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Strategic intel based OCOs enables successful damage limitation against North Korea

Long 17—Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and non-resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was previously an Associate Professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs [Austin, 2017, “A cyber SIOP? Operational considerations for strategic offensive cyber planning”, Journal of Cybersecurity, 3(1), 19–28, doi: 10.1093/cybsec/tyw016, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library] AMarb

In contrast, strategic OCO may be very useful for achieving damage limitation objectives, particularly against regional powers like North Korea. Indeed former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Harvey has called for a comprehensive effort to negate North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, including: Cyber capabilities to disrupt warhead arming and firing systems, or cause flaws to be introduced into warhead designs, so that any arriving warheads are duds. On this last point, foreign “assistance” to North Korea’s nuclear program is a problem, but it is also an opportunity. Under such conditions, North Korea’s leaders would no longer “own” their nuclear weapons — in a sense, we would. A bit fanciful? Not necessarily. The technologies, subsystems and capabilities exist today to address each one of these goals notwithstanding the need for a bit of luck here and there. It is well within the realm of technical possibility [23]. Thus, the target choice would be less restricted in planning for damage limitation than in escalation control – essentially everything would be fair game. Yet this has escalation risks unique to OCO – establishing the accesses needed for OCO could be escalatory, as discussed in the next section.

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