supreme Court is undermining America’s long-standing comparative advantage among world economies in securing reliable and effective patent rights for all innovators.

Property rights are the foundation for flourishing societies and economic growth.1 This is equally true for patents, which are property rights in new and useful inventions. The economic and historical evidence is overwhelming that reliable and effective property rights in new inventions—patents issued and secured by stable political and legal institutions functioning under the rule of law—are an essential ingredient for growing innovation economies.2 Many people witness this on Shark Tank as the venture capitalists always ask inventors if they have a patent to secure their invention.3

Even before Shark Tank, students learn in school about the innovators responsible for making modern life a veritable miracle, such as Charles Goodyear (vulcanized rubber), Cyrus McCormick (mechanized reaper), Alexander Graham Bell (telephone), Thomas Edison (record players, lightbulbs, electrical systems), Nikola Tesla (electrical systems), Willis Carrier (air conditioning), Steve Wozniak (personal computers), and many others. All of these inventors had the fruits of their productive labors secured to them by reliable and effective patents. Thus, they were willing to create their new inventions and then sell them to consumers in the marketplace, revolutionizing our day-to-day lives in the 21st century.

] The mission of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is to develop and oversee an intellectual property and innovation system that is capable of transforming the U.S. economy, creating new jobs and industries, and improving the lives of all in America. For those of us involved in the innovation enterprise, we know that the granting of robust and reliable intellectual property rights to inventors and entrepreneurs is critical to this mission. Guaranteeing these rights--in exchange for disclosing the details of an invention to the public--has proven to be the most effective mechanism ever created to turn new discoveries into viable and transformative commercial products and services.

Guided by the new USPTO Strategic Plan, 1we are working to accelerate U.S. innovation, especially in critical and emerging technologies, bring more people into the innovation ecosystem, and, importantly, bring that innovation to impact. I will discuss some of the USPTO's unique efforts to expand participation in the innovation enterprise, but first will share some of what we are doing to shore up the U.S. IP ecosystem.

All told, this is an especially important time for the USPTO to be engaged in such activities. The recent passage of major new legislation such as the CHIPS and Science Act 11($ 280 billion), the Inflation Reduction Act 12($ 500 billion), and the Infrastructure bill 13($ 1.2 trillion), are all aimed at revitalizing the high tech and green energy industrial base of our country like at no other time in our Nation's history.

The hundreds of billions of dollars of additional federal spending on research and development, on regional technology and innovation hubs, on training a new generation of high-tech workers--all of this must be accompanied by increasing the awareness and use of the IP system. The success of all of these programs depends on the IP protections guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution, that enable companies to raise the money needed to bring new technologies to commercial production.

The need to secure intellectual property and cybersecurity has never been more urgent. Migrating valuable intellectual property to digital platforms exposes these assets to cyber threats such as hacking, data breaches, and intellectual property theft, just to name a few. This article explores the complex relationship between intellectual property law and cybersecurity, examining common cyber threats, the current legal landscape, and practical strategies for safeguarding innovation in the digital age. The relationship between intellectual property law and cybersecurity Intellectual property law traditionally focuses on protecting creations of the mind and fostering innovation by providing creators with exclusive rights to their inventions, designs, and works. Today, the traditional legal framework is evolving to address the challenges to intellectual property that the digital landscape poses. For example, the patent system is adapting to include provisions for software and technology patents, and companies are increasingly patenting cybersecurity technologies to secure their digital infrastructure. Companies often rely on copyright protection for their software codes. Digital rights management and encryption technologies help reinforce copyright protection by preventing unauthorized access and reproduction. Meanwhile, new threats to digital property are emerging. For example, cyber threats such as domain hijacking, cybersquatting, and counterfeit websites can tarnish trademarks.

Using data from 2005–2014, we investigate the relationship between reportable CSBs and future levels of innovation. The increasing costs associated with CSBs, along with the possibility of CSBs leading to a diversion of resources away from future innovation activities, make this topic important to study. While the existing CSB research largely focuses on short-term market impacts of a CSB (e.g., Goel and Shawky 2009; Spanos and Angelis 2016; Higgs et al. 2016) and argues that such effects are not economically significant to affected firms (Hilary et al. 2016), we take a relatively longer-term approach to analyze the potential innovation impacts by using one- and two-year windows and by investigating investment efficiency and ROA for CSB firms over the four years following the CSB.

Consistent with the cited literature, we expected that the presence of a reportable CSB is negatively associated with our main innovation measure of subsequent-year R&D spending. Given that R&D spending is not uniformly distributed across the cross-section of firms, we predicted that Innovation Leader and Innovation Peer firms react to CSBs in different ways. Additional analyses examine alternative innovation proxies. Specifically, we investigate if affected firms reduce patent activity two years after a reportable CSB, hold more cash, and reduce their investment efficiency.

ABSTRACT: Many firms cite cyber risk as a primary risk factor due to the increase in cybersecurity breach (CSB) incidents. Existing research focuses on the negative, short-term impacts from CSBs, but the longer-term impact is still unknown. Our study investigates firms’ levels of innovation following a CSB as an important determinant of firm growth and profitability. Examining reported breaches from 2005–2014, we find a 10 percent decline in research and development spending in the year following a CSB. Further investigation indicates that firms for which R&D is not the primary business model drive the results. We also provide evidence of a decrease in patents two years after a breach, an increase in cash holdings in the year after the breach, and a decrease in investment efficiency four years following the breach. Our aggregate results suggest that CSBs are associated with future strategic decisions involving firm-level innovation and investment decisions.

The war in Ukraine is renewing fears of a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. — and the danger that such a strike could spiral into a wider conflict between the two powers.

U.S. officials have worried for years about a potential Russian hack of critical systems such as the electric grid, which energy experts say is vulnerable to attacks that could cut off power for hours, days, weeks or even months. The United States would almost certainly respond to such an assault on Americans’ daily lives — and lawmakers and policymakers have said the options would need to include military reprisals or cyber counterattacks, not just more economic sanctions.