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2023 Michigan Kritik
Capitalism Kritik—2023 Michigan Starter Packet › Topshelf › Framework Core—2NC

Plan focus is not neutral, but a particular ethos that legitimates capitalism. Choosing to bracket their assumptions out from debate is a unique link.

Azmanova, 20—Professor of Political and Social Science, University of Kent, Brussels School of International Studies (Albena, “Capitalism Under Scrutiny: From Concept to Critique,” Capitalism on Edge: How Fighting Precarity Can Achieve Radical Change Without Crisis or Utopia, Chapter 2, pp. 45-50, dml)

When I discuss altering public attitudes to democratic capitalism in subsequent chapters, I will use “ethos” to speak of the ensemble of worldviews, including perceptions of interest, that orient behavior and endow it with social meaning. Ethos cannot be equated with ideology, rational interest, and ethical norms. In my usage, it connotes the cognitive and normative orientations regarding views about truth, appropriateness, and acceptability— a societal “common sense” or rationality. Within the ethos of modern democratic societies, for a person to claim decisional power for political or economic office on grounds that he or she is fated for such an office would be nonsensical. Similarly, claiming that a human being can be deprived of life without any justification would not only be considered inappropriate and unacceptable in most of these societies—it would be absurd. Therefore, such an idea would not even enter public debates: it stands beyond the common sense of our societies, beyond their ethos. Rational justification is the fulcrum of any modern ethos, present as much in modern democracies as in modern dictatorships. (Note that the latter would either hide the killing or offer some rational justification.) It is under the normative pressures of this overarching ethos that the legitimation matrix and the legitimacy deal of a social order take shape.

The triad of concepts—ethos, legitimation matrix, legitimacy deal—speak to different stages of the process in the course of which suffered injustice becomes politically thinkable as an issue of justice demanding the attention of public authority. Not all experiences of suffering are voiced as grievances. From those that are, only a limited set are recognized as matters relevant to politics and valid objects of policy. The selection of which social phenomena do gain visibility as public concerns and in turn are recognized as being politically relevant is framed by society’s ethos, by shared notions of truth, appropriateness, and acceptability. However, it is a more narrow set of normative and cognitive orientations—those that make up the specific legitimation matrix (ideas of fair distribution of life-chances, as well as what constitutes a life chance)—that determine the thematic scope of the agenda of public debate: which social practices become politicized and thus objects of contestation and which ones are accepted as a matter of course and therefore remain unchallenged. This is a crucial point in my conceptualization of the missing crisis of capitalism (in chapter 5). To the extent that a certain type of social suffering is not politicized, there is no legitimation crisis of the socioeconomic and political order.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Capitalism Kritik—2023 Michigan Starter Packet › Topshelf › Framework Core—2NC

Counter-interpretation: the power relations undergirding the 1AC should be a legitimate site of negation. Alternative sets of power relations are competitive, and we shouldn’t be held to every detail of alt implementation even if it seems utopian.

Ypi, 23—professor of political theory at the London School of Economics (Lea, in conversation with Amy Allen, Paul Apostolidis, and Albena Azmanova, “The ends of radical critique? Crisis, capitalism, emancipation: a conversation,” Journal of Political Power, 16:1, 101-124, dml)

To take Utopia: I understand utopia as an ideal of human relations that is necessary to ground our critique of capitalism and of the societies in which it is entrenched, and that also shapes our vision of the societies which we want to emerge. I do not believe that this is the same as writing ‘recipes for the cookshops of the future’, as Marx accused utopian socialists of attempting, but I think it is important to have an account of what it is that makes capitalism wrong from a moral perspective. The same goes for the desirability of revolution and the way we understand and evaluate transformative practices that seek to move us beyond the status quo.

I have always been attracted to Rosa Luxemburg’s account of revolution, and the way she analyses its relationship to social reform. As Luxemburg points out correctly, the difference between reform and revolution is not in the way in which we try to realize certain ends but in the content of these ends, in what it is we want to reach. She suggests, again, correctly in my view, that the difference between reform and revolution is not whether one is gradual and more likely to succeed, or more or less representative of the general will, but in the kind of political goals we commit to, in the question of who holds power and for what reasons, and whether those power relations are entrenched into a legal system or not. One thing that I was struck by in Albena’s account and also in her set of positive proposals for what happens when we overcome capitalism and how to accelerate the transition is that they are all limited to policy proposals. But they do not seem to me to be political, in the sense that they do not speak to the redistribution of power relations in society and to the question of how you entrench those in the law. And so it seems to me that not much is said about the intersection between law and politics, and with reference to the political horizon within which those particular policy proposals are inscribed. And yet, if we try to turn these proposals into law and think about what fundamental transformations they bring to society, we might need a revolutionary upheaval of the status quo, and a very radical change in the legal systems we are familiar with. So, to return to the question of reform and revolution, the problem is not so much the difference in method – one is violent, the other is peaceful, one is slow, the other is faster – after all, history has familiarized us with reforms that are fast and violent, and with revolutions that are slow and peaceful. The problem is the difference in the content of fundamental legal disposition, the body of basic norms, whether and how fundamental principles of social cooperation are constitutionalized and how. The paths you discuss for overcoming capitalism, decommodification and the like, require a fundamental upheaval in the legal structures of our political institutions and a different set of power relations, in short, a revolution. And this in turn requires a normative vision within which we are able to assess critically your proposals, and to reflect on the related questions of justice and political legitimacy.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Capitalism Kritik—2023 Michigan Starter Packet › Topshelf › Alt Solvency—2NC

We don’t need to win that voting neg starts the revolution or inaugurates a socialist utopia—critiquing the legitimating ideals behind their policy proposal is necessary and sufficient to guide emancipatory struggle.

Azmanova, 20—Professor of Political and Social Science, University of Kent, Brussels School of International Studies (Albena, “Capitalism Under Scrutiny: From Concept to Critique,” Capitalism on Edge: How Fighting Precarity Can Achieve Radical Change Without Crisis or Utopia, Chapter 2, pp. 55-59, dml)

The problem goes even further. Successful struggles against inequality and exclusion and the structures that enable them do not simply obscure systemic domination: they often enhance it. This happens because such struggles confer value on the system (and the attendant notions of a successful life and an accom- plished person) within which we seek equality and inclusion. In this way, struggles against relational and structural domination risk deepening systemic domination. While feminists struggled against the oppressive structure of patriarchy and fought for equality with men in the labor market, women in fact increased the desirability and, ergo, the legitimacy of the competitive pro- duction of profit as a systemic dynamic of capitalism. Struggles against global capitalism such as “America First” and Brexit valo- rize capitalism at home. The welfare state consensus on inclusive growth and redistribution has elevated the value of prosperity into a right to be middle-class, with expectations for ever-improving living standards. This formula of prosperity-for-all remedied the relational injustice of inequality, but did so to a great extent by deepening the systemic injustice of environmental destruction.

The protests of the Indignados against austerity policy expressed the paradox of emancipation perfectly in their famous slogan “We are not against the system; the system is against us.” They render the system more valuable through calls for being included in it. This is how the validation of the system often penetrates the language of protest and disables the radicalization of social protest: that is, it prevents the transition from fighting relational forms of injustice to fighting systemic ones. That is why it is imperative that when addressing inequality and exclusion, intellectual critique and political mobilization make sure to also target the very constitutive logic of the social order within which inclusion and equality are being pursued.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Capitalism Kritik—2023 Michigan Starter Packet › Topshelf › Impact Framing—2NC

Our impact outweighs on scope. Defenses of capitalism don’t account for its extra-economic violence, which creates interlocking crises that make all their impacts inevitable. It’s try or die for the alt because changing wealth production, not just distribution, is critical.

Fraser, 22—Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School (Nancy, “Cannibal Capitalism: Are We Toast?,” Cannibal Capitalism: How Our System Is Devouring Democracy, Care, and the Planet—and What We Can Do about It, Preface, pp. xiv-xvii, dml)

"Capitalism," too, cries out for clarification. The word is commonly used to name an economic system based on private property and market exchange, wage labor and production for profit. But that definition is too narrow, obscuring rather than disclosing the system's true nature. "Capitalism," I'll argue here, better designates something larger: a societal order that empowers a profit-driven economy to prey on the extra-economic supports it needs to function--wealth expropriated from nature and subject peoples; multiple forms of carework, chronically undervalued when not wholly disavowed; public goods and public powers, which capital both requires and tries to curtail; the energy and creativity of working people. Although they do not appear on corporate balance sheets, these forms of wealth are essential preconditions for the profits and gains that do. Vital underpinnings of accumulation, they, too, are constitutive components of the capitalist order.

In this book, accordingly, "capitalism" refers not to a type of economy but to a type of society: one that authorizes an officially designated economy to pile up monetized value for investors and owners, while devouring the non-economized wealth of everyone else. Serving that wealth on a platter to the corporate classes, this society invites them to make a meal of our creative capacities and of the earth that sustains us with no obligation to replenish what they consume or repair what they damage. And that is a recipe for trouble. Like the ouroboros that eats its own tail, capitalist society is primed to devour its own substance. A veritable dynamo of self-destabilization, it periodically precipitates crises while routinely eating away at the bases of our existence.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Capitalism Kritik—2023 Michigan Starter Packet › Topshelf › 1NC

Vote negative to conceptually expand socialism beyond the economic. That generates credibility and unites emerging movements.

Fraser, 22—Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science at The New School (Nancy, “Food for Thought: What Should Socialism Mean in the Twenty-First Century?,” Cannibal Capitalism: How Our System Is Devouring Democracy, Care, and the Planet—and What We Can Do about It, Chapter 6, pp. 141-143, dml)

In any case, "socialism," too, is back! For decades the word was considered an embarrassment--a despised failure and relic of a bygone era. No more. At least not in the United States.' Today, US politicians like Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez wear the label proudly and win support, while organizations like the Democratic Socialists of America attract new members in droves. But what exactly do they mean by "socialism"? However welcome, enthusiasm for the word does not translate automatically into serious reflection on its content. What exactly does or should "socialism" signify in the present era?

The arguments of the preceding chapters suggest an answer. The expanded conception of capitalism outlined there implies that we need an expanded conception of socialism, too. After all, once we've abandoned the view of capitalism as an economy, we can no longer understand socialism as an alternative economic system. If capital is wired to cannibalize the "non-economic" supports of commodity production, then a desirable alternative to it must do more than socialize ownership of the means of production. Over and above that desideratum--which I wholeheartedly endorse--it must also transform production's relation to its background conditions of possibility: namely, social reproduction, public power, nonhuman nature, and forms of wealth that lie outside capital's official circuits but within its reach. In other words, as I shall explain, a socialism for our time must overcome not only capital's exploitation of wage labor, but also its free riding on unwaged carework, public powers, and wealth expropriated from racialized subjects and nonhuman nature.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Capitalism Kritik—2023 Michigan Starter Packet › Topshelf › 1NC

Capitalist accumulation is unsustainable, causes extinction and planetary immiseration.

Robinson, 23—Distinguished Professor of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara (William, “The Violent Crackup of the Post-WWII International Order: Notes on the Geopolitical Crisis and Global Capital,” Journal of World-Systems Research, Vol. 29, No. 1, dml)

Some scholars have framed the crisis of global capitalism in terms of a declining U.S. hegemony and the rise of a Chinese competitor. But no new nation-state power can supply the political authority necessary to stabilize the now-inextricably integrated global economy. The crisis of hegemony in the international system takes place within this single, integrated global economy. No one state, no matter how powerful, can control the process of global accumulation. This disjuncture between a globalized economy and a nation-state-based system of political authority generates enormous geopolitical tensions. The end of Western domination of world capitalism is upon us as the center of gravity of the global economy shifts to China. But China will not become a new hegemon. Rather, we are moving towards political multipolarity at a time of acute crisis in global capitalism—prolonged economic turbulence and political decay.

The breakdown of the political organization of world capitalism is not the cause but the consequence of contradictions internal to a globally integrated system of capital accumulation. Escalating geopolitical conflict is pushing us towards global conflagration. Wars provide enormous outlet for surplus accumulated capital. Historically they have pulled the capitalist system out of accumulation crisis while they serve to deflect attention from political tensions and problems of legitimacy. The most urgent task at this time is to prevent World War III. The more we understand the changing nature of this beast that is global capitalism, the better we are situated to work out strategies of resistance and transformation. The task before us is ever more urgent in the face of the threat of nuclear holocaust, the collapse of the biosphere, and ever more acute inequality, immiseration, and social disintegration around the world.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Capitalism Kritik—2023 Michigan Starter Packet › Topshelf › 1NC

Their focus on emancipation via redistribution legitimizes capitalism and disempowers radical alternatives.

Azmanova, 20—Professor of Political and Social Science, University of Kent, Brussels School of International Studies (Albena, “Precarity Capitalism,” Capitalism on Edge: How Fighting Precarity Can Achieve Radical Change Without Crisis or Utopia, Chapter 5, pp. 131-134, dml)

It is not simply the alliance of center-left and center-right party elites and the electorates that propel them to public office who are the culprits for imposing “socially irresponsible rule.” The radical Left and the Far Right have done their share in contracting the space of political contestation. Calls against inequality (from the left) and for safeguarding societies from troublesome incomers (from the right) share a particular logic: they help to politicize the social evils that globally integrated capitalism incurs in the terms of distribution of membership within a given social order. This prevents questioning the social order within which equality and inclusion are being sought. When social harm is thematized in terms of inclusion and equality, it misrepresents instances of what I labeled as systemic injustice in chapter 2 as relational injustice instead. In other words, problems of the model of well-being generated by the sociopolitical system are translated as problems of one’s place or inclu- sion within it. This invites remedial policies of redistribution or inclusion/exclusion rather than radically altering the rules of the game. The most disturbing example of the fallacious politiciza- tion of otherwise valid social grievances is the recourse to xeno- phobia, where political actors have used the most easily available language of political mobilization—that of hatred—to cash in on social discontent.

With the exception of environmental protest, which does indeed target the overall logic of capital accumulation (the way goods are produced, distributed and consumed), the shared myo- pia across forms of social protest and intellectual critique involves focusing attention on instances of injustice rooted in the asymmetrical distribution of economic, political, or symbolic power among actors, a practice engendering inequalities and exclusion. The logical solution, then, is to equalize power relations through redistribution and inclusion, rather than alter the very logic of social reproduction. This inability to question the political economy of capitalism and the democratic framework of politics in terms other than distribution and inclusion persists. It is well illustrated by the Occupy movement and what are now con- sidered radical calls for justice, such as “We Are the 99 Percent” and “Tax the Rich.” While anger is rightly and poignantly mobilized against the uneven distribution of advantage in our societies, it leaves the mechanisms that produce advantage unquestioned—and the whole way of life sodden with injustice for all.

2023 Michigan Kritik

Possible Solvency advocate

U+BI can be the cornerstone of a reparative framework for post-colonial, racial and settler colonial violence as a form of reparations.

Klein, and Fouksman, 2021 (Elise, Senior lecturer @Australian National University, Elizaveta, Lecturer at King’s College London, Reparations as a Rightful Share: From Universalism to Redress in Distributive Justice, Development and Change, Volume 53(1): 31-57)

There are intersections between redistributory universalism and reparative redress. In many cases, the links between class and race can be reflected in statistics of poverty. However, this can also hide the way in which race has been the grammar of unequal relations and has justified expropriation and exploitation in places like the US since colonization. This is also the case in Australia, where ignoring the ways in which race and coloniality have impacted and continue to impact Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples ignores aspects of settler colonialism that are not only about economic dispossession, but also about racism, white supremacy and patriarchy. Yet (re)distribution must be as much a key part of reparatory justice as is recognition. As Nancy Fraser (2003, 2005) has pointed out, recognition without redistribution holds the danger of displacing struggles for economic justice—an issue that Fraser argues has plagued feminism in recent decades (Fraser, 2005: 298). The negotiations between Namibia and Germany around the Herero-Nama genocide are another example: while Germany is willing to recognize the genocide, and give some additional development aid as part of this recognition, it has declined to term the accompanying payment ‘reparations’, fearing to set a precedent for other or larger redistributive claims to reparative payments. Fraser has argued that both recognition and substantive redistribution are equally essential parts of social justice; one cannot be forsaken in favour of the other. Here we have built on that argument to make the case that the two are in fact intertwined in justice-based claims for shares of collective wealth. All three cases illustrate common themes. While the US is a post-slavery society, it is also a settler colonial state, and insights from the Australian case have resonance for Native Americans in the US who also have substantive claims for reparative justice. The US case gave us one possibility on how mechanisms of distributive justice can also do some measure of reparative work via universal, redistributive and individual payments framed as a rightful share. A U+BI contends with some of the issues of recognition and redress raised in this article. While it is universal in scope and rightful in framing, the addition of the plus includes recognition of specific historical ills in need of reparative justice. The Australian case also suggested avenues that could accompany reparations, showing how not just recognition but also sovereignty could include specific national truth-telling processes, returning of land rights and self-determination, along with a U+BI or other forms of reparative redistribution. These reparative packages would need to be directed by Indigenous peoples themselves. Decentralized and decolonial cosmopolitanism — such as a global UBI framed as reparations for colonialism and its after-effects — may help fulfil reparations for post independence injustice. However, these payments need to also transcend nation state boundaries and connect with people that are stateless, or diaspora dispersed because of colonialism and slavery. We have made the case that reparative justice must become a key part of conceptualizing claims for distributional justice or claims to a share of collective wealth. This is both for instrumental and intrinsic reasons. Universal forms of distributive justice that do not consider claims to redress can do damage, for instance if, in settler colonial states and post-independent states, a universal basic income is used to mute claims to more radical forms of redistribution as well as sovereignty or self-governance. At the same time, we contend that if claims to distribution are based on a historical case around the communal creation of wealth by past generations, then this view must also encompass the ways this wealth creation has been intertwined with a global history of racist expropriation. Thus, in conceptualizing claims to distributive justice, we must take into account claims for reparative justice, particularly as they highlight the limits of nation state boundaries and the importance of recognition and redress for past and contemporary harms. Only then can what is rightful also encompass the right to atonement and redress.

2023 Michigan Kritik

AT: KATO

No extinction link—our reps identify a shared threat stemming from the settler present

Joseph J. Z. Weiss 15. Ph.D. candidate, Anthropology, University of Chicago. December 2015. “Unsettling Futures: Haida Future-Making, Politics and Mobility in the Settler Colonial Present.” p.216-232,

Conclusion: “What’s next? Just guess.” Signs of the Future One of the more recent additions to the socio-landscape of Old Massett, which I noticed on a return visit in 2014, was a series of blue signs that had appeared in many of the lawns on reserve and a good few uptown. The sign was a good two feet high and emblazoned with capitalized text: UNITED AGAINST ENBRIDGE. Below the text was a picture of a salmon. The salmon and the first word, “UNITED,” were in stark, attention-grabbing white, while the other text was in black. The signs, I later discovered, were distributed for five dollars each by the “Friends of Wild Salmon,” a coalition of northern British Columbia residents – including both First Nations and non-First Nations members – working together to oppose the Enbridge Gateway Pipeline Project.1 Perhaps appropriately, then, I noticed the sign on the lawns of both Haida and non-Haida, in Old Massett, (New) Masset, and out by Towtown. The signs may have been new, but their message is one that should have become familiar to us at this point: The people of Haida Gwaii oppose “Enbridge;” that is, The Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines Project. The project, first proposed in the mid-2000s, seeks to construct two pipelines to transport crude oil and condensate from northern Alberta to Kitimat on the coast of British Columbia.2 The oil would then be transported via “super-tanker” from the coast, through the Hecate Straight that passes between the west coast and the islands of Haida Gwaii before being exported to other nations (particularly China). Enbridge has received heavy support for the project from Canada’s current Conservative government, headed by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and in 2013 the Enbridge Joint-Review Panel – despite the words of hippies and Haida alike, alongside fierce opposition from all over the northwest coast - approved the pipelines, albeit with 209 required conditions.3 As a partnership between Canadian federal and corporate interests, the Enbridge Pipelines Project promises a future horizon of economic prosperity, one that unequivocally justifies any environmental risk in the present. On Haida Gwaii, Enbridge presages a rather different future, one in which the unpredictable waters of the Hecade Straight all but guarantee a tanker spill. Such a spill would devastate the waters and lands of the islands and the neighbouring coastline of British Columbia, destroying the fish and poisoning the plants that currently draw on ocean waters and the animals that feed thereon. Neither eagles nor ravens could survive, living as they do on a diet that consists primarily of marine life, a fact which all but guarantees the disappearance of Eagles and Ravens, the Haida people whose lifeways as such are so fundamentally tied to the islands of Haida Gwaii. Haida Gwaii could no longer be home. A song recorded in protest again Enbridge by Aboriginal artist Kinnie Starr and animated as a music video by Haidawood, a team of Haida and non-Haida stop-motion artists and animators, makes this threat explicit, asking in its opening lines “Who will save these waters, save them for our great granddaughters, save them for our great grand-daughter’s sons, […] save them before all is dead and gone?”4 This nightmare future, this future that is no future, is one that looms large over the whole of this dissertation. It is familiar because it is a reiteration of the horror of ecological cataclysm that the CHN formed itself in opposition against, that the “hippies” risk metonymically bringing about by taking from the lands and waters without respect. But it is also familiar because in a broader sense it is the future that settler colonialism attempted to give to Native peoples; indeed, to render as their already given destiny. This is the future of indigenous erasure, of ultimate disappearance, of a closed temporality which can only end in “all dead and gone.” As I have also hopefully shown in each of my chapters, however, the future of “no future” is never taken as inevitable or already determined by Haida people. The work of future-making instead always acts to ward off the nightmare future of Haida erasure, always puts in its place instead multiple possible futures in which Haida people continue. Take the blue signs on the lawns of the Masset(t)s, Old and New, implicitly answering Kinnie Starr’s question with the bold declaration that the islands (will) stand “UNITED” against Enbridge. But the social significances of these futures are never encompassed solely by the ways in which they respond to the threat of nightmare futures. As we saw in Chapter 3, for instance, the production of a future of Haida and non-Haida unity is considerably more complicated than the declaration of shared solidarity, speaking back to a particular history of Haida and settler relations and fantasy schemas, looking forward towards finding productive ways in which non-Haida can be integrated into Haida systems of sociality and responsibility. To speak of a future united against Enbridge is thus necessarily to speak of many other things, just as it is the case when speaking of a future of Haida return, a future of care-full leadership, or a future of traditional authority. Larger social worlds unfold out of the constitution of particular futures. This is why, more than anything, I want to make clear in the final, concluding chapter of this dissertation that the political (if not the existential) significance of Haida future-making does not lie simply in the specific ways in which individual futures respond to particular dilemmas of the settler colonial present. Rather, what is most crucial about future-making as a way of thinking out from within the temporal brackets of settler colonialism’s deferred erasure is simply the fact of future-making itself. What matters the most is the capacity to say, as Haida rapper Ja$e ElNino does in a guest appearance in Starr’s song, “Now expect the best from the northwest/ What’s next? Just guess.” ElNino asserts the openness of the future, challenging his listeners to even attempt to predict the field of possibilities still to come. This does not mean, though, that this openness is unmoored. Quite the opposite, ElNino asks us to “expect the best of the northwest,” in response to the threat of Enbridge and, I think, more generally. In this spirit, in what follows I highlight the significance of location to indigenous futurity, exploring how Old Massett, its neighbouring communities along Masset Inlet, and the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii act as locations around which the very openness of Haida futures can be articulated. My discussion will be largely synthetic, reading together my previous chapters to attempt to arrive at a few conclusions for this dissertation at a whole. I begin with a discussion of Haida Gwaii, once again, as “home,” asking what it means to consider the islands as a Haida homeland (and one that requires “care” as such) in the light of the futures I have sketched out. I then draw on this to pose a few suggestions for the political anthropology of indigenous peoples and its abiding contemporary concern with sovereign rights and territoriality. Finally, I conclude by drawing out the multiple meanings of my titular phrase, “unsettling futures,” in the context of Haida futuremaking. Homeland Haida Gwaii is in at least some sense at the center of each of the futures I have discussed in this dissertation. It is the home to which Haida are expected (and expect) to return, the “cornucopia” of off-the-grid fantasy, the ongoing historical space of complex social and material relations that these fantasies elide, the perpetually at risk ecological landscape which demands (and authorizes) the CHN’s care and respect. And, as we have seen, these various futures for the islands are not isolated from one another. Quite the opposite, futures proliferate in response to each other. The potential for non-Haida homing necessitates strategic forms of future-oriented social integration to bring these new arrivals into respectful relations with the Haida world, the nightmare non-future of ecological collapse is warded off by the attempt to constitute care-full futures under Haida control. What all these Haida futures have in common – at least as they relate to the islands - is that they work to preserve Haida Gwaii, and the community of Old Massett in particular, as spaces in which Haida futures remain possible. This fact, as I have already begun to suggest in Chapter 2, might help us to resolve some of James Clifford’s dilemmas in relation to indigenous mobility. As I pointed towards then, the notion that “place” is significant to indigenous peoples – politically, socially, affectively, culturally – has become one of the essential components of how “indigeneity” is understood as a global phenomenon and a strategic identity from which rights claims can be advanced. Take Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this regard (Assembly 2007:10, emphasis mine). But what precisely does it mean to have a “distinctive, spiritual relationship” to a place, and who determines what might constitute that relationship? Here one of the perils of Povinelli’s “cunning of recognition,” as indigenous rights to territory become conflated with - and evaluated against - essentialized settler notions of Native ecological spirituality and/or emplacedness (cf: Raibmon 2005; Nadasdy 2003). If indigeneity thereby takes on the significance of being “rooted” in a particular place, of having certain identifiably “distinctive” cultural relationships to that place that others might lack, then the fact of indigenous mobility would indeed pose a profound dilemma for the category of indigeneity on the one hand and the capacity to make claims to territorial rights qua one’s indigeneity on the other. But there is a remarkable temporal shallowness to all this. To give a representative example, the Australian state criteria for what constitutes “cultural rights to territory” that Povinelli interrogates function solely in the past and the present, mandating that Aboriginal people show continuity of occupation and of the cultural practices associated with “Aboriginal occupation” in the mind of the court in order to be recognized as possessing a rightful claim to their home territories (Povinelli 2002). Erased in this is the possibility that a territory could be the site of departure and return, that it could have a future horizon that is flexible, subject to transformation alongside the transformations of the people(s) who call it home, without thereby necessarily losing its integrity as a rightful space of indigenous occupation. Such a possibility is not controversial for my Haida interlocutors. Rather, it has the status of an already-given certainty, community common sense - though there is without doubt much social work that goes into the production of that certainty. What makes indigenous mobility fraught, then, might have rather more to do with the constitution of settler polities than it does with the actual practices of indigenous peoples. Consider the various ways in which we have already seen colonial authorities attempt to control Haida movement, from the forced expulsions of 19th century Victoria to the removal of Haida children from the islands for residential schools less than a century later. Consider too the manufacture of the reserves themselves, the fixing of two Haida “Bands” with their own federally determined territories, beyond which Haida people could claim no rights over land, waters, or resources (cf: Harris 2002). This is a logic of containment, of isolation. In leaving their assigned spaces, Native peoples were assumed by colonial authorities to be leaving the space of their Nativeness behind, assimilating into settler society on its terms. Indeed, this was the motivating logic of the residential schools program, which took as its premise the idea that “Indians” could always “backslide” into “savage customs” as long as they remained in their homes and with their families. Aboriginal children thus had to be brought somewhere else to learn how to join “civilized,” that is, white Christian, society (Miller 1996). Reserves could thus be rendered as the last bastions of a “weird and waning race,” to quote Scott, their inhabitants temporally foreclosed and spatially fixed. The notion that indigenous people could move without ceasing to be (or ceasing to fight for their rights to self-determination and Title to their lands) unsettles this narrative, just as does the intertwined possibility of indigenous futurity. The relationship to Haida Gwaii that we’ve seen sketched out by the Haida futures explored in this dissertation does not preclude the possibility of “distinctive spiritual relationships” between Haida and their home territories. Quite the opposite, the ineffable quality of homing alone suggests that many of my interlocutors feel a connection to their home that goes beyond the kinds of practices that are only possible on the islands, their beauty or their history. Indeed, when considered as home, when considered as a site that requires care, there is little doubt that Haida Gwaii can encompass a wide range of phenomenological, affective, social, and cultural ways of relating to its lands and waters by Haida people (and their neighbours, at times for good, at times for ill). But it is not these relations as such that encompass the totality of Haida Gwaii’s significance. Rather, what is of greatest concern to my interlocutors is the continuing future possibility that relations like that could be formed, that people could continue to be called home to Haida Gwaii once they’ve fully explored the world off-island, that the qualities that precisely make Haida Gwaii home could be preserved. This is what it means, I think, to “take care” of Haida Gwaii, to allow it to continue as a homeland for uncounted future generations. Though they certainly emphasize the need for Haida Gwaii to be maintained as a location for Haida futurity, this does not mean that the futures we have seen expend all the possible ways in which such future forms of Haida social, material, ecological, and relational life could be formed. Recall Ja$e ElNino’s challenge of a future so open that its possible contents can only be guessed at. What Haida future-making demonstrates is that there are a set of potentialities which are worth protecting so that Haida people can continue to access them, to come home to them, even as continuing forms of mobility and political processes can also shape and reshape Haida social and cultural life on and off the islands. Homeland is not a regimented place where Haida people must always live in order to be authentically Haida. Rather, it is a location where they should always be able to, in their own (necessarily multiple, often contested, sometimes even contradictory) terms. Sovereignty At the same time, there is an inescapably political dimension to the attempt to render Haida Gwaii as the homeland of a still open Haida future. The assertion of the (located) openness of the future does not necessarily make it so. As I noted in the first part of this dissertation, the flow of Haida departures and returns unfold in the broader context of the settler, capitalist state; indeed, they are made necessary in part by the current absence of economic opportunity on island, just as the arrival of potentially threatening strangers is a result of their privileged position in the very capitalist economy they seek to escape. Constituting futures in which Haida people have the freedom to engage with that economy (and settler society more generally) as they see fit while retaining the capacity to come home (complicated as that process might be) also reiterates the inescapability of some form of engagement with that socio-economy. Likewise, the notion of Haida Gwaii as Haida homeland cannot be separated from current Haida struggles to assert their rights to the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii, the resources found therein, and their sovereign capacity to govern themselves and the islands in the ways they find appropriate. This is, recall, the very crux of the CHN’s own commitment to the assurance of futurity, as it is only by positioning itself as the rightful, sovereign government of the Haida Nation and its homeland of Haida Gwaii that it can adequately care for the islands and protect them from external threat. And the continuing advance of the Enbridge project despite fierce opposition from CHN, the Old Massett Village Council, their Haida constituents, and the non-Haida actors with whom they are “united against Enbridge” (and this alongside protest all over the northwest coast) gives the nightmare futures of environmental collapse – pushed through by corporate interests and Canadian politicians - a frightening immanence. The assertion of the openness of the future is made, in short, in (and against) a context in which closures remain endemic. And yet, something has changed in this landscape from the initial erasures of Native futurity we drew out in the first chapter. In the narratives of colonial actors like Duncan Campbell Scott, it was absolutely clear that “Indians” were disappearing because their social worlds were being superseded by more “civilized” ways of living and being, ones that these Native subjects would also, inevitably, in the end, adopt (or failing that, perish outright). There was a future. It was simply a settler one. But the nightmare futures of that my Haida interlocutors ward against in their own future-making reach beyond Haida life alone. Environmental collapse, most dramatically, threatens the sustainability of all life; toxins in the land and the waters threaten human lives regardless of their relative indigeneity, race, or gender (e.g. Choy 2011; Crate 2011). Put another way, the impetus for non-Haida (and non-First Nations subjects more generally) to be “united against Enbridge” with their indigenous neighbours comes in no small part because an oil spill also profoundly threatens the lives and livelihoods of non-Aboriginal coastal residents, a fact which Masa Takei, among others, made clear in Chapter 3. Nor is the anxiety that young people might abandon their small town to pursue economic and educational advantage in an urban context limited to reserve communities. Instead, the compulsions of capitalist economic life compel such migrations throughout the globe. The nightmare futures that Haida people constitute alternative futures to ward against are not just future of indigenous erasure under settler colonialism. They are erasures of settler society itself. There is thus an extraordinary political claim embedded in Haida future-making, a claim which gains its power precisely because Haida future-making as we have seen it does not (perhaps cannot) escape from the larger field of settler-colonial determination. Instead, in Haida future-making we find the implicit assertion that Haida people can make futures that address the dilemmas of Haida and settler life alike, ones that can at least “navigate,” to borrow Appadurai’s phrasing, towards possible futures that do not end in absolute erasure. If Povinelli and Byrd are correct and settler liberal governance makes itself possible and legitimate through a perpetual deferral of the problems of the present, then part of the power of Haida future-making is to expose the threatening non-futures that might emerge out of this bracketed present, to expose as lie the liberal promise of a good life always yet to come and to attempt to constitute alternatives. It is no coincidence that we find this in the midst of a struggle over sovereignty. And this not just in the sense of the Council of the Haida Nation’s ongoing assertion of its sovereign right to govern the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii on behalf of all Haida people, as we saw in Chapter 5. Rather, as Joanne Barker has argued, over the course of the latter half of the twentieth century sovereignty has emerged as a: particularly valued term within indigenous scholarship and social movements and through the media of cultural production. It [is] a term around which analyses of indigenous histories and cultures were organized and whereby indigenous activists articulate their agendas for social change (Barker 2005:18). Through the assertion of sovereignty, indigenous political leaders, activists and scholars refute “the dominant notion that indigenous people [are] merely one among many ‘minority groups’ under the administration of state social service and welfare programs.” Instead, “sovereignty defines indigenous people with concrete rights to self-government, territorial integrity, and cultural autonomy under international law” (18). The trouble is, of course, that indigenous claims to sovereignty are always made within the context of colonial nation-states, ones whose own legitimacy is put at considerably risk both by the prospect of self-determining indigenous Nations (re)-emerging within their boundaries and the troubling of their own historical narratives of sovereign rights (cf: Comaroff and Comaroff 2003b). (One of these narratives, which reinterpreted indigenous lands as terra nullius and thus open to occupation, we’ve encountered already in Chapter 3). Thus, while sovereignty might indeed “define” indigenous peoples with concrete rights to territorial Title and self-determination, in theory equal under international law to the states who also lay claim to their territories, that definition does not in and of itself make possible the practice of this sovereignty. In this regard settler states such as Canada have shifted in their response to First Peoples’ sovereignty claims from outright rejection to a set of policies of selective recognition,5 but even the latter still positions Native nations as being subject to the authority and oversight (if not the structural forms) of the state. This means, as we have seen in Chapter 5, that indigenous governments such as the Council of the Haida Nation are in a precarious position, attempting to constitute their own sovereign authority without access to many of the conventional means of sovereignty in Western political thought – e.g., the monopoly on legitimate violence (Weber 1946), decisive authority to make and enact law (Schmitt 2005), or exclusive territorial control (Brown 2010; cf: Hobbes 1994). Alongside this precarity is the equally anxious question of whether or not sovereignty is even an appropriate analytical to center indigenous rights around precisely because it is historically a Western concept, one that had been drawn on to dispossess indigenous peoples over the course of settler colonial history (Barker 2005:18–19). (Indeed, the very next essay in Barker’s edited volume, by Mohawk scholar Taiake Alfred, categorically rejects sovereignty as an inappropriate tool for indigenous political assertions for these reasons and, also, because it draws attention away from developing and furthering “genuinely” Aboriginal political modes of thought (Alfred 2005; cf: Alfred 2009). The fact that sovereignty remains such a preeminent concept in the struggle for indigenous rights even though it is both epistemologically problematic and politically constrained has meant that there has been a recent push in both anthropology and indigenous studies to “widen” the definition of sovereignty, so that it might encompass multiple forms of indigenous social, political and legal practice outside of the conventional purview of “sovereign power” (e.g. Cattelino 2008; Richland 2011; Simpson 2000; Simpson 2014). Or, as Joanne Barker puts it: There is no fixed meaning for what sovereignty is – what it means by definition, what it implies in public debate, or how it has been conceptualized in international, nation, or indigenous law. Sovereignty – and its related histories, perspectives, and identities – is embedded within the specific social relations in which it is invoked and given meaning. How and when it emerges and functions are determined by the “located” political agendas and cultural perspectives of those who rearticulate it into public debate or political document to do a specific work of opposition, invitation, or accommodation. It is no more possible to stabilize what sovereignty means and how it matters to those who invoke it than it is to forget the historical and cultural embeddedness of indigenous peoples’ multiple and contradictory political perspectives and agendas for empowerment, decolonization, and social justice (Barker 2005:21, emphasis original). The opening up of sovereignty as flexible, multiple, and subject to all manner of diverse rearticulations carries particular weight (and, perhaps, ambiguity) since, as a historical concept in Western political theory, sovereignty was overwhelmingly concerned with closure. As Wendy Brown argues in her Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, the classic vision of sovereign power rests in the capacity to divide the inside from the outside, to make borders around a people – a “nation” – and separate that people from those outside it. Thus Schmitt’s “friend-enemy” distinction, for instance, or even John Locke’s consistent preoccupation with fences as a way of marking the existence of territory (Brown 2010; cf: Schmitt 1996; Locke 1988). The historical conditions of indigenous sovereignty claims in the context of settler colonialism make such absolute closures impossible for indigenous peoples. We might add, though, that their persistent presence also challenges the closure of the settler nation-state. Indeed, this is part of Brown’s point. The very fact that we see ever more spectacular performances of sovereign power on the part of contemporary nation-states – e.g., the titular “walls” that are being constructed along the borders of an increasing number of states - is a sign of the very insecurity of their political authority (Brown 2010).6 The conditions of settler colonial sovereignty, in other words, may be rather more “open,” and thus closer to those of indigenous “nation-within-nations,” then they may at first appear. If this means, in turn, that the future of settler political life is becoming as uncertain as the future for indigenous life has always been since the advent of settlement, then this means only what we have already begun to see: the dilemmas that Haida people confront in their future-making practices are also the dilemmas facing settler society. Take Chapter 4, in which the absence of any “one” definitive governing entity compels the constitution of an aspirational framework of accountability which could, were it realized, render navigable Haida relations to the many governments that claim their loyalties. As I hinted at there, such dilemmas are not restricted to the Haida sociopolitical world; rather, they may in fact be endemic to contemporary democratic societies and the multiple forms of governance (licit and otherwise) that emerge therein. In suggesting that there are Haida ways of refiguring a shared Haida-settler set of contemporary problematics, we might think of Haida future-making as simultaneously an instantiation of the multiple, flexible and always contingently located practices of sovereignty to which Barker points and a different way of thinking about indigenous political potentiality. In the former sense, Haida future-making is without doubt concerned with carving out spaces in which Haida existence can continue, expand, and change without losing the capacity to reproduce itself as, precisely, Haida existence. Thus the processes of homecoming we explored in Chapter 2, or Chapter 5’s explicitly political attempts to establish control over the islands for future generations. If the absence of indigenous sovereignty is the absence of the capacity of an indigenous people to (self)-determine their own futures, then the constitution of Haida futures can be seen exactly as sovereign work, whether in the overt sense of the Council of the Haida Nation’s assertions or the somewhat more implicit mode of Alice Stevens’ proposed mass adoptions. Significant here, though, is the fact that these acts of future-making carry meanings beyond their status as “responses” to the social and political dilemmas of contemporary Haida life. Thus Alice Stevens’ adoptions bring “hippie” children into the framework of Haida kinship relations, in one sense neutralizing their potential threat, but also constituting a complex new network of social relations between Haida and non-Haida whose potential significances go well beyond the protection of Haida territory and resources; thus the Council of the Haida Nation emerges as a “state-like” governing entity through its authorizing promise to “take care” of the islands, but in so doing takes on a series of new roles in Haida political life whose full consequences remain to be seen. If it is a sovereign action to envision an opening of possible futures for Haida people, then this very openness might also exceed the boundaries of sovereignty as a problematic for indigenous people even as it responds to them. Which is also, perhaps, why Haida futures seem so consistently to sketch out social, ecological, and political fields that encompass non-Haida; more, that are futures for Canada as well as for the Haida people living within the nation-state’s borders. Or, at least, futures that have the capacity to be so. What would it mean to figure an indigenous sovereignty that speaks beyond itself, one that promises to invert the order of settler domination through reconfiguring the shared futures of indigenous and settler peoples? This would not be a sovereignty premised on territorial closure, or even absolute political autonomy. It would, however, decisively overturn any settler colonial anticipations of the inevitable erasure of Native peoples. Quite the opposite, it would position indigenous practices of anticipation, aspiration, certainty, and anxiety at the forefront of contemporary modes of political imagination. Unsettling Futures A question remains, however. Could such a refiguring of the temporal and political horizon of settler and indigenous relationships remain possible even if the futures that indigenous people work to constitute remain unrealized in the settler colonial present? Or, put another way, we must always be careful not to conflate a capacity to form new futures for settler nation-states with the actual materializations of these futures. The Haida futures that I have discussed, even as they promise possible ways of navigating – of restructuring, even – the settler-Haida present, remain firmly bound by the colonial constraints of this present. But perhaps the stakes here have never been about overthrowing the Canadian colonial order outright. Rather, what I hope this dissertation has shown is that Haida future-making has the capacity to unsettle the settler colonial present, to challenge its received categories and demonstrate how, slowly, gradually, Haida people are reconfiguring its terms through the work of producing the future. Certainly, the sheer fact of Haida futurity should put to the lie any further notion that Haida people exist only to replicate their past or live only in the deferral of their eventual disappearance. The future is alive and well in Old Massett, although this does not meant that it is not also a site of profound anxieties. In working to ward off those anxieties through the juxtaposition of nightmare futures against their more desirable alternatives, then, Haida people unsettle the epistemological foundations of the forms of settler colonialism and liberalism against which Byrd and Povinelli write. At the same time (if you’ll pardon the pun), I think we can see the social work that futuremaking does iteratively, as a gradual reshaping of the actual conditions of Canadian society. Here I borrow Judith Butler’s suggestion, following Foucault, that the regulatory norms of society function only through their consistent and unstable reiteration (and materialization) in everyday social life.7 From this perspective, the ways in which Haida people work within and even reiterate the constraints and demands of Canadian settler mainstream society can also slowly and strategically shift those very constraints and demands, materializing a HaidaCanadian future that might in fact be quite different from the present even as it does not ever fully “escape” from its dilemmas. Perhaps the most unsettling potential of all here lies simply in the ways in which Haida people incorporate the conditions of the settler colonial present as being paths towards Haida futures. Not vanished, or vanquished. Ongoing.

2023 Michigan Kritik

Rights Good

“Rights” are the most effective framework for advancing decolonization. Their critique denies the reality of effective indigenous rights movements that chose to use this language.

Lightfoot 20, PhD – University of Minnesota, Political Science is Anishinaabe, a citizen of the Lake Superior Band of Ojibwe, enrolled at the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community in Baraga, Michigan (“The Pessimism Traps of Indigenous Resurgence,” In: Pessimism in International Relations, Edited by: Tim Stevens and Nicholas Michelsen, pp. 164)

Concerning the state in relation to Indigenous peoples on the international level, Corntassel argues that states and global organisations, for years, have been consistently framing Indigenous peoples’ self-determination claims in ways that ‘jeopardize the futures of indigenous communities’.31 He claims that states first compartmentalise Indigenous self-determination by separating lands and resources from political and legal recognition of a limited autonomy. Second, he notes, states sometimes deny the existence of Indigenous peoples living within their borders. Thirdly, a political and legal entitlement framing by states deemphasises other responsibilities. Finally, he claims that states, through the rights discourse, limit the frameworks through which Indigenous peoples can seek self-determination. Like Alfred and Coulthard, Corntassel has concluded that states are deliberate and never changing in their behaviour. With this move, Corntassel limits and actually demeans Indigenous agency, overlooking the reality that Indigenous organisations themselves chose the human rights framework and rights discourse as a target sphere of action precisely because, as was evident in earlier struggles like slavery, civil rights or women’s rights, these were tools available to them that had a proven track record of opening up new possibilities and shifting previous state positions and behaviour. Indigenous advocates also cleverly realised, by the 1970s, that the anti-discrimination and decolonisation frames could be used together against states. States did, in no way, nefariously impose a rights framework on Indigenous peoples. Rather, Indigenous organisations and savvy Indigenous political actors deliberately chose to frame their self-determination struggles within the human rights framework in order to bring states into a double bind where they could not credibly claim to adhere to human rights and claim that they uphold equality while simultaneously denying Indigenous peoples’ human rights and leaving them with a diminished and unequal right of self-determination. But, because he is caught in the pessimism trap of seeing the state only as unified, deliberate and unchanging, Corntassel overlooks and diminishes the clear story of Indigenous agency and the potential for positive change in advancing self-determination in a multitude of ways.

2023 Michigan Kritik

Engage State good

Refusal to engage settler states sabotages successful indigenous movements. Binary between authentic resurgence and coopted recognition facilitates divide and conquer response.

Sheryl LIGHTFOOT Canada Research Chair of Global Indigenous Rights and Politics @ British Columbia – Anishinaabe from the Lake Superior Band of Ojibwe ’20 in Pessimism in International Relations eds. Stevens and Michelsen p. 156-170

Despite all of these activities designed to re-write the relationship between states and Indigenous peoples, some high-profile critical Indigenous political theorists reject all state overtures towards reconciliation and take extremely pessimistic approaches towards future Indigenous-state relations. They advocate that Indigenous resurgence through a return to Indigenous land-based forms of governance is the only path to decolonisation. I argue that while resurgence school theorists are strong advocates for Indigenous nations, and bring focus and clarity to a set of issues about power structures and dynamics, they are all caught in the same set of three ‘pessimism traps’ that unnecessarily limit their capacity to contribute to improved Indigenous-state relationships. These pessimism traps emanate from a reliance on Fanonian revolutionary thought and a problematic application of Fanonian theory from French-colonised North Africa to an entirely different context in the English-speaking settler states. Finally, I argue, these pessimism traps are diametrically opposed to the work and vision of Indigenous organisations who have been working on the ground for decades to assert Indigenous nationhood both domestically and internationally, in ways that often assertively and creatively challenge and shift the existing system of sovereign states. In sum, because the resurgence school remains trapped in a pessimism box of its own making, it remains significantly out of step with Indigenous movements and actually risks harming their efforts to advance Indigenous self-determination in creative and innovative ways.

2023 Michigan Kritik

Totalizing Bad

Framing settler colonialism through a totalizing lens makes indigenous liberation impossible by setting the terms of victory as all-or-nothing—pessimism actively reifies settler dominance

Busbridge, 18—Research Fellow at the Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University (Rachel, “Israel-Palestine and the Settler Colonial ‘Turn’: From Interpretation to Decolonization,” Theory, Culture & Society Vol 35, Issue 1, 2018, dml)

The prescription for decolonisation—that is, a normative project committed to the liberation of the colonised and the overturning of colonial relationships of power (Kohn & McBride, 2011: 3)—is indeed one of the most counterhegemonic implications of the settler colonial paradigm as applied to IsraelPalestine, potentially shifting it from a diagnostic frame to a prognostic one which offers a ‘proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack’ (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). What, however, does the settler colonial paradigm offer by way of envisioning decolonisation? As Veracini (2007) notes, while settler colonial studies scholars have sought to address the lack of attention paid to the experiences of Indigenous peoples in conventional historiographical accounts of decolonisation (which have mostly focused on settler independence and the loosening of ties to the ‘motherland’), there is nevertheless a ‘narrative deficit’ when it comes to imagining settler decolonisation. While Veracini (2007) relates this deficit to a matter of conceptualisation, it is apparent that the structural perspective of the paradigm in many ways closes down possibilities of imagining the type of social and political transformation to which the notion of decolonisation aspires. In this regard, there is a worrying tendency (if not tautological discrepancy) in settler colonial studies, where the only solution to settler colonialism is decolonisation—which a faithful adherence to the paradigm renders largely unachievable, if not impossible.

2023 Michigan Kritik

Engage Civil Society 1st

Perm do both – Aff as a pre-requisite and Decol alone fails – engagement with civil society is necessary to create spaces to free ourselves from colonialism.

Turner, 2006 Dale Antony. Associate Professor of Government and Native American Studies at Dartmouth - This is not a peace pipe: Towards a critical indigenous philosophy. University of Toronto Press, 2006.

Alfred is right to make colonialism, and decolonization, a political problem for indigenous peoples. But it is not only a political problem. What do we mean when we say that colonial mentalities have taken a stranglehold on indigenous communities? In the language of postcolonialism, Alfred tells us that 'the colonial mentality is the intellectual dimension in the group of emotional and psychological pathologies associated with internalized oppression.'35 Colonialism is embedded in the very being of indigenous life, which for many indigenous peoples includes the spiritual dimension of their existence. It is the process of decolonization that I find difficult to imagine. As with the drive for indigenous forms of political recognition, in order to create the space for us to be free from colonialism, we must engage the dominant culture. We may not know what the process will look like, but we do know it has to be a dialogical one. Colonial discourses, and now postcolonial discourses, may or may not be ultimately useful for indigenous politics, but it seems to me that these forms of intellectual projects work with a view of colonialism that involves a complex, intercultural set of relations that are dynamic in nature. Colonialism has influenced virtually every aspect of indigenous people's daily lives: language, religion, sexuality, art, philosophy, and politics. Alfred is right to point out that colonialism has to end and that indigenous peoples can play a major role in bringing about that end, but we need to know how to go about doing so. Abolishing colonialism is the goal of many indigenous and non-indigenous peoples; finding a way to do it is the great dilemma. If a just political relationship has to be dialogical in nature, indigenous peoples will not be able to secure a 'postcolonial' political relationship without the help of non-indigenous people. But making sense of the meaning of colonialism, and especially addressing colonialism in 'philosophical thinking,' is relatively new territory for indigenous intellectuals.

2023 Michigan Kritik

Transition is Violent

Revolutionary politics cause atrocities, reformism is key.

Fred HALLIDAY IR @ London School of Economics ‘3 “Finding the Revolutionary in Revolution” in The Future of Revolutions ed. John Foran p 306-309

A second issue central to discussion of revolution today is that of the historic legacy of revolutions. Writers on revolution like to invoke Marx's observation about the weight of past generations lying on the minds of the present; it has been often stated that all revolutions invoke symbols and claims derived from the past, real or imagined. The revolutionaries of the twentieth century all looked, in some degree, backwards: Lenin and Trotsky to 1789, Mao and Ho to I9I7, Castro to the 1890s, Khomeini to the seventh century. The present discussion of revolution seems, at first sight, not to do this. Political sociologists do look at earlier revolutions, but this is without practical import. Discussion of the possibility of change, particularly that linked to the anti-globalization movement, seems to be curiously ahistorical. The price of this is, however, that not only is inspiration from the past muted but, equally, lessons are not learnt. Here something curious seems to have happened since the collapse of communism: the amnesia of neoliberal discussion, which consigns all that was associated with the communist experiment to the dustbin, seems to be replicated in the case of the radical movements of today. But to do this is questionable. In this latter respect, there are dangers, of an amnesia that is long on enthusiasm but short on responsibility and realism. For the fact is that the history of revolution in modern times is one not only of resistance, heroism and idealism, but also of terrible suffering and human disaster, of chaos and incompetence under the guise of revolutionary transformation, of the distortion of the finest ideals by corrupt and murderous leaders, and of the creation of societies that are far more oppressive and inefficient than those they seek to overthrow. The anti-globalization movement makes much of revolutionary internationalism: tills is not some benign panacea, but a complex, often abused, transnational practice (Halliday I999). All of this entails confronting something that revolutionaries have always assumed but too often failed to discuss: the ethics of revolution. Denunciation of the given and invocations of an ideal other are not enough (Geras 1989). To grasp this involves a shift beyond the political sociology of revolutions, an academic pursuit that focuses in large measure on the incidence of revolutions, to an analysis of the consequences and longerterm records of revolutionary states. In the course of recent years, in writing my own work on revolutions, I have had reason to visit a number of cities that had served as the centers of world revolution and, if not revolution, anti-imperialist radicalism: Beijing, Havana, Tripoli, Tehran. These were the culminations of upheavals that had produced revolutionary regimes by some strange numerical consistency in, respectively, I949, I959, I969, I979· In every case, one could still discern the outlines of the original revolutionary project: a rejection of exploitation, foreign and domestic, a comnlitment to the transformation of society, internationalist support in rhetoric and deed for those resisting oppression elsewhere. But in the 1990S this had all faded: these were not the wave of the future. Whatever else, it could not be said that the initial revolutionary project was in good shape: few in these countries now believed in the ideological project that had initiated the revolution; corruption and inefficiency were widespread; there was a pervasive desire for change, towards a more open, liberal, society; the initial internationalist appeals had faded. Revolution had, in effect, become tired. It was indeed capitalism, not revolutionary socialism and third-worldism, which in the 1990S formed the global vision of the future. This haphazard and impressionistic response has, however, to be compounded by a reflection on the overall legacy of the century of revolutions: neither form of amnesia - counterrevolutionary or revolutionary - is acceptable. Indeed, amnesia invites the repetition of another common saying with regard to revolutions, that those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it. Here perhaps is one of the most worrying aspects of the contemporary radical movement, be it in its national or internationalist forms: the failure to reflect, critically, on the past record of revolutionary movements. This pertains to models of alternative political and social orders. It pertains to the dangers inherent in any utopian, radicalized, mass movement that lacks clear forms of authority and decision-making. It also involves the espousal, spirited but onlinous, of alternative social orders that could work only if imposed by an authoritarian state. A pertinent contemporary example is that of radical environmentalism: the program of de-industrialization, and restricted consumption and travel, entailed by such ideas could only be established, and maintained, by a coercive state. In the international sphere, the simple invocation of solidarity may too often conceal interests of power, and manipulation. In the days of authoritarian Communist Parties, but equally in that of national and communal movements today, unconditional solidarity with repressive organizations may be at odds with any commitment to emancipatory values. Such a critical reflection has to apply, too, to the individuals often invoked for contemporary purposes: Lenin was a visionary, but also a cruel, pompous bigot; Che was a man of heroism and solidarity, but his econonlic programs were a disaster and his austere romanticism at times led to cruelty; Mao freed a quarter of mankind from imperialism, but also repeatedly plunged his society into barbarous conflict and socialexperimentation; Khomeini overthrew the Shah, but his social and political program was reactionary and repressive. A similar pause in romanticization might be applicable to some of the supposed components of the anti-globalization front today: few might defend Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong-il or Ayatollah Khamenei, but there is perhaps too little questioning of the commitment to emancipatory values of the PKK in Turkey, Sendero Luminoso, the FARC in Colombia, the Chechen rebels, to name but some. The Zapatista movement has become for many an icon of hope: but, as contributors to this volume make clear, it is not always itself a model of democratic practice. More importantly, one has to ask if this is the most important experience in the Latin America of the I990S to study: it is part of, but only one part of, a broader crisis of the authoritarian PRI regime that beset Mexico and resulted in the rise on the one hand of the PRD and on the other of the election of Fox in 2000. An open assessment of challenges to authoritarian, and neoliberal, policies in Latin America in the I990S would also examine democratization in Brazil and Chile, and the experience of social movements, be they of women, workers or indigenous peoples, who engaged with reformist states. This need for a critical retrospective on the historical legacy of revolutions is, however, linked to another, perhaps even more pressing, issue, one that pervades the pages of this book, namely the relation of revolution to liberal democracy as a whole. Several contributors point out that where liberal democracy is established revolution is off the agenda. But this reflection may be taken further to ask the question of whether, faced with the alternative, one or other outcome is preferable. The implication of much 'revolutionary' writing over the past century has been that liberal democracy is to be denounced, and those who engage with and in it are reformists, dupes, or, in older language, 'class traitors'. Such a view lives on, in some of the contributions to this book, as in parts of the left. Yet this contrast of reform with revolution is not some eternal polarity. It too needs to be set in historical context, and seen for what it is, a product of the particular context of the twentieth century, starting with the split between the moderate and revolutionary factions of the socialist movement in I9I4. The costs of this division are evident enough, and it would be desirable, in the aftermath of the collapse of the revolutionary socialist models, to re-examine it (Therborn I989). Part of this re-examination would involve a questioning of the automatic antinomy of reform and revolution present in much contemporary and recent writing, and of the assumed contradictory relation of revolutionary ideas to those of another critical, and internationalist, trend produced by modernity: liberalism. This has immediate implications for the discussion in this book. In particular, it relates to an issue that is widely present in contemporary academic and political discussion, but that writers on revolution tend to avoid, namely the question of rights. The language of rights was long denounced by the left, and its revolutionary part, as a bourgeois myth, except where it was for tactical reasons deemed pertinent to use it, as with regard to workers' rights, or the right of nations to selfdetermination. The record of the revolutionary tradition, once it came to power, is a very mixed one: a strong commitment to certain social and economic rights, whose abolition by neoliberal policies many in the former Communist states regret; and a sustained, cruel and dogmatic denial of political rights, collective and individual. Yet the program of rights embodied in national, regional and international codes is, as much as any flamboyant radicalism, both a critique and a program that confronts the contemporary world. Faced with the record of the Communist tradition on rights on the one hand, and the aspirations of liberalism on the other, this disdain for rights, and the related adherence to a denunciation of reformism and liberalism, should be questioned. Invocations of a romanticized I968, of the nicer cases of armed struggle, or of Seattle may be fine for mobilization: they are not a serious answer to the problems of the contemporary world.

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Revolutionary actions renders colonized populations the oppressor and equates any negotiation with anti-revolutionary dooming revolutions to kill the very colonized populations they claim to protect.

Kebede, 2001 (Messay, Professor of Philosophy at Dayton, “The Rehabilitation of Violence and the Violence of Rehabilitation: Fanon and Colonialism” Journal of Black Studies 31 (5) p. 555-560.)

But recall that Fanon does not raise the issue of violence only as a means of expelling the rule of an outsider. He attributes to violence a therapeutic and creative value: It liberates the colonized from inferiority complex and turns them into active makers of his- tory. My purpose is to question the alleged therapeutic and creative value of violence. Let me begin by saying that Fanon's rejection of the rehabilitation of the past sounds excessive. His position would have been correct if, instead of characterizing the rehabilitation of the past as a useless and detrimental attempt, he had implied that it was not enough to obtain liberation. What makes his argument against the rehabilitation of the past even less receivable is that more than any- body else, Fanon has studied the profound and devastating effects of inferiority complex on the colonized peoples. His study suggests that this sense of inferiority has been inculcated by a deliberately disparaging discourse on the history of these peoples. If so, it is not clear why the attempt to refute the colonial discourse would be without effect. The discredit of the legacy of the colonized peoples having induced the inferiority complex, its rehabilitation should act as an antidote. This is to say that Fanon's resolution to convince the colonized that they have no other option than recourse to violence is at best exaggerated and highly restrictive. True, the method of ethnophilosophy, notably the claim to Otherness and the subsequent endorsement of the notion of race, can be debilitating. Still, other ways than racial classification exist to defend pluralism. Such is the case, for instance, of cultural pluralism, which draws diversity from cultural rather than biological inheritances. This position is all the more consistent the more identities are ascribed to inventions, a case in point being Fanon himself. To say that the nigger does not exist any more than the White man is to hold that what distinguishes people is less their biological determinants than the way they choose to define themselves. This fact of identities being constructs allows the cultural approach to pluralism. Sure enough, human beings can define themselves in a beneficial or detrimental way. Fanon was quite within his rights when he maintained that rehabilitation cannot come from songs and poems or when he charged racial classification with detrimental outcomes. But it is one thing to say that cultural rehabilitation is not enough or misguided and quite another to suggest that the refutation of the colonial discourse is useless. At any rate, Fanon's opposition to cultural rehabilitation does not yet indicate why violence should take the lead. His argument that the rehabilitation drawn from the past is an illusory wealth that distracts the colonized from fully identifying with their wretchedness and hence from growing into a real revolutionary force can be seriously contested. More yet, the question of whether violence is an efficient and relevant response to the challenge posed by Western hegemony must be posed against the back- ground of economic power being the major driving force of the modern world. No response is really defiant of the West if it does not pave the way to economic power. This issue of economic power is how Hegel took his revenge on Fanon. Does it not point out that the mastery of nature is the only dialectical, progressive way to liberation? Unlike the dialectics of Hegel in which the slave submits and turns his attention to work, Fanon wanted the colonized to rebel. Without the episode of violent confrontation, Fanon maintained, the colonized will never gain freedom and self-respect. Freedom remains a mere grant of the col- onizers so long as it is not wrenched from them. Galvanizing and fulfilling however the snatching of freedom may appear to be, in the context of colonial and neocolonial domination, it overlooks one important aspect of the question: The colonized are yet to understand the real reason for their subordination. They will understand the real reason if they ascribe their inferiority to their inability to dominate nature. But then, the issue is not so much the violent expulsion of the colonizer as the resolution to rise to the economic challenge. So long as the economic handicap persists, independence remains illusory. Fanon was right when he stated that independence is not enough but wrong when he stipulated that regeneration cannot occur without the moment of violent confrontation If anything, the idealization of rebellious attitude has led a generation of Third World scholars and leaders to assert their freedom through the rejection of Western values. This defiant attitude refuses the patience of learning; it identifies it with submission. It goes without saying that the depiction of the problems of the Third World in terms of bravado has been detrimental to its real interest. It has caused the devalorization of bourgeois virtues as well as impatience with expectations. Most of all, it has served as a justification for those numerous regimes that presented dictatorship as the only appropriate defense against imperialism. Antagonism toward imperialism became a much-praised virtue, the mark of a progressive regime, even though the defiance was empty talk. We hear an echo of this orientation coming from Fanon (1982) himself when, speaking of African bourgeoisie, he stated, "The combined effort of the masses led by a party and of intellectuals who are highly con- scious and armed with revolutionary principles ought to bar the way to this useless and harmful middle class" (p. 175). Yet, without economic power, the violence that the colonized brandish against the West is anything but frightening. It remains the violence of arrows and spears against missiles and jet fighters. So long as violence is not backed by science and technology, the whole idea of considering the Third World as a rising revolutionary force intent on toppling the developed world is nothing but laughable. Insofar as the poor world is granted with a power of violence that it does not yet possess, Fanon can be justifiably accused of putting the cart before the horse. In being technologically insignificant, the violence of the Third World will be countered by real violence, to paraphrase Fanon. If violence thus resolves nothing because it cannot even be real violence without the power of technology, the narrowing of the technological gap emerges as the only remedy for Western hegemony and, hence, the only dissolvent of the inferiority complex. Let alone curing the disease, the prescription of bravado retards the administration of the real remedy. But there is more to the matter than this. Fanon denounced Negritude and ethnophilosophy as an internalization of the colonial world. The whole question is to know whether the valorization of violence and the vision of human relationships in terms of violent confrontations are not themselves a projection of the violent colonial world.The question makes sense in view of the fact that Fanon endowed violence with a curative mission. If violence is an outcome of colonial rule, it is not clear how it can possess curative virtues. The attempt to decontaminate one's soul from such a perversion would be the right attitude. The point, one may object, is that the decontamination requires the phase of violent response, there being no doubt that for Fanon, the colonial neurosis will not dissipate unless the accumulated frustration is provided with an outlet. But then, this therapy of violence needs to explain how capitulation to an impulse amounts to a victory over that impulse. All ethical thinking teaches that resistance to impulses is the manner the will and the good triumph. Even those theories that resent resistance admit that the best way to deal with uncontrolled impulses is to sublimate them, that is, to channel them into superior and creative works. Fanon rightly took note of the accumulated anger of the colonized people but never shows how this immense anger could be transformed into a creative work. His proposal was not to sublimate anger; it was rather to let it explode. But is capitulation to anger likely to have a positive outcome when it is but providing an outlet to destructive impulses? What the Third World needs is to give in to its anger less and to channel it into con- structive works. The sublimation of violence, and that alone, would be the right therapy. Alluding to the curative and creative role of sublimation, the apostle of nonviolence, namely, Mahatma Gandhi, had the following words: I have learned by bitter experience, through a period of close upon thirty years, the one supreme lesson, namely, to conserve my anger, to control it, and just as heat conserved is transmuted into energy, so also our anger, conserved and controlled, can result in a power that becomes irresistible throughout the world. (Green, 1993, p. 230) When instead of being conserved and controlled, anger is given full vent, the outcome is rarely positive. History has repeatedly confirmed the sticking mania of violence. Guerilla movements interiorize violence so deeply that despite their often-generous goal, they end up by instituting violent regimes for the simple reason that they have lost the sense of true human relationships. In this regard, the Algerian case is instructive. As an active participant in the Algerian war of liberation, Fanon believed that the ideals of the war will preside over the emergence of a modem and peaceful Algerian society. That independent Algeria is still torn by violent conflicts and little engaged in a resolute process of modernization invalidates the alleged creative role of violence. This is the time to reflect on the theory of nonviolence as developed by Gandhi and Martin Luther King. The main lesson is that no matter the degree of oppression, the best human response is never to imitate oppressors; it is rather to refuse their world, to decontaminate one's soul by the affirmation of positive human values. Opposition to oppression becomes redeeming only when it understands that as one Gandhi's commentator puts it, "To resist it violently would be to yield to the conquerors's ideology" (Green, 1993, p. 195). To tell the truth, the association of violence with the affirmation of humaneness sounds strange. Violence has more to do with animality than humanity. The affirmation of the human by way of violence, which is the value of the colonizer, is what the colonized should strongly reject. Because colonizers are acting like beasts, there is no reason to aspire after their values. Instead, one must refuse to become beasts like them. Once violence is internalized, it will sully all the behavior of the colonized, who would then behave in the same violent way vis-a- vis each other. This violent disposition has a hand in the failure of most Third World countries to institute democratic societies. Grant violence with the power to provide solutions, and no reason exists to assume that the problems of postcolonial societies do not fall under the same treatment. Viewed from this necessity of cleansing the colonized soul of the accumulated anger, Negritude's appeal to the particular essence of the Black soul appears as a protection against colonial contaminations, as an attempt to preserve a mea- sure of human countenance in a world disfigured by violence. The crux of the matter is that Fanon mistakes the refusal of contamination for submission. Yet, Gandhi's doctrine of nonviolent resistance is far from implying any attitude of submission. First, nonviolence implies courage, commitment, and willingness to risk one's life, in short, all the positive elements that make up the seduction of the violent option. It even reproduces them in a higher form because it urges for active disobedience and noncooperation in the face of injustice. The practice of such activism requires greater control on one's fear. To show that nonviolence squarely asserts what the violent option wants to assert-namely, dignity, courage, readiness to sacrifice one's life, and so on-a Gandhi's follower has this to say: For the majority of mankind, the heroic virtues of disdain of personal comforts, constant alertness, readiness to lose one's life for a cause transcending one's self, are forged on the anvil of the battle- field. But the believer in non-violent resistance can forge these same heroic virtues for himself on the anvil of a moral equivalent of war ... the substitution of non-violent non-cooperation or civil dis- obedience for violent warfare. (Muzumdar, 1952, p. 21) But in addition to proving courage and dignity, nonviolent resistance has the clear impact of denouncing the barbarism of the colonizer, thereby drawing a clear demarcation line between the values of the oppressor and the ideals of liberation. Most of all, in demystifying and rejecting violence, it graciously prepares a bright and democratic future, the very one where force will have no say. Whereas the myth of violence ends up by valorizing violence as a legitimate resource, Gandhi's nonviolent option banishes forever the use of force from human society. Not even against the colonizer was violence used: Such is the norm that it establishes.

2023 Michigan Kritik

Basic Income - Perm

Doing the aff and the alternative leads to a redistributive UBI that helps unsettle settler colonialism.

Klein, and Fouksman, 2021 (Elise, Senior lecturer @Australian National University, Elizaveta, Lecturer at King’s College London, Reparations as a Rightful Share: From Universalism to Redress in Distributive Justice, Development and Change, Volume 53(1): 31-57)

Any granting of compensation in Australia is often framed by the state and judiciary as an exceptional event and not linked to redressing the settler colonial process that underpins the compensation award. This is at odds with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ calls for reparations as a means through which the process of settler colonialism can be recognized, unsettled and destabilized (Newfong, 1972/2014). Equally, as demonstrated by the case of the East Kimberley, Aboriginal sovereignty is constantly in danger of being undermined by the settler state, often through punitive, workfarist social security policies. This danger can be partially avoided with more unconditional redistribution and welfare, but can only be fully eschewed via a recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander sovereignty along with the dismantling of settler colonial structures such as the contemporary social security system. This means that a more just distribution and access to a rightful share of national wealth (for instance, via a UBI for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples) would need to be one part of a broader reparations framework that also includes land rights, treaties, self-determination and the truth-telling of past and ongoing contemporary violence. Grants for collective community-led projects are also a way to make up for lost assets and associated inequality (Altman and Klein, 2017). These aspects together could begin to destabilize the structures of settler colonialism while honouring Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander sovereignty. A UBI, perhaps in the form of something similar to the U+BI proposed by the Movement for Black Lives, could be a mechanism for just distribution as long as it also provides scope for recognition and the unravelling of ongoing settler colonial structures of repression and dispossession. It would be a way to replace punitive conditionalities on payments such as those attached to the Cashless Debit Card and CDP. But payments to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples need also to be controlled by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples themselves. In paying for the plus in the U+BI formulation, the Australian state would also need to acknowledge not just the past but also the contemporary violence against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, such as what has been done in the name of ‘welfare’.

2023 Michigan Evidence
AFF › Nuke War › Nuke War---AT: Rainout

Rainout would only exacerbate the effects of nuclear fallout.

Edward Geist 22, policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, 10/8/2022, "What If Putin Actually Uses Nuclear Weapons on Ukraine?," https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2022/10/what-if-putin-actually-uses-nuclear-weapons-on-ukraine.html

Yeah. So if you detonate a nuclear weapon and there’s a rain cloud above where all the radiological mess is in the ground, what would’ve been fallout is now “rainout.” And there are arguments I find convincing — this appears in computer models and appears to have maybe happened in the atomic bombings in Japan — where the nuclear explosion itself creates what’s called a pyrocumulus like a big forest fire can. The heat source actually causes a rain cloud to form, then it can rain out the nuclear fission products directly. That’s really scary, because it’s so near to the burst time that the stuff is ludicrously radioactive.

If it’s rained out within a few minutes of the burst, the doses that can be experienced on the ground by people are outrageous even for a low-yield device. So there are all these sorts of intangibles, where Russia could be trying very hard to engineer the attack to avoid collateral damage, then just fail.

2023 Michigan Evidence
AFF › Nuke War › Nuke War---Sarg

Nuclear war causes anti-gravitational tornadoes. Extinction.

Stoyan Sarg 15, phd in physics and directs a physics department, “The Unknown Danger of Nuclear Apocalypse,” https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/10/09/the-unknown-danger-of-nuclear-apocalypse/

With the new NATO plan for installation of nuclear tactical weapons in Europe, nuclear missiles may reach Moscow in only 6 minutes, and the opposite case is also possible in the same time. The question is: how can we be sure that this will not be triggered by a human error or computer malfunction. An adequate reaction dictated by the dilemma “to be or not to be” and the concept of preventive nuclear strike may lead to a nuclear consequence that is difficult to stop. At the present level of distributed controlled systems and military global navigations, this will lead to unstoppable global nuclear war. However, there is something not predicted, of which the military strategists, politicians and powerful forces are not aware. Probably, it will not be a nuclear winter that they hope to survive in their underground facilities. The most probable consequence will be a partial loss of the Earth’s atmosphere as a result of one or many powerful simultaneous tornadoes caused by the nuclear explosions. In a tornado, a powerful antigravitational effect takes place. The official science does not have an adequate explanation for this feature due to an incorrect concept about space. The antigravitational effect is not a result of the circling air. It is a specific physical effect in the aether space that is dismissed in physics as it is currently taught. Therefore, the effective height of this effect is not limited to the height of the atmosphere. Then in the case of many simultaneous powerful tornadoes, an effect of suction of the earth atmosphere into space might take place. Such events are observed on the Sun and the present physical science does not have an explanation for them. The antigravitational effect is accompanied by specific electric and magnetic fields with a twisted shape. This is observed in tornado events on the Sun. Some effects in the upper Earth atmosphere known as sprites have a similar combination of electrical and magnetic fields but in a weaker form. They are also a mystery for contemporary physical science. At the time of atmospheric nuclear tests, made in the last century, a number of induced tornadoes are observed near the nuclear mushroom as shown in Figure 1. The strongest antigravitational effect, however, occurs in the central column of the formed nuclear mushroom. The analysis of underwater nuclear tests also indicates a strong antigravitational effect. It causes a rise of a vertical column of water. In the test shown in Figure 2, the vertical column contains millions tons of water. Thermonuclear bombs are multiple times more powerful. The largest thermonuclear bomb of the former Soviet Union tested in 1961 is 50 megatons. It is 3,300 times more powerful than the bomb dropped by USA on Hiroshima at the second world war and may kill millions. It is known that Mars once had liquid water and consequently an atmosphere that has mysteriously disappeared. If the scenario described above takes place, the Earth will become a dead planet like Mars. The powerful politicians, military adventurers and their financial supporters must be aware that even the most secured underground facility will not save them if a global nuclear conflict is triggered. Their disgraced end will be more miserable than the deaths of the billions of innocent human beings, including the animal world.

2023 Michigan Evidence
AFF › Nuke War › Transition Wars

Decline causes war.

Sung Chul Jung 22, Political Science Professor at Myongji University, “Economic slowdowns and international conflict,” vol. 1 no. 17

The present study explores whether and how eco- nomic slowdowns affect the likelihood of international conflict. Do troubled economies make states more aggressive? If so, against which other states? The main argument of this article is that a slowing economy increases the probability of interstate militarized conflict. It also finds that economically troubled autocracies tend to target democracies whose economies are dependent on them. However, although political unrest contributes positively to conflict initiation, there is little evidence that politically troubled states are more likely to target their economic partners. Before World War II, for exam- ple, Nazi Germany was a rising but anxious power with deep concerns about its economic potential and territor- ial autonomy, which prompted it to attack its neighbor- ing trade partners (Tooze, 2008). Similarly, when faced with an economy that had been deteriorating since the late 1930s, imperial Japan attacked Pearl Harbor to save the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Beasley, 2011[1990]: chs 7 & 8).

The next section of this article presents a critical review of theorizing on diversionary conflict, focusing on the implications of slower growth and domestic unrest. It then advances a theory as to how economic slowdowns lead to diversionary conflict, providing a cau- sal mechanism for (autocracy’s) strategic targeting of (democratic) economic partners with testable hypoth- eses. Next, it tests these hypotheses by conducting a statistical analysis of directed dyads from 1950 to 2010. A discussion of the results follows. The concluding section considers the implications for current and future international relations, focusing on the possible of con- sequences of major powers’ economic slowdowns, if not economic depressions, and their relations with neighbors in an era of a globalized economy and overall decline of democracy.

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AFF › Nuke War › Transition Wars

Goes nuclear.

Andrew Bertoli et al 18. PhD & Assistant Professor @ IE University; Allan Dafoe. PhD & MA, Assistant Professor of PoliSci @ Yale; Robert F. Trager. PhD & Associate Professor @ UCLA. 5-9-2018. "Is There a War Party? Party Change, the Left–Right Divide, and International Conflict." Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol 63. No 4. pp 950–975. Sage. pacc

Is the likelihood that a democracy will take military action against other countries largely influenced by which party controls the presidency? Many believe so (Palmer, London, and Regan 2004; Arena and Palmer 2009; Clare 2010). In modern American politics, one party is consistently identified as more hawkish than the other. Surveys have revealed that Republican voters consistently prefer more aggressive policies (Eundak 2006; Trager and Vavreck 2011; Gries 2014). Moreover, many believe that Al Gore, had he been elected, would not have invaded Iraq like President George W. Bush did (Jervis 2003; Lieberfeld 2005), and that the foreign policies of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump would be similarly opposed (Paletta 2016).

Nevertheless, it is very difficult to determine whether the party in control of the presidency really has an important impact on foreign policy due to the selection of parties into particular domestic and international contexts. Put simply, which party controls the presidency is not random. For example, the victory of George W. Bush in 2004 can be attributed to a number of domestic and international factors at the time, including the American public's heightened concerns over national security following September 11. Similarly, Barack Obama's success in 2008 was influenced by problems at home and a decrease in public willingness to engage in military adventurism. Therefore, an observational analysis would likely be biased by such selection processes. Thus, even if countries behave differently when certain parties control the presidency, it would be very difficult to know if that difference is explained by the parties or by the environments into which the parties are selected.