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NATO should increase their information sharing among organizations – organizations can develop better practices and defensive measures

Daniel & Kenway ’20 (Michael Daniel currently serves as President and CEO of the non-profit Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA). Joshua Kenway is a Cybersecurity Associate at the Cyber Threat Alliance and a Research Fellow with the Algorithmic Justice League. “Repairing the Foundation: How Cyber Threat Information Sharing Can Live Up to its Promise and Implications for NATO,” in Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis, December 2020, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/Cyber-Threats-and-NATO-2030_Horizon-Scanning-and-Analysis.pdf)

The new information sharing presumptions proposed in this chapter—careful consideration of information type and relevance, comparative advantage in information production, how to overcome existing context-specific bar- 188 riers, and how to create and maintain trust—make the cyber threat information sharing landscape far more complex than most people envision. Yet, this very complexity provides an opportunity for simplification: rather than everyone trying to share everything all the time, organizations can concentrate on the information types most relevant to them. Information sharing architectures, policies, and systems should assist organizations in focusing their information sharing activities. Although identifying all the implications is beyond the scope of this chapter, some more prominent ones are worthy of mention. Few organizations will share every type of cyber threat information. Most organizations should focus on the types of information most relevant to their business model. For example, under this paradigm, only organizations with strong technical capabilities would share technical cyber threat information: cyber security providers, telecommunications companies, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs), and large, multinational companies in critical industries. Government agencies would focus less on producing stand-alone technical indicators of compromise (IOCs), which industry has in abundance, and more on combining that information with strategic and tactical warning about specific threats, since their comparative advantage lies in their intelligence and law enforcement capabilities. Most citizens, businesses and organizations would primarily consume information about best practices and defensive measures. The focus of information sharing programs should change. Since most organizations do not need to produce or consume technical cyber threat information, government cyber security initiatives should reflect this. These programs should instead encourage most organizations to hire a cyber security vendor or MSSP. Those service providers would consume the technical, contextual, vulnerability, and exploitation information and use it to make security adjustments such as updating blacklists or prioritizing patches. Most organizations would primarily consume updates to best practice and strategic or tactical warnings. This change would make information sharing programmed more relevant and cost-effective. Information sharing programs need to build trust. Since trust is a key component for effective information sharing, programs, structures, and architectures need to build trust over time. Policies and structures should include operational processes designed to enhance confidence and trust when personal rapport among stakeholders may be lacking, particularly when programs are starting (see Sauerwein et al., 2017; Sillaber et al., 2016; Vázquez et al., 2012; Wagner et al., 2019). For example, CTA’s information sharing rules specify the nature and scope of the sharing commitment, how members should handle shared information, and what enforcement mechanisms and penalties will be applied for violating those rules. Such clarity and consistency help new members trust that other members will treat their information properly. 189 Information sharing products can incorporate more than one information type. Since the different information types are interdependent, any given sharing product can contain more than one type. For example, CTA members share technical indicators and tactical context (and occasionally attribution) through the same automated system and standard format (Cyber Threat Alliance, 2020). A more rigorous conceptual framework for information sharing does not require a rigid division among the information types from a software or process flow perspective. Reducing the number of organizations expected to share technical information would make achieving speed and scale easier. Abandoning the idea that all organizations everywhere should engage in technical cyber threat information sharing makes overcoming the barriers to technical sharing easier. Under this assumption, the number of organizations with the combination of willingness, relevance, and capability to engage in technical cyber threat sharing decreases to a large but manageable number (Aspen Cybersecurity Group, 2018). At this size, having most of these organizations participating in formal information sharing groups becomes a reasonable goal. The information sharing burden would decrease while the value would go up, increasing the likelihood that organizations voluntarily participate in such activities. By focusing sharing activities on the most relevant information types, the time and monetary investment for most organizations would decrease. At the same time, the connection between shared information and the organization’s mission or business model would become clearer, thereby increasing its value, and making that value easier to assess. The decreased burden and increased value would expand the number of organizations that participate in sharing activities. Additional standard formats for non-technical information types would emerge, along with systems to share those formats with increasing degrees of automation. On the technical side, several standard formats now facilitate automated information sharing, such as the STIX (MITRE Corporation, 2012) and MITRE’s Adversarial Tactics, Techniques and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK) frameworks (MITRE Corporation, 2020). More rigorously dividing cyber threat information into different types would encourage other formats to emerge and organizations to adopt them. Standard formats make consumption of information easier for the recipient. Increased automation would increase speed and scale, making sharing more effective. Effective cyber threat information sharing requires planning, long-term investment, and sustained commitment. For example, technical cyber threat information sharing is not merely a matter of adopting a technical standard and installing software. It takes engineering and analytic time on an ongoing basis as well as maintenance of the technology and processes. Similarly, consuming cyber security best practices is not a one-time endeavor; organization’s must incorporate regular review and implementation into their business processes. Absent a long-term commitment from organizational 190 leadership, sharing usually withers after an initial burst of enthusiasm. Cyber security should take on the same status as other business enablers, such as accounting, legal affairs, and communications; like these areas, cyber security should be a function that all organization’s budget for and sustain over the long-term.

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