Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Environment Tax › ---Gas Tax Solves Environment

A gas tax promotes sustainable transportation

Giménez-Nadal and Molina, 19 – J. Ignacio Giménez-Nadal (University of Zaragoza and BIFI, Department of Economic Analysis, Faculty of Economics), José Alberto Molina (University of Zaragoza, BIFI and IZA, Department of Economic Analysis, Faculty of Economics), September 2019, Elsevier, “Green commuting and gasoline taxes in the United States,” //ellie

In this paper, we analyze the relationship between the commuting behavior of workers in the United States and gasoline taxes, with a focus on driving and “green” modes of personal transport (i.e., public transport and walking/cycling). The United States is among the countries with the highest consumption of gasoline in the world (over 130 billion gallons of gasoline annually, Gillingham et al., 2015), generating around one-third of the US greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of the country (EPA, 2014). In order to implement efficient policies aimed at decreasing the consumption of energy, GHG emissions, and improving management of the environment, policymakers need to know the effects of different policy measures, such as increasing fuel taxes, or the Zero Emissions Vehicle (ZEV) mandate, both of which critically depend on the behavior of consumers. Thus, it is important to analyze the consumer response to changes in fuel taxes in their private transport decisions, and we here focus on the relationship between commuting time and gasoline taxes.

Despite that consumers may respond differently to changes in taxes than to changes in prices (Li et al., 2014), it is expected that consumers will respond similarly to each of those factors. Prior research has found negative price elasticities for the consumption of gasoline, based on driving behavior (Dahl and Sterner, 1991; Greening et al., 2000; Small and van Dender, 2007; Hughes et al., 2008; Burke and Nishitateno, 2013; Gillingham, 2014; Hymel and Small, 2015; Chen et al., 2017), and similar evidence has been found for the relationship between gasoline taxes and the consumption of gasoline (Dahl, 1979; Goel, 1994; Bento et al., 2005; Li et al., 2014; Liu, 2015). But the research to date has focused on the effect of gasoline taxes/prices on driving, leaving aside other modes of transport. Such analysis is relevant, as it has implications for GHG emissions. For instance, the use of public transport may be beneficial for the environment in comparison to private vehicles, as it helps to reduce GHG emissions (Stanley et al., 2003; Chapman, 2007; Gössling and Choi, 2015; Holian and Kahn, 2015). Also, the use of physical modes of transport contribute more to the reduction of GHG emissions as they are, ultimately, ‘zero carbon’ and an environmentally friendly solution for personal transport (Chapman, 2007). Thus, in order to have a complete view of the effect of tax instruments, we need to ask whether the reduction in driving due to an increase in fuel taxes devolves to a greater use of public transport, if it results in more walking/cycling, or both.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Environment Tax › ---Transportation Tax Solves National Security

Transportation taxes increase national security

Samusevych et al, 23 – Yaryna Samusevych (Department of Accounting and Taxation, Sumy State University), Serhiy Lyeonov (Department of Economic Cybernetics, Sumy State University, Department of Applied Social Sciences, Silesian University of Technology), Artem Artyukhov (Department of Marketing, Sumy State University), Volodymyr Martyniuk (Administrative and Financial Management Department, Lviv Polytechnic National University, Institute of Public Administration and Management, University of Economy and Innovation in Lublin), Iryna Tenytska (Department of Accounting and Taxation, Sumy State University), Joanna Wyrwisz (Faculty of Management, Lublin University of Technology), Krystyna Wojciechowska (Faculty of Management, Lublin University of Technology), January 3, 2023, Sustainability: Sustainable Organizations and Their Products in a Turbulent Environment Special Edition, “Optimal Design of Transport Tax on the Way to National Security: Balancing Environmental Footprint, Energy Efficiency and Economic Growth,” //ellie

Environmental taxation has a wide range of regulatory influence directions. Thus, taxes on the emissions of polluting substances have a direct restrictive and compensatory effect, to a greater extent. At the same time, energy, transport taxes, packaging taxes, etc. can provide incentives for the transformation of the economy in the direction of increasing its environmental and energy efficiency while maintaining the pace of economic development. Summarizing the directions of the regulatory influence of environmental taxes allowed for singling out three target blocks, reflecting the results of their functioning. This forms a background of the hypothesis that the result of establishing environmental taxes is the national security for the country ().

CHART OMITTED

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Environment Tax › ---Plastic Bag Tax Solves Environment

A 5-cent bag tax solves plastic pollution

Meyers 20 – Chloe Meyers, Duke University Graduate, April 18, 2020, Duke Nicholas School of the Environment US Environmental Policy, “The Power of the Plastic Bag Tax,” //ellie

Plastic has penetrated all aspects of daily life and is one of the most commonly used materials on the planet. The production of plastic is exponentially increasing, and it is now estimated that we produce the weight of the entire human population in plastic each year.[1] Plastic can be found in clothing, appliances, transportation, medicine, and even food.[2] Half of all plastic produced is used for single-use purposes, which includes plastic bags, bottles, and containers.[3] Although single-use plastics are often used just once for a few minutes, they accumulate and last on the planet for hundreds of years.[4] Worldwide, 500 million plastic bottles are used every year and more than one million plastic bags are used each minute.[5] Additionally, plastic bags are used for only 15 minutes on average before they are discarded.[6] To combat this growing and alarming issue, the federal government should implement a nationwide plastic bag tax to ensure each state is doing its part to fight plastic waste. This tax will mandate that each state implements a 5-cent plastic bag fee, which individual states or cities can increase or add an additional ban onto.

When single-use plastic is disposed of, it will either end up in a landfill or the ocean. Between 1950 to 2015, only 9% of plastic was recycled overall and 79% ended up in landfills, where plastic can take up to 1000 years to degrade.[7],[8] Once in a landfill, plastic can either accumulate, clutter around drains and enter rivers and the ocean, or blow away and land in the ocean.[9] Littered plastic is most often carried by rainwater and wind to the nearest streams and rivers.[10] Additionally, smaller plastics such as cotton buds and wipes can be flushed down the drain, sending it to the ocean.[11] The bottom line is that if plastic is not disposed of properly, chances are it will find its way into the ocean. It is estimated that over 8 million tons of plastic enter the ocean every year and over 90% of seabirds have plastic in their stomachs.[12]

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Environment Tax › ---Plastic Bag Tax Solves Environment

A bag tax significantly reduces plastic and paper pollution

Energy and Environment Lab, 18 – University of Chicago Energy and Environment Lab, September 2018, UChicago Urban Labs, “Chicago Bag Tax Study,” //ellie

One hundred billion plastic bags are used annually in America, where the majority end up in landfills, taking up to an estimated 1,000 years to decompose. In addition, paper bags also have significant environmental impacts—in 2015, paper production contributed to 20% of all toxic air releases in the US.

In early 2017, in an effort to curb disposable bag use, the City of Chicago implemented a seven-cent tax on all paper and plastic checkout bags. In partnership with ideas42 and New York University, the Energy & Environment Lab set to work to understand the effect of the tax.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Environment Tax › Solves Innovation

Environment taxes spur green tech innovation

Deng, Juqiu, et al. "Environmental protection tax and green innovation of heavily polluting enterprises: A quasi-natural experiment based on the implementation of China's environmental protection tax law." PLoS ONE, vol. 18, no. 6, 15 June 2023, p. e0286253. Gale Academic OneFile, (Deng Juqiu is a Professor of Department of Finance and Taxation at Sichuan University, Ph.D. Economics, Doctoral Supervisor)  link.gale.com/apps/doc/A753093976/AONE?u=umuser&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=b75614d4. Accessed 2 July 2023. *Only Introduction and conclusion included/hcc

Since the reform and opening up, China's previous extensive model has caused serious environmental pollution. To deal with the worsening pollution problem, China piloted the implementation of the pollutant charge fee system in 1979. However, there are some problems in the implementation of the system, such as low emission collection standards, insufficient rigidity of law enforcement and lack of standardization, which greatly reduce the effectiveness of . In order to overcome the disadvantages of the system and more effectively implement the concept of green development, the Chinese government introduced an environmental protection tax on January 1, 2018, which is the first separate tax law for environmental protection in China. As a more coercive and executive instrument of environmental regulation, the environmental protection tax plays a positive role in forcing enterprises to transform and upgrade, promoting the adjustment of economic structure and development mode to the intensive type and realizing green development. It cannot be ignored that the environmental protection tax may affect the innovation of enterprises by affecting the investment cost of enterprises. The improvement of green total factor productivity is the fundamental way to solve the problem of the dual pressure of environmental protection and economic growth in China, and the improvement of green productivity mainly depends on the green technological innovation of enterprises [1]. So how does the introduction of the environmental protection tax affect the green innovation of enterprises? Is the effect positive or negative? Is there heterogeneity in this effect? An in-depth study of the impact of environmental protection tax on enterprises' green innovation is not only conducive to exploring the "win-win" model of economic development and environmental protection, but also of great significance in promoting enterprises to achieve green transformation. Environmental protection tax is a typical tool for environmental regulation, while at present there are differences in the research conclusions on the role of environmental regulations on enterprises' green innovation. The traditional view of the neoclassical school of economics holds that the imposition of environmental protection tax will increase the costs of enterprises and reduce the profits of them, which will hinder the innovation activities of enterprises. Using the Chinese Carbon Trading Pilot Policy as a quasi-natural experiment, C et al. [2] found that this environmental regulation policy reduces enterprises' economic performance, thereby reducing the R&D investment, making overall enterprise technology innovation weaker. The empirical results of Stucki et al. [3] suggest that environmental laws and regulations will reduce the innovation tendency of enterprises if taxes and regulations cannot generate additional demand. However, the Porter Hypothesis [4] holds that the appropriate environmental regulation will stimulate the green technological innovation of enterprises, because the economic results of the green technological innovation of enterprises can offset the cost of environmental tax and compensate for the input of green innovation, thus increasing the profits of enterprises. Acemoglu et al. [5] believe that proper environmental regulation tools can achieve enterprises' green technology innovation, supporting the Porter Hypothesis. Peng et al. [6] found that environmental regulations enhances the enthusiasm of enterprises for green innovation and thus promotes green innovation behavior. The research of Zhang et al. [7] and Hu et al. [8] also show a positive relationship between environmental regulation and green innovation. But beyond that, some scholars believe that the impact of environmental regulation on corporate innovation is uncertain or not obvious [9,10]. In this paper, we argue that the reason for the dispute is that the influence of environmental taxes and fees on enterprises' green innovation is the result of the combination of the crowding out effect and the anti-driving effect, while the extent of them is uncertain. To answer the above questions and test the net effect of environmental protection tax on enterprises' green innovation, this paper constructs a three-sector model including consumers, producers and government based on Yu Pang's research [11] and theoretically analyzes the relationship between environmental protection tax and enterprises' green innovation. On this basis, this paper takes the Chinese A-share listed companies in heavily polluting industries from 2012 to 2021 as a sample, and uses the double difference model to test the net effect of environmental protection tax on enterprises' green innovation. The results show that: (1) the environmental protection tax significantly improves the level of enterprises' green innovation, and the conclusion is still significant after parallel trend test, PSM, replacement of explained variables and so on. (2) The influence of environmental protection tax on green innovation of enterprises is heterogeneous, which plays a positive role in state-owned enterprises, mature enterprises and enterprises located in areas with high level of marketization, but it plays an inhibiting role in growing enterprises and enterprises in areas with low level of marketization. In non-stated-owned enterprises and enterprises in recession period, the impact of environmental protection tax on the level of enterprises' green innovation is not significant. The following are this paper's marginal contributions: First, it enriches the theoretical framework of environmental protection tax. By building a theoretical model, we derive the conditions under which the environmental protection tax encourages green innovation in enterprises. Most of the existing research examines the influence of environmental protection taxes on corporate green innovation from an empirical perspective, but few do so from the perspective of theoretical modeling. Second, it broadens research into the economic effects of environmental protection taxes. The existing findings are mostly concerned with environmental governance and corporate environmental investment, with little attention paid to the influence of environmental levies on green innovation at the micro-level. Third, it optimizes the method for measuring the effect of environmental protection tax. The paper develops a double difference model based on the quasi-natural experiment of "Environmental Protection Fee to Tax" in China, which effectively alleviates the endogeneity problem of reverse causation in OLS empirical study. Fourth, it improves the accuracy of the study of the effect of an environmental protection tax. In this study, we focus on heavily polluting enterprises, the core target group of the environmental tax, and further explore the impact of the environmental tax on heavy polluters with different ownership, life cycle status and located in different marketization regions, providing empirical evidence for the government to clarify the impact of the environmental tax as a regulatory instrument and provide more targeted environmental protection policies. As a market-incentivized environmental regulation strategy, environmental protection taxes encourage heavily polluting enterprises to fulfill their environmental duties and accelerate their green transformation. Using a sample of A-share listed firms in heavily polluting industries from 2012 to 2021, this research gives an empirical examination of the influence of environmental protection tax on the level of green innovation in heavily polluting enterprises. The following are the key findings: The implementation of environmental protection taxes promotes heavily polluting enterprises to advance green technologies. The impact of environmental protection taxes on heavily polluting firms' green innovation is exerted through the "anti-driving effect," in which an increase in environmental management costs encourages enterprises to boost R&D investment, hence improving their green innovation level. Further research reveals that the promotion effect of environmental protection taxes on green innovation of heavily polluting enterprises exists significantly in state-owned enterprises, mature enterprises, and enterprises in regions with high level of marketization, but is insignificant for non-state-owned enterprises and enterprises in recession period and inhibits enterprises in growing period and those in regions with low level of marketization. Based on the above conclusions, the policy significance of this research mainly lies in the following: First of all, preferential tax policies should be further improved. The heavily polluting enterprises carrying out green innovation activities will generally face relatively great financial pressure. The government should make full use of proper preferential tax policies to increase the benefits of green innovation in heavily polluting enterprises while collecting environmental taxes, especially to reduce the tax burden of enterprises that develop low carbon, energy saving and new energy products. Secondly, it is necessary to strengthen the financial support for green innovation. Capital is one of the crucial factors influencing the level of green innovation in enterprises. It is suggested that special management of environmental tax should be carried out, and the revenue of environmental tax should be exclusively used for environmental pollution control and financial support for enterprises to develop environmental friendly technologies and projects. Finally, the government should strengthen the supervision of environmental tax and evaluate its implementation effect. The government should attach importance to the collection and management of environmental tax, implement the policy of environmental tax reduction and exemption in earnest, and constantly improve the environmental tax system, in order to maximize its incentive effect on green innovation of heavily polluting enterprises.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Corporate Tax › AT: Causes Inflation

Corporate taxes do not cause inflation

Isaac Baley, Andres Blanco, Erin Markiewitz “The Long-Run Effects of Corporate Tax Reforms.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4011253. (Andres is an assistant professor of economics at The University Of Michigan and a PHD student whose primary field of interest is macroeconomics) . (Erin Markiewitz is a PhD candidate in economics at the University of Michigan) (Isaac Baley is a Assistant Professor of Economics at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Associated Researcher at CREI, and. Affiliated Professor at the Barcelona School of Economics. (The abstract, introduction, empirical results, and quantitative response are included.) Accessed 29 June 2022.

We study how monetary policy responds to permanent corporate tax reforms that are motivated by long-term objectives. Using cross-country data between 1960 and 2020, we construct a set of corporate-tax-reform shocks and show that they are exogenous to current inflation and output. Using these new corporate tax shocks, we document that central banks raise policy rates an average of 2 percentage points following a drop of 10 percentage points in the statutory corporate income tax rate. We setup a New Keynesian model with corporate taxes to assess the observed response and examine optimal monetary policy The primary objective of most central banks is to ensure price stability, and in many cases, to maintain output close to its potential. To the extent that fiscal policy has an impact on inflation and output dynamics, it matters for monetary policy. Within the various stances of fiscal policy, the corporate tax structure—through its effect on private investment—is relevant in determining the short-run fluctuations and the long-run growth potential of an economy, and in principle, should be of interest to central bankers. Do central banks respond to corporate tax reforms? Should monetary policy explicitly take into account corporate taxation? The relationship between monetary policy and corporate taxation has surprisingly received little attention in the literature due to several challenges. The first challenge is a lack of data: Corporate tax reforms happen rarely. In the US, for example, only six changes to the corporate income tax rate occurred in the last 60 years.2 Thus data limitations preclude from establishing a systematic relationship when using information from a single country. The second challenge is methodological: Diff-in-diff methodologies rely on cross-sectional heterogeneity in treatment to estimate firm-level responses to tax reforms, and therefore, by design, are unable to measure the effects on aggregate quantities and prices, which are exactly the objects monetary policy responds to.3 The third challenge is the identification of fiscal shocks in general, and corporate tax shocks in particular: Both fiscal and monetary policy could be jointly influenced by other aggregate variables, thus a simple series of corporate tax changes is not appropriate to estimate the monetary policy response. This paper proposes a new methodology that exploits cross-country data to circumvent these challenges. First, we significantly expand the number of observations by assembling a dataset with 40 countries for the last 60 years of statutory corporate tax rates. Second, following Romer and Romer (2010), we decompose changes in the statutory tax rate between tax changes motivated by long-run considerations (e.g., sustainability, efficiency, or redistribution) from tax changes motivated by short-run objectives (e.g., business cycle stabilization) using non-parametric methods that identify multiple structural breaks in time-series. The premise is that tax changes with longrun objectives generate permanent changes in the statutory corporate tax rate. In this way, we tackle the omitted-variable bias by focusing on permanent corporate tax reforms—reforms with clear long-run motives, such as growth or fairness concerns, that remain in place for long periods of time—, which ensures that the drivers of corporate tax reforms are different from the drivers of monetary policy. Through a variety of tests, we show that our new measure of corporate tax changes is exogenous to monetary policy, and in the case of the US, that our series coincides with series obtained through a narrative approach by Romer and Romer (2010). Third, we use our new shock series to estimate central bank responses to tax reforms using local projections methods (Jord`a, 2005). We find that a drop in the statutory corporate tax rate of 10 percentage points generates a 2 percentage point increase in the policy rate. Empirical results. Our main result is that, on average, central banks raise policy rates after a corporate tax reform. On average, there is a 2 percentage point (pp.) increase in the policy rate after a 10 pp. decrease in the corporate income tax rate. We also observe a lag in the Central Banks responses: On average, monetary policy rates peak two to three years after the tax reform. The shape of the response suggests that the policy response is transitory, as rates go back to their average value after 4 years. Importantly, these results control for country-level outcomes, which by definition, embed general equilibrium and aggregate effects. With new tax reform instrument to examine the relationship between tax reform, monetary policy, and other aggregates. First, we estimate our baseline specification, using local projection (LP) methods by Jord`a (2005). We then employ three other LP estimators to address concerns relating to omitted variable bias, allocation bias, and anticipatory effects. This section concludes with a discussion of the relationship between our tax reform measure and other aggregates. Quantitative results (In progress). The second part of the paper aims to understand the documented monetary policy response through the lens of a medium-scale New Keynesian model suited to conduct counterfactuals and study optimal policy. In the spirit of Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010), our framework will consist of a DSGE model with capital and labor inputs, wage and price rigidities, investment frictions, corporate taxes, and a Taylor-type rule followed by the monetary authority. The calibrated version of this model replicates the observed response.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Corporate Tax › Empirical Solvency

The 2017 corporate tax cuts did nothing to help businesses, increasing them can only have positive effects on the economy

CHUCK MARR, et. al. 2021 ,  AND , 5-25-2021, "Corporate Rate Increase Would Make Taxes Fairer, Help Fund Equitable Recovery," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/corporate-rate-increase-would-make-taxes-fairer-help-fund-equitable-recovery, accessed 6-25-2023

As Washington turns its attention from providing short-term relief to millions of struggling people through the American Rescue Plan Act to building an equitable recovery for the long term, policymakers have an historic opportunity to rebuild the nation’s infrastructure and to begin addressing its long-standing economic and racial disparities that COVID-19 and the economic fall-out both highlighted and exacerbated. Policymakers will likely seek to finance recovery legislation through federal borrowing as well as tax increases on wealthy individuals and profitable corporations. In outlining his vision for the first of a two-part recovery package, President Biden proposed roughly $2 trillion of infrastructure, research and development, and other investments, financed over 15 years by raising the corporate income tax rate from its current 21 percent to 28 percent and reforming our international tax system to raise revenue and reduce incentives for U.S. multinational corporations to shift profits and investments overseas.[1] These changes would leave the corporate rate still significantly below its previous level of 35 percent, which President Trump and a Republican-run Congress cut to 21 percent in the 2017 tax law. And the revenues these permanent changes would raise would begin to restore the nation’s eroded revenue base so that it can support the needs of a 21st century economy that broadens opportunity, supports workers and those out of work, and ensures health care for everyone. When evaluating President Biden’s corporate tax proposals, we suggest that policymakers keep four points in mind: First, raising taxes on corporations would make the tax code more progressive while helping to generate the revenue needed to help finance investments that would promote an equitable recovery; Second, the dramatic corporate tax cuts of 2017 provided few benefits to the economy in general and to low- and middle-income households in particular; Third, raising corporate taxes by a modest amount will not undermine the economic recovery and, in fact, using those revenues to finance needed investments will help make the economy stronger; and Fourth, reducing the favorable tax treatment for offshore profits and investments, which the 2017 law largely did not do, would ensure that U.S. multinationals pay their fair share while positioning the United States as a leader in global tax negotiations. Corporations, including multinationals, that operate in the United States derive considerable benefit from the federal government. These companies rely heavily on our roads, airports, and ports to move their goods and employees. But they also benefit greatly from the government’s role in the research and technology development process, with huge contributions by, for instance, the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation. Private companies benefit from the large spillover effects of this government-funded research, and they also benefit from public investments in education, public health, and a clean environment — and a host of other areas that help workers, communities, and companies thrive. Asking profitable corporations that gain so much from public investments to pay more to fund them is one important way to build toward a more equitable nation. "Asking profitable corporations that gain so much from public investments to pay more to fund them is one important way to build toward a more equitable nation." Corporate Tax Rate Hike Would Promote Tax Fairness, Fund Key Priorities Incomes and wealth have grown more highly concentrated at the top in recent decades and, over the last two decades in particular, tax policy helped to fuel this growing divide between the wealthiest households and all the rest. Most prominently, the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts under President George W. Bush cut individual tax rates and reduced the tax on estates, both of which provided the largest tax benefits to the highest-income taxpayers. The 2017 tax cuts under President Trump dramatically cut the corporate tax rate, cut the top individual income tax rate, further weakened the estate tax, and created a big new tax deduction on “pass-through” business income (business income from partnerships, S corporations, and sole proprietorships). A disproportionate share of these tax benefits flowed not only to corporations but, once again, to households at the top. All of that tax cutting also significantly reduced federal revenues. Federal revenues as a share of the economy (gross domestic product, or GDP) stood at 20 percent in 2000. In 2019, at a similar peak in the business cycle, federal revenues had fallen to just 16.3 percent of GDP — which is far too low to support the kinds of investments needed for a 21st century economy that broadens opportunity, supports workers and helps those out of work, and ensures health care for everyone. As part of that overall reduction in federal revenues, the corporate income tax’s contribution to revenues fell by roughly half, from 2.0 percent of GDP in 2000 to about 1.1 percent in 2019. That alone amounts to roughly a $200 billion annual loss of revenue. (See Figure 1.) The Biden proposal reportedly would lift annual revenues by about 0.5 percent of GDP, recapturing about half of this revenue erosion.[2] As a share of GDP, the U.S. federal government receives less revenue from the corporate tax than that of all but one other country of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (or OECD, an organization of 37 mostly Western nations with mostly advanced economies).[3] Meanwhile, corporate profits of U.S. companies as a share of GDP are quite high: according to Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary Kimberly Clausing, “corporate profits (after-tax) as a share of GDP averaged 9.7 percent (2005-2019), whereas in the period 1980-2000, corporate profits averaged only 5.4 percent of GDP.”[4] FIGURE 1 Corporate Tax Revenue has Eroded President Biden’s proposal to raise the corporate tax rate to 28 percent, reversing only part of the 2017 rate cut, would help make the tax code more progressive and help generate the revenues to finance needed investments. The burden of a corporate rate hike would fall mostly on corporate shareholders, who reaped most of the benefit of the 2017 corporate tax cut. “Shareholders, in the short run and, mostly, in the long run, bear the burden of higher corporate tax rates,” according to the Tax Policy Center’s Steve Rosenthal and Theo Burke.[5] Wealthy shareholders have enjoyed significant wealth gains even during the pandemic that left many out of work and households struggling to afford food. The ownership of corporate shares — as with other kinds of wealth — is highly concentrated at the top. Foreign investors own about 40 percent of U.S. corporate equity (up from just 11 percent in 1980), while retirement accounts own about 30 percent, and investors with taxable accounts own about 25 percent. (See Figure 2.) Within the latter two categories, wealthy households directly or indirectly own the vast majority of corporate stock: “The top 10 percent of households, on average, own $1.7 million of stock, directly and indirectly,” Rosenthal and Burke concluded, “while the bottom 50 percent only own about $11,000.”[6] Stock ownership is also increasingly concentrated among the ultra-wealthy. “The wealthiest 0.1% and 1% of households now own about 17% and 50% of total household equities, respectively, up significantly from 13% and 39% in the late 1980’s,” according to Goldman Sachs senior economist Daan Struyven.[7] FIGURE 2 Large Share of Corporate Shareholders Are Foreign Investors Nor, despite the claims of those who oppose corporate tax increases, would low- and middle-income workers bear much of the burden of a corporate tax increase. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), and the Treasury Department’s Office of Tax Analysis all agree that only a quarter or less of the burden of corporate taxes falls collectively on workers. And, of that one-quarter or less, the burden would fall mostly on upper-income workers (that is, far more on a CEO more than a blue-collar worker) simply because, by definition, upper-income workers have more labor income that would feel the modest side effect of the corporate income tax. Moreover, workers and their families would benefit significantly from the investments that a corporate tax increase would help finance. Big 2017 Corporate Tax Cut Provided Few Benefits The centerpiece of the 2017 law was a corporate tax rate cut from 35 to 21 percent[8] and a shift towards a “territorial” tax system, in which the foreign profits of U.S.-based multinational corporations largely no longer face U.S. corporate taxes. For budgetary reasons, policymakers could not make all of the 2017 law’s tax cuts permanent. They made the corporate tax cuts permanent while scheduling every tax cut for individuals (e.g., an increase in the Child Tax Credit) to expire after 2025. Efforts to reform corporate taxes by broadening the base of corporate profits that’s subject to taxation and lowering the rate were widely debated before 2017, but few serious plans proposed to cut corporate taxes as drastically as the 2017 law did. President Obama, for example, proposed cutting the corporate rate to 28 percent[9] but, in contrast with the 2017 law, his plan would not have generated higher deficits because it would have broadened the corporate and business tax base. Before the 2017 law, the main Republican corporate tax reform proposal was the 2014 plan from then-House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp,[10] which would have cut the corporate tax rate to 25 percent. Importantly, the Camp plan would have moved away from aggressive accelerated depreciation, which lets businesses claim larger upfront deductions for new investments, as part of an effort to broaden the tax base while reducing the rate. The 2017 tax law, however, went in the opposite direction of Camp’s proposal on depreciation (providing full expensing, which lets businesses deduct the full cost of investments immediately) and cut the corporate rate even more deeply than the Camp plan. Though the corporate rate cut of 2017 was dramatic (by two-fifths — from 35 to 21 percent), the large economic benefits that its proponents promised have been hard to find. In February of 2020, Jason Furman, the Chairman of President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, told the Ways and Means Committee that: “GDP growth did not increase following the 2017 tax law: it was 2.4 percent in the eight quarters leading up to the law and 2.4 percent in the eight quarters since the law; “The major private domestic components of GDP slowed in the two years since the 2017 tax law, including slowing consumption growth, business fixed investment growth and residential investment growth. In contrast, government expenditures and investments grew at a faster pace; (see Figure 3) and “The macroeconomic data to date appear to rule out the immediate and large effects on investment that were predicted by many cheerleaders of the 2017 tax law and provide no reason to update the ex ante projections of minimal longer-term growth effects made by a range of economic modelers.”[11] FIGURE 3 GDP Didn’t Grow Faster After the 2017 Tax Law Similarly, in a Congressional Research Service report of June 2019, Jane Gravelle and Donald Marples highlighted that: Workers did not see the increase in wages that proponents of corporate tax cuts promised: “There is no indication of a surge in wages in 2018 either compared to history or to GDP growth.” They also noted that gains in worker wages depend on increases in investment that ultimately raise productivity, but the investment data do not reveal investment increases either.[12] Disproportionate increases in the types of investment that the 2017 law sought to encourage have not materialized, further undercutting the view that the tax cuts are driving an investment surge. Based on the law, for example, they note that the “effects of investments in structures would be expected to be largest, with small (or negative) effects on intellectual property. To date this pattern has not been observed.” FIGURE 4 Firms Invested Little of Extra Cash From 2017 Tax Cuts Well-publicized, one-time bonuses for employees that companies announced after the tax cuts were modest overall — averaging $28 per U.S. worker, and amounting to just 2 to 3 percent of the total benefits from the corporate tax cut — while announcements of stock buybacks, which benefit shareholders by raising the value of the stock they already hold, exceeded a record-breaking $1 trillion in 2018. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) study on the 2017 law’s impact on investment further detailed this pattern of share buybacks.[13] It cited a survey of firms showing that just 11 percent of businesses reported accelerating investment because of the tax cuts. Examining data for firms on the Standard & Poor’s 500 index, the IMF researchers asked, “Where then have firms put the incremental free cash from the [tax cuts]?” and answered that “much of the remainder was used for share buybacks, dividend payouts, and other asset-liability planning and balance sheet adjustments.” (See Figure 4.) Corporate Tax Hike Would Fund Pro-Growth Investments Without Undermining the Recovery Every major tax debate of recent decades has included overheated claims that tax increases will cause economic doom or that regressive tax cuts will generate enormous economic benefits. The latest installment of that debate, in fact, has already begun, with some policymakers now arguing that the President and Congress should not raise taxes as the economy continues to recover from the recession.[14] There are, however, several key points to keep in mind about the recovery and corporate taxes. First, with no evidence that previous corporate tax cuts significantly boosted investment and economic growth, there is no reason to believe that partially undoing those cuts would significantly slow investment and growth. Slashing the corporate tax rate in 2017 largely enriched well-off shareholders, not the broader economy, and the impact of partially reversing these tax cuts would be borne mainly by these shareholders. Second, there is little evidence that a corporate rate hike would hinder wage growth, which is a key measure of whether the burgeoning recovery becomes a successful one, particularly for lower- and middle-income workers. Indeed, as a report from the Economic Policy Institute put it, “Since World War II, productivity and wage growth in the U.S. economy have been significantly greater in periods with higher corporate tax rates.” [15] That doesn’t mean that higher corporate tax rates caused the wage growth, but it is strong evidence that the tax rates didn’t unduly impede wage growth either.[16] Third, an important consideration is what policymakers would do with the revenue they raise by boosting the corporate tax rate. Of the Biden proposal, Harvard economist Raj Chetty told the Washington Post, “The impacts of the infrastructure programs are likely to be an order of magnitude larger than any disincentive effects from the taxes.”[17] Per Figure 5 below, CBO found that infrastructure investment or tax cuts for low- and moderate-income households will boost an economy that is still emerging from a deep recession more than a corporate tax cut. So, raising corporate taxes and investing the funds in infrastructure or an expanded Child Tax Credit would, on net, boost the recovery. FIGURE 5 Infrastructure and Middle Class Tax Cuts Stimulate Economy Better Than Providing More Cash for Corporations A new analysis by Mark Zandi and Bernard Yaros of Moody’s Analytics, using a model similar to those used by the Congressional Budget Office and Federal Reserve Board, estimated the combined impact of the American Jobs Plan’s infrastructure investments and corporate tax increases.[18] It found that: “Despite the higher corporate taxes and the larger government deficits, the plan provides a meaningful boost to the nation’s long-term economic growth,” with “higher GDP, more jobs and lower unemployment.” The plan would produce an estimated 2.7 million jobs, most of which would go to people with lower income. These net positive economic effects reflect the large returns from the plan’s infrastructure investments and the modest impacts of partially undoing the 2017 corporate tax cuts. “Long term, economic research is in strong agreement that public infrastructure provides a significantly positive contribution to GDP and employment,” the report explained. Yet combined federal, state, and local infrastructure investment has fallen for more than half a century, according to the report, from around 6 percent of GDP in the 1950s and 1960s to less than 1 percent today. And fourth, specifically with regard to the recovery from COVID-19 and its economic fall-out, another important consideration is the deep economic and racial disparities that this crisis both highlighted and exacerbated. While millions of lower-income families and individuals continue to face financial hardship due to COVID-19 and the economic fall-out, those at the top in large measure continued to prosper during these hard times — a dichotomy that has become known as the “K-shaped” recovery.[19] Raising taxes on those struggling during this crisis could create headwinds for the recovery, but a corporate tax hike would predominantly fall on those wealthier people who have already recovered from (or never experienced) the recession. A robust and equitable recovery requires that policymakers prioritize still-struggling households, and that’s precisely what raising corporate revenue to fund public investments will do. International Tax Reforms Would Raise Revenue, Limit Profit Shifting, and Position the United States as a Leader in Global Tax Negotiations Before the 2017 tax law, multinational corporations could shield large amounts of their profits from taxation by shifting profits and operations overseas to low-tax countries (known as “tax havens”). The 2017 tax law made a series of changes to the international tax regime, but it ultimately left in place (or created new) large incentives to shift profits on “paper” as well as actual investments and operations overseas.[20] That law, for example, permanently excludes from tax certain income of U.S. multinationals and it taxes other foreign profits at a low 10.5 percent rate (or half the domestic corporate tax rate). Two years after the law’s enactment, the amount of profit shifting by U.S. multinationals is virtually identical to that before the law.[21] President Biden’s plan seeks to better limit federal tax incentives for companies to shift their profits and investments overseas to where they face little or no tax. It seeks, for instance, to strengthen the current minimum tax on certain foreign profits to ensure that more of the foreign income of U.S. multinationals faces the tax, and that it’s taxed at a higher rate. To encourage other countries to enact similar minimum taxes, the plan would deny certain deductions to non-U.S. multinationals with U.S. operations if they are headquartered in countries that don’t impose minimum taxes. Other countries should adopt minimum tax measures as well in order to ensure that companies’ decisions on where to locate and where to “book” their profits are not based on differences in countries’ corporate tax systems. The United States can do a lot, on its own and in coordination with other countries, to discourage the corporate tax “race to the bottom,”[22] which refers to countries cutting their corporate taxes to encourage multinationals to locate within their borders. As Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary Clausing put it, “the present moment is an ideal time to reform our international tax rules, since there is a strong international consensus around addressing these problems, and our action can encourage action abroad.”[23] Reforming U.S. taxes on the foreign profits of U.S. multinationals would position the United States as a global leader in international taxation, which is especially important this year as OECD countries work toward a once-in-a-century global tax deal. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has expressed a desire to engage “robustly”[24] in these negotiations, and Congress should support that effort. Moreover, reforming the international tax system would raise significant revenue to invest in infrastructure and workers, which is a far better way to strengthen the economy and support innovation than continuing to permit large-scale tax avoidance by multinationals that drain U.S. revenues and encourage multinationals to locate profits and investment offshore.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Carbon Tax › AT: Inflation

Robust, empirical studies find that carbon taxes don’t lead to inflation.

Konradt ’23 [Maximilian Konradt; Geneva Graduate Institute, Switzerland; 3-16-2023; "Carbon Taxation and Greenflation: Evidence from Europe and Canada"; OUP Academic; https://academic.oup.com/jeea/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvad020/7079134; Accessed 6-30-2023; AT]

Against the backdrop of the current debate on the economic effects of climate mitigation policies by market participants and central banks, this paper empirically assesses the response of inflation to carbon pricing. Does putting a price on carbon in fact lead to “greenflation”?

Our findings, drawing on 18 carbon taxes from Europe and Canada, cast doubt on the view that carbon taxation leads to inflation. Controlling for country and year fixed effects, as well as economic controls, we find no robust evidence of an inflationary response, on average. This result holds both for European countries and Canadian provinces, and survives a battery of robustness checks.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Carbon Tax › AT: Inflation

Samples from developed countries prove carbon tax will not result in catastrophic inflation

Maximilian Konradt PhD,, 3-16-2023, Maximilian Konradt is a PhD at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva. His research focuses on international finance and international macroeconomics, as well as political economy. "Carbon Taxation and Greenflation: Evidence from Europe and Canada," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/jeea/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvad020/7079134

Our main finding is that carbon taxes do not lead to aggregate inflation. Both in the European and Canadian data, we do not find robust evidence that pricing carbon leads to an increase in inflation in a counterfactual scenario of a $40 per ton tax applied on 30% of an economy’s emissions. In our baseline specification for Europe, including country and year fixed effects and controlling for economic conditions, we find a cumulative response of headline inflation by 0.5 percentage points after 5 years post-tax enactment. The one standard deviation error bands always include zero. For the Canadian sample the results point to slightly deflationary responses associated with putting a price on carbon. Our findings survive to a battery of robustness checks, such as adding a broader set of controls and excluding smaller carbon taxes. Further, our results are comparable when we employ panel-vector autogressive (VAR) models, or use alternative inflation and carbon tax data.

Although we do not find evidence of carbon taxes affecting inflation, our results suggest that they change relative prices. When comparing the responses of headline, core, and energy and food inflation, we observe that inflationary pressure associated with carbon taxation is confined to the food and energy component of the consumer price index (CPI). As a result, our dynamic responses for core inflation persistently lie below those for headline inflation. This pattern is consistent with carbon taxes increasing the price of energy, but not spilling over to a broad basket of consumption goods and services.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Carbon Tax › Solves Economy

A carbon tax will benefit companies and increase competitiveness

Patnaik and Kennedy 21 – Sanjay Patnaik, Director for Regulation and Markets, Bernard L. Schwartz Chair in Economic Policy Development, Fellow in Economic Studies. Kelly Kennedy, Former Senior Research Assistant, Center on Regulations and Markets. “Why the US should establish a carbon price either through reconciliation or other legislation,” October 7, 2021, Brookings Institution, //ellie

3. Boost the global, long-term competitiveness of American companies

The lack of a carbon price has created uncertainty for U.S. companies. Without knowing if or when the U.S. will institute carbon pricing, companies cannot accurately plan future investment decisions. Some companies have tried to rectify this issue by instituting , where business units incorporate a predetermined price on carbon emissions into their present and future budgets. Yet without guidance from the federal government on what this price should be, companies might set their price too low. A  finds that most firms set their internal carbon price below the minimum price of . These prices : while the median internal carbon price set by energy companies is $25, the median price set by financial services companies is $6 per ton. Instituting a federal carbon price would allow firms to  plan their long-term investment decisions better.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Carbon Tax › Solves US Leadership

A carbon tax will restore US climate leadership in the international community

Patnaik and Kennedy 21 – Sanjay Patnaik, Director for Regulation and Markets, Bernard L. Schwartz Chair in Economic Policy Development, Fellow in Economic Studies. Kelly Kennedy, Former Senior Research Assistant, Center on Regulations and Markets. “Why the US should establish a carbon price either through reconciliation or other legislation,” October 7, 2021, Brookings Institution, //ellie

4. Restore the U.S.’ global reputation as a leader on climate issues

Over the past few decades, the United States’ global reputation on climate issues has steadily declined. While other countries and nations, such as the EU, have set ambitious climate goals, the U.S. continues to grapple with . It has rejected membership in both of the key global climate accords of the past two decades—the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement—even though it recently rejoined the latter. Rather than government leaders and policymakers committing to significant action on climate change, the majority of reductions in emissions over the past decade have been  through shifts in fossil fuel usage and increased efficiency in industry.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Carbon Tax › Solves Climate Change

Carbon taxes are necessary to meeting Sustainable Development Goals.

Ian Parry 19, the principal environmental fiscal policy expert in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, December 2019, “The Case for Carbon Taxation – IMF F&D,” https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2019/12/the-case-for-carbon-taxation-and-putting-a-price-on-pollution-parry, rezz

Without major and urgent efforts to slow accumulation of carbon dioxide (CO 2) and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, future generations will inherit a much warmer planet with risks of dangerous climate events, higher sea levels, and destruction of the natural world.

The international community’s response is grounded in the 2015 Paris Agreement, which has the key objective of limiting future global warming to between 1.5 and 2˚C above pre-industrial levels. One hundred ninety parties submitted climate strategies for this agreement, almost all of which include mitigation commitments. A typical pledge among advanced economies is to reduce emissions by 20–40 percent by 2030 relative to emissions in a baseline year. These pledges are voluntary, but participating parties are required to submit updated pledges every five years starting in 2020 and to routinely report progress on implementing them.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Carbon Tax › Solves Inequality

Carbon taxes solve---six reasons.

Sara Brown 22, news writer for MIT, a master's degree in journalism from Boston University and an undergraduate degree from the University of Washington, 2/22/2022, “6 arguments for carbon taxes,” https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/6-arguments-carbon-taxes, rezz

The first carbon tax was proposed in the United States in 1973. Almost 50 years later, 27 countries have instituted carbon taxes, but the U.S. has yet to take action.

The idea remains in favor with economists: In 2019, more than 3,600 economists signed a letter in support of a carbon tax as the “most cost-effective lever to reduce carbon emissions at the scale and speed that is necessary.” Proponents include MIT Sloan finance professor Deborah Lucas. “It seems clear that it’s going to cost a lot to get the world to where it needs to be,” she said during a recent appearance on Barclays’ The Flip Side podcast. “That money has to come from somewhere.” Efficiency, fairness, and transparency dictate that policymakers address the question of who will pay what head on, she said.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Carbon Tax › Solves Inequality

Carbon taxes are uniquely and inherently progressive---comprehensive research proves.

Gilbert Metcalf 21, the John DiBiaggio Professor of Economics at Tufts University, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment and Energy at the U.S. Department of the Treasury in 2011 and 2012; Lawrence Goulder, the Shuzo Nishihara Professor of Environmental and Resource Economics at Stanford University, served on several scientific advisory committees to the U.S. and California environmental protection agencies, 4/28/2021, “Economists: A US carbon tax would be progressive,” https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/550691-economists-a-us-carbon-tax-would-be-progressive/, rezz

Environmental justice concerns have been at the forefront in discussions of U.S. environmental policy. They have been central, in particular, to discussions of proposals for a nationwide carbon tax to address climate change. While economists tend to favor a carbon tax as the most cost-effective way to promote reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases, progressives and EJ groups often oppose this option on the grounds that it is regressive — that it would disproportionately burden low-income households.

Our own research, conducted independently, finds that this claim is unfounded. We find that a carbon tax is inherently progressive, narrowing the income gap between rich and poor households. Beyond that, we find that it can potentially raise real incomes of low-income households.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Carbon Border Tax › Deters Aggression

Border adjustment tax succeeds – generates billions of revenue and deters further military aggression

Asia News Monitor, 2-28-2023, "United States/Russia: US announces additional tariff increases on goods from Russia worth $2.8 bln," No Publication, https://www.proquest.com/docview/2780172405/fulltext/2419F01537434E3FPQ/1?accountid=14667

US President Joe Biden on Friday handed down instructions to increase tariffs on the import of Russian goods worth $2.8 bln, United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai said in a statement.

"Over the last year, President Biden has worked with our Allies and partners to support Ukraine and impose strict costs and sanctions on Russia for its aggression against Ukraine. As part of that effort, today President Biden announced additional tariff increases on a variety of goods from Russia worth approximately $2.8 bln," the statement reads.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Carbon Border Tax › Solves Competitiveness

International carbon tariffs disproportionally affects US domestic industries by decreasing US price competitiveness

Yang and Yan ’23 [Changjiang Yang, Xiaoxuan Yan; School of Economics, Fudan University, China; 4-1-2023; "Impact of carbon tariffs on price competitiveness in the era of global value chain"; No Publication; https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0306261923001691; Accessed 7-2-2023; AT]

The price competitiveness of a country or industry depends not only on its own price changes, but also on the prices of related countries and industries in the global market. Therefore, we further analyze the impact of carbon tariffs on the price competitiveness of countries and industries by calculating the multilateral relative price changes through the real effective exchange rate.

As we can see from the figure below, after the imposition of carbon tariffs, the relative prices of the US and Russia increase and their price competitiveness decreases because the prices of their products increase more than those of other countries in the international market. Although the prices of other countries are affected by the carbon tariff, the prices of their products are relatively lower compared with those of the US and Russia, and therefore their price competitiveness is improved. The real effective exchange rate of countries with close trade ties with the US, such as Mexico and Canada, decreases particularly significantly because these countries give a greater weight to the US in calculating the real effective exchange rate. Since the US and the EU impose a larger carbon tariff rate and cover a wider range of industries in Scenario 2, the real effective exchange rate of each country changes more than that in Scenario 1, but the direction of change remains the same.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Carbon Border Tax › Generic Good

The Carbon Border Adjustment forefronts global climate leadership – revitalizes US economic competitiveness, strengthens US-EU relations, and deters Chinese militarization.

Cohen ‘23 [Ariel Cohen; Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and the Founding Principal of International Market Analysis, Senior Fellow with the International Tax and Investment Center (ITIC) directing their Energy, Growth, and Security Program (EGS); 3-15-2023; "Bipartisan Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism"; Forbes; https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2023/03/15/bipartisan-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanisma-political-unicorn/; Accessed 6-30-2023; AT]

For the US, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism has a significant potential to revitalize and promote the domestic economy, especially many industrial sectors that have struggled recently. According to the Climate Leadership Council, US goods are “40% more carbon efficient than the world average,” and over three times more carbon efficient than China. Implementing CBAM legislation would further improve US competitiveness by monetizing its relative efficiency. It would also bring back a significant amount of business and may improve the decades-long huge trade deficit between Washington and Beijing.

As other low-emission countries begin to use the CBAM, any delay in implementation could put US trade at a considerable disadvantage. Joining the CBAM initiative would place the United States at the forefront of global climate leadership and set a strong example of a modern sustainable economy while countering the environmental impact of global emissions from industrial production. This shared initiative would also likely strengthen diplomatic and trade relations with the EU by streamlining trade and climate policy in the transatlantic region. As the EU is virtue signaling its stalwart support for CBAM, proposing it in the US may also make it a valuable bargaining chip in future trade talks with Brussels.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Capital Gain Tax › Solves Inequality

Increasing capital gains tax solves inequality – current tax gap allows the rich’s income to go untaxed

Saez and Zucman 20 [Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, both Professors of Economics at Berkeley, founders of tax justice now, “The Rise of Income and Wealth Inequality in America: Evidence from Distributional Macroeconomics Accounts,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol 34, No 4, . ]

The Rise of Wealth Inequality A first step toward the creation of US distributional national accounts was taken in Saez and Zucman (2016), who produced estimates of US wealth inequality allocating 100 percent of the household wealth recorded in the Financial Accounts, the official US macroeconomic balance sheet. Household wealth includes all the nonfinancial assets (such as real estate) and financial assets (such as equities, bonds, and pension wealth, whether held in individual retirement accounts or through pension funds) of US households, net of debts. In 2019, the Federal Reserve released its own official Distributional Financial Accounts painting a similar picture of a large rise in wealth concentration. Measuring Wealth When There Is No Administrative Data on Wealth Because there is no administrative data on wealth in the United States, Saez and Zucman (2016) use an indirect method, known as the income capitalization technique, to estimate wealth inequality. The idea is to link the Financial Accounts aggregates to the income flows that these assets generate: thus, interest-bearing assets are linked to interest payments, corporate equities are linked to dividends and capital gains, business assets are linked to business profits, and so on. Concretely, if the ratio between the stock of interest-bearing assets in the Financial Accounts and the total flow of interest income reported in tax returns is 50, then someone with $1,000 in interest is assigned $50,000 in bonds, saving accounts, and other interestgenerating assets. Wealth, in other words, is estimated by capitalizing income; in the preceding example, interest is capitalized using a capitalization factor of 50, or equivalently, an interest rate of 2 percent. Because not all assets generate taxable income (pensions, most importantly, do not), tax data need to be supplemented with other data sources to capture all forms of wealth. The basic capitalization method is simple and transparent, and it delivers results consistent with other evidence about US wealth. In 2016, according to the basic capitalization method, US billionaires owned $3.1 trillion in wealth, a number close to the $3.0 trillion implied by the Forbes annual list of the 400 wealthiest Americans. Tax units with less than $1 billion and more than $50 million in net wealth owned $9.2 trillion, a number not dissimilar to the $10.2 trillion found in the Survey of Consumer Finances. In its simplest form, the capitalization method relies on the assumption that within an asset class, the link between income reported in tax returns and wealth is the same across individuals; in other words, that people have the same realized rate 6 Journal of Economic Perspectives of return to wealth. Of course, not everybody actually has the same realized rate of return. The rates of return may even be positively correlated with wealth. In Saez and Zucman (2016), we showed that the assumption of constant realized returns within an asset class appeared reasonable, based on data from estate tax returns matched to the income tax return of the decedent the year before death, the Survey of Consumer Finances, and tax returns from foundations. In particular, we showed that the capitalization technique works well for US foundations despite the fact that the wealthiest foundations—with sophisticated investments in private equity and hedge funds—have higher total rates of returns than less wealthy foundations. The reason for this apparent paradox is that the high total returns of top foundations stem from high unrealized capital gains, not from high realized income (interest, dividends, realized capital gains) relative to wealth. What matters for the capitalization method is that within an asset class, the flow of realized income be proportional to wealth, which generally seems to be the case. However, we also found in matched estate-income tax data, an interest rate premium that seemed to appear among the rich starting around the time of the Great Recession of 2008–2009 and noted (Saez and Zucman 2016, p. 550) that this pattern should be watched. Subsequent research suggests that the interest rate premium of the rich has become a fixture of the post-Great Recession era. In the Survey of Consumer Finances, the top 1 percent richest households have a higherthan-average interest rate in the 2010, 2013, and 2016 waves of the survey by a factor of 1.3 (Bricker, Volz, and Hansen 2018; Saez and Zucman 2019a). In matched estates-income tax data, estates above $10 million have continued to exhibit a slightly higher interest rate than average Americans after 2012, the last year in Saez and Zucman (2016) (Smith, Zidar, and Zwick 2020). Thus, assuming that all Americans have the same interest rate exaggerates the interest-bearing assets of the wealthy in the post Great Recession period. For equity wealth, the capitalization method infers assets based on dividends and realized capital gains, and thus it cannot capture the wealth of someone who receives no dividend and barely realizes any capital gains. A striking example is given by Warren Buffett, the main shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway, a company that does not pay dividends. In 2016, Buffett disclosed he had an adjusted gross income of $11.5 million in 2015, a negligible realized return relative to the value of his stake in Berkshire Hathaway, which amounted to about $60 billion (as reported in Cohen 2016). Six of the top 10 wealthiest Americans—Jeff Bezos (Amazon), Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook), Warren Buffett (Berkshire Hathaway), Sergey Brin (Alphabet), Larry Page (Alphabet), and Elon Musk (Tesla), collectively worth more than $600 billion in September 2020, which is 0.6 percent of all US wealth—are the main shareholders of corporations that do not pay dividends. Indeed, by triangulating the available sources on the reported incomes of the ultra-wealthy, Saez and Zucman (2019a) estimate that the top 400 wealthiest Americans as a whole earn less taxable equity income (dividends and realized capital gains) relative to their equity wealth than the rest of the population by a factor of about 2. Assuming that all Americans have the same realized return on The Rise of Income and Wealth Inequality in America 7 equities thus underestimates the equity assets of billionaires—a problem that has become more acute in the 2010s with the growth of giant tech companies that typically do not distribute dividends. Capturing these trends calls for implementing a more sophisticated version of the capitalization method. The September 2020 update of the Saez and Zucman (2016) estimates of wealth inequality, published on the World Inequality Database and also presented in this paper, incorporate the interest rate premium of the rich seen in matched estates-income tax data. They also upgrade the equity wealth of billionaires so that the total net worth of billionaire keeps matching Forbes. These changes do not significantly affect the level of top wealth shares nor their trend but bring asset composition in line with the existing evidence. For example, in these updated series, interest-bearing assets account for 23 percent of the wealth of the top 1 percent in 2018, consistent with the asset composition seen in the official Federal Reserve data on wealth inequality.

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › Capital Gain Tax › Effective

Capital gains tax targets the wealthiest

Rychkov 22 [Anthony Rychkov, seattle law school, “Critical Tax Theory: Combatting Racial and Income Inequality in America,” Seattle Journal for Social Justice, Vol 21, Issue 1, ]

1. Maintain or Increase the Capital Gains Tax On April 25, 2021, the Washington legislature passed Senate Bill 5096, which imposes a 7% tax on capital gains of more than $250,000.174 According to State Representative Noel Frame, the intent of the bill is for “the wealthy to pay their fair share.” 175 Beginning in 2023, the law is expected to raise $550 million annually, and the bill exempts a wide range of assets from taxation (like retirement accounts, real estate, livestock, timber, and certain agricultural lands).176 Of course, the law is not without opposition. Within days of the bill’s passage, a lawsuit was filed against the State, alleging that the law imposes an income tax, and thus violates the state constitution, specifically Article VII, Section 1 of the Washington constitution, which requires all taxes to be “uniform upon the same class of property.177 On March 2, 2022, Douglas County Superior Court Judge Brian Huber agreed and overturned the capital gains tax on the basis that the tax 172 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 13. 173 WASH. STATE BUDGET & POL’Y CTR., supra note 15, at 16 (capital gains are profits from the sales of corporate stocks, bonds, real estate investments, and other financial assets.). 174 Joseph O’Sullivan, Washington House Approves New Tax on Capital Gains as Fight Brews Over a Referendum, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 21, 2021, 5:11 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/washington-house-approves-new-taxon-capital-gains-as-fight-brews-over-a-referendum/ [https://perma.cc/A7A6-WGR7]. 175 Id. 176 Id. 177 Id.; WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 114 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE violated Article VII, Section 1 of the Washington constitution.178 Washington Attorney General Bob Ferguson announced that his office would appeal to the Washington Supreme Court as “[t]here’s a great deal at stake in this case, including funding for early learning, child care programs, and school construction.” 179 Similarly, President Biden’s proposed imposition of taxes on unrealized capital gains could also face legal challenges from opponents as it is unknown whether taxes on unrealized capital gains are different from income taxes allowed by the Sixteenth Amendment. 180 Attorney General Ferguson’s appeal is pending before the Washington Supreme Court, and oral arguments before the Court are expected in January 2023. 181 Proponents of the tax say that it is not an income tax, but instead a “sales tax that only is collected when a sufficient amount of stock is sold.”182 Additionally, following the November 2021 General Election in Washington State, state Advisory Vote No. 37—which concerns the new capital gains tax—was rejected by over 60% of Washington voters.183 Note, 178 Judge Overturns Washington State’s New Capital Gains Tax, KING 5 NEWS (Mar. 2, 2022, 7:22 AM), https://www.king5.com/article/news/politics/state-politics/overturnswashington-states-capital-gains-tax/281-41326c01-0ad3-49bf-8dac-5bf3374f881b [https://perma.cc/Z3QE-235G]. 179 Id. 180 Rappeport, supra note 30. 181 David Gutman, Washington Supreme Court to Hear Challenge to New Capital Gains Tax, Bypassing Court of Appeals, SEATTLE TIMES (July 13, 2022, 2:07 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/washington-supreme-court-to-hearchallenge-to-new-capital-gains-tax-bypassing-court-of-appeals/ [https://perma.cc/PJE9- 4T2Y]; Taylor Soper, Washington State Capital Gains Tax Can Move Forward with Supreme Court Case Pending, GEEKWIRE (Nov. 30, 2022, 6:36 PM), . https://www.geekwire.com/2022/washington-state-capital-gains-tax-can-move-forwardwith-lawsuit-pending/ [https://perma.cc/29WR-J6Q4]. 182 Mike Lewis, Signature Shortage: The Future of Washington State’s Capital Gains Tax is in the Hands of State Supreme Court, GEEKWIRE (July 12, 2022, 4:46 PM), https://www.geekwire.com/2022/signature-shortage-the-future-washington-states-capitalgains-tax-in-the-hands-of-the-courts/ [https://perma.cc/6M6R-3X3W]. 183 November 2, 2021, General Election Results: Advisory Vote No. 37, OFF. SEC’Y OF STATE (Nov. 23, 2021, 4:07 PM), https://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20211102/advisoryvote-no-37.html [https://perma.cc/5A3K-Y9EM]. Critical Tax Theory: Combatting Racial and Income Inequality in America 115 VOLUME 21 • ISSUE 1 • 2022 however, that advisory votes are nonbinding in Washington. 184 This public sentiment may be indicative of either the public’s strong opposition to tax increases on the rich or its ignorance of the true intent of the tax (or both). Ultimately, a capital gains tax would impact the wealthiest in Washington State, the top 1%, with little to no impact on low- and middle-income families. 185 Like the increased revenue from higher federal taxation on high-income groups, the increased revenue from Washington’s capital gains tax would be used to provide more resources for schools, early learning programs, and other investments that could create greater opportunities for people of color.186

2023 Michigan Evidence
Taxes Good › !Generic › AT: States Solve

States can’t solve - only federal government taxes can reduce inflation.

Leclaire ‘22 [Joëlle Leclaire; Department of Economics and Finance, Buffalo State College, Buffalo, PhD; 12-1-2022; "Taxes Are Deflationary and Can Be Used as a Deflationary Tool"; SpringerLink; https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-11240-9_7; Accessed 6-24-2023; Bell-AT]

Table 1 shows the amount of money received by the US Federal government from the various types of taxes that we discussed above. It makes quite clear the largest category of taxes paid to the Federal government is the personal income tax, which is followed closely by social insurance taxes. The third largest source of Federal tax is the corporate income tax. These three categories of taxation are all taxes on incomes (either individual income or corporate profits). Together they overwhelm all the other sources of Federal government revenue by a factor of around 30. The majority of Federal government taxes reduce income directly. As a result, they reduce spending and demand in the entire economy. This puts downward pressure on prices.

Table 2 looks at the revenue sources of state and local governments. It should be noted at the outset that the tax collected at these lower levels of government in the US is close to the amount collected by the Federal government. Table 2 shows that the largest categories of state and local government receipts are state income taxes and sales taxes. Two large Federal taxes—corporate income taxes and employment taxes (primarily state unemployment insurance)—are relatively small contributors to state and local government revenues. So, unlike the Federal government, whose main tax is primarily income taxes, state governments rely nearly equally on taxes that are imposed on incomes and taxes that are imposed on the sales of goods and services. Also unlike the taxes imposed by the Federal government, these tax revenues usually lead to greater spending by state and local governments; so state and local government taxes typically return tax revenues to the local economy and to the flow of consumption and income. So, they do not have a large deflationary effect. This is one reason that fiscal policy in the US is usually conducted at the Federal level.