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As is the case with many ambitious endeavors, there will be those who doubt its value. In this case, there are critics who are doubtful of the bill’s effectiveness when it comes to patenting artificial intelligence (AI). Since Alice v. CLS Bank, the high likelihood of an AI invention being found to be directed to an abstract idea has created the worrisome possibility of precluding an entire field capable of generating worlds of foundational technology from patentability. Indeed, it is hard to fathom a world where things like the Star Trek computer, with its endless knowledge base and control capabilities, could be patent ineligible, but that is where we are at present because the very thing that makes AI so useful is its abstract nature, which often defies concrete characterization. One of the most challenging aspects of claiming AI effectively in order to capture its commercial value requires a heavy reliance on functional computer language rather than traditional positive machine or apparatus claiming, as these components are vulnerable to very easy design arounds when it comes to practical AI deployment.

Because PERA would eliminate the foundations of the Alice 2A/2B abstract idea analysis that has proven to be a death knell to many AI claims, there is no doubt that PERA would make things better—perhaps too much, so that it is hard to envision it being enacted as written—especially when some on the pro-patent side want even more. Let us break down how PERA addresses Alice and Mayo and the bill’s impact on subject matter eligibility, particularly the eligibility of artificial intelligence.

Courts have been grappling with judicially imposed patentability standards since 2014, when the U.S. Supreme Court issued a series of decisions attempting to establish guidelines for what is—or, more importantly, is not— eligible for patent protection in the U.S.

Most notably, in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, the Supreme Court held that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas were unpatentable, absent a showing of some additional “inventive element.” In Alice and in many cases since, the exception has been used to invalidate software patents, but it has also been applied to patents involving DNA sequences and artificial intelligence-related works.

Courts have been grappling with judicially imposed patentability standards since 2014, when the U.S. Supreme Court issued a series of decisions attempting to establish guidelines for what is—or, more importantly, is not— eligible for patent protection in the U.S. Most notably, in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, the Supreme Court held that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas were unpatentable, absent a showing of some additional “inventive element.” In Alice and in many cases since, the exception has been used to invalidate software patents, but it has also been applied to patents involving DNA sequences and artificial intelligence-related works. The 2014 rulings were aimed at updating patent law to address issues raised by new technologies. But the result has been to make patentability standards too unpredictable and to render many innovations unpatentable in the U.S., though eligible for patent protection in other countries, says Chen, who holds a Ph.D. in physics and has been a practicing patent lawyer for nearly a decade. “The general consensus is that the whole process has become somewhat confusing,” he says. “The statute itself is quite broad, but the judicial exceptions are applied inconsistently. The framework consists of the judicial exceptions to the statute to render a subject matter ineligible and then provides ways out of the judicial exception that are vague. So the framework is really a system of exceptions to the exceptions to the statute. Chen says the unpredictability as to what is patentable exists not only among the courts but even within the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, where different patent examiners have differing views on how to apply the Alice standard of judicial exception to the statutory definition of what is patentable and what constitutes sufficient limitations to take a claimed subject matter out of the judicial exception. In a 2021 survey by the USPTO, nearly two-thirds of respondents reported a negative view of current patent eligibility jurisprudence, saying it undermines innovation and discourages investment in cutting-edge technologies, not only because of its ambiguity but also because it rules too many innovations ineligible for patent protection. Critics of current patent eligibility jurisprudence say the restrictions leave unprotected some innovations that could be patented in Europe and China, and that the current framework has hurt U.S. competitiveness.

On Monday, the United States Supreme Court denied inventor Jeffrey Killian’s petition for a rehearing in his case asking the Court to provide clear guidance on – or else throw out – the Alice/Mayo test for patent eligibility.

The Supreme Court denied Killian’s original petition in early October, but Killian filed a request for rehearing several weeks later.

Catastrophic consequences for civilization. The consequences of this rapid pruning of the evolutionary tree of life extend beyond the obvious. There could be surprising effects of biodiversity loss that scientists are unable to fully anticipate in advance. For example, prior research has shown that localized ecosystems can undergo abrupt and irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping point. According to a 2012 paper published in Nature, there are reasons for thinking that we may be approaching a tipping point of this sort in the global ecosystem, beyond which the consequences could be catastrophic for civilization. As the authors write, a planetary-scale transition could precipitate “substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population.” An ecosystem service is any ecological process that benefits humanity, such as food production and crop pollination. If the global ecosystem were to cross a tipping point and substantial ecosystem services were lost, the results could be “widespread social unrest, economic instability, and loss of human life.” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist Adam Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, this could occur in a matter of decades—far more quickly than most of the expected consequences of climate change, yet equally destructive. Biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that, by pushing societies to the brink of collapse, will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles between state and non-state actors. Indeed, it could even fuel the rise of terrorism. (After all, climate change has been linked to the emergence of ISIS in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and CIA director John Brennan, have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are connected.) The reality is that we are entering the sixth mass extinction in the 3.8-billion-year history of life on Earth, and the impact of this event could be felt by civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes,” as the aforementioned 2012 Nature paper notes. Furthermore, the widespread decline of biological populations could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem on an even faster timescale: perhaps a single human lifetime. The unavoidable conclusion is that biodiversity loss constitutes an existential threat in its own right. As such, it ought to be considered alongside climate change and nuclear weapons as one of the most significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and survival.

Ecologists rapidly adopt new techniques and technologies to improve our understanding of the natural world. Two decades ago, Schneider [1] documented the rise of mathematically based theories, computer-supported models, and quantitative methods to explain ecologically complex relationships that were replacing more descriptive approaches. This trajectory has continued, with quantitative ecology firmly entrenched as fundamental to the modern discipline [2]. We believe that the application of quantum computing (see Glossary) will drive the next paradigm shift for numerical ecology. Quantum computing has the potential to enable increased accuracy and precision of complex ecological models and outperform classical computers in solving complex problems [3].

Conventional (classical) computational capability has increased significantly according to Moore’s law [4], enabling more complex statistical and mathematical approaches. As an example, 50 years ago Hastings [5] described the computational challenges of sampling from high-dimensional probability distributions using Monte Carlo methods. At the time, Hastings was pressing the boundaries of both statistical methodology and the capability limits of classical computing. Fast forward to today, quantum computing has the potential to overcome computational bottlenecks associated with optimisation, machine learning and simulations, and enable the development of a new suite of algorithms to better understand the natural world. Here, we explore the role quantum computing may have in ecology.

Climate change is an existential threat to humans and global biodiversity, as was reinforced in the sixth assessment report (1) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as well as Conferences of the Parties of the IPCC (Glasgow, UK; November 2021) and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (Montreal, Canada; December 2022). But these gatherings also implicitly highlight severe shortcomings in how conservation scientists and policymakers are addressing the climate change threat.

Research in climate change ecology and conservation is still dominated by attempts to understand how species are vulnerable to the altered abiotic conditions driven by climate change alone (e.g., rising temperature) (2). This threat is undoubtedly important. But we argue that other facets of climate disruption could have vastly greater impacts—in particular, the ways in which climate-altered human societies, demographics, and economies interact with natural ecosystems and species. Unfortunately, these human dimensions of climate change ecology have received scant attention. Broad-scale assessment of the scale of biodiversity responses to climate change (3) are therefore underestimating the problem—potentially on a massive scale—when only incorporating direct, abiotic impacts.

There is a race among companies to achieve supremacy in quantum technology because it will drastically reduce computing time from years to hours or even minutes. The power of quantum computing will be a boon for data-intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals, artificial intelligence, industrial design, logistics, and national security [31]. However, it raises serious threats to the cybersecurity of classical computing devices. Theoretically, all cryptography algorithms are vulnerable to quantum attacks. Q-Day is when quantum computers will break the Internet [4]. Given the ubiquity of cryptographic schemes in our everyday online activities, this could be catastrophic. Computer scientists are predicting how quantum computers can cause havoc with encryption, resulting in a global catastrophe [32].

With Google’s declaration of quantum supremacy in 2019, claiming that they solved a problem in three minutes that would take a classical computer over a thousand years, quantum computing is no longer a hypothetical idea [33]. Nevertheless, the millions of qubits of computing power required to break modern cryptography remains a challenging goal. Practical quantum computers with millions of qubit capacity will be able to break nearly all modern public-key cryptographic systems. Before quantum computers arrive with sufficient qubits, we must be ready with quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms, tools, techniques, and deployment strategies to protect the classical ICT infrastructure.

The rate of patenting in quantum computing is escalating, mirroring the rapid growth of the sector. As manufacturers begin to introduce commercially viable quantum computers that outperform classical counterparts and generate substantial revenue, they will begin to become targets for patent assertions, making the competition in the realm of intellectual property increasingly relevant.

Patents concerning the physical realization of quantum computers are potentially influential as they encompass foundational technologies utilized across the entire industrial chain that are often easy to detect and hard to design around. Yet, patents specifically targeting physical realization modalities of quantum computers account for a small fraction (less than 10%) of all quantum computing patents. The volume of patent applications for most modalities is still modest compared to more established industries. This relatively open field presents unique opportunities for companies to secure broad and impactful patents.

At the USPTO, similar challenges may arise, including challenges based on written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). U.S. patent law requires that a patent application contains a “full and clear description of the invention” (35 U.S.C. § 112(a)) and that the “specification concludes with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter … [of the] invention” (35 U.S.C. § 112(b)).

As at the EPO, a patent examiner at the USPTO is likely to be unfamiliar with common terminology used to describe quantum computers, and the technology itself may be unintuitive. When addressing rejections based on either written description or definiteness, it can be helpful if the specification provides clear definitions of important claim terms—particularly those claim terms that read like jargon. Additionally, providing working examples illustrating how the technology is implemented (i.e., describing exactly how a quantum circuit is performed physically by sending certain signals to the qubit(s)) can be helpful in enabling the claims.

Recent technical advances highlight the potential of quantum technologies in several domains including simulation, sensing and metrology, computation, and communication. This includes achieving quantum supremacy using programmable processors based on superconducting qubits.Footnote1 The potential applications of quantum technologies range from (1) simulating quantum systems to enhance our fundamental understanding of nature and its applications (e.g. modelling chemical processes in drug development) to (2) achieving unprecedented sensitivity, resolution and accuracy in measurement through quantum sensing and metrology, (3) solving computational problems that are beyond the reach of classical computing by using quantum computers to deploy quantum algorithms, and (4) developing a new generation of secure communication systems.Footnote2

These advances are of interest to academia, industry and governmentsFootnote3 due to the implications for (1) basic science, (2) a broad cross-section of industry sectors ranging from computing and IT to pharma, and (3) governments concerned about the ultimate national security implications of quantum technologies. Technology-based innovation is typically driven by the synergy between academia, industry and market forces such as the intensity of competition, new market entrants, availability of substitute solutions, and the bargaining power of customers and suppliers. Governments also play a key role since they set innovation incentives and regulatory frameworks. Additionally, it is often the case that governments are a core market participant since they may also be an end customer for new technological solutions, especially when these have applications in defence and national security.

Blockchain is a powerful tool that can significantly improve the transparency, accountability and traceability of greenhouse gas emissions. It helps companies provide more accurate, reliable, standardised, and readily available data on carbon emissions. Blockchain can be utilised through smart contracts to better calculate, track and report on the reduction of the carbon footprint across the entire value chain. It can provide instant authentication, verification of real-time data and clear data records. Blockchain technologies can transform individual efforts of companies into a networked effort. And, it can clearly pinpoint the contributions individual actors make to reduce their carbon footprint. The spirit of competition and market-based incentives create a win-win situation for all. Clean technology startups play a critical role in this process. They develop blockchain-enabled platforms that bring together all stakeholders, including companies, government and citizens. The decentralised approach of blockchain provides both breadth and depth. It engages and enables everyone to participate in the calculation. It allows for tracking and reporting of reductions in greenhouse gas emissions along the entire supply chain, including manufactures, suppliers, distributors and consumers. Innovations in blockchain technologies are powerful enablers for collective action to fight climate change. Recognising the unique value of clean technology startups in this process is of great importance. Public and private investors are starting to take notice of their unique value.

It is well known that nuclear powers have and continue to base their targeting requirements of nuclear weapons on calculations that are restricted mostly to the major but immediate effects of nuclear explosions – blast, heat and radiation. According to General Lee Butler, the former United States, Strategic Forces Commander, during the cold war, the Standard Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) had targeted Moscow with 400 nuclear weapons and Kiev with 40. Several scientific studies of the impact of nuclear explosions since the 1980s up to the present which utilises advanced computer models, confirm the effect of smoke injected into the stratosphere that would block sunlight from reaching the earth’s surface and is described as ‘Nuclear Winter’. In essence global temperatures would plunge below freezing point thus posing threats to life support systems especially food production. In short, it threatened human existence itself.

Later studies that focused on regional nuclear wars especially in the Indo-Pak context, have indicated that the impact of a nuclear exchange would have an immediate significant and catastrophic impact in terms of death and destruction. The latest Toon study, estimates that in a situation where around 350 warheads are used by India and Pakistan, the immediate casualties would vary between 50 to 125 million lives depending on the yields of the weapons used which could vary between 15-100 Kilotons. (a Kiloton being the explosive equivalent power of 1000 tons of TNT).

Will emerging technology cause nuclear war? For more than 70 years, the world has avoided major-power conflict, and many attribute this era of peace to nuclear weapons.1 In situations of mutually assured destruction, neither side has an incentive to launch a nuclear first strike because doing so will only result in self-annihilation. Maintaining secure, second-strike capabilities—the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack—is the key to deterrence.2 Recently, analysts have begun to worry, however, that new military technologies may call into question this model of global strategic stability.3

The world is experiencing a fourth industrial revolution (4IR) in which a wave of new and transformative technologies is being developed, including artificial intelligence (AI), additive manufacturing, quantum information technology, hypersonic missiles, biotechnology, and directed energy.4 While these technologies are expected to have profound implications for societies and economies, most are dual use and will also affect national security, including nuclear strategic stability.

There are decades where nothing happens, and there are weeks where decades happen.” Those words are apocryphally attributed to the Bolshevik revolutionary (and Foreign Affairs reader) Vladimir Lenin, referring to the rapid collapse of tsarist Russia just over 100 years ago. If he had actually said those words, Lenin might have added that there are also decades when centuries happen. The world is in the midst of one such decade. As with other historical hinges, the danger today stems from a sharp decline in world order. But more than at any other recent moment, that decline threatens to become especially steep, owing to a confluence of old and new threats that have begun to intersect at a moment the United States is ill positioned to contend with them. On the one hand, the world is witnessing the revival of some of the worst aspects of traditional geopolitics: great-power competition, imperial ambitions, fights over resources. Today, Russia is headed by a tyrant, President Vladimir Putin, who longs to re-create a Russian sphere of influence and perhaps even a Russian empire. Putin is willing to do almost anything to achieve that goal, and he is able to act as he pleases because internal constraints on his regime have mostly disappeared. Meanwhile, under President Xi Jinping, China has embarked on a quest for regional and potentially global primacy, putting itself on a trajectory that will lead to increased competition or even confrontation with the United States. But that is not all—not by a long shot. These geopolitical risks are colliding with complex new challenges central to the contemporary era, such as climate change, pandemics, and nuclear proliferation. And not surprisingly, the diplomatic fallout from growing rivalries has made it nearly impossible for great powers to work together on regional and international challenges, even when it is in their interest to do so. Further complicating the picture is the reality that American democracy and political cohesion are at risk to a degree not seen since the middle of the nineteenth century. This matters because the United States is not just one country among many: U.S. leadership has underpinned what order there has been in the world for the past 75 years and remains no less central today. A United States riven internally, however, will become ever less willing and able to lead on the international stage. Call it a perfect—or, more accurately, an imperfect—storm. These conditions have set off a vicious circle: heightened geopolitical competition makes it even more difficult to produce the cooperation demanded by new global problems, and the deteriorating international environment further fuels geopolitical tensions—all at a time that the United States is weakened and distracted. The frightening gap between global challenges and the world’s responses, the increased prospects for major-power wars in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and the growing potential for Iran to cause instability in the Middle East have come together to produce the most dangerous moment since World War II. Call it a perfect—or, more accurately, an imperfect—storm. To warn of danger is not to predict the future. Ideally, things will turn out for the better. But good things rarely happen on their own; to the contrary, left to their own devices, systems deteriorate. The task for U.S. policymakers, then, is to rediscover the principles and practice of statecraft: to marshal national power and collective action against the tendency toward disorder. The goal must be to manage the collision of old geopolitics and new challenges, to act with discipline in what is sought, and to build arrangements or, better yet, institutions where there is sufficient consensus. To do all that, Washington will have to prioritize establishing order over fostering democracy abroad—at the same time as it works to shore up democracy at home.

Attendant to this crisis of fiscal legitimacy are increasing challenges to the primacy of the US dollar. The standing of the dollar allows the United States to shape the global economic and political system and offers it greater influence abroad, greater flexibility at home, and greater insulation from international crises.18 For those who would downplay the benefits of dollar dominance, the British experience is instructive. Prior to World War II, the British pound sterling was the primary international currency, thereby allowing Britain to finance military expenditures and manage its wartime debt. Once the sterling was eclipsed by the dollar in the postwar years, Britain was no longer able to finance its war debt, a problem that contributed to its economic decline and exacerbated persistent financial crises during the 1960s.19

The sustainability of the dollar as the leading global reserve currency has been a near constant concern since the 1960s. During this time, foreign dollar reserves began to outgrow US gold reserves, and many international actors began to question the United States' ability to convert dollars to gold at the fixed official rate specified by Bretton Woods. As this confidence declined, speculative attacks against the dollar abounded. The United States eventually abandoned the gold standard, but the dollar has retained its dominance ever since. Thus, anyone decrying the dollar's current strength risks crying wolf.

A blockchain lobbying group backed by the likes of Goldman Sachs, Citi Group, Circle and Fidelity has urged the United States Congress to pass a legal framework for digital assets or risk falling behind other nations. On May 19, the U.S. Chamber of Digital Commerce sent a call to action to Congress and the Senate to prioritize passing a national approach to crypto regulation. The organization added that it requests that Congress organize a “Digital Asset and Blockchain Technology Solarium Commission” to develop a “national strategic approach to digital assets and blockchain technology” in the U.S. There was a stark warning that failure to act would enable “adversarial nations” to further their activities in the space that “endanger U.S. leadership and dollar primacy.” Excerpt of Chamber of Digital Commerce call to action. Source: Chamber of Digital Commerce It mentioned China as an example of such adversarial action with its development of an internationally focused Blockchain-based Services Network (BSN) to “incorporate global development and trade and fill the U.S.-created vacuum.” It also cited the growing number of countries considering or choosing to trade with China directly in yuan and ditching the U.S. dollar. These include Saudi Arabia, Russia, France, Brazil and India, it wrote.

-removing the test clears up backlogs in litigation The blockchain industry has witnessed remarkable growth and innovation in recent years, revolutionizing various sectors with its decentralized and transparent nature. However, amid this rapid development, the importance of patents and intellectual property (IP) in the blockchain ecosystem cannot be overstated. Patents play a vital role in every major industry protecting and incentivizing innovation. They provide legal protection for novel ideas, algorithms, processes, and inventions. With patents, innovators can safeguard their intellectual capital, encouraging them to invest time and resources into research and development, knowing that their efforts will be protected. Some of the top industry leaders holding blockchain-related patents include IBM, Baidu, Alipay, Toyota, Bank of America, and Microsoft. Moreover, patents grant companies a competitive advantage by offering exclusivity over their inventions. This exclusivity allows them to differentiate their products or services in a crowded marketplace. By holding patents on blockchain-related technologies, companies can prevent competitors from using or commercializing their inventions, thus solidifying their market position. IBM serves as a compelling example of a company that recognizes the value of patents and IP in the blockchain industry. Over the years, IBM has been actively pursuing and acquiring patents related to blockchain technology. IBM holds an impressive number of blockchain patents, firmly establishing its position as a key player in the industry. One notable example is IBM's patent for "A Blockchain for Program Code Execution." This patent addresses the challenge of securely executing program code in a blockchain network, offering a solution that ensures the integrity and authenticity of the executed code. By securing this patent, IBM protects its innovative approach and gains a competitive edge by having exclusive rights over the technology. Another avenue that allows for the same protections involves licensing patents. A company called Silakab Corp allows for exactly that. With their global, all-encompassing omnibus patents, companies, startups, and even government entities can leverage Silakab Corp through an exclusive licensing deal to gain IP protection and remain focused on innovation and creating blockchain applications. As an example, Silakab’s patents focus on the protection of data, personal information, and physical property, giving companies a significant advantage when using Silakab’s patents for the basis of their blockchain architectural design. Silakab’s patents also include ground-to-satellite communications using blockchain, which has a wide array of applications in IoT and communication networks. As major corporations and governments begin investing their time and effort into technologies like Blockchain, having IP protection will become an essential component of doing business. Despite the large demand, patent issuance has actually been declining at a dramatic rate over the past couple of years, meaning that they are becoming harder to obtain. Issuance went from 3,000 in 2020 to less than 1,000 in 2023. On top of that, patent litigation is increasing and a heightened understanding of blockchain technology in the judicial system will lead to greater enforcement. This further bolsters the importance of owning a blockchain-related patent or being able to license one if you’re developing blockchain products and services. In the fast-paced world of blockchain technology, patents and intellectual property are vital in driving innovation, ensuring a competitive advantage, and protecting the fruits of research and development. Companies like IBM have recognized this importance and invested significantly in acquiring patents for blockchain-related inventions, while others like Silakab Corp have done the hard work to make patents available to companies that can’t afford to pursue the rigorous process of patent approval themselves. By securing patents and protecting IP, companies can pave the way for future advancements and foster a thriving ecosystem of blockchain innovation.

Like the algorithm for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary form in Benson, and the mathematical formula for computing “alarm limits” in a catalytic conversion process in Flook, getting a patent on blockchain technology which uses a peer-to-peer network using proof-of-work to record a public history of transactions is like getting a patent on an algorithm, is directed to an abstract idea, and is likely going to fail the first step of the Mayo test under US law. Nonetheless, depending on the specific claims that the patent application makes, the patent may still pass muster as patentable subject matter if the second prong of the Mayo test is satisfied. Under step two, a claim that recites an abstract idea must include “additional features” to ensure that the claim “is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].”20 The problem with overcoming step two of the Mayo test for all the pending patent applications for blockchain technology is going to be the fact that the algorithm behind the blockchain technology is already “well known in the art,” given Satoshi Nakamoto’s paper and the innumerable papers that followed which explain blockchain technology. In fact, universities across the United States are introducing courses on blockchain technology, some of which even provide an overview of the code behind blockchain.21 When the patent applications append conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality, it is not “enough” to supply an “inventive concept.”22 Nonetheless, even if the claim in these patent applications employs blockchain’s “well known” algorithm, if it uses the algorithm in a process designed to solve a technological problem in “conventional industry practice,” the assignee could still be granted the patent. For example, in Diamond v. Diehr, the inventor was granted the patent because the invention used a “thermocouple” to record constant temperature measurements inside the rubber mold—something “the industry ha[d] not been able to obtain.”23 In other words, while the technology’s core is already well known, important additions and variations can be patented.

The Nuclear Dimension A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait will have a nuclear dimension regardless of whether the United States is directly involved. Both Taiwan and China know that the latter is nuclear armed and could, at least in theory – but in violation of its No First Use policy – use nuclear weapons against Taiwan.[39] The nuclear dimension is intensified if the United States is factored in, because it means that two nuclear-armed great powers are on opposing sides of an armed conflict. It is intensified further if we make the plausible assumption that one of the reasons that Taiwan is interested in protection from the United States is that the latter has nuclear weapons. America’s arsenal constitutes one of the main appeals of extended deterrence. But it also means that the United States needs to factor in China’s nuclear prowess when it considers the assistance it offers to Taiwan in an armed conflict and the actions it is willing to take against China’s forces.[40] There are more deliberate and less deliberate ways in which the threshold could be crossed from a Taiwan Strait conventional armed conflict to one involving nuclear weapons. In terms of the deliberate side of the equation, it cannot be exaggerated how big such a decision – by China, by the United States, and/or by both – would be for course of the war and the course of history. Why then might either of them be willing to violate the nuclear taboo that has been in place since 1945? Under what circumstances would such a step make any sense at all as a deliberate policy choice? We can take some solace that there is no obvious answer to these questions. But there are still some more detailed issues that need to be considered. For example, even if China has been emboldened by its dominant cross-Strait military position to intensify its conventional attacks on Taiwan as the crisis moves into war, it would end up encountering a different balance of military power to the extent that the United States becomes involved. Of course the latter comes with much greater immediate risks than it once did. American analysts may be increasingly aware of the costs and risks of intervening militarily in a Taiwan Strait crisis. They may wonder how quickly the US could reposition its forces for a more protracted conflict with China. Hence Washington probably has less scope to repeat its 1996 playbook. It is arguably harder for the United States to deter a PLA attack on Taiwan today than it was a quarter of a century ago. And it is certainly much harder for the United States to deter China from coercing Taiwan. Yet if Taiwanese and American deterrence of China has failed, and China is at war with Taiwan, Washington may very well decide to commit to a limited conventional war against China. (Strategic ambiguity raises questions about the time, place, nature and probability of an American response. But these questions don’t allow us to conclude that if China attacks Taiwan, the US won’t get involved in a fighting war). Notwithstanding China’s ability to put American forces at risk, American attacks on PLA force elements could have a devastating effect on China’s military options as the crisis escalates. Some of these measures could be undertaken from a distance: the United States could hold PLA mainland targets at risk even if China had a momentary advantage around Taiwan. And if China initially held the upper hand, Washington might have extra reasons to put mainland PLA targets at risk. If the United States pursued some of the conventional military steps implied earlier and degraded China’s military by attacking PLA forces situated on the mainland, (including through attacks on missile bases and command systems), then China would face a deteriorating correlation of forces. China’s sense of vulnerability will be much greater than America’s. There is more than a passing possibility that Beijing would feel its time for making choices that mattered was closing in. Perhaps in anticipation of these American measures, the Communist Party leadership may have already decided that it is time to use “all options are on the table” language, hinting at nuclear possibilities. Hinting is about as far as things might go. Writing over a decade ago, admittedly when the distribution of military power was more strongly in America’s favour, Baohui Zhang suggested that “the possibility of China threatening first use of nuclear weapons should not be ruled out when a real crisis in the Taiwan Strait makes U.S. military intervention seemingly unavoidable,”[41] which also reminds us that there is a difference between issuing a threat and carrying it out. But once those American precision attacks have begun (and China’s conventional and nuclear deterrence has failed to prevent such an intervention) the situation changes. If China’s options to manage and escalate the conventional conflict seem to be getting scarcer because of the effects of American strikes – actual as well as anticipated – what remaining choices will Beijing have aside from crossing the nuclear threshold and putting an end once and for all to its no first use declaratory policy? This runs against the assessment that “there is no evidence that China envisages using nuclear weapons first to gain a military advantage by destroying U.S. conventional forces or to gain a coercive advantage by demonstrating its greater resolve in a conflict with the United States.”[42] But this envisaging has not been occurring when China is losing a conventional war against the United States. And surely the possible targets for a nuclear attack by China would not be confined to the Strait, unraveling any remaining sense of a tacit agreement to limit the geographical confines of the conflict. Would Beijing consider nuclear attacks on US territories in the wider region – including Guam – if it really wanted to exercise some measure of intra-war deterrence (to make the costs of continuing too great for Washington to handle?) Would it want to hold hostage cities and other targets in the Pacific coast of the US mainland? The hostage-taking scenario may seem farfetched. But if China judged that America’s conventional attacks were sufficiently damaging to warrant the use of nuclear weapons, it would then be obliged to think ahead to what sort of American retaliation would ensue. Any such thinking would be bound to focus minds on the very significant asymmetry between China’s and America’s nuclear forces, and the absence of nuclear options on Beijing’s part that might communicate intentions of fighting a limited nuclear war[43] (however preposterous that notion sounds). But should escalation dominance in such a situation be judged by capability and doctrine (which would favour the United States) or by desperation (which might favour China)? At this point there is also an obligation to consider whether the United States might be the first of the two nuclear-armed states in this crisis to use nuclear weapons. There is the decades-old precedent of US nuclear threats against China in a Taiwan Strait crisis (which occurred several years before China itself had a nuclear arsenal). But the mid-1950s were the era of massive retaliation strategies, and America’s nuclear weapons were not used. And more than half a century later, United States decision-makers would also have some confidence that many of their military objectives – including knocking out PLA systems on the mainland – could be achieved by using advanced conventional systems (eg conventionally armed cruise missiles launched from offshore). Moreover, while some US attacking options would be vulnerable to China’s pressure (including forces based in regional bases) the United States would retain long-range options (including bombers) that would be very hard for the PLA to reach. But we need to ask whether the United States would use nuclear weapons first in a Taiwan Strait conflict if the conventional phase of that war was heading strongly in China’s favour? In other words, if it looked like China had a good prospect of turning military outcomes in the Strait into a political victory: unification by force. Taiwan’s future could head in almost any direction, including forceful absorption into China, without any obvious direct threat to America’s own survival. Yet Taiwan’s absorption would imply that Washington had been defeated by China in East Asia. America’s reputation amongst regional allies which depend on it (eg Japan and Korea) would have been seriously affected. Japan’s own security, including against fears of being trapped alongside a triumphant China, would be imperiled by the PLA’s ongoing presence in a Beijing-controlled Taiwan. The temptation for nuclear proliferation in East Asia after America’s failure to protect the interests of its allies would be strong. America’s national security policymakers might argue that despite the enormous costs of using nuclear weapons, (and the moral opprobrium that would follow) at stake in choosing not to use them was the future of the East Asian equilibrium on which many United States vital interests depend. What then of the less deliberate side of the nuclear ledger? Here I do not have in mind an entirely accidental nuclear war – one in which no obvious decision to proceed with hostile acts was involved. Instead there are risks in any close military-technical and doctrinal interdependence between the conventional and nuclear forces of participants in what begins as a limited war in the Taiwan Strait. The question here is a simple one about a complex situation: can either of the two sides (and especially the United States) put at risk the conventional forces of the other side (and especially China’s) without also endangering the target country’s nuclear forces? Endangering nuclear forces is not necessarily restricted to attacks on delivery systems and warheads – eg the nuclear armed variants of the PLA rocket forces. Also crucial are the command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaisance systems for these nuclear forces, without which their delivery to target may be compromised or prevented. At stake here is China’s confidence that it retains nuclear options in the event of a significant American conventional attack and America’s confidence that it can attack China’s conventional capabilities without unintentionally putting at risk China’s nuclear forces, creating more use them or lose them choices for the adversary. This problem is not confined to considerations of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The late Desmond Ball and I argued a few years ago that any colocation of the PLA’s conventional and nuclear systems could create significant escalatory hazards in a conventional war between China and Japan which brought in the United States as Japan’s security guarantor.[44] Similar risks would be in play should some of the same mainland missile bases that China would use in conducting attacks against Taiwan allow for nuclear as well as conventional options. David Logan argues that while some of these comingling problems have been overstated and others remedied by China’s military reforms, still more may be emerging.[45] P.W. Singer and Ma Xiu have noted that while it was assumed that “the PLA was at least separating its nuclear and conventional forces into distinct and geographically discrete brigades” the deployment of the intermediate range DF26 missile with both conventional and nuclear payloads portends a new and worrying point of instability.[46] If the very same missile offers nuclear as well as conventional options to China, the inadvertent escalation problem raises its dangerous head. In a thoughtful exploration, Talmadge suggests that in the event the United States attacked the capabilities that China was most likely to use in a missile bombardment across the Strait, China’s leaders would still retain some of their most significant nuclear options (and the command and control systems that would permit their use).[47] What matters less, she argues, are the technical interconnections. What matters more is whether China’s leaders believe (wrongly or rightly) that the United States had decided on a counterforce mission, (conventional or nuclear) designed to disarm China. And this version of the nuclear temptation will grow for China’s leaders, “as more and more of their conventional and nuclear or nuclear-relevant assets come under threat during a conventional war.”[48] It needs hardly to be said that putting assets under threat is part of the modern American military philosophy. This would extend to targeting China’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, vital to PLA missile systems (and so reducing the threat to US forces) but also crucial to China’s ability to know what was going on.