Liberalism is least coercive and self-reflexive
Ikenberry 2020
G. John, the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. “Mastering Modernity.” A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order. Pp 245-252. LJS
How do we square these contradictory impulses? If liberal internationalism has offered a vision of a postimperial global order, is it also implicated in a pattern of liberal interventionism, or liberal imperialism? Some critics see liberal internationalism as a fig leaf with which elites disguise and legitimate more traditional great-power impulses. The problem with liberal internationalism is that it does not put a sufficient ideological or political brake on American interventionism. Other critics make an even stronger argument—that liberalism itself drives American interventionism. As ideologies and political projects, liberalism and liberal internationalism are inherently revisionist. It is American liberalism that leads the United States to intervene and seek to reshape other societies. For realist critics, the liberal sources of American interventionism look particularly striking since the end of the Cold War, when the United States emerged unrivaled and undisciplined by the bipolar balance of power. Equipped with unipolar power and liberal internationalist ideas, the United States found itself supporting the expansion of NATO and the European Union, engaging in humanitarian intervention, projecting itself into regional conflicts and civil wars, and pursuing violent regime change, most fatefully in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The suggestion is that a more realist-oriented America would have pursued a more restrained vision of the national interest.106 The liberal tradition has certainly informed the conduct of American foreign policy. As I noted in chapter 6, during the Cold War, liberalism became a “fighting faith” that tied American power to a global struggle to protect the liberal democratic world when that world was under attack from powerful illiberal forces. A great contest between open societies and totalitarian challengers was an ideological struggle but also a military and geopolitical struggle. Leading liberal thinkers of the day, such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Isaiah Berlin, and Raymond Aron, considered the survival of the democratic way of life to be at extreme risk. Western liberal democracies had stumbled in the 1920s and 1930s by failing to respond to the instabilities and inequalities of capitalist society. In response, these Cold War liberals, as Jan-Werner Müller argues, sought to “craft a principled politics of freedom for the twentieth century.”107 Their view of the threats to liberal democracy focused on both the troubled internal politics of Western societies, where the political center was threatened by extremism on the Right and the Left, and the wider world-historical struggle then unfolding with the Soviet Union and international communism. Schlesinger’s influential 1949 book The Vital Center epitomized this worldview. It offered a defense of pluralism and open societies and called for the continuation of New Deal–style reform by activist governments. But in response to the larger global challenge, Schlesinger urged collective action by the liberal democracies, led by the United States, to defend their institutions and the liberal international order from totalitarian rivals.108 The challenge to liberal democracy was manifest in a worldwide struggle between alternative visions of modernity. Cold War liberalism offered a narrative that put liberal internationalism in the service of an activist American foreign policy.109 Is the American liberal tradition inherently interventionist? Do liberal principles predispose the United States to actively seek to impose democracy on other states? A long tradition of realist thinking has argued that they do. As Henry Kissinger maintains, “the idea that peace depends above all on promoting democratic institutions has remained a staple of American thought to the present day,” and he traces this idea back to Woodrow Wilson.110 The United States is often depicted as a “crusader state” seeking, under the sway of liberal ideas, to remake the world in its own image.111 More recently, realist scholars have linked American liberalism to controversial American foreign policy actions in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, such as the doctrine justifying preventive war and forcible regime change. John Mearsheimer argues that liberalism provides the impulse and legitimating rationale for repeated episodes of American military interventionism. Liberal ambitions spurred the United States to push Western institutions to the doorsteps of Russia and China and provided the rationale for the disastrous war in Iraq. Similarly, Michael Desch traces American interventionism to the founding ideas of liberal internationalism. He sees Kantian liberalism as providing the philosophical justification for military efforts to democratize illiberal sovereign states by force. In effect, the liberal tradition generates what David Hume called an “imprudent vehemence” toward illiberal regimes.112 These claims bring the debate back to the question of whether liberalism contains an “urge” to empire. Mearsheimer and Desch essentially take the view of liberalism that is elaborated by Uday Mehta in Liberalism and Empire. Here it is not empire but military interventionism that the leading liberal state uses to bring backward people and regimes into the modern world. Intervention and regime change are embedded in the assumptions that liberalism makes about the “state of nature” and the conditions for peace. Only when all states embrace representative government will liberal democracies be truly safe. But the urge to intervene to promote democracy is clearly contingent, not absolute. Most liberal internationalists would almost certainly agree that, all else being equal, liberal democracies would be safer in a world dominated by liberal democracies. But whether this justifies forcible regime change is another matter. Kant’s view of intervention was surely more complicated—and contingent—than Desch admits. Kant did believe that a republican constitution is the ideal, he also acknowledged that even despotic states have a claim of legitimate authority that entitles them to nonintervention. Kant did argue that “perpetual peace” depends on all states developing republican forms of rule, but this does not generate a right by liberal states to bring about such a result by force.113 Michael Doyle has shown that liberalism is conflicted—even “congenitally confused”—on the question of intervention. Liberalism embraces principles that are in tension with each other. On one hand, liberal principles accord all states, including illiberal states, the right to noninterference, even when these states inflict harm on their own populations or violate their rights. On the other hand, liberalism also emphasizes that the rights of individuals in these societies must also be respected, and this opens the door—at least under extreme conditions—to intervention.114 Doyle argues that Kant “made a strong case for respecting the right of non-intervention because it afforded a polity the necessary territorial space and political independence in which free and equal citizens could work out what their way of life would be.”115 But Kant could also imagine polities that so abused their people—committing massacres or genocide, for example—that the duty of nonintervention would not apply. This contingency, of course, raises the question of how liberal states should decide whether and how to respond. Liberalism thus offers arguments for and against intervention. Georg Sørensen has described these alternative logics as the “liberalism of imposition” and the “liberalism of restraint.”116 The liberalism of imposition is manifest in the state’s employment of power to expand liberal principles. John Stuart Mill argues this position when he writes that noncivilized societies—which he calls “barbarous” nations—do not observe the rules and traditions of international morality, and therefore their independence does not merit full respect. Liberalism of restraint, Sørensen argues, stresses a different set of liberal values, such as “pluralism, non-intervention, respect for others, moderation, and peaceful cooperation on equal terms.”117 This is the vision that Gerry Simpson has called “charter liberalism,” with its values embodied in the United Nations Charter. States are accorded equality of treatment, their sovereign independence is respected, and each state is allowed to determine how to establish its own rights and protections.118 Restraint liberals recognize that some states will violate basic rights, but until some extreme line of violence and genocide is crossed diversity is tolerated, in the belief that over the long run, these societies will evolve toward universal standards of rights and decency.119 These debates within the liberal tradition burned fiercely during the years surrounding the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq. How much was liberal internationalism implicated in this decision? The Bush administration articulated a sweeping new doctrine of national security based on American global dominance, the preventive use of force, “coalitions of the willing,” and the struggle between freedom and tyranny. In the spring of 2003, this doctrine provided the intellectual backdrop for the invasion of Iraq. As the invasion turned into a protracted war, the Bush administration increasingly invoked liberal internationalist ideas to justify its actions. In his now famous second inaugural address, George W. Bush stood on the steps of the US Capitol and proclaimed, “We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands.”120 The echoes of Woodrow Wilson and the Cold War liberal internationalism of Truman and Kennedy were unmistakable. But was Bush truly Wilson’s heir? Liberal internationalists themselves debate this issue.121 Some argue that Bush followed a “neoconservative” stand of liberal internationalism, focused on putting the full weight of American power behind bringing the “blessings of liberty” to oppressed people.122 Others argue that this neoconservative turn in American foreign policy was a distortion of liberal internationalism and that the Bush grand strategy was more imperial than liberal. Multilateralism is at the heart of the liberal international vision, these people argue, but the Bush administration willfully put the United States above the rules and institutions of the liberal order. In the long run, liberal democracies will be safer and more secure in an international order undergirded by shared rules and norms, cooperative security, and mutual restraint—and the Bush administration was undermining such an order.123 Liberal internationalists clearly differ on the importance of democracy promotion to their project, and on whether democracy is best promoted through force or example.124 But were the ideological origins of the Iraq War really traceable to liberal internationalism? The principal architects of this ill-fated venture were, by all accounts, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.125 It is difficult to describe the political ideology of any of these officials as liberal internationalism. For all three, the primary objective of the war was the preservation and extension of American primacy in a region important to American national interests. They saw Iraq as a regional revisionist state with a demonstrated record of chemical-weapons use and a long-standing ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, making it a military threat to American forces and allies in the region. The decisive defeat of Iraq was also meant to provide a worldwide demonstration of America’s capacities and willingness to defend its global position against challengers such as North Korea and Iran and to dispel lingering doubts created during the Clinton years about America’s willingness to use force. In the decade before the war, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz had all been associated with efforts to enunciate a post–Cold War American grand strategy of preventing the emergence of a peer competitor.126 All three had publicly urged the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime for more than a decade before the 2003 invasion. Their utterances betrayed no trace of liberal internationalism. Put simply, the Bush administration’s policy in Iraq was decidedly realist. Prominent academic realists opposed the war, offering eloquent critiques of American hubris and grand strategy.127 But the case for war was also argued, at least initially, in realist terms. Democracy promotion was among the rolling rationales for the war offered by the Bush administration, but it is difficult to believe that this goal was the originating impulse for the war. It is more plausibly seen as the administration’s public justification for the war and possibly a template for postwar Iraqi reconstruction. Democracy was not a core objective: it emerged later, as a program for making Iraq into a pillar of the hegemonic American order in the region.128 Some liberal internationalists supported the war and others opposed it, but many of those supporters were less focused on democracy promotion than on the genuinely frightening threats that weapons of mass destruction posed and on the search for responses to this threat when deterrence and arms control were not effective. (It turned out, of course, that the reason Hussein could not be persuaded to give up his weapons of mass destruction was that he had nothing to give up, and he wanted to hide this fact from neighboring enemies like Iran.) Finding cooperative solutions to rising problems of security interdependence was at the top of the post–September 11 liberal internationalist agenda, but it tended to get lost in the controversies over the Iraq War.129 Even if one could disentangle American liberalism from power politics, it is not clear that a purely realist-oriented foreign policy would be more restrained or enlightened. There is no necessary link between liberal internationalism and coercive regime change. Liberalism may provide reasons to intervene abroad, but it also provides ideological and institutional mechanisms that restrain the exercise of military power. Realist critics think they can prevent another Iraq by removing liberal internationalist ideas from policymaking. But liberal internationalism also inspired the building of the wider system of postwar rules, institutions, and partnerships. Realists cannot assume that this system would have been built in a purely realist world of offshore balancing. If the goal is a “restrained” foreign policy, the postwar system of rules and institutions that ties the liberal democracies together under shared commitments and rules of conduct is surely part of the solution and not the problem.130 A large part of the resistance to the Bush administration’s war in Iraq was based on standards of conduct that the United States had championed. Western Europeans, for example, criticized the war as a transgression of liberal internationalist notions of sovereignty, multilateralism, and international law. Two scholars have called this “liberal anti-Americanism.”131 If military interventionism is not inherent in either liberalism or realism, the question comes down to the quality of political institutions and decision making. Does the United States learn from its mistakes? The lack of enthusiasm for new Iraqi-style interventions does suggest that foreign policy decision makers—liberal internationalists or not— do rethink their views.