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2023 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Background Cards

What is disability

Emerson 22 (Spring 2022. Tyler Christopher Emerson -- Student at Brad College -- Author for Economic Senior Projects (From Brads Digital Commons). “The Job Guarantee as it Relates to People with Disabilities”) //Don Markos

The first task, to define disability, is a challenge in itself due to the sheer magnitude of bodily variation in the human population. In a world without similar patterns of discrimination 10 across the disability community, it would be incoherent to group thousands of unrelated physiological and psychological variations together. For the purposes of this research, there are still some useful systems of organization that are understood in common usage because, while the corporeal experiences of people with disabilities vary greatly, the effects of exclusion due to ableism are experienced quite consistently. According to the World Health Organization, disability has three dimensions based upon the Medical Model of disability: impairment, activity limitation, and participation restrictions (Geneva, 2001). Impairment refers to physiological or mental changes in function (e.g. a broken leg or Alzheimer's). Disabilities can refer to genetic attributes from before and after birth or physiological changes or injuries over the course of life. A disability may also be a static, progressive, or intermittent condition. This is all to say that every person will experience at least temporary disability in their lifetime. It is vital to provide an additional definition for disability as well. While the WHO represents the messaging of the Medical Model of disabilities, Mike Oliver (2004) and other academics represent the Social Model of Disability. The Social Model theorists assert that disability is defined by a culture and the socially constructed barriers that prevent full social inclusion. The idea of disability itself is partially a creation of the capitalist and scientific movements in America. As Wasserman et al. contend, “there were no such concepts [of disability] to attend to until 19th century scientific thinking put variations in human function and form into categories of abnormality and deviance" (2016). Like race or sex, immutable genetic and environmental traits result in socially constructed identities, but in the case of disability there are sometimes functional and material underpinnings to those differences. To understand disability with a little more nuance, some theory can provide insight to the way this population has been regarded over time. As Burch and Sutherland write, before the 11 1980s, the “assessment of disability came almost exclusively from outsiders: educators, doctors, and policy makers. Most adhered to what we now call a Medical Model of disability" (2006). Under this model, the person is pathologized and reduced to a category. The disability is treated as a problem to be remedied. The barrier to opportunities and access in society at large is seen as a result of the disability itself. This model implies that the disability is what causes quality of life variations. This has economic consequences for benefits, too: “The Medical Model appears to support the correction of the biological condition or some form of compensation when that is impractical" (Wasserman et al., 2016). Thus, society bears the cost of not only medical rehabilitation and assistance, but also the systemic costs of exclusion. Curative methodology sees disability as a deficiency to be remedied with professional treatment and assistance. These approaches, by necessity, narrowly envision individual reformation. Unfortunately, these models relegate humans to the role of patient and deviant. This approach deemphasizes and excludes the knowledge and experiences of people with disabilities. In the 1980’s, the Social Model of disability came into favor as a result of changing attitudes and the work of disability activists (Burch and Sutherland, 2006). This model emphasizes the arbitrary nature of the social and economic boundaries placed on individuals because of random genetic factors and diseases (Wasserman et al., 2016). The barriers for full participation are seen as the problem, and removing those obstructions is the primary concern for improving quality of life. Of course, just like race, disabilities are socially recognized categories. Additionally, there are very real, material consequences of medical conditions as demonstrated by the lived experiences of individuals with disabilities. Social limitations also define what is valuable and necessary in the lives of individuals with disabilities. Barriers to the workplace like missing elevators, transportation, or working 12 accommodations are seen as the operative problem, not the physiological or psychological characteristics of people with disabilities. Wasserman et al. note that under this view, “the main reason people with disabilities encounter hardship is because they suffer discrimination along the same lines as racial or ethnic minorities. Accordingly, civil rights protections and anti-discrimination laws are the proper responses to disability" (2016). This is not to compare the struggles of the two communities, in fact this is an intersectional problem; people with disabilities in Black, Indiginous, and people of color (BIPOC) communities face even greater hardship, abuse, and neglect (NDI, 2019). The 1990 ADA in America was a response to those new notions and ideals of inclusivity. The question to ask is whether those laws are materially changing the lives of Americans with disabilities to provide them the same access to life and labor as their non-disabled counterparts. Based on the longitudinal employment data, there are serious grounds to question the economic efficacy of the ADA, at least as it is currently supported by other programs (U.S. BLS, 2013). But, at the same time, there can be no doubt the ADA introduced a radical new era of accessibility to spaces, transportation, and education. Americans with disabilities have a long and complicated relationship with the medical industry and with the Government due to a long list of human rights abuses which have occurred. For example, Liat Ben-Moshe writes on the relationship between the carceral state and disability in American capitalism. Employment metrics in studies around the world demonstrate that there is a connection between economic condition, rates of disability claims, and social wellbeing (Mont, 2014). Disability, like unemployment, can be viewed as a direct result of structural inefficiencies in our models of social organization and the private labor market. Ben-Moshe illustrates that point here: 13 “In the context of capitalism, disability became the category through which people are measured as need based or work based... . Such interpretations dispel the common belief that people with disabilities are not productive under the capitalist system because they do not hold jobs. As Russell suggests, people with disabilities are commodified and deemed profitable, especially when occupying institutional beds. By clever capitalist alchemy, surplus populations are spun into gold. Disability is commodified through this matrix of incarceration (prisons, hospitals, nursing homes, and more).” This is the strange contradiction of disability in American society: though society disproportionately excludes Americans with disabilities from productive life, the healthcare and financial sectors depend on the needs of chronically and acutely ill patients to survive. In a monetary state where we are forced into wage work to earn our place in society and to pay taxes, disability is the logical category for people whose bodily and material circumstances prevent full social participation. Although the ADA on its face changed the legal rights of people with disabilities within certain bounds, our institutions take time to adjust to these new ideas of inclusivity and there must be careful consideration in the necessary steps to take to improve the lives and protect the human rights of people with disabilities.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Impact D › Unchecked Tech D---1AR

Their impact is technophobia produced by cognitive bias.

Steve Calandrillo & Nolan Kobuke Anderson 22, Calandrillo is Jeffrey & Susan Brotman Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law; Anderson is J.D. candidate, Columbia Law School, “Terrified by Technology: How Systemic Bias Distorts U.S. Legal and Regulatory Responses to Emerging Technology,” University of Illinois Law Review, vol. 2022, no. 2, 2022, pp. 597–662

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL RISK PERCEPTION: WHY HUMANS MISPERCEIVE TECHNOLOGY

There are several psychological factors that contribute to risk misperception in humans. People rely on a mixture of cognitive crutches, heuristics, and emotional appraisals to navigate the risks of everyday life.2 15 A brief mental exercise demonstrates one of these cognitive shortcuts. Take a moment and picture a bird in your mind. Chances are you pictured a sparrow, robin, or crow instead of a long-wattled umbrellabird or an albatross. But why did your brain, without any conscious thought, select the bird that it did? Why does the baseball player refuse to wash his lucky socks? 216 Why do Americans perceive Black men as more dangerous than white men? 217

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › General Answers › 2AC --- CP freaks-out stakeholders

Uncertainty of the cp freaks out stakeholders --- undermines support for the CP

Chien ‘19

(Colleen V. Chien, Justin D'Atri Visiting Professor of Business Law, Columbia Law School; Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; 2013-2015 White House Senior Advisor, Innovation and Intellectual Property, “Rigorous Policy Pilots: Experimentation in the Administration of the Law, July, 2019, “104 Iowa L. Rev. 2313,” pg lexis//um-ef)

While a voluntary, limited or temporary pilot will have less impact than a mandatory, agency-wide, or permanent practice, there's also a risk that the [*2331] uncertainty associated with a temporary program will unsettle stakeholders and result in more speculative and premature reactions than would be elicited by a more formed proposal. 104To reduce these risks, an agency's disclosure should at least inform the public of: the motivation for the pilot, the policy to be tested out, the information sought, and (where available) the agency's commitment to action based on the results of the pilot - a best practice in experimentation called "pre-commitment." Rulemaking based on experimental evidence may require more disclosure. The Portland Cement 105decision of the D.C. Circuit and its progeny have been read to suggest "an obligation to reveal agency data from the outset," 106in order to support review and engagement with the data when dispositive. 107In cases where the data is conclusive, even if more work to disclose, with the shared experience comes a greater chance of a common, ground truth, at least that is the hope. 108As long as the agency faithfully follows the ordinary notice and comment process, procedural obstacles should be surmountable.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › General Answers › 2AC --- CP Wont Scale-up

The cp fails --- will be rejected and wont spill-up

Chien ‘19

(Colleen V. Chien, Justin D'Atri Visiting Professor of Business Law, Columbia Law School; Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; 2013-2015 White House Senior Advisor, Innovation and Intellectual Property, “Rigorous Policy Pilots: Experimentation in the Administration of the Law, July, 2019, “104 Iowa L. Rev. 2313,” pg lexis//um-ef)

The previous Part addresses legal challenges to rigorous policy pilots. However, significant practical and institutional challenges to rigorous piloting will often attend. Recent research has found that people tend to view as inappropriate pilots that purport to randomize a treatment even when the underlying treatment is unobjectionable, 136suggesting that buy-in of the [*2336] relevant population, if required, will require education and communication. More upfront work is also required to make explicit the assumptions behind an intervention, and then to develop a strategy for testing them. Agencies carrying out rigorous tests must marshal resources, data, statistical expertise, support for departing from the status quo, and explanations for skeptics. 137There often will be no agreed upon measure of success. Even when there is, attrition, changed circumstances, poor design or a host of other factors can lead to a lack of inconclusive or null results. The results may be rejected. For example, in their review of the 50 or so randomized experiments in U.S. law that have ever been conducted, mostly in the field of criminal law and judicial procedure, Greiner and Matthews found a major problem to be the refusal of judges and lawyers to accept experimental results that did not jive with their sense of the "right answer." 138

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › General Answers › ---Pilot Projects fail

10 reasons pilot programs fail.

Ann Latham, 15. Contributor to Forbes. “10 Reasons Pilot Programs Fail And What To Do About It.” https://www.forbes.com/sites/annlatham/2015/12/20/10-reasons-pilot-programs-fail-and-what-to-do-about-it/?sh=2d3af5c14378.

Ready, Aim, Fire" is so old-fashioned. Careful, thorough, risk averse planners simply need not apply. This fast paced, action oriented world demands a lot less "readying" and "aiming." Pilot programs are a great response. Until they succumb to these common ailments:

1. Collaboration killers

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › General Answers › ---Pilot Projects fail

Pilot Projects are too costly---makes them less effective.

Camille Fink, 19. Freelance writer/editor and communications consultant based in Chicago. 2019. “The Problem with Pilot Programs.” https://www.planetizen.com/news/2019/09/106007-problem-pilot-programs

Pilots—for programs ranging from a new model of fire engine to teen pregnancy prevention efforts—are an accepted management technique almost everywhere. Unfortunately, there are lots of ways to get tripped up by them," write Katherine Barrett and Richard Greene.

One issue is that residents may not realize that the infrastructure or service is part of a pilot program that could eventually go away, they note. "So, if the ultimate decision is made that permanently implementing the pilot program would be too expensive, those who’ve enjoyed the benefits of the new service will lose it."

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › General Answers › 2AC --- Pilots Fails

Pilot program causes delays and uncertainty BUT has no net benefit.

Jon Western 12. Carol Hoffmann Collins '63 Professor of International Relations @ Mount Holyoke. “Can’t stop thinking about tomorrow…” https://duckofminerva.com/tag/forecasting

Michael Horowitz and Philip Tetlock have an interesting piece in Foreign Policy that examines the record on long-range forecasting of global events — 15 – 20 years into the future. They acknowledge the inherent difficulties of such a projections, but still wonder:

whether there are not ways of doing a better job — of assigning more explicit, testable, and accurate probabilities to possible futures. Improving batting averages by even small margins means the difference between runner-ups and World Series winners — and improving the accuracy of probability judgments by small margins could significantly contribute to U.S. national security.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › General Answers › Pilots Don’t Spill-Over

Basic income pilots will not result in policy change---doesn’t spill over to a UBI.

Taylor ’22 [Chris; April 19; Academic director at Cardiff University Social Sciences Research Park (SPARK), Cardiff University; “Three reasons universal basic income pilots haven’t led to policy change – despite their success,” , WWIS]

But none of the experiments have (so far) ended with the implementation of basic income as a policy, by keeping the pilot going or rolling it out to wider populations. The International Public Policy Observatory (of which The Conversation is a partner), in collaboration with the Institute of Policy Research at the University of Bath, recently examined 38 experiments across Europe, North America and Asia (in countries that already had established welfare systems) and found three main reasons why the effort ended with the pilot.

1. Gaps in evidence

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › General Answers › BI Pilot Fails

A basic income pilot program is severely limited.

Standing ’21 [Guy; June 25; Professorial Research Associate at SOAS, University of London, and a founder and co-President of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Director of the Socio-Economic Security Programme of the International Labour Organisation, Former chairholder of Universities of Bath and Monash (Australia); “Basic Income Pilots: Uses, Limitations and Design Principles,” , WWIS]

Determining the impact of a basic income requires comparing outcomes, both with the behaviour and attitudes of people beforehand (before the ‘treatment’ began) and with ‘control groups’, otherwise similar, who do not receive the ‘treatment’ or come under the policy. This is to ensure that outcomes are the result of the basic income and not a change coming from the outside.

While randomised control trials (RCTs) are currently in vogue, they have severe limitations when it comes to evaluating basic income. The principle behind RCTs, as the name implies, is that those receiving the ‘treatment’ should be selected ‘randomly’ from a wider population, and the control group should also be selected ‘randomly’. This would typically mean listing households in an area and drawing a sample, so that one family (or individual within a family) would receive the basic income while the family next door would not.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › General Answers › 2AC --- Links to Ptix

CP wont shield backlash --- if they win the plan is unpopular, the cp is as well

Chien ‘19

(Colleen V. Chien, Justin D'Atri Visiting Professor of Business Law, Columbia Law School; Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; 2013-2015 White House Senior Advisor, Innovation and Intellectual Property, “Rigorous Policy Pilots: Experimentation in the Administration of the Law, July, 2019, “104 Iowa L. Rev. 2313,” pg lexis//um-ef)

At the same time, as described above, rigorous experimentation will neither remove the burdens of ensuring an adequate nexus to a legitimate governmental objective, nor absolve an agency of procedural compliance with notice and comment, nor shield agency from scrutiny. When the stakes are high and agency action is likely to have material consequences for stakeholders, experimental evidence, like other evidence, is likely to be contested and challenged. While on one hand, experimental evidence can create a shared experience, on the other hand, stakeholders and even agencies are likely to interpret evidence in the manner that advances their interests. 135Matters of institutional competence may come into play if the court is unsure how to evaluate an an agency's experimental design or interpretation of experimental results.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Queer - Neg › 1NC › States PIK

The impact is perpetual surveillance via the panopticon.

Jasbir K Puar 17, Jasbir K. Puar is a U.S.-based philosopher and queer theorist. She is a professor and graduate director of women's studies and gender studies at Rutgers University, where she has been a faculty member since 2000, 2017, “Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times”, Chapter: “intimate control, infinite detention”, , RMazhankou

On June 26, 2003, consensual adult sodomy was decriminalized in the United States. While the ruling was understandably lauded by gay and lesbian civil rights activists, others were quick to caution against an easy acceptance of the terms of the decision. The legal scholar Nan Hunter, for example, argues that the Lawrence and Garner v. Texas decision (hereafter referred to as Lawrence-Garner) ‘‘performed a double move, creating a dramatic discursive moment.’’ A generative project of liberalism, the purportedly liberating process of deregulation inaugurates yet again the multiplication of pools of knowledge—particularization, minutiae, what Hunter terms ‘‘heightened scrutiny’’—of queer bodies.∞ This time, unlike sexology, psychiatry, and other fields embedded in the study of deviance, liberalism works through the positive register of incorporation (the productive e√ects of exclusion notwithstanding). Paradoxically, the decriminalization of sodomy results in accentuated state regulation of sexuality rather than a decline in such patrolling,≤ commissioning many other actors to intensify other types of scrutiny, for example, to assess the suitability of homosexuals for adoption and parenting. Hunter locates this heightened scrutiny as part of the subterranean ‘‘examination of the social acceptability of those persons who are the objects of the government’s interventions’’ specific to jurisprudence regarding sexuality. Highlighting the Foucauldian entanglement of freedom and intimate control, infinite detention 115 tion, Hunter argues that ‘‘deprived of criminal law as a tool, opponents of equality for lesbians and gay men are likely to concentrate increasingly on the strategy of containment.’’ She delineates several areas where containment tactics might be most precarious: disputes involving children, control over expressive space, otherwise known as the public sphere, and distinguishing the ‘‘respectability’’ of queer relationships that reinforce hierarchies of race, class, gender, and citizenship.≥ These points regarding containment are well taken, but other forms of power focus less on state regulation and the scrutiny of actors and instead foreground floating mechanisms of continuous control, enacted through the proliferation of management devices and details, an implosion and explosion of information about sexual subjects that subtends the emancipatory ideals of the liberal subject, straddling the disciplinary apparatus of the state and the more di√use registers of control societies. Disciplinary containment—discursive, ideological, and spatial—is still very much in operation as a panoptic power player even while new grains of information, indeed, information that was once only superfluous or seemingly superfluous to circuits of domination, feed the epistemological will-to-know of control societies: the dance between the ‘‘internalization of the gaze’’ and the ‘‘processes of administration, social sorting and simulation,’’ the latter dubbed ‘‘superpanopticism.’’∂ These tensions reflect an ongoing discussion about the uses of the panopticon as a surveillance model, whereby subjects are disciplined through regulations, and the ‘‘superpanopticon’’ of informational surveillance through which there is a regularization of population construction and the proliferation of ‘‘regularities.’’ For Foucault, normalization of society entails tendencies from ‘‘technologies of drilling’’ that are enacted in various institutional sites of confinement (hospitals, prisons, schools, barracks) to populations as they are produced through what he calls ‘‘technologies of security’’—insurance and reassurance—that work through the ‘‘regularization’’ of risk, profoundly di√erent from regulation and the regulatory modes invested in disciplinary sites. In his later work, Foucault contends that biopolitics shifts or even overrides the emphasis on disciplining subjects to the regularization of populations, with a ‘‘normalizing society’’ as the object and objective of both.∑ While regulatory power is maintained through the minimum amount of exertion to delineate internals and externals, ‘‘powers of exuberance’’ characterize the productive capacity of informational economies, fecund circuits that exponentially multiply through intersections, overlaps, matches, points of contact, coordinates, and contradictions. The focus is regenerative rather than retributive, producing more and more rather than mediating inclusion and exclusion. Thus, unlike power that banishes and excludes, or includes and organizes and manages, this power operates through calculation and intervention, characterized by tendencies and degrees, adjusted through tweaking and modulation rather than norming.∏ There is less emphasis on the outside or inside to regulate, less emphasis on ‘‘closed site[s] di√erentiated from . . . another closed site’’; instead, closed sites give way to ‘‘frightful continual training . . . continual monitoring.’’π Detailing the trajectories of the move ‘‘from disciplining to biopolitical control,’’ Patricia Clough argues that governance and representational politics, adapting to the ‘‘disorganization of nationally organized capital,’’ transit into expansive modalities of ‘‘risk management, militarism, and policing’’∫ that dislocate or slice through the imagined coherency of contained sites, identity categories (race, class, gender, sexuality, nation), and the body-as-organism: a tension between disciplinary normativization of subjects and their ‘‘behavioral expression of internalized social norms’’Ω and the social control of pools of bodies both human and nonhuman. Thus, the ‘‘new regime of heightened regulation of homosexuality’’ that Hunter speaks of must be understood in conjunction with, not separate from, profiling, surveillance, and information technologies currently in use.∞≠

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Queer - Neg › 1NC › States PIK

The state destroys all forms of queer resistance---even supposed “progress” like the AFF is done in the name of furthering the patriarchal institution.

Nour Abu-Assab and Nof Nasser-Eddin 18, Dr. Nour Abu-Assab is co-founder and co-director of the Centre for Transnational Development and Collaboration (CTDC). Nour is a queer Palestinian feminist sociologist, who was awarded a PhD in Sociology in 2012 from the University of Warwick, Dr. Nof Nasser-Eddin is co-founder and co-director of the Centre for Transnational Development and Collaboration (CTDC). Nof is a queer Palestinian feminist sociologist, who was awarded a PhD in Sociology in 2011 from the University of Warwick, Summer 2018, Kohl, “Queering Justice: States as Machines of Oppression”, , RMazhankou

Within this context, the concept of liberty is largely viewed as “antistatal… the more extended the concept of the state, the narrower the scope for freedom” (Ayubi, 2006: 24). This echoes Weber’s (1978) definition of the state as “a compulsory political organisation… its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to monopoly of legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order” (Weber, 1978: 54-5). This enforcement of order, or rule of law as some call it, in fact, is at the heart of contemporary definitions of justice. The crackdown on non-normative people in Egypt, which manifested itself in the imprisonment of around 62 people following the waving of the rainbow flag at a concert in Cairo in September 2017, represents, in many ways, the way the state uses its justice mechanisms to police people’s sexualities, practices, and bodies. However, this policing is deeply rooted in the ruling elite’s desire to maintain their power by preserving the status quo. In this case, like in many, non-normative people were scapegoated to preserve order. The Egyptian rulers’ desire to mobilise the segments of society that sympathise with or support the Muslim-Brotherhood in order to ensure stability in the country was one of the main motives for the crackdown (Parvaz, 2017). By imprisoning non-normative people, the Egyptian state was sending a message to the Islamic-leaning society, making it clear that the state is on their side. This move was an attempt to whitewash their tyranny, military rule, and the economic marginalisation of the majority of Egyptian people, particularly in light of the instability that prevailed in the country in 2017 after the attack on the Coptic church in Cairo and later the mosque in Sinai. In addition to that, the Egyptian authorities charged some of those imprisoned during the 2017 crackdown with belonging to a “cult” or a “group” that threatens the stability of the country, 8 and it has been treated in some cases as a matter of national security, under article 86 [bis] of Law 58/1937. 8 CTDC 2017. “Crackdown on Non-Normative People in Egypt: A Policy Brief.” Policy Brief No. 5, October 24, 2017. Queering Justice 53 In response to the crackdown on non-normative people in Egypt, civil society9 condemned the attack and utilised media platforms to pressure the Egyptian authorities to release detainees. Unfortunately, and probably to the detriment of those imprisoned, if anything, the intervention of Global North states is often met with further tightening and control over bodies and sexualities. In this case, the Egyptian state was pushed to intensify its crackdown in order to save face and to ensure that it maintains an image of sovereignty in front of those who oppose it. Interestingly, despite the media attention, parliamentary briefings, and demonstrations, not even one single Global North government issued a statement condemning the crackdown, also due to political reasons and interest in maintaining the status quo in relation to the administration of the country. Under such circumstance, the pursuit of a queer feminist intersectional justice cannot be contained within Universalist narratives of human rights due to the hypocrisy of such allegedly benevolent principles. The pursuit of queer feminist intersectional justice is inevitably state-phobic, and this type of state-phobia is in fact needed to address the root causes of such oppressive mechanisms of so-called justice. In cases as such, the neopatriarchal state’s justice mechanisms are in themselves oppressive, while the ruling elites perceive their actions and oppression as just, according to those mechanisms. However, and returning again to Foucault’s conceptualisation, civil society on the local and international levels is not exempt from the contemporary world disorder. The international civil society is in fact controlled by donor governments as well, representing their own elitist agenda, while the local civil society is often trapped between its own state’s injustices and the monopolisation of rights’ discourses by the international one. In that sense, local civil society 10 in the Global South is faced with antagonistic, competing forces: complicity with oppressive state systems on the one hand, and the narratives and discourses of rights and justice that fit within the cultural imperialist narratives of the Global North on the other, which also operates within neopatriarchal state structures. In addition to this neopatriarchy, narratives of nationalism within the nation-state in the Middle East and North Africa are also oppressive insofar as they are constructed to serve the continuation of the nation through reproduction and bodily control. Reproducing Collectivities Understanding the nature of marriage is essential for understanding any kinship system... kinship and marriage organise productive and reproductive relationships… the organisation of marriage and of the relationships built around it should provide explanations to the organisation of gender relationships (Shahd, 2004: 13). “Torn” between “imperatives” of patriarchy and modernisation (Moghadam, 1995: 12), the model of the nation-state in the Middle East and North Africa ensures that it maintains control over bodies, and especially female bodies, to guarantee the continuation of the nation. As we have established so far, the nation-state in the Middle East and North Africa is neopatriarchal in the sense that it replicates the 9 Here, we are referring mostly to organisations and groups, registered and unregistered, working specifically using LGBTQ rights framework to advocate for gender and sexual rights. 10 Ibid. Kohl 4.1 54 same structures existing within the patriarchal family unit. Within this unit, the family as the first site of women’s oppression, and women as wives, mothers, and sisters, are held responsible for the reproduction of ethnic and national identities (Charles and Hintjens, 1998). In her study of Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, Charrad (2003) highlights the central role state legislation plays in shaping gender relations within the family; she emphasises that the legal frameworks place the family at the centre of women’s lives. 11 This narrative around women’s roles within the nation-state has implications that include but are not limited to imposing control over women’s sexuality and ensuring the continuation of the heteronormative family structure. As Fortier (2000: 168) puts it, “ideas of authenticity are defined in terms of fixed gender roles and heterosexual norms… the prioritisation of irreducible gender differences – that also signal irreducible heterosexual complementarity – acts as a display of cultural continuity.” Therefore, controlling and policing bodies and sexuality and regulating relationships serve to benefit the neopatriarchal state on the one hand, and to maintain its status quo on the other. In addition to the political nature of the policing of bodies that took place in Egypt, the preservation of the family unit also serves the neopatriarchal states’ agendas. Maintaining the patriarchal family unit as the main building block of society, and imposing control over bodies are necessary to preserve an allegedly “authentic” cultural national identity, as the state is seen as an extension of the patriarchal family unit (Sharabi, 1988). Kings or rulers are portrayed as the “fathers” of the communities they rule and as heads of societies, and the nations are portrayed as their families. Like in patriarchal families, the king or president has absolute power over his community, and the nation should respect, fear, and follow the ruler. The metaphorical use of the patriarchal family to describe rulers’ relation to citizens reinforces the paradigm of the patriarchal family, and, vice versa, the preservation of the patriarchal family reinforces the power of the rulers. As Sharabi, again, puts it: The nation as family, a metaphor very dear to Arab rulers revolutionary, conservative, and semi-tribal alike – is the trans-ideological model of authority common to all neopatriarchal regimes, regardless of ideology or socioeconomic system… the same authoritarian vertical relations existed everywhere, preventing genuine social integration and keeping the majority of the population outside the mainstream of social and political life (Sharabi, 1988: 132-3). In order to preserve the already fragile imaginary of the nation, states across the world, in varying degrees, regulate intimate sexual relationships by legitimising some through their institutions and apparatuses. Through marriage, states do not only keep track of reproduction, but also create a system of surveillance and policing of sexualities and intimate relationships. Marriage becomes the most legitimate relationship, while alternative forms of relating including polyamorous, open, and group relationships are not considered as legitimate. Therefore, queer feminist intersection justice, a justice that acknowledges and recognises difference when addressing faces of oppression, cannot be attained through access to the state system, or to marriage equality, as state surveillance and policing of 11 It is important to note here that this is not a phenomenon that is exclusively omnipresent in the MENA region. Right-leaning governments in the Global North, including the Trump Administration in the USA, and the conservative government in the UK, often do emphasise the importance of the family, family values and the good society. Queering Justice 55 relationships are another form of oppression. Thus, pro-marriage equality mainstream liberal12 LGBTQ rights narratives are by no means a step forward to attain justice, as we want it. The Zionist settler colony is the ultimate example of adopting such liberal LGBTQ rights discourses. “Israel” disguises the atrocities it commits against the Palestinians through promoting itself as adoptive of gay rights and a saviour of the Palestinians fleeing family persecution, and promoting its capital as the gay capital of the world. By doing so, it presents itself as modern and progressive vis-à-vis its other “barbaric,” “homophobic,” Palestinian “Arab” other – a phenomenon termed as pinkwashing13 (AbuAssab, 2014a). In fact, the settler colony “Israel” is far from a saviour, and far from being a guarantor of LGBTQ rights. In the colony, lesbians and gays are only tolerated if they lead heteronormative lifestyles, while transgender people are very much discriminated against and face hate crimes (AbuAssab 2014b). Reproduction, however, is favoured. Lesbian couples are encouraged to have babies, and IVF is provided by the state free of charge for lesbians to increase the number of Jewish people in occupied Palestine and to outnumber the Palestinians. Colonial gay men are encouraged to find surrogate mothers for their sperms in South Asian countries at discounted prices. Thus, tolerance within the context of the colony is meant to guarantee the continuation of the nation. In addition to reproduction, in the Zionist colonialist imaginary, and even within intimate settings, the other Palestinian “Arab” is always subordinated through power hierarchies. During an encounter14 with a self-identified “Israeli” lesbian, whose partner was Palestinian, she said: “my nationalist Israeli acquaintances’ reaction to our relationship was disgusting. They started saying things to me like, so do you give it to her the way we give it to them?” referring to non-consensual violent sexual practices, sexual subordination and sexual power hierarchies. The impact of the reproduction of the nation is not only limited to the Zionist state, but also extends to a means of resistance among Palestinians, further amplifying control over bodies and sexualities in the name of securing a nation-state. During a piece of qualitative research we embarked15 to look at Palestinians’ perceptions of homosexuality, we found that the way the Zionist entity constructs the “other” pushes Palestinians to define the boundaries of their group, and increases anti-homosexual sentiments among the Palestinian community. During interviews with Palestinians, we were told: “Israel wants to promote homosexuality among Palestinians to decrease the number of Palestinians and outnumber us to be able to take more land.” 16 During a similar conversation, we were also told: “this is what Israel wants us to become, a broken nation, whereby people stop procreating and we end up ethnically cleansed.” This type of anti-homosexual sentiments is justified through a claim to resisting the 12 Most mainstream LGBTQ rights narratives are also being constructed by neoliberal elites, across the world, as the current world disorder has created a global class characterised by affluence, access to similar cultural capital, including but not limited to lifestyle and fashion, and complicity with global structures of inequality, which are beyond the scope of this paper to address. 13 Pinkwashing refers to the use of LGBTQ rights discourses by the Zionist occupation in order to promote itself as progressive, modern, a protector of LGBTQ rights, and even a protector of LGBTQ Palestinians, for the purpose of harnessing international support, justifying its colonial conquests in Palestinian lands, and whitewashing the atrocities it commits against the Palestinians. 14 The encounter was involving one of the authors during an international academic conference. Explicit consent to use this experience for research has been granted. 15 Research findings were presented at a conference (Abu-Assab, 2014b). 16 Ibid. Kohl 4.1 56 occupation and the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians, which gives it legitimacy and makes it harder to counter as it is framed as reactionary to the Zionist agenda. Pinkwashing done by the Zionist state perpetuates a vicious circle of negative sentiments towards non-normative genders and sexualities that is difficult to counter by non-normative Palestinians in light of the occupation, as they become perceived as “westernised,” “traitors,” and, above all, “anti-nationalist.” In addition to that, trapped between the hammer and the anvil, Palestinian civil society in general, and particularly those promoting gender and sexual rights in addition to self-proclaimed feminist organisations, becomes an additional site of oppression and silencing for non-normative people. Immersed in the fight against pinkwashing, and in promoting women’s rights, Palestinian civil society does not only ignore the atrocities committed by the Palestinian authorities in the West Bank, but also prevents people from talking about them so that such stories do not reinforce the image of the “homophobic” and “sexist” Palestinian. Speaking out against the Palestinian Authority or against sociocultural oppression becomes a taboo sacrificed for the sake of protecting the nation and its image, and some feminist organisations completely silence and refuse to engage in issues related to nonnormative genders and sexualities, claiming that it is not a priority within national discourses. Hence, civil society employs the master’s tools against its own people and communities, contributing to an injustice for the sake of a perceived national justice. This supports Foucault’s critique of the idealisation of civil society: in light of the lack of a sovereign Palestinian state, Palestinian civil society resisting the occupation constitutes another site of political power and control, albeit limited. In its complicity in “preserving the image of the nation,” civil society under occupation restricts its field of vision to the boundaries of the nation, failing to identify possibilities beyond state boundaries and borders. Within the context of Palestine, gender and sexual justice is neither pursued inwardly nor outwardly. Hence, an unpacking of national identity sometimes “demands a ‘reading of the silences’… understanding the unspoken is a crucial aspect of any investigation, capturing the silence” (Handrahan, 2002: 39). Reading silences against the fight for the eradication of borders, then, is necessary to attain queer feminist intersectional justice. Conclusions: Border Control versus Body Control For even people remaining in familiar and ancestral places find the nature of their relation to place ineluctably changed, and the illusion of a natural and essential connection between the place and the culture broken (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992: 10). Nations are imagined, and so are nation-states with their borders. States, and consequently their nations, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, have become, in all their forms, machines of oppression. These machines of oppression do not only police, surveil, and incarcerate, but also constitute virtual prisons for their citizens, particularly for their non-normative inhabitants. Our relationship to the state in the region is one that is neither natural nor innate; instead, it is fluid and changing. For the many of us living under dictatorship, our relationship to the state system is not positive, not only due to queerness or non-normativity, but also because states have been sites of oppression for a long time. We have demonstrated so far that much of gender and sexual oppression is Queering Justice 57 done in the name of peoples’ right to self-determination, right to a nation-state, and right to access justice through state mechanisms. When we speak of justice within the framework of a state, we are fundamentally speaking of justice through and within machines of oppression, and justice based on injustice is of no account. We try to manoeuvre, negotiate, and tiptoe around a world order that is fundamentally disorderly. Our bodies move within state borders that seem to protect the borders of the Global North, and movement outside of these borders is often conditioned by the availability of capital. The state in all its forms, with artificial borders, is a site of restriction, policing, and oppression. It confines, incarcerates, and punishes the human within its borders – a big prison cell. These borders do not only control and police our bodies, but also restrict our imagination, through creating unnatural bonds to an imagined nation, imagined homeland, and imagined collective memories. We think within a box – a manmade17 box – that encapsulates and limits our resistance. It is the same box that defeats our queerness, which is meant to disturb identities rather than define them. The intention of this article is not to offer alternatives, but to rather open up queer possibilities that could exist if, in our pursuit of queer feminist intersectional justice, we think and act outside the box, the borders, and the boundaries of the oppressive nation-state. Thus, a queer intersectional feminist justice is one that acknowledges difference, embraces non-conformity and non-normativity, and recognises that due to the intersectionality of our experiences, there is not one singular system of law, governance, and rights that can act as like a panacea to eradicate all faces of oppression. A queer intersectional feminist justice is one that pushes for diverse forms of justice, addressing the root causes of social injustice rather than punishing the individual for “wrongdoing.” It prompts an inquiry into the why and how injustice repeatedly occurs, and addresses the structural problems leading to oppression, focusing on remedying the cause rather than addressing its symptoms. Therefore, we aim to queer justice, as we know it, in order to become able to collectively articulate it, as we want it.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Queer - Neg › 1NC › 1NC---Solvency

Cruel Optimism makes aff solvency structurally impossible and deals much more harm to queer people --- especially trans folk.

Jules Gill-Peterson, 5-21-2021, Trans Pessimism, Part I, Sad Brown Girl Substack, , Gill-Peterson is an American historian specializing in transgender history. She is an associate professor of history at Johns Hopkins University, Accessed: 7-15-2023, //ONHS IF

JUNE HAS COME a few weeks early on Twitter this year. Our cursed friend “Pride discourse” is once again in the melodrama of a full swing. Between now and the end of June I’ll be bringing you this series on trans pessimism that, I hope, leads us in other directions than becoming the Queer Sex Police of the NYPD’s dreams. To inaugurate the series, I have a question for the revisionism attached to the Stonewall riots: why is trans politics so fucking optimistic? Lauren Berlant handily defines optimism in terms of attachment. In this idiom, optimism is “the force that moves you out of yourself and into the world in order to bring closer the satisfying something that you cannot generate on your own but sense in the wake of a person, a way of life, an object, project, or scene” (1-2, emphasis in original). Sounds lovely, but of course the eponymous concept of their book cues us into the ways that attachments to optimism often ironically incur and even prolong the very damage that they pretend to overcome. Optimism is a stubborn clinging to the scene of transcending the wear and tear of contemporary life that actually ensures its permanent exhaustion. Sometimes I think we know this in our bones, but not our hearts. If there was ever a concept for millennials and gen z, those for whom any fantasies of the capitalist and imperial good life in the global north have been set on fire by perpetual war, global financial catastrophes, the greatest uneven concentration of wealth in living memory, and the use of taxpayer dollars to underwrite apartheid in Palestine instead of canceling student debt, raising the minimum wage, and making healthcare and higher education public—well, you get it. Trans optimism is an arguably cruel genre because there’s not much reason for trans people to be optimistic. Our meteoric rise only in cultural visibility has directly led to Caitlyn Jenner running for governor of California and shattered record after shattered record of violence against trans women of color. Over 100 bills in nearly 30 states have attempted to extinguish trans life in the first few months of this year alone by relentlessly targeting children. Despite the tiniest ameliorations in jurisprudence from our apparently bestest dude Neil Gorsuch and a metric ton of vapid symbolism (Kamala goes by she/her, PRONOUNS IN THE BIO!), this is an extremely dangerous time to be trans. And let’s be honest: it’s an okay time to be a white trans masculine person precisely because it is an extremely dangerous time to be a trans women or a trans person of color. And yet if you look at the generic discourse that marshals us for the legendary month of June by lazily invoking words like legendary, you wouldn’t know it. We’re instructed, no more than during Pride, to organize our lives in relation to political optimism, to live for a promised future of inclusion and freedom, or safety and care. A future where they stop killing us. A future that is paradoxically always just around the corner and yet guaranteed. But the tiring want of that future gets wrongly projected in reverse onto the present, when the point was supposed to be that we aren’t free now. And so, the description of present social life gets elevated to the political without cause. You’ve seen it a thousand times. The fact that a trans woman of color does something is celebrated as a political act. Except, the fact that any of us Black and brown girls survive to do some living tells us next to nothing. It’s mundane as shit. Revolution is something else, not a fact of life and not an act of living. Besides, the trans woman of color whose life is invoked is always putative. She’s no fact. Who is she? How do you know her? I know why Chase Bank, or Sephora pretends to know her. But you? What’s your excuse? Much of this optimistic attachment promises—magically, it would seem, which I can again excuse capitalists and their literal commodity fetishism for more than I can broke queers—to reverse the deadly forces that stalk trans women of color. This line of thinking ought to be tired. “My god, the revolution is finally here!” is attributed to Sylvia Rivera at the time of the Stonewall riots in 1969. We are living over five decades later and, with all due respect, there has been no revolution. Let me be mean for a moment, but not because I am mean. I mean, let me be stylistically mean, in order to show, by contrast, how infantilizing and idealizing our commonplace rhetoric and figurations of Sylvia Rivera and Marsha P. Johnson have become. A children’s book is about as literal an example as I can offer you. Sylvia and Marsha Start a Revolution! tries about as hard as humanly possible to make what it says true without actually doing anything (a trait of optimism to add to our collection). Here is how describes it: “A picture book telling the story of Sylvia Rivera and Marsha P. Johnson, the transgender women of colour who fought for LGBTQ+ equality.” To be mean: no. Rivera and Johnson most certainly did not “fight” for something called “LGBTQ+ equality,” nor does the contemporary phrase “transgender women of colour” recognize the rich and complex epistemologies of their race, gender, sexuality, language and political tactics. Indeed—and I truly hate to say this—some terfs who delight in creating right wing memes that they then bulk email to trans women like me have taken pleasure in claiming that Rivera and Johnson did not identify as trans women in one of their recent creations (I suppose they think this sleight of hand will convince people meme-etically that “trans politics” is really men taking over…from…also men? I don’t know, they’re not sending their best). Trans optimism is shockingly less sophisticated than terf warfare at the level of tactics, in case you needed proof that we’re way off course. What pricks about Sylvia and Marsha Start a Revolution! is the astonishing hubris through which it uses them to project something onto our present that is plainly absent. Yes, they did start a revolutionary organization and they did support other revolutionary projects like the Black Panthers and the Young Lords, but the idea that we—the collective noun of the historical present—inherit this uninterrupted legacy, that we are somehow continuing their direct work, the “LGBTQ+ equality” and whatever else Pride is supposed to indicate in the liberal political imaginary, is historically laughable. This isn’t a history lesson, but to make the point: Black trans women continue, today, to do radical organizing on the left around prison abolition, police violence, housing, poverty and welfare, and mutual aid. As did Rivera and Johnson before them. But those are decidedly not the central platforms of “LGBTQ+” politics. Nor were they in 1970. And yet the use of Black trans women and trans women of color as their figureheads, the claim to work in their name, is everywhere. This is the dirty work that optimism does. And here comes the syllogism: if Black and brown trans women are always already the most oppressed and yet are also somehow living out the revolution at the same time, why are they not free? If the storyline is static about the last fifty years and we are just as unfree as ever despite having known how to free ourselves the whole time, the storyline is lying about something. Are you starting to see why I’m a trans pessimist? Whatever “trans” as an abstracted umbrella means these days, it is not Sylvia and Marsha starting a revolution. ANDREA LONG CHU HAS has made perhaps the strongest argument for trans pessimism to counter this mendacious optimism. Its frequently misread brilliance is that it’s a universalizing argument: because the female condition reveals the structural fallout of attachments to optimism. Don’t get it twisted, you are not biologically (literally) female, that’s some terfy nonsense. What Chu uses the concept of the female to demonstrate is that there is nothing peculiar about trans people’s failures to become what they desire to be, whether that desire be happiness or a vagina (oh, the ways in which people misread her New York Times essay). Given that trans womanhood is the most negated, most reviled, and most shameful form of gendered desire out there, she is right to lean on the example. In a culture that manifestly hates women on an unconscious level, trans women are the remarkable ones who dare to desire to become women despite knowing that desire can only ever deliver you to failure and condemnation. The thing is—and Chu embraces this better than most—there’s nothing actually that bad about desire’s inevitable failure to deliver. That’s just, like, how desire works, female-dude. Imagine wanting something you can’t ever have and choosing to strive for it anyways. That’s what every single person does, every single day, with every single thing they desire (though we do not have to admit that and can build all sorts of reactionary things to pretend otherwise). But trans women? We do it for fucking womanhood and so we are hated and envied for our desire to a degree that can prove fatal. Chu is an avid reader of Berlant and her theory of trans femininity’s failed desire no doubt follows Berlant’s observation that “one of optimism’s ordinary pleasures is to induce conventionality, that place where appetites find a shape in the predictable comfort of the good life” (Cruel Optimism, 2). Cue here, no doubt, the thou doth protest too much chorus of brave gender warriors who proclaim that they don’t ever, under any circumstance, want to pass, and that somehow makes their queerness holier than thou, mortal transsexual woman. As Chu provocatively puts it (I’m obviously grumpy about the trans misogyny that animates most readings of her work, if by misogyny I mean violently ignoring genre to take her ideas literally, as if they were written in arithmetic—a repulsive male trait of reading, if ever there was one [See, I can do it too! Relax.]): “The political is the sworn enemy of the female; politics begins, in every case, from the optimistic belief that another sex is possible. This is the root of all political consciousness: the dawning realization that one’s desires are not one’s own, that one has become a vehicle for someone else’s ego; in short, that one is female, but wishes it were not so.” (Females, 13, emphasis in original) Chu here provides us with an operative reason to dislike trans optimism: it responds to a useful self-awareness with just about the dumbest doubling down possible on what caused the problem. Oh, trans feminine and racialized life are as abject as it gets, generically prohibited from becoming real according to the powers that be despite their self-evident realness—you’ll recall that Black and brown girls quite literally invented the category—? No, you see, it’s actually the contrary: trans women of color show us the revolution, show us utopia in their suffering! We must make of them our models, our inspiration! For the love of gay Hegel, please stop, your dialectic is giving me a headache. A trans pessimism is deeply skeptical of any political project where trans signifies the exceptional or idealized, ready-made queer political programme or promise of utopia, through the outrageously impossible “revolutionary realness” of existing trans women of color’s living conditions. Whatever world you are agitating for, ask yourself why it needs a Black trans woman as its prop, because unless we’re talking about Black trans women’s actual activism, the answer is probably that you’re stuck in the hamster wheel of optimism. (Whether trans pessimism might take a non-appropriative position on Afropessimism, a spacious field of Black philosophical critiques of modernity—with many worthwhile rejoinders from Black feminist, Black queer, and Black trans thinkers like , , , and —remains unclear. I am alarmed at the degree to which unsurprisingly white trans and queer ideologues lift Black concepts with rich and often centuries-old genealogies and repackage them as cheap slogans with whitewashed politics—think only of “gender abolition,” which, I have to say, makes precisely zero sense in the way it is used. Show me how to abolish gender in a way that won’t be structurally trans misogynist and envision my literal obsolesce, and I’ll buy you a cocktail this June.) Trans pessimism, for me, is not just a female trait, but one with a distinct consciousness about race. It’s an indictment of the world as arranged, a world whose modernity is the transactional outcome of the transatlantic slave trade, global colonialism, and settler colonialism: three racialized processes of political and economic domination that directly birthed the Western sex binary and, much later, gender—two of its prized enforcers. Like it or not, single-axis politics like trans optimism operate within that worldview and so find themselves unable to bring about anything worthy of the word revolutionary. While many rejoice at their obsessive incantation of Rivera and Johnson’s names this June, the countless Black and brown trans women who have found the secret to surviving in this world will remain just as faceless to the proud as they were in 1973 when Rivera had to physically fight her way on stage in Washington Square park to address the increasingly gender-normative, predominately white gay liberation movement. Until that changes, don’t bother trying to sell me your optimism.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Queer - Neg › 1NC › 1NC---Solvency

The impact is cruel optimism --- placing any form of hope into the state is uniquely bad for queer folk and divorces queerness from radical movements. The aff doesn’t address the root cause of queer inequality which is the untenable logics of capitalist accumulation.

Katarzyna Paszkiewicz, 9-17-2020, ‘Tipped over, but still growing’: Cruel Optimism and Queer Temporalities in The Florida Project, Taylor & Francis, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/10509208.2020.1819731, Accessed: 7-15-2023, //ONHS IF

The relationship between Berlant’s investment in the idea of the normal as a utopian desire mediated through and reflected in popular culture (which can be traced back to ‘Sex in public’),Footnote21 and her later reflection on the rise of an economic precarity that cuts across different identity markers in Cruel Optimism, deserves further, more nuanced attention. As Sianne Ngai observes in her incisive reading of the latter book, Berlant’s critique of the normative fantasy of the good life is deeply informed by her earlier work on sexuality, exemplifying ‘how queer theory, still regarded by many as a minoritizing-only discourse whose “proper object” must be limited to sex and issues related to sexual object choice, can directly contribute to debates about the universalizing concept of “precarity”’ (2013). Berlant’s reflection on the painful, injurious or, one could say, ‘negative’ attachments in contemporary social, cultural and political life aligns her work with the antisocial paradigm in queer studies, and the exploration of negativity that followed, as illustrated by Leo Bersani, Lee Edelman and, in more recent discussions of negative affect (though with a number of notable differences), by Jack Halberstam, Sara Ahmed, Heather Love and Sianne Ngai, among many others.Footnote22 More specifically, one could relate Berlant’s cruelly optimistic orientation toward the future, in a time when the fantasies of ‘upward mobility, job security, political and social equality, and lively, durable intimacy’Footnote23 are fraying, to the heteronormative temporal regimes in Western cultures examined by these scholars. Writing in the context of the 1980s at the peak of the AIDS crisis in the United States, BersaniFootnote24 scrutinizes how the disease was discursively constructed as a threat to the (white, heterosexual, middle-class) family unit at the heart of capitalist society, the ‘homosexual body’ having been opposed to marriage, parenthood and property. Rather than actively countering this stigmatization, and the identification of queerness with social failure, Bersani embraces the politics of negativity as a form of resistance to the heteronormative social order. Following Bersani, Edelman draws on the antisocial thesis to rethink the questions of queer temporality and futurity. In his influential No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, EdelmanFootnote25 shows how the symbolic figure of ‘the Child’, standing in for the future horizon and the promise of a better tomorrow, is deeply rooted in the heterosexual nuclear family ideal and its temporal regime, ‘rendering unthinkable […] the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relations’.Footnote26 Edelman celebrates queerness as invested in ‘no future’ – that is, as the threat to the ‘reproductive futurism’Footnote27 – refocusing, as Berlant also does, on the critical presentness and, in the process, challenging everyday notions of temporality (including linear narrative, teleology, progress, history, and so on).Footnote28 While coinciding with Edelman’s argument that we should focus on pathologized modes of living and the politics of negativity to undermine a normative future, Halberstam turns to ‘the potentiality of a life unscripted by the conventions of family, inheritance, and child-rearing’.Footnote29 Drawing on Foucault’s notion of ‘way of life’, Halberstam suggests that queerness can be detached from sexual identity when it is thought of as ‘an outcome of strange temporalities, imaginative life schedules, and eccentric economic practices’.Footnote30 Queer subjects are also those who live outside the logic of capitalist accumulation (crucially, not only deliberately, but also accidentally or of necessity): ‘those […] who live without financial safety nets, without homes, without steady jobs, outside the organizations of time and space that have been established for the purposes of protecting the rich few from everyone else’.Footnote31 Thus, Halberstam’s work, like Berlant’s, allows us to trace the connections between queerness, ‘strange temporalities’ and the scenarios of survival in the 21st-century landscape of precarity. Significantly, in his later work on failure, HalberstamFootnote32 challenges Edelman’s rejection of the child figure, criticized as part and parcel of a heterologic of futurity, and conceptualizes childhood and childishness, especially as they circulate in teen comedies and children’s animated features, as queer experiences: ‘mainstream films marketed to children produce, almost accidentally, plenty of perverse narratives of belonging, relating, and evolving’,Footnote33 often replacing heterosexual coupling with friendship, or individuation with collectivity. While it is true that many of the Disney cartoons display gender-normative characterizations and traditional narrative resolutions, children’s filmsFootnote34 like Babe, Chicken Run, Finding Nemo, and Shrek foreground nonlinear temporality – privileging repetition over sequence, celebrating ‘fairy tale time (long, long ago) and mythic space (far, far away)’Footnote35 – which is often paired with childish or queer ways of life that open new imaginings of community: ‘The beauty of these films is that they do not fear failure, they do not favor success, and they picture children not as preadults figuring the future but as anarchic beings who partake in strange and inconsistent temporal logics’.Footnote36 This latter point is a particularly important one in relation to my argument on queer temporalities and childhood as represented in The Florida Project, and I return to it in due course. To be sure, The Florida Project is quite different from the films featured by Halberstam in The Queer Art of Failure, and, at first sight, it aligns more readily with the esthetics of the cinema of precarity as discussed by Berlant. However, the film’s focus on the children’s fantasies articulated through the Disney imaginary provides additional folds of meaning and potentiality as contemplated by Halberstam. On the other hand, it is important to recognize the affective differences in Berlant’s and Halberstam’s respective projects: Berlant uncovers optimism’s cruelty, while Halberstam re-narrates negativity as the politics of anti-achievement. As Robyn Wiegman astutely observes in her examination of the current queer feminist criticism: Halberstam’s practice of converting loss into heroic loserdom requires vigilance and a willingness to forfeit ambiguity in favor of assuring one’s object that being undone is a way of overcoming, even when life still feels bad. […] Berlant rejects redemption in favor of interpretative endurance by conferring meticulous attention on the psychic and social environments in which her objects of study struggle to live. Her critical practice keeps pace with the suffering of her objects by offering them (and us) an interpretative sensorium of the intimate detail.Footnote37 By holding on to Berlant’s ‘interpretative sensorium of the intimate detail’, in what follows I show that The Florida Project recodes optimism’s cruelty in potentially political ways, while simultaneously embracing the ambiguity of the endeavor. As the article proceeds, I focus on how Baker utilizes the realist esthetics of the cinema of precarity to create both the sense of stuckness and the sensory overload and temporalities associated with ‘the wondrous anarchy of childhood’,Footnote38 which is highly mediated by Disney’s utopian universe, thus significantly complicating the film’s meditation on the cruelty of normative temporality in the capitalist scene.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Queer - Neg › 1NC › 1NC---Solvency

a) Even if the plan is passed, current trends in SCOTUS decisions indicate that it’s likely to be struck down along with other protections for queer folk.

Devan Cole, 7-1-2023, What the Supreme Court's LGBTQ rights decision means, KCRA, https://www.kcra.com/article/supreme-court-s-lgbtq-rights-decision/44403263, Accessed: 7-15-2023, //ONHS IF

The Supreme Court has who wanted to refuse to create websites to celebrate same-sex weddings out of religious objections. Could the ruling have a far-reaching impact on other minority groups or open the door to other cases that weigh civil rights protections in the U.S.? In a 6-3 opinion delivered Friday by Justice Neil Gorsuch that was joined by the court's five other conservatives, the justices said that the First Amendment's free speech protections permitted the web designer, Lorie Smith, to refuse to extend her services for same-sex weddings. The ruling was rooted in free speech grounds and could create a massive hole in state public accommodation laws for businesses that sell so-called "expressive" goods, allowing for companies that provide customized, expressive products and services to pick and choose who they work with. Legal experts say the decision is likely to cause confusion about which businesses fit into the description provided by the opinion, and stressed that members of the LGBTQ community are not the only ones impacted by the ruling. "I don't think the court was clear at all. I think it sort of invented categories that don't exist in commerce. The idea of 'customized' or 'expressive' services are not categories," said Elizabeth Sepper, a University of Texas Law professor and expert on public accommodations laws. "So I think the category of businesses that will be able to claim free speech rights against anti-discrimination laws is not at all clear. But it's not small," Sepper added. "There's going to be a relatively large range of businesses who can lay claim to free speech rights against anti-discrimination laws." The experts also warned that the decision in 303 Creative v. Elenis is just the opening chapter in what will likely be years of litigation from people looking to push the limits around state and local laws providing civil rights protections for various minority groups. Jennifer Pizer, the chief legal officer for Lambda Legal, an LGBTQ rights group, also said the court wasn't clear on what types of businesses are included within the category the court mentioned. "I think the issue is the admittedly very broad range of goods and services in society that involve some amount of customizing, some amount of creativity," Pizer said. "The decision today does not approve discrimination by anybody and everybody that uses some creativity, some talent, some skill to create a custom product," she added. "The decision today addresses a particular thing and describes that thing as involving extensive involvement with the customer to create a unique work that involves the artistic expression of the designer." The vast majority of Americans live in an area where state or local public accommodation laws exist. As of this month, 22 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands and Washington, D.C., had laws on their books that explicitly prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, according to the , a nonprofit think tank that advocates for LGBTQ rights, while another five states interpret "existing prohibition(s) on sex discrimination to include sexual orientation and/or gender identity." Confusion over the scope and meaning of Friday's ruling may be similar to the legal fights following a major gun rights case from last year. In that case, the conservative majority changed the test courts are to use when analyzing the constitutionality of firearm regulations, opening the floodgates for all sorts of gun safety laws to be challenged in federal court. For instance, the justices that bars an individual subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm – a law that a lower court reconsidered in light of the Supreme Court's decision last year in the Second Amendment case. Ruling implicates other minority groups The Supreme Court's three liberal members dissented from Friday's ruling, with Justice Sonia Sotomayor writing that the majority was giving businesses a "new license to discriminate." She suggested that the decision's "logic cannot be limited to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity," and wrote that it "threatens to balkanize the market and to allow the exclusion of other groups from many services." Gorsuch pushed back in a footnote, writing: "Our decision today does not concern – much less endorse – anything like the 'straight couples only' notices the dissent conjures out of thin air." But legal experts believed that Sotomayor was not crying wolf in her dissent in that the opinion could open up other minority groups to be subjected to the same type of behavior for which Smith sought approval. "The worry is that this provides a green light to any business owner that they can refuse service to any person on the basis of their identity, whether they're gay or lesbian, or Jewish or Black, or anything, because they have an objection to those sorts of people being in their business," said Katherine Franke, a professor at Columbia Law School. "There was nothing in the opinion that limits it to objections to same-sex marriage," Franke added. Sepper similarly said that the majority didn't specifically limit the decision to LGBTQ people. She said that in other cases from the court in this area, there has been language about race, for example, being different. "We don't see that here in 303 Creative. So this opens the door to race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin discrimination – any kind of discrimination," she said. Meanwhile, Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser said in a statement Friday that the decision promises to "destabilize the public marketplace" enabling all types of businesses to have "a first amendment right to refuse customers because of who they are." Future disputes lie ahead The court's decision in 303 Creative represented a notable departure from other major LGBTQ rights cases it has decided in recent years. In 2020, Gorsuch delivered a massive win to the LGBTQ community when he delivered the majority opinion in a case that extended federal protections to gay, lesbian and transgender workers. And in 2015, the court legalized same-sex marriage nationwide, a long-fought victory for members of the community. But in the fallout of Friday's decision, LGBTQ advocates and experts cautioned that, far from settling the issue at the center of the case, the ruling could embolden opponents of LGBTQ rights and spur a fresh wave of litigation that could strip away civil rights protections in other areas of life. "There's nothing in this opinion that would limit it to only website design cases, and the rules articulated by the court today could easily also be extended to all range of businesses. Whether it's employment, housing, any kind of business, and those cases will be the ones coming next," Franke said. Pizer doubled down on that point, saying the decision "is poking yet another hole in civil rights laws and it's likely to be taken as a message justifying a lot more discrimination." "I think the big problem here, and it has been and remains a big problem, is that this type of case doesn't settle the issue," she said. "It invites a lot more litigation to ascertain where the limits might be."

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Queer - Neg › 1NC › 1NC---Solvency

The UBI is not a radical transition away from capitalism or even close to it --- the program incentivizes market growth which harms the groups that the aff is trying to protect.

Daniel Zamora, 12-28-2017, The Case Against a Basic Income, The Jacobin, https://jacobin.com/2017/12/universal-basic-income-inequality-work, Accessed: 7-16-2023, //ONHS IF

In her campaign memoir What Happened, Hillary Clinton wrote that the idea of a universal basic income (UBI) for all Americans “fascinated” her. Reflecting on her wholly uninspiring campaign, she explained that she wanted to include it in her platform but “couldn’t make the numbers work,” so she dropped the idea. She had planned to call it “Alaska for America,” referring to the Alaska Permanent Fund. Established in 1982, that program gives each of the state’s citizens an annual dividend from oil revenues. The idea gained popularity in the mid-sixties, and Nixon almost implemented it nationwide. American researchers conducted large-scale experiments in New Jersey, and a Canadian study took place in Winnipeg during the mid-seventies. At the time, the proposal produced heated debates in continental Europe and North America, but the decades that followed led to a slow but steady decline in support. The conservative preference for the “workfare” and “activation” policies that characterized welfare reform in the nineties — led by a different Clinton — turned basic income into a utopian fantasy. But as interest in UBI from one of the planet’s most powerful political figures attests, the last ten years have given new life to the idea. Indeed, it’s now on the agenda of many movements and governments. For Philippe Van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght, two of UBI’s leading proponents, “the conjunction of growing inequality, a new wave of automation, and a more acute awareness of the ecological limits to growth has made it the object of unprecedented interest throughout the world.” Finland’s right-wing government is testing the idea, replacing part of its unemployment benefits system with a basic income distributed to all Finnish citizens. In Canada, the government of Ontario has been conducting a large-scale experiment since the summer of 2017. The Netherlands has the most developed UBI program experiment in Europe. Several municipalities are testing the program’s effects on its beneficiaries. And in France, the unfortunate socialist candidate for president, Benoît Hamon, made basic income his key measure. Political parties across the globe are now openly discussing the idea of distributing an unconditional income to every citizen. Each side of the political spectrum points to different supposed benefits: the Right praises UBI for getting rid of outdated state bureaucracies; the Left for eradicating poverty. Appearing at once “liberal” and “social,” basic income, according to a popular view, divides those who still think about class and the industrial revolution in old-fashioned terms from those who recognize that the “knowledge economy” has profoundly transformed our economy and society. For this latter group, full employment is utopian, stable work is an outdated demand, and the old institutions of wage labor — social security, unions, and so on — are obsolete, brakes on progress and individual freedom. For radical left “accelerationist” theorists Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, basic income constitutes a “post-capitalist” exit path, while the self-described “entrepreneur” Peter Barnes, whose bestseller With Liberty and Dividends For All inspired Hillary Clinton, sees it as a way to create a “better-balanced capitalism — we would call it everyone-gets-a-share capitalism.” The studies, experiments, and debates are multiplying, making UBI once again an idea “whose time has come.” Paradoxically, then, UBI seems to be a crisis demand, brandished in moments of social retreat and austerity. As politics moves to the right and social movements go on the defensive, UBI gains ground. The more social gains seem unreachable, the more UBI makes sense. It’s what botanists would call a “bioindicator”: it indexes neoliberalism’s progress. Support for basic incomes proliferates where neoliberal reforms have been the most devastating. In this sense, UBI isn’t an alternative to neoliberalism, but an ideological capitulation to it. In fact, the most viable forms of basic income would universalize precarious labor and extend the sphere of the market — just as the gurus of Silicon Valley hope. The Impossibility of a Left Basic Income The question of UBI’s economic viability, though basically technical, is vital for determining its political character. That’s because UBI’s effects depend on the amount distributed and the conditions of its implementation. Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, in their accelerationist manifesto, Inventing the Future, write that “the real significance of UBI lies in the way it overturns the asymmetry of power that currently exists between labour and capital.” Its establishment would allow workers to have “the option to choose whether to take a job or not.… A UBI therefore unbinds the coercive aspects of wage labour, partially decommodifies labour, and thus transforms the political relationship between labour and capital.” But to do this, the authors insist, it “must provide a sufficient amount of income to live on.” If the payment isn’t high enough to let people to refuse work, UBI might push wages down and create more “bullshit jobs.” Despite the key importance of size and implementation, the countless texts dedicated to establishing a UBI — including Srnicek and Williams’s work — rarely discuss the policy’s concrete details. Many of basic income’s benefits would only arrive if it provided a generous monthly amount, meaning that a moderate or low-amount version could have potentially negative effects. Guy Standing, a pioneer of basic income in the United Kingdom, currently defends the low-amount version. To advance his proposal, he points to the think tank Compass, which produced several micro-simulations to assess the effects and feasibility of the measure in the UK context. Compass’s study shows the risks of any basic income scheme that tries to replace existing means-tested benefits: such a “full scheme” would, in its simplest version, give every adult $392 (£292) each month while existing means-tested programs would be abolished. The results would be catastrophic: child poverty would increase by 10 percent, poverty among pensioners by 4 percent, and poverty among the working population by 3 percent. Compass also analyzed a “modified scheme,” with a monthly basic income of £284 ($380) for working-age adults (and smaller payments for others) that would stand alongside, rather than replace, most existing social programs. But it would also count as income when calculating recipients’ eligibility for those programs, as well as for tax purposes; this “add-on” structure makes the measure less expensive than it would otherwise be, since a large part of the cost is included in existing social spending. But that also dampens the total boost to the net income of the poor. Nevertheless, the total cost of this version — the amount of new taxes that would be needed — is £170 billion or 6.5 percent of the UK’s GDP. Despite the fiscal effort that would go into implementing the new system — 6.5 percent of GDP, or nearly twice the share of GDP that the US currently spends on its military — the results are rather disappointing. Child poverty shrinks from 16 to 9 percent, but for working-age people it decreases less than 2 points (13.9 to 12 percent), and among pensioners it declines only 1 point (14.9 to 14.1 percent). The considerable sum of money mobilized has only a modest effect on poverty and doesn’t specifically benefit those who need it most. As economist Ian Gough writes, the idea looks like “a powerful new tax engine” that “pull[s] along a tiny cart.” This fact is even more striking when we consider that the cost of eradicating poverty in any developed country is around 1 percent of GDP. An individual unemployment benefit set at the poverty line (around $1,200 a month) and granted to all jobless individuals regardless of their place in the family structure would not only pull everyone out of poverty but also end workfare, challenge the normative dimensions of family structures, and fundamentally alter the labor market. All this, for somewhere between six to thirty-five times less money than a universal basic income. The same criticism applies to the moderate version from Philippe Van Parijs, one of the founders of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), which has promoted UBI since the mid-1980s. Van Parijs calls for a “base” income of €600 ($710), which, like Standing’s version, is not fully added to existing social benefits. This program would cost a bit over 6 percent of GDP in a country like Belgium, with an already high level of social spending and benefits — for a system that fails to increase the meager incomes of the vast majority of people dependent on social services. This is a remarkable fact about a measure so often described as “revolutionary” — a fact made explicit in the Finnish trial: it cites its “primary goal” as being to “promote employment” by incentivizing people “to accept low-paying and low-productivity jobs.” Of course, we could plead for a more generous version, closer to anticapitalist or accelerationist proposals, like that of French economist Yann Moulier-Boutang. His UBI proposal amounts to €1,100 ($1,302) a month for each citizen and would be added to existing benefits. In France, it would cost €871 billion, or 35 percent of GDP. When the French socialist party’s think tank, Fondation Jean Jaurès, studied the budget impact of a €1000 monthly UBI, it estimated that it would cost as much as all current social spending — pensions, unemployment, social assistance, and so on — plus the budgets for either national education or health care. Suffice it to say, this version is unlikely to see the light of day. Moulier-Boutang himself acknowledged this, writing that although “a detailed balance sheet must still be drawn up,” “one thing is certain: the current income tax system can only fund a small partial application of this measure.” To solve this problem, Moulier-Boutang suggests replacing the current taxation system (including progressive income tax) with a 5 percent tax on financial transactions — a “fiscal revolution” that would “reduce the budget deficit” while “keeping the current level of social spending and adding a UBI of 871 billion euros.” The author’s rather fantastic calculations sound tempting, but a financial transaction tax could never collect such a large sum. The volume of financial transactions is vast — currently ten times GDP — but that’s precisely because they’re not taxed at 5 percent. Since financial transactions are typically carried out to achieve profit arbitrages as small as a few tenths of a percent, they would simply cease if we set up Moulier-Boutang’s proposed tax. By way of comparison, the “Tobin tax,” the only financial transaction tax being seriously considered today, is generally envisioned at between 0.05 percent and 0.2 percent at most — one hundred times smaller than Moulier-Boutang’s proposal — yet it’s specifically designed to reduce speculation (and thus transactions). No existing economy can pay for a generous basic income without defunding everything else. We would either have to settle for the minimalist version — whose effects would be highly suspect — or we’d have to eliminate all other social expenditures, in effect creating Milton Friedman’s paradise. Faced with these facts, we should question UBI’s rationality; as Luke Martinelli put it: “an affordable UBI is inadequate, and an adequate UBI is unaffordable.” Until we profoundly transform our economies, we can’t implement a measure that would cost more than 35 percent of GDP in economies where the state already spends around 50 percent of GDP. The power relations needed to establish this level of UBI would constitute an exit from capitalism, pure and simple, rendering depictions of UBI as a “means” of social transformation nonsense. Indeed, many defenses of basic income can be classified as what Raymond Geuss called “nonrealist political philosophy”: ideas formulated in complete abstraction from the existing world and real people, completely “disjoined from real politics” — like the Rawlsian model of justice that serves as an important inspiration to figures like Philippe Van Parijs. If UBI does take shape, current power relations will favor those who have economic power and want to profit by weakening the existing system of social protection and labor market regulations. Who will decide the monthly amount and who will dictate its terms and condition? Who do today’s power relations favor? Certainly not the worker. The Crisis of Work? When asked about work, Philippe Van Parijs likes to quote the physician Jan Pieter Kuiper, who launched the debate on basic income in the Netherlands in the 1970s: “Among my patients there are guys who are sick because they work too much, and guys who are sick because they are unable to find work.” This contradiction runs through the history of capitalism, and it motivates Van Parijs and many of his followers. UBI would create a society in which “those who work too much … work less, in order to avoid burnout, breathe a little, retrain for new work, or care for their loved ones, and the jobs thus freed up could then be taken by others.” That is, it doesn’t aim at “working less, so all can work,” as the workers’ movement traditionally did, but letting everyone choose how much to work at any given moment. Proponents present it as a way to achieve a more harmonious distribution of work. That objective may seem sensible, but it raises several questions. Most important, it risks amplifying employers’ current race to the bottom. Today’s labor market is highly stratified: some people enjoy access to good jobs while others, subject to harsh competition, can only find precarious and unstable work. A low or moderate UBI — too low to let people refuse job offers — could relegate the least qualified people to more intensely precarious situations. As Luke Martinelli puts it: The lack of an exit option for such workers, and their weak bargaining position with respect to employers, means that basic income could end up exacerbating poor pay and conditions if other workers were willing to reduce their wage demands as a result of the unconditional payment. Martinelli highlights “the danger that basic income ‘would aggravate the problem of low pay and subsidize inefficient employers,’ leading to a proliferation of ‘lousy’ jobs.” In this scenario, those with good jobs will continue to lead fulfilling lives, now supplemented by universal income, while others will have to combine their UBI with one or more “lousy” jobs, with little gain in income. The proposal makes no attempt to help those without a job today get one tomorrow or improve the job they have. Indeed, everything suggests that the opposite will happen: the UBI will function like a war machine for lowering wages and spreading precarious work. This aspect of basic income isn’t new: it explains why the neoliberal economist George Stigler originally proposed a UBI, in the form of a negative income tax. In contrast to Keynes, who downplayed the role of wage levels in his explanation of unemployment, Stigler’s famous 1946 paper “The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation” argued that the minimum wage reduced employment. He called on the government to abolish such regulations so that workers could accept wages that don’t exceed the market price. Stigler’s negative income tax, which would supplement incomes up to a certain point, would allow workers to accept low-wage jobs while still living above the poverty line. In effect, the system guarantees a minimum income without affecting the wage price. As Friedman wrote in 1956, the program, “while operating through the market, [does] not distort the market or impede its functioning,” as Keynesian programs do. Today, one still commonly sees UBI advocates resort to neoclassical platitudes about employment. We can only be astonished, for example, at the dubious claims made by Van Parijs and Vanderborgh in their recent book Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy, such as: “where the level of remuneration is and remains firmly protected by minimum wage legislation, collective bargaining, and generous employment insurance, the result tends to be massive losses of jobs.” We shouldn’t be starting from the premise that too-high wages generate unemployment by disrupting the economy’s optimal equilibrium: that’s precisely the idea we should fiercely challenge. Indeed, recent studies seriously undermine these claims. Contrary to neoclassical predictions, countries that tax work the most have the highest employment rates because income taxes fund social services, which promote labor market participation, especially for women. Who Works? Still, imagine that it was mathematically possible to establish a UBI high enough that none of us would have to work. Suppose we could have this generous basic income and still have a strong welfare state. Certainly it would be a game changer. Yet even this utopia rests on two problematic assumptions work. First, it assumes that unemployed people don’t want to work or would be just as happy to receive a generous monthly check. But what if that’s wrong? The notion that we should reduce the demand for jobs rather than fight for full employment fails to consider that many people do want to work. As Seth Ackerman has argued, it assumes that the despair expressed by unemployed people amounts to false consciousness, a problem that can be mitigated by propaganda campaigns promoting non-work. This is a faulty explanation of what’s at stake with the question of work. There’s something deeper at play: work is more than a means for earning money. That’s not just due to “pro-work ideology,” but also to the objective conditions of a society based on a large-scale division of labor in which everyone contributes individually to collective production. This system generates a certain income distribution as well as a certain distribution of work. People are obviously worried about income inequality, but aren’t they also worried about job inequality? As Ackerman writes, “so long as social reproduction requires alienated work, there will always be this social demand for the equal liability of all to work, and an uneasy consciousness of it among those who could work but who, for whatever reason, don’t.” That’s why a universal job guarantee and a reduction in work hours still represent the most important objectives for any left politics. Collectively reducing work time is politically and socially preferable to creating a socially segmented pool of unemployed workers, a situation that would have serious consequences for the employed. It’s not hard to imagine how this situation could foster divisions within the working class — as it already has over the last several decades. Second, such a “utopian” UBI raises questions about how the distribution of work — that is, the division of labor — would be determined in a society where we could choose not to work. Under capitalism, the division of labor is set in a brutal fashion, relegating large sectors of the population to jobs that are difficult and badly paid, but often of great value to society. A “utopian” UBI, by contrast, simply assumes that in a society liberated from the work imperative, the spontaneous aggregation of individual desires would yield a division of labor conducive to a properly functioning society; that the desires of individuals newly freed to choose what they wish to do would spontaneously yield a perfectly functional division of labor. But this expectation is assumed rather than demonstrated. If we want to envision a society where the division of labor is no longer determined through compulsion, then we will have to rethink work itself. And a rethinking of work will only point in an emancipatory direction if work is made more meaningful and attractive. In a society where the nature of work is profoundly unequal — not only in its distribution but also in its content — transforming it becomes fundamental. Cash or Decommodification? Beyond arguments of feasibility or the effects on the labor market, we need to ask a more fundamental question: is distributing €1,100 to the whole population the best use of 35 percent of GDP? Isn’t the best way to fight against capitalism to limit the sphere in which it operates? Establishing a base income, by contrast, merely allows everyone to participate in the market. Our current economic crisis goes beyond the problem of income inequality. While inequality garners the most attention, it’s a secondary feature of capitalism. One of capitalism’s most remarkable achievements (but also one of its most violent) is that it made market exchange the nearly exclusive means to acquire the goods necessary for our own reproduction. In doing so, it turned money into almost the only valid medium of exchange and it made the majority of the population dependent on capital, enforcing a fundamentally asymmetric power relation between the boss and the worker. This profoundly unequal relationship not only subordinates people within the sphere of labor, but outside it as well, through the powerful influence economic power exerts on politics, ideology, and culture. By the end of the nineteenth century, leftists understood this problem perfectly well. The welfare state tried to limit the areas in which the market and economic power could operate. If industrialization had made only owners full citizens with real rights, then social security and unemployment insurance established what Robert Castel called “social property,” marking “the emergence of a new function of the state, of a new form of rights, and a new conception of property.” As the British sociologist T. H. Marshall explained, equality isn’t possible “without restricting the freedom of competitive markets,” without opening socialized spaces free from market imperatives. In other words, for the Left, the economic effects of extending the market (as well as the political and cultural effects) were never divorced from a questioning of the logic of the market itself. Though this perspective has suffered enormous setbacks since the early 1970s, it still offers a vision radically different from our current neoliberal consensus. The ultimate aim is not to make competition more “fair,” less “discriminatory,” or less “normative.” Instead, it seeks to curtail the space in which competition exists. In this sense, freedom doesn’t signify the ability to access the market, but rather the ability to reduce the space in which it operates. Hillary Clinton was right to say that she underestimated the power of “big ideas.” But that doesn’t mean UBI is the big idea we need. We should reconnect with the postwar period’s emancipatory heritage. The institutions workers established after World War II did more than stabilize or buffer capitalism. They constituted, in embryonic form, the elements of a truly democratic and egalitarian society, where the market would not have the central place it now occupies. And if the recent successes of Bernie Sanders and Jeremy Corbyn are anything to go by, the door may now be open to a rebirth of socialist politics. Utopia is not beyond our reach — it’s closer than we think.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Queer - Neg › 1NC › 1NC---Work

There’s a laundry list of potential issues that could lead the UBI to increase gender inequality.

Loui Williams, 2021, UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME: POTENTIAL AND LIMITATIONS FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE, https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2021/04/policy-brief-universal-basic-income, Loui Williams has worked in the Research and Data Section at UN Women since 2017, and most recently contributed to the report ‘Government Responses to COVID-19’, which analyses over 5000 government measures taken in response to the pandemic from a gender perspective. Loui is also a UN Globe representative for UN Women, supporting LGBTIQ+ personnel across the organization., Accessed 7/15/23, //ONHS IF

Others have been more cautious about the implications of UBI for gender equality. The potentially high costs could preclude public investments in other areas, including care services. One estimation of the costs of UBI paid at 100 per cent of the national poverty line to every adult and child for a sample of 130 countries found that this basic level would require a significant fiscal outlay of 20 to 35 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) for most world regions, making this a very difficult proposition for most countries and out of reach for those that are highly indebted.24 The question of how the substantial level of resources necessary for UBI set at this level could be mobilized raises important questions about sustainability and equity, with implications for gender equality. For UBI to be within reach for highly-indebted countries, debt relief would be an essential first step. In the context of fiscal tightening and austerity, there are fears that UBI is being promoted to replace social security—which tends to provide higher levels of protection and promotes social solidarity—with a minimal social safety net plus individual private insurance schemes for those who can afford them. This runs the risk of exacerbating inequalities given that, in determining premiums and entitlements, private insurance schemes tend to discriminate by sex, age, pre-existing conditions that are affected by structural determinants of health, and other factors, rather than pooling risks and resources as is the case in solidarity-based social insurance schemes.25 A flat-rate UBI for all would also fail to address specific gendered risks throughout life, such as childbirth, unemployment and old age, and may also erode existing provisions for groups such as women with disabilities or single mothers. Feminists have also expressed doubt about how far UBI truly challenges ongoing gender- and race-based inequalities in unpaid care and paid employment.26 They have cautioned that, rather than shifting gender norms on care, UBI in higher income contexts and heterosexual partnerships may mean that women cut back on paid work while men continue in full-time employment and receive additional income on top. UBI would therefore be little more than a “housewives wage”, reinforcing gender inequalities.27 The impacts of this potential reshuffling of household labour on migrant domestic workers remains unknown.28 Given the enormous fiscal implications, most UBI schemes will likely not be generous enough to cover basic living costs, meaning that recipients will require additional sources of income, particularly from paid work. In this regard, UBI cannot make up for lack of fulfillment of worker’s rights or access to decent work, especially for women and transgender and gender-diverse people experiencing multiple and intersecting inequalities in access to employment. Trade unionists have rightly warned that UBI does not solve issues of low pay, precarious work or lack of negotiating power in the workplace and could potentially detract from the need to tackle exploitative labour conditions and strengthen workers’ rights, including through living wages, universal job guarantees, affirmative action, unionization and collective bargaining.29 In this case, UBI would merely act as a band aid for a broken economic system and divert attention from more radical, transformative change needed to address structural inequalities. Finally, UBI raises important questions around who is included in a purportedly ‘universal’ scheme. For example, if receipt were attached to narrow notions of citizenship, incarcerated or formerly-incarcerated persons (a group often including disproportionately high numbers of people of colour and people living in poverty), migrants and their children (particularly those who are undocumented), unhoused people and those without government-issued IDs that reflect their identity (including many transgender and intersex individuals) might all experience exclusionary treatment.30

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Queer - Neg › 1NC › 1NC---Work

The current state of politics in the US makes passing legislation that protects the queer subject more likely to be struck down in the long-term --- that leads to serial policy failure. Protections for queer folk are more likely to be performative than not.

Victoria A. Brownworth, 7-21-2022, A bad time to be queer in America, Philadelphia Gay News, https://epgn.com/2022/07/21/a-bad-time-to-be-queer-in-america/, Accessed: 7-15-2023, //ONHS IF

On Tuesday, July 19, the House chamber erupted in applause after Speaker Nancy Pelosi gavelled in the final vote tally on the Respect for Marriage Act. In an extremely rare act of bipartisanship, 47 Republicans voted in favor of codifying same-sex marriage. It was the only good thing that has happened for LGBTQ people in a very long time and while the moment was, on a certain level, exhilarating, it was in many respects performative: the bill will never pass the Senate. Mere days before the House vote, Texas Senator and likely 2024 presidential candidate Ted Cruz said that the Supreme Court was “clearly wrong” and “overreaching” in its decision to legalize same-sex marriage. The Texas Republican’s remarks were in response to Justice Clarence Thomas asserting in the decision to overturn Roe v. Wade that the Supreme Court “should reconsider” past rulings, including Obergefell v. Hodges, which legalized gay marriage nationwide. “Obergefell, like Roe v. Wade, ignored two centuries of our nation’s history,” Cruz said on his July 16 podcast, “Verdict with Ted Cruz,” in which he discussed the “vulnerability of the Obergefell ruling.” Cruz said, “marriage was always an issue that was left to the states. We saw states before Obergefell — some states were moving to allow gay marriage, other states were moving to allow civil partnerships. There were different standards that the states were adopting.” He added, “the way the Constitution set up for you to advance that position is, convince your fellow citizens and that if you succeeded in convincing your fellow citizens, then your state would change the laws to reflect those views. In Obergefell, the court said, ‘no, we know better than you guys do, and now every state must, must sanction and permit gay marriage.’” Cruz said, “I think that decision was clearly wrong when it was decided. It was the court overreaching.” Cruz matters because Texas has led on all the most repressive anti-LGBTQ laws. In addition, the Texas anti-abortion law, the most stringent in the country with no exceptions for rape or incest, led directly to the Supreme Court ruling that reversed Roe. As I reported earlier this month, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton would enforce sodomy laws should Lawrence v. Texas be overturned. And the Texas GOP platform, codified last month, declared homosexuality “abnormal” and calls for end to same-sex marriage. The 40-page Texas GOP party platform contains a series of anti-LGBTQ policies including an end to same-sex marriage and nullification of the Obergefell v. Hodges U.S. Supreme Court ruling, support for conversion therapy, bans on gender-affirming care for trans youth and total restriction of any sex education that includes sexual orientation or gender identity. But if that feels extreme, it actually mirrors the national Republican party platform. The fact is, it’s a really bad time to be queer in America. It’s also a really bad time to be trans or nonbinary. The Republican party as a whole is virulently anti-LGBTQ. It’s not new news – it’s just that Donald Trump codified anti-LGBTQ attitudes throughout his presidency and Trumpism has subsumed the GOP. As I have reported for PGN and other venues, the Biden administration has been well-meaning toward LGBTQ people. Within his first month, President Biden issued an executive order on “preventing and combating discrimination on the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation.” That order was an attempt to implement the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Bostock v. Clayton County. In that ruling, that the Court vitiated Title VII’s prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of sex by definition bars employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. Biden’s executive order directed federal agencies to “fully implement” laws that prohibit sex discrimination in accord with this interpretation of Bostock. Periodically President Biden and Vice President Harris have made other pro-LGBTQ announcements, as they did for Pride Month. And both Biden and Harris tweet supportively to LGBTQ people from their respective accounts. But if we are honest about both the administration and the Democratic party, LGBTQ people have been failed badly, all while the GOP has ramped up their anti-LGBTQ rhetoric, and with it, in the states and the courts, actions that put the very lives of queer and trans people at risk. Conventional political wisdom asserts that criticizing Democrats during a midterm battle is working for the GOP. It’s not––it’s working for the people––the most vulnerable people in America. If Biden, Harris and the Democrats can’t stand up to valid intra-party criticisms, how will they stand up to the GOP? The lack of attention to the attacks on queer and trans people by HHS and the education department in particular is not without consequence. On July 15, a Trump-appointed federal judge temporarily blocked the Biden administration from enforcing directives that extended civil rights protections to LGBTQ students and workers. The lawsuit was filed by Tennessee Attorney General Herbert H. Slatery III and joined by 19 other states, and contended that the government was infringing on states’ rights to regulate their workplaces and schools. In point of fact, as the Biden administration argued, they hadn’t actually implemented these regulations yet. These fights for the civil rights and liberties of LGBTQ people are ongoing and dangerous. And nothing, right now, is standing in their way.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Queer - Neg › 1NC › 1NC---Work

Innovation solves extinction

Heigeartaigh ’17 [Sean; 2017; Executive Director at the University of Cambridge’s Center for the Study of Existential Risk, Ph.D. in Genomics from Trinity College Dublin; OpenMind BBVA, “Technological Wild Cards: Existential Risk and a Changing Humanity,” ]

Existential Risk and a Changing Humanity Humanity has already changed a lot over its lifetime as a species. While our biology is not drastically different than it was 70,000 years ago, the capabilities enabled by our scientific, technological, and sociocultural achievements have changed what it is to be human. Whether through the processes of agriculture, the invention of the steam engine, or the practices of storing and passing on knowledge and ideas, and working together effectively as large groups, we have dramatically augmented our biological abilities. We can lift heavier things than our biology allows, store and access more information than our brains can hold, and collectively solve problems that we could not individually. The species will change even more over coming decades and centuries, as we develop the ability to modify our biology, extend our abilities through various forms of human-machine interaction, and continue the process of sociocultural innovation. The long-term future holds tremendous promise: continued progress may allow humanity to spread throughout a galaxy that to the best of our knowledge appears devoid of intelligent life. However, what we will be in the future may bear little resemblance to what we are now, both physically and in terms of capability. Our descendants may be augmented far beyond what we currently recognize as human. This is reflected in the careful wording of Nick Bostrom’s definition of existential risk, the standard definition used in the field. An existential risk “is one that threatens the premature extinction of earth-originating intelligent life, or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future development.”3 Scholars in the field are less concerned about the form humanity may take in the long-term future, and more concerned that we avoid circumstances that might prevent our descendants—whatever form they may take—from having the opportunity to flourish. One way in which this could happen is if a cataclysmic event were to wipe out our species (and perhaps, with it, the capacity for our planet to bear intelligent life in future). But another way would be if a cataclysm fell short of human extinction, but changed our circumstances such that further progress became impossible. For example, runaway climate change might not eliminate all of us, but might leave so few of us, scattered at the poles, and so limited in terms of accessible resources, that further scientific, technological, and cultural progress might become impossible. Instead of spreading to the stars, we might remain locked in a perennial battle for survival in a much less bountiful world. The Risks We Have Always Faced For the first 200,000 years of humanity’s history, the risks that have threatened our species as a whole have remained relatively constant. Indonesia’s crater lake Toba is the result of a catastrophic volcanic super-eruption that occurred 75,000 years ago, blasting an estimated 2800 cubic kilometers of material into the atmosphere. An erupted mass just 1/100th of this from the Tambora eruption (the largest in recent history) was enough to cause the 1816 “year without a summer,” where interference with crop yields caused mass food shortages across the northern hemisphere. Some lines of evidence suggest that the Toba event may have wiped out a large majority of the human population at the time, although this is debated. At the Chixculub Crater in Mexico, geologists uncovered the scars of the meteor that most likely wiped out seventy-five percent of species on earth at that time, including the dinosaurs, sixty-six million years ago. This may have opened the door, in terms of available niches, for the emergence of mammalian species and ultimately humanity. Reaching further into the earth’s history uncovers other, even more cataclysmic events for previous species. The Permian-Triassic extinction event wiped out 90–96% of species at the time. Possible causes include meteor impacts, rapid climate change possibly due to increased methane release, large-scale volcanic activity, or a combination of these. Even further back, the cyanobacteria that introduced oxygen to our atmosphere, and paved the way for oxygen-breathing life, did so at a cost: they brought about the extinction of nearly all life at the time, to whom oxygen was poisonous, and triggered a “snowball earth” ice age. The threats posed by meteor or asteroid impacts and supervolcanoes have not gone away. In principle an asteroid could hit us at any point with little warning. A number of geological hotspots could trigger a volcanic eruption; most famously, the Yellowstone Hotspot is believed to be “due” for another massive explosive eruption. However, on the timescale of human civilization, these risks are very unlikely in the coming century, or indeed any given century. 660,000 centuries have passed since the event that wiped out the dinosaurs; the chances that the next such event will happen in our lifetimes is likely to be of the order of one in a million. And “due around now” for Yellowstone means that geologists expect such an event at some point in the next 20,000–40,000 years. Furthermore, these threats are static; there is little evidence that their probabilities, characteristics, or modes of impact are changing significantly on a human civilizational timescale. New Challenges New challenges have emerged alongside our civilizational progress. As we organized ourselves into larger groups and cities, it became easier for disease to spread among us. During the Middle Ages the Black Death outbreaks wiped out 30–60% of Europe’s population. And our travel across the globe allowed us to bring diseases with us to places they would never have otherwise reached; following European colonization of the Americas, disease outbreaks wiped out up to 95% native populations. The Industrial Revolution allowed huge changes in our capabilities as a species. It allowed rapid progress in scientific knowledge, engineering, and manufacturing capability. It allowed us to draw heavily from cheap, powerful, and rapidly available energy sources—fossil fuels. It helped us to support a much greater global population. The global population more than doubled between 1700 and 1850, and population in England—birthplace of the Industrial Revolution—increased from 5 to 15 million in the same period, and doubled again to 30 million by 1900.4 In effect, these new technological capabilities allowed us to extract more resources, create much greater changes to our environment, and support more of us than had ever previously been possible. This is a path we have been accelerating along ever since then, with greater globalization, further scientific and technological development, a rising global population, and, in developed nations at least, a rising quality of life and resource use footprint. On July 16, 1945, the day of the Trinity atomic bomb test, another milestone was reached. Humans had developed a weapon that could plausibly change the global environment in such an extreme way as to threaten the continued existence of the human species. Yellowstone National Park (Wyoming, USA) is home to one of the planet’s hot spots, where a massive volcanic explosion could someday occur. Power, Coordination, and Complexity Humanity now has a far greater power to shape its environment, locally and globally, than any species that has existed to our knowledge; more so even than the cyanobacteria that turned this into a planet of oxygen-breathing life. We have repurposed huge swathes of the world’s land to our purposes—as fields to produce food for us, cities to house billions of us, roads to ease our transport, mines to provide our material resources, and landfill to house our waste. We have developed structures and tools such as air conditioning and heating that allow us to populate nearly every habitat on earth, the supply networks needed to maintain us across these locations, scientific breakthroughs such as antibiotics, and practices such as sanitation and pest control to defend ourselves from the pathogens and pests of our environments. We also modify ourselves to be better adapted to our environments, for example through the use of vaccines. This increased power over ourselves and our environment, combined with methods to network and coordinate our activities over large numbers and wide areas, has created great resilience against many threats we face. In most of the developed world we can guarantee adequate food and water access for the large majority of the population, given normal fluctuations in yield; our food sources are varied in type and geographical location, and many countries maintain food stockpiles. Similarly, electricity grids provide a stable source of energy for developed populations, given normal fluctuations in supply. We have adequate hygiene systems and access to medical services, given normal fluctuations in disease burden, and so forth. Furthermore, we have sufficient societal stability and resources that we can support many brilliant people to work on solutions to emerging problems, or to advance our sciences and technologies to give us ever-greater tools to shape our environments, increase our quality of life, and solve our future problems. It goes without saying that these privileges exist to a far lesser degree in developing nations, and that many of these privileges depend on often exploitative relationships with developing nations, but this is outside the scope of this chapter. Here the focus is on the resilience or vulnerability of the human-as-species, which is tied more closely to the resilience of the best-off than the vulnerability of the poorest, except to the extent that catastrophes affecting the world’s most vulnerable populations would certainly impact the resilience of less vulnerable populations. Many of the tools, networks, and processes that make us more resilient and efficient in “normal” circumstances, however, may make us more vulnerable in the face of extreme circumstances. While a moderate disruption (for example, a reduced local crop yield) can be absorbed by a network, and compensated for, a catastrophic disruption may overwhelm the entire system, and cascade into linked systems in unpredictable ways. Systems critical for human flourishing, such as food, energy, and water, are inextricably interlinked (the “food-water-energy nexus”) and a disruption in one is near-guaranteed to impact the stability of the others. Further, these affect and are affected by many other human- and human-affected processes: our physical, communications, and electronic infrastructure, political stability (wars tend to both precede and follow famines), financial systems, and extreme weather (increasingly a human-affected phenomenon). These interactions are very dynamic and difficult to predict. Should the water supply from the Himalayas dry up one year, we have very little idea of the full extent of the regional and global impact, although we could reasonably speculate about droughts, major crop failures, and mass starvation, financial crises, a massive immigration crisis, regional warfare that could go nuclear and escalate internationally, and so forth. Although unlikely, it is not outside the bounds of imagination that through a series of unfortunate events, a catastrophe might escalate to one that would threaten the collapse of global civilization. Two factors stand out. Firstly, the processes underpinning our planet’s health are interlinked in all sorts of complex ways, and our activities are serving to increase the level of complexity, interlinkage, and unpredictability—particularly in the case of extreme events. Secondly, the fact is that, despite our various coordinated processes, we as a species are very limited in our ability to act as a globally coordinated entity, capable of taking the most rational actions in the interests of the whole—or in the best interests of our continued survival and flourishing. This second factor manifests itself in global inequality, which benefits developed nations in some ways, but also introduces major global vulnerabilities; the droughts, famines, floods, and mass displacement of populations likely to result from the impacts of climate change in the developing world are sure to negatively affect even the richest nations. It manifests itself in an inability to act optimally in the face of many of our biggest challenges. More effective coordination on action, communication, and resource distribution would make us more resilient in the face of pandemic outbreaks, as illustrated so vividly by the Ebola outbreak of 2014; a relatively mild outbreak of what should be an easily controllable disease served to highlight how inadequate pandemic preparedness and response was.5, 6 We were lucky that the disease was not one with greater pandemic potential, such as one capable of airborne transmission and with long incubation times. Our limited ability to coordinate in our long-term interest manifests itself in a difficulty in limiting our global resource use, limiting the impact of our collective activities on our global habitat, and of investing our resources optimally for our long-term survival and well-being. And it limits our ability to guarantee that advances in science and technology be applied to furthering our well-being and resilience, as opposed to being destabilizing or even used for catastrophically hostile purposes, such as in the case of nuclear weapons. Collective action problems are as old as humanity,7 and we have made significant progress in designing effective institutions, particularly in the aftermath of World War I and II. However, the stakes related to these problems become far greater as our power to influence our environment grows—through sheer force of numbers and distribution across the planet, and through more powerful scientific and technological tools with which to achieve our myriad aims or to frustrate those of our fellows. We are entering an era in which our greatest risks are overwhelmingly likely to be caused by our own activities, and our own lack of capacity to collectively steer and limit our power. Our Footprint on the Earth Population and Resource Use The United Nations estimated the earth’s population at 7.4 billion as of March 2016, up from 6.1 billion in 2000, 2.5 billion in 1950, and 1.6 billion in 1900. Long-term growth is difficult to predict (being affected by many uncertain variables such as social norms, disease, and the occurrence of catastrophes) and thus varies widely between studies. However, UN projections currently point to a steady increase through the twenty-first century, albeit at a slower growth rate, reaching just shy of 11 billion in 2100.8 Most estimates indicate global population will eventually peak and then fall, although the point at which this will happen is very uncertain. Current estimates of resource use footprints indicate that the global population is using fifty percent more resources per year than the planet can replenish. This is likely to continue rising sharply; more quickly than the overall population. If the average person used as many resources as the average American, some estimates indicate the global population would be using resources at four times the rate that they can be replenished. The vast majority of the population does not use food, energy, and water, nor release CO2 at the rate of the average American. However, the rapid rise of a large middle class in China is beginning to result in much greater resource use and CO2 output in this region, and the same phenomenon is projected to occur a little later on in India. Catastrophic Climate Change Without a significant change of course on CO2 emissions, the world is on course for significant human-driven global warming; according to the latest IPCC report, an increase of 2.5 to 7.8 °C can be expected under “business as usual” assumptions. The lower end of this scale will have significant negative repercussions for developing nations in particular but is unlikely to constitute a global catastrophe; however, the upper end of the scale would certainly have global catastrophic consequences. The wide range in part reflects significant uncertainty over how robust the climate system will be to the “forcing” effect of our activities. In particular, scientists focused on catastrophic climate change worry about a myriad of possible feedback loops. For example, a reduction of snow cover, which reflects the sun’s heat, could increase the rate of warming resulting in greater loss of snow cover. The loss of arctic permafrost might result in the release of large amounts of methane in the atmosphere, which would accelerate the greenhouse effect further. The extent to which oceans can continue to act as both “heat sinks” and “carbon sinks” as we push the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere upward is unknown. Scientists theorize the existence of “tipping points,” which, once reached, might trigger an irreversible shift—for example, the collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheets or the melt of Greenland’s huge glaciers, or the collapse of the capacity for oceans to absorb heat and sequester CO2. In effect, beyond a certain point, a “rollercoaster” process may be triggered, where 3 degrees of temperature rise rapidly and irreversibly may lead to 4 degrees, and then 5. Laudable progress has been made on achieving global coordination around the goal of reducing global carbon emissions, most notably in the aftermath of the December 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference. 174 countries signed an agreement to reach zero net anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by the second half of the twenty-first century, and to “pursue efforts to limit” the temperature increase to 1.5 °C. But many experts hold that these goals are unrealistic, and that the commitments and actions being taken fall far short of what will be needed. According to the International Energy Agency’s Executive Director Fatih Birol: “We think we are lagging behind strongly in key technologies, and in the absence of a strong government push, those technologies will never be deployed into energy markets, and the chances of reaching the two-degree goal are very slim.”9 Soil Erosion Soil erosion is a natural process. However human activity has increased the global rate dramatically, with deforestation, drought, and climate change accelerating the rate of loss of fertile soil. There are reasons to expect this trend to accelerate; some of the most powerful drivers of soil erosion are extreme weather events, and these events are expected to increase dramatically in frequency and severity as a result of climate change. Biodiversity Loss The world is entering an era of dramatic species extinction driven by human activity.10 Since 1900, vertebrate species have been disappearing at more than 100 times the rate seen in non-extinction periods. In addition to the intrinsic value of the diversity of forms of life on earth (the only life-inhabited planet currently known to exist in the universe), catastrophic risk scholars worry about the consequences for human societies. Ecosystem resilience is a tremendously complex phenomenon, and it seems plausible that tipping points exist in them. For example, the collapse of one or more keystone species underpinning the stability of an ecosystem could result in a broader ecosystem collapse with potentially devastating consequences for human system stability (for example, should key pollinator species disappear, the consequences for agriculture could be profound). Current human flourishing relies heavily on these ecosystem services, but we are threatening them at an unprecedented rate, and we have a poor ability to predict the consequences of our activity. Everything Affects Everything Else Once again, the sheer complexity and interconnectedness of these risks represents a key challenge. None of these processes happen in isolation, and developments in one affect the others. Climate change affects ecosystems by forcing species migration (for those that can), a change in plant and animal patterns of growth and behavior, and by driving species extinction. Reductions in available soil force us to drive more deeply into nonagricultural wilderness to provide the arable land we need to feed our populations. And the ecosystems we threaten play important roles in maintaining a stable climate and environment. Recognizing that we cannot get all the answers we need on these issues by studying them in isolation, threats posed by the interplay of these phenomena are a key area of study for catastrophic risk scholars. All these developments result in a world with greater uncertainty, the emergence of huge and unpredictable new vulnerabilities, and more extreme and unprecedented events. These events will play out in a crowded world that contains more powerful technologies, and more powerful weapons, than have ever existed before. Humanity and Technology in the Twenty-First Century Our progress in science and technology, and related civilizational advances, have allowed us to house far more people on this planet, and have provided the power for those people to influence their environment more than any previous species. This progress is not of itself a bad thing, nor is the size of our global population. There are good reasons to think that with careful planning, this planet should be able to house seven billion or more people stably and comfortably.11 With sustainable agricultural practices and innovative use of irrigation methods, it should be possible for many relatively uninhabited and agriculturally unproductive parts of the world to support more people and food production. An endless population growth on a finite planet is not possible without a collapse; however, growth until the point of collapse is by no means inevitable. Stabilization of population size is strongly correlated with several factors we are making steady global progress on: including education (especially of women), and rights and a greater level of control for women over their own lives. While there are conflicting studies,12 many experts hold that decreasing child mortality, while leading to population increase in the near-term, leads to a drop in population growth in the longer term. In other words, as we move toward a better world, we will bring about a more stable world, provided intermediate stages in this process do not trigger a collapse or lasting global harm.13, 14 Current advances in science and technology, while not sufficient in themselves, will play a key role in making a more resilient and sustainable future possible. Rapid progress is happening in carbon-zero energy sources such as solar photovoltaics and other renewables.15 Energy storage remains a problem, but progress is occurring on battery efficiency. Advances in irrigation techniques and desalination technologies may allow us to provide water to areas where this has not previously been possible, allowing both food production and other processes that depend on reliable access to clean water. Advances in materials technology will have wide-ranging benefits, from lighter, more energy-efficient vehicles, to more efficient buildings and energy grids, to more powerful scientific tools and novel technological innovations. Advances in our understanding of the genetics of plants are leading to crops with greater yields, greater resilience to temperature shifts, droughts and other extreme weather, and greater resistance to pests—resulting in a reduction of the need for polluting pesticides. We are likely to see many further innovations in food production; for example, exciting advances in lab-grown meat may result in the production of meat with a fraction of the environmental footprint of livestock farming. Many of the processes that have resulted in our current unsustainable trajectories can be traced back to the Industrial Revolution, and our widespread adoption of fossil fuels. However, the Industrial Revolution and fossil fuels must also be recognized as having unlocked a level of prosperity, and a rate and scale of scientific and technological progress that would simply not have been possible without them. While a continued reliance on fossil fuels would be catastrophic for our environment, it is unclear whether many of the “clean technology” breakthroughs that will allow us to break our dependence on fossil fuels would have been possible without the scientific breakthroughs that were enabled directly, or indirectly, by this rich, abundant, and easily available fuel source. The goal is clear: having benefitted so tremendously from this “dirty” stage of technology, we now need to take advantage of the opportunity it gives us to move onto cleaner and more powerful next-generation energy and manufacturing technologies. The challenge will be to do so before thresholds of irreversible global consequence have been passed. With 537 square meters of solar panels and six blocks of lithium-ion batteries, PlanetSolar is the world’s largest solar ship, as well as its fastest. It is also the first to have sailed round the world using exclusively solar power. The broader challenge is that humanity as a species needs to transition to a stage of technological development and global cooperation where as a species we are “living within our means”: producing and using energy, water, food, and other resources at a sustainable rate, and by methods that will not impose long-term negative consequences on our global habitat—for at least as long as we are bound to it. There are no physical reasons to think that we might not be capable of developing an extensive space-faring civilization at a future point. And if we last that long, it is likely we will develop extensive abilities to terraform extraterrestrial environments to be hospitable to us—or indeed, transform ourselves to be suitable to currently inhospitable environments. However, at present, in Martin Rees’s words, there is no place in our Solar System nearly as hospitable as the most hostile environment on earth, and so we are bound to this fragile blue planet. Part of this broader challenge is gaining a better understanding of the complex consequences of our actions, and more so, of the limits of our current understanding. Even if we cannot know everything, recognizing when our uncertainty may lead us into dangerous territory can help us figure out an appropriately cautious set of “safe operating parameters” (to borrow a phrase from Steffen et al.’s “Planetary Boundaries”16) for our activities. The second part of the challenge, perhaps harder still, is developing the level of global coordination and cooperation needed to stay within these safe operating parameters. Technological Wild Cards While much of the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk’s research focuses on these challenges—climate change, ecological risks, resource use, and population, and the interaction between these—the other half of our work is on another class of factors: transformative emerging and future technologies. We might consider these “wild cards”; technological developments significant enough to change the course of human civilization significantly in and of themselves. Nuclear weapons are such a wild card; their development changed the nature of geopolitics instantly and irreversibly. They also changed the nature of global risk: now many of the stressors we worry about might escalate quite quickly through human activity to a worst-case scenario involving a large-scale exchange of nuclear missiles. The scenario of most concern from an existential risk standpoint is one that might trigger a nuclear winter: a level of destruction sufficient to send huge amounts of particulate matter into the atmosphere and cause a lengthy period of global darkness and cold. If such a period persisted for long enough, this would collapse global food production and could drive the human species to near- or full-extinction. There is disagreement among experts about the scale of nuclear exchange needed to trigger a nuclear winter, but it appears eminently plausible that the world’s remaining arsenals, if launched, might be sufficient. Nuclear weapons could be considered a wild card in a different sense: the underlying science is one that enabled the development of nuclear power, a viable carbon-zero alternative to fossil fuels. This dual-use characteristic—that the underlying science and technology could be applied to both destructive purposes, and peaceful ones—is common to many of the emerging technologies that we are most interested in. A few key sciences and technologies of focus for scholars in this field include, among others: Topics within bioscience and bioengineering such as the manipulation and modification of certain viruses and bacteria, and the creation of organisms with novel characteristics and capabilities (genetic engineering and synthetic biology). Geoengineering: a suite of proposed large-scale technological interventions that would aim to “engineer” our climate in an effort to slow or even reverse the most severe impacts of climate change. Advances in artificial intelligence—in particular, those that relate to progress toward artificial general intelligence—AI systems capable of matching or surpassing human intellectual abilities across a broad range of domains and challenges. Progress on these sciences are driven in great part by a recognition of their potential for improving our quality of life, or the role they could play in aiding us to combat existing or emerging global challenges. However, in and of themselves they may also pose large risks. Virus Research Despite advances in hygiene, vaccines, and other health technology, natural pandemic outbreaks remain among the most potent global threats we face; for example, the 1918 Spanish influenza outbreak killed more people than World War I. This threat is of particular concern in our increasingly crowded, interconnected world. Advances in virology research are likely to play a central role in better defenses against, and responses to, viruses with pandemic potential. A particularly controversial area of research is “gain-of-function” virology research, which aims to modify existing viruses to give them different host transmissibility and other characteristics. Researchers engaged in such research may help identify strains with high pandemic potential, and develop vaccines and antiviral treatment. However, research with infectious agents runs the risk of accidental release from research facilities. There have been suspected releases of infectious agents from laboratory facilities. The 1977–78 Russian influenza outbreak is strongly suspected to have originated due to a laboratory release event,17 and in the UK, the 2007 foot-and-mouth outbreak may have originated in the Pirbright animal disease research facility.18 Research on live infectious agents is typically done in facilities with the highest biosafety containment procedures, but some experts maintain that the potential for release, while low, remains, and may outweigh the benefits in some cases. Some worry that advances in some of the same underlying sciences may make the development of novel, targeted biological weapons more feasible. In 2001 a research group in Australia inadvertently engineered a variant of mousepox with high lethality to vaccinated mice.19 An accidental or deliberate release of a similarly modified virus infecting humans, or a species we depend heavily on, could have catastrophic consequences. Similarly, synthetic biology may lead to a wide range of tremendous scientific benefits. The field aims to design and construct new biological parts, devices, and systems, and to comprehensively redesign living organisms to perform functions useful to us. This may result in synthetic bacterial and plant “microfactories,” designed to produce new medicines, materials, and fuels, to break down waste, to act as sensors, and much more. In principle, such biofactories could be designed with much greater precision than current genetic modification and biolytic approaches. They should also allow products to be produced cheaply and cleanly. Such advances would be transformative on many challenges we currently face, such as global health care, energy, and fabrication. Moreover, as the tools and facilities needed to engage in the science of synthetic biology become cheaper, a growing “citizen science” community is emerging around synthetic biology. Community “DIY Bio” facilities allow people to engage in novel experiments and art projects; some hobbyists even engage in synthetic biology projects in their own homes. Many of the leaders in the field are committed to synthetic biology being as open and accessible as possible worldwide, with scientific tools and expertise available freely. Competitions such as iGEM (International Genetically Engineered Machine) encourage undergraduate student teams to build and test biological systems in living cells, often with a focus on applying the science to important real-world challenges, and also to archive their results and products so as to make them available to future teams to build on. Such citizen science represents a wonderful way of making cutting-edge science accessible and exciting to generations of innovators. However, the increasing ease of access to increasingly powerful tools is a cause of concern to the risk community. Even if the vast majority engaging in synthetic biology are both responsible and well intentioned, the possibility of bad actors or unintended consequences (such as the release of an organism with unintended ecological consequences) exists. Further, we may expect that the range and severity of negative consequences will increase, as well as the difficulty in tracking those who have access to the necessary tools and expertise. At present, biosafety and biosecurity is deeply embedded within the major synthetic biology initiatives. In the United States, the FBI works closely with synthetic biology centers, and leaders in the field espouse the need for good practices at every level. However, this area will progress rapidly, and a balance will need to be struck between allowing access to powerful tools to a wide number of people who can do good with them, while restricting the potential for accidents or deliberate misuse. It remains to be seen how easy it will be to achieve this. Geoengineering represents a host of challenges. Stratospheric aerosol geoengineering represents a particularly powerful proposal: here, a steady stream of reflective aerosols would be released into the upper atmosphere in order to reduce the amount of the sun’s light reaching the earth’s surface globally. This effectively mimics the global cooling phenomenon that occurs after a large volcanic eruption, when particulate matter is blasted into the atmosphere. However, current work is focused on theoretical modelling, with very minimal practical field tests carried out to date. Questions remain about how practically feasible it would be to achieve this on a global scale, and what impact it would have on rainfall patterns and crop growth. It should be highlighted that this is not a solution to climate change. While global temperature might be stabilized or lowered, unless this was accompanied by reduction of CO2 emissions, then a host of damages such as ocean acidification would still occur. Furthermore, if CO2 emissions were allowed to continue to rise during this period, then a major risk termed “termination shock” could manifest. In this case, if any circumstance resulted in an abrupt cessation of stratospheric aerosol geoengineering, then the increased CO2 concentration in the atmosphere would result in a rapid jump in global temperature, which would have far more severe impacts on ecosystems and human societies than the already disastrous effects of a gradual rise. Critics fear that such research might be misunderstood as a way of avoiding the far more costly process of eliminating carbon emissions; and some are concerned that intervening in such a profound way in our planet’s functioning is deeply irresponsible. It also raises knotty questions about global governance: should any one country have the right to engage in geoengineering, and, if not, how could a globally coordinated decision be reached, particularly if different nations have different exposures to the impacts of climate change, and different levels of concern about geoengineering, given we are all under the same sky? Proponents highlight that we may already be committed to severe global impacts from climate change at this stage, and that such techniques may allow us the necessary breathing room needed to transition to zero-carbon technology while temporarily mitigating the worst of the harms. Furthermore, unless research is carried out to assess the feasibility and likely impacts of this approach, we will not be well placed to make an informed decision at a future date, when the impacts of climate change may necessitate extreme measures. Eli Kintisch, a writer at Science, has famously called geoengineering “a bad idea whose time has come.”20 Artificial intelligence, explored in detail in Stuart Russell’s chapter, may represent the wildest card of all. Everything we have achieved in terms of our civilizational progress, and shaping the world around us to our purposes, has been a product of our intelligence. However, some of the intellectual challenges we face in the twenty-first century are ones that human intelligence alone is not best suited to: for example, sifting through and identifying patterns in huge amounts of data, and integrating information from vast and interlinked systems. From analyzing disparate sources of climate data, to millions of human genomes, to running thousands of simulations, artificial intelligence will aid our ability to make use of the huge amount of knowledge we can gather and generate, and will help us make sense of our increasingly complex, interconnected world. Already, AI is being used to optimize energy use across Google’s servers, replicate intricate physics experiments, and discover new mathematical proofs. Many specific tasks traditionally requiring human intelligence, from language translation to driving on busy roads, are now becoming automatable; allowing greater efficiency and productivity, and freeing up human intelligence for the tasks that AI still cannot do. However, many of the same advances have more worrying applications; for example, allowing collection and deep analysis of data on us as individuals, and paving the road for the development of cheap, powerful, and easily scalable autonomous weapons for the battlefield. These advances are already having a dramatic impact on our world. However, the vast majority of these systems can be described as “narrow” AI. They can perform functions at human level or above in narrow, well-specified domains, but lack the general cognitive abilities that humans, dogs, or even rats have: general problem-solving ability in a “real-world” setting, an ability to learn from experience and apply knowledge to new situations, and so forth. There is renewed enthusiasm for the challenge of achieving “general” AI, or AGI, which would be able to perform at human level or above across the range of environments and cognitive challenges that humans can. However, it is currently unknown how far we are from such a scientific breakthrough, or how difficult the fundamental challenges to achieving this will be, and expert opinion varies widely. Our only proof of principle is the human brain, and it will take decades of progress before we can meaningfully understand the brain to a degree that would allow us to replicate its key functions. However, if and when such a breakthrough is achieved, there is reason to think that progress from human-level general intelligence to superintelligent AGI might be achieved quite rapidly. Improvements in the hardware and software components of AI, and related sciences and technologies, might be made rapidly with the aid of advanced general AI. It is even conceivable that AI systems might directly engage in high-level AI research, in effect accelerating the process by allowing cycles of self-improvement. A growing number of experts in AI are concerned that such a process might quickly result in extremely powerful systems beyond human control; Stuart Russell has drawn a comparison with nuclear chain reaction. Superintelligent AI has the potential to unlock unprecedented progress on science, technology, and global challenges; to paraphrase the founders of Google DeepMind, if intelligence can be “solved,” it can then be used to help solve everything else. However, the risk from this hypothetical technology, whether through deliberate use or unintended runaway consequences, could be greater than that of any technology in human history. If it is plausible that this technology might be achieved in this century, then a great deal of research and planning—both on the technical design of such systems, and the governance structures around their development—will be needed in the decades beforehand in order to achieve a desirable transition. Predicting the Future The field also engages in exploratory and foresight-based work on more forward-looking topics; these include future advances in neuroscience and nanotechnology, future physics experiments, and proposed manufacturing technologies that may be developed in coming decades, such as molecular manufacturing. While we are limited in what we can say in detail about future scientific breakthroughs, it is often possible to establish some useful groundwork. For example, we can identify developments that should, in principle, be possible based on our current understanding of the relevant science. And we can dismiss ideas that are pure “science fiction,” or sufficiently unfeasible to be safely ignored for now, or that represent a level of progress that makes them unlikely to be achieved for many generations. By focusing further on those that could plausibly be developed within the next half century, we can give considerations to their underlying characteristics and possible impacts on the world, and of the broad principles we might bear in mind for their safe development and application. While it would have been a fool’s errand to try to predict the full impacts of the Internet prior to 1960, or of the development of nuclear weapons prior to 1945, it would certainly be possible to develop some thinking around the possible implications of very sophisticated global communications and information-sharing networks, or of a weapon of tremendous destructive potential. Lastly, if we have some ideas about the directions from which transformative developments might come, we can engage in foresight and road-mapping research. This can help identify otherwise insignificant breakthroughs and developments that may indicate meaningful progress toward a more transformative technology being reached, or a threshold beyond which global dynamics are likely to shift significantly (such as photovoltaics and energy storage becoming cheaper and more easily accessible than fossil fuels). Confronting the Limits of Our Knowledge A common theme across these emerging technologies and emerging risks is that a tremendous level of scientific uncertainty and expert disagreement typically exists. This is particularly the case for future scientific progress and capabilities, the ways in which advances in one domain may influence progress in others, and the likely global impacts and risks of projected advances. Active topics of research at CSER include how to obtain useful information from a range of experts with differing views, and how to make meaningful scientific progress on challenges where we have discontinuous data, or few case studies to draw on, or even when we must characterize an entirely unprecedented event. This might be a hypothesized ecological tipping point, which when passed would result in an irreversible march toward the collapse of an entire critical ecosystem. Or it might be a transformative scientific breakthrough such as the development of artificial general intelligence, where we only have current trends in AI capability, hardware, and expert views on the key unsolved problems in the field to draw insight from. It is unrealistic to expect that we can always, or even for the most part, be right. We need to have humility, to expect false positives, and to be able to identify priority research targets from among many weak signals. Recognizing that there are limits to the level of detail and certainty that can be achieved, this work is often combined with work on general principles of scientific and technological governance. For example, work under the heading of “responsible innovation” focuses on the challenge of developing collective stewardship of progress in science and technology in the present, with a view to achieving good future outcomes.21 This combines scientific foresight with processes to involve the key stakeholders at the appropriate stages of a technology’s development. At different stages these stakeholders will include: scientists involved in fundamental research and applied research; industry leaders; researchers working on the risks, benefits, and other impacts of a technology; funders; policymakers; regulators; NGOs and focus groups; and laypeople who will use or be affected by the development of a technology. In the case of technologies with a potential role in global catastrophic risk, the entire global population holds a stake. Therefore decisions with long-term consequences must not rest solely with a small group of people, represent only the values of a small subset of people, or fail to account for the likely impacts on the global population. There have been a number of very encouraging specific examples of such foresight and collaboration, where scientific domain specialists, interdisciplinary experts, funders, and others have worked together to try to guide an emerging technology’s development, establish ethical norms and safety practices, and explore its potential uses and misuses in a scientifically rigorous way. In bioengineering, the famous 1975 Asilomar conference on recombinant DNA established important precedents, and more recently summits have been held on advances such as human gene editing. In artificial intelligence, a number of important conferences have been held recently, with enthusiastic participation from academic and industry research leaders in AI alongside interdisciplinary experts and policymakers. A number of the world’s leading AI research teams have established ethical advisory panels to inform and guide their scientific practices, and a cross-industry “partnership on AI to benefit people and society” involving five companies leading fundamental research has recently been announced.22 More broadly, it is crucial that we learn from the lessons of past technologies and, where possible, develop principles and methodologies that we can take forward. This may give us an advantage in preparing for developments that are currently beyond our horizon and that methodologies too deeply tied to specific technologies and risks may not allow. One of the key concerns associated with risks from emerging and future technologies is the rate at which progress occurs and at which the associated threats may arise. While every science will throw up specific challenges and require domain-specific techniques and expertise, any tools or methodologies that help us to intervene reliably earlier are to be welcomed. There may be a limited window of opportunity for averting such risks. Indeed, this window may occur in the early stages of developing a technology, well before the fully mature technology is out in the world, where it is difficult to control. Once Pandora’s box is open, it is very difficult to close.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Queer - Neg › 1NC › 1NC---Work

Capital flight causes brain drain and ruins innovation

Fabio Mariani, 03-01-2008, Paris School of Economics, "Brain Drain, R&D-Cost Differentials and the Innovation Gap," Cairn.info, https://www.cairn.info/revue-recherches-economiques-de-louvain-2008-3-page-251.htm, //hm-sms

Some recent literature on the effects of skilled migration tends to present the brain drain as an opportunity for sending countries. In fact, papers such as Mountford (1997), Beine et al. (2001) and Stark and Wang (2002) argue that a well managed migration rate, making available higher wages (abroad) for the most skilled, can create an incentive to invest more in education, thus producing an increase in the average (after migration) domestic level of human capital. As a consequence, skilled emigration may turn out to have beneficial consequences for welfare and growth in the home economy. In particular, Stark and Wang (2002) highlight the possible role of a positive migration chance as a substitute for educational subsidies in less advanced countries, in order to reach the socially optimal level of human capital. 2This argument may admittedly fit quite well the case of developing countries (whose growth is not led by innovative production), and then the so-called South-North brain drain. However, it proves less satisfactory with reference to the North-North high-skilled migration, since it neglects the central role played by innovation in developed economies, and by the interaction between firms’ and workers’ decisions (investments in skills and new technologies, respectively). In fact, policy makers in industrialized countries do not care only about human capital per se: they are rather concerned with the possibility to translate it into effective R&D and innovation. 3Consider, for instance, the case of Europe. 4One of the main concerns of European authorities in the last decade has been to fill the innovation gap with the U.S.; yet, up till now, the approach to implementing the so-called Lisbon strategy has had very limited success, and the goal of making the Union “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” by 2010, seems completely out of sight. In fact, the European Innovation Scoreboard (European Commission, 2003) reports how Europe is still lagging behind U.S. with respect to 10 (out of 11) innovation indicators, the widest gap concerning high-tech patents. Two years later the same publication (European Commission, 2005) says that “… the innovation gap between the EU25 and the US is close to stable”, while “… the innovation gap between the EU25 and Japan is increasing” 5The notable exception to this large and persistent gap between Europe and the U.S. is represented by the number of S&E graduates. However, as a matter of facts, many of these skilled professionals, especially top-class researchers, are crossing the Atlantic Ocean. As pointed out by the Time magazine (2004) in a recent issue devoted to Europe’s brain drain [2] “… one of the most worrying signs of their (European leaders’) failure is the continued drain of Europe’s best and brightest scientific brains, who finish their degrees and pursue careers in the U.S. […] No wonder the U.S. has 78% more high-tech patents per capita than Europe, which is especially weak in the IT and biotech sectors.” 6If we look at country data on innovation in historical perspective, we see that, inside the OECD, some countries (Japan, Australia, Canada, Scandinavian countries, Germany, Switzerland) are converging to the U.S. innovation potential, along the last decades, while others (especially big European countries like United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain) definitely are not (see for instance Furman et al., 2002). As far as education is concerned, we realize that, on the contrary, all European and OECD countries are progressively reaching levels of schooling comparable to the U.S. (see Barro and Lee’s data (2000) for some compelling evidence). 7Since education and R&D are usually considered to be intimately related, one could ask why only a limited group of countries has succeeded in translating higher education into stronger innovation activity. Integrating skilled migration in the analysis, we could suggest an answer to this question: although many other factors may lay behind those stylized facts, R&D-convergence might have been hampered by the consistent human capital flight mentioned above [3]