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Delegation is part and parcel of politics because elected officials who write statutes and make policy rarely personally implement these directives on the ground. The central challenge in the design of government institutions is thus to provide street-level bureaucrats with sufficient authority to utilize their expertise while avoiding having this discretion be abused to pursue divergent policy goals. This dilemma remains at the heart of the study of bureaucratic politics. However, the dilemma presupposes a trade- off between the discretion thought necessary for bureaucratic effectiveness and democratic responsive- ness (e.g., Epstein and O'Halloran 1999, 6). In reality, there are ample arenas in which discretion and respon- siveness go hand-in-hand - with street-level bureau- crats exercising their authority in highly responsive ways. Across many policy areas, including Medicaid (Weissert 1994), occupational health and safety (Scholz 1986; Scholz, Twombly, and Headrick 1991), labor law (Schmidt 2002), Social Security disability insurance (Keiser 1999), and immigration (Lewis et al. 2013), local workers appear to use their discretion to align realized policy outcomes with the local community norms and values, even when their formal responsibility is to implement otherwise identical statutory language. Such behavior is a different sort of bureaucratic responsiveness, one that may conflict with the clear intent of the legislators and elected executives who crafted the relevant legislation. In these and many other settings, discretion potentially brings about too much responsiveness rather than too little of it from the point of view the laws' authors.

The present study examines bureaucratic adaptation in the context of the national food stamp program. Using administrative records from the federal Department of Agriculture and various state social service agencies, I document substantial local variation in food stamp enrollment rates and show that these differences correspond to local voter attitudes toward government economic policies. The existence of such differences in food stamp access is surprising because Congress took a number of steps to bring about national uniformity in the program in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when lawmakers centralized many key decisions over its design in Washington, DC. The second part of my anal- ysis, which takes advantage of state-level variation in the way the program is administered, offers an explana- tion why these centralization efforts did not ultimately produce their desired effect. Most US state governments retain administrative responsibility over food stamps. In these states, potential beneficiaries submit their applica- tions at local offices, but the caseworkers who staff these offices report directly to state-level agencies. In a dozen remaining states, by contrast, administrative respon- sibility for the program is devolved further to county governments, which are overseen by locally elected offi- cials. Surprisingly, I show that the degree of administrative centralization does not affect the level of observed bureaucratic responsiveness to the preferences of local voters, which is high in both institutional settings.

Political scientists concur with international trade economists who argue that institutional structures, rules, and policies matter. While multicountry studies may explain how national policies affect crosscountry differences in income inequality, they do not help us understand how national policies affect within-country income inequality. Hatch and Rigby (2015) note there is significant heterogeneity in U.S. states’ fiscal policies—taxation and expenditures—and other. laws, including labor laws such as right to work Kelly and Witko (2012) find that state policy, such as state minimum wage laws, plays an important role in reducing income inequality, and Franko and Witco (2017) find that state laws that weaken unions also increase income inequality. Langer (2001) finds states that adopt more demandside economic development policies, such as investment in education and research and development, as opposed to more traditional supply-side policies, such as tax incentives, show reductions in income inequality. Solt (2008) finds that as inequality rises those in the lower-income categories become disengaged from the political process leading to a cycle where greater income inequality results in greater political inequality thus reinforcing policies that may favor the wealthy at the expense of the poorer. This latter result is largely reaffirmed by Kelly and Enns (2010: p855) who find “economic inequality is, in fact, self-reinforcing” through policy actions. As Hayes and Medina Vidal (2015) discuss, there is political response bias in favor of the wealthier, which also reinforces inequality.

Newman et al. (2015) talk in terms of how income inequality can influence public policies in terms of redistributive and inequality democracy perspectives. Here, the former argues that democratic processes create the potential for addressing inequality that is generated by economic forces. The bulk of the electorate will vote in their own economic self-interested and pursue policies that promote redistribution. Unequal democracies take a grimmer perspective in that higher-income voters have a disproportionate influence on economic policies to the detriment of lower- and middle-income voters. Gilens (2005, p778) in a study of voting behavior across different income levels finds “…that when Americans with different income levels differ in their policy preferences, actual policy outcomes strongly reflect the preferences of the most affluent but bear virtually no relationship to the preferences of the poor or middle-income Americans.”

At the same time as Harrison and Bluestone's “great U-turn,” in the mid-1970s there was also a surge in antitax activity. On June 6, 1978, California voters approved Proposition 13, the “People's Initiative to Limit Property Taxation,” which placed a constitutional limit on increases in property tax assessments to two percent per year. Also, in 1978, voters approved the "Headlee" tax limitation amendments to the Michigan Constitution, limiting increases in property taxes to the rate of inflation. Two years later, Massachusetts approved Proposition 2½, which limited increases in the property tax (as well as automobile excise taxes) to only 2.5% per year (hence the name). The current era is one where almost every state has some form of Tax and Expenditure Limitations (TELs) legislation for local governments, and most states have self-imposed limits on state governments (Amiel, Deller, & Stallmann, 2009).

The timing of the reversal of income convergence (the Great U-turn) and the tax revolt movement that occurred in the mid to late 1970s could be a coincidence, but it raises important questions. First, was the tax revolt, and specifically the movement in support of TELs, an attempt by those with higher incomes to protect their income or wealth by lowering their taxes? Alternatively, did the desire for lower taxes by the public result in unintended consequences that exacerbate trends in widening income inequality? Taxes are unequally distributed across income groups and the instruments chosen to limit tax/spending growth—restricting property taxes versus sales taxes or limiting the overall ability to raise taxes or increase expenditures—may have the unintended result of increasing income inequality. Additionally, unintended consequences may be the result of lower revenues and increasing budget inflexibility that result in cuts to programs that address income inequality.

Appendix D: Housing Benefits: Implications of a Publicly Funded Guaranteed Income

For the three largest housing programs—Housing Choice Vouchers (Section 8), Project Based Rental Assistance, and Public Housing129—income determinations not only affect income eligibility for program entrance but may affect the amount of a recipient’s subsidy and, by extension, the amount of rent they pay. HUD has provided pathways to exclude from consideration some guaranteed income payments that are part of privately funded demonstrations that provide monthly payments for research related purposes, but a publicly funded guaranteed income may face challenges regardless of implementation strategy.130

Appendix B: SNAP: Implications of a Publicly Funded Guaranteed Income

Unless explicitly excluded, federal SNAP regulations include “payments from Government-sponsored programs, dividends, interest, royalties, and all other direct money payments from any source which can be construed to be a gain or benefit,” as unearned income that is counted during the eligibility determination.112 For privately-funded guaranteed income demonstrations, there are some SNAP provisions that have been used to exclude certain lump sum and recurring payments from consideration in SNAP.113 However, for publicly funded state programs, the analysis is more complex and depends on the state’s choices regarding implementation strategy and frequency of payment.

To date, most guaranteed income programs have been funded by private philanthropic dollars. As state-level stakeholders look at opportunities to scale these programs, private donations will not be sufficient to sustain larger programs.

In the short term, there are opportunities to utilize federal dollars from various COVID relief efforts, particularly funding from the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA). ARPA provides $350 billion in funding to states, counties, metropolitan cities, municipal governments,72 with the first half of funding being received in May 2021, and the second half to arrive in 2022. Units of government receiving these funds have tremendous discretion to utilize the funds to:

Are basic-income policy proposals relevant at the state or local level? Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend illustrates how states can create dividends from sovereign wealth funds, or more directly from taxation of the use of common assets. But what about resource-poor states like Maine? Gary Flomenhaft (2012) calculated that even Vermont, also a resource-poor state, has enough resources that, if all the rents were taxed, and the revenue distributed as dividends, every citizen could receive between $1,900 and over $10,000 annually. Of course, clawing back these resources after having turned them over to private companies would face major political challenges.

A more modest, partial basic income could be created at the state level in several ways. A state-level carbon tax, desirable as a way to reduce fossil-fuel emissions, could yield a significant universal dividend, and the dividend would rectify an otherwise regressive and unpopular consumption tax. A carbon tax with progressive tax reductions has been implemented successfully in British Columbia (Durning and Bauman 2014).

Every person deserves to live with dignity and have their basic needs met. After decades of rollbacks and disinvestment, our current social safety net is insufficient given the economic situation we face. In the United States there is unconscionable and accelerating wealth inequality,1 wages have been stagnant for 40 years2 and, both before3 and throughout4 the coronavirus pandemic, many Americans struggle to meet their basic needs. In the richest country on Earth, elimination of deep poverty is attainable and long overdue. Historically, states have played a critical role in testing concepts to improve the lives of low-income residents and created a blueprint for anti-poverty measures that can be implemented nationwide.5 It is time to boldly reimagine and revitalize an eroded social safety net, and states have an opportunity to lead by example.

The devastation of the COVID-19 pandemic prompted mitigation strategies intended to get cash to people who were impacted. Federal policies such as increased unemployment insurance, an expanded and fully refundable Child Tax Credit (CTC), and stimulus checks have led to burgeoning support for permanent cash transfer programs like a guaranteed income. Additionally, state and local governments added to relief efforts by using federal dollars provided by both the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act and the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) to fund cash transfer programs of their own.6

But can workers and their families thrive on a half-time job guarantee?

Obviously, income from half-time work even at $15 per hour is not going to be a comfortable life, but because government supports have become more generous—particularly with policy changes made during the pandemic—a half-time job guarantee offers a reasonable safety net for working families.

In the wake of the Covid recession, state and local governments have the chance to remake local labor markets—and public assistance—by adopting a policy guaranteeing half-time employment at $15 an hour for every resident.

Despite the hype of supposed proliferating job openings, long experience shows that even if we approach rates of nominal “full employment” again, such statistics will inevitably ignore higher unemployment rates for Black, Latino, formerly incarcerated, and many other workers. In a Covid-based recession where women in particular have struggled to return to previous levels of employment, a job guarantee may be critical to restore real employment alternatives for everyone who wants a job.

The 42nd Annual Kenneth M. Piper Lecture explores the origins and impact of the Green New Deal (GND) as an example of "catalytic localism": local policymaking shaped in dynamic dialogue with federal policy processes. As an ambitious effort to address the "triple crisis" of spiraling economic inequality, climate change, and structural racism, the GND is an important illustration of the dynamic scale-shifting - from local to federal to local, and back again - of mutually reinforcing policy cycles designed to build political and cultural consensus for systemic legal change. First introduced in February 2019 by a group of progressive Democrats led by Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and Senator Ed Markey (D-MA), who championed "the duty of the Federal Government" to create good jobs by building a clean energy economy, 1. the GND advanced principles that grew out of local "blue-green" campaigns to promote economic and environmental equity These local campaigns built networks and policy templates that shaped the structure and content of the federal GND, which in turned helped to influence the political environment for GND-style laws and legislative proposals at the state and local levels. The lecture examines this dynamic lawmaking, while evaluating the potential and tradeoffs of laws - like those proposed under the GND - that seek to combine sustainable environmental change with structural labor reform. Specifically, drawing on evidence from states and cities that passed or proposed "mini-GNDs" prior to the pandemic, the lecture explores the challenges of incorporating robust labor standards into ambitious proposals to address climate change and considers the conditions under which the GND might work better for workers.

My motivation to study the GND as a version of catalytic localism grew from a puzzle. Because the GND resolution emerged during the Trump presidency - and thus had no chance of becoming law - what precisely was it meant to achieve? The conventional wisdom was that the GND was a progressive vision statement: an aspirational document intended to galvanize [*292] voters, bolstering the progressive bloc within the Democratic party, and strengthening the position of its authors as party influencers (and, in the case of Ocasio-Cortez, as a potential candidate for higher office). While this analysis seems correct, my previous research on local blue-green alliance formation and policymaking suggested an alternative, complementary, rationale 2: that the GND, though not meant to be immediately enacted, might nonetheless serve to catalyze change from below; and that bottom-up momentum might produce a critical mass of state and local mini-GNDs that could provide the political foundation for, and build public opinion around, a national version - which might then spark new local innovations. My lecture explores this possibility by tracing the local origins of labor-environmental collaboration, the relationship between the federal GND and state and local laws, and the potential for federal GND policymaking, which was raised in connection with President Biden's ambitious - though now politically moribund - infrastructure plan.

Toward this end, GND reforms seek to link investments in clean energy to the creation of high-quality domestic jobs and opportunities for business ownership in disadvantaged low-income communities and communities of color. This theory of change leverages clean energy sector growth to promote [*296] economic equity and racial inclusion. Since at least 2017, clean energy jobs have significantly outnumbered those in the traditional fuel sector, 18and these jobs are geographically dispersed. In nearly every state, there are significantly more jobs in "clean energy" - such as building renewable solar farms and wind power, and creating clean coal and zero-emission electricity - and "energy efficiency" - such as creating LEED certified buildings and LED lightbulbs, electric plug-in vehicles, and grid modernization - than in the fossil fuel sector. 19 The projected trends suggests further growth. 20Independent observers have found that these "green" jobs pay on average 25% higher than the national median and have higher unionization rates. 21This linkage between the "green" of private sector clean energy job growth and the "blue" of high-road labor standards formed the foundation for Biden's "big bet" on infrastructure - codified in the Build Back Better plan - which rested on the fundamental argument that fighting climate change would add "good paying jobs for American workers," 22and that those jobs could be targeted to people historically excluded from high-road employment opportunities. From this perspective, the administration could achieve a "just transition" to equitable clean energy by making strategic national investments to nudge existing trends forward to advance a "triple bottom line" - with significant environmental, economic, and racial equity returns - responding directly to the "triple crises." The political failure of this plan underscores the dearth of moral leadership and the profoundly broken state of American politics, while also drawing attention to the potential of alternative pathways of political change that do not hinge on the immediate promise of good-faith bipartisan policymaking at the national level.

B. Catalytic Localism

This review of pre-pandemic mini-GNDs highlights the significant legislative activity on issues of climate and economic justice around the GND [*340] "moment" - just before and (mostly) after the early 2019 launch of the federal resolution. It illuminates the diversity of approaches, while also revealing important policy continuities. With respect to environmental policy, there are three major takeaways. First, most states and localities align with the federal GND by proposing to eliminate or reduce carbon emissions, albeit with different goals and timetables. Following a core GND tenet, most mini-GNDs propose renewable and clean energy targets economy-wide or in more limited fashion - for example, in relation to electric power. This sometimes involves public investments in improving the efficiency of renewable energy sources, such as Minnesota's plan to invest $ 16 million to install solar panels in public schools. Second, most mini-GNDs focus on upgrading the energy efficiency of buildings through retrofits, eliminating glass walls, mandating efficient lighting, and following LEED standards. And third, state and local GNDs devote significant resources to clean transit: spending to purchase and retrofit buses, upgrade subway lines, and promote high-speed rail. Clean transit initiatives include state-level incentives for the purchase of electric vehicles, like Nevada's rule increasing weight limits for electric trucks.

As for the labor provisions, there are also three important takeaways from my review. First, less than half of the mini-GNDs explicitly promote job creation and better wages, and those that do generally set goals and standards, often without specific enforcement mechanisms. For instance, California's AB 1839 calls for green jobs that are "family-supporting with career ladders," without providing a roadmap for implementation. One exception is Oregon's proposed GND, HB 2020, which would mandate that clean energy projects funded with public dollars meet specified labor standards. Second, there is very little that mini-GNDs have to say about unions and collective bargaining, outside of reference in a few plans, such as OneNYC, to supporting workers' right to bargain collectively. One example of a more direct link comes from Washington state, where SB 5116 provides a tax exemption for clean energy projects that pay workers at rates determined by collective bargaining. Third, almost all of the mini-GNDs reviewed place a significant focus on "just transition." However, there is wide variance in what precisely is covered by those provisions. In New York and California, mini-GNDs create advisory boards to promote equity in the distribution of funds to protect workers displaced by the shift from fossil fuels, focusing on public benefits and retraining. Colorado's HB 19-1314 creates a Just Transition Office and mandates benefits to coal transition workers to support education and retraining. Other jurisdictions seek to dedicate just transition funding streams to ensure that marginalized communities gain the benefits of clean energy [*341] projects. In this vein, Illinois's proposed Clean Energy Jobs Act commits $ 750 million for low-income communities to access solar power and other clean energy sources.

B. State Legal Incentives for Green New Deal Power Generation

1. Uneven "Green" Resource Distribution and Access

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL RISK PERCEPTION: WHY HUMANS MISPERCEIVE TECHNOLOGY

There are several psychological factors that contribute to risk misperception in humans. People rely on a mixture of cognitive crutches, heuristics, and emotional appraisals to navigate the risks of everyday life.2 15 A brief mental exercise demonstrates one of these cognitive shortcuts. Take a moment and picture a bird in your mind. Chances are you pictured a sparrow, robin, or crow instead of a long-wattled umbrellabird or an albatross. But why did your brain, without any conscious thought, select the bird that it did? Why does the baseball player refuse to wash his lucky socks? 216 Why do Americans perceive Black men as more dangerous than white men? 217

(Colleen V. Chien, Justin D'Atri Visiting Professor of Business Law, Columbia Law School; Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; 2013-2015 White House Senior Advisor, Innovation and Intellectual Property, “Rigorous Policy Pilots: Experimentation in the Administration of the Law, July, 2019, “104 Iowa L. Rev. 2313,” pg lexis//um-ef)

While a voluntary, limited or temporary pilot will have less impact than a mandatory, agency-wide, or permanent practice, there's also a risk that the [*2331] uncertainty associated with a temporary program will unsettle stakeholders and result in more speculative and premature reactions than would be elicited by a more formed proposal. 104To reduce these risks, an agency's disclosure should at least inform the public of: the motivation for the pilot, the policy to be tested out, the information sought, and (where available) the agency's commitment to action based on the results of the pilot - a best practice in experimentation called "pre-commitment." Rulemaking based on experimental evidence may require more disclosure. The Portland Cement 105decision of the D.C. Circuit and its progeny have been read to suggest "an obligation to reveal agency data from the outset," 106in order to support review and engagement with the data when dispositive. 107In cases where the data is conclusive, even if more work to disclose, with the shared experience comes a greater chance of a common, ground truth, at least that is the hope. 108As long as the agency faithfully follows the ordinary notice and comment process, procedural obstacles should be surmountable.

(Colleen V. Chien, Justin D'Atri Visiting Professor of Business Law, Columbia Law School; Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; 2013-2015 White House Senior Advisor, Innovation and Intellectual Property, “Rigorous Policy Pilots: Experimentation in the Administration of the Law, July, 2019, “104 Iowa L. Rev. 2313,” pg lexis//um-ef)

The previous Part addresses legal challenges to rigorous policy pilots. However, significant practical and institutional challenges to rigorous piloting will often attend. Recent research has found that people tend to view as inappropriate pilots that purport to randomize a treatment even when the underlying treatment is unobjectionable, 136suggesting that buy-in of the [*2336] relevant population, if required, will require education and communication. More upfront work is also required to make explicit the assumptions behind an intervention, and then to develop a strategy for testing them. Agencies carrying out rigorous tests must marshal resources, data, statistical expertise, support for departing from the status quo, and explanations for skeptics. 137There often will be no agreed upon measure of success. Even when there is, attrition, changed circumstances, poor design or a host of other factors can lead to a lack of inconclusive or null results. The results may be rejected. For example, in their review of the 50 or so randomized experiments in U.S. law that have ever been conducted, mostly in the field of criminal law and judicial procedure, Greiner and Matthews found a major problem to be the refusal of judges and lawyers to accept experimental results that did not jive with their sense of the "right answer." 138

Ready, Aim, Fire" is so old-fashioned. Careful, thorough, risk averse planners simply need not apply. This fast paced, action oriented world demands a lot less "readying" and "aiming." Pilot programs are a great response. Until they succumb to these common ailments:

1. Collaboration killers

Pilots—for programs ranging from a new model of fire engine to teen pregnancy prevention efforts—are an accepted management technique almost everywhere. Unfortunately, there are lots of ways to get tripped up by them," write Katherine Barrett and Richard Greene.

One issue is that residents may not realize that the infrastructure or service is part of a pilot program that could eventually go away, they note. "So, if the ultimate decision is made that permanently implementing the pilot program would be too expensive, those who’ve enjoyed the benefits of the new service will lose it."

Michael Horowitz and Philip Tetlock have an interesting piece in Foreign Policy that examines the record on long-range forecasting of global events — 15 – 20 years into the future. They acknowledge the inherent difficulties of such a projections, but still wonder:

whether there are not ways of doing a better job — of assigning more explicit, testable, and accurate probabilities to possible futures. Improving batting averages by even small margins means the difference between runner-ups and World Series winners — and improving the accuracy of probability judgments by small margins could significantly contribute to U.S. national security.