Modern liberalism good—defensive liberalism is the most effective tool for emancipation in modernity and reforms solve its flaws
Ikenberry 2020
G. John, the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. “Mastering Modernity.” A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order. Pp 294-303. LJS
On what grounds can we defend liberal internationalism? This question can be answered by looking at six major debates that liberal internationalists have had among themselves over their project’s scope and character. In these debates, they have grappled with the trade-offs between efficiency and social stability, sovereignty and interventionism, and global openness and political community. They have debated the nature of “the global”—the forces and logic shaping the modern world and their implications for the security and well-being of liberal democracy. As they did in past crises, liberal internationalists must again debate the character, limits, and possibilities of their project. Efficiency versus Social Stability A core strand of liberal internationalism has been a commitment to open trade. Countries linked by trade and open markets gain both economically and politically. Ideally, trade generates efficiency and welfare gains for countries that participate, thus facilitating their growth and advancement. These mutual gains and interdependence have political effects, including heightened incentives to settle disputes peacefully. From the British repeal of the Corn Laws to the post-1945 building of a multilateral trading system, liberal democracies have consistently looked for ways to realize the gains of trade. Winners win more than losers lose, so if the winnings are distributed in ways that compensate the losers, everyone comes out ahead. But open trade is a disruptive threat to workers and communities, and the social bargains that soften the impact of economic dislocation are imperfect. In giving national governments space and policy tools to pursue economic stabilization and development, the “embedded liberalism” behind the reconstruction of the postwar Western world tried to reconcile open trade and free-market capitalism with social protections and economic security. As we saw in chapter 8, this compromise has broken down. The embrace of neoliberal policies and the deregulation and global integration of capital markets that accompanied the post–Cold War spread of economic and political liberalism have been driving forces. The Western governments’ capacity and willingness to maintain their social democratic commitments has waned. Even under the best of conditions, the model of international trade at the heart of economic liberalism oversimplifies reality. “It neglects all the noneconomic considerations that so often turn governments away from its prescriptions, such as the social and cultural side-effects of trade, or the frequent neglect of public goods, collective equipments, and education,” writes Stanley Hoffmann. “Above all, it ignores factors of inequality: the benefits from free trade spread slowly, if at all, and unevenly through the formidable barriers of privilege, class, and status within societies (in which small groups often monopolize the rewards) and the obstacles of unequal endowments and levels of development in the world.”1 Not all the rise in inequality or the breakdown in economic and social protections is traceable to the liberalization of trade and capital flows. Technological changes in the workplace and shifts from manufacturing to services also play a role.2 But efficiency gains from deeper economic integration seem to be slowing relative to the rise of economic insecurity and inequality. Dani Rodrik argues that the advanced industrial countries have already passed the point beyond which expanded trade does more to redistribute wealth within their societies than to increase efficiency and growth. Although economic globalization is intensifying the gaps between the winners and losers, it is not generating sufficient economic gains to compensate the losers.3 In making the case for economic openness, liberal internationalists will need to reestablish the foundations of embedded liberalism—that is, managed openness that reconnects trade and markets with social security and shared gains. The industrial world cannot return to the early decades of the Bretton Woods system, but it can look for new ways to balance openness and social protections. The aim of reforming international rules and institutions should be to enable national governments to make good on their social democratic commitments. “Democracies have a right to protect their social arrangements,” Rodrik argues, “and when this right clashes with the requirements of the global economy, it is the latter that should give way.”4 Economic openness can last in liberal democracies only if it is tied to a social ethic of fairness and shared benefits. Without inaugurating a new era of protectionism, liberal democracies have to reestablish the multilateral system of rules and institutions that allows states to manage openness, guided by the liberal norms of multilateralism, reciprocity, and nondiscrimination. They need to rebuild the social contract at home and renew the international rules and norms that balance openness with social stability. Sovereignty versus Interventionism The norms of sovereign equality and national self-determination are integral to the modern liberal international vision. As we have seen, by the second half of the twentieth century, the liberal international project was firmly built on a Westphalian foundation. To be sure, the United States and other liberal states have repeatedly practiced all the dark arts of power politics. Throughout the Cold War and post–Cold War decades, they have transgressed sovereignty norms through military intervention, covert action, and coercive regime change. But the norms and principles of state sovereignty remain firmly embedded in the institutions and legitimating rationale of the post–World War II liberal international order. American military interventionism during the Cold War played out as part of the geopolitical and ideological struggle with the Soviet Union. The Korean and Vietnam Wars were the most tragic and costly of the dozens of armed interventions carried out by the United States across the Cold War periphery. Since the Soviet Union fell, the reasons for interventions have expanded to include humanitarian disasters, human rights violations, and nonstate terrorist threats. In areas of humanitarianism, economic policy, and democracy promotion, the Western liberal states look increasingly as if they are trying to impose their own values and interests on weaker states.5 In this regard, it is useful to distinguish between two versions of liberal internationalism: defensive and offensive.6 Defensive liberalism is the older liberal orientation anchored in the norms of self-determination and the right of countries to maintain their own institutions and doctrines. Offensive liberalism is the more recent universalizing agenda that involves the reordering of other societies.7 Rising states such as China, India, and Brazil tend to embrace defensive liberalism and resist the intrusiveness of the newer liberalism. In accommodating these rising powers, liberal internationalism will need to rethink their offensive liberal impulses. Gaining agreement on the broader principles of order—sovereignty and multilateral rules and institutions that allow states to manage their interdependence—should take precedence over efforts to force convergence on the details of development or governance. In the areas of human rights and transnational terrorism, the dilemmas are less about the imposition of liberal values on unwilling states than about the circumstances under which the international community needs to act.8 When a state commits mass domestic violence such as genocide or ethnic cleansing, the outside world cannot simply look away. If a state is collapsed or unable to prevent transnational terrorist groups from operating on its territory, these circumstances might also require the international community’s intervention. The response proposed for these occasions is the evolving norm of “responsibility to protect” (R2P), which was adopted by the United Nations in 2005 and remains controversial.9 R2P is not a license for great powers to unilaterally intervene in weaker states. It is meant to stimulate international agreement on the circumstances under which agents of the international community—authorized by the United Nations—are morally obliged to prevent or stop atrocities. The burden of the norm is actually Westphalian in implication. Its goal is to strengthen the presumption that national governments must make good on their obligations as sovereign states and that the international order should help them do so. Only in the absence of this Westphalian state capacity—and under extreme conditions defined by the international community—do outside powers intervene. The goal for liberal internationalists should be to seek as wide an agreement as possible on the legal bases for intervention.10 Clubs and Open Systems The postwar liberal international order was built around exclusive groupings of states, such as NATO and the European Union, as well as wider multilateral organizations with more open membership, such as the United Nations. When the Cold War broke the world into bipolar blocs, the United States and its partners put their efforts into building the Western economic and security order. This Western political grouping resembled a club. It was a clearly defined, exclusive group of like-minded states with a shared identity based on their regime characteristics, geography, and historical experience. There was little doubt about who was inside and who was outside the order.11 As I argued in chapter 6, the club character of the postwar liberal order was important for its functioning. To be inside was to have rights and responsibilities. The club offered protection and provided governments with institutions and capacities to facilitate cooperation and problem solving. The compromises of embedded liberalism were organized within its confines. That there were barriers to entry only reinforced commitment and cooperation. In chapter 8, I argued that the erosion of this club-like nature is a defining feature of the current crisis. Open systems of multilateral cooperation, which reflect the Westphalian norms of sovereign equality and nondiscrimination that are embedded in the wider global order, are also integral to the liberal international vision. Membership in these organizations is predicated not on regime character, but only on recognition of a state’s sovereign status and its commitment and ability to carry out the responsibilities of membership. If the legitimacy of the club of liberal democracies lies in their shared social purposes, the legitimacy of open systems of order derives from the universalism inherent in Westphalian principles of sovereignty. An open system’s strength is its inclusiveness. For many realms of international relations—including arms control, pandemic disease prevention, environmental regulation, and management of the global commons—regime type is not relevant to cooperation. Addressing these problems requires as wide a participation of states as possible. The weakness of open systems is in enforcement. If the rules say that any state can be in or out as it chooses, the benefits of membership cannot be predicated on embracing a suite of values and responsibilities. Liberal internationalists, including Woodrow Wilson, have spoken up for both types of order. Initially, in offering American support for a postwar organization, Wilson argued in favor of open and universal membership. In his speech to the League to Enforce the Peace in May 1916, Wilson said the United States “shall be as much concerned as the nations at war to see peace assume an aspect of permanence.” This was why it would be in the nation’s interest to participate in a “universal association of the nations . . . to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence.” Eager not to be seen as committing the United States to upholding an unjust status quo, Wilson advanced general principles that would guide the settlement, including famously asserting that “every people” had “a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live,” and small states were entitled to “the same respect for their sovereignty and for their integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon.”12 During the years of American neutrality, Wilson did not once mention that the peace settlement would be linked to the way states were internally governed or the character of their regimes.13 In January 1917, Wilson’s “peace without victory” speech explicitly called for a settlement between existing states and regimes. It was only after Wilson brought the United States into the war that he shifted the focus to freedom and democracy as prerequisites for peace. In his War Address in April 1917, Wilson now asserted that “a steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic governments. No autocratic state government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.”14 Wilson was now envisaging a more exclusive grouping of democracies that would be bound together ideologically and oriented toward building a democratic peace. After the war was over, Wilson essentially reverted back to the open and universal version of his program. For Wilson, in the end, the establishment of a League of Nations was more important than the specific logic of its membership. The question today for liberal internationalism is: How much of the clublike character of liberal order should and can be rebuilt? The goal is not to undermine or ignore the Westphalian principles that set the terms of wider global cooperation. But what is the future of the deeper, more exclusive cooperation among liberal democracies? In security relations, human rights, and the political economy of industrial society, liberal democracies have specific interests and values that illiberal states do not. Exclusive groupings within the wider international order are still an important means for advancing these values. So too is it important to strengthen the mechanisms of conditionality and the enforcement of norms and principles within the club. The European Union is struggling to respond to member states that transgress its common standards. NATO has also found itself struggling to deal with alliance members that lose their democratic character.15 The irony of the rise of China and Russia as overt challengers to Western liberal democracy is that it may strengthen the identity and functioning of the liberal democratic world as a political grouping, even as it gives illiberal states an alternative club to join. Relations with the Illiberal World Dealing with illiberal great powers is one of the oldest problems facing the liberal international order. Do you invite them in, anticipating that they will become socialized and move toward liberal democracy? Do you exclude them? Do you actively seek to confront their revisionist agendas, or seek peaceful coexistence? At different times over the past two centuries, liberal states have pursued all these strategies. The underlying reality is that the liberal international order—open, rules-based, and organized around a core of liberal democracies—is a threat to illiberal states. From their perspective, the United States and the liberal capitalist order are revisionist. The American grand strategy at the end of the Cold War was to invite the illiberal states into the liberal order. Once China and Russia gained the benefits of trade and exchange, went the reasoning, they would understand that it was in their interest to become “responsible stakeholders.” Implicit in this logic was the expectation that these states would engage in self-initiated regime change. They would slowly shed their autocratic and authoritarian institutions and move closer to the Western liberal democratic model. This has not happened, and liberal internationalists must now reassess their assumptions and consider new approaches. One option is to seek accommodation with these illiberal states by making the liberal international order less revisionist. This might mean curtailing efforts to promote “offensive” liberalism”—that is, efforts to push and pull these states toward the liberal democratic model. In effect, this strategy calls for making the liberal international order friendly to China and Russia by stepping back from the vision of a one-world liberal order. The emphasis instead would be on coexistence, building on the “defensive” liberal principles of self-determination, tolerance, and ideological pluralism. Liberal internationalism would be made more conservative.16 Another option is to confront illiberal states more aggressively. The assumption here is that China and Russia are the vanguard of a broader longterm challenge to the liberal international order. If it cannot contain the ambitions of these countries, the liberal order itself is threatened. This view hinges on a key claim about China: that it hopes to perfect an authoritarian model of industrial society that can compete with—and even surpass—the long-term growth capacity of liberal democracy. The jury is still out.17 But if China does succeed in offering the world an illiberal pathway to modernity, the stakes for the liberal democratic world rise and the rivalry can easily become a Cold War–style struggle between deeply antagonistic ideological and political projects. Finally, liberal internationalists might pursue a mixed strategy of looking for opportunities to cooperate with China and Russia on the playing field of Westphalian internationalism, focusing on shared functional problems such as arms control, environment, and the global commons, while actively seeking to consolidate and strengthen cooperation across the liberal democratic world. Here the assumption is that the liberal democracies—particularly if they are organized worldwide—have long-term advantages that will bend the grand struggle in their favor. The key is to renew and defend liberal democracy within like-minded states and to strengthen the institutions, functionality, and legitimacy of the liberal international order.18 Hegemony and Restraint on Power Over the past century, the liberal international project has become deeply entangled with the exercise of American power. Woodrow Wilson carried liberal internationalist ideas to the Paris Peace Conference. After World War II, the United States built a liberal hegemonic order organized around open, rules-based relations and a core of Western liberal democracies. As I argued in chapter 6, this liberal hegemonic order both amplified and legitimated American power as well as shaped and restrained it. The United States tied itself to the other leading liberal states and exercised power through an array of economic, political, and security institutions. How restrained it was during the postwar era is a subject of much debate. Institutional restraints were certainly not an iron cage, and the United States reserved the right to act unilaterally when it chose. Power politics was hardly eliminated from the democratic world. Nonetheless, this liberal hegemonic order did manifest important features of consent. The United States and the other Western liberal democracies used institutions to establish restraint and commitment, and in doing so, they created an order that was somewhat independent of balance-of-power and imperial logics. The presence of liberal institutions allowed these states to dampen the two forces that typically shape international order—anarchy and empire. These forces never totally disappeared, of course, but they retreated enough to define the Western order as a hierarchical order with liberal characteristics.19 Liberal internationalism has both benefited and suffered under American hegemony. Like Great Britain in the nineteenth century, the United States in the twentieth century incorporated liberal internationalist ideas and projects into its hegemonic order building while pursuing other great-power strategies. Great Britain held on to its empire, and the United States engaged in crude imperial ventures and cultivated close relations with illiberal states. But particularly after 1945, it is difficult to see how liberal internationalism— defined as open and rules-based order with progressive social purposes— would have fared any better if it were not closely tied to America’s efforts to organize and dominate the postwar international order. As I argued in chapter 6, American postwar leaders recognized the value of binding the nation to other liberal democracies and operating within the postwar system of multilateral institutions. This strategy made American power more legitimate and enduring. The liberal great power’s pursuit of enlightened self-interest was integral to the rise and spread of liberal ideas and projects. Yet the United States also demonstrated, repeatedly, that it can be an unfaithful steward of liberal internationalism. Under the Trump administration, it is actively seeking to undermine the liberal features of the existing global order. The challenge for liberal internationalists is to try to recover the connections between hegemony and liberal order. The reasons powerful liberal states might want to build and operate within a system of open, rules-based relations are clear enough. As I argued in chapter 8, the hollowing out of the security-community character of the existing liberal order is one reason it is now in crisis: today it is easier for leaders to offer alternative narratives of the American national interest. The Trump administration’s claims that the liberal order generates more costs than benefits for the United States also register with some voters. Yet the costs that the United States incurs from seeking to operate outside the rules and norms of liberal international order are also real—and over the long term, they are much greater. They include the loss of influence, credibility, and the cooperation of friends and allies. America’s democratic allies clearly want the United States to remain within this order. During the high tide of American unipolarity, it was possible for US officials to see less value in liberal rules and institutions. But in an era of declining American power, the value of cooperation with other liberal democracies should grow. Roles, responsibilities, expectations, bargains—these aspects of the postwar liberal order draw our attention precisely because the Trump administration ignores and undermines them. Yet lurking in this new danger is an opportunity to renegotiate the hegemonic character of liberal internationalism or, short of this, build a post-hegemonic consortium of like-minded states that could collectively underwrite a reformed liberal order.