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Crude oil production is at record levels in Canada, as is oilsands output. The U.S. oil industry is heading for a record production year while global oil markets are expected to produce at a record rate of 102 million barrels a day for the next two years, according to a forecast by the U.S. Energy Information Agency. Coal output is setting records.

Peak oil scenarios have been wrong for decades, and for one overwhelming set of reasons that relate to the uncertain science of measuring and understanding the economics of fossil fuel energy — first from the supply side and now from the demand side.

Oil prices edged higher Thursday, extending recent gains on signs of cooling U.S. inflation as well as a fall in U.S. inventories.

At 09:10 ET (13:10 GMT), Brent Oil Futures rose 0.3% to $85.37 a barrel, while West Texas Intermediate crude futures rose 0.4% to $82.42 a barrel.

Reports indicate that global crude prices have increased by around $4 per barrel in the last two weeks, while HSD prices have risen by $2 per barrel. Premium on petrol is estimated at $8.76 per bbl and $6.50 per bbl.

This rise in international prices is expected to translate to a domestic increase of Rs7.55 per litre for petrol and Rs3.52 per litre for HSD.

Crude oil futures rose Thursday as inflation eased, bolstering hopes that the Federal Reserve will cut interest rates later this year. Inflation as measured by the  dropped 0.1% from May to June, putting the 12-month rate at 3%, near the lowest level in more than three years, according to the U.S. Department of Labor. The market is expecting the Federal Reserve to start cutting interest rates in September. Lower interest rates typically stimulate economic growth, which can bolster crude oil demand. The inflation and interest rate outlook overshadowed mixed signals on oil demand for this year. The Paris-based International Energy Agency said global demand growth eased to 710,000 barrels per day year on year in the second quarter, the slowest increase since the fourth quarter of 2022, as consumption in China contracted. The IEA is forecasting global oil demand growth will average just under one million barrels per day in 2024 due to subpar economic growth, greater energy efficiency and electric vehicle adoption. OPEC, on the other hand, is much more bullish, forecasting demand growth of 2.2 million barrels per day as the cartel sees solid economic growth of 2.9% this year.

In the event of contentious anti-government uprisings, the monarchy would feel pressured to offer change. The most likely scenario would be the promotion of MBS, a reformer with a great deal of youth support. This promotion is unlikely to quell elite resentment and could further inflame tensions among the monarchy, rival family members, and the religious establishment. If MBS offers liberal reforms, he would likely lose the support of the ultra-conservative Wahhabi clerics. Yet if he fails to provide reforms, resistance to the Saudi rulers could grow based on regionalism and tribalism in the Hijaz, Nejd, or the Eastern Province. Neither scenario bodes well for the monarchy. Though he has a loyal following in the military, MBS’s military excursion in Yemen has received substantial criticism, creating the conditions for a coup if destabilization escalates under his stewardship.

Hostile elites with competing clientele bases would see state collapse as an opening for greater power. Since the kingdom’s unification in 1932, an overarching Saudi identity has been elusive. Saudi nationalism is a new concept. The state has been united by the cooptation of elites and the promotion of Wahhabi ideology, which while popular in the Nejd heartland faces rejection from the country’s Shi’ite minority. Not all Saudi Sunnis, meanwhile, practice this branch of Sunni Islam.

Resource-rich countries, overwhelmed by income from resource sales, have three options that are listed here in decreasing order of economic efficiency: (i) forced investment strategies that use income for modernising the economy in an attempt to prepare the country for a period in which income from resources falls, but which may overstress the adaptation capacities of societies; (ii) investment in funds in preparation for periods of declining sales; (iii) domestic use, which in most cases overstresses the absorption capacities of national economies and leads to price hikes in local goods, endogenous deindustrialisation and a revaluation of the currency, thus reducing national competitiveness. This follows transfer theory (Samuelson, 1964; Balassa, 1964) and is the basis of what is called the resource curse (Auty and Mikesell, 1993).2 The three strategies often appear as hybrids; however, dominant characteristics can be identified. For example, Shah Reza Pahlavi applied the first strategy in the 1960s and 1970s when trying to propel Iran into modernity. This failed because of inner opposition but left the mullahs with a formidable industry structure. Today, Norway commands one of the world’s largest investment funds. The Netherlands, on the other hand, spent gas income on domestic programmes that led to price hikes followed by wage increases in the non-tradable sector that subsequently spilled over into manufacturing. The loss of competitiveness drove the rail, car and aircraft industries out of the markets. It is known as the Dutch disease or the East German disease because of the similar effects of the stabilisation transfers from West Germany after unification (Blum, 2008). It is clear that the loss of criticality will hit a type iii country hardest, and even if type ii funds are available, they may be syphoned off. Moreover, this may completely reverse financial flows in large countries and have a devastating effect on international financial stability. Oil has been a critical resource for a long time; however, this is beginning to change. We use the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a major oil producer, as a reference. The country is in danger of economic collapse if oil prices suddenly fall – which is not beyond the realm of possibility. The remainder of the article is organised as follows: In the next section, we analyse the roots of crises from a resource perspective. Using oil as an example, we point to the problem of managing financial inflows efficiently and to the impact of geostrategic rivalry. We then concentrate on two major factors that have led to a regime change in the balance between global oil production and consumption: fracking and defossilisation.3 We subsequently apply this to Saudi Arabia and point to the medium- to long-term challenges for global stability given this regime change. Finally, we conclude that a substantial turnaround in investment management is required of (Middle Eastern) oil-producing countries to guarantee global stability. Geostrategic Cheap oil has promoted the rapid industrialization of the Western world and benefited oil-exporting countries by providing a sufficient influx of oil money, especially to those that joined forces and co-founded the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to set oil prices. Many of these oil-rich countries have achieved oil-driven economic growth and joined the group of middle- and high-income countries. Oil has been a critical energy resource since the 19th century. In 2018, crude oil made up 33% of the world’s annual primary energy consumption (BP Energy, 2020). Since its wide industrial use from the late 19th century onwards, partly due to Rockefeller’s efforts to monopolise the oil market and then the antitrust-led breakup of the Standard Oil Company, global oil consumption and production have been steadily increasing. In the 21st century, soaring demand in emerging economies has compensated for the stagnating oil demand from the developed world. Today, oil still has a relatively low degree of substitution, particularly with respect to technology (transport sector, chemicals) and transport (large tankers, pipelines). This guarantees a stable demand despite volatile prices. Empirical studies support the relatively low price elasticity of the global oil demand, especially in the short run (Cooper, 2003; Caldara et al., 2016). Due to its low substitutability and the oligopolistic market structure, oil has provided its suppliers with a steady stream of revenues. Having experienced an ever-increasing demand for fossil fuel, the second half of the 20th century was besieged by the economic threat of “peak oil”. However, this concern about a negative supply shock has now mainly shifted to “peak demand”. According to recent predictions, oil’s dominance, and therefore criticality, will decrease rapidly in the coming 30 years. The main driver of this profound shift in mindset is environmental concerns about greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, fracking turned the US from an importer to an exporter of oil and gas. This has not only put pressure on prices, it decoupled the US strategically from the Middle East as a military safeguard of global oil supplies. In response, Saudi Arabia launched an oil price offensive, trying to drive the US fracturing industry from the market and indirectly hitting its biggest regional rival, Iran, in its strategy to modernise its industries. In fact, Saudi Arabia had switched from swing pricing, which tries to pricing, which tries to equilibrate oil prices to levels that satisfy both producers and consumers, to limit pricing.

The OPEC oil price is a critical factor influencing the global oil market. This price is determined by the balance of supply and demand for oil, which in turn depends on various factors such as economic growth, political instability, changes in production, and technological innovations. The OPEC oil price also affects the price of WTI oil, as they are closely linked to each other. However, it should not be forgotten that the markup for WTI oil also depends on other factors, such as crude oil types such as Brent and Dubai Crude. This effect is attributed to the high cost of crude oil extraction using the U.S. Hydraulic fracturing technology. As global crude oil prices increase, hydraulic fracturing becomes more lucrative. The Drilling Productivity Report [3] notes that an increase in the number of active wells in the U.S. leads to increased oil production. However, drilling new wells generally costs more than fracturing existing ones and enhancing their productivity. The U.S. fracking boom [4] has resulted in a surge in crude oil production and increased global supply, driving down world oil prices. The reduction in world oil prices triggers the closure of unprofitable wells and a decrease in oil production in the U.S., which directly impacts the WTI price formation and can be incorporated into the model.

However, it also highlights the significance of renewable energy sources as a potential solution to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. With the rise of renewable energy, such as solar and wind power, the demand for crude oil may decrease, thus leading to a reduction in hydraulic fracturing and crude oil production. Moreover, as renewable energy technologies continue to advance and become more affordable, they could become more competitive with traditional energy sources. This could result in a shift towards renewable energy sources and a decrease in the use of fossil fuels, which would not only reduce the impact on the environment but also provide long-term economic benefits. Therefore, the insights gained from understanding the dynamics of crude oil production can inform the transition towards a more sustainable energy future.

U.S. crude oil rose nearly 1% Wednesday, topping $82 per barrel as U.S. inventories declined while OPEC sees solid demand supported by stronger economic growth this year.

U.S. oil inventories fell by 3.4 million barrels last week while gasoline stocks shrank by two million barrels, according to the. But implied oil demand, measured by products supplied to the market, softened by 334,000 barrels per day.

But it does seem prudent to ask just how much economic devastation we want to inflict upon a country with roughly 4,500 nuclear warheads — 4,477 warheads to be precise, with “about 1,588 strategic warheads [which] are deployed on ballistic missiles and at heavy bomber bases, while an approximate additional 977 strategic warheads, along with 1,912 nonstrategic warheads, are held in reserve.”

For a long stretch of the post–Cold War years, the West feared some Russian military official selling off a nuclear weapon or components or radioactive materials to dangerous forces. Forcibly impoverishing the country with the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world feels like a formula for more trouble down the road.

For a few crazy hours last weekend, Vladimir Putin's presidency looked like it could be on the brink.

The dramatic revolt by the mercenary Wagner Group culminated in an armored column making its way toward Moscow. As the convoy powered through the country, preparations were made in the capital for imminent conflict.

The OPEC oil price is a critical factor influencing the global oil market. This price is determined by the balance of supply and demand for oil, which in turn depends on various factors such as economic growth, political instability, changes in production, and technological innovations. The OPEC oil price also affects the price of WTI oil, as they are closely linked to each other. However, it should not be forgotten that the markup for WTI oil also depends on other factors, such as crude oil types such as Brent and Dubai Crude. This effect is attributed to the high cost of crude oil extraction using the U.S. Hydraulic fracturing technology. As global crude oil prices increase, hydraulic fracturing becomes more lucrative. The Drilling Productivity Report [3] notes that an increase in the number of active wells in the U.S. leads to increased oil production. However, drilling new wells generally costs more than fracturing existing ones and enhancing their productivity. The U.S. fracking boom [4] has resulted in a surge in crude oil production and increased global supply, driving down world oil prices. The reduction in world oil prices triggers the closure of unprofitable wells and a decrease in oil production in the U.S., which directly impacts the WTI price formation and can be incorporated into the model.

However, it also highlights the significance of renewable energy sources as a potential solution to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. With the rise of renewable energy, such as solar and wind power, the demand for crude oil may decrease, thus leading to a reduction in hydraulic fracturing and crude oil production. Moreover, as renewable energy technologies continue to advance and become more affordable, they could become more competitive with traditional energy sources. This could result in a shift towards renewable energy sources and a decrease in the use of fossil fuels, which would not only reduce the impact on the environment but also provide long-term economic benefits. Therefore, the insights gained from understanding the dynamics of crude oil production can inform the transition towards a more sustainable energy future.

U.S. crude oil rose nearly 1% Wednesday, topping $82 per barrel as U.S. inventories declined while OPEC sees solid demand supported by stronger economic growth this year.

U.S. oil inventories fell by 3.4 million barrels last week while gasoline stocks shrank by two million barrels, according to the. But implied oil demand, measured by products supplied to the market, softened by 334,000 barrels per day.

Governments can also stimulate sustainable innovation by providing incentives for research and development. For instance, tax credits, grants, and subsidies for companies investing in green technologies can reduce the financial barriers to entry for innovators. The UK’s Green Channel program, which expedites the examination of environmentally beneficial patents, serves as a prime example of how regulatory measures can accelerate the pace of green innovation. By reducing the time and cost associated with patenting sustainable technologies, such programs can encourage more organizations to prioritize eco-friendly solutions.

Moreover, fostering collaborative innovation is essential to overcome the limitations of traditional patent systems that may impede technology transfer. Strategic patent management should include approaches like open-source licensing and patent pools, which can facilitate the sharing of knowledge and promote widespread adoption of green technologies. These collaborative frameworks enable companies to leverage shared intellectual property for mutual benefit, thus speeding up the diffusion of innovations critical to addressing climate change and resource scarcity.

The underlying principle for advocating a patent rewards system for clean and sustainable technologies is that a cleaner environment constitutes a public good (meaning, one individual’s use does not reduce another’s use), and that positive externalities undercut demand for environmentally friendly products and services [41]. In other words, profit-maximizing firms do not subscribe much weight to the environmental benefit of a technological investment towards the social value and benefit on numerous third parties and to society, but instead are focused on the direct costs. Thus, if businesses are not willing to pay for clean and sustainable technologies that reflect their social value, then the patent system may not incentivize development of such technologies to a socially optimal value.

Instead, an alternative type patent system — a parent rewards system — could bring private incentives in line with the social value of an invention, and could be wove into the existing patent system [18]. Similar to inventions concerning national security, which may not receive patents, a patent reward system would provide a monetary reward based on the importance of the invention. While valuing the environmental benefit may be difficult, it already exists in some administrative agencies. In effect, such a rewards proposal is akin to a prize, where an inventor is paid an amount in the form of prize and the invention is then placed into the public domain, and then the invention is placed into the public domain [42]. While a would allow the government to acquire rights to patent, compensate the inventor directly, and would enable the government to force licensing of the invention or use the invention itself, it would generate a significant shift from the current patent regime [18]. A patent rewards system has not been implemented by any country and generated mostly scholarly debate.

One method that may remedy the issue of positive externalities is a patent prize system (sometimes called a “patent reward”).91 A patent prize is a reward—often, but not exclusively, a monetary award—given to the first individual to meet the reward criteria established by the government.92 Similar to patent systems, inventors “[i]n a pure prize system”93 bear both the cost of development and the risk of failure.94 The difference between patents and prizes, as they relate to innovation incentives, is that market forces determine the value of a patent, while a nonmarket entity (e.g., the government) determines the value of a prize.95 Significant scholarship has focused on developing accurate methods for determining prize value.96 Examples include compensating inventors based on the inventor’s expected profit,97 sales data,98 auction process,99 and a mix of private and government estimates.100 An innovative example of a non-monetary award is found with the Patents for Humanity award, discussed below in section II.C, wherein a successful inventor is awarded a certificate for accelerated patent examination.101 Regardless of the chosen method, the advantage of any prize system is that a nonmarket entity is at least theoretically capable of taking into account not only the market value of the technology but the social value as well.102 Some suggested prize systems propose that the inventor relinquish their patent rights to the government in exchange for the prize,103 but this is not necessary to every prize system.104 Additionally, both patents and prizes are flexible enough in form so that their monetary value can be paid out as either a lump sum or incrementally over time.105 Prizes have several advantages over patent systems. As already mentioned, prizes are not necessarily tied to market demand, meaning that they can internalize positive externalities in ways that patents cannot.106 For example, the market may fail to account for the social value of technologies that generate substantial positive externalities, but a prize established by a government can account for such value.107 Prizes can also reduce the inefficiency caused by companies expending resources to invent around competitors’ patents.108 Furthermore, they can reduce licensing transaction costs, which can further reduce the risk and cost inefficient “patent thickets.”109 Prizes can also eliminate the “deadweight loss” resulting from the noncompetitive pricing of patented inventions (though this implies that the patent is no longer available to the inventor for commercialization purposes).110 A patent prize system is not without its disadvantages. Determining the value of inventions is the most obvious difficulty.111 If the government’s compensation model fails to accurately reflect the invention’s profitability, inventors will take the risk of commercializing the invention themselves.112 If the compensation model fails to accurately compensate for the environmental benefit of the invention, then it provides no advantage over the normal patent system from a market demand perspective.113 This is compounded by the possibility that the government is at an informational disadvantage relative to market actors in establishing commercial value.114 Moreover, prizes do not typically have as great a commercialization incentive as patents because much of a patent’s value is only realized through commercialization (which potentially hinders the distribution of the technology after the prize is awarded).115 Finally, prize mechanisms require the establishment of clear, concrete goals or particular problems to be solved.116 Despite the difficulty of calculating proper compensation, some patent prize models are already in place in several areas.117 For example, there is already a patent prize system in place for atomic weapons inventions.118 The Patent Compensation Board sets compensation for inventions related to atomic weapons and considers the “actual use” and “importance” of the invention when assessing its value.119 Additionally, several administrative agencies already employ environmental valuation strategies when balancing the benefits and costs of environmental regulation,120 suggesting that, while difficult, “[v]aluing the social benefit of environmental innovation is . . . [an] achievable[] task.”121 Lastly, an example of non-monetary compensation is the Patents for Humanity award, which bypasses the difficulty of calculating social benefit by instead awarding a special certificate to expedite the patent process.122

In light of the patent system’s shortcomings in the environmental domain, the analysis conducted in this Article supports increasing the use of other policy instruments for incentivizing innovation alongside the patent system.221 There is a variety of such alternative incentive mechanisms that may be applicable in different contexts.222 In the environmental domain, two non-patent incentive schemes that seem to hold a particular promise are prizes (monetary rewards provided to the first person to deliver a specified invention),223 and direct ex ante governmental funding via R&D subsidies and grants, cooperation agreements, or procurement.224

Despite the central role of the patent system in discussions of incentives for R&D,225 there has been a reemerging scholarly interest in the foregoing alternative mechanisms in recent years.226 Several scholars have also noted the potential beneficial use of such alternative mechanisms in the specific context of environmental innovation.227 Sure enough, governments already employ these (and other) types of mechanisms to incentivize innovation alongside the patent system.228

Both of us have experienced in our own way the damage created by white silence. For example, many years ago, one of us, Wendy, worked for a large, complex department at an institution in the West that had a history of recruiting Black employees. She would often hear rumblings about the discontent and mistreatment of them through colleagues. Yet in her position as a midlevel employee in the department, aligned racially with the white leadership, she failed to recognize the issue and advocate for them to interrogate and understand the experience of those Black employees, as well as to explore opportunities for her department to make transformative change.

Wendy and others in that department prided themselves on hiring Black, Latine, Indigenous and LGBTQ+ employees, as well as people with disabilities. But they did not examine why they hadn’t retained many of those employees or promoted them to leadership roles—they simply accepted that Black folks coming into the department and quickly leaving as “just what happens.”

School of Social Sciences at the University of irvine, they earned their Ph.D. at the University of Texas at Austin in Anthropology.] (Damien M., “Another Life is Possible: Black Fugitivity and Enclosed Places” University of California, Irvine, Nov 29 2017, https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3343&context=lawreview)// [King K]

Black Fugitivity: Politics of Disengagement and Refusal

[23] Elsewhere, in a discussion of Du Bois on the study of black folk, Gordon restates an existential phenomenological conception of the antiblack world developed across his first several books: “Blacks here suffer the phobogenic reality posed by the spirit of racial seriousness. In effect, they more than symbolize or signify various social pathologies—they become them. In our antiblack world, blacks are pathology” (Gordon 2000: 87). This conception would seem to support Moten’s contention that even much radical black studies scholarship sustains the association of blackness with a certain sense of decay and thereby fortifies and extends the interlocutory life of widely accepted political common sense. In fact, it would seem that Gordon deepens the already problematic association to the level of identity. And yet, this is precisely what Gordon argues is the value and insight of Fanon: he fully accepts the definition of himself as pathological as it is imposed by a world that knows itself through that imposition, rather than remaining in a reactive stance that insists on the (temporal, moral, etc.) heterogeneity between a self and an imago originating in culture. Though it may appear counterintuitive, or rather because it is counterintuitive, this acceptance or affirmation is active; it is a willing or willingness, in other words, to pay whatever social costs accrue to being black, to inhabiting blackness, to living a black social life under the shadow of social death. This is not an accommodation to the dictates of the antiblack world. The affirmation of blackness, which is to say an affirmation of pathological being, is a refusal to distance oneself from blackness in a valorization of minor differences that bring one closer to health, to life, or to sociality. Fanon writes in the first chapter of Black Skin, White Masks, “The Black Man and Language”: “A Senegalese who learns Creole to pass for Antillean is a case of alienation. The Antilleans who make a mockery out of him are lacking in judgment” (Fanon 2008: 21). In a world structured by the twin axioms of white superiority and black inferiority, of white existence and black nonexistence, a world structured by a negative categorical imperative— “above all, don’t be black” (Gordon 1997: 63)—in this world, the zero degree of transformation is the turn toward blackness, a turn toward the shame, as it were, that “resides in the idea that ‘I am thought of as less than human’” (Nyong’o 2002: 389).xiv In this we might create a transvaluation of pathology itself, something like an embrace of pathology without pathos. [24] To speak of black social life and black social death, black social life against black social death, black social life as black social death, black social life in black social death—all of this is to find oneself in the midst of an argument that is also a profound agreement, an agreement that takes shape in (between) meconnaissance and (dis)belief. Black optimism is not the negation of the negation that is afro-pessimism, just as black social life does not negate black social death by inhabiting it and vitalizing it. A living death is as much a death as it is a living. Nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society, of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of people and place, of history and heritage, of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonized, of all that capital has in common with labor—the modern world system. Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space. This is agreed. That is to say, what Moten asserts against afropessimism is a point already affirmed by afro-pessimism, is, in fact, one of the most polemical dimensions of afro-pessimism as a project: namely, that black life is not social, or rather that black life is lived in social death. Double emphasis, on lived and on death. That’s the whole point of the enterprise at some level. It is all about the implications of this agreed- upon point where arguments (should) begin, but they cannot (yet) proceed.

Rather than correct his reading of Arendt, note instead how both theorists narrate a history producing impasse and compose romances of a revolutionary treasure each protects from devaluation and danger. Despite moments of blur in their texts, their categorical self-definitions split off natality from a threatening other, albeit lodged in inverted images of sociality and politics. Her reversal foregrounds and redeems natality-as-politics from capture by the social; his reduction of the political—to sovereignty as metaphysics, state power, and antiblackness—redeems fugitive black sociality from capture by politics. Yet as she argues—and manifests—theorists who “reverse” a polarity remain trapped in its terms; arguably, he risks capture by the metaphysics he would undo. The alternative to the canonical tradition, I would say, is refusing an Aristotelian or Kantian split between the political, and its abject (immature, wild, social, abject) otherness. In crucial ways Moten does just that, by finding natality, publicness, and performative pleasure—a “regenerative grammar” of “informal form”—in blackened sociality. But for him, the autonomy and integrity of this grammar, is targeted by correction and endangered by appropriation. Defending it requires refusing politicization, any translation into the “necrophilic” grammar of “sovereignty,” as connoting organized (even democratized) rule, politics by representation, and a subject-centered (possessive, rights-bearing) individualism. At stake in his reversal is warding off this demonic specter, which haunts and harms fugitive life in the undercommon. What Moten calls sovereignty thus names truly destructive forces and fictions but also seems like a charged, disavowed and projected object or specter. For his vision of jurisgenerativity, defined only as the fecundity of informal (noncoercive and multiplicitous) meaning-making, is sustained by disavowing the signifiers of power, exemplified by (participation in) a form of rule, by formal rules, by institutional organization, by stipulations of a collective subject, or by membership in an explicitly bounded political body.

In turn, radical democrats may refuse his reduction of politics to sovereignty, but if we then identify the properly political as nonsovereign action, as nonrule or (fugitive) refusal to be governed, we remain captive to this demonic picture of power and its idealized other. By affirming only the “power to” of solidarity and action in concert, we risk disavowing power “over,” as participation in rule, as explicit rule-making, and as “ruling out” antidemocratic interests and practices. Do we imagine that generativity thrives only by refusing rule, and not also through forms of structure and even imposition, as parents and teachers know? As Prospero, a personification of both sovereignty and theory, finally acknowledged Caliban as the “dark thing” he must “own as mine,” the trope of fugitivity entails a disavowed remainder, the problem of power and rule, which needs to be acknowledged. For freedom requires not only flight from rule, but flight into it, as a problem that no one can escape, but that a democratic politics explicitly acknowledges and undertakes to rework by participatory practices of contest.40