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NATO must strengthen its threat identification, network protection, intrusion detection, etc to defend itself against cyber attacks.

Susan Davis 19, general reporter of NATO, “NATO IN THE CYBER AGE: STRENGTHENING SECURITY & DEFENCE, STABILISING DETERRENCE”, STC, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-09/148%20STC%20Davis%20-%20NATO%20IN%20THE%20CYBER%20AGE%20-%20fall%20revision%20-%20clean%2011.9.19.pdf

As armed forces around the world, including in potential adversary states, build up their cyber capabilities, NATO and its member states must devise strategies and policies to counter the threat of serious state-directed cyber attacks. Overall, NATO is leaning heavily on the same general strategies it uses to counter other attacks: dissuasion by denial and deterrence by punishment. However, Allies should continue to support work on international norms and engage in serious discussions if and how strategies such as persistent engagement, as outlined above, can supplement overall NATO strategy. 1. Norms in Cyber Space 25. Due to the specific characteristics of malicious cyber code, arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation measures very likely remain beyond reach for now, most importantly because verification seems impossible. However, the further development of norms in cyber space could become an important pillar of support against such attacks. NATO continues to argue that international law applies to cyber space, including international humanitarian law and the United Nations Charter. This is also in line with the declaration of the 2013 Report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE, 2013). The Alliance has declared its support for “work on voluntary international norms of responsible state behaviour and confidence-building measures regarding cyberspace” (NATO, 2016b). Allies furthermore made clear that they “stand to benefit from a norms-based, predictable, and secure cyberspace” (NATO, 2018a). However, it is unrealistic to expect that NATO, as an Alliance of 29 sovereign nations, could become the primary driving force for the further development of norms. Instead, individual Allies must continue to drive this effort in the international community and encourage other member states to do the same. 2. Cyber Security and Defence 26. Strategies of dissuasion by denial aim at “dissuading an action by having the adversary see a credible capability to prevent him from achieving potential gains adequate to motivate the action” (Davis, 2014). In other words, the defender must make such an attack look futile: the attacker should either fail or, at the very least, not benefit from a cyber attack (Nye, 2017). Such cyber dissuasion is squarely premised on strong cyber security and defence, which is primarily a national responsibility, but NATO must and does play a role, which the next sub-sections show (see also Box 4). 27. In theory, cyber security and defence is a straightforward proposition. Defenders try to reduce vulnerabilities, block access points, and minimise the impact of payloads. Cyber security and defence include a range of preventive, passive, and active measures. Those seeking to protect their networks must strengthen their capabilities in several areas: threat identification; network protection; intrusion detection; responses against attacks; and resilience and recovery (US NIST, n.d.; see Box 5). Determined intruders are often very agile and adapt rapidly to circumvent new cyber security or defence measures. Allies, thus, often turn to more active cyber defence. For example, the US DOD, under its active cyber defence concept, can synchronise defence across all government and critical infrastructure networks. In other words, they defend more than just the networks owned and operated by the DOD. A step beyond is the so-called ‘defend forward’ concept, adopted by the United States in 2018 for example. When defending forward, defenders can cross over into the attacker’s networks to conduct intelligence operations; try to disrupt ongoing or even planned attacks; quickly reverse damage from attacks; and, in extreme situations, punish attackers (Hoffman and Levite, 2017; US DOD, 2018).

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