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As for the struggle for women’s and gay rights, there is also no doubt the Supreme Court played a role. But the counterfactual is always: compared to what alternative method? Feminists abroad made greater strides than ever occurred in the United States without generalized recourse to judges, while there is no telling what democratic mobilization for gay rights would have gotten under its own power had not the Supreme Court intervened in Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015—without allowing conservatives to pose along the way as the best friends of democratic choice, as Justice Antonin Scalia did constantly, with Chief Justice John Roberts following suit in Obergefell itself.

The objection that there may be territories in the country that would surely reject abortion (as well as gay marriage) if it were opened to a vote is a serious one. But the Supreme Court has, as with school integration before it, already acted to allow those states to eliminate abortion (though not gay marriage) de facto. And the reactionary judicial power that liberals helped conjure does not respect the boundary between red and blue America. Bush v. Gore picked a catastrophic president for the whole country. In more recent years, Citizens United converted national elections into contests pitting oligarch-funded candidates against each other. Janus v. AFSCME pounded another nail in the coffin of public unions. And if a fair verdict on juristocracy is to be reached, it is also worth recalling when an empowered judiciary undermined democracy by failing to act, with the effect of ratifying a near monopoly of executive power on issues like securing the borders against immigrants and fighting enemies endlessly beyond them.

The value of democracy has been taken for granted until recently, but this assumption seems to be under threat now more than ever before. As was explained in Chapter 1, democracy’s claim to be valuable does not rest on just one particular merit, and scholars tend to distinguish three different types of values (Sen 1999). This book focused on the instrumental value of democracy (and hence not on the intrinsic and constructive value), and investigated the value of democracy for peace (Chapters 3 and 4), control of corruption (Chapter 5) and economic development (Chapter 6). This study was based on a search of an enormous academic database for certain keywords,6 then pruned the thousands of articles down to a few hundred articles (see Appendix) which statistically analysed the connection between the democracy and the four expected outcomes. The frst fiding is that a reverse wave away from democracy has not happened (see Chapter 2). Not yet, at least. Democracy is not doing worse than before, at least not in comparative perspective. While it is true that there is a dramatic decline in democracy in some countries,7 a general trend downwards cannot yet be detected. It would be better to talk about ‘stagnation’, as not many dictatorships have democratized recently, while democracies have not yet collapsed. Another fnding is that the instrumental value of democracy is very questionable. The feld has been deeply polarized between researchers who endorse a link between democracy and positive outcomes, and those who reject this optimistic idea and instead emphasize the negative effects of democracy. There has been ‘no consensus’ in the quantitative literature on whether democracy has instrumental value which leads some beneficial general outcomes. Some scholars claim there is a consensus, but they only do so by ignoring a huge amount of literature which rejects their own point of view. After undertaking a large-scale analysis of carefully selected articles published on the topic (see Appendix), this book can conclude that the connections between democracy and expected benefts are not as strong as they seem. Hence, we should not overstate the links between the phenomena. The overall evidence is weak. Take the expected impact of democracy on peace for example. As Chapter 3 showed, the study of democracy and interstate war has been a fourishing theme in political science, particularly since the 1970s. However, there are four reasons why democracy does not cause peace between countries, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak. Most statistical studies have not found a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level. They show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, and even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one (caveat 1). Moreover, the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear (caveat 2). In addition, democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive (caveat 3). Finally, the process of democratization is dangerous. Living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country (caveat 4). With regard to peace between countries, we cannot defend the idea that democracy has instrumental value. Can the (instrumental) value of democracy be found in the prevention of civil war? Or is the evidence for the opposite idea more convincing, and does democracy have a ‘dark side’ which makes civil war more likely? The findings are confusing, which is exacerbated by the fact that different aspects of civil war (prevalence, onset, duration and severity) are mixed up in some civil war studies. Moreover, defining civil war is a delicate, politically sensitive issue. Determining whether there is a civil war in a particular country is incredibly diffcult, while measurements suffer from many weaknesses (caveat 1). Moreover, there is no linear link: civil wars are just as unlikely in democracies as in dictatorships (caveat 2). Civil war is most likely in times of political change. Democratization is a very unpredictable, dangerous process, increasing the chance of civil war significantly. Hybrid systems are at risk as well: the chance of civil war is much higher compared to other political systems (caveat 3). More specifcally, both the strength and type of political institutions matter when explaining civil war. However, the type of political system (e.g. democracy or dictatorship) is not the decisive factor at all (caveat 4). Finally, democracy has only limited explanatory power (caveat 5). Economic factors are far more significant than political factors (such as having a democratic system) when explaining the onset, duration and severity of civil war. To prevent civil war, it would make more sense to make poorer countries richer, instead of promoting democracy. Helping countries to democratize would even be a very dangerous idea, as countries with changing levels of democracy are most vulnerable, making civil wars most likely. It is true that there is evidence that the chance of civil war decreases when the extent of democracy increases considerably. The problem however is that most countries do not go through big political changes but through small changes instead; those small steps—away or towards more democracy—are dangerous. Not only is the onset of civil war likely under such circumstances, but civil wars also tend to be longer, and the confict is more cruel leading to more victims, destruction and killings (see Chapter 4). A more encouraging story can be told around the value for democracy to control corruption in a country (see Chapter 5). Fighting corruption has been high on the agenda of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, the theme of corruption has been studied thoroughly in many different academic disciplines—mainly in economics, but also in sociology, political science and law. Democracy has often been suggested as one of the remedies when fghting against high levels of continuous corruption. So far, the statistical evidence has strongly supported this idea. As Chapter 5 showed, dozens of studies with broad quantitative, cross-national and comparative research have found statistically signifcant associations between (less) democracy and (more) corruption. However, there are vast problems around conceptualization (caveat 1) and measurement (caveat 2) of ‘corruption’. Another caveat is that democratizing countries are the poorest performers with regard to controlling corruption (caveat 3). Moreover, it is not democracy in general, but particular political institutions which have an impact on the control of corruption; and a free press also helps a lot in order to limit corruptive practices in a country (caveat 4). In addition, democracies seem to be less affected by corruption than dictatorships, but at the same time, there is clear evidence that economic factors have more explanatory power (caveat 5). In conclusion, more democracy means less corruption, but we need to be modest (as other factors matter more) and cautious (as there are many caveats). The perceived impact of democracy on development has been highly contested as well (see Chapter 6). Some scholars argue that democratic systems have a positive impact, while others argue that high levels of democracy actually reduce the levels of economic growth and development. Particularly since the 1990s, statistical studies have focused on this debate, and the empirical evidence is clear: there is no direct impact of democracy on development. Hence, both approaches cannot be supported (see caveat 1). The indirect impact via other factors is also questionable (caveat 2). Moreover, there is too much variation in levels of economic growth and development among the dictatorial systems, and there are huge regional differences (caveat 3). Adopting a one-size-ftsall approach would not be wise at all. In addition, in order to increase development, it would be better to focus on alternative factors such as improving institutional quality and good governance (caveat 4). There is not suffcient evidence to state that democracy has instrumental value, at least not with regard to economic growth. However, future research needs to include broader concepts and measurements of development in their models, as so far studies have mainly focused on explaining cross-national differences in growth of GDP (caveat 5). Overall, the instrumental value of democracy is—at best—tentative, or—if being less mild—simply non-existent. Democracy is not necessarily better than any alternative form of government. With regard to many of the expected benefts—such as less war, less corruption and more economic development—democracy does deliver, but so do nondemocratic systems. High or low levels of democracy do not make a distinctive difference. Mid-range democracy levels do matter though. Hybrid systems can be associated with many negative outcomes, while this is also the case for democratizing countries. Moreover, other explanations—typically certain favourable economic factors in a country—are much more powerful to explain the expected benefts, at least compared to the single fact that a country is a democracy or not. The impact of democracy fades away in the powerful shadows of the economic factors.8

On Monday, the hard-working staff here at Spoiler Alerts sounded pretty gloomy about the state of American civic life. As it turns out, elected officials are behaving exactly as political scientists predicted they would behave, focusing like a laser beam on staying in power. This has led Republicans to demonstrate slavish devotion to the president, and congressional Republicans in particular to show amazing deference to executive power.

Furthermore, as Jonathan Swan of Axios reported on Sunday, President Trump's takeaway from his Senate acquittal is that he's bulletproof. "Trump and his entire inner circle convey supreme self-confidence, bordering on a sense of invincibility," according to Swan. "Over the past month, Trumpworld's sense of being unbeatable has only grown. This is partly because the president sometimes defines victory in narrow terms." The idea, perhaps best exemplified by Sen. Joni Ernst (R-Iowa), that Trump has learned his lesson from the impeachment episode is risible.

As for the struggle for women’s and gay rights, there is also no doubt the Supreme Court played a role. But the counterfactual is always: compared to what alternative method? Feminists abroad made greater strides than ever occurred in the United States without generalized recourse to judges, while there is no telling what democratic mobilization for gay rights would have gotten under its own power had not the Supreme Court intervened in Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015—without allowing conservatives to pose along the way as the best friends of democratic choice, as Justice Antonin Scalia did constantly, with Chief Justice John Roberts following suit in Obergefell itself.

The objection that there may be territories in the country that would surely reject abortion (as well as gay marriage) if it were opened to a vote is a serious one. But the Supreme Court has, as with school integration before it, already acted to allow those states to eliminate abortion (though not gay marriage) de facto. And the reactionary judicial power that liberals helped conjure does not respect the boundary between red and blue America. Bush v. Gore picked a catastrophic president for the whole country. In more recent years, Citizens United converted national elections into contests pitting oligarch-funded candidates against each other. Janus v. AFSCME pounded another nail in the coffin of public unions. And if a fair verdict on juristocracy is to be reached, it is also worth recalling when an empowered judiciary undermined democracy by failing to act, with the effect of ratifying a near monopoly of executive power on issues like securing the borders against immigrants and fighting enemies endlessly beyond them.

This rise in litigation is attributable to many sources. First, the United States population has grown since 1960," from about 179 million people in that year 66 to about 281 million in 2000,67 roughly a fifty-seven percent increase. Naturally, this is not enough to account for the caseload rise on its own-after all, the caseload of the courts of appeals rose more than thirteen-fold from 1960 to 199568

Second, there have been congressional sources of the rise in caseloads. Since 1960, Congress has passed two laws-Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196469 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 7 -that have created civil remedies available to private parties for emloyment discrimination that are enforceable in the federal courts. Furthermore, in addition to other statutes creating private rights of action,72 federal regulation has grown in the late 73 twentieth century, which has created additional rights of action.

The preceding Parts have identified and unpacked the primary types of floodgates arguments that the Supreme Court has considered. In doing so, however, the discussion has underscored a set of difficult normative questions: Should floodgates arguments ever be considered in the Court’s decision making? If so, when and why? And in such cases where it might be legitimate for the Court to rely on floodgates reasoning, is it sufficient for a party or the Court itself to assert that a deluge of cases will surely follow, or is more required to turn the outcome of the case? In light of the fact that the justices have considered such arguments in more than sixty cases—and this consideration has increased significantly over the last few terms—the need to have purchase on these questions has become all the more pressing. Answering these questions is no easy task. It is no accident that the Court has fractured—and, indeed, that individual justices have gone back and forth—on these very matters. A large part of the difficulty lies in the fact that these questions cannot be answered in a wholesale manner. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, floodgates arguments vary considerably based upon the institution that is being affected by the flood and what kinds of cases the feared flood contains. And yet, what makes these questions challenging to answer is also what illuminates one way to begin to answer them. As the analysis here shows, floodgates arguments often are best understood as a subset of a larger category of normative arguments—about the relationship between courts and Congress, for example, or about the relationship between the federal and state court systems. The primary goal of this Part is to situate the various floodgates arguments in the appropriate normative contexts. As this Part demonstrates, once situated, the use of some floodgates arguments becomes fairly easily defensible, while the use of others—precisely because theay are not supported by accepted lines of doctrine and practice—becomes far more questionable. Specifically, Part IV.A considers the arguments based on other-regarding concerns—both interbranch and intersystemic— and argues that they are tied to the constitutional principles of separation of powers and federalism, as well as the doctrines of qualified immunity and abstention. These ties, in turn, suggest that the consideration of other-regarding floodgates is defensible. To be clear, the fact that these floodgates arguments have footing in constitutional principles and doctrine does not suggest that they should be immune from scrutiny or that they should always prevail; the point is simply that this grounding at least gives them a prima facie claim to legitimacy. Part IV.B then considers court-centered floodgates arguments and finds them to be on shakier ground. The Court is vindicating no well-established constitutional principle when it defends the federal courts’ docket from caseload pressures, and these arguments have no clear doctrinal or theoretical analogue. The use of court-centered floodgates arguments therefore requires some affirmative justification, which neither the Court nor commentators have provided. Moreover, there is reason to be skeptical of this kind of prudential argument, as shaping the 1058 The University of Chicago Law Review [80:1007 docket of the federal courts is generally understood to come under the purview of Congress, and not the Court. Accordingly, this Section concludes that the justices should let the lower courts rely on the other tools that they have at their disposal— such as case-management practices—to respond to docket pressures, rather than altering substantive law. The remaining objective of this Part is to briefly consider the follow-up question to the central normative one—that is, if there are some circumstances in which it is defensible for the Court to entertain a floodgates argument, what kind of analysis or even evidence is required to affect the outcome of a case? Accordingly, Part IV.C offers some initial thoughts on the minimum amount of support a floodgates argument should have for that argument to be dispositive.  

The preceding Parts have identified and unpacked the primary types of floodgates arguments that the Supreme Court has considered. In doing so, however, the discussion has underscored a set of difficult normative questions: Should floodgates arguments ever be considered in the Court’s decision making? If so, when and why? And in such cases where it might be legitimate for the Court to rely on floodgates reasoning, is it sufficient for a party or the Court itself to assert that a deluge of cases will surely follow, or is more required to turn the outcome of the case? In light of the fact that the justices have considered such arguments in more than sixty cases—and this consideration has increased significantly over the last few terms—the need to have purchase on these questions has become all the more pressing. Answering these questions is no easy task. It is no accident that the Court has fractured—and, indeed, that individual justices have gone back and forth—on these very matters. A large part of the difficulty lies in the fact that these questions cannot be answered in a wholesale manner. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, floodgates arguments vary considerably based upon the institution that is being affected by the flood and what kinds of cases the feared flood contains. And yet, what makes these questions challenging to answer is also what illuminates one way to begin to answer them. As the analysis here shows, floodgates arguments often are best understood as a subset of a larger category of normative arguments—about the relationship between courts and Congress, for example, or about the relationship between the federal and state court systems. The primary goal of this Part is to situate the various floodgates arguments in the appropriate normative contexts. As this Part demonstrates, once situated, the use of some floodgates arguments becomes fairly easily defensible, while the use of others—precisely because theay are not supported by accepted lines of doctrine and practice—becomes far more questionable. Specifically, Part IV.A considers the arguments based on other-regarding concerns—both interbranch and intersystemic— and argues that they are tied to the constitutional principles of separation of powers and federalism, as well as the doctrines of qualified immunity and abstention. These ties, in turn, suggest that the consideration of other-regarding floodgates is defensible. To be clear, the fact that these floodgates arguments have footing in constitutional principles and doctrine does not suggest that they should be immune from scrutiny or that they should always prevail; the point is simply that this grounding at least gives them a prima facie claim to legitimacy. Part IV.B then considers court-centered floodgates arguments and finds them to be on shakier ground. The Court is vindicating no well-established constitutional principle when it defends the federal courts’ docket from caseload pressures, and these arguments have no clear doctrinal or theoretical analogue. The use of court-centered floodgates arguments therefore requires some affirmative justification, which neither the Court nor commentators have provided. Moreover, there is reason to be skeptical of this kind of prudential argument, as shaping the 1058 The University of Chicago Law Review [80:1007 docket of the federal courts is generally understood to come under the purview of Congress, and not the Court. Accordingly, this Section concludes that the justices should let the lower courts rely on the other tools that they have at their disposal— such as case-management practices—to respond to docket pressures, rather than altering substantive law. The remaining objective of this Part is to briefly consider the follow-up question to the central normative one—that is, if there are some circumstances in which it is defensible for the Court to entertain a floodgates argument, what kind of analysis or even evidence is required to affect the outcome of a case? Accordingly, Part IV.C offers some initial thoughts on the minimum amount of support a floodgates argument should have for that argument to be dispositive.  

That's why, in order to optimize the ability of entrepreneurs to thrive, the United States Patent and Trademark Office is working in concert with the Department of Commerce and the Obama Administration, to reduce barriers to medical device business development, and accelerate success. First and foremost, the capacity for growth of any inventor or entrepreneur or new enterprise rests in their ability to raise capital, spur additional research & development, and ultimately bring their ideas to the marketplace. Recognizing that need, the Administration is taking concrete actions to improve the environment for high-growth innovation through the Startup America initiative.

By building partnerships with the private sector, the Department of Commerce and the Small Business Administration match up to $2 billion for private funds that invest in early-stage R&D, invest in businesses in underserved communities, and invest in small entities that face difficult challenges in accessing capital. These nation wide partnerships not only help break down barriers that independent entrepreneurs may face in seeking funding, they also encourage and incentivize direct partnerships between venture capital firms and small companies.

Individuals have historically resolved disputes through face-to-face (F2F) interactions, such as litigation or traditional 'arbitration, mediation, or negotiations. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) theorists and practitioners have long assumed that empathy gained from in-person contact is necessary for resolving conflicts. Furthermore, the norm has been litigation, as individuals seek to avail their rights in courts of law. Public justice demanded that dispute resolution be exactly that, public and in full view. This has especially been true in the United States (U.S.), where one's "day in court" is sacred. Nonetheless, times have changed, and individuals have realized that litigation is too expensive and somewhat nonsensical in many cases. Individuals used to the digital age demand real remedies in real time. Time is money. This is especially true for small dollar, property tax, parking, and other similarly less complex cases. Consumers simply are not willing to spend the time and money it takes to file a claim in court or arbitration and travel to an in-person process. For small dollar claims, it is even too costly to seek redress through F2F small claims courts or litigation alternatives such as mediation, if one must pay for the mediator's time and bear the costs of travel and time off work.1 Meanwhile, we have become increasingly comfortable with transacting online.2 The Pew Research Center recently did a study of online shopping and e-commerce and found tremendous growth in the way our commercial behaviors have changed.3 Surveys of U.S. consumers in 2015 indicated that Americans were spending nearly $350 billion annually online, and 79% of Americans indicated that they make purchases online.4 Additionally, roughly half of Americans reported making online purchases using their cell phones, and many indicated their purchases were made on social media sites such as Facebook or Twitter.5 These percentages have presumably grown since that time. At the same time, e-commerce sites such as Amazon and eBay have gathered loyal customers by providing online means for quickly resolving purchase disputes. 6 This gave birth to the field of online dispute resolution, or "ODR.' 'v ODR includes automated decision-making, as well as online negotiation, mediation, arbitration, community courts, and variations thereof. Its efficiency, accessibility, and ease expand access to justice that moves at the pace of technology, thus allowing for innovation. 8 ODR also allows individuals to resolve disputes quickly and cheaply, without the costs or hassles of travel or taking time away from work. 9 These ODR attributes have sparked initiatives for furthering its use throughout the world. For example, the European Union (E.U.) has promulgated the ADR Directive and ODR Regulation, which work in tandem to require Member States to implement ODR systems for consumer claims.10 Furthermore, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) worked for many years in advancing guidelines on ODR for cross-border ecommerce through its Working Group III on Online Dispute Resolution. Although the Working Group never reached a consensus for such guidelines, it ended in 2016 with a strong recommendation for continuing development of ODR as imperative for efficient redress in cross-border claims. It is therefore not a surprise that the UNCITRAL Working Group IV recently expressed a desire to consider the role of ODR in its examination of cloud computing contracting and identity management. 11 Nonetheless, public courts have been slow to adopt ODR or develop e-courts. 12 It may seem surprising that the U.S. has not moved more quickly in this direction, given that many of the leading innovators in legal technology are based in the U.S.13 That is not to say that there are no innovators in U.S. courts. Instead, some courts in Michigan, Ohio, New York, and elsewhere are developing pilot projects for ODR as a pre-cursor to trial, or for e-courts to handle specific disputes. 14 Groups such as the American Bar Association (ABA) are also developing ODR projects that will operate as an alternative to the courts in an effort to assist parties in resolving claims with only limited judicial assistance. 15 At the same time, public ODR projects are taking shape in other parts of the world. Most notable have been online courts in Canada and China. Indeed, forward thinking policymakers are learning that ODR programs improve judicial efficiency and access for litigants to "attend court" in a meaningful way.16 There is no reason to confine ODR to e-commerce. Instead, individuals in our increasingly wireless world prefer to resolve disputes online. Often, lack of physical access and real-time availability of all participants impede access to justice in F2F ,., processes.1 7 For minor disputes, the time, money, and real or perceived risks involved with going to court are often not worth the cost or hassle.18 It is simply more cost-effective and convenient for most people to use ODR for small claims, traffic, landlord-tenant, and similarly smaller or less complex disputes. Public bodies also benefit from ODR because it is more efficient than traditional judicial proceedings. The initial start-up costs often appear daunting, but are easily eclipsed by later savings in terms of time and money. Problem diagnosis built into ODR leads to dispute prevention, while users enjoy online negotiation and mediation that lead to consensual and quick, resolutions. This saves the courts from the administrative burden of trial and helps clear court dockets with minimal personnel costs. Online court systems also encourage fee and judgment payments by incorporating automatic notices and payments. Moreover, evidence suggests that ODR boosts citizen satisfaction. 19 That leaves us asking why e-courts and public ODR are not the norm, especially for small-dollar cases. Why do we only see pilot projects in discrete locations and contexts? The answer seems to be, in part, fear of the unknown, fear of losing jobs and status, fear of start-up costs, and fear that technology will disrupt due process. This Article, therefore, aims to provide fuel for overcoming these fears to assist access to justice through expansion of e-courts and public ODR for small dollar and less complex cases. To that end, Part I will provide a brief background on the development of ODR, and reasons for moving remedy systems online. Part II will then give examples of ODR in U.S. courts, while Part III will add discussion of the international efforts toward online courts. These Parts will therefore set the stage for comparative analysis leading to Part IV, which will unpack important issues for policymakers to consider as these public ODR projects unfold. This aims to spark further debate, by discussing the essentials for building fair and efficient ecourts. Finally, Part V will conclude.

Appeals from Patent Trial and Appeal Board decisions have flooded the docket of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in the last few years, substantially altering the makeup of that court’s docket. Based on publicly available docket data, the number of appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) pending at the CAFC has exploded from just over 100 in 2013 (when the first PTAB Trials under the America Invents Act were still winding their way through the PTAB) to over 630 PTO appeals pending as of May 2017. Over that same period, PTO appeals have gone from 11% of the CAFC’s docket, to over 40%. In contrast, appeals from the district courts have dropped from 44% of the CAFC’s docket to under 35%.As the graph indicates, this dramatic increase in appeals from PTO proceedings has not been offset by a substantial decrease in district court appeals. As a result, the number of total cases pending at the CAFC has increased over 50% from May 2013 to May 2017.This change to the CAFC’s caseload has already had an obvious impact on the court. In particular, the court recently began expanding its argument calendar to six days of argument per month, rather than the traditional five days, permitting additional cases to be calendared for argument. So far, the change to the court’s caseload has not substantially impacted the court’s time to resolution statistics. However, assuming this situation persists, it would not be surprising to see a lengthening of case pendency times.

SAN JOSE — Growing up in Silicon Valley, amid the apricot orchards and nascent semiconductor companies, Michelle Lee saw the hard work that comes with creating something new. The daughter of an engineer, Lee said it wasn’t uncommon to see others in her neighborhood invent something, file a patent to secure more venture capital funding and then start a company. “Some of those companies succeeded and some of them didn’t. But the few that did really revolutionized the world and the way we live,” she said. “That was very exciting and I knew I always wanted to be a part of that.” Lee, the first woman to lead the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, sat down with this newspaper to chat about diversity, her office’s priorities, the rise of patent infringement lawsuits and thinking globally. This interview has been edited for clarity and length. Q You’re the first woman to lead the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. What is it like being a woman in a male-dominated field, and is it different in law and government versus in tech and science? A For much of my life, I’ve tread a path that did not have people who looked like me. When I was at MIT, women were in the minority and that was at the undergraduate level. In electrical engineering and computer science, it’s even more so. When you enter the legal profession, particularly patent litigation, it helps to have a technical background. There weren’t many women in these roles and in leadership positions whether it be in technology, a top tier law firm or even in the government. It’s something I’m aware of and that’s why I launched initiatives such as “All in STEM” because I hope more girls enter STEM professions and stay for as long as it’s appropriate for them. At the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, we do a decent job. About 40 percent or so of our execs at the senior level are women. Compare that with the private sector and you’ll see there’s a difference, but we can still do more. I think it’s a matter of economic imperative, not just a social one, that we nurture and develop all of our talent. Q Is your office doing anything to increase the number of women patent holders? A If you look at a study that was conducted over I think a 30-year period, fewer than 15 percent of U.S.-based inventors listed on a patent were women. At the current rate, it will take another 140 years to equalize and reach parity with male inventors. That’s another reason why I launched the “All In STEM” initiative. Getting a patent gives you respect and recognition. It also means that you’re more likely to get venture capital funding to start a business based on that patented technology. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office worked with a number of organizations to help create a Girl Scout patch on intellectual property. It’s important that we get our youngsters excited about these issues early on. And for the girls, that we get an increasing number in the pipeline who work their way up in their careers. The attrition rate for women in the STEM profession is higher compared to the non-STEM profession. That’s something that’s worth looking at and where we can make improvements. Q A recent report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office noted that patent infringement lawsuits are on the rise and patents can be unclear and overly broad. Do you agree with these findings and what is your office doing to improve the quality of patents that are issued? A Even before that study came out, I launched the Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative. Not because I believe that the agency was not issuing good quality patents. I think the agency has been doing a good job and especially recently a better job. But our backlog was going up, and through a lot of hard work from my predecessors and my team that backlog has been going down. In fact, many of the recommendations that they mentioned, we were already working before the report published. Q Why do you think patent infringement lawsuits have increased so much in the last couple of years and what role does your office play in this? A That’s a very complicated question. The fact of the matter is that intellectual property rights are more valuable now than ever before. The most valuable assets of the most valuable companies these days is not the factory, inventory or machines. It’s the brand, processes, the algorithms, the designs. It’s not surprising that there will be fights over who owns what because having rights to it entitles you to a certain portion of the market share. Our goal and the administration’s goal is to eliminate the needless and abusive skirmishes and create an environment where companies can flourish. Q What are some of your other top priorities this year? A Making sure that American companies can confidently sell and export their products overseas. It’s important that they do so because there’s huge markets out there beyond the borders of the United States. We want our American companies to be able to tap into that and they will only do so with confidence if there are strong protections for their intellectual property. Q Your office also meets with other patent and trademark offices in Korea, Japan, Europe and China. What was the takeaway from this year’s annual gathering? A With the economy being as global as it is, there’s no way that a company is filing patent applications only in the United States if they’re eyeing the potential of foreign sales. We work with many offices across the globe to make sure that we’re not duplicating each other’s efforts. To the extent that we can streamline and reduce the redundancy and duplication — not rubber stamp the other’s office’s work — but take a look at what they’ve done and refine it in our examination process then we’ll produce a better quality product.

U.S. patent litigation is big business. Billion-dollar judgments, readily available litigation financing, and favorable venues and lax filing standards mean between three and four thousand suits are filed annually, almost none going to trial. As is standard today, the true identity of the entity filing suit is often shrouded in secrecy; rules and regulations associated with tax status and corporate formation—in addition to making patent litigation more profitable—make it favorable to create straw-man shell corporations (also known as non-practicing entities (NPEs Non-Practicing Entity. A broad term associated with trolls but now disfavored because it includes universities and legitimate technology developers that seek to license technology in advance rather than after a producing company has independently developed it. More ) in legal jargon) for use as judgment-proof vehicles to sue. And the lawyers, of course, make a killing. For the NPEs Non-Practicing Entity. A broad term associated with trolls but now disfavored because it includes universities and legitimate technology developers that seek to license technology in advance rather than after a producing company has independently developed it. More that use a “file-and-settle” model, filing hundreds of complaints (and sending even more demand letters per year) and obtaining quick settlement, often for less than the cost of litigation, is critical—if problematic for the lawyers pushing hundreds of cases a year. This practice, if taken to the extreme (as some have), is bound to violate ethical and court rules, like those of reasonable pre-suit investigation, diligence, and the prohibition against filing frivolous suits. That’s why just a handful of lawyers are willing to risk it. These lawyers and their filings are rarely reviewed—particularly because these cases settle so quickly that not even court clerks, much less magistrates or District Court judges, generally get to lay eyes on them before they are withdrawn or settle for nuisance value (typically less than $30,000, and by some reports often as little as a few thousand). In this cottage industry representing more than 1,000 patent suits a year—over a fourth of all filings per annum—the entities are represented by a handful of lawyers, suing roughly 50 U.S. companies a month, never (as in, not once in the approximately ten years this practice has been prevalent) going to trial. Small companies dominate the target list, including, start-ups, retailers, and others not versed in defending against these actions. It’s so many suits that these lawyers literally do not have the time to conduct reasonable pre-suit diligence on even a fraction of their filings. Exhibit A of this phenomenon is William (“Bill”) Ramey III. He has filed over 300 suits this year alone (through October), almost exclusively in the Western District of Texas’s Waco division; in the past ten years, he’s filed thousands. A former drunk-driving billboard defense lawyer, he’s moved into Waco and is driving the heavy filings there. Some of the subsidiaries he files for include AML IP LLC, Authwallet LLC, Cybersoft IP LLC, and PacSec3, LLC, to name a few, each of whom have filed against dozens of defendants or more. This high-volume practice has led to a panoply of sanctionable conduct. See Traxcell Technologies, LLC v. Huawei Technologies USA Inc., 2-17-cv-00042 (EDTX) (fining counsel $65,000 and imposing numerous evidentiary sanctions); WPEM, LLC v. SOTI Inc., 2020-1483, 2020 WL 7238458, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 9, 2020) (Gilstrap, J., below) (sanctioning counsel for lack of pre-suit investigation); NetSoc, LLC v. Chegg Inc., No. 18-cv-10262 et al. (S.D. NY Dec. 10, 2020) (filing included numerous typographical errors in unproofed claim charts, such as incorrect patent numbers and apparently cut-and-paste-induced errors; when confronted with these obvious errors in the pleading in at least three cases (and by counsel), Mr. Ramey apparently took over three months to address them, enough that the case was deemed exceptional under Octane Fitness.). What is also worth noting is, according to Docket Navigator, of the 39 times this counsel reached a decision on the merits before a court at his current self-run firm—e.g., motions to dismiss, failure to state a claim, ultimate judgment—he lost each one. And they have further sanctions motions pending. See, e.g., ZT IP, LLC v. VMware Inc., No. 3:22-cv-00970, ECF 39 (ND Tex) (scheduling oral argument on exceptional case and attorney’s fees). There are others, too—like Landmark Technology A, LLC, responsible for 1,800 demand letters and dozens and dozens of lawsuits, all demanding $65,000 to license, to “every kind of business under the sun” other than financial institutions themselves, including bakeries, florists, pharmacies, jewelers, bookstores, and other storefront businesses, on a patent ostensibly related to “loan processing and credit reporting.” See State of Washington v. Landmark Technology A, LLC, No. C21-728RSM, ECF 35 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 28, 2022) (noting that eleven parties have, to date, filed for declarations of non-infringement, and noting that business have settled for “payment of licensing fees between $15,000 and $20,000 each”). Others—DynaIP, IP Edge, and other groups of subsidiaries—together file upwards of 1,000 suits a year. And Equitable IP, IP Investments, Dominion Harbor, and other frequent filers round out the list, some of which may have less questionable or more a legitimate volume of filings or licensing strategies, or at least capable counsel conducting the required pre-suit diligence. And IP Edge, another frequent filer controlling hundreds of subsidiaries, uses Bill Ramey for some of their filings. In another example, entities apparently backed by Raymond Anthony Joao—who was himself famously sanctioned $1 million for actions by a subsidiary in a decision upheld on appeal (see https://www.law360.com/articles/778961/patent-owner-must-pay-1m-in-fees-for-its-tortuous-suit)—recently filed many dozens of suits, many, under the Decapolis Systems, LLC name, against Texas healthcare practices, universities, municipalities, and the like. See, e.g., Decapolis Systems, LLC v. UT Southwestern Health Systems et al., 2:22-cv-00159 (E.D. Tex.); Decapolis Systems, LLC v. Texas Retina Associates et al., 2:22-cv-00173 (E.D. Tex.). Judge Albright in Waco recently transferred some of those cases that hung around long enough to get to a ruling out; their pleadings showed no real ties to Texas, as he noted. See, e.g., Decapolis Systems, LLC v. eClinicalWorks, LLC., 4:22-cv-40020, ECF 30 (D. Mass). Another, Hawk Technology Systems, sued hundreds, including Goodwill franchises, school districts, and hospitals on a single old CCTV patent both difficult to read and vague in its claims. See, e.g., Hawk Technology Systems v. DeSoto County School District, 3:18-cv-00132 (N.D. Miss); Hawk Technology Systems v. Goodwill of Silicon Valley, 3:16-cv-06213 (N.D. Cal.); Hawk Technology Systems, LLC v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, Inc., 1:16-cv-01284 (D. Md.). Many of the complaints look deficient on their face; some contain typographical or cut-and-paste errors or allegations that, again on their face, are simply not credible. There are others, some who have filed so many complaints in such a short amount of time, it’s hard to keep track. Shipping and Transit, LLC—an NPE Non-Practicing Entity. A broad term associated with trolls but now disfavored because it includes universities and legitimate technology developers that seek to license technology in advance rather than after a producing company has independently developed it. More formed by the same people and asserting some of the same patents as the infamous ArrivalStar campaign—conducted a litigation campaign that sent more than a thousand demand letters and filed over six hundred and fifty lawsuits against small companies, mostly just small companies with a website, like CD Universe, a company owned and employing a single person, which resold CDs on a website. Defendants were sued for using tracking widgets from third party shippers like FedEx, and asked to settle for less than $50,000 (often much, much less). A few defendants fought back, pouring thousands in legal fees into chasing Shipping and Transit down for sanctions and fees, which they got, but not until after the entity had made its money and filed 650+ complaints. For instance, in Shipping and Transit, LLC v. Hall Enterprises, Inc., No. 16-cv-16535-AG-AFM (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2017), the defendant was awarded attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. Section 285. The Hall Enterprises court relied on SFA Sys., LLC v. Newegg, Inc., 793 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that patent plaintiff’s sue-and-settle litigation business model relevant to determining whether case is “exceptional” under Section 285). Shipping and Transit offshored most of the licensing revenue obtained, later declared bankruptcy, and valued their entire patent portfolio at $1. Perhaps the attorneys partaking in the file-and-settle model should simply be reminded, again, of their ethical and legal obligations. For instance, as patent practitioners, 37 C.F.R. Section 11.301 states that a practitioner “shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous. Other sections prohibit undue delay in proceedings before a tribunal, prohibit the making of false statements of fact or law to a tribunal, the failure to disclose to a tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the practitioner to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel, and the knowing offer of false evidence. Additional sections govern fairness to opposing counsel and parties and conduct involving dishonesty or fraud, among other restrictions. The Courts have analogous regulations, as well as FRCP The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These are the rules that govern all civil cases in federal courts, including patent infringement cases. Rule 11, and each state Bar has ethical rules. But these attorneys and companies have been reminded, repeatedly, and it has neither slowed down their practices nor resulted in any obvious change in behavior. What is needed, then, is some more comprehensive inquiry into the speed and volume of their practices. Barring intervention from the Court or a third party, some other, more comprehensive guidance on ethical conduct in patent cases or some more effective sanction would be needed. Otherwise, it’s time for the patent bar and state bars to take notice.

Major catastrophes and downturns can unleash a torrent of lawsuits, and the coronavirus pandemic is no exception. At least 917 federal and state lawsuits have been filed in relation to the pandemic, according to a database run by Hunton Andrews Kurth, an international law firm. That tally is just starting, says Torsten Kracht, a partner running the project. “I can easily foresee litigation directly related to COVID-19 continuing to be filed for the next two, three years at least. It will be litigated for the next decade, likely.” Disasters and downturns often spur litigation — but the pandemic is different The 9/11 attacks spurred cases over issues like health coverage for first responders at Ground Zero and the real estate developer’s insurance policies. A victim’s compensation fund paid out more than $7 billion to survivors and families that agreed not to sue airlines. The Great Recession triggered lawsuits against major financial institutions that allegedly misled investors and regulators. It also set off a wave of bankruptcies and foreclosures. But the COVID-19 pandemic is different for the breadth and scale of legal issues, observers say. The virus has killed more Americans than the Vietnam War, raising a host of public health issues about the workplace and reopening economies. It’s caused more than 30 million people to file for unemployment benefits and triggered a $2.2 trillion stimulus bill to help faltering businesses and households. What’s more, the pandemic is a global event, so the reach goes far beyond one single place. Just in the employment law context, ‘what we are confronting now is really unprecedented in scale, complexity and how heavily it depends on science.’— Joseph Sellers, a partner at Cohen Milstein In employment law alone, “what we are confronting now is really unprecedented in scale, complexity and how heavily it depends on science,” said Joseph Sellers, a partner at the law firm Cohen Milstein who represents plaintiffs in civil rights and employment class actions. Legal liability is becoming a major issue. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell says businesses need protection from “the biggest trial-lawyer bonanza in history.” White House National Economic Council director Larry Kudlow also thinks it’s a good idea to confine businesses’ legal exposure. Businesses are making “an opportunistic attempt” to try weakening laws that protect workers and consumers, some consumer advocates say. Here’s a breakdown of the cases already piling up in the courts: Nurses are suing about a lack of personal protective equipment Nurses are some of the “frontline” workers, so it’s not surprising their cases are at the forefront of the legal battle, especially in New York, the outbreak’s American epicenter. For example, the New York State Nurses Association, a union with 42,000 members, alleged one hospital, Montefiore Medical Center, wasn’t providing it with sufficient protective gear — a charge the hospital denies. The union has two other cases pending alleging nurses aren’t getting the protective gear they need. Meanwhile, a nurse is anonymously suing Good Samaritan Hospital in a county north of the city. She alleges she contracted COVID-19, but her bosses refused to get her needed equipment or re-assign her. The nurse said she had no choice but to resign and is pressing for at least $1 million in damages. The nurse’s attorney declined an interview and the hospital did not respond to a request for comment. Retail workers are suing their employers over workplace safety Workplace safety is an issue in the retail industry too. The estate of a Walmart WMT, +1.57% worker who died from COVID-19 said the company failed to protect workers. The dead man, Wando Evans, 51, was healthy before he fell ill, his lawyers said. Walmart officials were “heartbroken” about the incident, the company said in a statement. “While it may be impossible to determine where or how someone contracts the virus, we have taken steps across the country to protect our associates and customers.” The company says safety is a serious matter and it will “respond as appropriate with the court.”

May 21--If the justice system were compared to a hose, courts would be the clog that backs everything up. Some who work in the system would argue there's been a major breach with leaked water spewing everywhere.

Haywood County Sheriff Greg Christopher said that arrests are going up, but the justice system can't increase its capacity to handle a greater case load, so it can be easy for things to get backed up.

January 17, 2024—U.S. prosecutor offices have an average of more than 14,000 cases awaiting trial, according to a national survey released today by The Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (APA). The survey, conducted by Dr. Adam Biener at Lafayette College and funded by Stand Together Trust, found that there has been an average increase of 5,565 cases per office and a 62% increase in case backlogs since the court disruptions due to COVID-19. Case backlogs are cases pending before the court for a longer period than typically experienced and/or a period longer than prescribed by the court. The survey sought to understand the prevalence and factors associated with prosecutor case backlogs and their impact on the criminal legal system since the start of the pandemic in March 2020. “Our office struggles with the same issues plaguing prosecutor’s offices around the country. My attorneys each have caseloads in excess of 3-times the national standards and I have hundreds of felony cases waiting to be reviewed for prosecution, “explained Audrey Cromwell, County Attorney in Gallatin County, Montana.  “These excessive caseloads challenge our ability to fulfill our responsibility to our community by driving experienced attorneys out of the profession and delaying cases, sometimes by years. The delay in justice leads to victim frustration, overcrowded jails and increased costs to law enforcement agencies and the judicial system. It is unacceptable.” Most offices indicated that caseloads have increased since the start of the pandemic and that they are currently experiencing a backlog. The average number of adult criminal cases per attorney in 2019 was 139 cases per attorney, with a median caseload of 84 cases per attorney. By the time of the survey (2022-2023), the mean and median rose to 176 and 100 cases per attorney, respectively. “This survey confirms that caseloads have grown post-pandemic and remain higher than pre-pandemic levels despite the resumption of normal operations and a varied programmatic response to address backlogs in many offices today,” said Dave LaBahn, CEO and President of the Association of Prosecuting Attorneys. “The morale challenges during the pandemic and lack of funding to hire and retain prosecutors appear to be the top reasons that offices are not able to adequately address their case backlogs.” Offices also agreed that hiring prosecutors post-pandemic has been more difficult. Roughly two-thirds of offices that indicated staffing reduction or retention issues reported that these issues continue to impact backlogs. All but one office that indicated morale was an issue and all offices that indicated funding was an issue reported that these factors continue to impact their case backlogs. These findings align with that prosecutor office staffing is not necessarily commensurate with jurisdiction size or caseloads, and that some offices have caseloads well in excess of their peers and above the consensus maximum numbers of cases set by the 

A 2021 report from Thomson Reuters explored the “unprecedented” challenges that the court system faced with the COVID pandemic. Among its findings was a survey of how much the pandemic had affected court backlogs. This survey relied on responses from more than 238 people from courts at the state, county and municipal levels. Their responses shed light on how much the courts’ backlogs had increased over 12 months: The average backlog for state cases rose from 1,030 to 1,430, a 39% increase. The average backlog for county and municipal cases rose from 828 to 940, a 13.5% increase 38% of respondents said the backlog in state cases had “increased greatly.” Meanwhile, the website for the United States Courts houses the annual federal judicial caseload statistics. The statistics for 2021 show that civil filings in U.S. district courts increased by 39 percent from 2020. Indeed, the courts saw an increase in filings for each year since 2018. At the same time, the courts were able to resolve fewer of these cases. The number of cases terminated in the district courts dropped from 2019 to 2020 and then dropped more steeply from 2020 to 2021. The result is that courts across the nation have seen increased backlogs. These have not been universal. Some courts have seen fewer filings. However, most courts continue to struggle. They continue to receive new filings even as they continue to amend their policies for COVID and track COVID cases among their staff. As the courts try to catch up on their backlogs, their delays have the potential to harm the people and businesses who see their motions and trial dates kicked down the road.

Still reeling from the COVID-19 pandemic, court systems in many states are working to clear their case backlogs. Some court systems have moved cases faster using virtual court proceedings, court data dashboards and online jury selection. In other states, lawmakers are stepping in. The pandemic worsened problems that already had caused state and local court delays, legal experts say. The hurdles include insufficient funding, judicial vacancies, lawyer shortages and delays processing digital and physical evidence. Some state legislators are particularly focused on shortages of prosecutors and judges. In Georgia, New York and Vermont, for example, lawmakers have filed or plan to offer bills that would increase prosecutor pay, boost the number of judges or streamline procedures to reduce the number of cases. “Managing cases today is much more complex on the part of our courts than it used to be, and the pandemic is just one more complexity,” said Brittany Kauffman, the CEO of the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, an independent research center at the University of Denver. The bulk of the backlog in most states and counties are criminal trials. Unlike civil or family law cases, they typically cannot be conducted online because criminal defendants have a constitutional right to face their accusers. The backlog poses significant challenges for defendants, whose right to a speedy trial can be jeopardized by extended pretrial detention. Those held in jail during pretrial detention may lose jobs and experience housing instability. And for crime victims, extended court proceedings can make navigating the already complex justice system even more difficult, said Renée Williams, the executive director of the National Center for Victims of Crime. “[Victims] are very much facing the justice system alone and kind of left to navigate the best they can, so when we start to see court backlogs, that becomes especially an issue because there might be a lack of communication to them about what’s going on,” Williams said in an interview. As proceedings drag on, there’s also a higher chance that victims may face intimidation or retaliation for coming forward — discouraging them from participating altogether, Williams said. Too few prosecutors. Public defenders and prosecutors are leaving in large numbers because of low salaries and heavy caseloads, with a shortage of applicants to fill the gaps, legal experts said. In Georgia, the five-year average turnover rate for assistant district attorneys is 25%, coupled with a 10% vacancy rate for state prosecutors, according to data from the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia, which assists and provides training for state prosecutors. In 2021, the state saw its highest turnover rate for a single year, peaking at 43.5%. Something has to be done, because if we can't get people to be prosecutors and public defenders, the system will come to a grinding halt. Peter Skandalakis, executive director of the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia Eight of the state’s 49 judicial circuits are facing assistant district attorney vacancy rates exceeding 25%, according to the group’s data. “Something has to be done, because if we can’t get people to be prosecutors and public defenders, the system will come to a grinding halt,” said Peter Skandalakis, the executive director of the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia. “It’s already slow enough.”The shortage of state prosecutors comes down to noncompetitive pay, said Coweta County District Attorney Herb Cranford Jr. Prospective assistant district attorneys often opt for positions in urban metro areas, where salaries are higher, leaving rural areas with fewer resources. Georgia’s decades-old state formula, which determines the number of assistant district attorneys, compounds the issue. The formula limits the state to paying for one assistant district attorney per judge in each judicial circuit. This formula, dating back to at least the 1980s, fails to consider factors such as population growth and caseload size, Skandalakis said. “The most populated judicial circuit is treated the same as the least populated judicial circuit. That is just not a good way to do business,” he said. Cranford said that while changing the formula may help reduce the state’s backlog, addressing pay would have more of an impact. “We can add as many prosecutors as we want. If we don’t address the competitive pay problem, it’s not going to matter because we can’t even fill the current positions we have,” Cranford said. Georgia Republican state Sen. Randy Robertson said he’s open to exploring budgetary options that would offer better pay and benefits to state prosecutors while also ensuring “good return on the taxpayers’ investment.” Robertson said he also plans to address the state’s assistant district attorney formula. “We absolutely need to look at the formula and make sure that we’re giving the courts that need it as much help as possible, and at the same time, making sure that some of the circuits aren’t overloaded,” Robertson said. Judge vacancies. In both New York and Vermont, judge vacancies are chief among the reasons for the states’ court backlogs.In September, the New York City Bar Association released a report calling on the state legislature to work toward repealing the state’s constitutionally prescribed cap on the number of judges that can be elected to the state’s supreme courts. The state has one supreme court per county, totaling 62 across the state. The cap, originally enacted in 1846, limits the number of state supreme court judges to one for every 50,000 residents of a judicial district. New York state has nearly 120,000 pending cases, according to the most recent court statistics available. In 2022, the state’s court system resolved more than 2.1 million cases, according to its annual report. The New York State Unified Court System did not respond to multiple requests for comment on the status of the state’s backlog or efforts to reduce it. Judges on other lower courts are tasked with stepping in when there are vacancies on state supreme courts, even if they were not initially elected for such roles, said Elizabeth Kocienda, the New York City Bar Association’s director of advocacy. This practice leads to backlogs in criminal, civil and family law cases, as lower court judges must handle cases outside their usual purview. And this routine reassignment contributes to vacancies on the lower courts, exacerbating the existing backlog, Kocienda said. “You end up with this mishmash of judges that are sitting on the supreme court with varying levels of experience, varying levels of all different practice areas,” Kocienda said. “They weren’t necessarily intended for that court, so it just creates a lot of downstream problems in other areas.” A bill to increase the number of state supreme court judges is already in committee in both the New York Assembly and the Senate. In December, Democratic Gov. Kathy Hochul signed a law to increase the number of state supreme court judges in three districts. The law also raises the number of judges serving on other courts, including family courts in New York City. Hochul also has expressed support for repealing the cap on the number of supreme court judges in the state, including a proposal for the measure in her State of the State agenda released earlier this month. The Vermont Judiciary, which encompasses the state’s entire court system, faced judge shortages at different times over the past year, leading to the reassignment of judges from their regular dockets to cover cases in other areas. This reshuffling prevented them from presiding over their own cases simultaneously, resulting in a reduction in scheduled hearings and a slowdown in case processing across both courts, according to Teri Corsones, Vermont’s court administrator. As of Jan. 16, there were over 35,500 pending cases statewide, according to data from the Vermont Judiciary. About 42%, or 15,294 of those pending cases, are criminal cases. That’s double the amount of pending criminal cases pre-pandemic. While five vacant judge positions were filled in November, the state still has one judicial vacancy and one magistrate vacancy. “We’ve been able to make slow but steady progress in addressing the backlog since resuming fully open courts, but greater progress has been hampered by the number of judge vacancies,” Corsones wrote in an email to Stateline. Vermont’s pretrial detainee population increased about 10% between 2019 and 2023, which means hundreds of people have languished in the state’s correctional facilities without being convicted of a crime, according to Nick Deml, the commissioner of the Vermont Department of Corrections. “It’s gonna take multiple lines of effort, attacking different parts of this problem,” Deml said. “There’s not going to be one silver bullet that solves the backlog.” Democratic state Rep. William Notte introduced a bill that would combine a person’s multiple misdemeanor theft charges into a single felony charge, which aims to reduce the time spent in court. Notte, who sits on the House Judiciary Committee, said the committee also plans to explore other measures designed to reduce the state’s backlog, such as expanding drug court statewide and streamlining the process for presenting judicial nominees to the governor. The Vermont Judiciary asked the legislature to fund two additional judge positions and 10 judicial assistants, Corsones wrote in an email. The judiciary is also “actively exploring” a funding request for a third additional judge position.

This event, known as the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum or PETM, happened only about ten million years after the dinosaurs were smashed by an asteroid impact. This ‘hyperthermal’ period took place quite suddenly (in geological terms)—in less than 2000 years—and lasted for about 170,000 years before the planet again cooled. The heat spike was accompanied by a major wipe-out of ocean life in particular, though most small land mammals survived. Investigating the records of old marine sediments Zeebe was able to show there had been a sharp, 70 %, leap in atmospheric CO 2 concentrations at the time. However, he concluded there was only sufficient carbon available to force the climate to warm by 1–3 °C and that some other mechanism must have been triggered by the initial warming, which then drove the Earth’s temperature to fever pitch, up by another 4–6 °C (Zeebe et al. 2009). This process is the ‘ runaway global warming ‘ which now menaces us.

The significance of PETM is that it appears that about the same volume of carbon was dumped by natural processes into the Earth’s atmosphere and oceans as humans are currently dumping with the burning of fossil fuels and clearing of the world’s forests—about 3 trillion tonnes in all—and it was this that triggered the hyperthermal surge in planetary heating.

A devastating fact of climate collapse is that there may be a silver lining to the mushroom cloud. First, it should be noted that a nuclear exchange does not inevitably result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter—the idea that firestorms would make the earth uninhabitable—is based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuclear devices.

An exchange that shuts down the global economy but stops short of human extinction may be the only blade realistically likely to cut the carbon knot we’re trapped within. It would decimate existing infrastructures, providing an opportunity to build new energy infrastructure and intervene in the current investments and subsidies keeping fossil fuels alive.

This latter aspect, the rate of change, is a critical factor in terms of adapting to climate change. Although some states and societies will be better able to adapt to change than others, regardless of how resilient a given society is there will always be some point at which its efforts would be overwhelmed by the pace of change. Changes in climate - long-term wind and rainfall patterns, daily and seasonal temperature variations, and so on - will produce physical effects such as droughts, floods and increasing severity of typhoons and hurricanes, and ecological effects such as changes in the geographical range of species (including disease-causing organisms, domesticated crops and crop pests). These physical changes in turn may lead to effects such as disruption of water resources, declining crop yields and food stocks, wildfires, severe disease outbreaks, and an increase in numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons.4