Human beings are dialogical beings and the significance of disability or impairment and their impact on well-being will tend to be comparative. As Sayer argues: ‘we measure ourselves not so much against absolute standards but against what others are like, particularly those with whom we associate the most’ (2011, 122). Evaluative judgements in relation to the individual experience of both disability and impairment are important. If we are to properly understand social phenomena, such as disability, we have to recognize their normative dimensions and the values attached to them. Value-laden statements, as Sayer (2011) argues, can strengthen the descriptive adequacy of accounts. Sayer demonstrates this by using the example of the Holocaust. This, he says, can be represented in two ways: ‘thousands died in the Nazi concentration camps’ and ‘thousands were systematically exterminated in the Nazi concentration camps’. The latter sentence is not only more value-laden than the first, but more accurate as well (Sayer 2011, 45). We would argue that talking about ableism, disablism or oppression does not make sense without reference to normative judgements about people’s well-being, as without such a discussion only a partial picture will emerge. The same may also apply to judgements about fair social arrangements. Disability & Society 641 CDS does not engage with ethical issues to do with the role of impairment and disability in people’s well-being and the pragmatic and mundane issues of day-today living. Imagine, for example, a pregnant woman who has agreed, possibly with very little thought, to the routine of prenatal diagnostics, and who has been informed that the foetus she is carrying has Tay-Sachs disease. She now has to make the decision over whether to terminate the pregnancy or carry it to term. The value judgements that surround Tay-Sachs include the fact that it will cause pain and suffering to the child and he or she will probably die before the age of four. These are morally relevant considerations to the mother. Whilst CDS would probably guide her to confront ableist assumptions and challenge her beliefs about the condition, considerations having to do with pain and suffering are nevertheless morally significant. The way people see things, and the language that is used to describe certain conditions, can affect how they react to them, but freeing oneself from ableist assumptions may not in some cases be enough. There may be insurmountable realities attached to some impairments where parents feel that their personal and social circumstances would not enable them to provide the child or themselves with a satisfactory life (Vehmas 2003). Impairment sometimes produces practical, difficult ethical choices and we need more concrete viewpoints than the ideas provided through ableism, which offers very little practical moral guidance. It is questionable whether the notion of ableism would help the parents in deciding whether to have a child who has a degenerative condition that results in early death. Campbell (2009a, 39, 149 and 159), for example, discusses arguments about impairments as harmful conditions, the ethics of external bodily transplants as well as wrongful birth and life court cases (whether life with an impairment is preferable to non-existence), and how ableism impacts on discourse around these issues. Whilst her analysis of such ableist discourses suggests ethical judgements, she provides no arguments or conclusions as to whether, for example, external bodily transplants are ethically wrong or whether impairment may or may not constitute a moral harm. Under the anti-dualistic stance adopted by CDS, even the well-being/ill-being dualism becomes an arbitrary and nonsensical construct. Under ableism it can be constructed as merely maintaining the dominance of those seemingly faring well (supposedly, ‘non-disabled’ people), and labels those faring less well as having lesser value. There may not be a clear answer to what constitutes human well-being or flourishing, but in general we can and we need to agree about some necessary elements required for well-being. Also, as moral agents we have an obligation to make judgements about people’s well-being and act in ways that their well-being is enhanced (Eshleman 2009). This is why we have, for example, coronary heart disease prevention programmes because the possible death or associated health problems are seen as harms. Possibly these policies are based on ableist perspective, but if that is the case then the normative use of ableism is null; eradicating supposedly ableist enterprises such as coronary heart disease prevention would be an example of reductio ad absurdum. Denying some aspects of well-being are so clear that their denial would be absurd, and simply morally wrong. CDS raises ethical issues and insinuates normative judgements but does not provide supporting ethical arguments. This is a way of shirking from intellectual and ethical responsibility to provide sound arguments and conceptual tools for ethical decision-making that would benefit disabled people. If we are to describe disability, 642 S. Vehmas and N. Watson disablism, and oppression properly, we have to explicate the moral and political wrong related to these phenomena. Whilst CDS has produced useful analyses, for example, of the cultural reproduction of disability, it needs to engage more closely with the evaluative issues inherently related to disability. As Sayer has argued (against Foucault): while one could hardly disagree that we should seek to uncover the hidden and unconsidered ideas on which practices are based, I would argue that critique is indeed exactly about identifying what things ‘are not right as they are’, and why. (Sayer 2011, 244) By settling almost exclusively to analyses of ableism without engaging properly with the ethical issues involved, CDS analyses are deficient. The moral wrongs related to disablism or ableism are matters of great concern to disabled people, and CDS should in its own part take the responsibility of remedying current wrongs disabled people suffer from. Disability and disadvantage In the final sections of this paper, we will discuss CDS in the light of the politics of disability. We will challenge its key ideas and their political use. We argue that deconstructing categories of difference is neither necessary nor desirable in the pursuit of justice for disabled people. Abolishing oppression requires recognition of the various ways different groups of people are marginalized and oppressed, and to do this requires more than an analysis of their categorization and their historical genealogy. Tackling disadvantage has been the main theoretical and political aim of disability studies and from its first inception academics such as Oliver, Barnes and Finkelstein were interested in documenting the disadvantage experienced by disabled people and how it can be prevented or challenged. It shares with political philosophy a desire to identify and critique discrimination associated with the ill-treatment of disabled people and their subordination (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 3). Improving the position of the worst off is generally seen, at least in an egalitarian outlook, as a matter of justice because people’s social status and well-being is inevitably related to the way society is organized. In order to create fair social responses to disadvantage, we have to have a common understanding about disadvantage, and a reasonable (non-arbitrary) way of comparing disadvantages and correcting them. The crucial issue is to define a proper metric of justice. In other words, ‘what should we look at, when evaluating whether one state of affairs is more or less just than another?’ (Robeyns and Brighouse 2010, 1). For example, what should be the primary focus for justice and how should it be evaluated? Is it the distribution of happiness, wealth, or something else, and how can these be measured? Western political thought has evolved from the contractarian tradition where people voluntarily commit to follow norms and laws they have established in order to ensure peaceful social life. Its most influential recent theorist was John Rawls (1971), whose proposal for the proper metric of justice was the idea of social primary goods; those goods that any rational person would want regardless of whatever else they wanted. Rawls’ list of social primary goods included things such as freedom of thought, movement and choice of occupation, equality of income and wealth, as well as social basis of self-respect. For Rawls the distribution of social primary goods is the main concern of justice. Rawls’ theory has been criticized for excluding people who Disability & Society 643 do not conform to the demands of normality from the spheres of justice. And indeed, Rawls did exclude disabled people from his theory as exceptions to the rule; we should, he argued, first work out a convincing theory for the ‘normal’ people and after that extend it to the ‘more extreme cases’ such as disabled people (Robeyns and Brighouse 2010, 3). Rawls’ ideas have recently been challenged by the capabilities approach, a theory developed initially by Amartya Sen and later by Martha Nussbaum (2006). Instead of focusing on resources such as income, wealth or legal rights, the capabilities approach emphasizes the significance of functionings and capabilities. Functionings refer to states of the person; things such as literacy, health, mobility, and the ability to appear in public without shame (Anderson 2010). Capabilities, on the other hand, are the real freedoms or opportunities to achieve functionings. So mobility is a functioning whereas the real opportunity for mobility is the corresponding capability (Robeyns 2011). Nussbaum (2006, 76–78) identifies 10 capabilities, ranging from life, ‘bodily health’, bodily integrity, physical security to emotions, affiliation and control over one’s environment. Capabilities provide the bare minimum that all humans should be able to achieve in terms of valued functionings and well-being. So, justice concerns ‘the capabilities to choose a life one has reason to value’ (Robeyns and Brighouse 2010, 2). Lacking involuntarily any capability or central human functioning amounts to a disadvantage. If we are to make comparative judgements about people’s well-being, we have to be able to come to an understanding of how well each individual is doing with regard to various functionings (Nussbaum 2006, 69–81; Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 36–62). The capabilities approach is an exceptional philosophical theory in that it has been operationalized. The United Nations, and a number of national governments, most notably the United Kingdom, have all used it as a basis for practical policy development and implementation. It is the basis for the UK’s Equality Measurement Framework, a tool developed for and implemented as part of the equality initiative launched by the last government. Unlike the ideas of Rawls, it has been successfully applied to disability (Burchardt 2004; Nussbaum 2006). The capabilities approach has been criticized on various grounds (Pogge 2010; Walby 2009) but, despite its possible shortcomings, it is one of the few philosophical theories that engages with issues, including disability, in a manner that is not only theoretically illuminating but also politically practical (Sayer 2011). Working within the capabilities approach agenda, Wolff and De-Shalit (2007, 172) have suggested a way of determining the issue of disadvantage by introducing two factors: what the person has or has access to, and what they can do with it. What the person has includes both internal resources, such as talents and skills, and external resources, such as wealth, income and less tangible matters such as family and community support. How effectively these can be used depends on various structures operating in society: laws and customs, the influence of tradition, informal and formal power relations, religion, language, culture and other social norms: the interaction of your internal resources and your external resources with the social and material structure within which you find yourself, determines your genuine opportunities for secure functionings […] In short, your resources are what you have to play with; the structure provides the rules of the game. (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 173) 644 S. Vehmas and N. Watson Aspects of social structure are as important in determining your genuine opportunities as your internal and external resources. Accordingly, tackling people’s disadvantage can take place in three different dimensions that may or may not be related to each other: internal resources, external resources and social structures. There at least four strategies for addressing these disadvantages: personal enhancement, cash compensation, targeted resource enhancement, and status enhancement (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 173–174). Personal enhancement is achieved through education and training as well as psychological and medical interventions. In cash compensation, people are given money to spend as they need. In the case of resource enhancement, people are provided with resources for a particular purpose (in the case of disabled people this could mean the use of an aid to daily living such as a computer with speech synthesizer or service such as personal assistance). Effective improvement of people’s internal or external resources cannot take place without social arrangements that recognize the equal rights of all. In practice this means status enhancement, where people’s opportunities and social status are improved by social changes, such as changes in law and social attitudes and the material environment. If the aim of a just society is to guarantee its members an equal chance for a minimum level of well-being, it needs to define the kind of disadvantage that is a matter of social concern. In addition it must also be able to identify the most disadvantaged members of society, and what factors affect how well-off or badly-off people generally are. These measures enable evaluation (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 21). This is necessary because, under conditions of finite or scarce resources, we need to not only have general criteria on the allocation of support (Stone 1984) but also know what works and what does not. Under conditions of finite resources, society needs to decide how to allocate resources between various sectors of justice and this needs to be done democratically. These decisions cannot be taken without an evaluation of how significant certain functionings are for human well-being in general, and what kind of weight they should have in our societal apparatus (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 92–93). Nussbaum (2006) emphasizes that satisfactory political theory must be pluralist in the sense that it takes into account cultural variation. At the same time, and to a degree, it must also be normatively objective as people often submit to the status quo against their own interest and adapt to their own deprivations. An acceptable principle of public justice must be capable of being known by all because justice fundamentally concerns claims that we can make to others; ‘Justice embodies demands of particular persons that can, by right, be exacted from others’ (Anderson 2010, 86; original emphasis). Capabilities theorists argue that political theory should be based on an objective (albeit an open-ended and subject to ongoing revision and rethinking) list of components of well-being and relevant capabilities people need to function as equals (Anderson 2010, 85–86; Nussbaum 2006, 73–76).