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2024 GDI Negative
Adv Ans: Innovation—Defense › Trade Secrets Ans › Trade Secrets: Innovation O—1NC

No impact to trade secrets—they drive innovation and there’s enough transparency via sharing even though it’s still protected

Weibust & Pelletier ’22 [Erik Weibust, attorney, Epstein Becker Green and Dean A. Pelletier, attorney, Pelletier Law LLC, “Protecting AI-Generated Inventions as Trade Secrets Requires Protecting the Generative AI as Well,” IP WATCHDOG, 7—24—22, , accessed 5-24-24]

The concern that a shift to trade secret protection will inhibit AI innovation may be overstated for three reasons. First, trade secret law protects and, therefore, encourages innovation. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481 (“The maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law.”).

Second, while an invention protected as a trade secret will not be publicly disclosed, “[t]rade secret law promotes the sharing of knowledge, and the efficient operation of industry; it permits the individual inventor to reap the rewards of his labor by contracting with a company large enough to develop and exploit it.” Id., at 493. Indeed, such sharing, with appropriate persons and under appropriate circumstances, is an inherent part of successfully exploiting a trade secret in a commercial enterprise. See, e.g., id., at 475 (“This necessary element of secrecy is not lost, however, if the holder of the trade secret reveals the trade secret to another ‘in confidence, and under an implied obligation not to use or disclose it.’ These others may include those of the holder’s ‘employees to whom it is necessary to confide it, in order to apply it to the uses for which it is intended.’”) (internal citations omitted).

2024 GDI Negative
Adv Ans: Innovation—Defense › Trade Secrets Ans › Trade Secrets: Inevitable—2NC

Monetization motives make it inevitable

Gibson & Buchman ’21 [Stan Gibson and Samuel Buchman, attorneys, “How to Safeguard AI Technology: Patents versus Trade Secrets,” IP WATCHDOG, 2—25—21, , accessed 5-7-24]

A common refrain is that an invention is only as valuable as the patent that protects it. But what happens when you cannot secure the patent? This is a frequent hurdle for inventors seeking to patent products utilizing artificial intelligence (AI). While still in its infancy, at least compared to the lofty expectations of technology enthusiasts, AI has proven integral to driving innovation, but it has also proven equally vexing to fit into the intellectual property legal regime.

Patentable subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” Notably missing from this definition is an exclusion describing ineligible subject-matter, but courts have long held that “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013).

2024 GDI Negative
Adv Ans: Innovation—Defense › Trade Secrets Ans › Trade Secrets: Inevitable—1NC

Secrecy inevitable—offers advantages that outweigh benefits of patents

Asay ’20 [Clark D. Asay, Professor, Law, Brigham Young University, “Artificial Stupidity,” WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW v. 61 n. 5, 2020, p. 1195-1196]

Second, trade secrecy, often viewed as the primary alternative to patent protection, provides AI developers with several key advantages in comparison to patent protection.37 For instance, keeping an AI system’s technical details under wraps is often a key competitive advantage because doing so can provide significant lead-time advantages.38 Trade secrecy allows AI developers to keep their systems secret, whereas patenting the same invention requires disclosure of key technical details as part of the patenting process.39 Furthermore, even in cases where parties may prefer patent protection,40 the relative ineffectiveness of AI patent protection means that more AI innovators are likely to choose trade secrecy over patent protection for their AI innovations. Thus, trade secrecy is increasingly displacing patent protection as the preferred form of legal protection in a growing number of AI contexts.41

2024 GDI Negative
Adv Ans: Innovation—Defense › AI Innovation Ans › Enforcement Problems: 1NC

Plan is unenforceable—it’s impossible to determine contribution.

Hadad 19 – Henry Hadad (President of the Intellectual Property Owners Association) “Re: Comments on Patenting Artificial Intelligence Inventions” US Patents and Trademark Office. November 11, 2019.

If non-natural entities were afforded inventor status, additional downstream issues would also need to be addressed. For example, during an enforcement proceeding it would be impossible to depose an AI system concerning its contribution to determine whether it was properly listed as an inventor and what it meant by the use of terms in the specification and claims.

2024 GDI Negative
Adv Ans: Innovation—Defense › AI Innovation Ans › AI Inventions Fake: A2 “Abbott Ev”

Abbott’s examples are just hype

Summerfield ’18 [Mark Summerfield, patent attorney and former Special Counsel, Watermark Intellectual Asset Management, “The Impact of Machine Learning on Patent Law, Part 1: Can a Computer ‘Invent’?” PATENTOLOGY, 1—13—18, , accessed 4-30-24]

Returning to the question of ‘computational invention’, a key assertion made by Abbott is that computers already independently or autonomously create potentially patentable inventions. He offers three examples in support of this claim:

the ‘Creativity Machine’, which was developed in the early 1990’s by computer scientist Stephen Thaler;

2024 GDI Negative
Adv Ans: Innovation—Defense › AI Innovation Ans › AI Inventions Fake: 2NC

Prefer industry standards—AI inventions are baked in and can’t operate without humans.

Straus 21 – Joseph Straus (Emeritus Professor of Law at University of Munich and University of Ljubljana and Director at the Max-Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition) "Will Artificial Intelligence Change Some Patent Law Paradigms?." Zbornik Znanstvenih Razprav 81 (2021): 11.

The answer to the question raised in the title of this contribution, whether Al will change some patent law paradigms, seemingly depends entirely on whose position one follows. On the one hand, the main patent offices seem confident they can adequately handle Al core inventions, as well as AI-applied inventions, 215 based on the existing legal instruments. Moreover, the patent offices, without exception, accept only a natural person as an inventor, and a natural or legal person as a patent owner, without explicitly addressing the issue of inventions autonomously generated by Al. Patent authorities see no necessity to alter current standards determining either the prior art, the person skilled in the art (of ordinary skill), or those of the enabling disclosure requirement. Although they acknowledge that AI-generated data may/will increase the amount of data forming prior art to search and consider when assessing novelty and inventive step, they seemingly assume that the use of pertinent Al tools will become, in appropriate cases, an inherent characteristic of the person skilled in the art. 216 The results of the USPTO 2019 Request for Comments show that the majority of public commenters, among them many industry-leading players in Al, favourably assess the practice of the USPTO in the Al area. According to them, the current state of the art is limited to 'narrow' Al, and AGI has not yet arrived. They argue that the Al currently could not invent without human intervention and "that human beings remain integral to the operation of Al". Finally, that the existing U.S. IP laws are calibrated correctly to address the evolution of Al, 2 17 in other words, the patent granting authorities and the majority of the main users of the patent system in the field of Al, at least for the time being and for the foreseeable future do not see Al radically changing the patent law paradigms. They view the system as flexible enough to adapt to changes the Al developments generate in an evolutionary way. Available patent statistics seem to confirm these findings.218 Very similar results have been produced by an extensive Report commissioned by the EU Commission, accomplished in September 2020,219 aimed at examining the state of copyright and patent protection in Europe for AI-assisted outputs in genera2 2 0 and in three priority domains: Science (in particular meteorology), media (journalism) and pharmaceutical research, as regards the EPC and the EPO practice. The Report reached, inter alia, the following conclusions: The EPC is currently suitable to address the challenges posed by Al technologies in the context of Al-assisted inventions or outputs. - While the increasing use of Al systems for inventive purposes does not require material changes to the core concepts of patent law, the emergence of Al may have practical consequences for national Intellectual Property Offices (IPOs) and the EPO. Also, certain rules may in specific cases be difficult to apply to AI-assisted outputs and, where that is the case, it may be justified to make minor adjustments."2

2024 GDI Negative
Adv Ans: Innovation—Defense › AI Innovation Ans › AI Inventions Fake: 2NC

It is structurally incapable of inventing

McCombs et al. ’21 [David McCombs, attorney, Eugene Goryunov, attorney, and Dina Blikshteyn, attorney, “Where We Are on AI Inventorship and Where We Should be Heading,” IP WATCHDOG, 10—12—21, , accessed 5-7-24]

One might ask: are there immediate ramifications to technological growth if AI cannot be named as an inventor? Unlikely.

AI is Still a Tool

2024 GDI Negative
Adv Ans: Innovation—Defense › AI Innovation Ans › AI Inventions Fake: 1NC

Autonomous inventions are fake.

Lizarralde 22 – Marta Duque Lizarralde LL.M, (Doctoral Candidate and Research Associate at the Technical University of Munich (TUM), Héctor Axel Contreras, IPR Commercialisation Manager at Ericsson) “The real role of AI in patent law debates” Arrow International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Volume 30, Issue 1, Pages 23–46. Spring 2022. A

Market effects and relevance of these topics in the current system The main problem in the inventorship debate is that automation is confused with autonomy, leading to both terms being used as synonyms when, from a technical point of view, they are not.61 While ‘automation’ is a technical term that describes the use of technology to minimize or replace human intervention in a specific process,62 ‘autonomy’ is the capacity of an entity to make independent decisions or to govern itself without an external command.63 When AI is employed in the inventive process, it enables a more automated operation, but the conception of the ‘invention’ still belongs to the human being.64 A different question is that of determining the human inventor of ‘AI-assisted inventions’, since they require the involvement of many people, such as the programmer, those who develop the operational logic model, the machine instructors and the operators. Inasmuch as the contributions of the aforementioned actors differ according to the application of the specific AI technology, the co-inventorship between them should be determined on a case-by-case basis.65 Since AI remains an instrument without real autonomy, AI-assisted inventions should be handled like inventions assisted by any other problem-solving tools for the purpose of identifying the inventor.66 On the other hand, inventions generated autonomously by AI do not exist and will not likely emerge in near the future. Consequently, it may be precocious to review the existing patent law on inventorship at this stage.67 The AI technology that is being used in creative and inventive processes is still in development. Therefore, it is advisable to first allow this technology to evolve, understand how it works and its applications, and only thereafter to adopt regulations that are well adapted to the circumstances.68 The inventorship debate is of significant academic interest, and will certainly need to be addressed from the perspectives of many fields when AGI becomes a reality, but for the moment, it is time to ‘go beyond the exclusive focus on AI-generated outputs’.69

2024 GDI Affirmative
Misc › Other

Restrictions on inventor mobility contradict stated goals of Bayh Dole

Simon, Professor of Law, California Western, 2021

[Brenda M. "Preserving the Fruits of Labor: Impediments to University Inventor Mobility," Tennessee Law Review 89, no. 1 (Fall 2021): 1-66 heinonline gdi-tm]

This subsection describes how overly-broad limits on inventor mobility may be inconsistent with the legislative and financial underpinnings of universities, as well as their reputational aims. In terms of the legislative foundations of academic research policies, restricting inventor involvement in commercialization seems to contradict the main objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act, which will be described below.204 In addition, government funding of universities may affect how the public considers the role of universities in developing technology to advance social welfare.205 Further, unduly restricting inventor participation in development would seem to undermine the missions that universities strive to advance as well as their historical foundations.

2024 GDI Affirmative
Answers To… › AT: K – Capitalism › Cap’st Innovation Solves Climate

Preserving competition and innovation within the market economy creates solutions to climate change.

Bosch and Schmidt 19 (Stephan, Institute of Geography, Chair for Human Geography, University of Augsburg, and Matthias, Institute of Geography, Chair for Human Geography, University of Augsburg, “Is the post-fossil era necessarily post-capitalistic? – The robustness and capabilities of green capitalism”, Ecological Economics, Vol. 161, July) DB

Concerning the second dimension of criticism, Section 4 illustrates how the rejection of green capitalism overlooks promising approaches to surmounting the environmental crisis. On the one hand, we argue that in face of the given narrow time slot as well as the prevailing political strategies, it is more realistic and pragmatic to primarily assess the efficiency of market-oriented solutions. Even though in principle we take sufficiency to have the best effectiveness regarding the solution of ecological and social problems, we still do not count on people's willingness to live in greater moderation within due time. On the other hand, we therefore presume that there are no other suitable economic frame conditions for surmounting the crisis than those offered by the capitalist social order. This perspective is based on the assumption that innovations, which above all emanate from thriving economies (Wangler, 2013), are highly relevant for overcoming the environmental crisis. As growth, innovation, and the development of new industries are to be seen as directly related to the export sector as well as the utilisation of comparative advantages (Bathelt and Glückler, 2012), we therefore also strictly object to the concept of autonomy. Moreover, we take innovation and the aspects of growth, entrepreneurship, and democratic processes of negotiation related to it (cf. Gailing et al., 2013; Walter and Gutscher, 2013; Raven et al., 2016), to be essential for the implementation of regenerative energy systems and social welfare (Iversen, 2005; Nasirov et al., 2017). Our presumption that innovations occur more likely and more frequently within a capitalist, than in alternative social orders (e.g. Harris, 2013: socialist markets), is derived from Schumpeter's notion of competitive capitalism, which he distinctly sets apart from trustified capitalism. Competitive capitalism is about fertile destructive impulses emanating from enthusiastic entrepreneurs who are ready to take risks, and act solution-oriented. These impulses may revolutionise the economic process: “This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism” (Schumpeter, 2009). Based on Schumpeter's ‘theory of economic development’ (cf. Herzog and Honneth, 2016; Schumpeter, 1994; Schumpeter, 2009) – which, according to Marques (2008), represents the original idea of innovation-driven capitalism – we analyse capitalism's robustness to the downfall of fossil energy; moreover, we investigate its potential contributions to ecologic sustainability. Yet we want to go beyond Schumpeter's perspective, which fixes on the entrepreneur, and take a closer look at the role of state policy in Section 5. Our argument is that creative entrepreneurs and markets alone will not suffice to specifically and quickly initiate the change of the energy system driven by innovation. We state the thesis that an active role of the state is needed which relies on political continuity when it comes to promoting environmental innovation and creates stable institutional frame conditions. In a last step, we will show that during the deployment of regenerative energy systems, social aspects have hitherto been given too little attention by actors of state and politics and that national objectives were uncoupled from local contexts. To achieve a successful low-carbon transition, these deficits need to be corrected. In principle, this seems possible, as market-economically oriented regenerative energy systems have often been the result of open-minded democratic negotiations. In Section 6, the findings of the study will be summarised. 2. The crisis of fossil energies and capitalism Energy sources are a central element of humankind's materialistic history and elementary changes in the relevance of energy carriers have always led to extensive economic and societal transformations (Bridge et al., 2013). Exemplarily, the drastic increase in productivity during industrialisation cannot be explained without the revolutionary change of the energy system towards fossil fuels (Osterhammel, 2011). Ever since, economic growth is accompanied by an increasing consumption of finite energy resources and non-energetic primary materials (Altvater, 2005). Accordingly, questions of economic development must always be regarded in the context of the energy system, as well as the circulation of energetic and non-energetic crude materials within it (Meadows et al., 2004). Altvater (2007) takes the relationship between humans and nature to be crisis-laden because a limited stock of energy resources within the Earth's thin crust forms the basis of the present economic system. This limitation implied grave consequences for the global ecology. The apparently crisis-laden interrelation of nature and economy is also highlighted in ‘Anthropocene or Capitolocene?’ edited by Moore (2016), in which the impacts of capitalism are regarded as significant enough to be marked as their own geochronological era. The main point of criticism is capitalism's orientation to industrial scaling and quantitative growth (Mathews, 2011), which likely will end abruptly once Earth's limited capacities will have been depleted by the exponential growth of population and economy (Daly, 1995). Yet not only the finiteness of energy carriers, but also the accumulation of extreme meteorological incidents, mass mortality of species, and sea level rise represent impediments of stable economic growth (McCarthy, 2015). The scenarios concerning trends of the world's condition developed by the Club of Rome illustrate that keeping a high wealth level can only be accomplished if a radical change in societal attitude concerning the valuation of growth will take effect (Meadows et al., 2004). Stopping environmental destruction while maintaining the present economic system appears to be impossible, since fossil energy carriers provide globally acting companies with the opportunity to spatially separate production and consumption as well as to externalise the manifold ecological expenses (Chisholm, 1990). Bridge (2010) rates the heated debates about Peak Oil as ecologically motivated forebodings of a new energy order in which the modern industrial nations are going to free themselves of their dependence on oil. For Neomarxist groups, the end of the age of mineral oil even represents an apocalyptic turn of eras during which nature were going to take vengeance on the ecological arrogance of capitalism. According to Bettini and Karaliotas (2013), the narration of Peak Oil thereby attains a symbolism that reaches far beyond mathematical calculations of the scarcity of fossil energy sources, being extended to a general criticism of a system that is exclusively oriented on growth. McCarthy (2015) sees the chance of a post-fossil capitalism especially in the commodification of wind, sunlight, geothermal heat, and waves. This way, nature would again be introduced into the cycle of capital. Van den Bergh (2011) presumes that this may be a practicable approach, perceiving criticism of market economy and capitalism as too radical and warns of one-sidedly problematising growth without simultaneously pointing out realisable alternative ways. He therefore prefers the ‘a-growth-concept’, which assumes a neutral position on growth, trying to create social as well as ecological sustainability by means of pricing policy, environmental agreements, and education initiatives. The commodification of nature, however, is rejected by the degrowth movement, as the comparison of the Montreal Protocol, which is based on regulations (ozone) with the Kyoto Protocol based on trade had shown a greater effectiveness of regulative measures (Kallis, 2011). Concerning the market's capabilities, North (2010) additionally speaks of the neoliberal enthusiasts' mindless faith in technology, who were mistakenly convinced that creative destruction is sufficient to face the societal challenges posed by Peak Oil and the climate crisis. Sarkar and Kern (2008) limit the possibilities of the global community's further development to the two options ‘eco socialism’ or ‘barbarism’. This rhetoric stylises capitalism as the image of the enemy: on the one hand, it represents the cause of the global ecological crisis due to the exploitation of natural resources – and for that reason alone were not to be maintained (Daly, 2005) – while on the other hand not offering a suitable social framework for mastering the crisis (Kallis et al., 2009). Hence, the development of a symbiotic economy (Garcia-Olivares and Sole, 2015) rooted beyond obsessive economic growth (Buch-Hansen, 2018) is promoted. Renewable energies were apt to meet these requirements since they can be developed through collaborative bottom-up mechanisms on a communal level, therefore enabling the decentralisation and democratisation of energy supply (Rifkin, 2013). In fact, this may be an option. However, in the following, we want to demonstrate that capitalism is not only very robust to crises, but is also able to contribute to the solution of the environmental crisis. 3. Robustness of capitalism 3.1. Space-time compression We will now show that the possibility of increasing productivity does not end with the transition to a regenerative energy system, but only needs to be embedded into new logistic-infrastructural contexts. In this, we contradict Altvater (2007), Huber (2009) and North (2010), who claim that capitalism could expand only on the basis of fossil fuels, since, due to the global transportability of oil, gas, and coal, entrepreneurial actions are no longer bound to the local availability of energy resources, but range globally. Furthermore, the usage of fossil energy carriers is not subject to daily or seasonal fluctuations. Transportability and baseload capacity hence lead to space-time compression (Harvey, 1996), as products can be generated in ever shorter intervals of time. Following this logic, the limitation of the fossil resource basis inevitably brings about the end of the capitalistic system. It remains undisputed that energy flow within a solar-based energy system is hard to control (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). Most forms of renewable energies are intermittent sources, whose contribution to the energy mix are subject to the rhythms of sun, wind, precipitation, and tides (Fares, 2015). Adapting energy production to demand, a fundamental prerequisite of continuous economic growth, thus becomes a major challenge. What Altvater (2007), Huber (2009) and North (2010) actually do not include in their considerations, are the numerous technological innovations for the stabilisation of regenerative energy systems. After all, with biomass and geothermal power, two energy carriers capable of providing base load are at hand (Matek and Gawell, 2015), which may, in the form of regenerative combined power plants, support the weather-dependent energy sources sun and wind (Palensky and Dietrich, 2011; Ramchurn et al., 2011). The numerous energy storage technologies are also important, albeit only few of these have reached industrial maturity. In principle, mechanical, chemical, electrical, or thermal kinds of storage are being discerned (Hadjipaschalis et al., 2009). Compressed air and pumped storage power plants with efficiency levels of up to 80% are especially promising (Anagnostopoulos and Papantonis, 2008). Research is also conducted on the conversion of surplus regenerative power into methane or hydrogen (Jensen et al., 2007), by which the bidirectional operation of the power and gas network is made possible, allowing for transportability as well as baseload capacity within large spatial units. Space-time availability may also be augmented by the development and capacity expansion of high-voltage transmission lines (Walter and Bosch, 2013). Harriss-White and Harriss (2007) have pointed out at an early point, that the existent grids, having been developed following a monopolistic logic, are outdated and incapable of integrating decentrally-produced electricity with strong fluctuations. These deficits, however, are successively being corrected. E.g., Germany's South, which is poor in wind but strong in terms of industry is being provided with direct access to the big wind energy off-shore potentials in the North as well as to the storage power plants in Scandinavia (cf. Fig. 1). The possibilities of intercontinental power transport from regenerative sources have been thoroughly investigated by DLR (2006) and Grossmann et al. (2014). Both energy storage and the development of the power grid thus will successively reverse the present space-time limitations of regenerative energy systems. The two domains, however, are not isolated from one another, but are coordinated via smart grids. Solomon and Krishna (2011) emphasise that smart grids are superbly suitable for the implementation of market-based approaches, so that an innovation-driven mass market for energy efficiency technologies could be anticipated. Smart grids also provide the possibility of no longer designing the mass production of renewable energy technologies on a fossil basis, but by the usage of renewable energy. While the production of the first generation of regenerative technologies was based on fossil energy, in future, the possibilities of energy storage, the almost unlimited energy potential of a solar-based economy, and the combination of both aspects through smart grids will ensure the flexible provision of regenerative energy at every production site without limits of time. Yet in order to optimise the flows of energy and material in smart grids, concepts of closed crude material cycles are needed, which, in the sense of the cradle-to-cradle approach (cf. Section 4), allow the reintroduction of used materials (e.g. old wind power plants made of renewable resources) to the biosphere. Thus, the problem of externalisation of ecological costs can be minimised. Summing up, the increase of productivity and stable economic growth within regenerative energy systems seems possible. Still, it remains to be emphasised that large-scale energy projects also entail negative social consequences. E.g., Yenneti et al. (2016) have shown that the Charanka solar park in Gujarat, India, was erected on areas that the local population's livelihood had depended on for decades. The refuse of access to these areas, as well as the inhabitants' successive dispossession through state measures thus are direct results of the Indian economy's ecological modernisation (Levien, 2013). In this context, Baka (2013) speaks of “energy dispossessions”, a phenomenon which has also been observed with large-scale wind energy parks (Avila, 2018; Cowell, 2010). The socio-material impact of economic modernisation on the local population, whose lives strongly depend on agricultural land use, are often insufficiently respected (Yenneti et al., 2016), so that the dubious impression was given that environmental protection and economic growth based on efficient technologies, competition, and state measures could go with one another without social side effects. Remarkably, the controversial energy mega-projects especially in the global South, are not the cause of the development of new power asymmetries and conflicts, but rather reproduce and harden long-standing social disparities and injustices (Avila, 2018). According to Bradley and Hedrén (2014), a low-carbon transition hence misses its aims if it is only about modernising the energy system without likewise transforming the underlying social structures. 3.2. Crisis as an element of capitalist social order We hold the view that the occurrence of crises in capitalism is not due to it being an ailing, doomed economic order; nor is it a proof of capitalism's ineptitude for meeting ecological challenges. Instead, we deem that crisis is a fundamental element of the capitalist social order that actually provides a chance for readjusting economic processes. Harvey (2011) explains that anything blocking the circulation and accumulation of capital may pose a threat to the capitalist system and induce a fundamental crisis. The finiteness of fossil fuels is a crisis of this kind (McCarthy, 2015). Altvater (2007) is convinced that capitalism will not be able to overcome this crisis; therefore, future technologic progress had to be embedded in a non-fossil, non-capitalist framework. Kallis (2011) also emphasises that the approach to a steady state (cf. Daly, 1991, Daly, 2005) will transform the institutional preconditions of property, work, banking, and distribution to such an extent that in the end, it will be impossible to still identify them as capitalistic. With regard to Kallis' doubts concerning the institutional robustness of capitalism, Schumpeter points out that precisely the ups and downs of industrial development, which are the outcomes of successful innovations' intensifying competition, enable progress (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). As crises therefore represent an immanent part of the capitalist system, an environmental and resources-related crisis caused by the capitalistic process does not provide sufficient evidence to suggest a possible downfall of the capitalistic social order. The crisis might even be taken as proof of an economic cycle, if it is regarded as a period of depression between the dwindling fossil and the emerging regenerative age. Böhm et al. (2012) and McCarthy (2015) confirm that capitalism is capable of overcoming even fundamental crises, actually using these as starting points of its further expansion. Concerning the environmental crisis, Harriss-White and Harriss (2007) also concede that the deployment of renewable energies holds the potential of founding a new form of capitalism that is characterised by a much lower degree of materialistic lavishness. Bettini and Karaliotas (2013) emphasise that from a neo-liberal point of view, the accusation of capitalism bringing about a resources-related and environmental crisis does not at all provoke self-doubts. Rather, it caused the profitable marketing of adequate approaches to solutions in the field of resource depletion and environmental impacts to move into economic focus. Even Altvater (2007) points out that the externalised effects of production and consumption on nature become relevant for companies once they jeopardise profitability and accumulation. In that case, environmental problems and their solutions can actually be made part of capitalist logic. Solomon and Krishna (2011) are convinced that in order to solve the environmental crisis, it were not even necessary to achieve further technologic breakthroughs, as the technologies needed for the remodeling of society towards energy efficiency were already mature and cost-efficient. Even if capitalism might be sufficiently robust, Kallis (2011) still takes the crisis as a chance to break up obstructive social and political lock-ins that have hitherto seemed unalterable and have lead into the crisis. Yet he does not regard the ability of social and political transformation to be inherent in the traits of market, but as a characteristic of a social order orientated towards degrowth. Certainly, Kallis is right in saying that the market is hard to control, making a concerted transformation towards sustainability difficult. Still his criticism only refers to that form of capitalism which Schumpeter characterised as trustified capitalism and which does lead to ecologically problematic lock-in effects. The criticism cannot, however, be applied to competitive capitalism, which generates those basic innovations giving rise to the revolutionary crises described as so fertile by Kallis (2011). Thus, an opportunity is provided for alternative social conditions to be brought about – but within the capitalist social order – and for substantiating these new conditions through further innovations. Innovations may emerge outside of competition and market economy, but will then lack the required frequency and force, as growth represents the most important incentive of innovation (Wangler, 2013). On the other hand, a continuous process of innovation again leads to growth, which may revolutionise the present social conditions, as Schumpeter states (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). Thereby, a new combination of the given means of production within new sites of production emerges, generating new goods, methods, and markets. Productive resources are applied to hitherto untested usages while being withdrawn from those usages they served before (Geels, 2011). What Kallis (2011) terms technological optimism with regard to the ecological innovative power of capitalism, is therefore technological realism in the context of Schumpeter's competitive capitalism. Without doubt, innovative boosts on the part of already established companies are also conceivable and may give rise to the possibility of maintaining trustified capitalism with its ecologically precarious structures. An example hereof is the innovation ‘Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage’, by which the ecological impact of the emission intensive electrical conversion of coal is being reduced (Benson and Orr, 2008). Technological progress may hence stabilise the existent system of economy and policy that is accountable for the environmental crisis (Bettini and Karaliotas, 2013). In Schumpeter's view, however, the decisive economic order is competitive capitalism, which is characterised by the aggressive economic demeanour of new, innovative enterprises economically challenging the establishment (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). The start-ups of new companies, which are inseparably connected with the processes of innovation, withdraw production goods from the present capitalist system by underbidding, disturbing the former economic balance that is so destructive for nature. Competition is therefore essential for overcoming the environmental crisis. In that respect, the concept of ‘solidary economics’ and its precept of surmounting the allegedly ruthless principle of competition and emancipating oneself from the logic of the markets (Embshoff and Giegold, 2008), is counterproductive, as the renunciation of competition impedes the breakup of crusted economic structures, which thus continue to harm the environment. After all, the big energy providers' strategy was and is to hold on to the fossil-nuclear power plant pool for as long as possible, suppressing alternative concepts of energy supply (Gawel et al., 2012). A radical transformation of the energy system therefore cannot emerge from the existent structures, as Schumpeter assesses (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). Instead, innovative processes emerge outside of the old major companies until proceeding to attack the incumbent regime through the rededication of means of production (Geels, 2011). Innovative marketing strategies of small and middle scale businesses supplanting cumbersome large companies play an essential part especially in the field of renewable energies (Walsh, 2012). In this, competition is a decisive element that cannot easily be superseded. 4. Capabilities of green capitalism A competitive green capitalism develops great creativity by its high rate of innovation, which may also reinvent the relationship between humans and nature. We now want to exemplify how this might be brought about. Schumpeter holds the view that innovation is the result of the capitalistic entrepreneurial spirit, not the other way round (Herzog and Honneth, 2016). Technological and social progress hence are no independent variables materialising out of thin air, but arise from the logic of the capitalist process. Meadows et al. (2004) accept that innovations may relocate the limits of growth, making it possible to maintain the living standard by continuously reducing the consumption of crude materials and energy. However, one of the energy system's prevailing deficits is that depleted or not yet tapped resources are being (re-)obtained based on non-regenerative energy (Schwartzman, 2008), causing capitalistic production to be increasingly energetically inefficient (Murphy and Hall, 2011). Overcoming the energy crisis hence calls for the consideration of thermodynamic principles (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, Georgescu-Roegen, 1986; Martinez-Alier, 1987). Harriss-White and Harriss (2007) see the deployment of renewable energies as a possibility of limiting the creation of entropy. Kaberger and Mansson (2001) have shown that innovative resources-saving material cycles may be possible and economical if they are based on the usage of the inexhaustible energy of irradiance. What is promising about this approach is that, due to research and development, the utilisation of solar energy becomes more and more efficient and lucrative (Schmid, 2016). Moreover, its inexhaustible potential allows for the exploitation of material resources even from deposits with extremely low crude material density. On a local level, the utilisation of solar energy may actually lead to a reduction of entropy (Ebeling et al., 1998; Kranert and Cord-Landwehr, 2010), as it is the case with the usage of waste heat of solar thermal power plants for the desalination of sea water (DLR, 2007). The integration of these capacities into smart grids and the associated remodeling of every production process to purely regenerative sources have been detailed in Section 3. We further argue that innovation surpasses conceivability. Even Harris (2010) sees a particularly high potential in unpredictable technological innovations to break through economic routine, thus encouraging further entrepreneurs in issuing their own innovations. Capitalism might thereby be provided with the chance to reduce its ecological exploitation. But innovation exceeds strictly technological aspects and may as well comprise social and institutional aspects (Arentsen and Bellekom, 2014). E.g., in the mobility sector, whose pollutant emissions have significantly contributed to the environmental crisis, innovations have led to new features of cargo and passenger transportation. This is illustrated by the example of car sharing as an innovative life style (Prettenthaler and Steininger, 1999) or bicycle-sharing schemes in urban areas (Midgley, 2011). Another representative case is the history of the ozone hole, which Meadows et al. (2004) describe as a history of civil success regarding the correction of a severe overshoot. Quite in the sense of Schumpeter, Meadows et al. (2004) name the ‘industry's creative heads’ as the crucial problem-solving determinant. Through the three innovative boosts ‘better insulation’, ‘reduced toxic substitute materials’, and ‘emission-free alternative substances’, it will be possible to rebuild the original density of the ozone layer by the mid-21st century. Remarkably, this is realised without abandoning the existent economic system. Furthermore, we argue that it is realistic to assume growth-oriented, competitive markets in the future, rather than socio-material conditions beyond them, which, as stated by Van den Bergh (2011) are completely uncertain as of now (e.g. Harris, 2013: socialist markets). We therefore hold the view that it is more pragmatic to design future mass markets in an eco-friendly way. Kallis (2011) rejects the possibility that the wonder of a dematerialised economy might occur, as improvements of efficiency were overcompensated by growing consumption. While dematerialisation may be tantamount to a wonder, researchers still do put effort into adjusting the materialised economy to ecological compatibility. One aspect is the thorough redefinition of nature protection, because nowadays, nature protection is reduced to the attempt of limiting the harmfulness of processes and products (Mulhall and Braungart, 2010). However, due to the potential creation of new mass markets for more eco-friendly and efficient processes or products, this strategy holds the danger of actually augmenting unwanted effects through rebound effects. In this regard, Alcott (2005) points to the Jevon's Paradox which says it is a great error to think that technologic innovations were going to reduce the consumption of resources. Polimeni et al. (2015) name the example of the Green Revolution: the remarkable increase of food production's area efficiency was not at all able to abate the problems of hunger and area consumption, as consequently, the population greatly increased. Likewise, a mass market of efficient and eco-friendly products would again lead to a massive amount of poison and waste, with disposed crude materials hardly being recycled. The ecological costs then would have to be externalised, which Sturm and Vogt (2011) regard as strong evidence of the failure of the market. The core problem hence lies in the fact that products are being produced exclusively for the technosphere (McDonough and Braungart, 2013). E.g., copper is almost universally applicable to and beneficial for technological systems, while in biological systems, this material is extremely poisonous. Thus, the aim must be to design products in a way that makes them equally usable in biosphere, i.e. subsequent to their technical usage. This calls for the development of a combined management of nutrients for techno- and biosphere. Human ways of living, the processes and products they are based on, may thereby be employed for the benefit of nature. The focus must therefore be put on those innovations that break up the present paradigm of environmental protection by realising products that create a useful material connection between techno- and biosphere. An example of this kind of creative destruction is the Austrian company Gugler, the first print shop worldwide that produces printing products free from harmful ingredients and exclusively with substances that can be biologically recycled (Gugler GmbH, 2018). E.g., the accruing sludge is returned to biosphere and the ash of burned printing products can be reused as a fertilizer. These conditions provide the possibility of designing economic activities to be ecologically compatible despite a high resource throughput.

2024 GDI Affirmative
Answers To… › AT: K – Capitalism › UOM is Capitalist

TTOs rent extraction and monetization of university research make them locus of corporatization

Ryan, et al, Professor of Law at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 2024

[Christopher J. Jr., et al. "The Hidden Cost of University Patents." Berkeley Business Law Journal, vol. 21, no. 1, 2024, pp. 203-249. HeinOnline -tm]

But, alternatively defined, and in a Coasean sense, "markets" may mean the contracting that firms engage in-specifically to avoid having to bear the cost of vertical integration, where the latter may exceed the transaction cost of entering into contracts with outside parties. Here, universities, while broadly purposed, regularly enter into contracts with intermediaries, especially in the intellectual property sector. And this is because the cost of production of their intellectual property output exceeds the cost of contracting with intermediaries.101 This contracting function is the raison d'etre of technology transfer offices.

2024 GDI Affirmative
Answers To… › AT: K – Capitalism › UOM is Capitalist

Bayh-Dole enables corporate hijacking of universities, undermining their ability to serve the public good

Ryan, et al, Professor of Law at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 2024

[Christopher J. Jr., et al. "The Hidden Cost of University Patents." Berkeley Business Law Journal, vol. 21, no. 1, 2024, pp. 203-249. HeinOnline -tm]

Additionally, there are concerns about the effect of the Bayh-Dole Act's incentive structure on consumers. Before the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, the government often ceded its patent rights in publicly-funded research to the public domain, allowing any inventor to use the innovation produced from publicly­ funded research to create commercially valuable products. After the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, the public has had to pay for innovation twice: first, when the government funds research at universities; and second, when-upon universities licensing their patents to commercial entities-the commercial entity with the university patent license charges monopolistic prices to consumers to generate profit from their license.

2024 GDI Affirmative
Answers To… › AT: K – Capitalism › UOM is Capitalist

University structures – including TTOs – reflects firm behavior and commercial focus, diverting universities from their public good origins

Ryan, et al, Professor of Law at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 2024

[Christopher J. Jr., et al. "The Hidden Cost of University Patents." Berkeley Business Law Journal, vol. 21, no. 1, 2024, pp. 203-249. HeinOnline -tm]

With a few exceptions, universities are non-profit entities, meaning that they have no duty to increase profitability to satisfy public shareholders. Rather, the wealth universities derive and control affords them the means to provide educational resources and pursue knowledge generation through research. Yet, universities are corporations of the non-profit variety. They have chartering instruments, and increasingly, their make-up structurally resembles the for-profit corporate model.

2024 GDI Affirmative
Answers To… › AT: K – Capitalism › UOM is Capitalist

University ownership has destroyed the innovation ecology of academic research, subjecting faculty to capitalist corporatization

Barnett, Director of the Research Technology Enterprise Initiative at the University of Washington, 15

[Gerald, “How Bayh-Dole failed to protect faculty inventors (from university administrators),” Research Enterprise, 09/28/15, https://researchenterprise.org/2015/09/28/how-bayh-dole-failed-to-protect-faculty-inventors-from-university-administrators/, accessed 7/17/24, GDI-JCR]

But what has happened? Universities have adopted large corporation methods: demand ownership of everything, let management sort out what’s of value, hold everything else just in case. They justify this based first on the overturned notion that Bayh-Dole vested ownership of inventions with the employer. When that explanation failed, they argued that to comply with Bayh-Dole, they had to implement present assignments. Or, much more conveniently, if they had changed their patent policy to require assignment (following the argument that doing so conformed to federal law), they simply pointed to the policy without indicated that the policy was the way it was based on an argument that was simply false.

2024 GDI Affirmative
Answers To… › AT: DA -- Univ. Funding › IOM Solves

University licensing offices don’t even recover their own costs in the status quo – expenses are too high. Inventor ownership is more efficient and effective.

Barnett, Director of the Research Technology Enterprise Initiative at the University of Washington, 16

[Gerald, “11 rationalizations regarding university compulsory patent ownership,” Research Enterprise, 08/01/16, https://researchenterprise.org/2016/08/01/11-rationalizations-regarding-university-compulsory-patent-ownership/, accessed 7/17/24, GDI-JCR]

Here’s a related statement to consider: University licensing offices cannot recover their costs in their present approach. One license deal every decade or two might make millions. Stanford had three lucrative deals in 36 years and has been the envy of most everyone. Then the millions might make up for the millions spent in patenting, salary for patent management staff, legal review and litigation, operating costs, insurance costs, costs in delays in research and contracting, opportunity costs as a consequence of the approach. But most university licensing operations don’t break even, even with comprehensive, compulsory ownership. One reason: they have claimed so much IP and non-IP that they are swamped with disclosures (which they report as success), swamped with patenting logisitics (which they report as a sign of future potential), and they are swamped with trying to document, inventory, and market all of what they have. They are so busy on the loading dock that they hardly have time to get anything out into service.

2024 GDI Affirmative
Answers To… › AT: DA -- Univ. Funding › IOM Solves

Data proves inventor ownership actually returns more income to the institution than university ownership

Barnett, Director of the Research Technology Enterprise Initiative at the University of Washington, 16

[Gerald, “11 rationalizations regarding university compulsory patent ownership,” Research Enterprise, 08/01/16, https://researchenterprise.org/2016/08/01/11-rationalizations-regarding-university-compulsory-patent-ownership/, accessed 7/17/24, GDI-JCR]

I hear this argument in informal chats. That if university inventors are left on their own, or work with external invention management organizations, the university receives less in royalty income than when the university hires its own invention management staff. I don’t see any data that supports the argument. The argument does involve an impossible comparison–we can’t run experiments in which an inventor uses both university and external invention management agents at the same time. Given that external invention management agents typically take costs + 40% and a university policy typically takes costs plus 67%, there is a superficial truth to the argument. But the actual money received by a university is a matter of both the fee structure and the effectiveness at licensing. If an external agent is better at placing inventions, or places them in better situations, or is better at collecting royalties, then the total income to the university after the inventor’s share, even after the agent has taken 40% , may still be much greater than the university’s own efforts.

2024 GDI Affirmative
Answers To… › AT: DA -- Univ. Funding › UOM Not Profitable

University licensing revenue is negligible

Eisenberg, Prof of Law at Michigan, & Cook-Deegan, Prof at the School for the Future of Innovation in Society, 18

[Rebecca, Robert, “Universities: The Fallen Angels of Bayh-Dole?” Daedalus 147.4, GDI-JCR]

The overall impact of Bayh-Dole has been a topic of lively debate in the thirty-eight years since its passage.18 University patenting has dramatically increased, and a few universities have made a lot of money from royalties. Yet licensing revenues remain a small portion of university budgets overall. Respondents to a 2015 survey of the Association of University Technology Managers reported $2.5 billion in licensing revenues (including revenues from trademark, copyright, and unpatented technologies). This is less than 4 percent of the $66.6 billion in university research expenditures, with the wealthiest universities capturing most of the benefits. Although university technology transfer professionals take credit for stimulating commercial development of new technologies, it is not clear how much of that development would have occurred without university patents.

2024 GDI Affirmative
Answers To… › AT: DA -- Univ. Funding › UOM Not Profitable

Universities put patent profits in slush funds that benefit nobody but patent administrators

Barnett, Director of the Research Technology Enterprise Initiative at the University of Washington, 16

[Gerald, “11 rationalizations regarding university compulsory patent ownership,” Research Enterprise, 08/01/16, https://researchenterprise.org/2016/08/01/11-rationalizations-regarding-university-compulsory-patent-ownership/, accessed 7/17/24, GDI-JCR]

Most patent royalties received by universities go into slush funds. If there’s a big hit deal, perhaps a building gets constructed, or an investment fund gets formed–use money to make more money and put that money in administrative slush funds. The University of Washington made hundreds of millions from the Washington Research Foundation’s licensing of a hepatitis B vaccine and related inventions, but put the money each year into administrative slush funds, some of which supported research that couldn’t get federal or industry support. I doubt anyone can point to anything of consequence that came of those hundreds of millions. It was like grinding up a truck load of gold bars every year and scattering the dust over the university.

2024 GDI Affirmative
Answers To… › AT: DA -- Univ. Funding › UOM Not Profitable

University administrators are greedy parasites on innovation that still fail to actually make real money for their institutions

Barnett, Director of the Research Technology Enterprise Initiative at the University of Washington, 16

[Gerald, “Working through an old op/ed on university ownership of inventions,” Research Enterprise, 12/06/16, https://researchenterprise.org/2016/12/06/working-through-an-old-oped-on-university-ownership-of-inventions/, accessed 7/17/24, GDI-JCR]

What this conclusion does state–I am sure–is an administrative truth: that university administrators are committed to taking ownership of everything they can get, and using whatever they get to try to make as much money as they can. It’s just that the very acts of taking and trying to profit run counter to public accessibility and development. It would be more direct for the op/ed to assert “We believe that our administrative jobs depend on stripping inventors of their choices and offering monopoly positions to whomever shows up with money. We mitigate criticism of our scheme by holding out the prospect for huge payoffs, claiming that we act in the public interest, and–although it is rare–by sharing a portion of our gains with inventors (but not with their colleagues, even in the same research team).”

2024 GDI Affirmative
Answers To… › AT: DA – Clog › AT: Thickets

Squo incentives increase patent thicket risk – and trades off with university education

Ryan, et al, Professor of Law at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 2024

[Christopher J. Jr., et al. "The Hidden Cost of University Patents." Berkeley Business Law Journal, vol. 21, no. 1, 2024, pp. 203-249. HeinOnline -tm]

Beyond questioning the necessity of university patent ownership to drive commercialization, there are arguments that creating incentives to pursue these patents can result in the overproduction of patentable research and stockpiling of often worthless patents. 41 As an example of this phenomenon, Professor Ritchie de Larena cited one major research institution that spent nearly $2 million developing a patent portfolio around one professor's research, despite the fact that the portfolio did not lead to any income generating licenses. 42 This over­ production of university patents can compound the problem of "patent thickets" 43 (i.e., many overlapping patents owned by multiple parties covering a single invention). 44 But more broadly, the pursuit of patents may distract universities from their core mission: the provision of education and the dissemination of knowledge. 45 These illustrations are but a few of the hidden costs associated with state-funded patent subsidies-from which public investment is never recouped by society.