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Intelligence coordination focused on resilience solves cyber offense and defense – the US can lead the way on establishing “safe-to-fail” goals.

Hamilton & Binnendijk ’22 (Daniel S. Hamilton is President, Transatlantic Leadership Network Senior nonresident Fellow, Brookings, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins University SAIS; Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. Hans Binnendijk is a Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council Former Senior Director for Defense Policy, U.S. National Security Council “One Plus Four: Charting NATO’s Future in an Age of Disruption,” NATO Task Force Report, Transatlantic Leadership Network, February 16, 2022, https://www.transatlantic.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/NATO-TF-SC-final-feb-16-2022.pdf)-mikee

c. Bolster Deterrence and Defense Against Hybrid Threats Advancing the Alliance’s ability to deter and defend also means prioritizing ways to deal with unconventional conflicts that might hover below the Alliance’s Article 5 mutual defense threshold. These include some types of cyberattacks, energy intimidation, financial destabilization, election interference, and dis- and misinformation campaigns. NATO’s Strategic Communications Center of Excellence Command (CoE STRATCOM) needs creative new steps to detect and counter false information, including real time alerts to Allies on emerging threats and recommended countermeasures. Many relevant competences in Europe fall to national civilian authorities, to the private sector, or to the EU. While NATO can lead in developing and adapting cyber-deterrence and counter-disinformation guidelines and capabilities, better EU-NATO coordination and planning, will be needed. There is greater need to align and intensify action via the Helsinki-based European Center for Countering Hybrid Threats, ensuring there are operational feedin loops to NATO and EU decision-making. NATO and the defense establishments of its members are under constant attack from cyber hackers seeking to penetrate their information systems, extract data and plant viruses that could be used against allies. Digital disruptors target NATO systems, the operational cyber networks needed to execute military missions, and an extensive number of civilian networks that are essential to critical societal functions. Allies have determined that some types of cyber attacks could trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In the 2016 Cyber Defense Pledge, allies affirmed their individual responsibilities under Article 3 of the Treaty to enhance their cyber defenses. The 2030 Reflection Group highlighted the need to develop both greater collective defense capacity in cyberspace and a more robust consultation framework to facilitate collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security in the cyber domain.20 These concerns were largely echoed by allies in the 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué.21 Nonetheless, allies have been reluctant to organize operational capabilities via NATO, and only five member states have announced that they will make sovereign cyber effects available to the Alliance.22 Limited measures thus far undertaken include deployment of cyber defense elements with NATO response forces, where continuous coordination and planning of cyber operations is essential. NATO has also gained initial experience through the SHAPE Cyber Operations Center (CyOC).

Box 1. Enhance Cybersecurity Through “Safe-to-Fail” Principles If NATO is to effectively address the broad range of security challenges emanating from the cyber domain, the Alliance could complement its current collective defense efforts by incorporating cyber resilience and “safe-to-fail” principles into the new Strategic Concept.23 Until now, NATO efforts to operationalize collective defense have relied primarily on ‘fail-deadly’ and ‘fail-safe’ logics in cyberspace. Should deterrence fail, ‘fail-deadly’ means the Alliance responds with the use of deadly force, whereas ‘fail-safe’ efforts are intended to ensure that the Alliance and its members can continue to operate safely and securely in the cyber domain.24 While these two approaches are important, they only apply to a limited band of the full spectrum of threats presented by the cyber domain. Fail-deadly deterrence is only likely to succeed in preventing adversarial states from cyber operations that reach the threshold of armed conflict with destructive physical effects that are quickly attributable.25 It is likely to be ineffective with state or non-state actors inflicting lower threshold attacks for which attribution is difficult. These considerations are further complicated by the differing legal restraints individual allies place on offensive cyber operations. Fail-safe measures also face several challenges. Given the sheer quantity of daily network probes experienced by NATO and individual member states, it is unlikely that every intrusion can be successfully countered or even identified. Highly sophisticated cyber operations are also likely to evade most defensive measures. Moreover, computers and systems increasingly rely on commercially available products and non-NATO-based manufacturers. Defensive strategies will have limited utility if hardware or software components have been preloaded with malware.26 The Alliance and its members need to account for a variety of threats and scenarios for which fail-deadly and fail-safe strategies prove ineffective—such as ransomware attacks, distributed denials of service, exploitation of digital supply chains, or operations conducted by non-state actors. To withstand and bounce forward from such disruptions, NATO should ensure that military cyber functions and capabilities are ‘safe-to-fail’ -- that is, they can fail in ways that do not remove their ability to recover at or above original operating capacity. Incorporating safe-to-fail principles would require the Alliance to fill out the full meaning of Article 3, which is not limited to “self-help” but also includes “mutual aid.” It would mean coordinating with the private sector and de-conflicting economic priorities, as provided under Article 2. It would include developing metrics for assessing Allied operational success in cyberspace, and horizon scanning for emerging cyber technologies that could affect Alliance security.27

The Strategic Concept should take NATO efforts further. The United States might offer to be the framework nation in the next evolution of NATO cyber operations planning and coordination. A full NATO Cyber Defense Forces Headquarters (NCHQ) should be agreed, based on the proven NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters (NSHQ) model. An NCHQ would improve cooperation among allies and protect NATO’s freedom of action in cyberspace, strengthening deterrence. Such a headquarters should generate the necessary arrangements and readiness to allow nations to plug their capabilities and produce cyber effects should there be a collective decision to do so. It should act to achieve consensus on issues of cyber deterrence, particularly whether individual Alliance cyber defense capabilities alone are adequate or whether capabilities are needed to effectively deter major strikes against NATO networks, the networks of individual nations, or against the critical infrastructures of allied societies (Box 1). It should be linked to the EU’s broader cyber toolbox.28

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