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2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 2NC Framework

Debates over innovation should be our starting point- interrogating pro innovation bias is crucial to course correct SQ triumphalism that narrowly constrains our understanding. The alternative enhances and sustains innovation

Rehn and Ortenblad, PhDs, 23

(Alf, Innovation@Denmark and Anders, Innovation@Agder Introduction In Debating Innovation: Perspectives and Paradoxes of an Idealized Concept ed. Rehn and Ortenblad)

Innovation, it’s a hell of a drug. Or, put in somewhat more diplomatic terms: Innovation, what a rush! Be it in business, politics, or academia, calls for innovation are rife and incessant, meant to entice us, energize us, extricate us out of the doldrums of everyday life. Innovation reshapes the world, breaks barriers, redefines everything it touches. Well, at least in the plentiful adverts and in the promises of the innovation evangelists. Innovation has become the panacea for all our problems, the goal of goals, the aim of all activities. That said, it is not always entirely clear what innovation is. We can all rattle off a list of innovations, not to mention innovators, but ask for a definition and things get a lot trickier. Not to mention fuzzier. Sure, there is no lack of definitions, but many if not most are very general, and some even circular. Some refer to change, others to value, others to acceptance. All are however adamant that innovation, be it what it may, is a good and desirable thing. Innovation saves nations, solves problems, uplifts people, and generates things; value, profits, jobs, change. In fact, some people close the circuit and simply proclaim that as long as good things emerge, innovation was the cause. This kind of contemporary update to the teleological argument has however led the field of innovation studies, broadly understood, into something of a muddle. With innovation defined so broadly as to encompass almost all kinds of positive outcomes of orga nized activity, the concept has also become both vague and difficult to debate in any deeper fashion. Revolutionary technology? It’s an innovation. Barely understandable improvement to a process? It’s an innovation as well. Innovation has become something of an all-purpose marker of progress, something that can be invoked whenever one feels that positive vibes are needed, wanted, or deserved. Corporations are prepared to spend untold sums to ensure that they have direct access to this fountain of corporate youth, and nation states are pushing for immense research and development funds to push themselves to a more fortuitous position on the “Most Innovative Nations” list. It is used to uplift certain workers, and to scare certain others. It is used to convince, to cajole, to market, to motivate, and to mollify. We all know it to be important, and a good thing, and altogether desirable. As we said, innovation—what a rush! We are of course being somewhat flippant, but the generality and the socio-moral certainties that define much of the current innovation discourse were key motivating factors in our wishing to edit this volume. Where many other innovation books keep repeating all the wonderful things that either innovation in general or some specific form of innovation can create, we wanted to bring in a more nuanced view, one where critiques of innovation were also given place. What we didn’t want, how ever, was a set of chapters that all attacked innovation, each one in their way. While there obviously should be space in the literature for such engagements as well, we were curious as to what would happen if one seriously started debating innovation, pro and con, for and against. An early idea and outline for this book was thus one where we would have a mass of innovation categories, and then a chapter arguing for its benefits and importance, and another one questioning the same. We envisioned incremental, radical, transformative, and systemic innovation, each with their own chapters for and against. We thought about product, service, and process innovation, each again with a chapter pro and a chapter con. We envision taking forms of innovation such as disruptive and open and organizational, all with nicely symmetrical chapters either hailing or challenging them. You get the drift. While we still think this could have been a rather charming book, it turned out that there aren’t that many people who are prepared to write a chapter against, for exam ple, radical innovation, or even a chapter for incremental such. Further, we came to the realization that such a book would in fact end up rehash ing arguments that have already been made in a thousand innovation books, including textbooks. This book still retains part of these ideas, and we are very happy to have a number of nicely paired chapters that present different takes on a key innovation issue or concept. In addition to this we have here gathered a couple of more general critiques of innovation, as a counterweight to the unreflected pro-innovation bias that dominates the literature, as well as a series of creative and/or critical perspectives on the field written in order to suggest new lines of inquiry. The critical tenor in some of these should however not be understood as wanting to present a blanket criticism of innovation, but rather as a way to engage with innovation in a broader, more objective fashion. Our job as researchers and scholars, even in a field such as innovation, is not to be evangelists and marketeers for a concept, but rather agents who wish to understand a complex phenomenon in as broad a manner as possible. It is thus important to point out that the chapters that are written in a more critical vein should be read as engagements, not as final words. All of our authors are well aware of the potential and the value that lies in innovation, even when they are writing specific criticisms against certain interpretations of the concept and the phenomenon. Yet, in order to have a robust debate, it is at times important to take on a proposition or a position that might not be one’s full view of the phenomenon, in order to inquire into the broader possibilities of the same. Thus we have in this book innovation speakers who criti cize the practice of innovation keynotes, researchers in open innovation who engage with the dark side of innovation, and thinkers who spend a considerable amount of time thinking about a cat and its relationship with creativity and innovation. They do so not in order to ban innovation keynotes, forbid open innovation, or to demand that the field of innova tion studies from now on focuses primarily on companion species, but in order to debate innovation, in a broad and productive manner. They do so not to diminish innovation, but to broaden our discussion regarding the same.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 2NC Impact Block

Innovation discourse produces serial policy failure and structural violence- old solutions FTW!

Waxman 12

(Simon, Editor@BostonReview , 9-10)

Education — a field in which innovation is not just a buzzword, but sine qua non — provides a case in point. Innovation has brought us charter schools, performance pay for teachers, de-unionization, vouchers, Teach for America and similar programs that ensure a steady flow of inexperienced educators, cash incentives for student achievement, high-stakes testing, multilingual pedagogy, and increasingly standardized curricula focused on math, reading, and science at the expense of music, visual arts, home economics, and physical education. Most of these innovations are intended to fix an achievement gap, as measured by standardized tests, between whites and people of color, poor and rich. Yet there seems to be little recognition of the fact that the achievement gap is not the disease, but rather the symptom. The diseases are systemic racism and poverty. Those are not going to be eliminated by innovations in education. By “tinkering toward utopia” through the schools, to borrow a phrase from education-reform historians David Tyack and Larry Cuban, we are ignoring the true challenge, a challenge that Americans prefer to believe does not exist. So here innovation is presented as a solution-in-itself, with no normative content: we’re just trying to get those numbers to even out. Not surprisingly, the most heavily promoted education innovations are corporatist in nature, favoring market-style fixes that are also presented as non-ideological, as is the market system itself. As in education, similarly in the arts. Here innovation colonizes other values and displaces the kinds of questions we have always asked about art, questions that some of us, especially those who think about and write criticism, might foolishly have thought were essential to art itself. Conflicts over what beauty is and what should be art’s purpose get muscled out. Where one might have seen art as a tool for political expression, community engagement, or deepening spiritual commitment, the zeal for innovation says art need only be a vessel for novelty. Whatever form that novelty takes, the work will be judged quantitatively, according to its distance from what came before. Novelty may be a useful criterion when we judge the success and failure of a creative work. But it shouldn’t be the only criterion, or even emphasized. Just as it shouldn’t be the only or primary watchword in politics and education. Perhaps the solution to the conflict in Israel and Palestine is an old one: democracy for everyone who lives there. Perhaps the solution to the achievement gap is an old one: welfare and affordable childcare, to combat the pathologies bred by poverty in the five years before kindergarten. But we don’t want to rehash those arguments, do we? We’d prefer to think that those ethical and ideological conflicts aren’t real after all, or are only as real as our imaginations are stunted. Will our faith in innovation be rewarded? Will the fetish for new ideas that we see in TED Talks, the Aspen Ideas Festival, the World Economic Forum ideas lab, Obama’s speeches, and the endless stream of idea-of-the-moment journalism at last prove its worth? Maybe. Or maybe it will go on doing principally what it does now: offering the false hope that we will one day conquer exhaustion, frustration, boredom, ourselves.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 2NC Impact Block

The case can’t outweigh the critique- 1AC impacts are a product of innovation framing that delegitimizes alternative solutions and obscures devastating consequences of innovation gone wrong

Pfotenhauer et al., PhDs, 18

(Sebastian M. Pfotenhauer, Munich Center for Technology in Society (MCTS) and TUM School of Management, , Joakim Juhlb Technical University Munich, Germany bDepartment of Planning and Development, Aalborg University, Denmark , Erik AardencDepartment of Science and Technology Studies, University of Vienna, Austria Challenging the “deficit model” of innovation: Framing policy issues under the innovation imperative , Research Policy, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2018.10.015)

The above case studies illustrate how the “deficit model of innovation” has become a powerful justification and organizing principle for major institutional and policy interventions. All three countries subscribed to the globalizing “innovation imperative,” yet each did so in its own way, pointing to unique social, economic, and institutional deficiencies and taking different courses of action. Our comparative analysis revealed the different dimensions of deficit construction and thus helps shed light on the discursive and political dynamics underwriting innovation policy in each case (see Table 2). First, in terms of problem diagnosis, the particular deficits identified are quite diverse and may combine seemingly disjointed socio-economic elements. In Luxembourg, uncertainty about the economic future, demographic change and its consequences for public health, and the absence of a critical mass in research were all considered part of the same compound innovation problem. Singapore turned to innovation not only to systematically address perceived deficits in education, research, institutional design and scientific culture more broadly, but also in response to perennial concerns about the country’s geopolitical survival. In Denmark, the innovation imperative imposed on the country’s universities sought to develop science as an economic resource and simultaneously to make universities more productive and accountable. Policymakers turned to equally diverse strategies to address the perceived problems while justifying them in the name of innovation all the same. Thus, innovation leadership was to be achieved, in Luxembourg, through developing capacity in the life sciences that could be plugged into European biotechnology markets, in Singapore, through importing various innovation “best practices” from abroad, and, in Denmark, through institutional reforms “from research to invoice.” All three countries turned to specific (and different) forms of innovation expertise, including an international consultancy firm in Luxembourg, the globally renowned innovation powerhouse MIT in Singapore and New Public Management approaches in Denmark. In each country, too, we saw how policymakers chose to address social problems through an innovation strategy, thus giving innovation primacy over other forms of policy intervention in the shaping of social order. In Luxembourg, biotechnology investments (rather than, say, an expansion of social services) were the vehicle of choice to tackle the challenges of an aging society. In Singapore, new institutional spaces for creativity and entrepreneurship were created in the name of innovation, rather than overhauling existing institutions. In Denmark, financial stabilization of DTU was coupled to an innovation agenda, even though it could have happened another way. The cases further illustrate that innovation success is understood in a comparative and fundamentally open-ended manner. Unlike the idea of discernible “scientific literacy” in PUS, there is no threshold for “innovation literacy.” Rather, innovation deficits and successes are always understood vis-à-vis global competitors. Luxembourg sought to secure a sustainable future as a competitive knowledge- and bioeconomy that positioned itself ahead of other nations as a gateway to Europe. Singapore consistently benchmarked itself vis-à-vis the latest MIT innovation practices. Denmark demanded scientific and economic competitiveness from its research base, benchmarking it against private-sector efficiency. This competitive benchmarking dynamic suggests that deficit remedies are at best temporary: caught in a self-reinforcing dynamic of catching up/staying ahead, the innovation imperative will never come to a conclusion. Even highly advanced nations such as Luxembourg, Singapore, and Denmark consider themselves at constant risk of falling behind. There are, of course, limits to our comparative study: for example, one must be prudent when comparing different sectors, e.g., a national biotech policy in Luxembourg as opposed to university reforms in Denmark. Our cases also cut across multiple scales (national, regional, and institutional). For example, national innovation strategies in Luxembourg and Singapore included the establishment of new research institutions, and the Danish university reforms were linked to a broader shift toward neoliberal governance for the country as a whole. Likewise, while all three countries are relatively small, the difference between the bustling city-state of Singapore and Denmark’s economically significant agrarian hinterland are quite large. Nevertheless, our cases illustrate how the innovation imperative and associated notions of innovation deficits permeate a wide range of policy domains and social contexts. Moreover, they reveal how different political cultures, steeped in different socio-economic histories, interpret and act upon the perceived innovation imperative in very different ways. These idiosyncratic ways of understanding what innovation requires and how it fits into the local institutional landscape resonate with what Pfotenhauer and Jasanoff (2017a) call “Imaginaries of Innovation.” From this vantage point, the case study in Luxembourg reveals how innovation relates to the country’s current economic structure based on financial services, a strong welfare state and its outlier role within Europe. Likewise, the life sciences strategy in Luxembourg reflects a national self-understanding that the country is at the geographical, cultural and linguistic heart of Western Europe. The Singapore case speaks to the malleable role of research institutions in the rapidly developing innovation system of a country known for its technocratic systems approach to governance. It also shows Singapore’s preoccupations with economic and technological advancement as a means for security and social reform, as well as a long tradition of overseas linkages. The Denmark case stands apart as an example of commercial reorientation of university research that has to be evaluated against the country’s democratic and welfare traditions. It also shows how an overt push for application and commercialization in the name of innovation can lead to considerable resistance. These findings speak to the hidden politics of the innovation imperative: in each of our cases, the innovation policies introduced fundamentally altered the premises under which existing institutions could fulfill their societal functions – frequently in ways that marginalized any rationales and values other than innovation for framing and tackling social problems. Moreover, these innovation strategies were rarely deliberated on as political decisions that touch upon a range of institutionalized social norms and values with potentially large consequences. For example, in the case of Luxembourg, should welfare states really bet their future on transnational biotechnology markets? What type of biotech does Luxembourg’s society find acceptable? And is an aging population really an asset? In Singapore, should a national flagship institution be included or sidelined in reforms? Is a research strategy based on importing foreign researchers really more desirable than a strategy based on homegrown talent? And does the shift from electronics manufacturing to biotech benefit the majority of the workforce? In Denmark, what is the role of universities within society – are they commercial enterprises pursuing returns on investment or cradles of civic emancipation and social upward mobility? How should universities be governed? And is research really worth funding only if it is commercially applicable? These questions underscore the need to understand innovation policy as essentially political: while all three policy strategies may indeed have promoted innovation, they also broadly intervened in existing social and institutional orders with consequences far beyond what their narrow focus on technological innovation betrays. Alternative priorities and courses of action were conceivable in each case, but rarely openly deliberated and generally outweighed by the perceived competitiveness pressures and the authority of innovation expertise. Against this background, we end on a word of caution. The similarities between DMS and DMI in terms of technocratic governance and a lack of institutional reflexivity suggest that continued blind adherence to the present deficit logic may result in the widespread erosion of public trust and credibility with regard to innovation policy. While the need for dialogue and inclusion has made some headway into mainstream policy discourses in science and technology policy (Irwin, 2006), a similar appreciation is currently lacking in innovation policy. All three cases arguably suffered from an absence of inclusive, deliberative processes about the desirability of the proposed changes and a recognition that innovation strategies, too, are a form of politics that require legitimacy. Without public legitimation, innovation policy may remain unable to better connect innovation to societal needs (Kuhlmann and Rip, 2014) or effect directed transformative change (Schot and Steinmueller, 2016). The continued deference to a global innovation imperative obscures the political stakes and diverse needs across diverse contexts and distracts from potential negative or disruptive social consequences of innovation. Thus, Wynne’s question (1992) as to whether we are truly approaching “new horizons” or are caught in a “hall of mirrors” rings as true for innovation policy today as it did for PUS in 1992. By imagining innovation under wider horizons, we may begin to conceive of more democratic forms of innovation policy.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 2NC Impact Block

Existential justifications for innovation/rupture have historically produced atrocity

Knudsen, PhD, 23

(Jon P., WorkingLifeAndInnovation@Agder, Creative Continuation: An Alternative Perspective on Innovation and Society In Debating Innovation: Perspectives and Paradoxes of an Idealized Concept ed. Rehn and Ortenblad)

In our Western tradition we tend to cherish deep changes, those that make us take big steps forward. In that sense the fascination for radical innovations resonates with a long history of linear thinking and attempts at squaring of circles, as if the early post-WWII ideologies of technological push, trickle down, and flattening of cultural spaces (Porter 2000) have zombie-like returned to become the most valid of intellectual and political currencies available for buying us into the future (Sennett 1992, 2006). Even to thinkers who are critical toward mainstream theories of innovation and economic growth, the belief in ruptures and leaps pre vails. Yet another fad in this vein is the (re-)birth of missions as a guiding principle for the need to take these big steps, not only to follow up put ting a man on the moon by sending another one to Mars, but, more importantly, to care for our common future (Mazzucato 2021). Further specification of this need is often made by referring to the 17 goals for sustainable development as listed by the United Nations (United Nations 2015), to which the concerned inhabitant of this planet and especially the intellectual segment of its populations is supposed to repeat: Yes, we can! But one thing is to acknowledge that radical changes and innovations often fail, and especially so when they are set to solve what is commonly referred to as “wicked problems” (Crowley and Head 2017), problems that are so multiple in origin and consequences that they cannot be addressed by recipe-like solutions, another thing is to face that attempts at big leaps forward often have the most catastrophic consequences for societies exposed to them. We do not have to repeat the historical debates on colonialism, neo-colonialism, or the famous Chinese big leap forward to make the point. Recent cases of Western missions designed to remake Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan to brighter futures suffice to prove our continuous and paradigmatic fascination with the concept of radical change and the subsequent blindness to the downsides of its missionary agency.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 2NC AT: Empirics/Science Proves Innovation Studies

Innovation research is financed by the industries in question- creates analytic blindspots

Witell et al. 23

(Lars Witell, Hannah Snyder, and Per Carlborg Against Service Innovation: Why Service Innovation Is Not Sustainable In Debating Innovation: Perspectives and Paradoxes of an Idealized Concept ed. Rehn and Ortenblad)

Research on service innovation focuses almost solely on the positive side of service innovation, ignoring the potential negative side effects. The “pro-change” bias in service innovation research has grown more intense over time (Witell et al. 2015) and we argue that researchers and managers need to take a more critical view of service innovation and its relation to sustainability. First, changing perspective using the line of conflict can reveal that service innovations seen as having positive effects on sustainability, in reality, have negative effects. This means that service innovation research misses the mark in their studies on the sharing econ omy and green services. Second, research on service innovation solely focuses on “successful” service innovation but neglects the services that never become service innovations. What if these failed services used the exact same methods and processes and had similar effects on sustainabil ity, so what has been established as success factors in reality might have no influence on success? Research with a pro-change bias has a higher probability of being published, and in addition, it might be easier to obtain funding for such research projects. Funding based on the logics of a market makes it difficult for research integrity to prevail over time (Vie 2021). As much research funding comes from external sources under competition, they are typically more or less restricted in their freedom of use, that is, in which type of research questions they can address. Financiers with interests and research agendas in a specific direction or topic often challenge the research integrity of the individual researcher. The power of the finan cier places the researcher in a situation where integrity needs to be bal anced with the ability to stay financially viable to conduct research. Hence, researchers need to balance both professional academic ethics, norms, and a high degree of critical thinking with the influence of finan ciers and the logic of the market (Vie 2021). By focusing too much on individual firms’ success in research, the negative effect on sustainability increases as the larger service ecosystem of actors is disregarded (e.g., social and environmental sustainability). To prevent the effects of weak ened research integrity, research funders, and especially research in the form of commissioned research (where external actors define topic and research problems), need to better understand the long-term value of independent research.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 2NC AT: Empirics/Science Proves Innovation Studies

The history of innovation isn’t an empirical fact, it’s a constructed narrative. Innovation is an ideology that relies on propaganda like the 1AC to continue

Rehn, PhD, 23

(Alf, InnovationandTech@Denmark, Images, Imperatives, and Ideology in the Innovation IndustryIn Debating Innovation: Perspectives and Paradoxes of an Idealized Concept ed. Rehn and Ortenblad)

The term ideology is rarely used in innovation research, and many of the innovation scholars I have queried about this fact seem to have a rather rudimentary understanding of what the term means in social the ory (see, e.g., Eagleton [1991]2007; Žižek 1989). Succinctly put, ideology is the name for a system of concepts which states unassailable truths about what in the world should be seen as normal and/or natural, and what should not. It is perhaps best known in its more narrow, political form (we rapidly recognize that socialism and capitalism are worldviews that, regardless of whether we agree with them or not, form competing systems of thought), but much everyday thinking is at heart ideological, as continual skepticism and querying can be quite a fatiguing way to go through life. We adopt ideologies because they make life easier and then trust other agents, such as researchers, to challenge that which needs to be challenged. Thus most of us would agree that democracy is the best polit ical system, by and large, and relatively few doubt the general efficiency of the market economy, even if we may be aware that criticism regarding both exists. The reason for this is self-evident and has been part of the critical apparatus since at least Marx (see, e.g., Jakubowski [1936]1976). Our systems, including systems of education, politics, and media, or what Marx would have called “the superstructure” continuously repeat the “truth” of these, establishing them as normal or at the very least the best of several bad systems. Note that I am not here making an argument regarding the efficiency or desirability (or lack thereof) of either system, merely pointing to how concepts become valorized, normalized, and naturalized. We are taught that market economy creates value, jobs, and well-being. We are taught that it is the functioning system and tales about the absurdity of competing systems. After a while, it all seems natural and necessary so that even if someone was to critique it (see, e.g., Rehn 2019), this feels mostly like a thought experiment. With concepts such as democracy and the market economy, these are of course very general, and things that in a very real way we feel engaged in and part of. Innovation is a murkier thing. We have of course engaged with innovations, but the amount of people who feel that they have been an active part of innovation is still limited. In order to establish the kind of ideological surety around it, with a currently limited but increasing attention to it in schools, another medium for enhancing the message was needed. The innovation industry, described above, is to my mind this medium. The manner in which innovation thinkers and speakers com modify the concept is perhaps more alike propaganda (see Stanley 2015) than education, but the end result is quite similar. The point of the end less books, conferences, workshops, etc. is in the end not to ensure that more innovation comes to be, but rather to valorize, normalize, and naturalize the concept. Over time, as the conceptual colonization ensures that all assumedly good things in the organized world—learning, change, cre ativity, imagination, renewal, and so on—are somehow connected to innovation, the very idea to critique this Great Good Thing starts looking like a perversion, like something unnatural. This again makes the innova tion imperative something that audiences of innovation messaging do not only accept, but actively desire. One of the things that I’ve always found most strange about the inno vation industry is the sado-masochistic subtext to it. Innovation “gurus” (which I too, despite feeling quite uncomfortable with the assignation, have been called) spend quite a lot of time berating their audiences implicitly or by proxy for failing to react quickly enough, for not taking enough risks, for failing to challenge enough things, and so on. The truly strange thing is that audiences take these criticisms in their stride and often actively urge speakers to go to even greater lengths in this. As I personally feel this direct model too patronizing, I tend to include myself in the masochism and have spent inordinate amounts of time standing on stages berating our communal failure as humans to break with tradition, open up our minds, and push our creativity. The more I do this, the greater the response in the audience. When I screech in nigh-hysterics about my hatred of innovation clichés and our incapacity to go beyond them, the audience has at times given me standing ovations. The dramaturgy here should be quite obvious. An ideology needs both constant repetition of its message and an easy to recognize set of heroes (Thomas Alva Edison, Steve Jobs, Elon Musk, etc.), but it also requires villains and what in Stalinism and Maoism was known as “self-criticism” (see, e.g., Riegel 2000). Ideologies tend to have a utopian tint or tendency, and part of engaging with an ideology lies in manifesting that one hasn’t quite been good enough. This is why innovation books tend to overflow with the most extreme of successes, and why exorbitant wealth is often used as a proxy for the innovativeness of a specific individual. Elon Musk creates novel things and is in addition extremely rich, there fore Elon Musk is a great innovator. While the statement might look childish when presented in this manner, this is the subtext to much of what is written. It is also why my self-flagellation on the stages of innovation conferences is so popular. It makes me something akin to either a fire-and-brimstone preacher, crying for repentance from the flock, or a sacrificial lamb who debases himself as a stand-in for our collective failure (the connection to Derrida’s reading of Plato is obvious, but I will here pass it by). Thus the innovation ideology needs the innovation industry, not nec essarily to carry any specific messages or learnings about innovation, but to establish the narrative and dramaturgical logic of the same. Not entirely unlike the itinerant preachers that have always been part and parcel of Christianity, the innovation industry today circulates the globe, preaching the one true gospel. In a detail to delightful too leave out, it should be noted that a majority of the most important innovation speakers are from the U.S., and speak of “the speaking circuit”, in an almost perfect mirroring of how early US clergy, particularly from the Methodist Episcopal Church, often were “circuit riders,” taking the message across the then sparsely inhabited U.S. on a “preaching circuit.” By way of staged retellings of a truth assumed to be pure and normal and natural, both the circuit riders and their contemporary brethren make sure that the hoi polloi know their place and the imperatives that are to be fol lowed. Like in so many other kinds of ideological tellings, the drama is not incidental.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 2NC AT: Empirics/Science Proves Innovation Studies

Innovation studies are theology not science- prophecies of profit and creativity provide an alibi for rising inequality

Leary 19

(John Patrick, , 4-16)

For most of its early life, the word “innovation” was a pejorative, used to denounce false prophets and political dissidents. Thomas Hobbes used innovator in the seventeenth century as a synonym for a vain conspirator; Edmund Burke decried the innovators of revolutionary Paris as wreckers and miscreants; in 1837, a Catholic priest in Vermont devoted 320 pages to denouncing “the Innovator,” an archetypal heretic he summarized as an “infidel and a sceptick at heart.” The innovator’s skepticism was a destructive conspiracy against the established order, whether in heaven or on Earth. And if the innovator styled himself a seer, he was a false prophet. By the turn of the last century, though, the practice of innovation had begun to shed these associations with plotting and heresy. A milestone may have been achieved around 1914, when Vernon Castle, America’s foremost dance instructor, invented a “decent,” simplified American version of the Argentine tango and named it “the Innovation.” “We are now in a state of transmission to more beautiful dancing,” said Mamie Fish, the famed New York socialite credited with naming the dance. She told the Omaha Bee in 1914 that “this latest is a remarkably pretty dance, lacking in all the eccentricities and abandon of the ‘tango,’ and it is not at all difficult to do.” No longer a deviant sin, innovation — and “The Innovation” — had become positively decent. The contemporary ubiquity of innovation is an example of how the world of business, despite its claims of rationality and empirical precision, also summons its own enigmatic mythologies. Many of the words covered in my new book, Keywords, orbit this one, deriving their own authority from their connection to the power of innovation. The value of innovation is so widespread and so seemingly self-evident that questioning it might seem bizarre — like criticizing beauty, science, or penicillin, things that are, like innovation, treated as either abstract human values or socially useful things we can scarcely imagine doing without. And certainly, many things called innovations are, in fact, innovative in the strict sense: original processes or products that satisfy some human need. A scholar can uncover archival evidence that transforms how we understand the meaning of a historical event; an automotive engineer can develop new industrial processes to make a car lighter; a corporate executive can extract additional value from his employees by automating production. These are all new ways of doing something, but they are very different somethings. Some require a combination of dogged persistence and interpretive imagination; others make use of mathematical and technical expertise; others, organizational vision and practical ruthlessness. But innovation as it is used most often today comes with an implied sense of benevolence; we rarely talk of innovative credit-default swaps or innovative chemical weapons, but innovations they plainly are. The destructive skepticism of the false-prophet innovator has been redeemed as the profit-making insight of the technological visionary. Innovation is most popular today as a stand-alone concept, a kind of managerial spirit that permeates nearly every institutional setting, from nonprofits and newspapers to schools and children’s toys. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines innovation as “the alteration of what is established by the introduction of new elements or forms.” The earliest example the dictionary gives dates from the mid-sixteenth century; the adjectival “innovative,” meanwhile, was virtually unknown before the 1960s, but has exploded in popularity since. The verb “to innovate” has also seen a resurgence in recent years. The verb’s intransitive meaning is “to bring in or introduce novelties; to make changes in something established; to introduce innovations.” Its earlier transitive meaning, “To change (a thing) into something new; to alter; to renew” is considered obsolete by the OED, but this meaning has seen something of a revival. This was the active meaning associated with conspirators and heretics, who were innovating the word of God or innovating government, in the sense of undermining or overthrowing each. The major conflict in innovation’s history is that between its formerly prohibited, religious connotation and the salutary, practical meaning that predominates now. Benoît Godin has shown that innovation was recuperated as a secular concept in the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth, when it became a form of worldly praxis rather than theological reflection. Its grammar evolved along with this meaning. Instead of a discrete irruption in an established order, innovation as a mass noun became a visionary faculty that individuals could nurture and develop in practical ways in the world; it was also the process of applying this faculty (e.g., “Lenovo’s pursuit of innovation”). Innovation as a count noun — that is, an innovation — was in turn the product of this process (e.g., “the new iPhone features innovations like a high-resolution camera”). But this new meaning evolved slowly. The concept’s old link to deceit and conspiracy shadowed its meaning into the twentieth century. Joseph Schumpeter, who elaborated an influential theory of innovation three years before the debut of the Innovation tango in his 1911 book The Theory of Economic Development, treated it as both a process and a product, with no sense of the old conspiratorial connotation. Schumpeter used “innovation” to describe capitalism’s tendency toward tumult and transformation. Critical to his definition is the distinction Schumpeter makes between innovation as the refinement of a process or product, and invention, the creation of something entirely new. While Schumpeter was suspicious of the mythology of the inventor, the innovator, a more complex figure, was fundamental to the process he was describing. He understood innovation historically, as a process of economic transformation, but for him this historical process relied upon a creative, private agent to carry it out. Schumpeter’s term for this agent was “the entrepreneur.” To innovate, Schumpeter wrote later, was to “revolutionise the pattern of production by exploiting an invention or, more generally, an untried technological possibility for producing a new commodity.” In the second decade of the twentieth century, the word began to appear regularly in brand names and advertisements (and short-lived dance crazes) in its now familiar form: as a new, improved product or process. One of the first major products to be advertised as an innovation was the Innovation wardrobe trunk, which Gimbel’s department store offered in 1915 to appeal to customers’ desires for the chimera of the new. (The trunks, the innovative features of which seem to have been their durability and “roomy construction,” were so popular that an “innovation trunk” became a generic name for any trunk, like “Kleenex” is for tissues.) Although innovation has been thoroughly rehabilitated and purged of subversion, it retains its old accent of individual prophetic vision, the talent of those who, as Hobbes said of “innovators” in 1651, “suppose themselves wiser than others.” It is not that innovation has lost its old moral connotation; instead, it has reversed. What we once regarded as deviant and deceitful is now praised as visionary. In a 2011 reflection on the late Apple computer executive Steve Jobs, probably the archetypal hero-innovator of our time, a San Francisco Chronicle author praised his “constant desire to innovate and take chances.” Here, the verb is used intransitively, in the more modern sense — that is, there is no direct object — but it lacks even the faintest hint of a reference. Jobs is no longer innovating on or upon anything in particular, which can make “innovate” sound like a kind of mantra. “If you don’t innovate every day and have a great understanding of your customers,” a Denver processed cheese executive told the Denver Post in 2010, “then you don’t grow.” And when the author of a Wall Street Journal obituary for Jobs writes that the Apple executive was a “secular prophet” who made innovation “a perfectly secular form of hope,” it is apparent that the term has never really lost its old association with prophecy. Other than mystifying creativity itself — which now looks more like an intuitive blast of inspiration, like an epiphany, and less like work — “innovation” gives creativity a specific professional, class dimension. It is almost always applied to white-collar and profit-seeking activities, although its increasing popularity in educational contexts only reflects the creeping influence of market-based models in this field. Quality organizations are supposed to cultivate it in their employees by giving them the freedom to work independently and creatively. Rarely do we hear of the innovative carpenter, plumber, or homemaker, in spite of the imagination, improvisation, and managerial skills required of each. Business publications issue rankings of the “most innovative countries in the world,” a curious usage that describes a) a capacity constrained by national borders, as if creativity dissipates or increases when one leaves passport control; and at the same time b) an intrinsic human talent unconstrained by fields, industries, or media. Another example of the term’s increasing mystification is the acceptability of the tautological construction “to innovate innovation.” “Who’s the Best at Innovating Innovation?” asks the Harvard Business Review; the same publication sponsors a lucrative prize called the “Innovating Innovation Challenge.” One can “innovate” without having to act upon any process or idea other than the act of innovation itself. One simply innovates in circles, forever. Innovation is an example of the ways in which the production and circulation of commodities becomes imbued with fantastic and even theological properties detached from the labor that produces them, or in the case of many common uses of the verb “to innovate,” detached from any object. So when liberal politicians promote an “innovation agenda” that includes student debt forgiveness for “startup founders,” as Hillary Clinton did during her 2016 presidential campaign, it is unclear how this differs from any other form of corporate welfare. And when conservative politicians or CEOs lament how labor unions or public regulation of the private sector “impede innovation,” we can recognize this as both a ludicrous obfuscation but also another example of the bourgeois contempt for labor. Innovation is thus a theological concept which became a theory of commodity production and which has lately become a commodity itself. The innovator, meanwhile, has always been identified with novelty and visionary charisma. But where the innovator’s visions were once widely feared as venal and destructive, now innovation is understood as the refinement of a technical process, in which creativity is turned to profit. But as the mythic figure of Jobs makes clear, rather than replacing prophecy with procedure, modern celebrations of innovation supplement each with the other. From the business world to education and politics, innovation is simultaneously spiritual and technological, both an individual’s reaction against bureaucratic malaise and the spirit of anti-orthodox creativity to be cultivated by the same bureaucracy. Innovation, therefore, is a strangely contradictory concept, simultaneously grandiose and modest, saccharine and pessimistic. The prophetic meaning embedded deep in its history allows innovation to stand in for nearly any kind of positive transformation, doing for the twenty-first century what “progress” once did for the nineteenth and twentieth. In the United States, innovation also suggests a high-tech update to the myth of “Yankee ingenuity” or “know-how” — the spirit of mechanical cleverness and entrepreneurial energy once associated with New England’s artisan class. Like the mythical inventors of the American industrial age — Alexander Graham Bell and Thomas Edison tinkering in their workshops — the innovator is a model capitalist citizen for our times. But the object of most innovations today is more elusive: you can touch a telephone or a phonograph, but who can lay hands on an Amazon algorithm, a credit-default swap, a piece of proprietary Uber code, or an international free trade agreement? As an intangible, individualistic, yet strictly white-collar trait, innovation reframes the cruel fortunes of an unequal global economy as the logical products of a creative, visionary brilliance. In this new guise, the innovator retains both a touch of the prophet and a hint of the confidence man.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 2NC Epistemology

Epistemology first- undermining the assumptions behind innovation delegitimizes its policy solutions, epistemic closure produces structural violence

Laurent, PhD, 21

(Brice, Ideology, engine or regime. Styles of critique and theories of innovation.. Benoît Godin, Gérald Gaglio, Dominique Vinck. Handbook on Alternative Theories of Innovation 2021, Edward Elgar, pp.369-386, 2021. hal-03442298)

The vocabulary of religion can be seen as a convenient figure of speech, which provides telling metaphors and powerful illustrations of what critics of innovation aim to convey. That these metaphors flourish in magazines and blogs is a sign of the appeal of this register and its easy use in public debates. But the vocabulary of religion is also the characteristic of a style of critique that is associated with a particular understanding of what “innovation” is, and why it deserves critical attention. “Innovation”, here, designates a mode of action that is based on descriptive and analytical elements, which serve as the basis for prescriptions. “Critique”, then, is about the demonstration that the descriptive and analytical elements are mistaken. It is an epistemic critique, that of an “innovation-speak”3 that functions as a dominant public discourse aiming to provide diagnoses and corresponding solutions. The use of the religious vocabulary by innovation critics is then associated with an approach seeking to “debunk” what is presented as a fact, yet is nothing more than poorly ground belief. As modernist critics of religion sought to confront religious dogma with the reality of historical facts (Poulat 1962), these critics target innovation as an ideology, and contrast it with a discourse meant to be based on facts. When Jill Lepore speaks about the “gospel of disruption”, she targets management scholar Clayton Christiansen and his theory of “disruptive innovation”, which is based on empirical examples, and leads into prescriptions for companies to use. Lepore shows that the empirical elements that Christiansen used can easily be contested, which weakens the whole theory he has been defending, and turns it into nothing more than an ideology. The critique contrasting ideology with facts is also visible each time the language of the “myths” of innovation is used, in which case the target is not an individual author or a definite theory (as Christiansen’s disruptive innovation), but tacit hypothesis of current innovation discourses. The references to these “myths” are numerous in the academic and non-academic4 literature. For instance, Mariana Mazzucato argues in The entrepreneurial state: Debunking public v. private sector myths that the role of the state is crucial in economic dynamic, whereas the discourse of innovation often makes free markets and the unconstraint interventions of entrepreneurs the sole source of innovation (Mazzucato 2015). She can then argue that if there is a US model and if it is to be replicated, then all its components ought to be included in it. In the online piece I quoted above, Langdon Winner identifies a persistence of a certain technological determinism, which has been contested in a rich body of scholarly work. Pierre- Benoît Joly (2017) discusses the pervasiveness of the linear model, which describes innovation processes in successive phases, in spite of numerous theoretical works and innovation projects that have challenged this model. Challenging the ideology of innovation The language of the innovation “myths” points to a critical position that consists in uncovering a discourse by challenging the truth-value of the claims it is implicitly or explicitly based upon. This type of critique can be identified beyond the use of the religious vocabulary, each time scholars or practitioners characterize an overly simple, yet dominant version of innovation that ignores more sophisticated analysis and practices. In a recent volume, Benoît Godin and Dominique Vinck describe an “ideology” that sees innovation as “good a priori” and equates it with a simple vision of radical technological change for market purposes (Godin and Vinck 2017). This simple version of innovation sees it as the articulation between a dynamic of technological change connected to market extension, performed by particularly bright entrepreneurs, for outcomes that are seen as unquestionably positive. This simple version can then be the target of a critique that contests the robustness of the narrative it proposes. One can track back the challenges to this simple version of innovation to earlier scholarly discussions about the selective gaze that innovation (usually seen as the mechanical effect of radical technological change) pre-supposes. Consider for instance historian David Edgerton’s critique of the scholarly focus on innovation. Edgerton speaks of the ways in which “technological futurism has affected our historiography”, by which he means that historians and scholars of technology tend to “reproduce the innovation orientation, both in the choice of innovation as subject matter, and in confusing the innovation with the technology-in-use” (Edgerton 1999, p. 128). For Edgerton, innovation implies an empirical and theoretical focus that is simply too selective, as it ignores the reality of technology as it is designed, practiced, and maintained. In the wake of Edgerton’s piece, maintenance studies have insisted that the mundane functioning of “technologies in use” is as interesting (if not more) than innovation for anyone wishing to understand technology and its impacts in human lives. This body of work shows that the actual work of scientists and engineers has often little to do with the tenets of innovation-speak (Russel and Vinsel 2019). This set of works is particularly interesting for our reflection on the nature of critique, because it connects an objective of debunking the ideology of innovation using the truth of (social) scientific facts with the problem of exclusion, of individuals and public concerns. The occultation of maintenance has indeed consequences, in terms of public policy priorities, industrial strategy and allocation of costs and benefits in the functioning of technical systems, including at the level of workers’ rights. Thus, the case of maintenance is useful to illustrate a variation on the critique of the ideology of innovation, which contests not only the epistemic quality of the hypothesis on which it is based, but also their consequences in terms of who is included and who is excluded, what is taken into account and what is not. One can connect this perspective to a range of studies that show that who can act as innovators and be recognized as one is deeply skewed in favor of certain people, often at the expense of women and people of color (Cook 2019). Exclusion effects also manifest themselves when considering the “unintended consequences” of innovation, in domains as diverse as digital technologies (Matsumoto and Kawajiri 2012) or the financial sector (Sveiby et al. 2012; see also Sveiby 2017), which are obscured when the discourse of innovation unproblematically hypothesizes that “innovation is always good” (Soete 2013; Sveiby et al. 2012).

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 2NC Alternative

The military and the market have failed to innovate in favor of tinkering- we must occupy innovation

Levine 12

(Greg, , 1-22)

If the US fought for the post-carbon economy the way it fights for nebulous state-building goals in foreign wars, the future would be brighter, cleaner, safer and cheaper, with more jobs and perhaps – because it would need to secure less of that foreign oil – fewer wars. If the country built new classrooms with the same urgency it built armored vehicles, more American teens could be choosing between colleges instead of choosing between minimum and subminimum wage jobs – and fewer would eventually need public assistance. If the government spent more on blackboards and less on bullets, it would create more jobs today and more innovation in the future. Neither the military nor the marketplace has proven to be the great incubator of innovation that proponents of defense spending and free markets wish to believe. Instead, both facilitate what author Malcolm Gladwell calls “tinkering” – refinements that might improve upon a big invention, rather than the big invention itself. This is not to slight tinkering: Edison's light bulb and Apple's iPod represent the kind of tinkering that can markedly affect everyday life. But those were improvements on earlier discoveries, not the world-changing discoveries, themselves (and, as has been demonstrated, not every tinkering innovation is for the benefit of the end-user). No, if the United States truly wants to “think different” (as Apple's advertising once implored), it needs to once again embrace the innovations upon which the country was founded: Real representative democracy; transparency; accountability; checks and balances of three co-equal branches of government; no taxation without representation; trial by jury; a wariness of foreign military entanglements; and, as was added soon after Independence, access to free public education as a right. They are ideals remarkably similar to those embraced by the Occupy movement – if not assumed by most Americans to be part of their national identity. But they are precepts that have been tarnished by the masters of the marketplace and the adherents of the military-industrial complex. Perhaps they don't need reinvention, but it appears some serious rededication is in order. If the innovation in public discourse known as Occupy Wall Street can continue to reframe the crisis, rethink the role of government and reinvigorate the democracy, then maybe America can reoccupy itself.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 2NC Alternative

We should emphasize quality not disruptive innovation- Germany proves

Krugman, PhD 14

(Paul, Nobel Prize Winner, , 1-26)

Jill Lepore has written a great article in The New Yorker debunking the hyping of “disruptive innovation” as the key to success in business and everything else. It’s not a bah-humbug piece; it is instead a careful takedown, in which she goes back to the case studies supposedly showing the overwhelming importance of upstart innovators, and shows that what actually happened didn’t fit the script. Specifically, many of the “upstarts” were actually long-established firms, and more often than not the big payoffs went not to disruptive innovators but to firms that focused on incremental change and ordinary forms of efficiency and quality. Andrew Leonard at Salon reports that Silicon Valley types are not pleased. You can understand why. But their annoyance also tells you why the disruptive innovation thing took off: it glamorizes business and lets nerdy guys come across as heroes. The same impulse, I think, explains why the economist Joseph Schumpeter gets cited so much. If you read his stuff, it’s interesting, I guess, although his attempts to describe the business cycle were a waste of good paper. But it’s that glamorizing phrase “creative destruction” that made his work popular, because it’s so flattering to the big money (and excuses a lot of suffering, too). Ms. Lepore tells us that innovation became a popular buzzword in the 1990s. I guess I thought it came much earlier – I wrote about product-cycle models of trade back in the 1970s, and even then I was formalizing a much older literature. And in trade, as in business competition, it’s far from clear that the big rewards go to those who trash the past and invent new stuff. What’s the most remarkable export success story out there? Surely it’s the German one – the country manages to be an export powerhouse despite its very high labor costs. How do the Germans do it? Not by constantly coming out with revolutionary new products, but by producing very high-quality goods for which people are willing to pay premium prices. So here’s a revolutionary thought: maybe we need to do less disruption and instead put more effort into doing whatever we do well.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 2NC Alternative

The innovation imperative requires constant re-affirmation- voting negative interrupts this system of subject formation

Rehn, PhD, 23

(Alf, InnovationandTech@Denmark, Images, Imperatives, and Ideology in the Innovation IndustryIn Debating Innovation: Perspectives and Paradoxes of an Idealized Concept ed. Rehn and Ortenblad)

An example might be fruitful here. I am, in addition to being a profes sor of innovation, design, and management, also a relatively popular speaker, particularly on the topics of creativity and innovation. I have over the last two decades given many academic lectures, presentations, and keynotes on these issues, but to this comes the fact that I have given more than 1000 keynotes for professional audiences, at both internal events for employees and management, and external events with more mixed audiences. The sizes of audiences have varied widely, from as few as a dozen to more than 20,000 people, with a few hundred to a thousand people being the most common audience size. My task at these events tends to be threefold. One, while clients rarely use such terms, part of the expectation for a speaker is to deliver “management entertainment,” namely statements and stories about management issues that are deliv ered in a way that amuse and entertain the audience. This can mean jokes and stories that engender laughter, but also more wry remarks and witti cisms, as well as material that is more dramatic or “feel-good” in scope. In other words, packaging and delivery matter. Two, clients expect some thing that they at least feel to be “practical,” that is, things that at least tentatively can be deployed in practice. This doesn’t necessarily mean that one needs to give direct, actionable advice, but can also be achieved by discussing what kind of matters should be kept in mind in certain situa tions, or even giving metaphorical advice (“Who in your organization is like Person-In-Anecdote-Just-Told, and are you supporting them?”). The third task is something of a meta-task, namely to give the audience termi nology, metaphors, and anecdotes with which to discuss similar issues in their own organizations. These three levels all point to a different level of active audience engagement. In my experience, the first level (entertainment) is the least active. People do engage by laughing and applauding and can at times make references back to the joke or the story. When I talk to audiences after a keynote, they may thank me for having presented innovation in an amus ing manner or gotten them to laugh about their creative shortcomings, but the activity stops there. There is, to use Hall’s (1973) terminology, not that much to decode here. The second level (practice) is, maybe somewhat surprisingly, not much more active. Again, audiences may react in a positive way here, but this does not necessarily lead to anything more than an acknowledgement of a piece of advice being potentially helpful or meaningful. Again, seeing as most people do not make direct innovation decisions in their day-to-day life, the “practical” elements remain highly abstract to most people; exhortations one can agree on, but practical in theory rather than in practice. It is on the third, discursive level where the real engagement emerges. What I’ve learnt as an innova tion speaker is that the highest level of audience engagement happens on a level where they can say “You just said what I’ve always been thinking, but couldn’t put in words,” a sentence I by now have heard innumerable times. With a few, basic rhetorical tricks, such as condemning innovation clichés (in a manner that might itself be turning into a cliché), I can make people feel as if they are “ahead of the curve” and to thus feel like innova tors, even when they’re yet to innovate. Audience activity in this sphere can thus be seen as seeing instances such as an innovation keynote as a possibility to craft one’s identity, seeking affirmation in what is seen as a legitimate agent of innovation (my title, which is “professor of innovation, design, and management” bestows me with almost immedi ate legitimacy in this regard). The importance here lies in the fact that imperatives only work if there is a predisposition to follow such, particularly if more forcible regimes of power aren’t available. In a totalitarian dictatorship one might of course simply force the populace to accept the innovation imperative, by decree and supported by threats of violence, but in most contexts innovation isn’t this forcefully supported. Instead we might say that it is established by relentless repetition, and in part this is achieved by allowing the term to be subjected to what I have elsewhere referred to as “epistemological emptying” (Rehn 2018). What this means is that the tendency in the innovation industry to allow more and more things to be referred to with the moniker “innovation” isn’t an accident, but rather a strategy. By not engaging critically with the way in which our society keeps calling any- and everything innovation, not only does the field then manage to appear more and more important, it also makes the innovation imperative easier to uphold. It should not be difficult to see how this is achieved: First, refer to a few, universally accepted positive developments (antibiotics, mobile phones, the Internet) as innovations. Second, extend this assignation to involve more and more things. Third, use the bolstered legitimacy to claim that innovation is no longer a minor issue, but a major one. Four, repeat incessantly. As innovation is turned into a term that can describe or associated with most things that are seen as positive or good, and the lack thereof associated with torpor, decay, conservatism, and bankruptcies, most people will simply accept this as the state of affairs and thus become primed/programmed to react in a positive manner to a repetition of the innovation imperative. Succinctly put, this means that the innovation industry and the inno vation imperative are both part of something larger, something that can be queried not only for understanding the manner in which innovation is discussed in our age, but also to why critical engagements with innovation are necessary—and that larger phenomenon is innovation as an ideology.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 2NC OV/AT: Innovation Good

We make innovation better- divorced from ethics innovation produces serial policy failure

Lennerfors and Murata, PhDs, 23

(Thomas Taro Lennerfors, IndustrialEngineering@Uppsala and Kiyoshi Murata, BusinessEthics@Meiji, Innovation Ethics In Debating Innovation: Perspectives and Paradoxes of an Idealized Concept ed. Rehn and Ortenblad)

In this chapter, we followed the current discourse on innovation ethics, focusing on the ethics of technological innovation in the for-profit sector. We then problematized the focus by pointing out the issue of competi tion and then constructed a potential way forward for innovation ethics. Innovation ethics: • must promote critical thinking and avoid reification of values. • needs to also focus on care and maintenance of existing values. • is processual and iterative and cannot be just invention ethics. • needs to be open to innovation in a variety of contexts. • acknowledges the infinite demands of ethics, but still is action-oriented. For researchers, our piece can hopefully contribute to stimulating a dis cussion about innovation ethics, going beyond current discussions of innovation ethics in different subfields. For practitioners, our approach to innovation ethics can problematize the ways in which ethics is discursively constructed in public and present an alternative where innovations need to be critically reflected upon and where innovations need to be seen as having good or bad consequences for the values that our society is expected to promote. We also argue that students in innovation studies, management of innovation, industrial management, as well as business and engineering degrees should be exposed to innovation ethics, to problematize an uncritically positive view about innovation, as well as students in non-technical degrees, some of whom might have a slightly more critical approach to technological progress. It is unlikely that progress toward a better society could be made without technological as well as other innovations, and an ability to think about a broader range of ethical implications can be valuable to bridge understandings among different parts of society and to create a joint exchange of meaning about what a desirable society is and what role innovation can play to advance it.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 2NC OV/AT: Innovation Good

Apply strict scrutiny to affirmative evidence- innovation studies is epistemically closed and ontologically conservative, this renders the entire 1AC suspect. Voting negative opens possibility of more nuanced understanding of innovation

Rehn and Ortenblad, PhDs, 23

(Alf, Innovation@Denmark and Anders, Innovation@Agder Introduction In Debating Innovation: Perspectives and Paradoxes of an Idealized Concept ed. Rehn and Ortenblad)

Here, it might be helpful to mention a novel philosophical concept, one originally deployed in ecological studies, namely that of the “hyperob ject.” In 2013, Timothy Bloxam Morton wrote the book Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology After the End of the World (Morton 2013), in which they developed a notion they had introduced in earlier work (see Morton 2010). In the former work, they were interested in objects and/or con cepts that were so massive and so distributed in time and space that it becomes impossible to understand them specifically as themselves, rendering them only thinkable through their symptoms or local manifesta tions. They originally used the term to understand a phenomenon like global warming, which is difficult to “see” and think about precisely because it is so all-encompassing. We can see the “footprint” of the hyper object, but never really the hyperobject in and of itself, as it is created by a number of complex relations between heterogenous objects. In addi tion, hyperobjects are “viscous,” in that they attach themselves to other objects, material and discursive, even to the point where trying to resist a hyperobject makes you evermore stuck to the same. The astute reader will by now have picked up on the fact that we are gesturing toward the fact that innovation might be a hyperobject as well. In fact, it lives up quite well to the criteria that Morton established. It is massively distributed in time and space, to the point where most things can be seen as innovation depending on which spatiotemporal position you choose to occupy. It clearly transcends specificity, in that things as far apart as a completely new product and a slightly different manner of sell ing the same are both referred to with the same term. It is massive, and seemingly ever-expanding, while at the same time only viable in the spe cific manifestations it appears to us at. Here, it is important to note that Morton’s argument was ontological, not nihilistic. We live in a world populated by objects that are simply to massive, too far beyond our capacity for perception, that a more humble ontology becomes necessary (N.B. Morton is connected to the emerging field of object-oriented ontology). This certainly holds for innovation. As Martin (2016) points out in his “Twenty challenges for innovation studies,” a key problem for innovation studies has been the tendency to look only where it is easiest (and most profitable) to do so. This is very much in line with an old joke, one that has been told since at least the 1920s, in which a drunk man is searching under a streetlight for an object (keys or some money, depending on which version you’ll hear), and is interrupted by a policeman: “–What are you doing?” “–I’m looking for my keys/bill/wallet!” “–Did you lose them here?” “–No, I lost them down the road!” “–Then why don’t you look there?” “–The light’s much better here!” In a similar manner, Martin takes innovation studies to task for mainly studying the things that have been easy to study, ignoring the “dark inno vation” (Martin 2016) that exists outside of the contemporary street lights. To this comes the question of studying the dark sides of innovation (see, e.g., Coad et al. 2021; Sveiby et al. 2012), those parts that are not merely marginalized for being more difficult to find, but those actively shunned for not fitting in with the existing paradigm. What is needed then, and what has been the driver of this book, is less clarity about innovation, in the simplistic sense of the word, and more challenges and debate. Our aim with this book was never to produce a final word, but to show that a hyperobject such as innovation needs to be engaged with not in a streamlined manner, with singular epistemologies, but on the contrary by highlighting the many perspectives and parleys and paradoxes that are a natural outcome of any engagement with a hyperobject. We are here not presenting the end to a debate, nor even the beginning of such an end, but calling out an end to simplistic and limited ways of trying to come to grips with something as grand, as strange, as interobjective, and as viscous as innovation is. We are not here to close the book on innovation, but rather to open the same. We are not here to fight over demarcations, as we are fully aware that the phenomenon we are interested in will always already make quick work of any attempt to establish such. We are here to allow the hyperobject to be a hyperobject, grandiose and unknowable, present and absent, hypermodern and eldritch, all at the same time. We are here for the debates, not the declarations. We are happy to stand in the shadows of paradox, rather than pretending that our epistemological flashlights are magic. We are here to do what many innovation scholars resist and spend their careers fighting against—answering the call to take innova tion seriously, as the strange hyperobject it is.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 1NC Alternative -more K

1AC advantage claims seem persuasive because we have been conditioned to take them at face value. Alternative relationships to technology are not utopian, voting negative snowballs

Etelson, JD, 14

(Erica Etelson is a recovering human rights attorney and environmental activist and writer. , 9-19)

There are 7 billion people on this planet, many of whom have been conditioned to expect their standard of living to improve. Certainly, most of them will be disappointed to learn that it would take five planet earths to enable everyone to live like a North American. Putting aside that fantasy, the question becomes: What technologies can most safely, effectively and efficiently meet the world population’s basic needs for clean water and adequate food, hygiene, shelter, clothing, medicine, birth control, education, arts and transportation? A secondary question is: What additional technologies should be used exclusively by people uniquely in need of them? Examples might include personal vehicles for elderly and disabled people and air conditioning for people with certain health conditions. And lastly: What technologies might we share as a community rather than each owning our own (e.g. computers, vehicles, phone booths – remember those)? Appropriate technologies are those that meet human needs and enhance people’s lives and communities, without exploiting or endangering workers and without damaging the environment. The best go one step further and actually restore damaged ecosystems. Examples of restorative technologies include permeable pavement that allows for rainwater to replenish aquifers and mycologist Paul Stamet’s remarkable use of fungi to clean up toxic spills and radiation. The good news is: We already have most of what we need to live comfortable and healthy lives. Many of the technologies that serve us the most safely and effectively are toward the low-tech end of the spectrum and have been around for decades if not millennia – composting, gray water, indoor plumbing, fermentation food storage, greenhouses, irrigation, herbal and homeopathic medicine, acupuncture, condoms, electrolyte solutions, bicycles, trains, LED lights, solar panels, windmills, printing presses. We know how to thrive without nuclear reactors, fossil fuels, pesticides, air cargo and smartphones; we’re just not doing it on a societal scale. Take the need for human waste disposal for the billions of people who don’t have flush toilets: The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation sponsored a toilet design competition. The winning toilet is a nifty, high-maintenance $2,000 contraption involving a solar-powered electrochemical reactor and hydrogen fuel cells. That toilet might be just the ticket for one of the Gates’ vacation homes but, for a rural dweller in a developing country, there are already cheap, sanitary, low-tech toilets available through organizations like SOIL. The hubristic toilet competition encourages innovation for the sake of innovation, an egotistical trap that blocks viable, existing solutions from widespread adoption. Evaluating the appropriateness of new and existing technologies is no easy task, and it’s easy to see how one’s biases can distort the process. A writer, for example, might be quick to conclude that the benefits of personal computers outweigh the environmental and spiritual damage they cause. The following questions might serve as a good starting point: Who owns and controls the technology? What are the benefits? To whom do they accrue? Has the technology been proven safe beyond a reasonable doubt (the precautionary principle)? Who is sponsoring the research and do we trust them? Who are the subjects of safety tests? Have they given informed consent or are they a marginalized population being exploited to test new substances or procedures? If they are animals, do the benefits justify the animals’ pain, suffering and captivity? What are the downsides and risks? Are there risks of catastrophic harm that can never be mitigated (e.g. nuclear accidents)? Does the technology bring us together or drive us further apart? Is there a less energy-intensive alternative? Does the technology deplete finite resources? Does manufacture or operation endanger worker or consumer health and safety? Can the technology be applied to weaponry or spying? Would widespread adoption of the technology displace and render obsolete classes of workers? What mental and physical capacities will atrophy when we adopt the technology? Can all 7 billion of us adopt it and, if we do, what are the consequences? Can an ethical argument be made for adoption by some subset of the global population and, if so, who, and who decides? What About Communications Technology? I’ve touched on some of the benefits and pitfalls of communications technology in this essay, but there are others, so many in fact that the exercise of evaluating these technologies is quite challenging. I don’t hold myself out as the arbiter of whether smartphones and Wi-Fi and Facebook do more harm than good. I simply argue that these technologies are not exempt from the same risk-benefit analysis I suggest all technologies undergo. What’s a Neo-Luddite to Do? It’s all well and good to undertake individual assessments of the merits of various technologies, but how do we translate our formulations into law and policy? There are no easy answers here, and the path wends through terrain familiar to many progressive causes. In a crony capitalist system in which corporate interests determine which technologies to develop and bring to market, the public interest is, by and large, irrelevant. So, what’s a neo-Luddite to do? Organize. Given such unparalleled heights of corporate power, the “Move to Amend” movement to strip corporations of constitutional personhood is essential so as to enable the enactment of draconian campaign finance reforms, the more draconian the better, given how thorough corporate political control has become. It should be noted that Move to Amend has already galvanized widespread support, thanks to the convenience of online petitions and other “netroots” tools. There’s a push for states and, ultimately, the federal government to adopt the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) as a more holistic and accurate measure of social and economic well-being than the GDP. The GPI would take stock of several of the risk factors technology presents, including environmental impacts, physical and mental health, divorce rates, educational achievement, etc. Emerging technologies are approved and regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other government agencies run by scientists and policy makers who worked in the past – and will likely work again in the future – within the very industries they are entrusted to regulate. To pick just one example of many, Tom Wheeler served as the head of two telecommunications lobbying groups before being sworn in as FCC commissioner in 2013. Until the revolving door is firmly shut, there’s little hope of regulation in the public interest. Ultimately, sound decision-making about emerging technologies may not be possible in a market versus a planned economy. By its very nature, market economies are technologically driven, with corporate players constantly racing to be the first to bring new technologies to market. Absent a system in which accountable elected officials oversee economic development and conduct risk-benefit analysis of proposed new products, the odds will always be in favor of new technologies. Be skeptical. Technology certainly can address some problems, but don’t assume the proposed techno-fix is the answer just because it’s receiving breathless media hype. Reporters love innovators and startups and their megalomaniacal founders, sometimes going so far as to portray them as supernatural heroes (Steve Jobs). Caught up in the techno-topian dream as much as any of us, reporters tend to pen glowing odes to the latest and greatest invention or product and avoid penetrating questions about its utility, safety and environmental impact. Don’t believe the hype. As Ralph Waldo Emerson forewarned, “Don’t trust children with edge tools. Don’t trust man, great God, with more power than he has, until he has learned to use that little power better. What a hell we should make of the world if we could do what we would.” Reject scare tactics. Putting the brakes on the rollout of new technologies will not, as the technocracy and their libertarian champions would have us believe, destroy the economy any more than any form of regulation, which is to say, not at all. Will it “disrupt” (to use a techie term) business as usual? You bet it will; that’s the whole idea. In its stead, people-powered and eco-friendly technologies and businesses will arise and will hire new workers, lots of them. If technocrats find some of their wealth, power and mythical prestige diluted in the process, that is all to the good. Opt out. If all 7 billion of us cannot live large, American-style, why should any of us? Contemplate and discuss with your family and community what you really need to live a healthy, meaningful and resilient life. Experiment with how close you can come to that standard of living voluntarily, and be prepared to accept involuntary cutbacks that are surely in store for us all, either in the form of a carbon tax, economic crisis, war, disease pandemic or ecological collapse. In the meantime, don’t be so fast to download the newest app or buy the latest device. Ask yourself both what the app or device will give you and what it will take away. Small acts of resistance and the adoption of new/old lifestyles will, eventually, coalesce into a force that can arrest our civilization’s race toward the cliff’s edge. Change seems to unfold slowly, but that’s only during the early, underground stages. Once the shoots break through the surface, things can change very quickly. Who foresaw the dismantling of the British Empire? Who in 1965 expected cohabitation of unmarried couples and recreational pot-smoking to become commonplace within 20 years? Who predicted a black president and the acceptance of gay marriage in the first decade of the 21st century? Once a tipping point in human consciousness is reached, once a noticeable number of people start rejecting what is cruel and destructive and begin reinventing their beliefs and lifestyles, things can change very quickly. With respect to our current predicament, they have to.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 1NC Innovation K

The Aff’s model of innovation is unsustainable and produces existential environmental catastrophe. We need to change our innovation thinking- slow is smooth and smooth is fast

Rehn, PhD, 23

(Alf, Innovation@Odense, The Future(s) of Innovation In Debating Innovation: Perspectives and Paradoxes of an Idealized Concept ed. Rehn and Ortenblad)

As stated above, there are indications that innovation might accelerate in quite a massive way in the future. That said, we should also consider whether the future of innovation lies in slowing down and becoming more measured and considerate. We should by now all be aware that there are not one but several mega- or gigatrends in connection to this that will affect society as a whole and through this innovation. The first, and most obvious one, is global warming and the many attendant phenomena this has or will give rise to. If we are to survive, as a species and in something akin to the civilization we have established, radical change is needed. We have for too long lived with the unspoken assumption that any kind of innovation is good innovation, and this has led us to waste money, material resources, and cognitive power that could have been used elsewhere. As an example, consider the attempts by several startups and corporations to create a laundry-folding robot. In one case, that of the Laundroid (see Rehn 2020a), more than 100 million USD was invested in a startup that in the end failed to even deliver on the promise of easing our laundry-folding woes. This can be inquired into from several perspectives. Does the world, in the state it is in, need to solve this “problem” technologically? Was there nothing more important that the amount of money and expertise that went into the Laundroid could have been used for? The champions of innovation might here point out that innovation trajectories can often be complex, and that there is a chance that, for example, some innovation discovered in the creation of the Laundroid might later bloom into something far more impactful, and this is a fair comment. Yet this does not take away from the fact that as global warming is turning into an existential crisis for humanity, we may not be in a position to gamble quite so freely with our limited resources as we have done up until now, and in the studies I have done about the Laundroid there seems to be little if anything in the way of positive externalities. Hope may spring eternal, but hope alone cannot save the planet. The second crisis that innovation needs to address is the evermore problematic issue of resource depletion. Our current global system is such that we are overusing most planetary resources, and in many cases do not at current have feasible ways of switching these out. The resources most discussed today tend to be fossil fuels, pointing to the critical issue of energy. Here, again, innovation is something of a double-edged sword. Many forms of innovation are energy-intensive, but innovation can also aid in the conservation of energy, and this discussion has already been quite robust in innovation research (see, e.g., Adams et al. 2016; Suchek et al. 2021), and we are already seeing impressive progress in a transition toward green energy. A far less discussed resource-issue is that of materials that tend to be understood as mundane and plentiful. We may seldom discuss the connection between innovation and water, but the fact remains that without potable water, most other conversations are point less. With massive urbanization has come critical issues regarding how we can keep up water infrastructures, and ensure continued life on our planet. Twenty-one of the 37 biggest aquifers on the planet were already in 2015 past their “sustainable tipping point,” i.e. drying out (Richey et al. 2015), with obvious ramifications for the global food system. Another, possibly more surprising depletion event is occurring in sand. While it to a layman might seem impossible that there could be such a thing as a sand shortage, with deserts and beaches seen as endless reserves, the fact of the matter is that sand shortage, with sand being the planet’s second-most used resource after water, is becoming a crisis event. The issue lies in the fact that much of what we normally call sand cannot be used for the purposes it today is: construction, glass manufacture, and the production of, for example, silicon chips. Desert sand, for instance, is not coarse enough to be used in making cement and other critical infrastruc ture, making a radical shift toward a circular economy needed, in particular when it comes to the built environment (cf. Torres et al. 2021). The issue doesn’t become rosier when we consider less common raw materials. Rare-earth minerals, with lithium as the best known of these, are as their name indicates rare. They are used in basically all electronics, their mining is often highly non-sustainable, and they are very difficult to replace. Something similar could be said about helium, which has been called the world’s only completely non-renewable resource, and one that we are wasting at alarming rates. To most people, this might seem like a non-issue, as helium is famous for balloons and little else, but in reality it is a critical resource for our modern world. It can act as a super-coolant, and is important for things such as medical apparatuses such as MRI machines as well as the aforementioned quantum computers, which all rely on liquid helium-cooled superconductors. A third crisis refers more to social sustainability, but is also linked to the two above. The issue of social inequality may at first glance seem somewhat further removed from the above-mentioned innovation issues, but I would contend that such an assumption would be mistaken. There has been a long tradition in innovation thinking of assuming “trickle-down” effects, so that an innovation initially is only used by the wealthiest, most novelty-seeking individuals or organizations, and in many cases this has held. Computers, the car, electric light, the television, and refrig eration are all cases where the early models were expensive luxuries, but today seen as necessities. That said, there are no guarantees that this is a process that will always occur, and in addition we have over the last decades seen that despite what some in the innovation industry have referred to as a golden age (by any other name) of innovation, many have not seen their socio-economic standing change in anything like a positive way. On the contrary, a number of commentators (see, e.g., Klein 2020; Piketty 2014, 2020) have remarked on an increased polarization even in affluent Western countries, where the middle class is being hollowed out and where structures of privilege have ensured that innovation increasingly benefits the few, rather than the many. Contemporary innovation has been a boon to the urban elite I myself represent, where I by pressing a few buttons on my iPhone can get people to deliver an ever-expanding universe of goods to my door, yet done little to ease the life of, for exam ple, poor pensioners, who may not even be able to afford the smartphone that I see as an utter necessity. With some of the latest business model innovations acting as a way to establish digital serfdom, this trend looks unlikely to end anytime soon. Here it should also be noted that despite a tremendous amount of the innovation conversation focusing in particular on the younger demographic, the main aging trend is not a question of more and more young people crowding the economy, but rather the general graying of society. Here, again, innovation literature has been achingly slow to respond to a clear trend that has been evident for several decades, and where costs for care and often insufficient pension systems are setting many societies up for very challenging decades to come. All three of these cases, which deal not with great future potential but actual and increasing limitations, may force the hand of future innovation, in various ways. It is self-evident that the carefree innovation for the sake of just creating more stuff cannot be sustained. Innovators will need to pay far more attention to what the environmental impact of their innovations are, and societies need to develop robust conversations about what kinds of innovation should be encouraged and supported. Whereas the augmented innovator of the future might have a virtual lab with unending possibilities, they will also need to think long and hard about whether and how their creations can be produced in a world with limited resources, and be quite sure about the ways in which these resources can be re-utilized at, for example, a product’s end-of-life. Further, innovators will need to understand that the socio-political context innovations are introduced in, and consider whether there might be more deserving audiences and more pressing problems than those that the urban elites face. All this will require slow innovation. Not in the sense that innovation processes per se need to be slowed down, but so that our innovation thinking becomes more considered and capable of thinking beyond the moment of commercialization. Life in the Anthropocene forces us to think not in the weeks it takes to prototype, or the months that it might take to create an innovation, but in decades and generations. Life in a complex world also makes it an imperative to think about true diversity and inclusivity, rather than about how one best can sell yet another gadget or service to a middle-aged, white professor in central Copenhagen. This might sound like the pessimistic cries of yet another Cassandra, but this would be a most mistaken reading. This kind of slowing down, this kind of focus on greater care and consideration might be exactly what innovation needs in order to be something more than the rote production of novelties. This might be what breaks a flawed innovation ideology and enables us to transcend simplistic models of the economy and innovation.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 1NC Innovation K

Pro-innovation bias produces epistemic closure- producing innovation as a meta goal obscures structural violence inherent in the process.

Pfotenhauer et al., PhDs, 18

(Sebastian M. Pfotenhauer, Munich Center for Technology in Society (MCTS) and TUM School of Management, , Joakim Juhlb Technical University Munich, Germany bDepartment of Planning and Development, Aalborg University, Denmark , Erik AardencDepartment of Science and Technology Studies, University of Vienna, Austria Challenging the “deficit model” of innovation: Framing policy issues under the innovation imperative , Research Policy, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2018.10.015)

To interrogate the dynamics of a parallel “deficit model of innovation” (DMI), it seems best to take the scholarly investigations into the DMS as a guideline. The starting point is again the question: What kind of deficit is being diagnosed? As has been argued above, the DMI logic intimates that societies are unable to address grand societal challenges or ensure economic competitiveness because their policies, institutions, scientific activities, or individual predispositions are not sufficiently oriented toward innovation – in short, because of a lack of innovation. This lack is usually expressed in terms of innovation capacity, whether at the national, regional, organizational, or individual level. In most cases, the overall diagnosis of a national or regional innovation deficit is immediately accompanied by a range of specific sub-diagnoses about where exactly institutions, policies, or societies are failing to live up to the innovation imperative – whether through a lack of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education, insufficient private sector expenditures on research and development (R&D), riskaverse attitudes, excessive regulation, or inadequate government incentives. For example, in 2015 the Washington Post declared that “Europe’s innovation deficit isn’t disappearing any time soon,” blaming over-regulation and lack of harmonization across the continent (Downes, 2015). The Canadian newspaper The Globe and Mail ran an article titled “Government can’t solve Canada's innovation deficit,” which pointed to a lack of private R&D spending and misguided handpicking of technologies by the government (Yakabuski, 2015). That same year, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), in conjunction with the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, released a report “The Future Postponed: Why Declining Investment in Basic Research Threatens a U.S. Innovation Deficit” (MIT, 2015). According to the DMI, these diagnosed deficits require policy action. This action typically takes the form of innovation strategies or initiatives, many of which have been proliferating around the globe (Pfotenhauer and Jasanoff, 2017a). These strategies provide more or less concrete remedies to tackling innovation deficits. For example, the OECD Innovation Strategy (2010) recommends a range of actions, including moving “beyond supply-side policies focused on R&D and specific technologies to a more systemic approach,” adapting “curricula and pedagogies […] to equip students with the capacity to learn and apply new skills throughout their lives,” or making “migration regimes for the highly skilled [more] efficient, transparent and simple and enable movement on a short-term or circular basis.” The report, Innovation Canada: A Call to Action (Jenkins et al., 2011), calls for the government to, among other things, “create an Industrial Research and Innovation Council (IRIC)” or “simplify the scientific research and experimental development (SR&ED) program by basing the tax credit for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on labour-related costs.” More generally, with its drive toward innovation policy action, the DMI reveals a distinct pro-innovation bias that tends to sideline questions about why social challenges are problems of innovation in the first place or what alternative framings might exist. Likewise, it rarely asks about the broader social consequences of enacting measures such as altering immigration or tax policies in the name of innovation. Like the DMS scientism, it seems “irrational” to oppose initiatives that foster innovation, which appear as the most legitimate way forward. Like PUS, too, the DMI emphasizes the value and critical importance of particular forms of expertise. Innovation itself has grown into a highly technical discourse, rife with its own experts, instruments, and metrics. A growing number of specialized academic journals currently address a broad range of questions and disciplinary perspectives on innovation and have contributed to the emergence of the field of “innovation studies.” Some scholars have pointed to the emergence of a “new disciplinary tribe” of Innovation Studies (Godin, 2014) or traced the emergence of innovation as a distinct form of expertise in the United States (Wisnioski, 2015). International organizations, spearheaded by the OECD, have developed a vast array of comparative innovation indicators, policy manuals, and catalogues of innovation instruments. Successful technology entrepreneurs are widely perceived as authorities on a wide range of public problems that may be solved through innovation, including Peter Thiel, Elon Musk, and Mark Zuckerberg (Pfotenhauer and Juhl, 2017). What is more, a number of regions and institutions – such as Silicon Valley and MIT – have emerged as global reference points for how to be innovative (Pfotenhauer and Jasanoff, 2017b). This emerging expert–lay distinction grants disproportionate power to those who speak on behalf of innovation’s transformative power. In this sense, innovation has ceased to be a purely analytic concept used to explain sociotechnical change and economic growth. Rather, it is a policy goal and a professionalized discourse that is reshaping society in fundamental ways. In particular, the prevalent theorization of innovation as a systemic phenomenon has argued that innovation requires a concerted effort from all other policy domains to flourish. Other policy domains – such as research, education, taxation, immigration, or environmental policy – are increasingly reframed under the DMI, making innovation, in effect, a meta-goal of public policy. To optimize innovation, therefore, innovation policy and its rationales are granted the power to redefine the importance and activities of other social institutions. The DMI restructures social and epistemic orders in yet another way. Decades’ worth of innovation research have emphasized – and perhaps monopolized – the theorization of innovation as a technoeconomic phenomenon (Godin and Lane, 2013; Pfotenhauer and Juhl, 2017). As a result, innovation is seen as desirable not just because of the ways in which technologies enhance our society. Instead, it is equally desirable because it is a major driver of economic growth and hence a key site of global competition (Romer, 1990; Scherer, 1999; Schumpeter, 1934). Electric cars, for example, promise not only cleaner mobility, but also a new car industry that guarantees employment and taxes for generations to come. This dual legitimacy of problem solving and economic prosperity contributes to a situation where innovation can continue to be desirable in economic terms even when the social consequences are questionable or highly disruptive. It is partly through this appeal to competition pressure and a “rising tide lifts all boats” rhetoric of economic growth that makes innovation automatically seem plausible and desirable, and that regularly serves to shortcut political debates about desirability. Both the primacy of economic growth and the policy framing around (national or regional) systems helped establish innovation as an essentially competitive process. Success is measured principally in comparative terms in relation to other nations’ innovation performance. This competition logic is consistent with a broader shift toward benchmarking as a modus operandi in public policy, where progress is typically measured through various “performance gaps.” Benchmarking practices make it possible to present innovation as a matter of “catching up,” “falling behind,” or “staying ahead,” which in turn feeds into “innovation deficits” and “emergencies.” It also resonates with the Darwinist logic of “survival of the fittest” that underwrites evolutionary thinking in innovation theory and concepts such as “disruption” and “creative destruction.” A comparison of deficit logics in PUS and innovation can be found in Table 1.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › Innovation › 1NC Innovation K

The 1AC relies on the deficit model of innovation- every problem is framed as a lack of innovation, making innovation an imperative. This obstructs potential alternatives framings- we need innovation politics not innovation policy

Pfotenhauer et al., PhDs, 18

(Sebastian M. Pfotenhauer, Munich Center for Technology in Society (MCTS) and TUM School of Management, , Joakim Juhlb Technical University Munich, Germany bDepartment of Planning and Development, Aalborg University, Denmark , Erik AardencDepartment of Science and Technology Studies, University of Vienna, Austria Challenging the “deficit model” of innovation: Framing policy issues under the innovation imperative , Research Policy, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2018.10.015)

Innovation has become a leitmotif of policy making and institutional design (Pfotenhauer & Jasanoff 2017a). The European Commission instructively labeled the continent an “Innovation Union,” setting the tone for European self-imagination in the new millennium (EC, 2011). Across the globe, ministries and agencies of innovation are being created or carved out of existing government portfolios, churning out countless strategies and reports. Universities – in the past, often portrayed as ivory towers of open-ended tinkering with ideas – have found their 21st-century mission primarily as “innovation engines” (Mansfield and Lee, 1996; Mowery, 2004; Thorp and Goldstein, 2010; Pfotenhauer, forthcoming) with significant consequences for their internal organization, funding models and assessment. Geeks and tech entrepreneurs have moved out of the countercultural margins of society and into the public and economic mainstream, frequently serving as role models for today’s teenage generation. Fittingly, the topic of this special issue in Research Policy highlights the transformative power of innovation. With growing ubiquity, the call for innovation is increasingly taking the form of an “innovation imperative” across countries and sectors. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development notes in its “Innovation Strategy” that “while no single policy instrument holds all the answers, innovation is the key ingredient of any effort to improve people’s quality of life. It is […] essential for addressing some of society’s most pressing issues, such as climate change, health and poverty” (OECD, 2010). The European Commission has diagnosed an “Innovation Emergency [whereby] Europe is spending 0.8% of GDP less than the US and 1.5% less than Japan every year on Research & Development (R&D). Thousands of our best researchers and innovators have moved to countries where conditions are more favourable” (EC, 2016). In its 2011 Strategy for American Innovation, the Obama White House likewise proclaimed that “America’s future economic growth and international competitiveness depend on our capacity to innovate. […] To win the future, we must out-innovate, out-educate, and out-build the rest of the world” (The White House, 2011). This “innovation imperative” has changed something about the way we bring the concept of innovation to bear in public policy: formerly principally an analytic category used to explain technological change and economic growth, innovation has become a framing device – a kind of diagnostic lens – through which we tend to frame policy problems as problems of innovation. The call for more innovation has become a panacea policy response that promises to solve problems almost independently of their specifics (Pfotenhauer and Jasanoff, 2017a). Complex social challenges that, a decade ago, might have been framed differently – from low literacy rates to sluggish economic growth, growing inequality, obesity, traffic congestion, environmental degradation, all the way to climate change – now all demand innovation centered solutions. Conversely, this logic suggests that we are unable to address our grand challenges or ensure economic competitiveness because our societies, institutions, scientific activities or individual predispositions are not sufficiently geared toward innovation. The innovation imperative is further exacerbated by perceived international competition pressure and the threat of falling behind, as illustrated by the above quotes from the European Commission and the White House Strategy. In this paper, we analyze this emerging pattern whereby policy problems are framed as problems of innovation and where a lack of innovation is routinely invoked as the main obstacle to social progress. We call this pattern the “deficit model of innovation” (DMI) because of salient parallels to the so-called deficit model of public understanding of science (PUS), which we will discuss below. Under this deficit model, innovation is increasingly wielded as a political framing device that constructs parts of society and various social institutions as insufficient and in need of an innovation agenda.1 We argue that closer attention to this deficit framing is needed because it is an essential part of how innovation transforms societies in the 21st century: not only through new technological possibilities or economic growth, but also by structuring policy options and acting as a source of legitimacy with profound consequences for how we envisage and justify social change. Diagnosing innovation deficits, we argue, is a political act that prevents alternative (and perhaps more appropriate) policy framings. Harnessing the transformative power of innovation and directing it toward the public good will thus require an explicit shift from “innovation policy” to “innovation politics,” supported by new forms for democratic deliberation. This puts our paper in direct conversation with what Schot and Steinmueller (2016) call an emergent “Frame 3” for innovation policy aimed at directed “transformative change.” In our opinion, the development of better policy instruments cannot proceed disconnected from thorough political discussions about the means and ends of innovation policy – i.e. which futures we collectively want, and how we want to get there. Here, innovation policy has much to learn from previous science policy debates around PUS, as discussed below. Our paper thus adds to the growing body of research that emphasizes the need for reflexive and critical engagement with innovation, as witnessed by the emergence of the responsible innovation paradigm (Stilgoe et al., 2013; von Schomberg, 2013) and growing calls for a more reflexive stance toward innovation systems approaches (Kuhlmann et al., 2012). In the following, we first develop an analytic framework for how the deficit logic operates, drawing on scholarship on PUS. We then apply the framework to three case studies to demonstrate its analytic purchase in analyzing recent innovation strategies in Luxembourg, Singapore, and Denmark. We conclude by outlining the implications of our research agenda for innovation scholarship and public policy.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › GND › 2NC Renewables Bad Link/AT Perm

Renewables are a productivist solution- they won’t displace fossil fuels, reducing work is superior to providing jobs for the transition

Fitz 21

(Don Fitz is on the Editorial Board of Green Social Thought https://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/articles/entry/be-careful-what-energy-you-wish-for , 10-15)

Climate change is an existential problem confronting humanity and Robert Pollin offers well thought-out plans in his first and second articles. There is only space here to respond to these themes: (1) We can reach zero CO2 emissions by 2050; (2) An enormous expansion of alternative energy (AltE) can create far more jobs than would be lost by eliminating fossil fuels (FF); and (3) Without stating so explicitly, he implies that negative aspects of AltE would be tiny. Unfortunately, the downsides of AltE loom so large that they must form the core of any serious discussion. Like many proponents of AltE, Pollin does not present climate change as symptomatic of capitalist overproduction, but as a stand-alone crisis whose resolution may require strengthening capitalism. Yet, there is already more than enough manufactured production to meet the needs of humanity, if only manufacturing were shifted from creating what is wasteful and destructive to production for need. The rush to massively expand AltE ignores what environmentalists have known for decades. Redesigning cities to create walkable communities is vastly more ecological than subjecting children in the Democratic Republic of Congo to the horrors of cobalt mining for electric vehicles. Humanity can reduce its footprint by consuming much less meat and relying on local food rather that transporting the average bite 1,700 miles. Americans do not need housing space vastly exceeding that of anywhere else in the world (except Australia). Buildings can be altered for reuse instead of constant tear-down-rebuilding. Manufacturing standards can be set to require the maximum life for goods rather than subjecting people to the message of “Buy, Buy, Buy!” as corporations design products to fall apart and go out of style. Humanity does not need more crap – corporations do. Rather than exploring these, Pollin labors to satisfy the corporate urge for infinite growth via “clean, renewable” energy sources of solar, wind, “small-scale hydro,” and “low-emissions bioenergy.” It is also necessary to point out that achieving a “zero emissions economy” by 2050 is a disingenuous goal. The life cycle of AltE requires FFs for construction equipment, mining for essential minerals, transportation, and disposing of the energy harvesting equipment. Wind and solar are intermittent, which means they require backup (often gas) for emergencies. Solar Power In addition to health problems from extraction, manufacturing and disposal, there are issues of those who would be affected. Greg Wagner recently wrote me: “I live in a small rural farming community known as Goldendale, Washington in Klickitat County on the east side of the state. I formed the group Citizens Educated about Solar Energy (CEASE) when I learned by accident the solar companies’ plans. My home and many others are surrounded by tens of thousands of acres of wheat/alfalfa/hay fields and beautiful views of Mt. Adams, Mt. St. Helens, and Mt. Hood. This will all be destroyed if our county commissioners allow Invenergy and Cypress Creek Renewables to build their proposed solar sites on the 10,000 acres we know about…” On the other side of the US, citizens in Culpepper County, Virginia blocked a proposal by Maroon Solar. The planning board said that “the project was out of character with the area, too large, and would be injurious to the health and safety of area residents.” Opponents also commented that “the utility-scale project would ruin the rural nature of the area, the environment, and historic resources.” Wind Power Health problems also appear with wind and victims of its placement are often unhappy. Opponents halted wind turbines in Reno County, Kansas. As in other areas, a major concern was having wind turbines too close to people. As Patrick Richardson reported, “The setback is often no more than double – sometimes just one and a half times – blade height, meaning turbines can be within as little as 500 feet away from a school, as in Labette County.” Showing that the problem is international, Shivani Gupta writes of 1000 villagers in the Kachchh district of India who protested plans to put industrial wind turbines in portions of the Sangnara forest and adjacent common grazing areas where farmers bring their cows and sheep. “The Sangnara forest is home to a huge diversity of endangered flora and fauna. This includes chinkara, wolf, caracal, ratel, hyena, desert cat, Indian fox, spiny tailed lizard, desert monitor, white-naped tit, vultures, and many more.” “Small Scale” Hydro Such power comes from dams with a capacity of less than 30 MW. While these dams are individually less destructive than mega-dams, a much, much larger number would be needed to provide power for an incessantly growing capitalism. At 22 MW capacity, the Agua Zarca hydro-project in Honduras was “small-scale.” Berta Cáceres won the 2015 Goldman Environmental Prize for organizing the Lenca people along with other indigenous groups and the Afro-Honduran Garifunas to oppose the dam. The following year she was murdered by those who stood to profit from “clean, renewable energy.” In addition to being sacred, “the Gualcarque River is a primary source of water for them to grow their food and harvest medicinal plants. Dams can flood fertile plains and deprive communities of water for livestock and crops.” “Low-Emissions” Bioenergy Burning organic material is now the rage in Europe. In April 2021, climate scientists James Dyke, Robert Watson, and Wolfgang Knorr, who had formerly supported plans for “net-zero” emissions did an about-face as they wrote about its latest version, Bioenergy Carbon Capture and Storage, or BECCS: “Rather than allow ecosystems to recover from human impacts and forests to regrow, BECCS generally refers to dedicated industrial-scale plantations regularly harvested for bioenergy rather than carbon stored away in forest trunks, roots and soils. Currently, the two most efficient biofuels are sugarcane for bioethanol and palm oil for biodiesel – both grown in the tropics. Endless rows of such fast growing monoculture trees or other bioenergy crops harvested at frequent intervals devastate biodiversity. It has been estimated that BECCS would demand between 0.4 and 1.2 billion hectares of land. That’s 25 percent to 80 percent of all the land currently under cultivation.” BECCS can also include burning wood pellets. Land Institute research scientist Stan Cox observes that “This process is not emissions-free; in fact, wood-fired power plants produce more pollution per kilowatt-hour of electricity than coal-fired plants.” Even if BECCS were used to capture those emissions, Cox notes that, “The process’s many steps – producing and harvesting biomass crops, hauling the biomass to the processing factory, grinding and pelletizing, hauling pellets to the power plant, sucking carbon dioxide out of the smokestack, liquefying the carbon dioxide, hauling the liquid to the injection field, and shooting it into the earth under high pressure – would, in sum, eat up large quantities of energy.” Jobs Once we realize both that AltE has devastating consequences and that humanity can exist quite well without the unnecessary production, a critically important question remains: Will using much less energy leave tens of millions of people unemployed? After all, ensuring full employment during a just economic transition must be a central goal of coping with climate disaster. The answer is provided to us by centuries of labor activists who have demanded a shorter work week. FDR was president the last time that labor considered a 30 hour work week in the US. Why in the world should we work more hours to destroy the lives of our descendants? Caps One of the most astounding aspects of the Green New Deal (GND) is that, despite understanding by its supporters that FFs must be reduced, none of the Democratic Party versions of the GND include a cap on the amount of FFs that can be produced. They imply that increasing AltE will cause FF use to decline, which is completely false. The capitalist state will ensure that AltE is added to the mix. As Cox notes succinctly: “The purge of oil, gas, and coal must be done directly, by law.”

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › GND › 2NC Renewables Bad Link/AT Perm

Renewable energy is the new ideology justifying capitalism- we should be skeptical of productivist solutions to climate change, they directly trade off with building alternative consciousness necessary to reduce consumption

Fitz 21

(Don Fitz is on the Editorial Board of Green Social Thought https://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/articles/entry/against-overproduction , 10-22)

Robert Pollin repeats a message often seen in writings defending alternative energy (AltE): while they briefly shake their heads at capitalist waste, they deny an overproduction problem. In his response to my article on “Be Careful What Energy You Wish For,” his message comes through that there are no limits on what can be done to the Earth’s ecosystems that AltE can’t solve. He accuses me of intending to restrict “consumption” even though that word never appears in my article. What appears repeatedly is the word “production.” Capitalism produces for profit, not consumption. This seemingly small difference becomes central for environmental solutions. A liberal might say “Produce cars, but make people feel guilty about driving them.” A socialist would say “Create walkable communities as a precondition for limiting production of individually owned cars.” As heat waves, out-of-control fires, and hurricanes increasingly sweep the globe, fossil fuel apologists continue their “climate change denial.” They are matched by the “energy denial” of AtlE enthusiasts who similarly deny that ALL industrially produced energy has seriously negative effects. The first major problem with Pollin’s rebuttal is that, like Congressional Democrats, he fails to demand federal legislation capping production of oil, gas, and coal and lowering the caps to zero by specific dates. With no plan for eliminating fossil fuels, we are left with a vague belief that increasing AltE will somehow cause a reduction in fossil fuels rather than adding new sources of energy to the mix. To further confuse the issue, he claims that AltE has no emissions, when in fact every type of AltE produces significant emissions during its life cycle. Second, by failing to acknowledge that AltE is not “clean,” he trivializes the way it destroys communities and ancestral lands, poisons workers, and intensifies species extinction during operation and decommissioning. One example is lithium for electric vehicles. As Thea Riofrancos writes: “Chile’s Atacama Desert is on the water system… Mining for lithium here is like mining salty water and evaporating it. Already water-scarce, the region is becoming drier due to climate change and water use by extractive sectors…” Lithium is then manufactured into batteries, exposing workers to NMP (reproductive toxin and embryotoxic), acetone (potential for neuroblastoma in children), and biphenyl (associated with Parkinson’s disease and dangers to the respiratory tract, liver, and nervous system). Multiply these effects of lithium by other damaging effects and then multiply them by the hundreds or thousands of substances that are mined for AltE and you get an idea of the KNOWN dangers. A third way in which Pollin exemplifies AltE writing is by vastly underestimating land area it requires by claiming that rooftops and parking lots provide most of the solution. Perhaps he did not read the quotation in my previous piece by climate scientists James Dyke, Robert Watson, and Wolfgang Knorr that harvesting wood for biomass energy “would demand between 0.4 and 1.2 billion hectares of land. That’s 25 percent to 80 percent of all the land currently under cultivation.” And perhaps he has not seen the estimate of Distinguished Professor Emeritus Vaclav Smil that “To replace current US energy consumption with renewables, you’d need to devote at least 25 to 50 percent of the US landmass to solar, wind, and biofuels.” Additional points must be considered: If Pollin truly believes that only a tiny land area is needed for AltE, then he should call for an end to lawsuits in the US and land grabs across the globe to build solar arrays and industrial wind turbines. Since the US uses 25 percent of the world’s energy with only 6 percent of its population, an unbelievable amount of land and rivers would be required for the rest of the world to match US squandering of resources. A 3 percent annual growth rate in GDP means a doubling of the economy in less than 25 years, a quadrupling of energy usage in less than 50 years, and an 8-fold increase in less than 75 years. The Law of Diminishing Returns verifies that the best space for wind, solar, hydro and biomass are used first and remaining land/rivers are less productive, requiring more to be used over time. This means that land usage must expand much more rapidly than GDP, exhausting the Earth’s resources and species. A fourth error permeating AltE writing is faith in unproven technologies. Pollin expects improvements in “industrial machinery, transportation equipment, and computers” along with “advances in battery storage and electricity transmission systems.” Such promises of accomplishments in an imagined future remind me that, during the ‘50s, the nuclear industry painted rosy pictures of “electricity too cheap to meter” which were just around the corner. Like other AltE supporters, Pollin insists that production must be increased massively to provide for the world’s poor. It is helpful to examine Cuba during its “Special Period” after the USSR collapsed in 1991 and discontinued its $4 to 5 billion annual subsidy. In my 2020 book, Cuban Health Care: The Ongoing Revolution, I emphasize that Cuba’s poverty is exacerbated by the embargo of 60 years from the richest country in the world, the US. During the Special Period, Cuba’s economy shrunk by 45 percent, imports fell from $8.12 billion to $1.99 billion, and oil imports from Russia plunged from 13.3 to 1.8 million tons. Despite these traumas, Cuba actually improved its health care system. In 1990, infant mortality per 1000 live births were 10.5 in Cuba and 9.4 in the US. By the end of the Special Period in 2000, Cuba was doing better with 6.3 deaths versus 7.1 in the US. At the beginning of the Special Period Cubans expected to live 64.2 years and Americans to live 69.8 years. By 2000, Cuba’s life expectancy of 76.9 years slightly edged out that of the US at 76.8 years. This is vitally important for a discussion of energy: Cuba spends roughly 10 percent per person per year on health care compared to the US. How is this possible? Even with an end to the embargo and ultra-economic growth, Cuba would not have been able to outpace per capita GDP of the US. The fundamental precondition of those changes was creating a new consciousness that Cuba could accomplish much more with much less. Without that new consciousness, its medical miracle could never have happened. Tunnel-visioning on AltE blocks the consciousness necessary for developing ways to use vastly less energy, which is essential for protecting biodiversity and human health. The gargantuan increase in production that a new AltE system would require is vital to capitalism, which cannot tolerate a long-term decrease in production. Capitalism is doomed to perish unless it finds a way to grow without fossil fuels. Thus, late capitalism desperately needs an ideology to justify AltE growth, just as infant capitalism needed the ideology of racism to justify plunder of Africa, Asia, and the Americas. During World War I, many Social Democrats took sides with “their own” national capitalists, believing that they were less bad. Today, their political great-grandchildren similarly help to preserve capitalism by siding with AltE “progressive capitalists.” Environmental, labor and socialist movements should reject any ideology of plundering of the Earth to fund capitalism’s pathological urge to grow. It is time to scream DEFUND CAPITALISM!

2023 Michigan Counterplan
AI Substance › GND › L: Renewable Exports/Economies of Scale

US Renewables exports/leadership re-centers capital accumulation

Lazare and Akuno 18

(Sarah, Contributing Editor, Kali, Director@CooperationJackson, https://inthesetimes.com/article/green-new-deal-alexandria-ocasio-cortez-climate-cooperation-jackson-capital , 12-12)

Sarah: What needs to be improved? Kali: There are some things in the framework that she put forth that need to be challenged. The one that I always highlight is this notion that the different types of solutions that are developed through the entrepreneurial innovations that come out of this program, like renewable energy technologies, that the U.S. government and major transnational corporations should be exporters of this energy and knowledge. That’s deeply embedding this thing as a new export industry, which is a new cycle of capital accumulation. That part really needs to be challenged. This is trying to embed the solution in market-based dynamics, but the market is not going to solve this problem. Sarah: U.S. industries have played tremendous and disproportionate role in driving climate change. It seems predatory for those industries to develop ​“solutions” and then turn around and sell them to the Global South. Kali: Yeah, it’s this logic of, I created the problem, I control the resolution of the problem through various mechanisms, I play a big role in preventing any serious motion that might happen at the level of intergovernmental exchange through the United Nations — under Obama, and now under 45. I set it up so that we come up with these technology solutions — some are pure scientific fiction – come up with a few carbon sequestration solutions, and I’m going to charge exorbitant rates selling technology to the Global South. Primarily Trump, the United States and western Europe created the problem and prevent anyone from coming up with solutions. They come up with market solutions and sell them back to us through force. We need to struggle with Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and others about this. We have to frame this in a way that really speaks to the global nature of the problem. We have to include the peoples of the world at the frontlines of the transition in the discussion to resolve it - Indigenous peoples, the peoples of Oceania, Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and the African continent. It’s not just a national problem. The way this is framed is really as if we’re going to stop certain problems within U.S. borders. But carbon emissions don’t observe national boundaries — they never have and never will. Nation-state policy limits us in certain ways. That’s another aspect of this that we have to push back on and challenge. This has to include front-line communities in the United States and from all throughout the world.