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2023 Michigan Kritik
Racial Capitalism Kritik --- K Lab 2023 › Link › 1NC --- Carbon Tax

Yes it applies to the aff—our evidence specifically indicts Carbon Dividends.

Patterson et al. 21, July 2021, Jacqueline Patterson is a Senior Director at the NAACP for the Environmental and Climate Justice Program. Lorah Steichen is a Consultant in the Environmental and Climate Justice Program at the NAACP. Katherine Egland is a chair for the ECJ Committee on the NAACP National Board of Directors. Saleem Chapman is a Consultant for the Environmental and Climate Justice Program at the NAACP. Mandy Lee is a sector manager for the Centering Equity in the Sustainable Building at the NAACP ECJP. Zoe Lee-Park is an intern at the NAACP Environmental and Climate Justice Program, “Nuts, Bolts, and Pitfalls of Carbon Pricing: An Equity-Based Primer on Paying to Pollute,” NAACP, , Orr

“The belief that a tax-driven process is possible distracts from the more complex and deep-reaching political changes necessary to drastically cut carbon emissions, such as regulating against the extraction and use of fossil fuels and seeking the best and most inclusive ways of transitioning toward a regenerative economy—one that doesn’t leave vulnerable people and communities behind.” Cynthia Mellon, Policy Coordinator at the Climate Justice

Faulty Economic Justice Arguments. Carbon pricing proponents say: “Carbon pricing helps deliver economic justice while fighting climate change.”Reality: Token revenues distributed to environmental justice communities, via Carbon Fee and Dividend or other models, will never make up for the destruction resulting from the source of that revenue.100Some iterations of carbon pricing policy attempt to make-up for the shortfalls described above by claiming to advance economic justice or function as a revenue generator for “disadvantaged” communities. Communities that policymakers often characterize as “disadvantaged” have long experienced systemic discrimination and oppression in the United States, often as a direct result of the policies and systems designed and implemented by U.S. policymakers. The suggestion that these communities should have to rely on funds generated from cap-and-trade or other carbon pricing schemes—which disproportionately harm the very communities that are supposedly receiving financial benefits from carbon markets—is frankly insulting. Effective climate policy should deliver economic justice outcomes alongside environmental ones. This is not achieved through carbon pricing, even when revenues are distributed to most impacted communities. Our allies at the Indigenous Environmental Network state: “Accepting such revenue not only does not compensate for the damage to our air, bodies, environment, and nature, but also implicates the receiver in the extraction, pollution and natural disasters that such pollution causes.”

2023 Michigan Kritik
Racial Capitalism Kritik --- K Lab 2023 › Link › 1NC --- Carbon Tax

Carbon taxes cater to the interests of big business, facilitating neoliberal pollution under the guise of environmental regulation. The plan increases emissions which turns the aff.

Patterson et al. 21, July 2021, Jacqueline Patterson is a Senior Director at the NAACP for the Environmental and Climate Justice Program. Lorah Steichen is a Consultant in the Environmental and Climate Justice Program at the NAACP. Katherine Egland is a chair for the ECJ Committee on the NAACP National Board of Directors. Saleem Chapman is a Consultant for the Environmental and Climate Justice Program at the NAACP. Mandy Lee is a sector manager for the Centering Equity in the Sustainable Building at the NAACP ECJP. Zoe Lee-Park is an intern at the NAACP Environmental and Climate Justice Program, “Nuts, Bolts, and Pitfalls of Carbon Pricing: An Equity-Based Primer on Paying to Pollute,” NAACP, , Orr

Despite embodying these characteristics, carbon pricing has emerged as a popular solution to climate change among many predominantly white organizations working on environment/climate. As the urgency of addressing the climate crisis grows and relative inaction persists, the pervasiveness of market-based “solutions” has continued to spread. In fact, in recent years,carbon pricing has begun to permeate some environmental justice spaces as well—or at the very least carbon pricing champions have begun to appropriate the language of the movement. At first glance, a price on carbon appears to make sense as it purports to incentivize shifting to renewable energy, low-or no-carbon technologies,and generally constrains the market to protect the planet. But looking beyond this surface-level analysis, the limitations and inherent flaws of carbon pricing as a tool to reduce emissions and meaningfully address the climate crisis become clear. It’s worth acknowledging that some carbon pricing models are more problematic than others. Likewise, there are some carbon pricing policies that are framed with well-meaning intentions. Ultimately, however, it is evident that carbon pricing is not the solution we need to significantly reduce carbon emissions and, in many cases, results in exacerbated impact on BIPOC as well as low-income communities and other populations vulnerable to the impacts of the extraction and refinement of fossil fuel-forms of energy, and the resulting carbon pollution from its use. Key Environmental Justice Critiques of Carbon Pricing. Carbon pricing falls short on many grounds. If we look at the lived realities of frontline communities in the US and around the world, and the track record of various carbon pricing schemes in existence, we can critique it from multiple vantage points: moral/ethical religious and spiritual human rights flaws in the economic theory which provides the rationale for the policy socio-economic outcomes environmental outcomes In this section, we deepen the environmental justice analysis by describing the four top contentions of carbon pricing advocates juxtaposed against the lived realities, as defined by frontline communities. #1: Missing the Bigger Picture Carbon pricing proponents say: Market-based solutionsare “elegant” and “efficient.” When a price is assigned to carbon emissions, polluters will be incentivized to reduce emissions and encouraged to invest in alternative forms of energy and production practices. Carbon pollution is not a technical problem that can be fixed with a market-based solution that allows fossil fuels to continue to be extracted from the earth and burned. Climate change is a symptom of—not technical problem within—the dig, dump, and burn economy. Climate change is the earth’s cry for us to profoundly rethink our relationship with each other as humans, and with the larger ecosystems of which we are a part –not simply to tweak prices for fossil fuels.As researcher Larry Lohmann asserts, “Many people of strong environmentalist convictions and democratic spirit genuinely believe that if the earth’s carbon-cycling capacity is to be respected and preserved, it is inevitable that it be treated as a commodity.” In fact, they have championed language which looks at nature through the lens of “environmental services” as a way of protecting and defending it. While we acknowledge the appeal of this viewpoint—notably its convenience and simplicity—the reality is that it doesn’t hold up. The purpose of the dominant, extractive economy is the accumulation, concentration, and enclosure of wealth and power achieved through resource extraction and labor exploitation. It is in the context of this deeply flawed economic system that the climate crisis has emerged. 60Considering how an entrenched logic of domination, exploitation of land and people, and indiscriminate economic growth has set the stage for the climate crisis as we experience it today, supposed solutions that uphold or reinforce this economic system should give us pause (if not set off alarm bells and red flags). A system where companies or governments buy and sell permits to pollute fails to challenge the economicsystem that created the climate crisis in the first place. On the contrary, it reinforces it. “Market-based mechanisms are a false solution to curb catastrophic climate change and deforestation. As an example, these mechanisms allow big polluters to continue to poison communities at sites of extraction and at points of distribution and processing by buying up pollution permits from forests around the world and simultaneously continuing dirty pollution practices in a different country.” Womens’ Earth and Climate Action Network. #2: Carbon Pricing Schemes Are Not Designed to Produce Localized Emissions Reductions. Carbon pricing proponents say: “Carbon pricing reduces emissions in the cheapest, most efficient means possible.”Reality: Carbon pricing makes pollution hot spots worse and fails to reduce localized emissions, by design. Rather than stop pollution at the source, carbon-pricing schemes often add to and reinforce the toxic and disproportionate burdens that BIPOC, low-income communities, and other frontline communities already face from polluting-facilities—such as power plants, industrial facilities, or trash incinerators. Carbon-pricing schemes are not designed to produce localized emissions reductions, as the California’s cap and trade program has demonstrated.81By spreading emissions cuts around so that the “cheapest,” “most efficient,” and “easiest” cuts are made first, carbon pricing explicitly neglects—and actually continues to erase and reinforce—the conditions of sacrifice communities. The health and well-being of these communities has been sacrificed in order to further the interests of those benefiting off of the extractive economy. By reducing the climate emergency to a crisis of carbon, carbon-pricing policies also fall short in addressing the co-pollutants that are produced from industrial facilities—notably, particulate matter, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, and air toxics (roughly six hundred chemicals subject to Toxics Release Inventory reporting and beyond). Fossil fuel combustion is not only the primary source of greenhouse gas emissions, but a major source of local ambient air pollution. Numerous studies indicate that such co-pollutants are connected to a variety of detrimental health impacts. The World Health Organization estimated that in 2012, approximately three million deaths were attributable to ambient air pollution.83This underscores the importance of monitoring co-pollutant emissions during the design and implementation of climate policies. “This is carbon trading—a multi-billion dollar scheme whose basic premise is that polluters can pay someone else to clean up their mess so that they don’t have to.” Tamra Gilbertson and Oscar Reyes in Carbon Trading: How it Works and Why It Fails. “We here in the town of Brookhaven are in a fight for our lives, literally. We have a power plant that was put here in an overburdened majority-minority community, and now they want to expand it to create an ash facility that will make us the garbage hub of the region. We had an initial victory. The citizen’s panel that was appointed to look at the feasibility of the ash facility has unanimously recommended that it not be built, and that was really a victoryfor the NAACP. The fight still continues because this is just the beginning. We’re in it. We’re the oldest and the boldest for a reason, because we stay the course.”Nicole Christian, Environmental Justice Chair, Brookhaven Town NAACP (Long Island, NY). Carbon offset markets are the most blatant example of relocating emissions instead of reducing them. By design, offsets merely “compensate” for emissions growth by implementing a reduction elsewhere. In many cases, however, offsets actually increaseemissions rather than displace them. Given that offsets are designed to be cheaper than emissions reductions, they are an attractive means to avoid changing practices and reducing emissions at the source. The largest companies which tend to purchase the largest portion of carbon offsets also tend to be the biggest polluters. When employed as a compliance mechanism in cap and trade, offsets remove the limit (the “cap”) on emissions supposedly imposed by the scheme. In addition to failing to result in real emissions reductions, offsets also allow companies and governments to shirk their responsibilities to clean up their practices. If a policy supposedly addresses carbon-emissions at large but fails to deliver localized emissions reductions or extend air-quality co-benefits, then it is most certainly a false solution. #3: The Origins of Carbon Pricing Advanced Programs Designed to Benefit Polluters Carbon pricing proponents say: “Everybody agrees—Republicans, Democrats, Investors, Fossil Fuel Companies—carbon pricing is the best way to address the climate crisis. 63Reality: Carbon markets were created so that governments and fossil fuel companies could “flexibly” meet emissions reductions standards without having to significantly change their own pollution practices. Carbon pricing programs are politically popular, in part, because they are perceived as the least expensive and most-industry friendly approach to reducing carbon pollution. Indeed, carbon markets originated as a means through which responsible entities (i.e. governments and corporations) could “flexibly” meet emissions reductions standards without having to make significant operating changes. This is especially true with mechanisms which offer compliance loopholes such as free allowances or carbon offsets that allow companies to continue polluting at rates that deny direct air quality benefits to those communities living in the shadow of their facilities. As a carbon pricing critique published by Food and Water Watch clearly articulates, “Companies trade pollution credits with little or no public input. This lack of transparency can concentrate emissions and exacerbate the persistent inequitable health and economic burdens in disadvantaged communities. Unlike the regulatory process, pollution trading leaves almost no room for political or legal recourse.” “Market-based approaches such as a carbon tax are accepted by the fossil fuel industry because they do not actually threaten the ongoing and continuous extraction of oil and gas.” Cynthia Mellon, Policy Coordinator at the Climate Justice Alliance “At a time when rampant free market capitalism has led to financial crisis, with skyrocketing oil and food prices, market based ‘innovative’ financial mechanisms are still being promoted to commodify nature including, carbon trading, carbon offsets, payments forenvironmental services, REDD, and biodiversity offsets. These 'solutions' are more likely to endanger biodiversity, climate and communities. Such false solutions are really for the benefit of corporations. The real agenda behind this is to increase corporate controlover land, forests, water, agriculture and biodiversity, using climate change and the biodiversity crisis as an opportunity to further these objectives. This is a new 21stcentury phase of colonialism.”Climate Justice Group Joint Statement at the Convention on Biological Diversity 86Given the historical fraternization between policymakers and powerful energy lobbyists, who have always subsidized, benefited, and favored the oil and gas industry at the expense of consumers, why would we venture to now trust the government to be fully accountable in fairly and accurately administering carbon pricing regulations? When carbon market advocates assert that pricingcarbon is “efficient” or “cost-effective,” those advocates fail to specify for whom: polluting industries.” If our objective is to achieve drastic emissions reductions or bring about a change in a larger technological system, a solution designed for polluters is not it. Food and Water Watch, November 2017 #4: Existing Carbon Markets Haven’t Produced Significant Results. Carbon pricing proponents say: Carbon pricing is an efficient and effective way to reduce emissions. Reality: Existing carbon markets have not produced significant emissions reductions at the rate we need. Carbon prices have consistently been low. Policymakers have often had more success in reducing emissions by imposing direct regulations. Beyond the deeply flawed ideological basis of carbon markets, existing carbon pricing approaches have dismal track records of producing significant emissions reductions. “These cap and trade proposals are mostly about protecting business as usual. Right now, the US subsidizes fossil fuels at more than twice the rate of renewables. What? We shouldn’t be subsidizing fossil fuels at all! These guys don’t seem to realize that the simplest way to keep carbon out of the atmosphere is to leave it safely in the ground. U.S. congressman, Rick Boucher, a well-known friend of the coal industry voted for cap and trade. He said it ‘strengthens the case for utilities to continue to use coal.’ No law that encourages coal use can stop climate change. Period. Solid caps, strong laws, citizen action, and paying off ecological debt and creating a clean energy economy, that’s how we can save our future.”Annie Leonard, Story of Stuff Project Countries where governments have imposed fees on carbon emissions haven’t shown significant decline in carbon emissions. As a matter of fact, after remaining flat for three years, global greenhouse emissions rose to an all-time high in 2017. Take British Columbia, Canada, for example, where carbon emissions have actually increased since a carbon tax was introduced in 2008. Recent data indicates that CO2emissions went up from 61.3 million tons in 2015 to 62.3 in 2016; CO2emissions have increasedin five of the last six years that data is available. In the United States, existing carbon pricing programs are encountering difficulties achieving reductions or spurring innovation. There is concern in California, for instance,that an oversupply of allowances could result in industries buying and hoarding so many that they might evade the need to actually reduce emissions in the future, when the state’s emission target stighten. In many cases, governments are unwilling to impose carbon prices that are high or broad enough to make a significant difference.In 2017, a group of economists known as the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices concluded that carbon prices would need to be between $40-$80 per metric ton by 2020, and between $50-$100 by 2030 in order to achieve the emission cuts called for in the Paris Climate Accord. (It’s worth noting that the goals set by the Paris Agreement are widely considered to be insufficient.)91A report from the United Nations called for a steeper price, estimating that governments would need to impose effective carbon prices of $135 to $5,500 per ton of carbon dioxide pollution by 2030 to keep overall global warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius. Of the global emissions now subject to a carbon price, only one percent are priced at or above $40, while three-quarters are priced below $10. Only 0.15 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions are subject to a carbon price that economists deem high enough to make much of an environmental difference. It’s important to point out here, that to date, policymakers have often had more success in reducing emissions by imposing direct regulations. Examples include the case of sulfur dioxide trading mentioned previously, as well as the United States’ strict fuel-economy standards, which have reduced domestic oil consumption by billions of barrels.94,95

2023 Michigan Kritik
Racial Capitalism Kritik --- K Lab 2023 › Link › 1NC --- Carbon Tax

Carbon Taxes uniquely disadvantage low/middle income families through inflation and tax differences – high level reforms for EJ fail absent grassroots movements that address limits of the liberal state.

Kashwan 21 (Prakash Kashwan, “Climate Justice in the Global North”, University of California Press, FEBRUARY 24 2021, , acc. 7/10/23)//AS

3. Injustices of Climate Responses Climate response has three components: mitigation, which refers to actions that help reduce emissions of GHGs; adaptation, which refers to measures that reduce vulnerability to the consequences of climate change; and resilience, which refers to the properties that enable a socioecological system to withstand the shocks of climate change. Although adaptation and resilience are closely intertwined, adaptation actions are generally thought of as responses to climate change impacts, while resilience actions are anticipatory. Each of these three types of “climate responses” has important implications for justice. Additionally, we briefly consider the importance of taking an intersectional approach to understanding climate action’s justice effects. A central component of the efforts to mitigate climate change is to curtail carbon emissions linked to energy-intensive consumption. However, in democratic societies, one cannot merely ban or arbitrarily restrict energy-intensive activities, not least because many of these activities are a source of employment and other means of economic wellbeing for many lower-income families. The next best option is to put a price on carbon emissions, commonly referred to as “carbon tax,” which many scholars and practitioners see as one of the most effective means of climate mitigation. If we lived in a world of economic and wealth equality, a carbon tax would simply realign economic incentives without imposing excessive burdens on specific social groups. However, in the presence of massive economic and wealth inequalities, a carbon tax would affect poor and/or racial minority households very differently compared to others. Unless subsistence items, such as food, water, and energy were protected from the inflationary effects of carbon taxes, even a moderate level of the carbon tax could make these items too expensive for the poor in the United States. In Paris, the Yellow Vest protestors cited economic inequalities and the unfairness of the gas tax that President Emmanuel Macron announced in 2019 as one of the main reasons for the protests. The protestors felt that it was unfair to ask low- and middle-income folks to “make sacrifices while rich people aren’t paying taxes anymore.” This feeling of unfairness contributed to “a sense of despair, as well as a sense of social injustice” [41]. The adverse effects of climate mitigation are not always contained within the national borders, though. Carbon offsets projects, including some that may be funded by environmentally conscious consumers paying an airline a little extra to offset the emissions linked to their air travel, have been implicated in the dispossession and displacements of indigenous groups in different parts of the world.20 Such projects may be less problematic when implemented within the Global North, characterized by the security of property rights and a robust rule of law. These conditions do not apply to most terrestrial carbon offset projects in Africa or Asia. Over 95% of forestlands are legally defined as public lands, even though most of these lands have been used customarily by indigenous peoples and other rural populations. Under those conditions, the financial returns linked to carbon offset projects incentivize powerful government agencies and private actors to set aside these lands for carbon offset projects, including in countries where customary land tenures are protected under the statute. The international community has developed social safeguards and other codes of conduct to regulate offset projects. However, research by the Center for International Forestry Research, the Oakland Institute, and the Rights & Resources Initiative shows that international offset projects contribute to widespread human rights violations [42, 43]. Similarly, a large-scale switch to renewables, including electric or hybrid batteries, windmills, and solar panels, could lead to a sudden spike in demand for rare minerals, such as copper and cobalt. The mining of these minerals also often contributes to gross human rights abuses, including child labor and the degradation and depletion of natural resources, such as water, forests, and pastures crucial for local livelihoods in the Global South [44]. For these reasons, some scholars argue that industrial-scale renewable energy infrastructure can be as exploitative as the fossil fuel industry practices have been. Noticeably, this argument applies to industrial-scale renewable infrastructure. Renewable energy resources can also exist in the form of “energy commons,” which give local communities real stakes in making decisions about siting, pricing, and profit-sharing [45]. Such democratization of energy infrastructure is crucial for implementing a transition plan that suits the site-specific requirements. Some consider climate adaptation, that is, the measures designed to deal with the climate crisis, to be synonymous with climate justice. The argument is that if the worst consequences of climate change fall on the poor and the marginalized, any interventions meant to adapt to climate change would necessarily help the poor. Yet not all climate adaptation measures are created equal. For example, coastal adaptation measures in response to sea-level rise should help sustain rather than disrupt subsistence and artisanal fishing, which are the mainstay of livelihood strategies for many coastal frontline communities. More broadly, as Dean Hardy and colleagues argue, “the land facing inundation is racialized land…that has been appropriated, settled, cultivated, and distributed through a long history of deeply racialized projects” [46]. They argue that sea-level rise adaptation planning must recognize the reality of such “racial coastal formations” and must commit to “resist the reproduction of and reinvestments in racial inequality in responses to climate change” [46]. The failure to address racial inequalities means that many urban climate adaptation interventions, such as public transit systems, public parks, and improved civic amenities, may increase property prices or rentals, which makes some areas unaffordable to their current residents. These changes lead to urban gentrification, which refers to the changes in a neighborhood’s composition because of changes in property values. It is called climate gentrification when such changes are related to climate change [47]. The framework of climate gentrification helps illuminate the social determinants of vulnerability. For example, as the rising sea levels and frequent flooding threaten expensive properties on Miami’s famed beaches, wealthy people invest in properties inland. The flux of new investments and new wealthy residents makes the previously low-income neighborhoods too costly to afford for low-income groups [48]. As human geographer Jesse Ribot has argued, “vulnerability does not fall from the sky” [49]. Considering that socioeconomic deprivations contribute to climate change-related vulnerabilities, any efforts to address climate injustice must address such disadvantages. 4. The Pursuit of Climate Justice The discussions above demonstrate that climate injustices are not just about the “climate system” or “global warming” but are rooted firmly in the unequal patterns of vulnerabilities shaped by the distribution of social and political power and economic inequalities. Climate change’s social consequences manifest in outcomes related to urban development patterns, energy prices, urban transportation, food production, and food markets. By implication, the pursuit of climate justice also requires addressing these various sectors of the economy and society. The following are some examples of how local governments, civic groups, academic institutions, and social movements seek to pursue climate justice. The fossil-fuel divestment movement popularized by 350.org has grown to secure commitments to divest more than US$14 trillion worth of investments made by more than 1,230 institutions, including religious institutions, pension funds, university endowments, and large charitable foundations. College students from several universities in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere have made significant contributions to the global fossil fuel divestment movement’s ongoing success [50]. The decline of the fossil fuel industry, including the state-owned oil corporations in some of the largest oil producing countries, will undoubtedly lower environmental pollution and contribute to environmental and climate justice. Another example from the energy sector is the 2019 Tennessee Valley Energy Democracy Tour, which focused on building a collective grassroots vision for an egalitarian energy future in the communities impacted by the New Deal era projects of the Tennessee Valley Authority.21 This tour served as a good reminder of why we need to pay attention to the historical legacies of unequal development and socioeconomic marginalization. Transformative reforms in state-level energy policies and programs are other crucial elements necessary for fostering an inclusive clean energy action. The Washington-based Institute for Local Self-Reliance scores and ranks states on their energy policies, specifically their devolution and inclusiveness [51]. Such rankings create useful resources for grassroots actors and could help foster healthy competition among states. Climate justice interventions related to urban areas include the Miami City Commission’s resolution directing the city managers to research urban gentrification and ways of stabilizing property tax rates in lower income areas located further inland [52]. City governments can act to institutionalize other means of fostering a healthy urban ecosystem. In 2019, the Boston City Council voted unanimously to enact a Good Food Purchasing Program (GFPP) for a more equitable food purchasing system at public institutions. Seven other cities, including Los Angeles, Chicago, and Cincinnati, have also adopted GFPP policies [53]. These initiatives help urban populations cut down on their reliance on imported food items that leave a significant carbon footprint. In doing so, they also undercut the stronghold of industrial agriculture, which is a large consumer of fossil fuels and one of the major causes of global climate change [54]. Equally important, food ordinances can help improve the profitability of urban and peri-urban agro-ecological farming, which is associated with multiple social, economic, environmental, and climate-related benefits [55]. More broadly, instead of privatizing urban infrastructure or having monopolistic state control, reimagining the city as a “commons” gives urban residents a collective stake in a city’s resources [56]. Democratizing urban governance—that is, allowing urban residents a meaningful say in the conduct of the ongoing affairs in a city—is an important prerequisite for incorporating concerns of ecology and environment into our urban imaginations. La Via Campesina, a transnational social movement, promotes agroecology and food sovereignty by engaging with all relevant actors, including the United Nations at the global level and peasant federations at the subnational level. They have been instrumental in the successful enactment of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas. La Via Campesina engages with 182 organizations representing an estimated 200 million farmers from 81 countries throughout Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. Another example of a grassroots network that has made a global impact is the Indigenous Environmental Network (IEN), founded in 1990 in Bemidji, MN, to address environmental and economic justice issues. IEN has also been one of the key actors in the global climate justice movement, mainly via its participation in the annual United Nations Climate Change meetings. The IEN has recently launched a People’s Orientation to a Regenerative Economy: Protect, Repair, Invest and Transform to put indigenous sovereignty and values at the front and center of collective efforts toward a sustainable future [57]. These are some examples of interventions from various actors and agencies invested in the pursuits of climate justice. Each of the examples cited above addresses a specific policy and programmatic area relevant to the daily lives of the people at the frontlines of climate change. However, the energy-intensive luxury consumption in the Global North and in some sections of the Global South that contribute significantly to the climate crisis does not receive adequate attention from policy makers. Our collective efforts to address climate change are unlikely to succeed if we fail to reduce consumption, especially the consumption of goods and services linked to “luxury emissions,” such as privately owned planes. The average carbon footprint of the wealthiest 1% of people globally could be 175 times that of the poorest 10% [58]. On the other hand, large sections of populations in the global South are still grappling with the provision of necessities such as nutritious food, safe drinking water, and a reliable supply of clean energy. Hundreds of millions also lack access to amenities such as sanitation systems, schools, and hospitals, as reflected in the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The emissions related to these activities are called “survival emissions” [59]. Some climate policy discussions tend to obfuscate these distinctions using the language of “human footprint” and “population problem” [60]. Such framings create a false equivalence between luxury consumption and survival emissions, while accounting for these distinctions provides policy guidance for climate policies that can be both just and efficient. As the discussion on fossil fuel subsidies demonstrates, the patterns of consumption and deprivation are products of political and economic structures. National policies and the actions of powerful state and non-state corporate actors have severe consequences for what happens at the local level. Any high-level reforms would not necessarily translate into a realization of climate justice without social and political mobilization at the grassroots level. For over three decades, environmental and social justice movements have struggled to bring these issues to the public agenda both in the United States and globally. Advocates of climate justice would benefit from building on the insights and lessons from these movements [61]. Additionally, transformative reforms in the economy and society, executed via the federal or state-level agencies, are also equally important. We must seek to address the limits of liberal state, which are responsible for the entrenchment of racial capitalism and the climate crisis [62]. Climate justice calls for wide-ranging reforms and concerted actions in the cultural, social, economic, and political spheres.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Racial Capitalism Kritik --- K Lab 2023 › Link › 1NC --- Asian Identity

Absent the theorization of how racial capitalism underscores the model minority myth the aff is wrong and does not account for the violent structures Asians in the US face

Au 22, Wayne Au, American educational researcher and professor in the School of Educational Studies at the University of Washington Bothell, 2022, “American racialization, racial capitalism, and the threat of the model minority” https://doi.org/10.1080/10714413.2022.2084326

There is an established literature about the racialization of Asian Americans1 in education and its dominant form, the Model Minority (see, e.g., Lee, 2009; Yi et al., 2020). Much of this literature has challenged stereotypes as well as advanced our understandings of Asian American educational life and the positioning of Asian Americans relative to other racial groups. However, I have found our educational theorization has been inadequate for us to fully account for why the racialization of Asian Americans allows us to be positioned and used as Model Minorities. In this paper, I seek to address this conceptual shortcoming by arguing for an Asian American racialization that takes seriously the political economy of racial capitalism (Brown & De Lissovoy, 2011; Chang, 1985; Kelley, 2017; Leonardo, 2012). To do so, I first discuss the racial category of Asian American, and then take up the myth of the Model Minority as the defining form of Asian American racialization in education. I go on to connect the Model Minority to the tropes of Yellow Peril and Orientalism, arguing that our shortcomings of understanding Asian American racialization generally, and in education specifically, require us to develop a different theory of Asian American racialization that is not wholly confined within the boundaries of the United States. Following the racial political economy of Day (2016), I then discuss a conceptualization of Asian American racialization as that of abstract and efficient alien labor, and point to the ways this explains how Asian Americans have been used within racial dynamics in the U.S. I conclude with a discussion of the implications this reconceptuali- zation of Asian American racialization for the construction of the Model Minority in education. Relative to other racial categories, “Asian American” is a recently constructed identity, one that consolidated amid U.S. wars in Korea and Vietnam, the burgeoning Civil Rights movement in the U.S., anti-colonial liberation movements around the world, and shifts in U.S. immigration policies that allowed for a new wave of Asian immigrants post-1965. The term originated among community activist and college students in the late 1960s as part of radical movements for racial justice in the U.S. that included the Black Liberation movement and the movement for Ethnic Studies (Chang, 2017; Ishizuka, 2016). Before then, however, Asian Americans were either referred to as “Orientals” or they were called by their specific, individual national origins (Hong, 2020). In these ways, “Asian American” has always been an identity based on a kind of coalition politics, stitching together significant and far-ranging heterogeneity in politically powerful ways. In 2019 there were over 23 million people of Asian or mixed Asian descent in the United States (or, 5.9% of the total U.S. population) spread across 21 different officially named ethnic and national groups (American Community Survey, 2020). Listed alphabetically using the government’s terms, these include: Asian Indian, Bangladeshi, Bhutanese, Burmese, Cambodian, Chinese, Filipino, Hmong, Indonesian, Japanese, Korean, Laotian, Malaysian, Mongolian, Nepalese, Okinawan, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, Taiwanese, Thai, Vietnamese, “Other Asian, specified” and “Other Asian, not specified.” A Pew Research Center analysis found that 34% of Asian Americans self-identified as speaking only English at home (the number rises to 65% for those that are U.S. born) (Budiman & Ruiz, 2021), and the largest language groups are Chinese (17%), Hindi (13%), Tagalog (9%), and Vietnamese (7%) (American Community Survey, 2020). Other major Asian language groups include Bengali, Formosan, Gujarati, Hmong, Ilocano, Indonesian, Japanese, Laotian, Malayalam, Mon-Khmer or Cambodian, Punjabi, Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu, among others (Chang, 2017). Even though the data illustrates significant heterogeneity within the racial category of Asian American, there are deeper levels of diversity within these groupings. For instance, the ethnic, national, and linguistic category of “Chinese” conceals as much as it reveals. The Han ethnic group officially makes up over 90% of the of Chinese population in China itself. While Mandarin is the official language of the country, there are at least 1,500 “dialects”—supposed off-shoots of Mandarin—that in reality are mutually- unintelligible languages that have less in common with each other than European languages have with each other (French, 2005). This linguistic (and ultimately cultural) diversity does not even include the other 55 non- Han ethnic Chinese minorities like the Uyghurs and Tibetans (Montefiore, 2013). Taiwan is also technically and officially designated as being part of “China,” but it has its own island indigenous peoples (Nesterova, 2019), and the island has experienced different waves of migration from “mainland” China under distinct circumstances that add complexity to that identity (Chang, 2017). Similar histories and complexities exist for most Asian nations. India has a mix of castes, religions, ethnicities, nation-states, languages, and indigen- ous peoples (Oommen, 2004). Japan has indigenous populations of the Ainu people, and it has control of the island of Okinawa—itself a former sovereign kingdom of indigenous island peoples that now struggles against military occupation, environmental degradation, and the colonizing powers of both the United States and Japan (Hibbett, 2019; Murphy-Shigematsu, 2004). The Philippines fundamentally consists of indigenous peoples with multiple languages that were colonized by both Spain and the United States (Herrera, 2015). Indeed, it is important to remember that most Asian Americans have either descended or immigrated directly from countries that, like the Philippines, have struggled with the legacies of colonization and imperialism: the Dutch and Portuguese colonized Indonesia; The British colonized the Malayan peninsula, parts of China, and India; France colonized Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; and Japan occupied all or parts of many East and Southeast Asian nations during World War II (Yang, 2015). As such, in addition to histories of communities with linguistic, ethnic, religious, class, caste, and indigenous diversity, most Asian Americans have lineages that, somewhere in their past, connect with terrible legacies of colonization and imperialism from foreign powers, colonization of indigenous peoples internally, and imperialist wars. The varying conditions of Asian immigration also matter greatly. For the majority of the current Asian American population, immigration to the United States has largely been structured by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which gave preference to those that already held educational degrees and who had professional skills. The Pew Center estimates that over 98% of Asian Americans either immigrated or are descendants of immigrants after 1965. Current immigration policy gives first preference to immigrants who have immediate family who are permanent residents in the U.S. and second preference to educated professionals. Wealthy immigrants also have the option of investing in U.S. businesses (in the amounts of either $900,000 or $1.8 million) in order to immigrate. On average, spread across both permanent and temporary work visas, over 60% (over 490,000) of the immigrants to the United States per year from 2017 to 2019 have been from Asia. Many of these visas include the H-1B visa, which is the visa heavily used by the technology sector, as well as by investors, bankers, and the entertainment industry (Watsky et al., 2020). These policies and practices have contributed directly to the fact that in 2019, 58.2% of Asian Americans held a bachelor’s degree (United States Census Bureau, 2020). However, in sharp contrast to these more highly educated and wealthier immigrants, refugees from Southeast Asia and their familial networks also make up a sizable and important portion of the Asian American population, and the data about their experiences tells a much different story. The peoples of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, including the Khmer and Hmong, have been resettled in the United States, fleeing persecution in their home countries after the U.S. military incursion in Southeast Asia ended. This refugee resettlement began in 1975 and has resulted in over 1.1 million refugees being relocated to the U.S. across three decades. More recent Southeast Asian immigrants have arrived almost solely through visas for family or employment, and currently there are over 2.5 million total Southeast Asian Americans, comprising 14% of the broader Asian American community (SEARAC & AAJC Los Angeles, 2020). Nationally, almost 1.1 million Southeast Asian Americans are officially designated “low income,” with 460,000 of those living in poverty. Hmong Americans are one of the poorest groups in the country, with 58% low income and 26% officially living in poverty. For comparison, these rates are essentially double that of white Americans, and they are on par with that of Black Americans. We know that income correlates strongly with educational attainment, and this remains consistent with Southeast Asian Americans. For instance, 2011–2015 data from California (where the high- est concentrations of Southeast Asian Americans live) shows that almost 30% of Southeast Asian Americans have not earned a high school diploma, with Cambodian Americans having the highest rate of 34%. While the total percentage of Asian Americans who hold a bachelor’s degree is over 50%, only 25% of Southeast Asian Americans hold the same degree. Laotian Americans have the lowest rate of higher-education degree attainment (14%), followed closely by Hmong Americans and Cambodian Americans, both at 17% (SEARAC & AAJC Los Angeles, 2020). The conditions faced by Southeast Asian American refugee immigrants vs. that of more privileged and elite Asian American immigrants illustrate a broader trend: As of 2018, Asian Americans had the greatest in-group income inequality in the U.S. (Kochhar & Cilluffo, 2018). There are almost 1.7 million undocumented Asian immigrants, and many have limited English skills. These highly vulnerable populations face housing insecurity and are often relegated to low-wage jobs. Such conditions contribute greatly to 25% of the Asians in New York City and just over 26% of those in Boston living in poverty (Yee, 2021). These kinds of economic class divi- sions are consistent with those that have existed between different Asian American groups and within individual groups historically (Kwong, 1996; Lan, 2011; Lee, 2009; Lew, 2006). The heterogeneity with the racial category of Asian American highlights an important contradiction within the category itself. There is power to be found in the stitching together of a community based on a kind of coalitional politics. If we can say that the Asian American exists as a unitary category, then we can feel the strength in those numbers. However, the broadness of the category does us a disservice because it also masks significant cultural, political, and material fractures within our community as well. The construction of Asian Americans as the Model Minority is built on a similar contradiction, simultaneously upholding the idea of Asian Americans as a monolithically successful group while hiding the diversity of material realities we face. The Asian American educational model minority The Model Minority has been the defining form of racialization for Asian Americans in education. It is the idea that Asian Americans, as a racial group, have been able to overcome any obstacles to succeed educationally, professionally, and racially—making them a “model” racial group to which all other racial groups should aspire (Poon et al., 2016; Yi et al., 2020). The term “model minority” first appeared in popular media in 1966, where in January of that year, the New York Times published an article entitled, “Success Story: Japanese-American Style.” That story was followed that December with a U.S. News and World report article, “Success Story of One Minority in the US” (Lee, 2009). In the 1980s, popular media expanded this view to include Southeast Asian Americans among the examples of Asian American “Whiz Kids” reaching academic success (Lee, 2009; Osajima, 1988). In the 1990s, Korean Americans were upheld as hardworking immigrants with strong families, and in 2006, a prominent columnist for the New York Times lauded Asian American students for being so successful (Lee, 2009). In 2012, a Mercury News headline read, “Asian Workers Dominate Silicon Valley Tech Jobs,” and a 2017 New Yorker column ended by arguing that Asian Americans were one of the most “prosperous, well-educated, and successful ethnic groups in America” (Sullivan, 2017, n.p.) because their hard work, education, and family structure enabled them to overcome a history of discrimination. In 2021, Iowa Senator Chuck Grassley addressed a Korean American nominee for a judicial post, by remarking, “If I’ve learned anything from Korean people, it’s a hard work ethic. And how you can make a lot out of nothing....So I congratulate you and your people” (Pfannenstiel, 2021, n.p.). The Model Minority was a crafted narrative of successful Asian American assimilation doubling as an argument either that racism did not exist in the U.S. or that racism could be overcome through hard work and the right cultural values. In turn, this narrative racialized Asian Americans in the form of an attack on other racial groups for their supposed inability to overcome structural racism and even as an attack against Asian Americans themselves as they struggled to meet the norms established through this identity formation (Lee, 2009; Suzuki, 1977). In education specifically, propagators of the myth of the Model Minority typically treat Asian American students as a monolithic, homogenous group, pointing to their scores on standardized tests, high school graduation rates, college attainment rates, acceptance rates into elite universities, and levels of college degrees as proof of the myth (Lee, 2009; Poon et al., 2016; Yi et al., 2020). Some of the most robust responses to the myth of the Model Minority in education have critically analyzed it through tracing its history, use, and impact within the context of Asian American racialization in the United States, particularly through critical lenses of intersectionality and trans- nationalism (Chang, 2017; Coloma, 2006; Iftikar & Museus, 2018; Yi et al., 2020). Much of this work empirically examines the material conditions and experiences of Asian Americans, paying particular attention to the hetero- geneity within the category itself. For instance, Buenavista et al. (2009), Lee (2005, 2006, 2009), Lew (2006), Louie (2001), Ng et al. (2007), Pang et al. (2003), and Wing (2007), among others, have done important research into the ways that socioeconomic class, gender, ethnic subgroup, cultural capital, and generation of immigration have produced varying educational out- comes and relationships to schooling—including significantly lower educational performance for working class students and students from specific Asian American subgroups. Additionally, most scholars point to the significant impact of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which gave preference to those Asian immigrants that already held educational degrees and who had professional training and skills, which is important in explaining the high number East and South Asian Americans with bachelor’s degrees and other markers of educational attainment, but also important in explaining the educational attainment of their children (Lee, 2009; Watsky et al., 2020). In turn, these analyses have been used to both highlight the material diversity of Asian American educational experiences and deconstruct the ways that a homogenous understanding of the category of “Asian American” invisibilizes the difficult realities faced by many Asian Americans (Budiman & Ruiz, 2021; Chang, 2017). However, it is also important to understand that the stereotype of the Model Minority also racializes Asian Americans as a threat, where the very same stereotypes that are used to uphold us are also used against us. As Okihiro (2014) explains: The Asian work ethic, family values, self-help, culture and religiosity, and intermarriage—all elements of the model minority—can also be read as components of the yellow peril. Asian workers can be “diligent” and “slavish,” “frugal” and “cheap,” “upwardly mobile” and “aggressive,” while Asian families and communities can be “mutual aid” and “self-serving” institutions, “inclusive” and “exclusive” groupings, “multicultural enclaves” and “balkanized ghettoes.”... “Models” can be “perils,” and “perils,” “models” despite their apparent incongruity. (pp. 141–142) History underscores Okihiro’s point, because the depiction of Asian American as a successful Model Minority also made Asians a threat to white America and white entitlement to resources. For instance, in the early 1980s, white fears about the rise of the Japanese automobile industry contributed to a bout of anti-Japanese racism, including the murder of Vincent Chin (a Chinese American) by two white autoworkers in Detroit. In the late 1980s, a white gunman opened fire on a California elementary school, killing five and wounding 32 school children, all of whom were of Cambodian or Vietnamese descent (Chang, 2021). In the 1980s and 1990s Asian American students were framed in popular media as “surging” like a “tidal wave” into top universities (Osajima, 2005, p. 221), and graffiti like “Stop the Asian Hordes” appeared at UC Berkeley. White university stu- dents also expressed resentment at the increased presence of Asian national and Asian American students at this time, joking that MIT (the Massachusetts Institute for Technology) was short for “Made in Taiwan” and that UCLA (the University of California Los Angeles) stood for “University of Caucasians Living Among Asians” (Osajima, 2005). Amid exaggerated reports of Chinese espionage in the U.S. in the 1990s, Chinese American scientist Wen Ho Lee was targeted as a potential spy, fired from his job, and jailed by the U.S. government despite a lack of evidence and the fact that he had been a well-educated, long time, trusted employee of a U.S. Defense lab (Wang, 2007). In the aftermath of the 192 W. AU September 11, 2001 bombing of the World Trade Center, many racist and nationalist Americans ignorantly associated Sikh turbans and dark skin with terrorism—resulting in a rash of attacks against the South Asian American community at the time and contributing to a gun massacre of 6 by a white supremacist at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin in 2012 (Chang, 2021; United Sikhs, 2019). More recently, in the context of China’s ascent as a global economic power, an increase in anti-Chinese rhetoric by then- President Donald Trump, and amid the Covid-19 global pandemic which most likely began in China (Devlin et al., 2021; Salcedo, 2021), the U.S. experienced a massive spike in anti-Asian hate crimes during 2020–2021, the majority of which have targeted Asian women in particular (Jeung et al., 2021; Yellow Horse et al., 2022). Research also shows us that the Model Minority has similarly operated as a threat within education. For instance, the construction of the Asian American Model Minority student has been used against non-white students. The stereotypical Asian American Model Minority student is supposed to be obedient, quiet, studious, and “good,” put in extra hours of work, value education, get high test scores and grade point averages, and attend elite universities (Lee, 2009; Okihiro, 2014). This “model” then gets used, for instance, against African American students who are subject to stereotypical anti-Black constructions of being lazy, uncaring, unintelligent, educational failures with disciplinary problems (Dumas, 2016a, 2016b). As an empirical embodiment of this relational use of the Model Minority threat, research has found that for some Asian American college students, stronger internalization of the Model Minority stereotype predicted stron- ger feelings of anti-Blackness and stronger opposition to affirmative action programs (Yi & Todd, 2021). Additionally, as opposed to being a “positive” stereotype that helps Asian American students, the myth of the Model Minority is in fact a racist stereotype that is used threateningly against Asian American students themselves (Chang, 2017; Iftikar & Museus, 2018; Yi et al., 2020). For instance, we know that several Asian American subgroups (e.g., Filipinx Americans and Southeast Asian Americans) are invisibilized by the Model Minority stereotype, leading to their educational needs being overlooked or ignored (Buenavista et al., 2009; Lee, 2005, 2006). Additionally, Asian American students who do not fit the Model Minority stereotype often silence themselves (Lee, 2009), face feelings of inadequacy and self-hate (McGee, 2018; Yi et al., 2020), and experience strong feelings of either being an impostor (Cokley et al., 2013) or an inauthentic Asian (Luthar et al., 2021). Asian Americans also suffer internalized racism due to the Model Minority and other stereotypes (Hwang, 2021) and demonstrate higher levels of psychological distress and an unwillingness to seek help REVIEW OF EDUCATION, PEDAGOGY, AND CULTURAL STUDIES 193 from others (Gupta et al., 2011; Kim & Lee, 2014). Importantly, the Model Minority stereotype also operates as a form of political threat against Asian Americans, because it effectively casts the legacies of radical resistance and activism that exist in our communities as “not really” Asian American since those legacies don’t match the constructed Model (Ishizuka, 2016; Liu et al., 2008; Maeda, 2009). The constructed Asian American Model Minority student has also been used against White students. As noted above, there is a history of white students complaining about too many Asian American students universities (Dong, 1995; Osajima, 1988), and more recent research confirms that white students still feel that Asian Americans are overrepresented in higher edu- cation (Cabrera, 2014). Other research has found that the Model Minority stereotype increased the likelihood of Asian American college students being viewed by White peers with resentment, envy, and as a threat (Ho & Jackson, 2001), and that White college students disdain Asian students for what they perceive as working too hard (Lin et al., 2005). One study of high school students in California also points to Whiteness being associated with “lower-achievement, laziness, and academic mediocrity,” while Asianness is, “linked with high achievement, hard work, and academic success” (Jimenez & Horowitz, 2013, p. 864). The perceived threat that “successful” Asian American students pose to White students highlights how, ultimately, the myth of the Model Minority partially upends a hege- monic racial-educational order that is supposed to privilege whites above all others (Allred, 2007). In doing so, the threat of the Model Minority— historically and in education—is in many ways a manifestation of the expression of all anti-Asian racism in the United States since the 1800s: Yellow Peril. Yellow Peril is the idea that Asian immigrants globally, and in this case Asian Americans domestically, represent a foreign threat to take over the United States and displace White “Americans” in areas of employment, education, and access to other valued resources, as well as a threat to dis- place Western Civilization with the barbarism of the “Orient” (Day, 2016; Okihiro, 2014). Ultimately, Yellow Peril is based in Orientalism (Said, 1978), a European imperialist binary typology that designates the West as the Occident and the East as the Orient. Within this paradigm, the Occidental represents civilization, cleanliness, goodness, justice, progress, Christianity, and cultural superiority. Conversely, the Oriental is considered to be the opposite: backward, heathen, barbaric, uncivilized, inferior, dirty, scary, and, importantly, alien (Day, 2016; Lee, 2015). To the Occidental, the Oriental represents a constant threat of degenerate hoards threatening to overwhelm the “civilized” West (Said, 1978). The “Oriental” is gendered too, because Orientalism frames Asian women as sexually exotic and particularly lascivious and excludes Asian men from the social construction of Western masculinity (Day, 2016; Lee, 1999). Even though Said’s (1978) original analysis mainly focused on the European construction of Western and Southern Asia, the concept of the Oriental evolved into an expression of Western views of all of Asia and Asians (Iftikar & Museus, 2018; Ngai, 2000). Additionally, early Chinese immigration to the North America set the stage for an “American Orientalism” that, “homogenized Asia as one indistinguishable entity, positioned and defined the West and the East in diametrically opposite terms, and used those distinctions to claim American and Anglo American superiority” (Lee, 1999, p. 239). In many ways, this requiring Asian labor on the one hand, and then finding that labor as threatening on the other, has always been the racial contract (Mills, 2014) for Asian Americans. Early waves of Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Korean, and South Asian immigrants were, each in their turn, used as cheap labor by white industrialists to work the railroads, mines, farms, canneries, and sawmills, among others. Then, again each in their turn, these communities were systematically targeted as threats to white America because of their labor, through racist arguments that “Orientals” were morally and culturally depraved, dirty, conniving, uncivil- ized, and ultimately unassimilable to whiteness. Historically this resulted in a series of laws excluding Asians from immigration and land ownership, violent white mob attacks on each of these Asian immigrant groups, the burning of Chinatowns and the lynching of Chinese workers, and the incarceration of Japanese Americans and transfer of most of their farms to white agribusiness during WWII (Lee, 2015; Lye, 2005). In contemporary times, we’ve witnessed similar impulses with the above-mentioned periods of anti-Asian attacks. From the early Chinese Coolies working on the rail- roads to the “high tech coolies” (Wang, 2007) we see now, Asian Americans have been valued for their productive labor (hard labor historic- ally and intellectual labor now) and then treated as an Oriental, Yellow Peril threat for that same productive labor—resulting in anti-Asian propa- ganda, restrictive laws, incarceration, and/or violence. However, we still have not full theorized what it is about Asian American racialization that has historically positioned us in such a threatening way. To do so requires we revisit theories of Asian American racialization. Toward a transnational Asian American racialization Historically, Asian American racialization has generally been theorized as being constructed within the paradigm of Black/White power relations in the United States, essentially arguing that Asian American positionality is contingent upon a foundation of anti-Black racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2002; REVIEW OF EDUCATION, PEDAGOGY, AND CULTURAL STUDIES 195 Day, 2016; Kim, 1999; Lye, 2008). One important example that has been used widely is that of Kim (1999). In Kim’s triangulation, Asian Americans are minoritized as non-white but placed in position of privilege relative to Black Americans such that, “White supremacy has pushed [Asian Americans] down, and anti-Blackness has provided the floor beneath which they cannot fall” (Kim, 2018, p. 10). Bonilla-Silva (2002) similarly maps Asian Americans onto a Black/White field, where he suggests that some Asian American subgroups can be classified as “Whites,” some as “Honorary Whites,” and others as “Collective Blacks” (p. 4). Likewise, Ong (1996) discusses how within the context of a Black/White racial discourse, some Asian American subgroups, like successful Chinese Americans, have been ideologically Whitened while others, like working class Cambodians, have been ideologically Blackened. To be clear, there is truth and power in these conceptions since we know that anti-Black racism has been central to racial formation generally in the United States (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995). We also know that the racial formation of Asian Americans has taken place in the context of anti-Black racism, as evidenced in the ways that the Model Minority Stereotype has been wielded against Black people (Chow, 2017) and as evidenced in anti-Black racism amongst some Asian Americans (Yi & Todd, 2021). However, even as the above statements hold true, what I am arguing here is that there are aspects of Asian American racialization that exceed the explanatory power provided by a framework of racialization defined only by a Black/white field based purely on anti-Black racism in the U.S. (Day, 2015, 2016; Lye, 2008; Ng et al., 2007). The central problem with this “Asian American analogical dependency” (Lye, 2008, p. 1735) on anti-Blackness is that it describes “Asian ostracism as deriving from a white-supremacist ideology that has already been put in place by the contradictions of a slave republic” (p. 1733). Further, as Day (2016) explains, such an approach “constrains our ability to elaborate the specificity of Asian racialization that isn’t merely a by-product of a founda- tional antiblackness” (p. 23).2 That is to say, if Asian American racialization is solely built on a foundation of anti-Black racism, then it not only limits how we can understand it on its own terms (Ng et al., 2007), it also leaves significant gaps in explaining aspects of that same racialization. One critical gap is that anti-Asian racism in the U.S. cannot be explained entirely through a lens of foundational anti-Blackness. Rather, as discussed above, anti-Asian racism in the U.S. is built on an ideological legacy that includes Orientalist racialization of Asian Americans as both alien and a threat (a threat, I have argued here, exists within the Model Minority stereotype and Yellow Peril). Asian American racialization thus in part arises from the European imperialist project of Orientalism—a project that, while linked to the enslavement of African peoples through White suprem- acy and systems of empire, originated outside of the Americas. In this sense, while anti-Asian racism in the U.S. is in part born of domestic racial formations clearly connected to anti-Blackness, it is also carries with it a fundamental, underlying conception of Asian Americans that is also trans- national in origin. We therefore cannot fully explain or understand anti- Asian racism if our analysis is kept strictly within the theoretical confines of the continental U.S. As Day (2016) explains: ...[T]he racialization of Asian Americans and Asian Canadians has unfolded as a parallel evolution of yellow peril to model minority.... This mirrored arc of Asian racialization, therefore, cannot be entirely attributable to an inherited legacy or second-order version of antiblack racism given the absence of a similar regime of plantation-based slavery in Canada ... To put it another way, a transnational framework contradicts an understanding of anti-Asian racism as solely derivative of a prototypical racialization of blackness. (p. 23) It is important to recognize that in the field of education Coloma (2006) does call for a turn toward transnationalism in Asian American racializa- tion, and that Iftikar and Museus (2018) also argue for a transnational Asian American racialization and do not reduce anti-Asian racism to anti- Black racism. However, despite these important advances, we still lack a more robust theory of the racialization of Asian Americans in education that attends to the role of Asian immigrant labor as part of global racial capitalism. Day’s (2016) theorization helps us do just that. Asian, alien, and abstract labor Day (2016) suggests a theorization of Asian racialization that is “translational but distinctively national” (p. 17) and directly linked to racial capitalism by proposing a different racial triangular framework for North America: Native, settler, and alien labor. This framing is critical because it enables us to understand what it is about the racialization of Asian Americans, as a Model Minority (and as Yellow Peril), that has positioned us to be used as a threat. The first two points of this triangular framework, Native and settler, are overall relatively consistent with other work in the area of settler-colonial studies, which generally seek to account for the col- onization of North America by Whites Europeans, the historical and ongoing processes of dispossession of indigenous peoples, struggles in the establishment and maintenance of indigenous sovereignty, and the main- tenance of a settler-colonial state (Coulthard, 2014; Tuck & Yang, 2012). However, Day’s (2015, 2016, 2021) work also departs from previous the- orizing of racialization in important ways. For instance, Day’s designation argues against categorizing Asian immigrants as settlers. Instead, Day (2016) suggests that, “[s]imilar to African Americans, Asians represented an alien labor force that mixed with Indigenous land to transform it into white property and capital” (p. 31). This is not to imply that Asian immi- grants are absolved of potential complicity with the settler colonialism, for as Saranillio (2013) explains: While migration in and of itself does not equate to colonialism, migration to a settler colonial space, where Native lands and resources are under political, ecological, and spiritual contestation, means the political agency of immigrant communities can bolster a colonial system initiated by White settlers. (p. 286) It is also important to note that Day (2016) recognizes that Hawaii is a specific case where several waves of Asian immigrant labor, combined with land ownership, has evolved into Asian Americans there assuming status as settlers (see also, Okamura & Fujikane, 2013; Saranillio, 2013). However, distinguishing the positionality of alien labor in North America as distinct from the settler recognizes that Asian immigrant labor exists as “willing or unwitting participants in a settler colonial structure that is driven to eliminate Indigenous people” (Day, 2015, p. 21), while also recognizing that “their racialized vulnerability and disposability supports a settler colonial project” (p. 21). To be clear, in grouping Black and Asian Americans together as alien labor, Day (2015, 2016, 2021) does not suggest that the racialization of Asian and Black Americans is equivalent or even similar. Day (2015) is expressly cognizant that this triangulation represents a significant departure from the Afro-pessimist arguments about the absolute primacy of anti- Blackness in all forms of racialization in the U.S., as well as arguments about enslaved Africans only existing as property and not also as labor (Bilge, 2020; Winnubst, 2020). Rather, Day (2016) argues that, “the diver- gent historical and economic contexts of Asian and African labor highlight the heterogeneity contained within an alien position” (p. 31). In an exten- sive treatment of this issue, Day goes on to discuss how Asian and Black alien labor in North America were treated in different ways specific to racial, economic, cultural, and historical contexts. Specifically, Day notes that Asian labor came to North America just as the economy built around chattel slavery began to decline in the 1830s. The flexibility provided by an immigrant workforce, as opposed to an enslaved one, “inoculated Asians from assuming the status of unfree labor” (p. 31). Indeed, as Jung (2008) observes, early Chinese labor was “viewed as a natural advancement from chattel slavery ... ” (p. 6). Day (2016) goes on to explain that historically “a logic of exclusion is the prerequisite for the recruitment of alien labor” (p. 34, original emphasis), but that exclusion has taken different forms for Asian and Black labor in North America. Whereas chattel slavery relied on segregation and 198 W. AU Jim Crow laws (forms of exclusion internal to the United States), Asian exclusion mainly took the form of border control and immigration policy (e.g. the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882), in what Day refers to as a “form of Jim Crow in a transnational context” (p. 32). Day further argues that because African Americans were not immigrants who could be subject to deportation, but also could not be biologically assimilated by White settlers, they were treated as an “undisposable alien labor population” (p. 33, ori- ginal emphasis) that could only be dealt with either by internal exclusion, “domestic social control” (p. 33), or death. Conversely, for Asian immi- grants, “the settler state produces a less fixed and more volatile racialization” (p. 33) that not only allowed for them to be controlled through immigration and exclusion at the border but also “inhibited Asian exposure to more sustained domestic logics of racial exclusion and elimination” (p. 33) faced by Blacks. Day’s (2016) overall point is, then, at least 3-fold. One is to emphasize the heterogeneity of racialization within the category of alien labor in a way to account for the specifically different treatments of Black and Asian labor in the United States. By extension, another is to suggest that this het- erogeneity is necessary to understand that the racialization of Asian alien labor cannot be fully grasped solely through a lens of “prototypical anti- blackness” (p. 31) because that racialization has been both national and transnational in nature. Third, is to explain that “the vicissitudes of Asian racialization are primarily shaped by the evolving economic landscape of settler colonialism within a global economy” (p. 31). This, in turn, orients us toward what Day argues is the fundamental framing for Asian racializa- tion in North America: an association with abstract labor. Abstract labor is a form of labor coined by Marx (1967) in Capital. Ever the dialectician, Marx argued that every commodity contains two types of labor within it—concrete and abstract—and that these two types of labor manifest in commodities in different, but related, ways. For Marx, concrete labor is connected to the production of use value within a commodity (how “useful” something is), and this in turn is connected to the qualitative value of a commodity (something being of high- or low-quality construc- tion). Abstract labor, on the other hand, is connected to the quantitative value in a commodity (how much something is “worth”), which can be measured in money. Understanding commodities as the expression of a dialectical unity between concrete and abstract labor is important in a Marxist analysis because it allows us to demystify the relations of capitalist production present in any commodity. Rather than separating the, “concreteness of labor, commodities, and nature, on the one hand, and the abstractness of money and finance, on the other” (Day, 2016, p. 14), a uni- fied view helps us see that overall value is not just generated by mysterious REVIEW OF EDUCATION, PEDAGOGY, AND CULTURAL STUDIES 199 forces of the market or controlled by far away financiers and investors, but instead is generated by workers and materials through a combination of the quality of what they produce and how long they take to produce it. In a Marxian view, then, efficiency—less time spent on production— becomes a key aspect for generating value, because the more efficient a worker is in production, the more value can be gained from the commod- ity. Day (2016, 2021) thus argues that abstract labor and efficiency are the key to understanding the racialization of Asians as alien labor in North America, where Asians have been associated with “the abstract dimensions of capitalism through labor time” (Day, 2016, p. 16) either as cheap or effi- cient labor. Day (2021) also clarifies how this association of Asianness with abstract labor helps us reframe the racialization of Asian American threat into one based on a form of productive efficiency that disrupts the relations of capitalist production, explaining that: ... [I]n North America, Asians have personified a destructive value regime rooted in the excessive efficiency of their labor, whether in conflicts between capital and labor against the backdrop of Reconstruction, or in fears over Japanese agricultural monopolies during the early-twentieth century, or in the evisceration of the US auto industry by Japanese competition in the 1980s....Moreover, the passage of neoliberal immigration reforms in 1965 that favored Asian immigrants from investor and managerial classes, alongside the rise of Asian economies, has further reinforced the identification of Asians with the speculative dynamism of finance capitalism. (n.p.) Thus, the “menacing foreignness” (Day, 2021, n.p.) lurking behind both the Model Minority and Yellow Peril tropes creates a form of dehumanization such that Asian Americans can be “...reduced to an economic func- tionality based on labor efficiency, identified not with the qualitative substance of their bodies but with the quantitative rate of their labor” (Day, 2021, n.p.). In this way we see that, ultimately, “ ... ‘yellow peril’ and the ‘model minority’ stereotype function as complementary aspects of the same form of racialization, in which economic efficiency is the basis for exclusion or assimilation” (Day, 2016, p. 7, see also, Lye, 2005). The raciali- zation of Asian Americans as efficient through their association with abstract labor, thus is the basis for their positioning as an ever-present, racial threat expressed through the construction of the Model Minority. Reframing the model minority in education Following Day (2016, 2021), the form of racialization of Asian Americans that I have argued for here—as efficient workers associated with abstract labor—allows us to understand the Asian American Model Minority in education and its use as a threat against all racialized groups in a new way. Whereas Black students and other non-Asian American students of color have been constructed as culturally deficient to explain their disparate 200 W. AU educational outcomes (Blanton, 2003; Ladson-Billings, 2017; Lee, 2009), we can now see that the Asian American Model Minority student has been constructed as culturally efficient to explain their educational success. That is to say that, within the myth, the Asian American Model Minority achieves in education because they are supposedly more efficient with their educational labor than other groups, and that this efficiency is explained by stereotypes about Asian culture. The possibility of this construction is cre- ated through the association of Asian Americans with abstract, efficient labor because the Asian American subject is functionally being abstracted from the concrete conditions faced by Asian American students and their communities. Higher test scores, graduation rates, and college attainment for Asian American students are thus articulated through of a form of raci- alization that masks the heterogeneous material conditions that produced those educational outcomes for specific groups in favor of a myth that the homogenous Asian American Model Minority simply works harder, can achieve more with less than Whites, and can even achieve more than other peoples of color despite also experiencing a history of racism and discrim- ination in the United States. The myth of Asian American cultural efficiency is thus used oppositionally as proof of the cultural deficiency of others, because it appears to partially disrupt the white supremacist racial order of educational labor. Understanding the Asian American Model Minority racialized as abstract, efficient labor also helps illuminate an intersection of race and neoliberalism in education. Importantly, some scholars have already connected the Model Minority stereotype directly to neoliberalism. Lee (2009), for instance, noted that: The continuing dominance of the model minority stereotype reflects the fact that the stereotype continues to support the rhetoric of the achievement ideology. Asian Americans as model minorities are the ideal neoliberal subject—motivated, self- sufficient, and successful. The model minority success of Asian Americans is interpreted as evidence that markets are neutral and color-blind. (p. 11). Similarly, Jun (2011), argues that, through the Model Minority, Asia(n) Americans have come to embody the neoliberal theories of human capital, individual entrepreneurship, and self-regulation in the post-1965 era of Asian immigration to the U.S. The theorizing of Asian American racialization presented here buttresses these arguments, since it identifies that labor efficiency is central to how Asian American Model Minority success is con- structed as individual merit based on hard work, rendering potential structural barriers as negligible or non-existent. Bringing this line of analysis to bear in education is important because if, as Lee (2009) suggests above, the Asian American Model Minority represents the “ideal neoliberal subject” (p. 11), then we can now also see that the Asian American Model Minority student comes to represent the ideal neoliberal educational subject. In this construction, Asian American student success is explained by their supposed ability to work hard and faster and triumph over their peers in the free market competition of individual achievement, all due to the excessive efficiency of their educational labor. The Asian American Model Minority student racialized as educationally efficient labor thus becomes the physical and cultural embodiment of meritocracy—the myth that all it takes to succeed in the United States is hard work (Lemann, 1999). This, in turn, also explains the positionality of some conservative Asian Americans, who in coalition with conservative whites, have attacked affirmative action programs as discriminatory. We can interpret conservative Asian American outrage at perceived discrimination as a combination of their own internalized belief in the racist Model Minority stereotype (Poon et al., 2019; Yi & Todd, 2021) and feelings that they or their children are not be rightly rewarded for what they perceive as the efficiency of their own educational labor. Relatedly, Asian American students in higher education who feel self-hate and isolation if they do not live up to the Model Minority stereotype (Gupta et al., 2011; Kim & Lee, 2014) can be explained as them feeling like they are not efficient enough to fit into their own racialization as Asian Americans. The association with efficient productivity and abstract labor ultimately dehumanizes Asian Americans, and this dehumanization points to how the Asian American Model Minority in education (and society) is dependent on the fungibility of Asian American labor. Fungibility is a legal and eco- nomic term that refers to the interchangeability and substitution of one thing for another, and it signals the way that economic systems require abstraction and homogenization in order to establish markets where one thing can be exchanged for another (Ong, 2016; Winnubst, 2020). Looked at dialectically, fungibility implies both a usefulness or value of something and a disposability or a willingness to exchange that same thing. In this light, we might understand the history of Asian Americans being both val- ued and despised for their labor that I described previously as the Asian American racial contract (Mills, 2014), as an embodiment of the fungibility of Asian American labor: Each specific Asian immigrant group was used for their labor, and when that labor was construed as a threat, one group was exchanged for another. In this way, Asian American fungibility is also at the heart of anti-Asian violence because Orientalist Yellow Peril relies on the Western construction of an abstracted, homogenous Asian “Oriental” such that any Asian American subgroup can be cast as a target of violence, incarceration, or exclusion depending upon historical, political, cultural, or economic conditions. Indeed, the myth of the Asian American Model Minority in education and society is built upon an abstracted homogeneity that renders Asian Americans fungible such that the educational and eco- nomic success of one subgroup can be substituted in exchanges as being true for all groups.3 This abstraction and fungibility of Asian American educational labor thus illuminates how the myth of the Model Minority invisibilizes the varied educational experiences and educational outcomes of specific Asian American subgroups and how the myth has been leveraged in a threatening manner against all racial groups.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Racial Capitalism Kritik --- K Lab 2023 › Link › 1NC --- Asian Identity

The aff’s identarian antiracist organizing obfuscates the role of capital in racial oppression and collapses activist efforts back into essentialized ideals of race—turning the aff.

Tran 21, 12/23/21, Jonathan Tran is the associate Dean for Faculty in the Honors College and a Professor of Theology at Baylor University and has a PhD in Theology and Ethics from Duke University, “Asian Americans and the Spirit of Racial Capitalism,” Introduction, Oxford University Press, , Orr

This book contrasts two approaches to race and racism. The first I will call identarian antiracism. Identarian antiracists proceed with the notion that there are specific kinds of races (e.g., white, black, and Asian American) and that each person possesses—whether or not she can articulate it—a racial identity. This approach includes a variety of views about the nature of race. Some identarians believe race is an innate property of persons.4 In this view, I am, for example, Asian American insofar as my ancestry can be traced to Asia, I am phenotypically identifiable as Asian, I share history and habits with other Asians, and so forth. Other identarians believe that the kind of race one “is” depends on the sort of socialization one has undergone; rather than being born a certain race I  am, through processes of socialization, made—“racialized” is the operative term—a race.5 In this case, my life in America (say, the ways others identify, talk about, and relate to me, the way systems categorize me, and how resources are offered or denied to me, etc.) makes me in a relevant sense Asian American.6 To be sure, these views are not mutually exclusive since one’s phenotypical features can lead to being accordingly racialized. Whether I am born Asian American (where racial identity denotes a natural kind) or become so (denoting a social kind), identarian antiracism proceeds with the idea that I am racially Asian American. Notice that I said that identarian antiracism proceeds with a notion of racial kinds and identities. Which is not to say that it starts with it. Identarianism works out from, without working out, a notion of racial kinds and identities. This is because its primary concerns are political, not metaphysical, and it seeks above all equitable relations between those it takes for granted as racial kinds. It cares about what people are inasmuch as perceptions of what they are determine how they are treated. In other words, identarian antiracists are concerned with race because they are concerned with antiracism. Their antiracist political commitments require that they take on board in some form or fashion the notion of race—including its many problems. The politics allows identarians to look past the problems. It also permits identarian antiracism its diversity of metaphysical views about the nature of race (i.e., whether it is a natural kind or a social kind, etc.). Identarian antiracists can afford to look past the problems and remain agnostic on the metaphysical questions because they are most concerned with the problematic political questions. They adopt the notion of race not because they have worked it out, but because their politics requires it.7 These are important but often overlooked features of identarian antiracist thinking. Identarian antiracism portrays racism as the personal and systemic denigration of racial kinds by other racial kinds, focused specifically—for better or worse—on the harm black people suffer at the hands of white people. It seeks to acknowledge and address these denigrations, a task it pursues by investigating the conditions under which they occur. Its constructive vision entails lifting up those who have suffered racism. This commits identarian antiracism to the work of establishing, securing, and asserting racial identity, work which programmatically comes under familiar banners: diversity, inclusion, representation, multiculturalism, and the like. The constructive vision comes with the deconstructive need to subvert, destabilize, and attack racial kinds deemed responsible for harming others (i.e., whites and others party to their racism). As this book shows, the constructive vision along with the deconstructive tasks have the combined effect of further solidifying (even with the metaphysical agnosticism) the reality of race. In other words, identarian antiracism racializes. Religion does not play a necessary role in identarian antiracism. Which is not to say that it cannot play an important role. The deconstructive tasks might interrogate various religions for supplying racists or racist systems with ideological reasons and motivations for their racism. For example, one might point to Gnosticism’s disembodying tendencies or Christian antisemitism as evidence for religious complicity.8 Conversely, the constructive vision can be aided by utilizing certain theological formulations in order to establish, secure, and assert specific racial identities, especially when those identities have been harmed. For example, one might highlight Jewish scripture that sides YHWH with the oppressed (Exodus 3:7) or Islamic teaching that declares “a white has no superiority over black nor a black has any superiority over white except by piety and good action.”9 Religion can play a role, but it need not. Identarianism can go about its business without ever mentioning religion, religious commitments, or religious people. Identarian antiracism can be as agnostic on religion as it is on the metaphysical status of race. Neither is crucial for its primary concerns. Identarian antiracism is an approach to racism that begins and ends with racial identity, prioritizing (white) racial identity as racism’s starting point and championing (non-white) racial identity as antiracism’s end game. In the academy and beyond, identarian antiracism is the dominant approach to race and racism. Its dominance rises to the level of established doctrine. Hence, one can call it the orthodox view. To get a sense of how identarianism as an antiracist mode of analysis works, as well as the alternative approach espoused by this book, consider the matter of gentrification. In both the academic and popular imagination gentrification is often construed in narrowly racial terms. Whites push black people out of black neighborhoods. Gentrification is presented here as an instance of the far-reaching powers of whiteness and antiblackness. This is an identarian story, cast as it is with the requisite racial dramatis personae. When ethnographer Derek S. Hyra recounts the gentrification of the Shaw/ U Street section of Washington, D.C., he explains things in these terms. His Race, Class, and Politics in Cappuccino City proposes “a plausible explanation for the arrival of some Whites in traditionally low-income African American communities.”10 Hyra zeroes in on a “living the wire” mentality whereby consumptive whites, enticed by the allure of stereotypically black-branded culture (“the wire” refers to a popular HBO series about inner-city Baltimore), move in on historically black communities, snatch up property, appropriate culture, and price African Americans out of house and home. The 2019 film The Last Black Man in San Francisco dramatizes a similar account, whereby adventurous cum progressive-minded whites take over Black San Francisco, not despite its black cultural heritage but rather because of it. Yet, like Richard Rothstein’s much celebrated The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America, Hyra’s book describes racism’s entanglement with housing markets without examining what such arrangements accomplish, without ever questioning what racism is for, leaving the impression that whites participate in racist systems solely for the purpose of harming black people.12 Like The Color of Law, Hyra’s identarian analysis misses what racism is—that is, what it does. Historian Destin Jenkins puts it this way: “If government was the tool by which segregation was created, who—or what—was the hand that wielded it? Curiously, The Color of Law ignores the obvious answer: capitalism. The book’s focus on law and policy shifts attention away from surplus value and patterns of extraction and exploitation, instead of focusing on these dynamics as an integral part of America’s democratic, law-making system. We might well view residential segregation as the domestic expression of the racial capitalism of the 20th century.”13 Cappuccino City’s focus is narrower still. Hyra attends to capitalism and issues of class, but his emphasis on white and black racial identity confuses matters, thereby failing to deliver on what such attention should do for any analysis of race and racism: illuminate the intrinsic relationship between racist domination and political economic exploitation.14 Hyra recognizes that the phenomenon he labels “living the wire” represents an inversion of market forces that previously redlined African Americans out of the U.S. housing market—hitherto their presence diminished property value; now (at least in this case) it elevates it. Yet, instead of interrogating a market logic whose governing principles use racial categories to judge value, he seems content with ridiculing those governed by it.15 Hyra’s insightful observations regarding the commodification of black culture fall short of realizing that racial identity and commodification go hand in hand.16 The notion that gentrification is a function of whiteness and antiblackness is only plausible if one ignores the material determinates of black displacement.17 As D.C. community organizer Alex Baca recounts, “While media attention often focuses on those few places that are witnessing a transformation, there are two more potent and less mentioned storylines. The first is the persistence of chronic poverty. Three-quarters of 1970 highpoverty urban neighborhoods in the U.S. are still poor today. The second is the spread of concentrated poverty: Three times as many urban neighborhoods have poverty rates exceeding 30 percent as was true in 1970, and the number of poor people living in these neighborhoods has doubled. The result of these trends is that the poor in the nation’s metropolitan areas are increasingly segregated into neighborhoods of concentrated poverty. In 1970, 28 percent of the urban poor lived in a neighborhood with a poverty rate of 30 percent or more; by 2010, 39 percent of the urban poor lived in such high-poverty neighborhoods.”18 Cappuccino City’s strangely individualist approach would leave unscathed entire structures and systems that utilize racial identity to facilitate African American eviction and foreclosure: explosive income inequality that concentrates wealth just as it concentrates poverty; a gold-rush approach to development and management scaled absurdly high and siphoned away from neighborhoods by the financial speculation of big money; a lack of sound government policy incentivizing infrastructure investment for existing communities, meaning that those actually committed to sustainability die the death of a thousand permits; gerrymandered political schemes that suppress communal agency long before impossible rent hikes rob people of homes; and so on.19 At the end of the day it is the persistence and spread of poverty and their antidemocratic antecedents and effects, and their structural and systemic consequences for black life, not the influx of an abstract whiteness, that displaces.20 But that story, one senses, is less tantalizing than the one Hyra tells about white hipsters. These determining factors don’t always add up to the “de jure” forms of racism Rothstein’s The Color of Law sensationalizes, but together they conspire against African American communities. Here is a picture of racism featuring no one group of individuals (e.g., red-faced sheriffs armed with firehoses and attack dogs, well-meaning mortgage lenders, or white progressives “living the wire”) but rather a whole network of oppressions carrying the force of history. The problem with the identarian mode of analysis is that it encourages one to look for the presence of certain racial personalities possessed of certain racist attitudes when one should be looking at structures and systems that often remain faceless and are no less deadly for it. The problem isn’t that in focusing on white gentrifiers Hyra “plays the race card” (as some might complain) but rather that he plays it too narrowly and thereby distracts from the fact that the whole deck of racial capitalism is stacked against anyone relegated to the bottom of the race-based political economy. Hyra turns what needs to be a broadly racial capitalist story (as Jenkins mentions) into one narrowly confined to racial identity. In failing to situate consumer preference within the concrete workings of capital—in failing to ask what redlining and displacement practically accomplish, what they profit—we are left with the sense that the problem lies with white people as such, a mythologized account of gentrification that has the practical effect of leaving the concrete reality of racism beyond reach and redress. This tendency of emphasizing racial identity to the exclusion of political economy is what I mean by identarian antiracism, what I call academic and popular antiracism’s reigning orthodoxy. This book challenges the orthodox identarian view by offering a political economic approach to race and racism. Unlike the orthodox view, my approach does not press the case for racial kinds possessed of racial identities. In fact, it considers orthodox antiracism’s intense focus on racial identity a serious impediment to the work of democratic life on the one hand and political liberation on the other. Instead of an approach to racism that emphasizes racial identity front to back, my approach foregrounds the political economy by which racial identity came to matter at all.21 It presents a genealogy whereby the ideas of race and specific racial kinds were originally established and continue to be used to facilitate domination and exploitation of a uniquely political economic variety. The story has two parts. In the first part, Americans at the end of the seventeenth century devise race in order to ideologically justify political economic domination and exploitation. The claims were thin, no more than skin deep, but because they were embedded within processes and commitments that needed them to be true, they stuck. This is the part of the story that concerns racism. A second, equally complicated part of the story concerns contemporary antiracism’s fixation with race. This book captures both parts in a continuous narrative. It relates the story as one where (1) racial capitalism originally created racial identity—a black race derivative of a white race—in order to facilitate political economic domination and exploitation and (2) antiracists now commit themselves to appropriating racial identity—and its founding white/black binary—for antiracist purposes. Given all that academic research has uncovered about the capitalist origins of white supremacy, there should be little question about the historical correlation between American capitalism and American racism (a correlation captured in this book under the designation “racial capitalism”). There should be, however, considerable debate about the strategic benefits of continuing to operate in terms of race identity, about whether race can be carried forward as unproblematically as antiracists seem to suppose. What we need, and what the genealogy demands, is an open and honest debate about whether race language can become more than it was set out to be at the foundations of American life. This book develops arguments for that debate. As said in the Preface, the lesson to be learned from this genealogy (origin story, if you will) is not one that champions postracial color-blindness, the fantasy that results when one fails to differentiate race from racialization.22 Decades of serious thinking about race teach us two things. First, we have every reason to question the view of race as a natural kind, the case for which has shown itself to be fatally flawed.23 Second, we have little reason to question the racializing effects of racial capitalism, the evidence for which is all those structures and systems racially categorizing people in order to facilitate dominative exploitation. Postracial color-blindness confuses the two, thinking that because race is not a natural kind, race concepts should be abandoned, even those that track the damage done by racial capitalism.24 Regarding racial capitalism, postracialism promotes willful ignorance, which ends up serving racial capitalism.25 Identarian antiracism, though, contributes its own confusions. The deconstructive need to track racialization combines with the constructive vision of establishing, securing, and asserting identity to produce concepts that naturalize race all over again (e.g., “whiteness” and “blackness”). Because identarian politics necessitates adopting race concepts without working out everything taken on board, this newly naturalized notion of race is left standing as an overlooked piece of orthodox dogma. Embracing racial identities that come downstream from racialization amounts to an intimate embrace of the political economy that produced them. We should avoid both confusions. Rather than willful ignorance, we need to keep track of racial capitalism’s many effects. Rather than naturalize race, we need to avoid dogmatic concepts that capitulate to racial capitalism’s identarian schemes. While they might seem mutually exclusive, postracialism and identarianism reinforce one another. What we need—what would constitute a genuine alternative to both—is consideration of political economies that do not leave us with postracialism and identarianism as our only options. Deracialization, not postracialism, should be the goal. Until that goal is met, it is unclear what racial identity comes to other than the furnishings of a political economy that continues unabated in its domination and exploitation. Properly undertaken, the debate about identarianism would raise hard questions about whether racial identity can be appropriated in the way antiracists want to believe it can. Can we, for example, talk about “yellow power” as some Asian American antiracists did in the 1960s without capitulating to the political economy that coined “yellow peril” in order to exploit Chinese migrants in the 1860s?26 Identarians have designs here of hijacking a concept meant for harm and redeploying it for good, reverse-engineering its use from dominative exploitation to political liberation. Can we not appropriate for good that which was meant for evil?27 Conducting this debate is not the primary point of this book, which offers proposals beyond identarianism. At minimum, those committed to keeping racial identity on the table will need to theorize its possibilities through its political economic origins. If I am right about identarianism’s dominance within contemporary antiracism, it will be these questions about the legacy of racial identity that become for many readers a particular bone of contention.28 This book takes the position that while antiracists would understandably want to take the path of appropriating racism’s central concepts, racial identity cannot be so easily appropriated. It cannot for the simple reason that the same political economy that deployed racial identity in the first place still determines the conditions of its use.29 Even if that were not the case, and I try to show throughout that it is, it is nevertheless surprising how rarely antiracists acknowledge the commanding role racial capitalism has played throughout American history. The omission suggests that identarian antiracism does not fully appreciate the stakes of the matter, nor the possibilities that remain. Of course, the mere coincidence of racial identity and racial capitalism is not enough to prove that something untoward has occurred. An argument will need to be made. This book offers one such argument for the claim that racial identity remains wedded to racial capitalism, and it submits those racialized as Asian Americans as evidence for the claim. In relationship to Asian Americans, identarianism comes up short in two telling ways. First, American race politics constructs race in a manner that marginalizes Asian Americans. Here I refer to the racial binary (between white and black) that governs the lives of those it identifies as Asian American. The racial binary limits their existence to a racial existence: who they are reduces to who they are racially. At the same time the racial binary determines the substance of that existence: who they are reduces to who they are relative to a white/black binary. Because race is presumed to work for those identified as white and black (i.e., those who are conceptually prioritized by the binary), it is presumed to work for others. Even if it doesn’t. It should be no surprise then that orthodox antiracism ends up marginalizing those already marginalized by racism.30 Over the course of the book, I offer a number of examples, some quite involved, along these lines. Second, as an explanatory concept racial identity explains very little about Asian Americans.31 Conceptually, racial identity is notoriously unwieldy. Yet identarians insist on using it in order to get at highly complex phenomena like racism, nativism, political community, democratic life, moral agency, and the like. The strategy of using unwieldy concepts to explain complex phenomena results in outcomes that are unsurprisingly mired in analytical problems. While indications of these problems are everywhere present, this book takes up the task of carefully laying out the evidence and delineating the question-begging structure of arguments that begin with racial identity (e.g., “Because of whiteness, white people. . . .”). Failure to pay heed to these problems puts antiracism on the wrong path. My argument proceeds as if that path has become so confused and convoluted that any hope of dismantling racism now involves dismantling significant aspects of antiracist thought. If we have reached a point where we need to, as Eddie S. Glaude suggests, “begin again” (more precisely, continuously begin again), then we need to venture rethinking even our most cherished concepts, including those related to racial identity.32 Throughout my argument, Asian Americans play a central role in challenging antiracist orthodoxy. Their experience within the dominant discourse shows that identarianism harms more than it helps (or that it harms at least as much as it helps but the harms do not so easily register). They similarly demonstrate that identarianism’s intense focus on racial identity severely limits its explanatory power (i.e., racial identity tells us little more than that and how persons are racially identified). Racial identity misconstrues identity, and therefore persons, making of identity’s translational, provisional, and pragmatic character something essential, permanent, and ideal.33 Emphasizing race above all other forms of identification—where one’s racial identity determines everything about one’s identity—then has the effect of misconstruing how identity works altogether. Racial identity misleads not only about race but also about identity, not only about racial persons but persons as such. As a whole, the book argues that replacing identarian antiracism with an antiracist approach focused on political economy gets us closer to overcoming racism. By explaining race and racism in terms of the historical and material contexts that produced and perpetuate race thinking and racist arrangements, political economy better explains what racism is, how it works, and what liberation entails and constrains. Relying, as identarianism increasingly does, on vague concepts like “whiteness” (i.e., that which determines history without answering to it) might be rhetorically useful, but it will not in the end get us very far. Rather than limiting ourselves to racial identity and rather than deploying concepts that float free of history, we might consider approaches that help us understand why racial identity came to matter at all. By narrating identarian antiracism in continuity with racism’s fixation with racial identity (that is, by telling both parts of the origin story), my political economic approach tries to understand the reigning orthodoxy better than it understands itself. Correspondingly, because it does not press the case for racial identity, it does not, as the identarian binaries do, prioritize some people to the exclusion of others. In my approach, each racialized person counts the same, as racialized and therefore commodified. There is not in this approach some conceptually privileged racialized group (some uncommodified racial group), either on account of access to power or proximity to suffering. To be racialized just is to be commodified. As a result, this non-identarian view of persons creates space for coalitional solidarity since your belonging to a group is not made to depend on your belonging to a certain race (which will segregate you from some just as it will join you to others). Belonging instead involves shared patterns of common life by which you and others mutually discover who you are. Coalitional solidarity premised on racial identity turns the degree of one’s racial suffering into the basis for one’s belonging, with predictable results—only certain races count. When race (e.g., “whiteness”) serves as the common enemy around which a coalition is built, then racial identity (i.e., one’s suffering owing to one’s race) becomes the criterion for participation. Just as race narrows what counts as suffering, so it narrows pathways for shared forms of life. When identity precedes liberative politics, it too often precludes it. Racial identity becomes a conversation stopper. When identity instead arrives as an achievement of shared struggle in revolutionary forms of love, identities (who and what we are) form around common liberative agendas.34 Inasmuch as racism stems from a baseline commodifying political economy and insofar as that political economy seeks to dominate and exploit everyone and everything, antiracism will need to provide remedies wide enough to overcome it. Identarianism’s individualizing approach will not do. If we hope to succeed, we will need others.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Racial Capitalism Kritik --- K Lab 2023 › Link › 1NC --- Agriculture

The alternative alone solves the aff better- black foodways have always been a way to access self-determination in the face racial capitalist power structures.

McClintock 18 [Nathan McClintock, Professor at Toulan School of Urban Studies and Planning, Portland State University, May 22, 2018, “Urban agriculture, racial capitalism, and resistance in the settler-colonial city”, Wiley Online Library, , JMH]

Through these lenses, understanding UA as a form of resistance and self-determination under racial capitalism/settler colonialism first demands attention to “banal acts of daily subsistence” as these “reflect and reproduce capitalist social relations, express their contradictions, and contain the seeds of their overcoming” (Figueroa, 2015, p. 502). Urban food production has historically served as a means of subsistence for low-income, racialized, and marginalized populations, supplementing diets and providing agriculturalists with supplemental income from sales of garden surplus. Often arriving in cities and towns from rural areas, people with limited incomes grew food to lower grocery costs and earn a little money on the side (McClintock, 2010; Nicolaides, 2001); indeed, in many cities, agriculture and truck farming was often one of the few activities open to racialized immigrants (Gibb & Wittman, 2013; Lim, 2015; Wong, 2004, pp. 211–220). For African Americans who moved from the U.S. South to urban centers in the North and West during the two Great Migrations, growing staple vegetables such as okra, collards, and sweet potatoes and raising small livestock was a means of saving money, supplementing incomes, and having fresh produce in the summer and canned surplus for the winter (Wiese, 2005, p. 78). Later waves of immigration to U.S. cities similarly saw newcomers growing food at home and in community gardens (Airriess & Clawson, 1994; Baker, 2005; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2014; Martinez, 2010; Saldivar-Tanaka & Krasny, 2004). For many immigrants, urban gardening provides “biographical continuity” (Li, Hodgetts, & Ho, 2010, p. 786) between their old lives in their country of origin and their lives in a new culture and space (Irazábal & Punja, 2009; Mares & Peña, 2010). Gardens also provided sustenance for many Indigenous people forcefully relocated to large cities in the 1950s and 1960s (Pollak, 2016, p. 94). Food production has thus served as a buffer against economic upheaval inherent to the socio-spatial logic of uneven capitalist development (McClintock, 2010; Sbicca, 2014; Tornaghi, 2014), providing a modicum of food security, supplementing diets with fresh produce, and providing benefits to mental and physical health (Gray, Guzman, Glowa, & Drevno, 2014; Hale et al., 2011; Kortright & Wakefield, 2011). Urban food production has similarly contributed to Black self-determination. Indeed, foodways have long played an important role in emancipatory politics in African American communities—from the agricultural and culinary knowledge of enslaved people (Carney, 2009; Wisecup, 2015) to the anti-hunger work of the Black Panther Party (Heynen, 2009b)—and have been a site of negotiation between divergent Black political ideologies (McCutcheon, 2015), from which theories of praxis emerge that link analysis of racial capitalist structures and relations to the “deeply human side” of everyday survival (Heynen, 2009a, p. 197). Black gardening is thus “a way to stake a claim to permanency, education, economic citizenship, and community leadership, rather than only as a vehicle for food security” (Tuck, Smith, Guess, Benjamin, & Jones, 2014, p. 55). Examining urban gardens in a majority African American area of Washington, DC, Reese (2018, p. 421) explains how gardeners draw on “memories and myths” of a hyper-local Black economy that arose in response to redlining and segregation. These affective stories served as “both a critique of the breakdown of Black community life and as inspiration for reclaiming a past of cooperative living that was seemingly lost.” Indeed, gifting, sharing, and trading garden produce between Black gardeners has traditionally “reinforced community bonds and preserved tangible links” (Wiese, 2005, p. 85) not only to an African American agrarian heritage in the South but also to Black liberation struggles and the Blues development tradition, more broadly (Figueroa, 2015; Heynen, 2009b; McCutcheon, 2013; Ramírez, 2015; Rickford, 2017; White, 2011b). Echoing other studies of UA in Detroit (Pothukuchi, 2015; White, 2011b, 2011a), Safransky (2017, p. 1093) describes how for some Black farmers, UA is “a strategy of resistance, an act of self-determination, a challenge to systemic violence” that contributes to wider efforts “to undo colonial spatial orders and structures of white supremacy,” an observation that appears to be true of Black UA efforts across the country: New York (Reynolds & Cohen, 2016; Sbicca & Myers, 2017); Chicago (Block, Chávez, Allen, & Ramirez, 2012; Shabazz, 2015, pp. 115–118); Los Angeles (Bonacich & Alimahomed-Wilson, 2011; Broad, 2016); the Bay Area (Bradley & Galt, 2014; Sbicca, 2016); and many other American cities (Passidomo, 2016; Ramírez, 2015; Rodriguez, 2017). As the literature cited in this article illustrates, UA can serve as both a tool of racial Othering and dispossession and a tool of resistance to these same processes and their outcomes. Urban agriculture is not inherently one way or another—it is simply an everyday practice. How it is mobilized and by whom, however, can make all the difference in whether it serves to bolster racial capitalism or to undermine it. Viewing UA through a relational framework of racial capitalism and settler colonialism can help clarify some of its contradictory outcomes. Future theoretical and empirical work in this vein might address any number of scales, from ethnographies focused on the micro-geographies of everyday UA practices, to macro-scale relational comparative work. A few additional recommendations for future work are worth mentioning. First, regardless of the scale or scope of analysis, scholars should work hard to identify which specific processes are at play in a given case, to clarify precisely how racial Othering and settler logics of erasure and dispossession mediate particular political economic processes (see, for example, Coulthard, 2014; Day, 2016; King, 2016; Pasternak & Dafnos, 2017). Second, future work should place gender more centrally, given the gendered dynamics of UA and social reproduction, more broadly. Third, while some have called for more attention to UA practiced by people of color (to offset the disproportionate attention paid to the urban farming of young, White hipsters; see Reynolds & Cohen, 2016, for example), scholars should take care to avoid essentializing the UA practices of Indigenous people and people of color. Fostering and protecting spaces for people to tell their own stories is one important way to uphold the diversity of epistemologies and narratives. Finally, future work might even call into question using UA as a framework of analysis in and of itself. Given that hunting, fishing, and gathering of foods are all central to Indigenous food sovereignty and resurgence (Daigle, 2017; Poe, LeCompte, McLain, & Hurley, 2014; Simpson & Bagelman, 2018), we might ask whether a narrow, Eurocentric focus on cultivation, as opposed to a more broadly defined food system, works to erase non-White epistemologies and practices. In sum, given the extent to which discursive Othering and erasure undergird racial capitalism, how we frame UA and other food spaces—and, indeed, what we choose to focus our research on—clearly matters.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Racial Capitalism Kritik --- K Lab 2023 › Link › 1NC --- Agriculture

Attempts at changing urban agricultural practice simply recreate the same hierarchies they attempt to dismantle. The 1AC will always recreate new and worse forms of gentrification while also demonizing projects of black and native foodways that have already begun the work.

McClintock 18 [Nathan McClintock, Professor at Toulan School of Urban Studies and Planning, Portland State University, May 22, 2018, “Urban agriculture, racial capitalism, and resistance in the settler-colonial city”, Wiley Online Library, , JMH]

Scholarship on contemporary Urban Agriculture (UA) projects reveals similar logics of Othering and civilizing at play in North American cities. Critical food scholars have written extensively on the ways in which alternative food initiatives ultimately support neoliberal capitalism (Alkon & Mares, 2012; Guthman, 2008c; Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011; Weissman, 2015), arguing, for example, that organized UA efforts can contribute to neoliberal subject formation by shifting responsibility to the individual and away from collective mobilization against the corporate agri-food system (McClintock, 2014; Pudup, 2008). But the formation of the ideal neoliberal “foodie” also mobilizes a highly normative set of imaginaries and claims, many of which undergird racial-capitalist and settler logics of Othering. Many UA efforts draw on an agrarian romanticization of “going back to the land” and “getting your hands dirty,” while remaining blind to racialized and gendered histories of agricultural exploitation (Carlisle, 2014; Guthman, 2008a, 2008b; Rotz, 2017) and eliding questions of whose land they are actually “going back to.” These studies have also revealed how UA can reinforce hegemonic racial hierarchies, where well-meaning UA advocates intent on “bringing good food to others” (Guthman, 2008a) can re-inscribe paternalistic power asymmetries and colonial patterns of oppression of people of color (Lyson, 2014; Ramírez, 2015; Reynolds & Cohen, 2016; Rosan & Pearsall, 2017). Discourses of purity, mobilized in opposition to corporate, processed food, can also denigrate Indigenous and non-White foodways (Alkon et al., 2013; DeLind, 2010; Minkoff-Zern, 2014). Furthermore, the Whiteness of alternative food initiatives—and their capacity for racial Othering—is spatialized through what Saldanha (2007, p. 50) refers to as “viscosity,” or the tendency of “white bodies to stick and exclude others.” Several scholars have described how such viscosity has rendered alternative food spaces as White spaces (Alkon & McCullen, 2011; Slocum, 2007), where community gardens, for example, become exclusionary, despite their presumed ability to bring a diversity of people together (Bosco & Joassart-Marcelli, 2017; Drake, 2014). As White people begin to dominate agricultural spaces in older communities of color, the actual practice of UA can result in territorial appropriation. Even well-intentioned activists working under a banner of “food justice” or “reclaiming the commons” can unintentionally contribute to dispossession and displacement of people of color (McClintock, 2018; Stehlin & Tarr, 2017). Indeed, UA efforts by White people are often perceived as colonial by those they intend to “help.” Meenar and Hoover (2016, p. 10) quote an African American gardener who describes the urban farming efforts in a low-income area of Philadelphia as “a white, top down activity.” Similarly, Owens and Antiporda (2017, p. 165) describe how garden project failed in its efforts to fulfill a promise to construct “a garden on every corner” in historically Black West Oakland precisely because it “replicated the colonial ‘ideology’ of ‘improvement’ and risked appearing obtuse to the reality of displacement in the context of extreme gentrification.” Discussing a White-led garden project in Seattle, Ramírez (2015) notes a similar blindness to power asymmetries, as do Rosan and Pearsall (2017) in their study of UA in Philadelphia, exemplifying the “disavowal of the processes of dispossession” (Snelgrove, Dhamoon, & Corntassel, 2014, p. 5) fundamental to the racial formation of White settlers (Rotz, 2017). But even while many White urban farmers are actually sensitive to uneven power dynamics, their efforts often overshadow the existing UA efforts of non-White community residents. This has material impacts, as municipalities and funders alike tend to privilege large-scale, photogenic UA, thereby disproportionately shifting land, equipment, and grant funding away from organizations of color to these new urban farmers (Horst, McClintock, & Hoey, 2017; Reynolds & Cohen, 2016). Indeed, it is in such gentrifying neighborhoods that UA seems most visibly entangled in racial-capitalist/settler-colonial logics of Othering and dispossession. Clamoring to take advantage of the growing “rent gap” between actual and potential property values in disinvested neighborhoods of color, developers, landlords, and gentrifiers alike invoke a frontier imaginary that appeals to “pioneers” and “urban homesteaders” in search of cheap housing (N. Smith, 1996). Harkening back to the westward settlement of the United States by Whites granted “free” land under a series of Homestead Acts, such discourse reframes devalued inner-city neighborhoods as uncharted “urbs nullius” (Coulthard, 2014, p. 176), rendering “the present innercity population as a natural element of their physical surroundings” (Smith, 1996, p. xvi), while “evading Indigenous sovereignty and the modern presence of actual urban Native peoples” (Tuck & Yang, 2012, p. 28; see also Jackson, 2009). In some cases, commercial developers and market gardeners, trumpeting promises of enhanced food security or sustainability, purchase or lease vast tracts of vacant land at fire sale prices in these neighborhoods, acquisitions that locals see as “land grabs” that do little more than enrich the owner at the community's expense (Paddeu, 2017; Safransky, 2017). Several authors have described this phenomenon in Detroit and other post-industrial cities where vacant land is abundant. But similar processes are visible everywhere, arising where land values are lower and—given the racialized nature of uneven development—where populations of color tend to be concentrated (Lederman, 2017; Pothukuchi, 2017; Rosan & Pearsall, 2017). Urban agriculture is caught up in racial-capitalist and settler logics of urban development precisely because it distinguishes “new development, rising home values, and a whiter residential population” from a neighborhood's “racially marginalized past” (Dillon, 2014, p. 1211), or as Pettygrove and Ghose (2018, p. 601) put it, UA works “to racialize revitalization as whiteness, in that it is a process meant to improve neighborhoods understood to be black.” Even if longtime residents tend gardens, the viscosity and visibility of White gardeners—growing food UA in their yards, community garden plots, or vacant lots—serves as a signal to future gentrifiers and investors that the neighborhood is on the road to being livable and green (McClintock, 2018). Urban agriculture, like other green amenities, is thus performative and often most widespread in some of the trendiest neighborhoods (Lebowitz & Trudeau, 2017; Lowell & Law, 2017; McClintock, Mahmoudi, Simpson, & Santos, 2016; Naylor, 2012; Quastel, 2009). As demonstrated above, UA has been entangled in processes of racial Othering and dispossession central to the racial-capitalist development of settler cities. But as noted in the introduction, UA can work in contradictory ways. In the next section, I draw on insights from Black geographies and Indigenous studies to illustrate how UA's emancipatory functions arise dialectically in response to the logics and material outcomes of settler colonialism and racial capitalism. Many scholars have raised that alarm that a narrow focus on political economic structures, particularly those grounded in Marxian critiques of neoliberal capitalism, can foreclose alternative, anti-capitalist pathways (Gibson-Graham, 2006; Parnell & Robinson, 2012; Springer, 2014). Scholars of Black geographies have further warned of the scholarly erasure of Black epistemologies, ontologies, and material practices. Even when well-intentioned, a narrow focus on racial violence can reinforce racist differentiation by essentializing the Black experience as tantamount to death and dying, thereby reinforcing the role that “scenes of subjection” (Hartman, 1997) have historically played in normalizing violence against Black bodies and Othering Black spaces (Gilmore, 2002; Mbembe, 2003; McKittrick, 2013; Woods, 2002). Instead, these authors argue for a dialectical approach to understanding Black space that also includes the social movements that emerge in opposition to racial capitalism's assault on Black life. McKittrick (2011, p. 955), for example, asserts that Black geographies “hold in them useful anti-colonial practices and narratives” and “are not just about limitations, captivities, and erasures; they are also about everyday contestations, philosophical demands, and the possibilities the production of space can engender for subaltern subjects” (McKittrick, 2006, p. 121). Mirroring Robinson's dialectical understanding of the emergence of the Black radical tradition as a movement to reconstitute social bonds torn apart by racial capitalism (Melamed, 2015, p. 80; Robinson, 2000), Woods identifies a “Blues model of sustainable development” that arises in dialectical opposition to slavery and Jim Crow oppression (Woods, 2000, 2017). Similarly, critics have warned that studies of settler colonialism risk perpetuating the dominance of a singular colonial narrative that can silence Indigenous theorizing, thus reinforcing settler-colonial logics of erasure (Hugill, 2017). Rather than focusing solely on settler structures of oppression, Indigenous scholars have stressed the importance of examining everyday practices and other assertions of the multiple sovereignties that work in opposition to settler logics (Corntassel, 2012; Daigle, 2017; Simpson, 2014). To this end, the theory and praxis of Indigenous resurgence entails “recommitments and reorientations” to Indigenous epistemologies, ontologies, and practices (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005, p. 611). Action at the scale of the individual and household may scale up over time into social or political movements challenging the authority and territorial claims of the settler-colonial state (Daigle, 2017).

2023 Michigan Kritik
Racial Capitalism Kritik --- K Lab 2023 › Link › 1NC --- Afrofuturism

Afro-futurism’s emphasis on cultural articulations of anti-blackness in trope, image, and discourse de-mobilizes anti-capitalist political mobilization and ensures co-option by neoliberal institutions – emphasizing performance as the terrain of resistance abstracts away from the concrete, material, and political-economic foundations of racial capitalism

Burden-Stelly 16

(Charisse Burden-Stelly, PhD in African-American Studies from University of California Berkeley, dissertation entitled “The Modern Capitalist State and the Black Challenge: Culturalism and the Elision of Political Economy,” pgs. 13-16)

Even though contemporary articulations of the African diaspora became abstracted from radical enunciations of Blackness, and became a form of cultural critical practice, of mutual recognition against the universality of black misrepresentation and abjection, and an articulation of the politics of identity and representation, the Black radical structure of feeling nonetheless provided the grammar and the pedagogy to critique and challenge regimes of coloniality79 that sustain the trans-spatial and trans-temporal conditions of Black abjection. It created an intellectual map for theories of the African diaspora to reflect anticolonial and antiracist grievance articulated in the conjunctural space of black radical consciousness. Unlike post-Cold War articulations of Blackness, the Black radical structure of feeling inflected a heterogeneous critique imbued with not only cultural, but also structural, anticapitalist, and anti-imperialist foundations. “New Negro Culturalism”—the Harlem Renaissance enunciation of Black radicalism—had yet to become the hegemonic mode of theorizing and asserting Blackness, so the project of constructing Black modern subjectivity became inhered in a robust theoretical framework that included structural critiques of capitalist exploitation, analyses of racialization, and the politicization of cultural production.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Racial Capitalism Kritik --- K Lab 2023 › 1NC › 1NC --- Shell v K

The alternative is a rejection of the 1AC’s ideological neglect in favor of black radical anti-capitalist resistance. Our call to action is a necessary launching point for challenging the system of racial capitalism both within debate and on the ground.

Suekama 21 [Nsambu Za Suekama, nonbinary and disabled Afro-transfemme coming from the Anarqa-pantherist movement, Red Voice, the voices of the People- news, commentary, and coverage, September 29, 2021, “The Devil Wears Dashikis, Pt. 4: Theoretical and Practical Lessons for the Struggle (Conclusion”, , JMH]

The ideological neglect, based in chauvinism, allows movements to not question the hierarchy and rigidity and cults of personality formed around great and strong individuals or units and deference to single sites of authority in these organizations who get credit and attention and even bread from the blood, sweat, and tears of members under them. The ideological neglect and chauvinism leaves unexamined the voracious almost evangelical/fundamentalist ways each of them wants to be the agent of revolutionary change, the vanguard who has the correct line and "out-organizes" everyone else, and the grift and manipulation that often hides behind these zealous declarations. Ideological neglect and chauvinism will also not question the fact that such values and procedural or methodological infrastructures are inculcated in bourgeois institutions like the church and nuclear family. To say nothing of the fact that it puts a spotlight on figures or formations that, when wiped out by the enemy or by their own internal contradictions, means the diffusion of revolutionary consciousness and necessary movement infrastructures and comradely bonds is slowed down or brought to a halt (let’s think about the revolving door in Black Hammer membership). And, further, it allows for the elevation of individual personality flaws and horrors to the level of antagonistic contradiction (as was so commonly taken advantage of by COINTELPRO to disrupt movement last century). What does it say about the anti-colonial Left in an age of celebrity "activism" (AOC at the Met; CBS producing a show like "The Activist"; and all the Derays and Shaun Kings), a wholly bourgeois and counterinsurgent phenomenon, that a YouTuber like Gazi was catapulted to prominence, with catastrophic consequences, in part with the help of organizations in our movement? It's the residue of ruling class ideology and gendered political values that allowed people to get wrapped up in Black Hammer's antics. And that is why these formations and milieus are so vulnerable to even non-fed wreckers who come and undermine revolutionary organizations, like the one under consideration in this document. The established anti-colonial Left’s chauvinism and ideological neglect prevents them from fully grasping the value in what INCITE! meant by “misogynists make great informants.” They cannot appreciate that it is as much a question of principles and care for all our people as it is a question of operational security and militant praxis to observe how gender violence and the techniques used to shield it destroy movements and dovetail with pig work. Only an acknowledgement that the emancipation of gender/sexuality is essential to the endogenous Third World national dynamics by which we fight for class liberation could have led the organizers in INCITE! to name how the same deceitful behaviors that allow an abuser to hide their deeds or manipulate sympathy and excuses from folk proximal to them are the exact strategies used by agents of the State infiltrating our movements. And this same acknowledgement, that the problem of the color line is threaded at the nexus of gender/sexuality as a material question, is why more broadly, QTGNC and marginalized gender Africans have identified that when the negrosie needs to distract the people they are exploiting from identifying the pressures of class oppression and amelioration, they will simply whip up fervor around homosexuality through appeals to defending “sovereignty.” Here, the source of deprivation is identified as a Queer/trans problem, juxtaposed against a reactionary nationalism, which is a mystificatory narrative. Few of the most major anti-colonial Left voices, however, have admitted this when speaking on the composition and strategies of the puppet/misleadership class in this neocolonial age. Just like a good number of them could not predict the monstrosities that would come out of BHO, and did not make attempts to adequately struggle against them. And why would they, when majority of them are used to and/or benefit from the relative degrees of safety, access, ideological commitments and behavioral sanction of cisheteronormative institutions such as the nuclear family, certain religions, education systems, medical industries, the State, etc. thereby sharing adjacent subjective contradictions and even interests as the outright reactionaries? Matter precedes mind, once again, and the weight of a cisheteronormative history, a material question, has imbricated upon our movements to create a certain ideological inertia that can only be addressed through consciously synthesizing from within. Everyone, including queer, trans, gender nonconforming folk in Third World/colonized contexts need to understand these lessons. No population is inherently radical or inherently reactionary: what’s decisive is how we choose to synthesize the material conditions with the endogenous dynamics unfolding in our histories of societal development. There was a time when the national liberation struggle was not class conscious; it took conscious struggle against internal contradictions in order for anti-capitalism to more visibly become a staple of Black nationalist politics. The African Blood Brotherhood made a similar observation, back in 1922, when they announced their program: “A race without a program is like a ship at sea without a rudder. It is absolutely at the mercy of the elements. It is buffeted hither and thither and in a storm is bound to flounder. It is in such a plight as this that the Negro race has drifted for the past fifty years and more. Rarely ever did it know exactly what it was seeking and never once did it formulate any intelligent and workable plan of getting what it was seeking, even in the rare instances when it did know what it wanted.” The Black struggle had at a time demonstrated one qualitative phase of development (a non-class conscious one) that began to give way to a markedly distinct qualitative phase (a class conscious one) only because of the efforts of organizations like the ABB and many others, especially going into the civil rights movements and the mid-to-late 20th century militant decolonization movements. The white Left, however, being chauvinistic, would often dismiss Black and Third World concerns on the mere account of our self-determined interaction with the anti-capitalist movement, which did not pattern their frame of reference. So, they refused to operate in solidarity with many of our organizations, both theoretically and practically. They essentially spat on the ship and wagged their fingers at the tired seasick sailors trying to find a way to guide it home to port, causing a number of our ancestors to break away from alliance with them. When it comes to the roadblocks in class consciousness along gender/sexual lines, where the ship is still finding its way, both for cisgender/heterosexual people and for QTGNC people, a similar thing is happening. A conscious struggle is needed in order to achieve a higher unity and the next phase in ideological evolution (ie, the ship needs revolutionaries who understand what it takes to build its rudder). But, just as the chauvinists in the white Marxist (and anarchist) settings isolate and even work against Black and Third World radicals that try/tried to do so, Black/Third World women and other marginalized gender radicals have had to either wrestle with or break away from the historical left because of the chauvinistic refusal of solidarity from supposed comrades and allies who also worked against us. Claudia Jones, Frances Beal, the Combahee River Collective are examples of this from the last century; but it is still prominent now. The ship needs a coxswain or a few, yet cishet radicals and even marginalized gender radicals who unite with their chauvinism wag their fingers at those of us who are training ourselves for the task. These refusals to extend self-determination in this way are wholly connected to many of the conservative, radlib, and neoliberal tendencies the Left likes to critique. Gazi was an entire QTGNC revolutionary anti-colonialist who kept pushing Hotep-like analyses of Black cis male oppression and calling for violence against trans Black women just like these reactionary forces do, and who visited violence and abuse and labor exploitation onto several Black women and other marginalized genders with the help of white/non-Black cis comrades. Then, there are QTGNC Black Lives Matter organizers speaking of “abundance” in the way prosperity ministers do and even going on right-wing platforms like the Breakfast Club to justify their grift, and echoing support of white imperialist politicians. And there are whole Queer- run Black Leftist publications and radio shows pushing the same lines about feminist/queer movements that go into why misleadership in places like Ghana and Nigeria are legislating against QTGNC rights (the latter of which is being facilitated by white religious movements partnering with local governments). Here, then, the white left’s anti-blackness converging with white liberal/conservative reaction, is translated into a bias in our movements along gender/sexual lines that dovetails with parallel biases in bourgeois society across nations, all with the same impact. And that's why, after the 2020 rebellions, when the right-wing insists on protecting the nuclear family alongside defending the nation, ratcheting up both the police state and anti-trans/anti-abortion legislation; we have anti-colonial Left voices piling on “identity politics” and related topics more vociferously than they are actually denouncing cisheteropatriarchy and organizing against it! Self-described revolutionaries tailing the ruling class? This, by the way, is the same thing the white Left did after the election of Trump in 2016, with dismissal of “wokeness." The latter should not be surprising for us, as the divide in the working class is maintained at the color line. But, reductive anti-colonialists, whether cisgender/heterosexual or not, who dismiss or fail to fully apprehend the gender/sexual horizons of the struggle for both self-determination and class liberation, are no different theoretically or practically, from the white reductionists who have been so historically chauvinistic and antagonistic toward Black and Third World movement. Perhaps that's why the two camps worked together so closely in BHO (and in cults like APSP who BHO patterned themselves on); and why in other organizations both camps have a discursive unity with the conservatives' insistence on cisheteropatriarchy and anti-feminism in particular. Is any of this advancing our struggle? Not when certain Black people have chosen to avoid Left politics because of an overrepresentation of whiteness within the anti-capitalist movement. They feel alienated. In this way we lose potential comrades. And, similarly, some QTGNC folk in particular have avoided the Left because of an overrepresentation of cisheteropatriarchy and abuse within the same. Because of alienation. More potential comrades lost. Then the liberals exploit this, encouraging folk to stick with and try to reform the system they know intimately (capitalism and the State); hence the popularity of representation politics, rather than be “fooled” into trying to join liberatory movements that promise something better but that end up an “authoritarian” nightmare behind the scenes. We lose comrades because of these myths. Is any of this advancing a united front? It is difficult to disprove propaganda from the enemy, if we insist on chauvinism, invalidating legitimate concerns about exclusion and violence and abuse and manipulation that lend certain stories credence. Gazi is just a very extreme example of what’s being described here, and so it was with a few of those who have helped them rise to and remain in prominence. Again, that is what will happen when you refuse to ideologically deal with developments endogenous to our national and gender experiences, to see their implications for class struggle. Like the white left marginalizing Black interests, Gazi/BHO, and their acolytes and supporters across races and tendencies held to a resounding refusal to synthesize specific histories and concerns of the QTGNC struggle with anti-colonial Left ideology. They insisted on calling “intersectionality” a white supremacist project. In an atmosphere like that, of course the dynamics that enable abuse to persist can go hidden. The ideological chauvinism had practical implications. There was complete erasure and lack of political education around the origins of the modern QTGNC movement as it relates to uprisings and lumpenized labor organizations led by Third World women of trans experience such as the gorls of STAR during the 70s era anti-colonial upheavals. Certain values, praxis, theoretical concerns cannot be synthesized in a movement when you bypass endogenous developments like this in our history. And that's why a failure to name, anticipate or respond to abuse in a principled way is so common. The need to build a rudder for the ship, borrowing once more from the words of the ABB, was neither acknowledged nor consciously struggled for. Instead, the ship was allowed to verse the high seas without direction, while some claiming to be vanguards either scoffed from the shore or they climbed aboard pretending to steer it, though they lacked the tools to do so, as they knew nothing of the waves or the winds or the stars and navigation, and simply let the most vulnerable rot at the bottom of the hold, and led folk, particularly youth, including underage ones, into destruction. And what came of that? All of the horrors we went over in this document, and then some. True political education and a culture of genuine revolutionary learning and practice is the only thing that would have allowed folk to identify this stuff from jump and act against it. It is not enough for folk to call themselves “scientific” revolutionaries, Nkrumahists, Marxists/Leninists, Maoists, or whatever other persuasion, too, all while maintaining a movement atmosphere and ideological milieu built on reaction to reaction and vice versa; not dialectics. Gazi’s antics could hardly be critiqued effectively when the self-described materialists around them had only learned to theorize gender by way of cissexist idealists like Tommy Curry (who believes sexualized racism against Black cishet men absolves them of patriarchal violence), Frances Cress Welsing (who believes white supremacy is primarily motivated by fear of Black cishet male virility), Clenora Hudson Weems (who sees Black feminism as divisive and prefers a “holistic” gender politics that is cissexist/heterosexist instead) when discussing gender contradiction. Gazi’s antics could hardly be critiqued effectively when the self-described queer radicals of the Left had only learned to theorize gender struggles by misusing Sylvia Wynter and Hortense Spillers’ critiques about the colonial basis of modern cisheteropatriarchy to idealize precolonial Africa as genderless and all Black people as essentially nonbinary. Gazi’s antics could hardly be critiqued effectively while the ship still lacks a rudder, while no synthesis toward higher unity is being advanced, while bad theoretical moves steeped in chauvinism and class interests mask horrible practices like gender violence and abuse. Even sadder is that due to all this, attempts to establish a better precedent on part of some Black/Third World radicals, particularly trans and nonbinary, especially trans woman, transfeminine, and transmisogyny-affected (TMA) ones, were being and are still being dismissed. There is still reactionary criticism upon reactionary criticism compounding, and all this shitslinging, and divisiveness, and hot takes, sensationalistic media titles (“fuck black history month” and “feminism is inherently bourgeois”), incendiary commentary (like those which denied the literal existence of a Black elder and political prisoner), intentional internet controversy campaigns (“operation storm of white tears”), and endless podcasts and breadtubes with surface level analysis akin to the revolving door of mainstream media reporting, rants that sound more like Shade Room comment sections, and exclusionary academic panel-style events led by wanna-be public intellectual types, the courting of celebrities, and overall reliance on the marketing apparatus that is social media (even to the point of mistaking mere popular education and even populism for political education and conscientization). Does any of this advance the struggle? Black Hammer Organization’s inconsistency at the theoretical level, their lack of cohesive understanding on colonialism and gender struggles, and the way that provided a smokescreen to cover the abusive and cult-like dynamics: it is made possible by a general problem on the anti-colonial Left where gender and hierarchy are seldom confronted materially. And this milieu is still driving more wedges, still keeps alienating potential comrades from the anti-colonial Left, and it shields chauvinists, and though you can scratch a chauvinist, and almost always either find an apologist for abuse or an actual abuser, like what happened with Gazi, these radicals are mystified as our movements are so rife with the people like the latter, and so they can't even effectively protect themselves or anyone else from these wreckers, just dusting their hands or looking the other way when the damage is done, or claiming that discussion of these things is a tool of the white Man. Sounds just like how abuse culture happens in the bourgeois world, right? The same stuff that led to a #MeToo movement? Interesting... . The anti-colonial Left must take this moment as indication about how necessary it is to parse embourgeoisement in our spaces. And we can only walk through the manifestations thereof by paying attention to the gendered/sexual contradictions that provide a throughline. Counterinsurgency is heavily reliant on celebrity activism and social media to water down and misrepresent radical ideas, and the problem of cults and hierarchy, which are gendered problems, is a perfect doorway to these bourgeois tendencies infecting our spaces. All Gazi did was foster a significantly horrible version of an alignment between an old problem and new realities that the rest of our movement hasn't fully grappled with yet. An organization like Black Hammer could rise to prominence without much opposition as a result of not dealing with this. To the point of being defended despite its egregious doings, and its astounding liberalism, its lack of cohesive scientific analysis or ideology or operational security, and its outright campaigns against other revolutionaries (in which BHO deemed us “opposition” or “enemies”). There is no valid reason that criticism of these issues was dismissed so readily and enthusiastically, or at least not taken seriously, save that there is unpreparedness on the anti-colonial Left to confront gender contradictions as a material/labor/praxis question. If something is not done about this immediately, at theoretical and procedural, and interpersonal and individual levels, at organizational and intracommunal levels, we will see the increased magnification of individualism, of cults of personality and of abuse and the apologism and shielding around the same, as well as grift and opportunism, to the point that there would cease to be a meaningful distinction between a “radical” space and a “radlib” or even “alt-right” space. With the gamut of tactics used by BHO to supposedly propagandize and politically educate that we have seen, the lines here are already blurred. And gender violence, especially (trans)misogynoir, will always be the tell. There is a web that must be detangled, ultimately, and it is threaded in gendered contradictions that stem from or are reaction to cisheteropatriarchy. It's this that enabled the rise of BHO/Gazi, which that formation unfortunately took to absolutely depraved extremes, but which much of the anti-colonial Left is guilty of either participating in or failing to meaningfully struggle against. One may say that correlation ain't causation, but correlation requires a look at the context that shapes a certain connection: and as regards cults, gender violence, etc, a context entrenched in organizational methodologies which value individualism and visibility and one-dimensional expressions of radical thought, that see other ideologies as competition (reminds us, competition on the Left is a residue of capitalist market logic), that regard "the masses'' as tabulae rasae who must be proselytized with the gospel of Marx or Lenin or Mao or Nkrumah or whomever, often cannot address the issue, see it coming, and they will even stand by it and make excuses or sweep narratives under the rug. And it is because their values come from the same gendered histories and institutions that already rely on abuse and manipulation. Every true revolutionary must have a commitment to extricating themselves from gendered oppression and exploitation and domination and division, and striving not to replicate them, if we want to see all power to the people. The ruling class is clear on this, that is why they are waging war on bodily autonomy through gender oppression, and on our consciousness through mystification around gender, as part of broader attempts to undermine revolutionary struggle. We want true transformation of ourselves and our movements, we need to be ready for this. We need the tools to anticipate and stamp out future abuse and cults, or at least adequately support victims and repair the damage that has already been done, and that could come in the future. This can only come when we put our faith in the magic of the hands, as Assata called it. Discovering how to practice this is the mission of this generation, and it's the gender/sexual struggle, it is a confrontation with cisheteropatriarchy as a material question, it is the courage to develop new institutions and new genres of being, it is the willingness to free the available "cultural and political maneuvers" that gender has enclosed, to liberate them from the inherited models so reliant on bourgeois hierarchies and values and labor ascriptions: this phase of struggle is what will help us both discover and fulfill that charge. We owe it to our ancestors and to all survivors and to our descendants, to see it thusly, and to move accordingly. And we owe it to our planet too, because the earth is being killed, and only a real united front of Black/Third World radical movements and networks can heal it. Shall we stagnate because we waited on “demiurges” who only want fame and to enact violence on the most vulnerable? or will we teach ourselves and our people that it's our collective strength that's gonna get us free? The choice is ours. Queer or not, we gotta do better.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Racial Capitalism Kritik --- K Lab 2023 › 1NC › 1NC --- Shell v K

Racial capitalism is terminally unsustainable, it culminates in constant war, interventions, and the super exploitation of blackness in the name of profit.

Burden-Stelly 20 [Charisse Burden-Stelly, Assistant Professor of Africana Studies and Political Science At Carelton University, July 1, 2020, “Modern U.S. Racial Capitalism”, EBSCOhost, Pages 8-10, JMH]

Drawing on the intellectual production of twentieth-century Black anticapitalists, I theorize modern U.S. racial capitalism as a racially hierarchical political economy constituting war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, and labor superexploitation.14 The racial here specifically refers to Blackness, defined as African descendants’ relationship to the capitalist mode of production—their structural location—and the condition, status, and material realities emanating therefrom.15 It is out of this structural location that the irresolvable contradiction of value minus worth arises. Stated differently, Blackness is a capacious category of surplus value extraction essential to an array of political-economic functions, including accumulation, disaccumulation, debt, planned obsolescence, and absorption of the burdens of economic crises.16 At the same time, Blackness is the quintessential condition of disposability, expendability, and devalorization. My operationalization of capitalism follows Oliver Cromwell Cox’s explication in Capitalism and American Leadership. 17 Modern U.S. racial capitalism arose in the context of the First World War, when, as Cox explains, the United States took advantage of the conflict to capture the markets of South America, Asia, and Africa for its “over-expanded capacity.”18 Cox further expounds upon this auspicious moment of ascendant modern U.S. racial capitalism thus: By 1914, the United States had brought its superb natural resources within reach of intensive exploitation. Under the stimulus of its foreign-trade outlets, the financial assistance of the older capitalist nations, and a flexible system of protective tariffs, the nation developed a magnificent work of transportation and communication so that its mines, factories, and farms became integrated into an effectively producing organism having easy access to its seaports.… [Likewise,] further internal expansion depended upon far greater emphasis on an ever widening foreign commerce.… Major entrepreneurs of the United States proceeded to step up their campaign for expansion abroad. The war accentuated this movement. It accelerated the growth of [modern] American [racial] capitalism and impressed upon its leaders as nothing had before the need for external markets.19 Relatedly, Peter James Hudson argues that the First World War fundamentally changed the terms of order of international finance, allowing New York to compete with London, Paris, and Berlin for the first time in the realm of global banking. This was not least because the Great War “drastically reordered global credit flows,” with the United States transforming from a debtor into a creditor nation.20 In addition to Latin American and Caribbean nations and businesses turning to the United States for financing and credit, domestic saving and investment patterns were altered to the benefit of imperial financial institutions like the City Bank.21 Although the United States is, to use Cox’s terminology, more a “lusty child of an already highly developed capitalism” than an exceptional capitalist power, the nation perfected its techniques of accumulation through its vast natural wealth, large domestic market, imbalance of Northern and Southern economies, and, importantly, through its lack of concern for the political and economic welfare of the overwhelming masses of its population, least of all the descendants of the enslaved.22 Modern U.S. racial capitalism is thus sustained by military expenditure, the maintenance of an extremely low standard of living in “dependent” countries, and the domestic superexploitation of Black toilers and laborers. Cox notes that Black labor has been the “chief human factor” in wealth production; as such, “the dominant economic class has always been at the motivating center of the spreads of racial antagonism. This is to be expected since the economic content of the antagonism, especially at its proliferating source in the South, has been precisely that of labor-capital relations.”23 In a general sense, racial capitalism in the United States constitutes “a peculiar variant of capitalist production” in which Blackness expresses a structural location at the bottom of the labor hierarchy characterized by depressed wages, working conditions, job opportunities, and widespread exclusion from labor unions.24 Furthermore, modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the imbrication of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism. Anti-Blackness describes the reduction of Blackness to a category of abjection and subjection through narrations of absolute biological or cultural difference; ruling-class monopolization of political power; negative and derogatory mass media propaganda; the ascent of discriminatory legislation that maintains and reinscribes inequality, not least various modes of segregation; and social relations in which distrust and antipathy toward those racialized as Black is normalized and in which “interracial mass behavior involving violence assumes a continuously potential danger.”25 Anti-Blackness thus conceals the inherent contradiction of Blackness—value minus worth—obscuring and distorting its structural location by, as Ralph and Singhal remark, contorting it into only a “debilitated condition.”26 Antiradicalism can be understood as the physical and discursive repression and condemnation of anticapitalist and/or left-leaning ideas, politics, practices, and modes of organizing that are construed as subversive, seditious, and otherwise threatening to capitalist society. These include, but are not limited to, internationalism, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, peace activism, and antisexism. Anti-Blackness and antiradicalism function as the legitimating architecture of modern U.S. racial capitalism, which includes rationalizing discourses, cultural narratives, technologies of repression, legal structures, and social practices that inform and are informed by racial capitalism’s political economy.27 Throughout the twentieth century, anti-Blackness propelled the “Black Scare,” defined as the specter of racial, social, and economic domination of superior whites by inferior Black populations. Antiradicalism, in turn, was enunciated through the “Red Scare,” understood as the threat of communist takeover, infiltration, and disruption of the American way of life.28 For example, in the 1919 Justice Department Report, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes, As Reflected in Their Publications, it was asserted that the radical antigovernment stance of a certain class of Negroes was manifested in their “ill-governed reaction toward race rioting,” “threat of retaliatory measures in connection with lynching,” open demand for social equality, identification with the International Workers of the World (IWW), and “outspoken advocacy of the Bolshevik or Soviet doctrine.”2 Here, anti-Blackness, articulated through the fear of the “assertion of race consciousness,” was attached to the IWW and Bolshevism—in other words, to anticapitalism—to make it appear even more subversive and dangerous. Likewise, antiradicalism, expressed through the denigration of the IWW and Soviet Doctrine, was made to seem all the more threatening and antithetical to the social order in its linkage with Black insistence on equality and self-defense against racial terrorism. In this way, “defiance and insolently race-centered condemnation of the white race” and “the Negro seeing red” came to be understood as seditious in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism. The link between my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism and Robinson’s catholic theory of racial capitalism, beyond his “suggest[ion] that it was there,” is vivified through the prison abolitionist and scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who writes: “Capitalism…[is] never not racial.… Racial capitalism: a mode of production developed in agriculture, improved by enclosure in the Old World, and captive land and labor in the Americas, perfected in slavery’s time-motion, field factory choreography, its imperative forged on the anvils of imperial war-making monarchs.”30 Racial capitalism, she continues, “requires all kinds of scheming, including hard work by elites and their compradors in the overlapping and interlocking space-economies of the planet’s surface. They build and dismantle and reconfigure states, moving capacity into and out of the public realm. And they think very hard about money on the move.”31 Perhaps more than Gilmore, though, my approach aligns with that of Neville Alexander as described by Hudson.32 Like Alexander, who focused on South Africa, I offer a particularistic understanding of racial capitalism, mine being rooted in the political economy of Blackness and the legitimating architectures of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism in the United States. Gilmore qua Robinson offers a more universalist and transhistorical conception. Like Alexander, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is primarily rooted in (Black) Marxist-Leninists and fellow travelers. This is an important epistemological distinction: whereas Robinson finds Marxism-Leninism to be, at best, inattentive to race, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the work of Black freedom fighters who, as Marxist-Leninists, were able to offer potent and enduring analyses and critiques of the conjunctural entanglements of racialism, white supremacy, and anti-Blackness, on the one hand, and capitalist exploitation and class antagonism on the other hand.33

2023 Michigan Kritik
Racial Capitalism Kritik --- K Lab 2023 › 1NC › 1NC --- Shell v K

The aff’s attempt at new radical modes of being is nothing more than a continuation of recognition politics that forecloses the possibility of genuine, material, anti-capitalist change.

Suekama 21 [Nsambu Za Suekama, nonbinary and disabled Afro-transfemme coming from the Anarqa-pantherist movement, Red Voice, the voices of the People- news, commentary, and coverage, September 29, 2021, “The Devil Wears Dashikis, Pt. 4: Theoretical and Practical Lessons for the Struggle (Conclusion”, , JMH]

Even before the publication of this article series, there was a wave of denunciations and even disaffiliations over the last few weeks regarding Black Hammer Organization in general, and Gazi Kodzo in particular (and/or the cult of personality that has been allowed to form around Gazi through social media and the other horrid means detailed here). Those developments simultaneously led to but also were made possible by the work that went into this document; but, more importantly, they need to be understood as part of a broader reckoning in the Black and Third World revolutionary struggle. That reckoning has to do with past and ongoing histories of abuse, cult-like dynamics, individualism, clout, de jure and de facto hierarchies, and the gendered labor divisions, assumptions, and violence these all tend to rely on and reinforce. This reckoning has had reverberations throughout the Left, across radical tendencies, and most significantly in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as heightening climate catastrophes, and the anti-police rebellions that ensued after the murder of George Floyd. From well known political formations such as the PSL, to IWOC/IWW contradictions, to Black Rose/Rosa Negra, and even the MOVE organization, to lesser known movement spaces, radical projects, affinity groups, collectives, alliances, parties, and more. All are being shaken up by a sharpened resistance to and refusal among colonized folk especially Black ones to accept the dynamics of clout, hierarchy (both formal and informal), abuse, individualism, and gender exploitation, which often imbricate upon one another. And this reckoning has had theoretical, practical, methodological, procedural, intracommunal, interpersonal, and individual implications. That this upheaval within our movements/organizations is happening whilst the bourgeoisie continues to use cultural representation of gender/sexual issues to either push liberal or conservative agendas, is a sure sign that if we are to speak of colonialism as a primary contradiction in the class struggle, which the revolutionary Black/Third World Left is known for: then we must amend Du Bois’ poignant observation. Where the problem of the 20th century is the color line, a relation of domination between the Man and the darker peoples of Africa, Asia, the Americas, and the Pacific; the problem of the 21st century is that said “color line'' is threaded at the nexus of gendered labor divisions/institutions/contradictions (and the values and practices traced back to them). Thus, all anti-capitalist liberation struggles among the colonized and oppressed, which are indeed the only true way to address the mounting economic and health and ecological issues we see building around us today, must confront them if we are to truly achieve full communism and autonomy for all peoples and sustainability for our ecosystem. Black Hammer Organization, however, and a great number of organizations claiming to be anti-colonial, have failed to meet this need. Instead there is a sort of ideological "pick me"/"tap dancing" energy very prominent, where folks like Gazi will declare that before they were "woke" they would make sexuality important to their sense of self, as if to be revolutionary then requires a type of asceticism for queer/trans people (akin to the race-first logics of cultural nationalists). Pronouncements like that are not simply about personal lifestyle choices, but a political commitment that is shaped in bourgeois/colonial logic. Yes, the cult was queer-led, and claimed to be queer affirming/inclusive. It’s not enough, though, to have queer representation in the anti-colonial Left. Gender/sexuality is not as simple as the conversations on identity we are so used to, nor the conversations on styles of dress, on pronouns and labels and names, on presentation and performance and affect, on attraction and intimacy and the like, or even on genetics/biology; although all of these phenomena are to some degree involved in the equation. Scientifically speaking, all supposedly “fixed” biological distinctions, the real phenotypical and genetic variations and diversity within our species that has been marked as “race” and “sex”: like our various skin colors, curl patterns and hair textures, nose shapes, gonad formations and other reproductive organs, hormonal levels, neurotypes, eye colors, body shapes, and more have to do with how social positions deriving from political histories and culture specific modes of organization relate to and exploit and limit our “nature.” Our brains/bodies have a certain natural potentiality for a range of expressions and experiences, though predisposed toward none; we cannot be reduced to them, because societal structures are the most significant factor in how these become shaped into identities and behavioral norms. Hence, Frantz Fanon once wrote that “beside phylogeny and ontogeny stand sociogeny,” and as we learn from Sylvia Wynter, the latter is always a question of class, so much so that we have to acknowledge two things. One, that we are a nature-culture species, not just nature, and two, that we evolve as such dialectically, which requires a materialist standpoint. The way we socially understand and live out and culturally embody and even transform our natural diversities has an economic base to it. Class struggle is key, and a failure to correctly apply it to marginalized genders in the anti-colonial context is what allowed for everything described here to unfold. As Black revolutionaries and Third Worldists, our materialism must emphasize that national liberation is the horizon within which our class consciousness develops. So, if we are to discuss the economic basis of gender ontology, that has to involve theorizing gender/sexual developments as part of a process that is endogenous to our uniquely African histories on this planet, including our histories of revolutionary participation. The term "endogenous" refers to any phenomenon, resource, any data, any object that is emerging or is discernible within the context of a given biological, social, or other kind of system, based on its dynamics and interactions and development. The Marxists historically looked past the endogenous processes within African life that influenced how Black people would eventually arrive at anti-capitalist struggle. Comrade Marcus Brown once spoke of these phenomena as an “internal dynamism” in Black Against Profit, pt. III: The African Mode of Production, speaking of them as an “innate capacity to develop progressively into freer, more democratic, and more technically advanced social configurations.” The comrade examines, using the scholarship of Cheikh Anta Diop, the development of these organizational patterns in African life, and points out the racist mischaracterization on part of Marxists which deemed our consciousness as tied to a supposed “Asiatic mode of production,” and so located the seat of revolutionary class consciousness in the European proletariat because of a Eurocentric teleology regarding certain relations within African nations (such as so-called “caste” or the development of the Egyptian state). Cedric Robinson wrote Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition, to offer a corrective about our history of struggle as well, displacing the dehumanizing view of African radical activity as merely “superstructural” and unable to grasp class struggle, and thereby challenged Western Marxist chauvinism. And so have other Afrikan thinkers, from Samir Amin to Kwame Nkrumah, to W.E.B Du Bois, and many others, each offering explanations of Black struggle that prioritize our role in our own unique histories and the objective challenge to the bourgeois order we continue to pose because of these endogenous social realities. But the chauvinism characteristic of the white Marxist view of endogenous African development re: the class struggle has yet to be challenged to the fullest degree. Instead, it's been carried into our movements, leaving the gender/sexual lifeways endogenous to African contexts throughout our history underexplored. Black women scholars, like Oyeronke Oyewumi (who theorized the unique "worldsense" that outlined African, especially Yoruba gender ontology) in The Invention of Women, and Ifi Amadiume (who looks at the practice of female husbandry in West African societies) in Male Daughters, Female Husbands, as well as other marginalized gender Black radicals, such as Yannenga Toure, a Black Two-Head radical and author of the "Two Head Manifesto" have taken time to analyze these legacies. Following this, we would see, as Sage Hunt, Afro-Native nonbinary transfeminine revolutionary theorist has written, that gender is clearly a “modality through which class is lived.” With that in mind, relations to the mode of production, whether that be the village and communal modes which were predominant in Africa, and even the other modes, less sedentary ones, as well as the less fluid, more somewhat feudalistic modes, all involve gender ontology as a material question. But overall, the Anti-colonial Left has neglected to transect these phenomena, and they have painted all concerns about this as "metaphysical" just like the white Left does to Black radicalisms. And so gender often remains and continues to remain somewhat undertheorized within the historical anti-colonial Left despite surface level appeals to the need for self-determination over our collective societal development. This is an undialectical bypassing of the full weight of our history as African people, and is a residue of white supremacy, and thus extremely vulnerable to opportunism and a culture of abuse and apologism History would show us that cisheteronormativity is a set of values, institutions, labor divisions, and social practices that is both European in origin, and part of the capitalist order. The prevalence of a biological reduced, binary, hierarchical kinship system and mode of self-understanding that upholds heteronormative gender/sexual codes is only a universal, global assumption now because of how racial capitalism transformed and subordinated pre-existing approaches in indigenous contexts. This fact is seldom discussed or organized against, at least not adequately, in the established anti-colonial Left. On the occasions that this is acknowledged, it is simply said that “Homophobia is unAfrican” (to challenge the neocolonial falsehood that “homosexuality is unAfrican”), which is thus a nature-culture appeal. For example, at a rally following the Queer Liberation March of 2020, Black Hammer Organization showed up and announced something along the lines of “before colonialism, all of our people loved and lived as they wanted.” While it was an acknowledgment of our more inclusive African social relations to the diversity of sexual experience in our species, it did not address the problem materially. As in, this theory of gender ontology was not attuned to the question of economic modes of production and all the structures and hierarchical organizational patterns and labor relegations that that implies, and the implications of this all for modern class struggle. It was functionally useless, because idealist (alongside being a homogenized account). And of course it was, otherwise Black Hammer Organization would have had to examine their own gender contradictions, and especially that of Gazi. The cult’s gender commentary was therefore opportunistic and self-serving, and as comrade Shupavu made clear this was a holdover from a similar opportunistic and self-serving relationship to queerness that went into why Gazi was recruited to the movement in the first place by Omali Yeshitela. In order to call these things as they are, we need a full picture of the Black radical relation to the gender/sexual struggle, and it needs to be more than just a question of cultural acceptance: it has to be materially grounded, thinking about ideology and labor and praxis.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Racial Capitalism Kritik --- K Lab 2023 › 1NC › 1NC --- Shell

The alternative is Black anti-capitalist organizing against the totalizing system of racial capitalism. Now is key for political and material organizing that circumvents the legacy of the afterlife of slavery.

Kelley, 23 [Robin D. G. Kelley, Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA, is author of Africa Speaks, America Answers: Modern Jazz in Revolutionary Times and Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination. Kelley, Robin D.G. “Why Black Marxism, Why Now?” Boston Review, 21 May 2023, www.bostonreview.net/articles/why-black-marxism-why-now/. ] ZRF 7/11/2023 🐥

The inspiration to bring out a new edition of Cedric Robinson’s classic, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition, came from the estimated 26 million people who took to the streets during the spring and summer of 2020 to protest the killings of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud Arbery, and the many others who lost their lives to the police. During this time, the world bore witness to the Black radical tradition in motion, driving what was arguably the most dynamic mass rebellion against state-sanctioned violence and racial capitalism we have seen in North America since the 1960s—maybe the 1860s. The boldest activists demanded that we abolish police and prisons and shift the resources funding police and prisons to housing, universal healthcare, living-wage jobs, universal basic income, green energy, and a system of restorative justice. These new abolitionists are not interested in making capitalism fairer, safer, and less racist—they know this is impossible. They want to bring an end to “racial capitalism.” The threat of fascism is no longer rhetorical, a hollow epithet. It is real.The state’s reaction to these protests has also brought us to the precipice of fascism. The organized protests in the streets and places of public assembly, on campuses, inside prisons, in state houses and courtrooms and police stations, portended the rise of a police state in the United States. For the past several years, the Movement for Black Lives and its dozens of allied organizations warned the country that we were headed for a fascist state if we did not end racist state-sanctioned violence and the mass caging of Black and brown people. They issued these warnings before Trump’s election. As the protests waned and COVID-19 entered a second, deadlier wave, the fascist threat grew right before our eyes. We’ve seen armed white militias gun down protesters; Trump and his acolytes attempt to hold on to power despite losing the presidential election; the federal government deploy armed force to suppress dissent, round up and deport undocumented workers, and intimidate the public; and, most recently the violent insurrection at the U.S. Capitol by members of the alt-right, racists, Neo-Nazis, and assorted fascist gangs whose ranks included off-duty cops, active military members, and veterans. The threat of fascism is no longer rhetorical, a hollow epithet. It is real. The crossroads where Black revolt and fascism meet is precisely the space where Cedric’s main interlocutors find the Black radical tradition. Black Marxism is, in part, about an earlier generation of Black antifascists, written at the dawn of a global right-wing, neoliberal order that one political theorist called the era of “friendly fascism.” Black Marxism was primarily about Black revolt, not racial capitalism. The Black radical tradition defies racial capitalism’s efforts to generate new categories of human experience stripped bare of the historical consciousness embedded in culture. What did Robinson mean by the Black radical tradition, and why is it relevant now? Contrary to popular belief, Black Marxism was primarily about Black revolt, not racial capitalism. Robinson takes Marx and Engels to task for underestimating the material force of racial ideology on proletarian consciousness, and for conflating the English working class with the workers of the world. In his preface to the 2000 edition of Black Marxism, Cedric wrote, “Marxism’s internationalism was not global; its materialism was exposed as an insufficient explanator of cultural and social forces; and its economic determinism too often politically compromised freedom struggles beyond or outside of the metropole.” It is a damning observation. Many would counter by pointing to Marx’s writings on India, the United States, Russia, slavery, colonialism, imperialism, and peasants. Others would argue that Marx himself only ever claimed to understand capitalist development in Western Europe. But because neither Marx nor Engels considered the colonies and their plantations central to modern capitalist processes, class struggles within the slave regime or peasant rebellions within the colonial order were ignored or dismissed as underdeveloped or peripheral—especially since they looked nothing like the secular radical humanism of 1848 or 1789. Cedric’s point is that Marx and Engels missed the significance of revolt in the rest of the world, specifically by non-Western peoples who made up the vast majority of the world’s unfree and nonindustrial labor force. Unfree laborers in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and the islands of the sea were producing the lion’s share of surplus value for a world system of racial capitalism, but the ideological source of their revolts was not the mode of production. Africans kidnapped and drawn into this system were ripped from “superstructures” with radically different beliefs, moralities, cosmologies, metaphysics, and intellectual traditions. Robinson observes, Marx had not realized fully that the cargoes of laborers also contained African cultures, critical mixes and admixtures of language and thought, of cosmology and metaphysics, of habits, beliefs and morality. These were the actual terms of their humanity. These cargoes, then, did not consist of intellectual isolates or decultured blanks—men, women, and children separated from their previous universe. African labor brought the past with it, a past that had produced it and settled on it the first elements of consciousness and comprehension. With this observation Robinson unveils the secret history of the Black radical tradition, which he describes as “a revolutionary consciousness that proceeded from the whole historical experience of Black people.” The Black radical tradition defies racial capitalism’s efforts to remake African social life and generate new categories of human experience stripped bare of the historical consciousness embedded in culture. Robinson traces the roots of Black radical thought to a shared epistemology among diverse African people, arguing that the first waves of African New World revolts were governed not by a critique rooted in Western conceptions of freedom but by a total rejection of enslavement and racism as it was experienced. Behind these revolts were not charismatic men but, more often than not, women. In fact, the female and queer-led horizontal formations that are currently at the forefront of resisting state violence and racial capitalism are more in line with the Black radical tradition than traditional civil rights organizations. Africans chose flight and marronage because they were not interested in transforming Western society but in finding a way “home,” even if it meant death. Yet, the advent of formal colonialism and the incorporation of Black labor into a fully governed social structure produced the “native bourgeoisie,” the Black intellectuals whose positions within the political, educational, and bureaucratic structures of the dominant racial and colonial order gave them greater access to European life and thought. Their contradictory role as descendants of the enslaved, victims of racial domination, and tools of empire compelled some of these men and women to rebel, thus producing the radical Black intelligentsia. This intelligentsia occupies the last section of Black Marxism. Robinson reveals how W. E. B. Du Bois, C. L. R. James, and Richard Wright, by confronting Black mass movements, revised Western Marxism or broke with it altogether. The way they came to the Black radical tradition was more an act of recognition than of invention; they divined a theory of Black radicalism through what they found in the movements of the Black masses. The final section has also been a source of confusion and misapprehension. Black Marxism is not a book about “Black Marxists” or the ways in which Black intellectuals “improved” Marxism by attending to race. This is a fundamental misunderstanding that has led even the most sympathetic readers to treat the Black radical tradition as a checklist of our favorite Black radical intellectuals. Isn’t Frantz Fanon part of the Black radical tradition? What about Claudia Jones? Why not Walter Rodney? Where are the African Marxists? Of course Cedric would agree that these and other figures were products of, and contributors to, the Black radical tradition. As he humbly closed his preface to the 2000 edition, “It was never my purpose to exhaust the subject, only to suggest that it was there.” The Black radical tradition is not a greatest hits list. Cedric was clear that the Black intellectuals at the center of this work were not the Black radical tradition, nor did they stand outside it—through praxis they discovered it. Or, better yet, they were overtaken by it. And, as far as Cedric was concerned, sometimes the Black intellectuals about whom he writes fell short. Marxism was their path toward discovery, but apprehending the Black radical tradition required a break with Marx and Engels’s historical materialism. Black Marxism is neither Marxist nor anti-Marxist. It is a dialectical critique of Marxism that turns to the long history of Black revolt to construct a wholly original theory of revolution. When the London-based Zed Press published Black Marxism in 1983, few could have predicted the impact it would have on political theory, political economy, historical analysis, Black studies, Marxist studies, and our broader understanding of the rise of the modern world. It appeared with little fanfare. For years it was treated as a curiosity, grossly misunderstood or simply ignored. Given its current “rebirth,” some may argue that Black Marxism was simply ahead of its time. Or, to paraphrase the sociologist George Lipsitz quoting the late activist Ivory Perry, perhaps Cedric was on time but the rest of us are late? Indeed, how we determine where we are depends on our conception of time.In thinking of the Black radical tradition as generative rather than prefigurative, not only is the future uncertain, but the road is constantly changing. Cedric took Marx’s historical materialism to task in part for its conception of time and temporality. From The Terms of Order to An Anthropology of Marxism, he consistently critiqued Marxism for its fidelity to a stadial view of history and linear time or teleology, and dismissed the belief that revolts occur at certain stages or only when the objective conditions are “ripe.” And yet there was something in Cedric—perhaps his grandfather’s notion of faith—that related to some utopian elements of Marxism, notably the commitment to eschatological time, or the idea of “end times” rooted in earlier Christian notions of prophecy. Anyone who has read the Communist Manifesto or sang “The Internationale” will recognize the promise of proletarian victory and a socialist future. On the one hand, Robinson considered the absence of “the promise of a certain future” a unique feature of Black radicalism. “Only when that radicalism is costumed or achieves an envelope in Black Christianity,” he explained in a 2012 lecture, “is there a certainty to it. Otherwise it is about a kind of resistance that does not promise triumph or victory at the end, only liberation. No nice package at the end, only that you would be free. . . . Only the promise of liberation, only the promise of liberation!” “Only the promise of liberation” captures the essence of Black revolt and introduces a completely different temporality: blues time. Blues time eschews any reassurance that the path to liberation is preordained. Blues time is flexible and improvisatory; it is simultaneously in the moment, the past, the future, and the timeless space of the imagination. As the geographer Clyde Woods taught us, the blues is not a lament but a clear-eyed way of knowing and revealing the world that recognizes the tragedy and humor in everyday life, as well as the capacity of people to survive, think, and resist in the face of adversity. Blues time resembles what the anarchist theorist Uri Gordon calls a “generative temporality,” a temporality that treats the future itself as indeterminate and full of contingencies. In thinking of the Black radical tradition as generative rather than prefigurative, not only is the future uncertain, but the road is constantly changing, along with new social relations that require new visions and expose new contradictions and challenges. What we are witnessing now, across the country and around the world, is a struggle to interrupt historical processes leading to catastrophe. These struggles are not doomed, nor are they guaranteed. Thanks in no small measure to this book, we fight with greater clarity, with a more expansive conception of the task before us, and with ever more questions. Cedric reminded us repeatedly that the forces we face are not as strong as we think. They are held together by guns, tanks, and fictions. They can be disassembled, though that is easier said than done. In the meantime, we need to be prepared to fight for our collective lives. Cedric reminded us repeatedly that the forces we face are not as strong as we think. They are held together by guns, tanks, and fictions. They can be disassembled.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Racial Capitalism Kritik --- K Lab 2023 › 1NC › 1NC --- Shell

Racial capitalism culminates in constant war, interventions, and the super exploitation of blackness in the name of profit.

Burden-Stelly 20 [Charisse Burden-Stelly, Assistant Professor of Africana Studies and Political Science At Carelton University, July 1, 2020, “Modern U.S. Racial Capitalism”, EBSCOhost, Pages 8-10, JMH]

Drawing on the intellectual production of twentieth-century Black anticapitalists, I theorize modern U.S. racial capitalism as a racially hierarchical political economy constituting war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, and labor superexploitation.14 The racial here specifically refers to Blackness, defined as African descendants’ relationship to the capitalist mode of production—their structural location—and the condition, status, and material realities emanating therefrom.15 It is out of this structural location that the irresolvable contradiction of value minus worth arises. Stated differently, Blackness is a capacious category of surplus value extraction essential to an array of political-economic functions, including accumulation, disaccumulation, debt, planned obsolescence, and absorption of the burdens of economic crises.16 At the same time, Blackness is the quintessential condition of disposability, expendability, and devalorization. My operationalization of capitalism follows Oliver Cromwell Cox’s explication in Capitalism and American Leadership. 17 Modern U.S. racial capitalism arose in the context of the First World War, when, as Cox explains, the United States took advantage of the conflict to capture the markets of South America, Asia, and Africa for its “over-expanded capacity.”18 Cox further expounds upon this auspicious moment of ascendant modern U.S. racial capitalism thus: By 1914, the United States had brought its superb natural resources within reach of intensive exploitation. Under the stimulus of its foreign-trade outlets, the financial assistance of the older capitalist nations, and a flexible system of protective tariffs, the nation developed a magnificent work of transportation and communication so that its mines, factories, and farms became integrated into an effectively producing organism having easy access to its seaports.… [Likewise,] further internal expansion depended upon far greater emphasis on an ever widening foreign commerce.… Major entrepreneurs of the United States proceeded to step up their campaign for expansion abroad. The war accentuated this movement. It accelerated the growth of [modern] American [racial] capitalism and impressed upon its leaders as nothing had before the need for external markets.19 Relatedly, Peter James Hudson argues that the First World War fundamentally changed the terms of order of international finance, allowing New York to compete with London, Paris, and Berlin for the first time in the realm of global banking. This was not least because the Great War “drastically reordered global credit flows,” with the United States transforming from a debtor into a creditor nation.20 In addition to Latin American and Caribbean nations and businesses turning to the United States for financing and credit, domestic saving and investment patterns were altered to the benefit of imperial financial institutions like the City Bank.21 Although the United States is, to use Cox’s terminology, more a “lusty child of an already highly developed capitalism” than an exceptional capitalist power, the nation perfected its techniques of accumulation through its vast natural wealth, large domestic market, imbalance of Northern and Southern economies, and, importantly, through its lack of concern for the political and economic welfare of the overwhelming masses of its population, least of all the descendants of the enslaved.22 Modern U.S. racial capitalism is thus sustained by military expenditure, the maintenance of an extremely low standard of living in “dependent” countries, and the domestic superexploitation of Black toilers and laborers. Cox notes that Black labor has been the “chief human factor” in wealth production; as such, “the dominant economic class has always been at the motivating center of the spreads of racial antagonism. This is to be expected since the economic content of the antagonism, especially at its proliferating source in the South, has been precisely that of labor-capital relations.”23 In a general sense, racial capitalism in the United States constitutes “a peculiar variant of capitalist production” in which Blackness expresses a structural location at the bottom of the labor hierarchy characterized by depressed wages, working conditions, job opportunities, and widespread exclusion from labor unions.24 Furthermore, modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the imbrication of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism. Anti-Blackness describes the reduction of Blackness to a category of abjection and subjection through narrations of absolute biological or cultural difference; ruling-class monopolization of political power; negative and derogatory mass media propaganda; the ascent of discriminatory legislation that maintains and reinscribes inequality, not least various modes of segregation; and social relations in which distrust and antipathy toward those racialized as Black is normalized and in which “interracial mass behavior involving violence assumes a continuously potential danger.”25 Anti-Blackness thus conceals the inherent contradiction of Blackness—value minus worth—obscuring and distorting its structural location by, as Ralph and Singhal remark, contorting it into only a “debilitated condition.”26 Antiradicalism can be understood as the physical and discursive repression and condemnation of anticapitalist and/or left-leaning ideas, politics, practices, and modes of organizing that are construed as subversive, seditious, and otherwise threatening to capitalist society. These include, but are not limited to, internationalism, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, peace activism, and antisexism. Anti-Blackness and antiradicalism function as the legitimating architecture of modern U.S. racial capitalism, which includes rationalizing discourses, cultural narratives, technologies of repression, legal structures, and social practices that inform and are informed by racial capitalism’s political economy.27 Throughout the twentieth century, anti-Blackness propelled the “Black Scare,” defined as the specter of racial, social, and economic domination of superior whites by inferior Black populations. Antiradicalism, in turn, was enunciated through the “Red Scare,” understood as the threat of communist takeover, infiltration, and disruption of the American way of life.28 For example, in the 1919 Justice Department Report, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes, As Reflected in Their Publications, it was asserted that the radical antigovernment stance of a certain class of Negroes was manifested in their “ill-governed reaction toward race rioting,” “threat of retaliatory measures in connection with lynching,” open demand for social equality, identification with the International Workers of the World (IWW), and “outspoken advocacy of the Bolshevik or Soviet doctrine.”2 Here, anti-Blackness, articulated through the fear of the “assertion of race consciousness,” was attached to the IWW and Bolshevism—in other words, to anticapitalism—to make it appear even more subversive and dangerous. Likewise, antiradicalism, expressed through the denigration of the IWW and Soviet Doctrine, was made to seem all the more threatening and antithetical to the social order in its linkage with Black insistence on equality and self-defense against racial terrorism. In this way, “defiance and insolently race-centered condemnation of the white race” and “the Negro seeing red” came to be understood as seditious in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism. The link between my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism and Robinson’s catholic theory of racial capitalism, beyond his “suggest[ion] that it was there,” is vivified through the prison abolitionist and scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who writes: “Capitalism…[is] never not racial.… Racial capitalism: a mode of production developed in agriculture, improved by enclosure in the Old World, and captive land and labor in the Americas, perfected in slavery’s time-motion, field factory choreography, its imperative forged on the anvils of imperial war-making monarchs.”30 Racial capitalism, she continues, “requires all kinds of scheming, including hard work by elites and their compradors in the overlapping and interlocking space-economies of the planet’s surface. They build and dismantle and reconfigure states, moving capacity into and out of the public realm. And they think very hard about money on the move.”31 Perhaps more than Gilmore, though, my approach aligns with that of Neville Alexander as described by Hudson.32 Like Alexander, who focused on South Africa, I offer a particularistic understanding of racial capitalism, mine being rooted in the political economy of Blackness and the legitimating architectures of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism in the United States. Gilmore qua Robinson offers a more universalist and transhistorical conception. Like Alexander, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is primarily rooted in (Black) Marxist-Leninists and fellow travelers. This is an important epistemological distinction: whereas Robinson finds Marxism-Leninism to be, at best, inattentive to race, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the work of Black freedom fighters who, as Marxist-Leninists, were able to offer potent and enduring analyses and critiques of the conjunctural entanglements of racialism, white supremacy, and anti-Blackness, on the one hand, and capitalist exploitation and class antagonism on the other hand.33

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
aff answers › impact › 1ar—!—deontology bad

deontology sucks. prefer util.

Alexander ’07 (Lawrence Alexander, professor of law @ UC San Diego, co-executive director @ the Institute for Law & Religion.), “Deontological Ethics,” 11-21-07, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

4. The Weaknesses of Deontological Theories On the other hand, deontological theories have their own weak spots. The most glaring one is the seeming irrationality of our having duties or permissions to make the world morally worse. Deontologists need their own, non-consequentialist model of rationality, one that is a viable alternative to the intuitively plausible, “act-to-produce-the-best-consequences” model of rationality that motivates consequentialist theories. Until this is done, deontology will always be paradoxical. There are several distinct hurdles that the deontologist must overcome. One hurdle is to confront the apparent fact that careful reflection about the degrees of wrongdoing that are possible under any single moral norm does not make it easy to see deontological morality as consisting of general, canonically-formulated texts (conformity to which could then be said to constitute the distrinct form of practical rationality unique to deontological ethics); rather, such apparently simple texts as, “thou shalt not murder,” look more like mere epistemic aids summarizing a much more nuanced and detailed (and thus less text-like) moral reality (Hurd and Moore forthcoming). A second hurdle is to find an answer to the inevitable question of authority, assuming that there are such general texts. If it is rational to conform one’s behavior and one’s choices to certain general texts, as deontology claims, it is always in point to demand the reasons making such texts authoritative for one’s decisions. Deferring one’s own best judgment to the judgment enshrined in some text is always prima facie paradoxical (see the entry on authority) and deontologists like everybody else need to justify such deference. Hopefully they can do so other than by reference to some person-like but omniscient Deity as the supposed source of such texts, because many deontologists cannot accept such theism (Moore 1995). Moreover, even for those with theistic commitments, they may prefer to join Kant’s insistence that ethics proceed from reason alone, even in a theistic world. The third hurdle exists even if the first two are crossed adequately. This hurdle is to deal with the seeming demand of deontological ethics that on occasion one’s categorical obligations require one to preserve the purity of one’s own moral agency at the cost of having one’s actions make the world be in a morally worse state of affairs—at least, “worse” in the agent-neutral sense of the word used by consequentialists. Patient-centered versions of deontology cannot easily escape this problem, as we have shown. It is not even clear that they have the conceptual resources to make agency important enough to escape this moral paradox. Yet even agent-centered versions face this paradox; having the conceptual resources (of agency and agent-relative reasons) is not the same as making it plausible just how a secular, objective morality can allow each person’s agency to be so uniquely crucial to that person. Moreover, it is crucial for deontologists to deal with the conflicts that seem to exist between certain duties, and between certain rights. For more information, please see the entry on moral dilemmas. Kant’s bold proclamation that “a conflict of duties is inconceivable” (Kant 1780, p. 25) is the conclusion wanted, but reasons for believing it are difficult to produce. The intending/foreseeing, doing/allowing, causing/aiding, and related distinctions certainly reduce potential conflicts for the agent-centered versions of deontology; whether they can totally eliminate such conflicts is a yet unresolved question. One well known approach to deal with the possibility of conflict between deontological duties is to reduce the categorical force of such duties to that of only “prima facie” duties (Ross 1930, 1939). This idea is that conflict between merely prima facie duties is unproblematic so long as it does not infect what one is categorically obligated to do, which is what overall, concrete duties mandate. Like other softenings of the categorical force of deontological obligation we mention briefly below (threshold deontology, mixed views), the prima facie duty view is in some danger of collapsing into a kind of consequentialism. This depends on whether “prima facie” is read epistemically or not, and on (1) whether any good consequences are eligible to justify breach of prima facie duties; (2) whether only such consequences over some threshold can do so; or (3) whether only threatened breach of other deontological duties can do so. Thirdly, there is the manipulability worry mentioned before with respect to agent-centered versions of deontology. To the extent potential conflict is eliminated by resort to the Doctrine of Double Effect, the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, and so forth (and it is not clear to what extent patient-centered versions rely on these doctrines and distinctions to mitigate potential conflict), then a potential for “avoision” is opened up. Such avoision is the manipulation of means (using omissions, foresight, risk, allowings, aidings, acceleratings, redirectings, etc.) to achieve permissibly what otherwise deontological morality would forbid (see Katz 1996). Avoision is an undesirable feature of any ethical system that allows such strategic manipulation of its doctrines. Fourth, there is what might be called the paradox of relative stringency. There is an aura of paradox in asserting that all deontological duties are categorical—to be done no matter the consequences—and yet asserting that some of such duties are more stringent than others. A common thought is that “there cannot be degrees of wrongness with intrinsically wrong acts…” (Frey 1995, p. 78, n.3; also Hurka 2019). Yet relative stringency—“degrees of wrongness”—seems forced upon the deontologist by one if not two considerations. First, duties of differential stringency can be weighed against one another if there is conflict between them, so that a conflict-resolving, overall duty becomes possible if duties can be more or less stringent. Second, when we punish for the wrongs consisting in our violation of deontological duties, we (rightly) do not punish all violations equally. The greater the wrong, the greater the punishment deserved; and relative stringency of duty violated (or importance of rights) seems the best way of making sense of greater versus lesser wrongs (Hurd and Moore forthcoming). Fifth, there are situations—unfortunately not all of them thought experiments—where compliance with deontological norms will bring about disastrous consequences. To take a stock example of much current discussion, suppose that unless A violates the deontological duty not to torture an innocent person (B), ten, or a thousand, or a million other innocent people will die because of a hidden nuclear device. If A is forbidden by deontological morality from torturing B, many would regard that as a reductio ad absurdum of deontology.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
aff answers › impact › 2ac—!—taxes good

taxes are not only necessary but good – laundry list of benefits.

Rogers ’06 (Diane Lim Rogers, PhD in economics.), “Good reasons for taxes,” 4-16-06, Brookings, //ike

Left unsaid, though, is that even with our imperfect tax system, the revenues provided by taxes strengthen, not weaken, our nation’s economy. They fund essential public goods and services, they contribute positively to national saving, and many of the things that they fund — from highways and schools to biomedical research and national parks — indirectly create private wealth as well. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes put it in 1927, ”Taxes are what we pay for a civilized society.” Policy makers who argue that taxes are too high are typically not just in favor of low taxes; they are also in favor of smaller government. They ignore the fact that the recent tax cuts have not shrunk government spending. The recent tax cuts instead have increased the budget deficit, reduced national saving, and made it more likely that our children and grandchildren will face a weaker economy and lower standard of living than would otherwise be possible. Since President Bush took office, the 10-year budget outlook has deteriorated from a $5.6 trillion surplus to a nearly $3 trillion deficit, according to the official ”baseline” estimates of the Congressional Budget Office. That $8 trillion turnaround actually understates the fiscal damage associated with current policies, because the CBO baseline assumes that the 2001 tax cuts expire at the end of 2010 and the 2003 dividend and capital gains tax cuts expire at the end of 2008. Those who have supported the tax cuts typically deny that the tax cuts have had anything to do with this deteriorating budget outlook. In fact, many have argued that revenues would have been lower without the tax cuts, i.e., that the tax cuts more than pay for themselves. But the facts show that the tax cuts already enacted will cost more than $3 trillion just through 2016. Thus, contrary to the view that the tax cuts were neutral or even beneficial, the tax cuts have been a huge factor in the deterioration of the 10-year outlook and our currently high and rising deficits. Making the 2001-03 tax cuts permanent, as the president is calling for, would bring the total cost through 2016 to $6 trillion, including interest. Yet the president says this is the way to ”stay on track to meet our goal of cutting the budget deficit in half by 2009.” Unfortunately, the goal of cutting in half the huge deficit created during this administration is a bit like a retailer marking up prices just before a sale. President Bush took office facing trillions of dollars in surpluses and said that his administration would reduce the federal debt by nearly $1 trillion in his first four years. Instead, the debt ceiling has been raised four times, by a total of more than $3 trillion. Finally, the argument that tax cuts grow the economy, while tax increases shrink it, is incomplete and incorrect. Economists generally agree that true tax reform, where marginal tax rates are reduced while the tax base is broadened and the revenue collected stays the same, is good for economic growth. But tax cuts that diminish revenue are harmful to economic growth if they increase deficits and reduce national saving. So as we work on our tax returns, what should we be pondering about the deeper meaning surrounding this painful and tedious task? Rather than making fiscally unsustainable tax cuts permanent, let us remember that taxes are collected for a reason: to provide vital public services such as a strong defense, homeland security, healthcare, retirement and income security, education and training, and disaster relief.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
aff answers › impact › 2ac—!—not theft – top level

pretax income has no independent significance.

Murphy & Nagel ’02 (Liam Murphy, legal, moral, & political philosopher, Thomas Nagel, professor of philosophy @ NYU.), “The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice,” 4-25-02, Oxford Academic, //ike

In a capitalist economy, taxes are the most significant instrument by which the political system can put into practice a conception of economic justice. But conventional ideas about what constitutes tax fairness--found in the vigorous debates about tax policy going on in political and public policy circles, in economics and law--are misguided. In particular, the emphasis on distributing the tax burden relative to pretax income is a fundamental mistake. Taxation does not take from people what they already own. Property rights are the product of a set of laws and conventions, of which the tax system forms a central part, so the fairness of taxes can’t be evaluated by their impact on preexisting entitlements. Pretax income has no independent moral significance. Standards of justice should be applied not to the distribution of tax burdens but to the operation and results of the entire framework of economic institutions. The result is an entirely different understanding of a host of controversial issues, such as the estate tax, the tax treatment of marriage, “flat” versus progressive taxes, consumption versus income taxes, tax cuts for the wealthy, and negative income taxes for the poor.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
aff answers › impact › 2ac—!—not theft – top level

it’s not theft – mad warrants.

Wells ’23 (Thomas R. Wells, philosopher.), “Why taxation is not theft,” 8-22-22, 3 Quarks Daily, //ike

The idea that ‘taxation is theft’ is one of those thrilling, paradigm shifting recognitions that are continually being rediscovered and shared. It is a classic case of pseudo-intellectuality, in which the excitement around an idea determines its popularity, rather than its quality (previously). First, unlike theft, taxation is legal – and this turns out to be a more significant difference than it first seems since we rely on laws to determine who owns what. Second, taxation is a device for solving collective action problems and thus allowing us (by coercing us) to meet our moral obligations to ourselves and each other – including our obligations to respect each others’ property rights. One can’t coherently be in favour of enforcing property rights, e.g. by having a police force and judges to catch and punish thieves, without also being in favour of a sustainable system for funding that enforcement. 1. Taxation is Legal The straightforward rebuttal of the claim that taxation is theft goes like this: Theft is when someone takes something from you in a way that violates your legal property rights When the government taxes money from you they do not violate your legal property rights Therefore Taxation is not theft To many people this semantic analysis is rather unsatisfactory. Whether things are legal or not is after all determined by the government. But whether something is right or wrong is determined by morality, which is not something determined by governments. The point of the claim that taxation is theft is that taxation is immoral in just the same way that theft is, i.e. that taking people’s property from them against their will and under threat of violence is wrong whether it is done by an ordinary person or by an agent of the government. I agree that people do have an intuitive idea of moral concepts like property, consent, and theft independent from how governments choose to define them. Yet these ‘pre-political’ intuitions are impractically vague. As natural rights theorists like John Locke acknowledge, we need to know much more precisely what property means if we are to successfully respect each other’s moral rights in a complicated modern society. For example, if I own a piece of land do I also own the part of the river that runs through it? Do I also own (some of) the fish in it? Do I also own the copper underneath it? If I mine the copper and kill the fish, do I owe people downstream compensation for killing ‘their’ fish? If I rent the land to someone else and they invest in agricultural improvements, who should get what share of the increased yield? If I go bankrupt who should decide which creditors get what share of my land and other assets? And so on. It is clear that we need clear and reliable answers to such peculiar questions if we are to know where we stand – who owns what – in a modern economy with its sophisticated and complex economic transactions and interdependencies. But it is also clear that these questions don’t have straightforward common sense answers that are already obvious to everyone in the way that our moral intuitions are supposed to be. We need another source for those answers, and that source is the laws made up by governments. Therefore it turns out that law is of greater moral significance than it at first seemed. The strong normative intuition that people shouldn’t take your things without your consent requires a clear shared understanding of exactly whose things they are in the first place. You can only say that such and such is your property and that someone else who takes it is a thief because of the legal definitions provided by the government (and also interpreted and enforced by them, as we will come to below). To put it another way, the very idea of private property can be understood as one person’s right to exclude all others from using certain objects without their consent, i.e. property rights are a restriction of the freedom of all other people except the rightful owner. Suppose one of those people disagrees with another about who owns an object. The moral determination of which person is the rights holder and which is the wrong doer will turn on the application of legal definitions. If the idea of theft itself depends on government defined and interpreted laws, then law is clearly not so irrelevant to our moral intuitions after all. Thus the fact that taxation is legal is a central, not incidental, difference with theft. Governments make the laws on which the definition of property depends. To deny the relevance of laws to determine what counts as whose rightful property is to undermine the concept of property on which the concept of theft itself depends.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
aff answers › link › 2ac—L—turn

link turn – eliminating economic inequality is a pre-requisite to realizing value of AMERICAN FREEDOM!

Spicker ’85 (Paul Spicker, Emeritus Professor of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen.), “Why Freedom Implies Equality,” 1985, Journal of Applied Philosophy, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24353449 //ike

Equality implies the elimination of disadvantage. Freedom is a redistributive idea, implying that the freedom of some must be restricted to increase the freedom of others. Although the individual concept of freedom is restrictive, equal treatment and equality of opportunity are largely compatible with it, and even equality of outcome with it to some degree. The social concept of freedom is broader, extending the scope of redistribution to all forms of social disadvantage. This demands a high degree of equality; it also defines the boundaries of the pursuit of equality, which is justifiable in so far as it increases freedom. Freedom is not, therefore, in conflict with equality. Certain egalitarian assumptions are part of its normative base, and it actively requires a degree of redistribution.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
aff answers › uniqueness › 2ac—uq—taxes inevitable

this disad has negative uniqueness...

Wikipedia ‘ND (Wikipedia, the FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA!), “Taxation in the United States,” Wikipedia, //ike

The United States of America has separate federal, state, and local governments with taxes imposed at each of these levels. Taxes are levied on income, payroll, property, sales, capital gains, dividends, imports, estates and gifts, as well as various fees. In 2020, taxes collected by federal, state, and local governments amounted to 25.5% of GDP, below the OECD average of 33.5% of GDP. The United States had the seventh-lowest tax revenue-to-GDP ratio among OECD countries in 2020, with a higher ratio than Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Ireland, Costa Rica, and Turkey.[1]

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › Education › CP---Education---1AR

Education isn’t nearly enough to eliminate economic disparities

Irwin ’15 [Neil; 03/31/2015; M.B.A. from Columbia University, Knight-Bagehot Fellow in Economics and Business Journalism, Senior economics correspondent for The New York Times; “Why More Education Won’t Fix Economic Inequality,” https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/upshot/why-more-education-wont-fix-economic-inequality.html //The St. Mark’s School of Texas, Anish Guddati–Class of 2024]

There remains a plausible solution to rising inequality that avoids those polarizing ideas: strengthening education so that more Americans can benefit from the advances of the 21st-century economy. This is a solution that conservatives, centrists and liberals alike can comfortably get behind. After all, who doesn’t favor a stronger educational system? But a new paper shows why the math just doesn’t add up, at least if the goal is addressing the gap between the very rich and everyone else.

Brad Hershbein, Melissa Kearney and Lawrence Summers offer a simple little simulation that shows the limits of education as an inequality-fighter. In short, more education would be great news for middle and lower-income Americans, increasing their pay and economic security. It just isn’t up to the task of meaningfully reducing inequality, which is being driven by the sharp upward movement of the very top of the income distribution.