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Coordinate conjunctions are used to join two similar grammatical constructions; for instance, two words, two phrases or two clauses. e.g. My friend and I will attend the meeting. Austria is famous for the of its landscape and the hospitality of its people. The sun rose and the birds began to sing. In these examples, the coordinate conjunction and is used to join the two words friend and I, the two phrases the beauty of its landscape and the hospitality of its people, and the two clauses the sun rose and the birds began to sing. The most commonly used coordinate conjunctions are and, but and or. In addition, the words nor and yet may be used as coordinate conjunctions. In the following table, each coordinate conjunction is followed by its meaning and an example of its use. Note the use of inverted word order in the clause beginning with nor. Coordinate Conjunctions and:  in addition She tried and succeeded.

Or. 1942. As used in the constitutional amendment and statue relating to the creation of public utility districts, the hybrid phrase “and/or” may be construed as meaning “or”.—Ollilo v. Clatskanie People’s Utility Dist., 132 P.2d 416, 170 Or. 173.

The legal phrase “and/or,” indicating that you can either choose between two alternatives or choose both of them, has proved irresistible in other contexts and is now widely acceptable though it irritates some readers as jargon. However, you can logically use it only when you are discussing choices which may or may not both be done: “Bring chips and/or beer.” It’s very much overused where simple “or” would do, and it would be wrong to say, “you can get to the campus for this morning’s meeting on a bike and/or in a car.” Choosing one eliminates the possibility of the other, so this isn’t an and/or situation.

N.D. 1964. “And/or” as used in contract may mean either “and” or “or”, and interpretation should be one which will best effect purpose of parties as determined in light of equities of the case.—Hummel v. Kranz, 126 N.W.2d 786—Contracts 159.

Having determined that Hess's 1996 employment contract is properly a part of the administrative record the district court was entitled to consider, we must next decide whether Hartford could reasonably have determined that Hess's benefits as of April 19, 1996, should have been based only on her 1995 draw amount. Like the district court, we cannot read the contract that way. Hess's 1996 contract clearly states that the draw system was to be phased out as of April 5. The contract also specifies that her benefits, including long-term disability benefits, would be calculated based on her "base salary and/or draw." (We note in passing that the phrase "and/or" has its critics. Bryan A. Garner reports in A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 56 (2d ed. 1995), that "and/or has been vilified for most of its life-- and rightly so." He goes on to say, however, that the expression, while "undeniably clumsy, does have a specific meaning (x and/or y = x or y or both)." Id.) Here, this would mean that Hess could have her benefits calculated on the basis of her base salary, or her draw, or both. In the context of Fleet's transition away from a draw system, the only reasonable interpretation of this provision was that the benefits would be based on the draw while it was in effect and on the base salary thereafter. As of April 5, Hess was thus contractually entitled to a benefits package based on her base salary--that is, based on the average of her previous two years' commissions. The fact that Fleet may have breached the contract (or been slow in implementing its details) by failing to move from the draw system to the base salary system until June 1 does not change the package of compensation and benefits to which Hess was contractually entitled. Nor could the fact that Fleet failed to inform Hartford about the date the change-over was to have occurred affect Hess's benefit amount. The Hartford policy states that "[i]f [Fleet] gives The Hartford any incorrect information, the relevant facts will be determined" to establish the correct benefit amount. Once informed by Hess's attorney that Hess believed the information Fleet provided Hartford was incorrect, it was incumbent on the examiner to refer to Hess's employment contract to determine her actual regular monthly pay. Had he done so, he would have seen that Hess became entitled to the higher level of benefits on April 5, two weeks before her disability. The district court therefore did not err when it concluded that Hartford's failure to consider the contract was arbitrary and capricious.

Does and/or mean "and and or", or "and or or"? That is, if I say I am interested in A and/or B, do I mean I'm interested in A and B and I'm interested in A or B, or do I mean that I'm interested in A and B or I'm interested in A or B? (You may want to say that it means I'm interested in A and B and/or I'm interested in A or B; but in that case I repeat my question.) Having reflected on it for a little while, I am convinced that the answer has to be that A and/or B must mean "A and B or A or B". That is, if an entity A is claimed to have the property of being F and/or G, the claim amounts to saying that either (i) A has the property of being both F and G or (ii) A has the property of being either F or G. And to claim that F is a property of entities A and/or B is to claim that either (i) F holds for A and B or (ii) F holds for A or B. However, in that case and/or is effectively identical in meaning with or, so it is at first rather hard to see why and/or exists at all. But I do have a guess. The right theory of what or means in English is that it is in general inclusive but that sometimes the exclusive special case is conveyed as a conversational implicature. I'm going to study linguistics at either York or Edinburgh would often be taken to have the exclusive sense: since you typically go to a single university to take a single degree, and during the degree course you have no time to study elsewhere, a decision to choose York would normally exclude choosing Edinburgh as well. The exclusive sense is thus conveyed: one or the other of York and Edinburgh will be chosen, and if it is York it will not be Edinburgh, and if it is Edinburgh it will not be York. But of course if you think about it, someone who says she is choosing between those two universities does not commit herself for life to never studying at the other. When the two alternatives exclude each other, then the exclusive meaning is the only one that makes sense. If you are asked whether you want to sit in the stalls or in the balcony, it's one or the other but not both, because you can only be in one place at one time. When they don't exclude each other, it's always understood that or allows for both: obviously someone whose ambition is to win either an Oscar or an Olympic medal wouldn't feel a failure if they won both. Winning both would satisfy the ambition in spades. So my guess would be that and/or is a way of underlining the point that the or is to be understood in its inclusive sense rather than its exclusive sense. Sometimes you want to explicitly indicate "or more than one of the above", and and/or does that. Take the first example of and/or in the Wall Street Journal corpus of 1987-1989 (a 44-million-word collection of random articles that linguists often use as a source for real-life examples because the Linguistic Data Consortium — the host for the giant Language Log servers — made it available in 1993 nice and cheap). The example (which actually happens to be a quotation from the Washington Post) is this: Too many of his attitudes, claims and complaints are careless, conflicting, dubious, inaccurate, mean, petty, simplistic, superficial, uninformed and/or pointlessly biased. I take it as obvious that if one hundred percent of the hapless man's attitudes, claims and complaints had all ten properties — every single one was careless and conflicting and dubious and inaccurate and mean and petty and simplistic and superficial and uninformed and pointlessly biased — then the quoted claim would be regarded as true, not false. An or would have done the job here, but the and/or injects a (logically redundant) reminder that it may well be the case that more than one of the list of ten properties applies to the miserable individual in question.

C.A.1 (Mass.) 1981. Words “and/or,” for contract purposes, commonly mean the one or the other or both.—Local Division 589, Amalgameted Transit Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Com. Of Mass., 666 F.2d 618, certiorari denied Local Div. 589, Amalgamated Transit Union AFL-CIO v. Massachusetts, 102 S.Ct. 2928, 457 U.S. 1117, 73 L.Ed.2d 1329.—Contracts 159.

First, patents must be recognized as not being ironclad property rights but rather probabilistic rights. If patents offered perfect protection against any imitation, there would be no doubt about the best protection regime. Lemley and Shapiro (2005) qualify the uncertain intellectual property rights in a suggestive way: "A patent does not confer upon its owner the right to exclude a potential imitator but rather a right to try to exclude by asserting the patent in court. When a patent holder asserts its patent against an alleged infringer, the patent is rolling the dice. If the patent is found invalid, the property right will have evaporated". Thus patent strength refers to the probability to recover damages, with the consequence that only strong patents give in principle to the patent holder the right to exclude an infringer or to force him to buy a license. But as we argue below, even holders of weak patents may escape the uncertain litigation process. They succeed through their licensing strategies to capture a significant part of the consumer’s surplus. This is why the notion of patent quality enters so forcefully in the agenda of antitrust authorities nowadays, especially through criticism of the examination system of the Patent Office (Merges, 1999, Lemley, 2001).

[Gary,07/13/2023, American Public University, “What Is Intellectual Property Law? And Why Does it Matter?”, https://www.apu.apus.edu/area-of-study/security-and-global-studies/resources/what-is-intellectual-property-law/#:~:text=IP%20Laws,variety%20of%20products%20and%20services, accessed 7/11/2024, LR]

The Copyright Office

[Gary,07/13/2023, American Public University, “What Is Intellectual Property Law? And Why Does it Matter?”, https://www.apu.apus.edu/area-of-study/security-and-global-studies/resources/what-is-intellectual-property-law/#:~:text=IP%20Laws,variety%20of%20products%20and%20services, accessed 7/11/2024, LR]

Copyrights

We do not find any ambiguity in KRS 341.070(1). It is our opinion that the key word in the statute is the word 'in,' preceding the words 'each of three calendar quarters', and if the word is accorded its ordinary and common meaning, the statute does not require simultaneous employment. According to Webster's New International Dictionary, the word 'in,' used with relation to a period of time, means 'during the course of.' The same meaning, expressed in another way, would be 'within the limits or duration of.' Employing this meaning, the statute says that an employer is subject to the Act if, during the course of, or within the limits or duration of each of three calendar quarters, he had in covered employment four or more workers, to each of whom the required amount of wages was paid. This clearly means that the employment need not be simultaneous. Obviously, the word 'in' does not mean 'throughout' or 'for the entire period of,' because then there would be no point in adding the requirement of the payment of a minimum of $50 in wages. In these times, no worker employed for a full calendar quarter would be paid less than $50 in wages. The appellant seeks to read into the statute the words 'at the same time,' following the words 'had in covered employment'. There is no justification for this, unless the word 'in' means 'during any one period of time in.' We are not aware of any authority for ascribing such a meaning to the word 'in'.

Colo. 1887. In the Act of 1861 providing that justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction “in” their respective counties to hear and determine all complaints, the word “in” should be construed to mean “throughout” such counties. Reynolds v. Larkin, 14, p. 114, 117, 10 Colo. 126.

1 a —used as a function word to indicate inclusion, location, or position within limits <in the lake> <wounded in the leg> <in the summer>

b : into 1 <went in the house>

While the “IP” in Critical Race IP is not intended to homogenize the various types of intellectual property law, it nonetheless points to the need to study intellectual property both as a mass noun through which policy is obscured and the component parts of that mass noun. Moreover, the work of intellectual property scholars, particularly those concerned with social justice, increasingly reflects the reality that copyrights, trademarks, patents, rights of publicity, trade secrets, and claims of unfair competition are not simply legal regimes confined to the realm of law but cultural objects that move through everyday life.156 That is increasingly true given the growth of international intellectual property regimes and appeals to human rights norms as a means of protecting the interests of marginalized peoples. Untangling the cultural implications of intellectual properties and intellectual property law, and not simply the legal regimes themselves, is therefore central to the “IP” in Critical Race IP.

Intellectual property citizenship, as I use the term here, points to the seemingly permanent nexus of copyright, patent, and trademark law and citizenship, a concept that necessarily implicates race, coloniality, racial capitalism, and personhood. It is an analytical tool for understanding the structural complexities of the legal regimes that define the mass noun “intellectual property” and a frame for rendering visible the power structures that prevent racially equitable outcomes in intellectual property contexts. “Citizenship, “a term that is often considered for its formal legal properties, is also a culturally negotiated concept through which certain individuals are included/excluded from the body politic. When it intersects with intellectual property discourse, as it has for hundreds of years, citizenship operates a discursive vehicle for excluding racially marginalized groups from legal practices of knowledge production and ownership. 14

[Gary,07/13/2023, American Public University, “What Is Intellectual Property Law? And Why Does it Matter?”, https://www.apu.apus.edu/area-of-study/security-and-global-studies/resources/what-is-intellectual-property-law/#:~:text=IP%20Laws,variety%20of%20products%20and%20services, accessed 7/11/2024, LR]

Trade secrets

Intellectual property (IP) is a company’s or individual’s asset that is used to create new products. It is a type of asset created by the capability of the human mind that is legally protected to ensure that only the owner can benefit from using it.

Intellectual property is based on the idea that some ideas are just as valuable as physical assets and can be utilized to generate revenue. Today, most countries provide intellectual property protection.

Intellectual Property (IP) rights are legal rights granted and/or protected by governments to ensure innovators benefit from their intellectual creations. IP rights include patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, and other forms.

Intellectual property rights are territorial; that is, they are defined and protected according to national laws. National governments grant a legal right to holders of such rights to limit or control the use of their IP rights by others, often for a period of time and with certain limited exceptions. IP rights holders may also pursue commercialization of their rights and/or allow others to leverage their innovations in return for fees or collaboration.

Of: The word "of" is a preposition. It is a word of different meanings, and susceptible of numerous different connotations. It may be used in its possessive sense to denote possession or ownership. It may also be used as a word of identification and relation, rather than as a word of proprietorship or possession. "Of" may denote source, origin, existence, descent, or location, or it may denote that from which something issues, proceeds, or is derived. The term may indicate the aggregate or whole of which the limited word or words denote a part, or of which a part is referred to, thought of, affected, etc.

OVERVIEW: The ISP made publicly available the internet search records of more than 650,000 of its members. Under a service agreement, all customers agreed to a forum selection clause that designated the "courts of Virginia" as the fora for disputes between the ISP and its customers. The ISP contended, and the district court agreed, that the clause permitted plaintiffs to refile their consumer class action in state or federal court in Virginia, but the customers contended the forum selection clause limited them to Virginia state court, where a class action remedy was unavailable; this violated California public policy favoring consumer class actions and rendered the forum selection clause unenforceable. The court held that the use of the preposition "of"--rather than "in"--was determinative and that the forum selection clause referred to the state courts of Virginia only, not the federal courts in Virginia. California had declared by judicial decision the same forum selection clause contravened a strong public policy of California--as applied to California residents who brought claims under California statutory consumer law in California state court.