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2023 Michigan Counterplan

United empowered small businesses and bolstered Democracy

Smith 10 (Bradley A. Smith is the Blackmore/Nault Designated Professor of Law at Capital University Law School, the chairman of the Center for Competitive Politics, and a former chairman of the Federal Election Commission. 1-25-2010, "The Citizens United Fallout," https://www.city-journal.org/article/the-citizens-united-fallout, accessed 7-15-2023)//Prozes

Other Democrats echoed the president. Senator Chuck Schumer, just a regular guy from New York, warned that the Court had “predetermined the winners of next November’s elections. It won’t be Republicans. It won’t be Democrats. It will be corporate America.” No matter that Schumer is the top Senate recipient of contributions from political action committees (PACs) and employees associated with the real estate, securities, finance, and insurance industries, according to the Center for Responsive Politics; this decision threatens democracy, he seems to feel. In truth, the Court’s ruling will have little impact on the typical Fortune 500 company, which can already afford to spend millions of dollars on lobbying and on building PACs with enough employees to fund them and campaign-finance lawyers to operate them. These corporations, especially massively unpopular Wall Street institutions, are unlikely to make independent expenditures directly from their treasuries in the 2010 campaign cycle because the ads, whose funding must be disclosed, could enrage an already restive public, unhappy with the status quo in Washington.

What Citizens United actually does is empower small and midsize corporations—and every incorporated mom-and-pop falafel joint, local firefighters’ union, and environmental group—to make its voice heard in campaigns without hiring an army of lawyers or asking the FEC how it may speak.

2023 Michigan Counterplan

More ev. (2NC Schiff solvency ev concedes that only a constitutional amendment solves.)

Schiff ’23 [Adam Schiff; American lawyer, author, and politician serving as a U.S. representative from California since 2001; “Schiff, Phillips, Jayapal, McGovern Introduce Constitutional Amendment to Rein in Unrestricted Campaign Spending”; January 19, 2023; https://schiff.house.gov/news/press-releases/schiff-phillips-jayapal-mcgovern-introduce-constitutional-amendment-to-rein-in-unrestricted-campaign-spending; accessed 7/10/23 // achan]

The Democracy for All Amendment would overturn Citizens United v. FEC – ahead of the anniversary of the Supreme Court’s January 21, 2010 decision – which allowed corporations and special interest groups to spend nearly unlimited funds on election campaigns. It would also address the fundamental flaws underlying the Court’s reasoning in that and an entire line of cases dating back to the 1976 Buckley v. Valeo decision, which prevented meaningful regulation of campaign expenditures by corporations and special interest groups.

“The flow of unrestricted corporate and dark money into our elections has dangerously eroded the American people’s faith in our democracy, and in our government’s ability to deliver for them and their families. Citizens United was one of the most egregious enablers of special interest money, but it was only the latest in a long line of Supreme Court cases that opened the floodgates. To truly rein in dark money, we must amend our Constitution,” said Schiff. “The Democracy for All Amendment will close legal loopholes that wealthy megadonors, corporations, and special interest groups have exploited for far too long, and return power to the people once and for all.”

2023 Michigan Counterplan

Overturning fails without a constitutional amendment.

Schiff ’19 [Adam Schiff; American lawyer, author, and politician serving as a U.S. representative from California since 2001; “Rep. Schiff Introduces Constitutional Amendment to Overturn Citizens United”; May 8, 2019; https://schiff.house.gov/news/press-releases/rep-schiff-introduces-constitutional-amendment-to-overturn-citizens-united; accessed 7/10/23 // achan]

Today, Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) introduced a constitutional amendment to overturn Citizens United and increase regulation of campaign contributions and spending. In 2010, the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision struck down decades of restrictions on corporate campaign spending and allowed corporations to spend unlimited funds to run campaign advertisements.

“The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United overturned decades of legal precedent and has enabled billions in dark money to pour into our elections,” Schiff said. “Amending the Constitution is an extraordinary step, but it is the only way to safeguard our democratic process against the threat of unrestrained and anonymous spending by wealthy individuals and corporations. This amendment will restore power to everyday citizens.”

2023 Michigan Counterplan

Can’t solve – the far right has gotten out of Corporate Control

Kleinknecht 2-21 (William Kleinknecht is a longtime newspaper reporter who covered politics, government, criminal justice, and the environment for the Detroit Free Press, New York Daily News, and Newark Star-Ledger, 2-21-2023, "GOP-Controlled Statehouses Are Lurching Right Due to Unfettered Corporate Money," Truthout, https://truthout.org/articles/gop-controlled-statehouses-are-lurching-right-due-to-unfettered-corporate-money/, accessed 7-16-2023)//Prozes

It was so out of control that the corporate leaders who had spent years bankrolling the very politicians pushing the election sabotage movement were alarmed at how far toward sedition they were willing to go. Even Charles Koch, the oil billionaire who had been at the forefront of injecting “dark money” into state politics, was startled by the divisiveness he did so much to create. “Boy, did we screw up,” he wrote in a memoir. “What a mess!” After Georgia passed its election law, leaders of major corporations in the state, including Delta Air Lines and Coca-Cola, spoke out in opposition, and hundreds across the country joined in a statement condemning the passage of legislation anywhere that made it harder for people to vote. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, and the National Association of Manufacturers were among the business groups pushing Congress to certify the Electoral College tally that gave Biden victory. This corporate statesmanship, absent so long from this country, did not sit well with the far right. Senator Marco Rubio called Delta Air Lines and Coca-Cola “woke corporate hypocrites” for criticizing the Georgia election law. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell advised corporations to “stay out of politics.” But the corporations continued to stick their necks out for fair elections. Overturning democracy, they suddenly realized, would be bad for business. There could be consumer boycotts, shareholder revolts, and a tarnishing of their brands. As it turned out, this moment of corporate of enlightenment was all for naught. Election-sabotage laws were still passed, and plans for throwing out election results were still hatched, in state after state. The “malefactors of great wealth,” as Teddy Roosevelt called the business elite, were unable to control the wildfire they had done so much to ignite.

2023 Michigan Counterplan

Overturning United misses the point – local participation solves better

Casleton 18 (Scott Casleton is a PhD student at UC Berkeley studying political philosophy and intellectual history. He has a degree in philosophy from Yale University, 5-7-2018, "It’s time for liberals to get over Citizens United," Vox, https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/5/7/17325486/citizens-united-money-politics-dark-money-vouchers-primaries, accessed 7-10-2023)//Prozes

From the moment the 2010 Supreme Court ruling Citizens United v. FEC came down, it scandalized liberals. The decision heralded the “hostile corporate takeover of our democratic process,” Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) thundered at the time. In 2017, a commissioner of the Federal Election Commission resigned, claiming “since the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision, our political campaigns have been awash in unlimited, often dark money.”* This was the animating sentiment of Bernie Sanders’s 2016 campaign for president; he even went so far as to claim that billionaires are simply “buying elections.” This idea has given rise to a new liberal battle cry: Repeal Citizens United! Unfortunately, that tactic is naive and misguided, and relies on a misunderstanding of the law and politics surrounding the case. As we approach the 2018 congressional elections — and beyond that, the crucial presidential election of 2020 — it is more vital than ever to have a clear view of where this ruling fits into the mosaic of campaign finance law.

Such understanding will, in turn, shine light on what can be done to make the election process fairer and make politicians more responsive to all their constituents, not just the big spenders. Some cities and states are already experimenting with programs that strengthen the voices of ordinary voters. Building on such efforts is likely to have far greater effects than continuing to demonize Citizens, whose logic is defensible on First Amendment grounds. Most widespread in liberal circles is the idea that Citizens opened the floodgates to massive amounts of corporate spending in politics. But as many legal scholars have argued, the floodgates were already open. Citizens is not responsible for the massive amounts of money showered on favored candidates. Nor is it responsible for the rise of so-called dark money in politics.

2023 Michigan Counterplan

United empowered small businesses and bolstered Democracy

Smith 10 (Bradley A. Smith is the Blackmore/Nault Designated Professor of Law at Capital University Law School, the chairman of the Center for Competitive Politics, and a former chairman of the Federal Election Commission. 1-25-2010, "The Citizens United Fallout," https://www.city-journal.org/article/the-citizens-united-fallout, accessed 7-15-2023)//Prozes

Other Democrats echoed the president. Senator Chuck Schumer, just a regular guy from New York, warned that the Court had “predetermined the winners of next November’s elections. It won’t be Republicans. It won’t be Democrats. It will be corporate America.” No matter that Schumer is the top Senate recipient of contributions from political action committees (PACs) and employees associated with the real estate, securities, finance, and insurance industries, according to the Center for Responsive Politics; this decision threatens democracy, he seems to feel.

In truth, the Court’s ruling will have little impact on the typical Fortune 500 company, which can already afford to spend millions of dollars on lobbying and on building PACs with enough employees to fund them and campaign-finance lawyers to operate them. These corporations, especially massively unpopular Wall Street institutions, are unlikely to make independent expenditures directly from their treasuries in the 2010 campaign cycle because the ads, whose funding must be disclosed, could enrage an already restive public, unhappy with the status quo in Washington. What Citizens United actually does is empower small and midsize corporations—and every incorporated mom-and-pop falafel joint, local firefighters’ union, and environmental group—to make its voice heard in campaigns without hiring an army of lawyers or asking the FEC how it may speak.

2023 Michigan Counterplan

Citizens United saved democracy – 7 warrants – make them respond to each.

Blackburn ’20 [Scott Blackburn; Harvard graduate, Senior Partner at McKinsey & Company, veteran; January 16, 2020; “Citizens United After 10 Years: More Speech, Better Democracy”; ; accessed 7/10/23 // achan]

On January 21, 2010, the Supreme Court struck down a federal law that prohibited corporations and labor unions from independently voicing their support or opposition to federal candidates. That law, the Court said, violated those organizations’ First Amendment rights. In the succeeding ten years, the Court’s decision in Citizens United has engendered more discussion and disagreement among policymakers than perhaps any other case in recent history. With ten years and five election cycles of hindsight, this report examines what we can learn from the effects of Citizens United on American campaigns. I. Since Citizens United, Politics Is More Diverse and Political Change Is Rapid. One common prediction about Citizens United was that it would fundamentally distort our elections in favor of wealthy interests. As The New York Times wrote in their editorial following the decision, “With a single, disastrous 5-to-4 ruling, the Supreme Court has thrust politics back to the robber-baron era of the 19th century… If a member of Congress tries to stand up to a wealthy special interest, its lobbyists can credibly threaten: We’ll spend whatever it takes to defeat you.” But far from an era dominated by the wealthy, in the five election cycles since the decision, America has seen some of the most vibrant, diverse, and rapid political change in a generation. We have seen the re-election of the first black President, Barack Obama, a Democrat, over business favorite Mitt Romney. This was followed by a celebrity outsider Republican in Donald Trump beating consummate Washington insider Hillary Clinton. The House of Representatives has seen similar rapid change with both Republicans and Democrats taking the House in populist waves. This is perhaps best exemplified by major establishment power brokers Eric Cantor and Joe Crowley being bested by political neophytes and outsiders David Brat and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, respectively. It is impossible to ascribe any one electoral outcome solely to Citizens United, but the prevalence of new voices in the political arena since the decision is undeniable. At the very least, it seems highly unlikely that if powerful moneyed interests were putting their finger on the scale of elections to a greater degree post-Citizens United, these are the outcomes they would have sought. II. Incumbents and Challengers Have Both Benefited From Super PAC Support – but the Support Helps Challengers More. Supporters of Citizens United, far from believing the decision hindered democratic ideals, regarded it as a boon to democracy by allowing political outsiders to more easily challenge incumbents and the status quo. As famed First Amendment attorney *chart/graph omitted* Floyd Abrams put it, “We want, for example, more Gene McCarthys and Ross Perots and individuals to come upon the scene and have a chance to build a war chest and go on out and try to reform the country as they think best.” The elections since the decision have certainly seen a significant amount of new blood in Washington, many of whom benefited from super PAC spending that was not tied to the traditional levers of party power. But incumbent politicians and insiders also quickly learned to take advantage of this new tool of campaigning. The best example of this is perhaps Right to Rise, the super PAC set up by supporters of Jeb Bush heading into the 2016 Republican primary. That group spent over $120 million peppering primary states with pro-Bush ads. But while Right to Rise bought a lot of ads, it failed to convince many voters. Super PACs supporting newcomers have had better success, as groups like Independent USA PAC and Women Vote! were able to give key support to previously unknown candidates. All told, the five election cycles since Citizens United saw an average of 79 freshmen members of Congress. The five cycles prior to the decision saw just 55. III. For-Profit Corporations Are Not Big Spenders in Campaigns. In the immediate wake of Citizens United, the main prediction from those opposed to the decision concerned corporate spending in elections. As one commentator put it, “today’s decision does far more than simply provide Fortune 500 companies with a massive megaphone to blast their political views to the masses; it also empowers them to drown out any voices that disagree with them.” Simply put, this has not happened. Corporate political spending continues to be dwarfed by spending from other traditional sources. In the four cycles since the decision, for-profit corporate political spending has averaged around 1% of spending from all sources. The following chart below shows total campaign contributions to any entity – candidates, political parties, standard PACs, super PACs, and other groups) (in blue), total contributions to independent groups from any source (including individuals, PACs, corporations, and unions) (in orange), and for-profit corporate contributions to independent groups (predominantly super PACs) (in red). *graph omitted* Even the roughly 1% of corporate contributions to super PACs each cycle likely overstates things, at least in the common understanding of Fortune 500 companies. As the Sunlight Foundation reported in 2014, “As far as we can tell, one thing the [200 largest corporations] did not do, for the most part, was take advantage of the new opportunities to spend on politics that the Citizens United decision afforded them. The 200 corporate donors gave just $3 million to super PACs, with the bulk of that amount a single $2.5 million donation from Chevron” to one particular super PAC. In 2018, The Washington Post looked at the top 50 donors for that election cycle and found similar results: just four were nonpersons, and they gave just 3% of the total donations from that group. Of those four corporate donors, two were nontraditional. One was a group that advocates on behalf of hospitals, and one was the company of longtime political activist Ross Perot. No matter how you slice it, Citizens United has not led to a flood of corporate money in our elections. IV. Money Still Can’t “Buy” an Election. Despite a near constant drumbeat from some politicians and activist groups, in the post-Citizens United era, money cannot and does not buy elections. In fact, this is conventional wisdom among most experts. As University of Missouri professor Jeff Milyo wrote: [T]here is something of a scholarly consensus . . . stand[ing] in stark contrast to the popular wisdom so often echoed by pundits, politicians and reform advocates that elections are essentially for sale to the highest bidder (spender). Decades of social science research consistently reveal a far more limited role for campaign spending. Since 2010, this truism has been demonstrated again and again, from the spectacular failure of deep-pocketed Jeb Bush to the meteoric rise of the heavily outspent Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. It is true, both before and after Citizens United, that the candidate who spends more money usually wins, but while spending certainly helps campaigns, it does not cause the victory. Rather, candidates who attract more voters typically also attract more donors. The inability of spending to “buy” votes on Election Day is easiest to see in the almost cliché trend of rich individuals self-funding lavish campaigns and underperforming when actual votes are counted, sometimes spectacularly so. As Richard Lau, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers, put it, “I think where you have to change your thinking is that money causes winning. I think it’s more that winning attracts money.” V. Most Campaign Spending Still Comes From Limited Contributions by Individuals to Candidates. The emergence of super PACs – political groups that exclusively make independent expenditures and therefore can accept contributions of any size – has been the largest and most significant innovation of the Citizens United decision. (Though technically it was a different case – SpeechNow.org v. FEC – that permitted the creation of super PACs, that unanimous decision followed the reasoning of Citizens United.) And it is true that super PAC spending has been increasing, as more and more groups see the advantages of independent speech. Nevertheless, the overall impact of super PACs has been overstated. At the time of the decision, it was argued that, “[those] players with the deepest pockets will be able to pay premium prices for as many ads as they want, easily dominating the airwaves.” But significantly more political spending is funded by donors that must abide by strict contribution limits, namely those who give to candidates and political parties. Contributions to super PACs have ranged from 12% to 26% of total political contributions over the four cycles since Citizens United. Candidates and political parties continue to outspend super PACs by at least three-to-one. *chart omitted* It’s also worth remembering that federal law automatically gives candidates the lowest cost for a political ad on TV or radio, meaning a dollar of super PAC spending buys less speech than the same dollar of candidate spending. VI. The Government Cannot Ban Political Books or Movies. Most forgotten in the decade since Citizens United is the actual speech the Court protected. The case was about political speech in its purest form and the government’s belief that it could regulate and prohibit that speech. Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation that, in 2008, wanted to advertise and sell on-demand a documentary critical of then-Democratic primary candidate Hillary Clinton. The Federal Election Commission said doing so would be illegal, because it was funded by a corporation, and any corporate spending that supports, opposes, or even mentions a candidate close to an election is prohibited (unless the speaker is a media corporation). In defending that position, the government went further, arguing to the Supreme Court that it could prohibit companies from publishing books that contained a single line advocating for or against a candidate. Those were the facts before the Supreme Court Justices when they issued their ruling. A rule that bans this speech must be inconsistent with the First Amendment. As Justice Anthony Kennedy put it in the majority’s opinion: “political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it.” Thanks to the Citizens United ruling, companies like Netflix and Amazon don’t have to worry about streaming political documentaries during election season, small publishing houses don’t have to hire a campaign finance attorney before publishing political books, and the government is one step further removed from policing political speech. VII. There is More Speech About Candidates Now Than Ever Before. By legalizing corporate and union independent expenditures and paving the way for super PACs, Citizens United opened up new and useful avenues for speech. Americans are speaking more now than ever before. This is true in monetary terms – campaign spending is up, as candidates and independent groups attempt to persuade voters through the airwaves and over the internet. It is also true in human terms. The Supreme Court’s ruling has allowed Americans to innovate new ways of organizing and speaking to promote their shared ideas. Challengers and newcomers, in particular, have found unexpected and sometimes highly persuasive ways to speak, providing them the opportunity to catch-up and compete both with incumbent politicians and established political powerbrokers. And research shows that all of this speech, from mailers to TV ads, make voters more informed and more engaged. While Citizens United hasn’t resulted in a flood of corporate cash “drowning out” ordinary voices, it has allowed new, often very important, voices to be heard. The decision not only protects the right to speak, but it protects the right of Americans to hear those voices. Citizens, rather than the government, decide what arguments are worthwhile. Citizens United is one of the most important decisions of the century for protecting, fostering, and benefiting American democracy.

2023 Michigan Counterplan

Campaign finance reform furthers inequality.

Atzmon ’23 [Yael Atzmon; editor at the Michigan Journal of Economics; “Op-Ed: Why Limiting Campaign Spending Will Not Resolve Political Inequality,” Michigan Journal of Economics; May 7, 2023; https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mje/2023/05/07/op-ed-why-limiting-campaign-spending-will-not-resolve-political-inequality/; accessed 7/16/2023 // achan]

Every election cycle, televisions all over the country are subject to an endless barrage of campaign related media. Nowadays, campaigns require an inane amount of funds and resources to produce the kind of advertisements that flood American media outlets. While activists and policymakers propose straight-forward policy that limits campaign expenditure, the implementation of such policy can further entrench political inequality. Instead, Americans should consider the complete dynamics of campaign finance in order to design more effective campaign finance reform. While campaigning has never been a cheap endeavor, the court case Citizens United v. The Federal Election Commission (2010) completely dismantled limits on campaign financing activity for unions and corporations. This new decision has contributed to a massive increase in campaign spending over the years through the creation of PACs and Super PACs (Arke & Robinson, 2019). PACs and Super PACs are specific types of political committees that “raise or spend more than $1,000 to influence the outcome of a federal election in a calendar year and [are] thus required to register with the Federal Election Commission (FEC)” (paras. 2-3). While PACs have a limit on the amount they are able to accept from any individual, Super PACs do not have this limit. Dark Money Groups are 501(c)(4) and c(6) organizations that can accept unlimited contributions as long as this is not considered their primary activity. They are allowed to contribute to Super PACs but not directly to a candidate (CLC, 2018). Although campaign finance has been fueled by more money recently, this phenomenon alone might not be cause for huge alarm. After all, the increase could be attributed to more participation in campaign funding efforts, perhaps through PACs. There are darker implications to this increase when we consider that those involved in raising money for political campaigns are not completely representative of the American public. According to Sean Mcelwee et. al (n.d.), “91 percent of federal election donors in 2012 and 92 percent of donors in 2014 were white” (p. 1) and white men specifically “comprise 45 percent of donors and account for 57 percent of money contributed” (p.2). This overrepresentation of certain demographic groups is especially concerning when paired with evidence that being a donor can lead to greater access to elected officials once they are in office. Indeed, “senior policy makers made themselves available between three and four times more often” for individuals they knew were campaign donors (p. 545) (Kalla & Broockman, 2016). If donors, who are mostly white men, are able to speak with policy makers and thus make their voices louder in the political process, the current campaign finance system seems antithetical to democracy. The majority of Americans (77%) apparently agrees and believes that “there should be limits on the amount of money individuals and groups can spend on campaigns” (para. 3) (Jones, 2018). Yes, something must be done. However, simply mandating limits on contributions is an extremely contrived solution to a very complex issue. While it is easy to assume that enforcing expenditure limits will reduce the influence of money across the board, the evidence suggests that this is simply not the case. The differentiation in campaign spending impact is especially potent when examining the usefulness of campaign spending value for incumbents and challengers distinctively. While spending more money leads to a higher incidence of success, on average, for challengers, the same is not true for incumbents (Vavreck, 2014). The explanation for this can be drawn to a basic economic concept: decreasing marginal returns for every dollar spent. In introductory economics, this means that the more a consumer buys, the less value they will get out of each additional good. The same logic applies to campaign finance, at least for incumbents. For incumbents, each additional dollar they spent is yielding less and less value in terms of helping them win their race. For challengers however, the more money they spend, the more likely they are to win (Vavreck, 2014). Incumbents benefit less from campaign spending partially because they are already familiar to voters. Conversely, challengers need to make themselves known in order to compete and thus profit politically from the extra spending (Vavreck, 2014). Thus, any kind of campaign finance that limits the amount of money being spent on campaigns point blank, will likely hinder challengers from overcoming incumbents. In this way, limiting the amount of money spent on campaigns could have unintended adverse effects and may even conglomerate power into the hands of those already in office. Additionally, simply limiting the amount of money being spent on campaigns will not address the fundamental issue which is not necessarily how much is being spent but rather who, and who is not, able to spend money in this way. 

2023 Michigan Counterplan

Citizens United upheld liberty and corporation rights

Scott Casleton 18, [Scott works in political philosophy, ethics, and the history of philosophy and is a writer for Vox. “It’s time for liberals to get over Citizens United”, Vox, 2018, https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/5/7/17325486/citizens-united-money-politics-dark-money-vouchers-primaries] Zulfiqar

Let’s put the hated decision into context. The inundation of elections with private cash is not the result of Citizens but rather was facilitated by the 1976 decision Buckley v. Valeo. That case established the legal framework sanctioning billions of dollars of independent private campaign spending. In it, the Court ruled that limits on campaign donations — direct donations to candidates — are constitutional but said it was unconstitutional to limit non-donation expenditures, such as independently funded advertisements.

Such independent spending — which cannot be coordinated with candidates, according to the Court — was protected under the First Amendment as not just speech but political speech. The idea is that money is a necessary instrument for supporting a political candidate, whether it’s paying for yard signs or taking out an ad in the newspaper. Not unreasonably, the Court ruled that limitations on independent expenditures would constitute limitations on one’s ability to support a candidate through any number of media. Placing a dollar limit on such expenditures would arbitrarily prevent certain kinds of campaign support simply by the fact of how expensive they are. Our inability to trace campaign donations to their source — the dark money issue — is the result of the lack of federal regulations to make disclosure mandatory. And such regulations are legal; the Court said as much in Citizens, with eight of nine justices agreeing on that point! The only thing standing in the way of transparency is congressional stonewalling. In 2010, Republican senators defeated a disclosure law 59 to 39, which would have made it more difficult for donors to use legal loopholes to hide their identities.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Possible Solvency advocate

U+BI can be the cornerstone of a reparative framework for post-colonial, racial and settler colonial violence as a form of reparations.

Klein, and Fouksman, 2021 (Elise, Senior lecturer @Australian National University, Elizaveta, Lecturer at King’s College London, Reparations as a Rightful Share: From Universalism to Redress in Distributive Justice, Development and Change, Volume 53(1): 31-57)

There are intersections between redistributory universalism and reparative redress. In many cases, the links between class and race can be reflected in statistics of poverty. However, this can also hide the way in which race has been the grammar of unequal relations and has justified expropriation and exploitation in places like the US since colonization. This is also the case in Australia, where ignoring the ways in which race and coloniality have impacted and continue to impact Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples ignores aspects of settler colonialism that are not only about economic dispossession, but also about racism, white supremacy and patriarchy. Yet (re)distribution must be as much a key part of reparatory justice as is recognition. As Nancy Fraser (2003, 2005) has pointed out, recognition without redistribution holds the danger of displacing struggles for economic justice—an issue that Fraser argues has plagued feminism in recent decades (Fraser, 2005: 298). The negotiations between Namibia and Germany around the Herero-Nama genocide are another example: while Germany is willing to recognize the genocide, and give some additional development aid as part of this recognition, it has declined to term the accompanying payment ‘reparations’, fearing to set a precedent for other or larger redistributive claims to reparative payments. Fraser has argued that both recognition and substantive redistribution are equally essential parts of social justice; one cannot be forsaken in favour of the other. Here we have built on that argument to make the case that the two are in fact intertwined in justice-based claims for shares of collective wealth. All three cases illustrate common themes. While the US is a post-slavery society, it is also a settler colonial state, and insights from the Australian case have resonance for Native Americans in the US who also have substantive claims for reparative justice. The US case gave us one possibility on how mechanisms of distributive justice can also do some measure of reparative work via universal, redistributive and individual payments framed as a rightful share. A U+BI contends with some of the issues of recognition and redress raised in this article. While it is universal in scope and rightful in framing, the addition of the plus includes recognition of specific historical ills in need of reparative justice. The Australian case also suggested avenues that could accompany reparations, showing how not just recognition but also sovereignty could include specific national truth-telling processes, returning of land rights and self-determination, along with a U+BI or other forms of reparative redistribution. These reparative packages would need to be directed by Indigenous peoples themselves. Decentralized and decolonial cosmopolitanism — such as a global UBI framed as reparations for colonialism and its after-effects — may help fulfil reparations for post independence injustice. However, these payments need to also transcend nation state boundaries and connect with people that are stateless, or diaspora dispersed because of colonialism and slavery. We have made the case that reparative justice must become a key part of conceptualizing claims for distributional justice or claims to a share of collective wealth. This is both for instrumental and intrinsic reasons. Universal forms of distributive justice that do not consider claims to redress can do damage, for instance if, in settler colonial states and post-independent states, a universal basic income is used to mute claims to more radical forms of redistribution as well as sovereignty or self-governance. At the same time, we contend that if claims to distribution are based on a historical case around the communal creation of wealth by past generations, then this view must also encompass the ways this wealth creation has been intertwined with a global history of racist expropriation. Thus, in conceptualizing claims to distributive justice, we must take into account claims for reparative justice, particularly as they highlight the limits of nation state boundaries and the importance of recognition and redress for past and contemporary harms. Only then can what is rightful also encompass the right to atonement and redress.

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › AT: KATO

Extinction is biggest impact

Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

2023 Michigan Kritik
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No extinction link—our reps identify a shared threat stemming from the settler present

Joseph J. Z. Weiss 15. Ph.D. candidate, Anthropology, University of Chicago. December 2015. “Unsettling Futures: Haida Future-Making, Politics and Mobility in the Settler Colonial Present.” p.216-232,

Conclusion: “What’s next? Just guess.” Signs of the Future One of the more recent additions to the socio-landscape of Old Massett, which I noticed on a return visit in 2014, was a series of blue signs that had appeared in many of the lawns on reserve and a good few uptown. The sign was a good two feet high and emblazoned with capitalized text: UNITED AGAINST ENBRIDGE. Below the text was a picture of a salmon. The salmon and the first word, “UNITED,” were in stark, attention-grabbing white, while the other text was in black. The signs, I later discovered, were distributed for five dollars each by the “Friends of Wild Salmon,” a coalition of northern British Columbia residents – including both First Nations and non-First Nations members – working together to oppose the Enbridge Gateway Pipeline Project.1 Perhaps appropriately, then, I noticed the sign on the lawns of both Haida and non-Haida, in Old Massett, (New) Masset, and out by Towtown. The signs may have been new, but their message is one that should have become familiar to us at this point: The people of Haida Gwaii oppose “Enbridge;” that is, The Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines Project. The project, first proposed in the mid-2000s, seeks to construct two pipelines to transport crude oil and condensate from northern Alberta to Kitimat on the coast of British Columbia.2 The oil would then be transported via “super-tanker” from the coast, through the Hecate Straight that passes between the west coast and the islands of Haida Gwaii before being exported to other nations (particularly China). Enbridge has received heavy support for the project from Canada’s current Conservative government, headed by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and in 2013 the Enbridge Joint-Review Panel – despite the words of hippies and Haida alike, alongside fierce opposition from all over the northwest coast - approved the pipelines, albeit with 209 required conditions.3 As a partnership between Canadian federal and corporate interests, the Enbridge Pipelines Project promises a future horizon of economic prosperity, one that unequivocally justifies any environmental risk in the present. On Haida Gwaii, Enbridge presages a rather different future, one in which the unpredictable waters of the Hecade Straight all but guarantee a tanker spill. Such a spill would devastate the waters and lands of the islands and the neighbouring coastline of British Columbia, destroying the fish and poisoning the plants that currently draw on ocean waters and the animals that feed thereon. Neither eagles nor ravens could survive, living as they do on a diet that consists primarily of marine life, a fact which all but guarantees the disappearance of Eagles and Ravens, the Haida people whose lifeways as such are so fundamentally tied to the islands of Haida Gwaii. Haida Gwaii could no longer be home. A song recorded in protest again Enbridge by Aboriginal artist Kinnie Starr and animated as a music video by Haidawood, a team of Haida and non-Haida stop-motion artists and animators, makes this threat explicit, asking in its opening lines “Who will save these waters, save them for our great granddaughters, save them for our great grand-daughter’s sons, […] save them before all is dead and gone?”4 This nightmare future, this future that is no future, is one that looms large over the whole of this dissertation. It is familiar because it is a reiteration of the horror of ecological cataclysm that the CHN formed itself in opposition against, that the “hippies” risk metonymically bringing about by taking from the lands and waters without respect. But it is also familiar because in a broader sense it is the future that settler colonialism attempted to give to Native peoples; indeed, to render as their already given destiny. This is the future of indigenous erasure, of ultimate disappearance, of a closed temporality which can only end in “all dead and gone.” As I have also hopefully shown in each of my chapters, however, the future of “no future” is never taken as inevitable or already determined by Haida people. The work of future-making instead always acts to ward off the nightmare future of Haida erasure, always puts in its place instead multiple possible futures in which Haida people continue. Take the blue signs on the lawns of the Masset(t)s, Old and New, implicitly answering Kinnie Starr’s question with the bold declaration that the islands (will) stand “UNITED” against Enbridge. But the social significances of these futures are never encompassed solely by the ways in which they respond to the threat of nightmare futures. As we saw in Chapter 3, for instance, the production of a future of Haida and non-Haida unity is considerably more complicated than the declaration of shared solidarity, speaking back to a particular history of Haida and settler relations and fantasy schemas, looking forward towards finding productive ways in which non-Haida can be integrated into Haida systems of sociality and responsibility. To speak of a future united against Enbridge is thus necessarily to speak of many other things, just as it is the case when speaking of a future of Haida return, a future of care-full leadership, or a future of traditional authority. Larger social worlds unfold out of the constitution of particular futures. This is why, more than anything, I want to make clear in the final, concluding chapter of this dissertation that the political (if not the existential) significance of Haida future-making does not lie simply in the specific ways in which individual futures respond to particular dilemmas of the settler colonial present. Rather, what is most crucial about future-making as a way of thinking out from within the temporal brackets of settler colonialism’s deferred erasure is simply the fact of future-making itself. What matters the most is the capacity to say, as Haida rapper Ja$e ElNino does in a guest appearance in Starr’s song, “Now expect the best from the northwest/ What’s next? Just guess.” ElNino asserts the openness of the future, challenging his listeners to even attempt to predict the field of possibilities still to come. This does not mean, though, that this openness is unmoored. Quite the opposite, ElNino asks us to “expect the best of the northwest,” in response to the threat of Enbridge and, I think, more generally. In this spirit, in what follows I highlight the significance of location to indigenous futurity, exploring how Old Massett, its neighbouring communities along Masset Inlet, and the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii act as locations around which the very openness of Haida futures can be articulated. My discussion will be largely synthetic, reading together my previous chapters to attempt to arrive at a few conclusions for this dissertation at a whole. I begin with a discussion of Haida Gwaii, once again, as “home,” asking what it means to consider the islands as a Haida homeland (and one that requires “care” as such) in the light of the futures I have sketched out. I then draw on this to pose a few suggestions for the political anthropology of indigenous peoples and its abiding contemporary concern with sovereign rights and territoriality. Finally, I conclude by drawing out the multiple meanings of my titular phrase, “unsettling futures,” in the context of Haida futuremaking. Homeland Haida Gwaii is in at least some sense at the center of each of the futures I have discussed in this dissertation. It is the home to which Haida are expected (and expect) to return, the “cornucopia” of off-the-grid fantasy, the ongoing historical space of complex social and material relations that these fantasies elide, the perpetually at risk ecological landscape which demands (and authorizes) the CHN’s care and respect. And, as we have seen, these various futures for the islands are not isolated from one another. Quite the opposite, futures proliferate in response to each other. The potential for non-Haida homing necessitates strategic forms of future-oriented social integration to bring these new arrivals into respectful relations with the Haida world, the nightmare non-future of ecological collapse is warded off by the attempt to constitute care-full futures under Haida control. What all these Haida futures have in common – at least as they relate to the islands - is that they work to preserve Haida Gwaii, and the community of Old Massett in particular, as spaces in which Haida futures remain possible. This fact, as I have already begun to suggest in Chapter 2, might help us to resolve some of James Clifford’s dilemmas in relation to indigenous mobility. As I pointed towards then, the notion that “place” is significant to indigenous peoples – politically, socially, affectively, culturally – has become one of the essential components of how “indigeneity” is understood as a global phenomenon and a strategic identity from which rights claims can be advanced. Take Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this regard (Assembly 2007:10, emphasis mine). But what precisely does it mean to have a “distinctive, spiritual relationship” to a place, and who determines what might constitute that relationship? Here one of the perils of Povinelli’s “cunning of recognition,” as indigenous rights to territory become conflated with - and evaluated against - essentialized settler notions of Native ecological spirituality and/or emplacedness (cf: Raibmon 2005; Nadasdy 2003). If indigeneity thereby takes on the significance of being “rooted” in a particular place, of having certain identifiably “distinctive” cultural relationships to that place that others might lack, then the fact of indigenous mobility would indeed pose a profound dilemma for the category of indigeneity on the one hand and the capacity to make claims to territorial rights qua one’s indigeneity on the other. But there is a remarkable temporal shallowness to all this. To give a representative example, the Australian state criteria for what constitutes “cultural rights to territory” that Povinelli interrogates function solely in the past and the present, mandating that Aboriginal people show continuity of occupation and of the cultural practices associated with “Aboriginal occupation” in the mind of the court in order to be recognized as possessing a rightful claim to their home territories (Povinelli 2002). Erased in this is the possibility that a territory could be the site of departure and return, that it could have a future horizon that is flexible, subject to transformation alongside the transformations of the people(s) who call it home, without thereby necessarily losing its integrity as a rightful space of indigenous occupation. Such a possibility is not controversial for my Haida interlocutors. Rather, it has the status of an already-given certainty, community common sense - though there is without doubt much social work that goes into the production of that certainty. What makes indigenous mobility fraught, then, might have rather more to do with the constitution of settler polities than it does with the actual practices of indigenous peoples. Consider the various ways in which we have already seen colonial authorities attempt to control Haida movement, from the forced expulsions of 19th century Victoria to the removal of Haida children from the islands for residential schools less than a century later. Consider too the manufacture of the reserves themselves, the fixing of two Haida “Bands” with their own federally determined territories, beyond which Haida people could claim no rights over land, waters, or resources (cf: Harris 2002). This is a logic of containment, of isolation. In leaving their assigned spaces, Native peoples were assumed by colonial authorities to be leaving the space of their Nativeness behind, assimilating into settler society on its terms. Indeed, this was the motivating logic of the residential schools program, which took as its premise the idea that “Indians” could always “backslide” into “savage customs” as long as they remained in their homes and with their families. Aboriginal children thus had to be brought somewhere else to learn how to join “civilized,” that is, white Christian, society (Miller 1996). Reserves could thus be rendered as the last bastions of a “weird and waning race,” to quote Scott, their inhabitants temporally foreclosed and spatially fixed. The notion that indigenous people could move without ceasing to be (or ceasing to fight for their rights to self-determination and Title to their lands) unsettles this narrative, just as does the intertwined possibility of indigenous futurity. The relationship to Haida Gwaii that we’ve seen sketched out by the Haida futures explored in this dissertation does not preclude the possibility of “distinctive spiritual relationships” between Haida and their home territories. Quite the opposite, the ineffable quality of homing alone suggests that many of my interlocutors feel a connection to their home that goes beyond the kinds of practices that are only possible on the islands, their beauty or their history. Indeed, when considered as home, when considered as a site that requires care, there is little doubt that Haida Gwaii can encompass a wide range of phenomenological, affective, social, and cultural ways of relating to its lands and waters by Haida people (and their neighbours, at times for good, at times for ill). But it is not these relations as such that encompass the totality of Haida Gwaii’s significance. Rather, what is of greatest concern to my interlocutors is the continuing future possibility that relations like that could be formed, that people could continue to be called home to Haida Gwaii once they’ve fully explored the world off-island, that the qualities that precisely make Haida Gwaii home could be preserved. This is what it means, I think, to “take care” of Haida Gwaii, to allow it to continue as a homeland for uncounted future generations. Though they certainly emphasize the need for Haida Gwaii to be maintained as a location for Haida futurity, this does not mean that the futures we have seen expend all the possible ways in which such future forms of Haida social, material, ecological, and relational life could be formed. Recall Ja$e ElNino’s challenge of a future so open that its possible contents can only be guessed at. What Haida future-making demonstrates is that there are a set of potentialities which are worth protecting so that Haida people can continue to access them, to come home to them, even as continuing forms of mobility and political processes can also shape and reshape Haida social and cultural life on and off the islands. Homeland is not a regimented place where Haida people must always live in order to be authentically Haida. Rather, it is a location where they should always be able to, in their own (necessarily multiple, often contested, sometimes even contradictory) terms. Sovereignty At the same time, there is an inescapably political dimension to the attempt to render Haida Gwaii as the homeland of a still open Haida future. The assertion of the (located) openness of the future does not necessarily make it so. As I noted in the first part of this dissertation, the flow of Haida departures and returns unfold in the broader context of the settler, capitalist state; indeed, they are made necessary in part by the current absence of economic opportunity on island, just as the arrival of potentially threatening strangers is a result of their privileged position in the very capitalist economy they seek to escape. Constituting futures in which Haida people have the freedom to engage with that economy (and settler society more generally) as they see fit while retaining the capacity to come home (complicated as that process might be) also reiterates the inescapability of some form of engagement with that socio-economy. Likewise, the notion of Haida Gwaii as Haida homeland cannot be separated from current Haida struggles to assert their rights to the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii, the resources found therein, and their sovereign capacity to govern themselves and the islands in the ways they find appropriate. This is, recall, the very crux of the CHN’s own commitment to the assurance of futurity, as it is only by positioning itself as the rightful, sovereign government of the Haida Nation and its homeland of Haida Gwaii that it can adequately care for the islands and protect them from external threat. And the continuing advance of the Enbridge project despite fierce opposition from CHN, the Old Massett Village Council, their Haida constituents, and the non-Haida actors with whom they are “united against Enbridge” (and this alongside protest all over the northwest coast) gives the nightmare futures of environmental collapse – pushed through by corporate interests and Canadian politicians - a frightening immanence. The assertion of the openness of the future is made, in short, in (and against) a context in which closures remain endemic. And yet, something has changed in this landscape from the initial erasures of Native futurity we drew out in the first chapter. In the narratives of colonial actors like Duncan Campbell Scott, it was absolutely clear that “Indians” were disappearing because their social worlds were being superseded by more “civilized” ways of living and being, ones that these Native subjects would also, inevitably, in the end, adopt (or failing that, perish outright). There was a future. It was simply a settler one. But the nightmare futures of that my Haida interlocutors ward against in their own future-making reach beyond Haida life alone. Environmental collapse, most dramatically, threatens the sustainability of all life; toxins in the land and the waters threaten human lives regardless of their relative indigeneity, race, or gender (e.g. Choy 2011; Crate 2011). Put another way, the impetus for non-Haida (and non-First Nations subjects more generally) to be “united against Enbridge” with their indigenous neighbours comes in no small part because an oil spill also profoundly threatens the lives and livelihoods of non-Aboriginal coastal residents, a fact which Masa Takei, among others, made clear in Chapter 3. Nor is the anxiety that young people might abandon their small town to pursue economic and educational advantage in an urban context limited to reserve communities. Instead, the compulsions of capitalist economic life compel such migrations throughout the globe. The nightmare futures that Haida people constitute alternative futures to ward against are not just future of indigenous erasure under settler colonialism. They are erasures of settler society itself. There is thus an extraordinary political claim embedded in Haida future-making, a claim which gains its power precisely because Haida future-making as we have seen it does not (perhaps cannot) escape from the larger field of settler-colonial determination. Instead, in Haida future-making we find the implicit assertion that Haida people can make futures that address the dilemmas of Haida and settler life alike, ones that can at least “navigate,” to borrow Appadurai’s phrasing, towards possible futures that do not end in absolute erasure. If Povinelli and Byrd are correct and settler liberal governance makes itself possible and legitimate through a perpetual deferral of the problems of the present, then part of the power of Haida future-making is to expose the threatening non-futures that might emerge out of this bracketed present, to expose as lie the liberal promise of a good life always yet to come and to attempt to constitute alternatives. It is no coincidence that we find this in the midst of a struggle over sovereignty. And this not just in the sense of the Council of the Haida Nation’s ongoing assertion of its sovereign right to govern the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii on behalf of all Haida people, as we saw in Chapter 5. Rather, as Joanne Barker has argued, over the course of the latter half of the twentieth century sovereignty has emerged as a: particularly valued term within indigenous scholarship and social movements and through the media of cultural production. It [is] a term around which analyses of indigenous histories and cultures were organized and whereby indigenous activists articulate their agendas for social change (Barker 2005:18). Through the assertion of sovereignty, indigenous political leaders, activists and scholars refute “the dominant notion that indigenous people [are] merely one among many ‘minority groups’ under the administration of state social service and welfare programs.” Instead, “sovereignty defines indigenous people with concrete rights to self-government, territorial integrity, and cultural autonomy under international law” (18). The trouble is, of course, that indigenous claims to sovereignty are always made within the context of colonial nation-states, ones whose own legitimacy is put at considerably risk both by the prospect of self-determining indigenous Nations (re)-emerging within their boundaries and the troubling of their own historical narratives of sovereign rights (cf: Comaroff and Comaroff 2003b). (One of these narratives, which reinterpreted indigenous lands as terra nullius and thus open to occupation, we’ve encountered already in Chapter 3). Thus, while sovereignty might indeed “define” indigenous peoples with concrete rights to territorial Title and self-determination, in theory equal under international law to the states who also lay claim to their territories, that definition does not in and of itself make possible the practice of this sovereignty. In this regard settler states such as Canada have shifted in their response to First Peoples’ sovereignty claims from outright rejection to a set of policies of selective recognition,5 but even the latter still positions Native nations as being subject to the authority and oversight (if not the structural forms) of the state. This means, as we have seen in Chapter 5, that indigenous governments such as the Council of the Haida Nation are in a precarious position, attempting to constitute their own sovereign authority without access to many of the conventional means of sovereignty in Western political thought – e.g., the monopoly on legitimate violence (Weber 1946), decisive authority to make and enact law (Schmitt 2005), or exclusive territorial control (Brown 2010; cf: Hobbes 1994). Alongside this precarity is the equally anxious question of whether or not sovereignty is even an appropriate analytical to center indigenous rights around precisely because it is historically a Western concept, one that had been drawn on to dispossess indigenous peoples over the course of settler colonial history (Barker 2005:18–19). (Indeed, the very next essay in Barker’s edited volume, by Mohawk scholar Taiake Alfred, categorically rejects sovereignty as an inappropriate tool for indigenous political assertions for these reasons and, also, because it draws attention away from developing and furthering “genuinely” Aboriginal political modes of thought (Alfred 2005; cf: Alfred 2009). The fact that sovereignty remains such a preeminent concept in the struggle for indigenous rights even though it is both epistemologically problematic and politically constrained has meant that there has been a recent push in both anthropology and indigenous studies to “widen” the definition of sovereignty, so that it might encompass multiple forms of indigenous social, political and legal practice outside of the conventional purview of “sovereign power” (e.g. Cattelino 2008; Richland 2011; Simpson 2000; Simpson 2014). Or, as Joanne Barker puts it: There is no fixed meaning for what sovereignty is – what it means by definition, what it implies in public debate, or how it has been conceptualized in international, nation, or indigenous law. Sovereignty – and its related histories, perspectives, and identities – is embedded within the specific social relations in which it is invoked and given meaning. How and when it emerges and functions are determined by the “located” political agendas and cultural perspectives of those who rearticulate it into public debate or political document to do a specific work of opposition, invitation, or accommodation. It is no more possible to stabilize what sovereignty means and how it matters to those who invoke it than it is to forget the historical and cultural embeddedness of indigenous peoples’ multiple and contradictory political perspectives and agendas for empowerment, decolonization, and social justice (Barker 2005:21, emphasis original). The opening up of sovereignty as flexible, multiple, and subject to all manner of diverse rearticulations carries particular weight (and, perhaps, ambiguity) since, as a historical concept in Western political theory, sovereignty was overwhelmingly concerned with closure. As Wendy Brown argues in her Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, the classic vision of sovereign power rests in the capacity to divide the inside from the outside, to make borders around a people – a “nation” – and separate that people from those outside it. Thus Schmitt’s “friend-enemy” distinction, for instance, or even John Locke’s consistent preoccupation with fences as a way of marking the existence of territory (Brown 2010; cf: Schmitt 1996; Locke 1988). The historical conditions of indigenous sovereignty claims in the context of settler colonialism make such absolute closures impossible for indigenous peoples. We might add, though, that their persistent presence also challenges the closure of the settler nation-state. Indeed, this is part of Brown’s point. The very fact that we see ever more spectacular performances of sovereign power on the part of contemporary nation-states – e.g., the titular “walls” that are being constructed along the borders of an increasing number of states - is a sign of the very insecurity of their political authority (Brown 2010).6 The conditions of settler colonial sovereignty, in other words, may be rather more “open,” and thus closer to those of indigenous “nation-within-nations,” then they may at first appear. If this means, in turn, that the future of settler political life is becoming as uncertain as the future for indigenous life has always been since the advent of settlement, then this means only what we have already begun to see: the dilemmas that Haida people confront in their future-making practices are also the dilemmas facing settler society. Take Chapter 4, in which the absence of any “one” definitive governing entity compels the constitution of an aspirational framework of accountability which could, were it realized, render navigable Haida relations to the many governments that claim their loyalties. As I hinted at there, such dilemmas are not restricted to the Haida sociopolitical world; rather, they may in fact be endemic to contemporary democratic societies and the multiple forms of governance (licit and otherwise) that emerge therein. In suggesting that there are Haida ways of refiguring a shared Haida-settler set of contemporary problematics, we might think of Haida future-making as simultaneously an instantiation of the multiple, flexible and always contingently located practices of sovereignty to which Barker points and a different way of thinking about indigenous political potentiality. In the former sense, Haida future-making is without doubt concerned with carving out spaces in which Haida existence can continue, expand, and change without losing the capacity to reproduce itself as, precisely, Haida existence. Thus the processes of homecoming we explored in Chapter 2, or Chapter 5’s explicitly political attempts to establish control over the islands for future generations. If the absence of indigenous sovereignty is the absence of the capacity of an indigenous people to (self)-determine their own futures, then the constitution of Haida futures can be seen exactly as sovereign work, whether in the overt sense of the Council of the Haida Nation’s assertions or the somewhat more implicit mode of Alice Stevens’ proposed mass adoptions. Significant here, though, is the fact that these acts of future-making carry meanings beyond their status as “responses” to the social and political dilemmas of contemporary Haida life. Thus Alice Stevens’ adoptions bring “hippie” children into the framework of Haida kinship relations, in one sense neutralizing their potential threat, but also constituting a complex new network of social relations between Haida and non-Haida whose potential significances go well beyond the protection of Haida territory and resources; thus the Council of the Haida Nation emerges as a “state-like” governing entity through its authorizing promise to “take care” of the islands, but in so doing takes on a series of new roles in Haida political life whose full consequences remain to be seen. If it is a sovereign action to envision an opening of possible futures for Haida people, then this very openness might also exceed the boundaries of sovereignty as a problematic for indigenous people even as it responds to them. Which is also, perhaps, why Haida futures seem so consistently to sketch out social, ecological, and political fields that encompass non-Haida; more, that are futures for Canada as well as for the Haida people living within the nation-state’s borders. Or, at least, futures that have the capacity to be so. What would it mean to figure an indigenous sovereignty that speaks beyond itself, one that promises to invert the order of settler domination through reconfiguring the shared futures of indigenous and settler peoples? This would not be a sovereignty premised on territorial closure, or even absolute political autonomy. It would, however, decisively overturn any settler colonial anticipations of the inevitable erasure of Native peoples. Quite the opposite, it would position indigenous practices of anticipation, aspiration, certainty, and anxiety at the forefront of contemporary modes of political imagination. Unsettling Futures A question remains, however. Could such a refiguring of the temporal and political horizon of settler and indigenous relationships remain possible even if the futures that indigenous people work to constitute remain unrealized in the settler colonial present? Or, put another way, we must always be careful not to conflate a capacity to form new futures for settler nation-states with the actual materializations of these futures. The Haida futures that I have discussed, even as they promise possible ways of navigating – of restructuring, even – the settler-Haida present, remain firmly bound by the colonial constraints of this present. But perhaps the stakes here have never been about overthrowing the Canadian colonial order outright. Rather, what I hope this dissertation has shown is that Haida future-making has the capacity to unsettle the settler colonial present, to challenge its received categories and demonstrate how, slowly, gradually, Haida people are reconfiguring its terms through the work of producing the future. Certainly, the sheer fact of Haida futurity should put to the lie any further notion that Haida people exist only to replicate their past or live only in the deferral of their eventual disappearance. The future is alive and well in Old Massett, although this does not meant that it is not also a site of profound anxieties. In working to ward off those anxieties through the juxtaposition of nightmare futures against their more desirable alternatives, then, Haida people unsettle the epistemological foundations of the forms of settler colonialism and liberalism against which Byrd and Povinelli write. At the same time (if you’ll pardon the pun), I think we can see the social work that futuremaking does iteratively, as a gradual reshaping of the actual conditions of Canadian society. Here I borrow Judith Butler’s suggestion, following Foucault, that the regulatory norms of society function only through their consistent and unstable reiteration (and materialization) in everyday social life.7 From this perspective, the ways in which Haida people work within and even reiterate the constraints and demands of Canadian settler mainstream society can also slowly and strategically shift those very constraints and demands, materializing a HaidaCanadian future that might in fact be quite different from the present even as it does not ever fully “escape” from its dilemmas. Perhaps the most unsettling potential of all here lies simply in the ways in which Haida people incorporate the conditions of the settler colonial present as being paths towards Haida futures. Not vanished, or vanquished. Ongoing.

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › Rights Good

“Rights” are the most effective framework for advancing decolonization. Their critique denies the reality of effective indigenous rights movements that chose to use this language.

Lightfoot 20, PhD – University of Minnesota, Political Science is Anishinaabe, a citizen of the Lake Superior Band of Ojibwe, enrolled at the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community in Baraga, Michigan (“The Pessimism Traps of Indigenous Resurgence,” In: Pessimism in International Relations, Edited by: Tim Stevens and Nicholas Michelsen, pp. 164)

Concerning the state in relation to Indigenous peoples on the international level, Corntassel argues that states and global organisations, for years, have been consistently framing Indigenous peoples’ self-determination claims in ways that ‘jeopardize the futures of indigenous communities’.31 He claims that states first compartmentalise Indigenous self-determination by separating lands and resources from political and legal recognition of a limited autonomy. Second, he notes, states sometimes deny the existence of Indigenous peoples living within their borders. Thirdly, a political and legal entitlement framing by states deemphasises other responsibilities. Finally, he claims that states, through the rights discourse, limit the frameworks through which Indigenous peoples can seek self-determination. Like Alfred and Coulthard, Corntassel has concluded that states are deliberate and never changing in their behaviour. With this move, Corntassel limits and actually demeans Indigenous agency, overlooking the reality that Indigenous organisations themselves chose the human rights framework and rights discourse as a target sphere of action precisely because, as was evident in earlier struggles like slavery, civil rights or women’s rights, these were tools available to them that had a proven track record of opening up new possibilities and shifting previous state positions and behaviour. Indigenous advocates also cleverly realised, by the 1970s, that the anti-discrimination and decolonisation frames could be used together against states. States did, in no way, nefariously impose a rights framework on Indigenous peoples. Rather, Indigenous organisations and savvy Indigenous political actors deliberately chose to frame their self-determination struggles within the human rights framework in order to bring states into a double bind where they could not credibly claim to adhere to human rights and claim that they uphold equality while simultaneously denying Indigenous peoples’ human rights and leaving them with a diminished and unequal right of self-determination. But, because he is caught in the pessimism trap of seeing the state only as unified, deliberate and unchanging, Corntassel overlooks and diminishes the clear story of Indigenous agency and the potential for positive change in advancing self-determination in a multitude of ways.

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › Engage State good

The aff acts as a mediator between civil society and anti-state politics – 2 impacts to this (1) It’s a survival strategy (2) It creates change through knowledge about problems in civil society.

Turner, 2006 Dale Antony. Associate Professor of Government and Native American Studies at Dartmouth - This is not a peace pipe: Towards a critical indigenous philosophy. University of Toronto Press, 2006.

This is where Tully's notion of a mediator is helpful. He is offering a way for philosophers, especially political philosophers, to see their own field of study in a way that includes - indeed, even demands -Aboriginal participation. But his mediator necessarily engages an Aboriginal mediator. An Aboriginal mediator - a word warrior - is an indigenous person who engages the imposed legal and political discourses of the state guided by the belief that the knowledge and skills to be gained by engaging in such discourses are necessary for the survival of all indigenous peoples. Tully's mediator and the indigenous word warrior both inhabit a social space that is difficult to define. Indigenous intellectuals must be citizens of an indigenous community, but how they will manage to move between languages, between ways of thinking about the world, remains to be determined in practice. Clearly, though, word warriors will have to assert and protect those ways of knowing the world that define indigenous peoples. This may well be a difficult task in a sometimes hostile world, but it is what we will need to do. Perhaps Edward Said' s idea of an intellectual as an exile is useful here: 'the exilic intellectual does not respond to the logic of the conventional but to the audacity of daring, and to representing change, to moving on, not standing still.' Later on he adds: 'Nothing in my view is more reprehensible than those habits of mind in the intellectual that induce avoidance, that characteristic turning away from a difficult and principled position which you know to be the right one, but which you decide not to take.'65

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › Engage State good

Rhetorical engagement in civil society is a survival strategy for Natives and is key to hold settlers accountable – this does not preclude Decolonization.

Turner, 2006 Dale Antony. Associate Professor of Government and Native American Studies at Dartmouth - This is not a peace pipe: Towards a critical indigenous philosophy. University of Toronto Press, 2006.

The issue of participation generates epistemological problems of reconciling indigenous forms of knowledge with Western European philosophy. It also generates practical problems: How are indigenous voices to be accommodated in the legal and political discourses of the state? I contend that the intellectual work required to bring (or force) indigenous voices into the dominant intellectual community is the responsibility of a group of indigenous intellectuals called 'word warriors.' Word warriors reconcile the forms of knowledge rooted in indigenous communities with the legal and political discourses of the state. They do this for two reasons. First, our survival as indigenous peoples demands that in order to assert and protect the rights we believe we possess, we must engage the discourses of the state more effectively. Second, indigenous knowledge offers legitimate ways of understanding the world - ways that have never been respected within the legal and political practices of the dominant culture. To make matters worse, these ways have not played a significant role (except in the early treaties) in determining the normative language of the political relationship. Word warriors do the intellectual work of protecting indigenous ways of knowing; at the same time, they empower these understandings within the legal and political practices of the state. Word warriors listen to their 'indigenous philosophers' while engaging the intellectual and political practices of the dominant culture. 9

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › Engage State good

Refusal to engage settler states sabotages successful indigenous movements. Binary between authentic resurgence and coopted recognition facilitates divide and conquer response.

Sheryl LIGHTFOOT Canada Research Chair of Global Indigenous Rights and Politics @ British Columbia – Anishinaabe from the Lake Superior Band of Ojibwe ’20 in Pessimism in International Relations eds. Stevens and Michelsen p. 156-170

Despite all of these activities designed to re-write the relationship between states and Indigenous peoples, some high-profile critical Indigenous political theorists reject all state overtures towards reconciliation and take extremely pessimistic approaches towards future Indigenous-state relations. They advocate that Indigenous resurgence through a return to Indigenous land-based forms of governance is the only path to decolonisation. I argue that while resurgence school theorists are strong advocates for Indigenous nations, and bring focus and clarity to a set of issues about power structures and dynamics, they are all caught in the same set of three ‘pessimism traps’ that unnecessarily limit their capacity to contribute to improved Indigenous-state relationships. These pessimism traps emanate from a reliance on Fanonian revolutionary thought and a problematic application of Fanonian theory from French-colonised North Africa to an entirely different context in the English-speaking settler states. Finally, I argue, these pessimism traps are diametrically opposed to the work and vision of Indigenous organisations who have been working on the ground for decades to assert Indigenous nationhood both domestically and internationally, in ways that often assertively and creatively challenge and shift the existing system of sovereign states. In sum, because the resurgence school remains trapped in a pessimism box of its own making, it remains significantly out of step with Indigenous movements and actually risks harming their efforts to advance Indigenous self-determination in creative and innovative ways.

Pessimism Trap 1: A Clear Demarcation of Indigenous Individuals into Only Two Categories, 'Authentic5 and 'Co-Opted5

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › Totalizing Bad

Framing settler colonialism through a totalizing lens makes indigenous liberation impossible by setting the terms of victory as all-or-nothing—pessimism actively reifies settler dominance

Busbridge, 18—Research Fellow at the Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University (Rachel, “Israel-Palestine and the Settler Colonial ‘Turn’: From Interpretation to Decolonization,” Theory, Culture & Society Vol 35, Issue 1, 2018, dml)

The prescription for decolonisation—that is, a normative project committed to the liberation of the colonised and the overturning of colonial relationships of power (Kohn & McBride, 2011: 3)—is indeed one of the most counterhegemonic implications of the settler colonial paradigm as applied to IsraelPalestine, potentially shifting it from a diagnostic frame to a prognostic one which offers a ‘proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack’ (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). What, however, does the settler colonial paradigm offer by way of envisioning decolonisation? As Veracini (2007) notes, while settler colonial studies scholars have sought to address the lack of attention paid to the experiences of Indigenous peoples in conventional historiographical accounts of decolonisation (which have mostly focused on settler independence and the loosening of ties to the ‘motherland’), there is nevertheless a ‘narrative deficit’ when it comes to imagining settler decolonisation. While Veracini (2007) relates this deficit to a matter of conceptualisation, it is apparent that the structural perspective of the paradigm in many ways closes down possibilities of imagining the type of social and political transformation to which the notion of decolonisation aspires. In this regard, there is a worrying tendency (if not tautological discrepancy) in settler colonial studies, where the only solution to settler colonialism is decolonisation—which a faithful adherence to the paradigm renders largely unachievable, if not impossible.

To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to return to Wolfe’s (2013a: 257) account of settler colonialism as guided by a ‘zero-sum logic whereby settler societies, for all their internal complexities, uniformly require the elimination of Native alternatives’. The structuralism of this account has immense power as a means of mapping forms of injustice and indignity as well as strategies of resistance and refusal, and Wolfe is careful to show how transmutations of the logic of elimination are complex, variable, discontinuous and uneven. Yet, in seeking to elucidate the logic of elimination as the overarching historical force guiding settler-native relations there is an operational weakness in the theory, whereby such a logic is simply there, omnipresent and manifest even when (and perhaps especially when) it appears not to be; the settler colonial studies scholar need only read it into a situation or context. It thus hurtles from the past to the present into the future, never to be fully extinguished until the native is, or until history itself ends. There is thus a powerful ontological (if not metaphysical) dimension to Wolfe’s account, where there is such thing as a ‘settler will’ that inherently desires the elimination of the native and the distinction between the settler and native can only ever be categorical, founded as it is on the ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ (2013a: 258). It is here that the differences between earlier settler colonial scholarship on Israel-Palestine and the recent settler colonial turn come into clearest view. While Jamal Hilal’s (1976) Marxist account of the conflict, for instance, engaged Palestinians and Jewish Israelis in terms of their relations to the means of production, Wolfe’s account brings its own ontology: the bourgeoisie/proletariat distinction becomes that of settler/native, and the class struggle the struggle between settler, who seeks to destroy and replace the native, and native, who can only ever push back. Indeed, if the settler colonial paradigm views history in similar teleological terms to the Marxist framework, it does not offer the same hopeful vision of a liberated future. After all, settler colonialism has only one story to tell—‘either total victory or total failure’ (Veracini, 2007).

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › Engage Civil Society 1st

Perm do both – Aff as a pre-requisite and Decol alone fails – engagement with civil society is necessary to create spaces to free ourselves from colonialism.

Turner, 2006 Dale Antony. Associate Professor of Government and Native American Studies at Dartmouth - This is not a peace pipe: Towards a critical indigenous philosophy. University of Toronto Press, 2006.

Alfred is right to make colonialism, and decolonization, a political problem for indigenous peoples. But it is not only a political problem. What do we mean when we say that colonial mentalities have taken a stranglehold on indigenous communities? In the language of postcolonialism, Alfred tells us that 'the colonial mentality is the intellectual dimension in the group of emotional and psychological pathologies associated with internalized oppression.'35 Colonialism is embedded in the very being of indigenous life, which for many indigenous peoples includes the spiritual dimension of their existence. It is the process of decolonization that I find difficult to imagine. As with the drive for indigenous forms of political recognition, in order to create the space for us to be free from colonialism, we must engage the dominant culture. We may not know what the process will look like, but we do know it has to be a dialogical one. Colonial discourses, and now postcolonial discourses, may or may not be ultimately useful for indigenous politics, but it seems to me that these forms of intellectual projects work with a view of colonialism that involves a complex, intercultural set of relations that are dynamic in nature. Colonialism has influenced virtually every aspect of indigenous people's daily lives: language, religion, sexuality, art, philosophy, and politics. Alfred is right to point out that colonialism has to end and that indigenous peoples can play a major role in bringing about that end, but we need to know how to go about doing so. Abolishing colonialism is the goal of many indigenous and non-indigenous peoples; finding a way to do it is the great dilemma. If a just political relationship has to be dialogical in nature, indigenous peoples will not be able to secure a 'postcolonial' political relationship without the help of non-indigenous people. But making sense of the meaning of colonialism, and especially addressing colonialism in 'philosophical thinking,' is relatively new territory for indigenous intellectuals.

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › Decol Fails

Alt can’t solve material decolonization – doesn’t prevent uranium mining, or unethical policy makers.

Anna Frances Laing 15. Ph.D. candidate, School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, College of Science and Engineering, University of Glasgow, “Territory, resistance and struggles for the plurinational state: the spatial politics of the TIPNIS Conflict,” Ph.D. thesis, January 2015, p.215-216,

The use of indigeneity as a common signifier has fostered mobilisation across different ethnic groups. This process has been aided by NGOs and técnicos (technical experts) that accompanied the Eighth and Ninth Marches. NGO representatives facilitated meetings, provided training, funded activities and constructed written announcements and texts. These mediatory actors therefore helped to re-articulate the grievances of the marchers under the banner of indigenous rights. This could be seen in the writing of open letters to the government during both the Eighth and Ninth Marches, made possible through the aid of technical experts from one of the principle legal organisations defending indigenous rights in Bolivia CEJIS (Centro de Estudios Jurídicos e Investigación Social; Centre of Legal Studies and Social Investigation). Therefore, in order to ‘speak’ and be heard, the indigenous peoples have to undergo a process of representation through the language of legal rights. They therefore remain ‘subaltern’ because their attempts at self-representation fall outside the ‘the lines laid down by the official institutional structures of representation’ (Spivak 1996: 306). Thus, Glenn (2011) contends that the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is ironic since it seeks the recognition of alternative epistemologies through civic institutions that have homogenising and universalising tendencies. However, as Fabricant notes in her work with the Landless Peasants Movement in Bolivia, movements ‘take NGO ideas and meld them with their own creative strategies to come up with solutions that will work for their communities’ (2012: 120). Moreover, Gustafson (2009b) offers a balanced interpretation of the ways that NGOs offer a language and model for politicising alternative worldviews. The indigenous movement consciously reifies certain strategic essentialisms whilst at other times actively resisting them. Indeed, indigenous knowledges do not exist outside of other knowledge forms (Walsh 2002). As Walsh argues ‘[t]he efficacy of the movement in fact derives from its ability to construct and use the correspondences among various contemporary knowledge positions […] in order to exercise political tactics and strategies’ (2002: 71). A politics of refusal is unlikely to advance indigenous demands. As such, Hale suggests an analytical framework based on the Gramscian notion of articulation to ask: will the subjugated knowledge and practices be articulated within the dominant, and neutralised? Or will they occupy the space opened from above while resisting its built in logic, connect with others, toward ‘transformative’ cultural-political alternatives that still cannot be fully imagined? (2002: 499). Indeed, there is the danger that identifying under a single indigenous label risks losing the complexities and processes that permeate the heterogeneous inter-ethnic collectivity of the lowland indigenous movement. This acts to disembody the identity claims from some of the more radical tangents of the movement. Mexican anthropologist Miguel Alberto Bartolomé argues that indigenous autonomy should contemplate ‘new modes of [interethnic, inter-cultural] social articulation that are more egalitarian than existing [ones]’ and that a multi-ethnic state ‘should explore all possible paths in the search for novel forms of conviviality between culturally distinct groups’ (2005: 146 cited in Gustafson 2009a: 998). Escobar similarly calls for a decolonisation that ‘can be started in earnest from a deessentialized perspective’ (2008: 305). Indeed, the movement seeks the recognition of plurality without the homogenisation of indigenous cultures or ideologies or the ranking of difference that necessarily works to subordinate some cultures and let others dominate. This project of emancipatory societal transformation is an on-going challenge for the lowland indigenous movement.

2023 Michigan Kritik
AFF › Decol Fails

Alternative Vagueness – Decolonization is not a clear tactic and only acts to confuse goals making resistance to codified legal principles impossible.

Bashir and Busbridge, 19

(Bashir, Sociology@OpenUniv., Rachel, ACUs National School of Arts , The Politics of Decolonisation and Bi-Nationalism in Israel/Palestine Vol 67, Issue 2, 2019)

For all its attached redemptive prospects and radical possibilities, it is important to emphasise that the meanings of decolonisation as both a concept and political project are not just broad, but also multifaceted and highly contested. What it means to ‘undo’ colonialism is deeply contextual (Jansen and Osterhammel, 2017). While colonialism can be defined broadly as a relationship of domination in which a people or territory is politically and economically subjugated to a foreign power, actual colonial situations vary quite widely from each other, depending on, among others, the particular political systems instituted to maintain control, types of exploitation and expropriation (resources, labour, plantations), relationship between the metropole and colony and patterns of migration they compel (slavery, settlement). Projects of decolonisation accordingly take different forms even if they are united by the common concern of ending or overturning structures of domination instituted by colonialism, which has historically taken place mostly through the withdrawal of colonial powers and achievement of independence for the colonised (Buchanan, 2010). Decolonisation speaks to the aspiration of self-rule and its concomitant critique of colonialism as the ‘systematic denial of freedom’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 6) and is therefore entangled with a variety of concerns, namely, self-determination, justice, equality, freedom and solidarity against colonialism and imperialism. As Todd Shepherd (2006: 3–4) writes, decolonisation is ‘a much wider concept than the mere “winning of Independence” or “transfer of power”… It entails the exploration of dreams, the analysis of struggles, compromises, pledges and achievements, and the rethinking of fundamentals’. Traditional literature on decolonisation approached it in terms of the historical process that began in the immediate aftermath of World War Two in which countries previously under (typically European) foreign rule transitioned to constitutional independence (Buchanan, 2010). Decolonisation was one of the most significant developments of the twentieth century, radically changing the face of the globe from one in which a small number of empires had dominion over some 80% of the earth’s surface to an international order based on the principle of self-determination and made up of ostensibly independent states (Hopkins, 2008). Scholars in this tradition have done much to illuminate the widereaching structural transformations that accompanied decolonisation, including the emergence of anti-colonial and national liberation struggles at the turn of the century, shifts in world economy that made the maintenance of traditional forms of Empire increasingly difficult, the development of a ‘Third World’ political project and the institutionalisation of human and civic rights principles that rendered systems based on ideas of racial and ethnic superiority less viable (Hopkins, 2008: 216). Yet, the focus on transition has been critiqued for its narrowness insofar as it seems to take for granted the meanings of selfdetermination and temporally restricts decolonisation to the moment of national liberation. Postcolonial scholars, among others, have been at the forefront of this charge, arguing that decolonisation did not produce a postcolonial world per se, but rather one that continues to be shaped in significant ways by the legacies of European colonialism (e.g. Spivak, 1999). As Ella Shohat (1992) has argued, there is no way of turning back from the world colonialism set in play nor did colonial modes of domination end with the formal period of decolonisation. From this broadened perspective, decolonisation is the difficult task of tracing the economic, political, social, cultural, relational and linguistic consequences of colonialism and is therefore also an ongoing imaginative project seeking ‘a new form of consciousness and way of life’ (Pieterse and Parekh, 1995: 3) beyond the coloniality of modern modes of culture, identity and knowledge more generally. While the transitional focus of conventional scholarship is quite illuminating in the contexts of Africa and Asia, for example, it furthermore excludes a great many decolonisation efforts that have taken place and continue to take place in other regions. This includes countries that remained dependent or only achieved semi-independence as dominions, decolonising projects carried out in territories never formally under colonial rule (the Iranian Revolution, for instance) and – as is particularly important to our discussion here – settler colonies that only partially decolonised, whether by way of loosening ties with the Motherland or achieving independence, but which continue to dominate substantial indigenous populations (Hopkins, 2008). There is a significant lacuna in the decolonisation literature when it comes to settler colonialism, which has increasingly been recognised as a distinct form of colonial practice – and one that is particularly resistant to decolonisation (Veracini, 2007). As the transfer of an exogenous population to a territory they intend to claim as their permanent home, settler colonialism establishes quite a different structural relationship to ‘traditional’ forms of colonialism, especially when settler colonial projects succeed in creating a state (Bateman and Pilkington, 2011). Rather than governing native peoples in order to extract resources for economic gain, settler colonisers instead aim to ‘seize their land and push them beyond an ever-expanding frontier of settlement’ (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 2). For Patrick Wolfe (2006), what distinguishes settler colonialism is thus that it is guided by a logic of elimination as opposed to a logic of exploitation, wherein the eradication of indigenous presence is essential to the success of settler colonial projects. The primacy of national liberation in the literature makes it especially difficult to imagine, let alone theorise, decolonisation in many settler colonial contexts. Whereas some settler colonial projects like Algeria and Kenya saw decolonisation by way of a mass settler exodus, paving the way for the establishment of independent states, the more successful ones established permanent settler communities (e.g. Northern Ireland) or their own states (e.g. Australia, Canada, the United States) which preclude a simple transition from foreign rule to sovereign status (Veracini, 2007). This is of course not to say that self-determination of the type aspired to by anti-colonial national movements was an easy or even necessarily achievable task. As Kohn and McBride (2011) suggest, in pursuing the dream of self-rule, anti-colonial thinkers had to reckon with the difficulties of articulating alternative political foundations that would make for a genuinely self-determining polity, an enormous task which demands decolonising of minds as much institutions and territory (see Fanon, 2001[1963]). Decolonisation must pursue a convincing ‘break’ between a colonial past and a postcolonial future ‘through decisive action in the present’; it must also ‘seek to reinterpret the past in such a way that it may help in the present and future struggle for self-rule’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 19). While these pursuits are invariably contingent, partial and commonly symbolic, national liberation struggles very often provide the fodder for a reinterpreted past that is robustly positive and the establishment of an independent state serves as that aspired for ‘break’. Settler colonial contexts, especially those where indigenous peoples live as minorities in settler states, make these types of symbolic transitions challenging, as they do the imagining of postcolonial alternatives. If the narrative structure of colonialism is circular (leave, stay, return), making that symbolic break possible, settler colonial narratives are linear insofar as the settler comes to stay and the line continues on unbroken (Veracini, 2007). As Ann Curthoys (1999: 288) writes, settler colonial spaces are simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising, which makes decolonisation temporally ambivalent at best. Lorenzo Veracini (2007) suggests that there are only two alternatives to settler evacuation for decolonising settler colonial forms and it is dubious whether one of these counts as decolonisation at all: the decolonisation of relationships through ‘the promotion of various processes of Indigenous reconciliation’ or the maintenance of the status quo ‘with the explicit rejection of the possibility of reforming the settler body politic’. Again, what the former might mean is often vague, and historically it is the decolonisation of relationships that is hardest to come by considering the psychological consequences of colonialism for coloniser and colonised alike (Memmi, 1965). Like traditional forms of colonialism, settler colonialism was legitimated by a belief in the colonised’s racial and cultural inferiority. However, the specific settler colonial pursuit of land seizure compels additional stereotypes of native peoples or unique applications of existing colonial ones, wherein their supposed inferiority makes them ill-equipped to develop that land (premodern, nomadic, barbaric) or, alternatively, voids any claims to ownership (terra nullius). In other words, settler colonialism is as much premised on the denial of indigenous peoples as a political constituency with rights to land as it is their purported inferiority, which is typically enshrined in their status as second-class citizens with all the economic, cultural and social disadvantage this entails (Bateman and Pilkington, 2011: 3). Given that settler societies are marked by ‘pervasive inequalities, usually codified in law, between native and settler populations’ which preserve political and economic privileges for the latter (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 4), decolonising relationships demands structural changes that often encounter significant resistance from settler constituencies. Likewise, it requires a reckoning with historical injustice – specifically violence and conflict at the colonial frontier – that is challenging for settler states and populations because it opens questions of settler identity, privileges, legitimacy and reparations and expressly seeks to scrutinise disavowed and long suppressed histories. Settler colonial decolonisation is thus complicated by a multitude of hurdles, which bring the postcolonial caution of the impossibility of a ‘break’ into stark relief. Kohn and McBride (2011) suggest that decisive action in the present is essential to decolonisation, but in settler colonial contexts this is hindered by power discrepancies between settler and native constituencies, a general lack of settler political will to enter into difficult processes of historical introspection as well as the constraining of Indigenous claims within the settler state. Indeed, even a commitment to a postcolonial polity as expressed through processes of historical reconciliation often encounters strong resistance when it comes to judicial, constitutional or legislative change genuinely decolonised relationships would demand. Nevertheless, even if it remains difficult to comprehensively imagine the decolonisation of ‘settler societies vis-à-vis Indigenous constituencies’ (Veracini, 2007), the central question must be how to construct political foundations which simultaneously acknowledge ‘the practices of racism, violence and subordination’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 18) that preceded them while also paving the way for a postcolonial future in which natives and settlers are equal parties and share the right to narrate the polity. Equality, freedom and justice may come from legally enshrining Indigenous rights to self-determination or, alternatively, doing away with the categories of ‘settler’ and ‘native’ altogether (Mamdani, 2001). What shape such efforts are likely to take depends, among others, on the ‘size and tenacity’ of Indigenous populations as well as the power of the settler constituency (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 3, 6). But we would suggest that the measure to which they may